DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR., v. COMMISSION ON ELECTION and AGAPITO J.

CARDINO
G.R. No. 193237 October 9, 2012
CARPIO, J.

FACTS:
Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del
Norte in the May 2010 elections. Jalosjos was running for his third term. Subsequently,
Cardino filed a petition under Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to cancel and deny
the certificate of candidacy (COC) of Jalosjos.
Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos
had already been convicted by final judgment for robbery and sentenced to prisión mayor
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 (RTC) of Cebu City. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos
has not yet served his sentence. Jalosjos admitted his conviction but stated that he had
already been granted probation. Cardino countered that the RTC revoked Jalosjos’
probation. Jalosjos refuted Cardino and stated that the RTC issued an Order declaring
that Jalosjos had duly complied with the order of probation. Jalosjos further stated that
during the 2004 elections the COMELEC denied a petition for disqualification filed against
him on the same grounds.
The COMELEC granted Cardino’s petition and cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of
candidacy. Concluded that Jalosjos indeed committed material misrepresentation in his
COC when he declared under oath that he is eligible to be elected when in fact he is not
by reason of a final judgment in a criminal case, the sentence of which he has not yet
served. It also found that Jalosjos’ certificate of compliance of probation was fraudulently
issued; thus, Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence (prision mayor). Further, the
COMELEC En Banc denied Jalosjos’ motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether Jalosjos is eligible to be elected

RULING:
The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal
conviction by final judgment is a material fact involving eligibility which is a proper ground
for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Jalosjos’ certificate of
candidacy was void from the start since he was not eligible to run for any public office at
the time he filed his certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos was never a candidate at any time,
and all votes for Jalosjos were stray votes. As a result of Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy
being void ab initio, Cardino, as the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest
number of votes for the position of Mayor.

A sentence of prisión mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification under

Section 40 of the Local Government Code and under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code. It is also a material fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74
and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, a person can file a petition under Section 40
of the Local Government Code or under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
 Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, or under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is
under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the
accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of
a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC
of the disqualification of the convict from running for public office. The law itself bars the
convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the final judgment
of conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive
branch, but also to other government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment
under the law.
People v. De Guzman
G.R. No. 77368, October 5, 1993

FACTS:

A robbery was committed in Quezon City in the house of Jose L. Obillos, Sr., where
various pieces of precious jewelry alleged to be worth millions of pesos were taken.
Subsequently, an information, dated 22 October 1985, for violation of Presidential Decree No.
1612, otherwise known as the "Anti-Fencing Law," was also filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City against herein respondent spouses Danilo A. Alcantara and Isabelita Esguerra-
Alcantara, from whose possession the jewelries stolen were recovered in Antipolo, Rizal.
The trial court, acting on the motion to quash filed by De Guzman, issued the
questioned order of 28 February 1986. Among others, the motion alleges, that as per
police investigation, the crime took place in Antipolo, Rizal. For this reason, Violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1612 is an independent crime, separate and distinct from that of
Robbery. The accused claims, likewise, that jurisdiction to try the same is with the Court
within which territorial jurisdiction, the alleged fencing took place.
Since the alleged act of fencing took place in Antipolo, Rizal, outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court, and considering that all criminal prosecutions must be
instituted and tried in the Municipality or Province where the offense took place, the trial
court, necessarily, does not have jurisdiction over the instant case.
The private prosecutor's motion for reconsideration was denied in the court's order
of 21 March 1986. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime of "fencing" is a continuing offense that could allow the
filing of an information therefor in the place where the robbery or theft is committed

RULING:

NO. Robbery is the taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to
gain, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon
anything.7 "Fencing", upon the other hand, is the act of any person who, with intent to
gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or
dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object
or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.

The crimes of robbery and fencing are clearly then two distinct offenses. The law
on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to
commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery
or theft. Neither is the crime of robbery or theft made to depend on an act of fencing in
order that it can be consummated. True, the object property in fencing must have been
previously taken by means of either robbery or theft but the place where the robbery or
theft occurs is inconsequential.
 The Court is not unaware of a number of instances when the Court would allow a
change of venue in criminal cases "whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand,
and there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally
had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a
miscarriage of justice." Here, however, we do not see the attendance of such compelling
circumstances, nor are we prepared to state that the lower court gravely abused its
discretion in its questioned orders.
ONG v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 190475
April 10, 2013

FACTS:

On the version of the prosecution, it was stated that private complainant was the
owner of forty-four Firestone truck tires of which 6 were sold and 38 tires remained inside
the warehouse. Private complainant marked the tires using a piece of chalk before storing
them inside the warehouse. All thirty-eight truck tires were stolen from the warehouse,
the gate of which was forcibly opened. Private complainant, together with caretaker
Cabal, reported the robbery.
Private complainant chanced upon Jong's Marketing, a store selling tires in Paco,
Manila, owned and operated by appellant. Private complainant inquired if appellant was
selling any Model T494 1100 by 20 by 14 ply Firestone tires, to which the latter replied in
the affirmative. Appellant brought out a tire fitting the description, which private
complainant recognized as one of the tires stolen from his warehouse, based on the chalk
marking and the serial number thereon. Private complainant then left the store and
reported the matter to the police.
A buy-bust team was formed and the appellant was arrested and the a total of 13
tires were confiscated.
On his defense, the appellant alleged that he had been engaged in the business
of buying and selling tires for 24 years and denied that he had any knowledge that he was
selling stolen tires in Jong Marketing.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found that the prosecution had sufficiently
established that all thirteen tires found in the possession of Ong constituted a prima facie
evidence of fencing. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether Ong is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Anti-Fencing Law

RULING:

YES. Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of P.D. 1612 as the "act of any person
who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep,
acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any
article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to
have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."

The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or
theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or on accomplice in the
commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item,
object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item,
object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery
or theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for
another.

The Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that the prosecution has met the requisite quantum of
evidence in proving that all the elements of fencing are present in this case.

First, the owner of the tires, private complainant Francisco Azajar (Azajar), whose testimony was
corroborated by Jose Cabal - the caretaker of the warehouse where the thirty-eight (38) tires were
stolen – testified that the crime of robbery had been committed on 17 February 1995. Azajar was
able to prove ownership of the tires through Sales Invoice No. 4565 dated 10 November 1994 and
an Inventory List. Witnesses for the prosecution likewise testified that robbery was reported as
evidenced by their Sinumpaang Salaysay taken at the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio. The
report led to the conduct of a buy-bust operation at Jong Markerting, Paco, Manila on 27 February
1995.

Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery, he never
denied the fact that thirteen (13) tires of Azajar were caught in his possession. The facts do not
establish that Ong was neither a principal nor an accomplice in the crime of robbery, but thirteen (13)
out of thirty-eight (38) missing tires were found in his possession. This Court finds that the serial
numbers of stolen tires corresponds to those found in Ong’s possession. Ong likewise admitted that
he bought the said tires from Go of Gold Link in the total amount of ₱45,500 where he was issued
Sales Invoice No. 980.

Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The words "should know"
denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in
performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact
exists. Ong, who was in the business of buy and sell of tires for the past twenty-four (24) years,
ought to have known the ordinary course of business in purchasing from an unknown seller.
Admittedly, Go approached Ong and offered to sell the thirteen (13) tires and he did not even ask for
proof of ownership of the tires. The entire transaction, from the proposal to buy until the delivery of
tires happened in just one day. His experience from the business should have given him doubt as to
the legitimate ownership of the tires considering that it was his first time to transact with Go and the
manner it was sold is as if Go was just peddling the thirteen (13) tires in the streets.

Moreover, Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling second hand tires. Section 6 of P.D. 1612
1âw phi 1

requires stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buying and selling of any good, article, item,
object or anything else of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof to secure the
necessary clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated National Police in the
town or city where that store, establishment or entity is located before offering the item for sale to the
public. In fact, Ong has practiced the procedure of obtaining clearances from the police station for
some used tires he wanted to resell but, in this particular transaction, he was remiss in his duty as a
diligent businessman who should have exercised prudence.