338 Disposal of Disused PDF

Disposal of disused
offshore concrete gravity

platforms in the OSPAR
Maritime Area
Report No. 338

February 2003
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Disposal of disused offshore
concrete gravity platforms in the
OSPAR Maritime Area
Report No: 
February 
Contributers
Erik Hjelde TotalFinaElf Exploration Norge AS Chairman
Bob Hemmings Shell Exploration
Egil Olsen ExxonMobil International
Ove Tobias Gudmestad Statoil ASA
Kjell orvald Sørensen Norsk Hydro asa
Michael Hall ConocoPhillips
Disposal of disused offshore concrete gravity platforms in the OSPAR Maritime Area
Summary
e objective of this document is to present the experienced gained by the industry in the
period – in a “state-of-art” review of the technical challenges and other assessment
issues considered in order to identify the best disposal option for disused offshore concrete
gravity substructures within the OSPAR Maritime Area.
OSPAR Decision / provides the regulatory framework for decommissioning all off-
shore structures. In respect of gravity based concrete structures the Decision states that
“e dumping, and the leaving wholly or partly in place, of disused offshore installations
within the maritime area is prohibited”, but adds that “…if the competent authority of the
Contracting Party concerned is satisfied that an assessment …shows that there are significant
reasons why an alternative disposal…is preferable to reuse or recycling or final disposal on
land, it may issue a permit for…a concrete installation...to be dumped or left wholly or partly
in place…”. e part of the concrete platform where such alternative disposal options may
be assessed would be the concrete substructure; ie the load bearing structure supporting the
topside facilities. No derogation possibility exists for the topside facilities.
ere are altogether  concrete platforms located within the maritime area of the OSPAR
Convention, in Norwegian (), British (), Dutch () and Danish () sectors of the North
Sea.
Between the adoption of Decision OSPAR / and July , decommissioning of  con-
crete platforms has been considered. Related studies have been carried out and completed
and they represent most of the knowledge gained by the industry since .
e two North Sea operators who have presented decommissioning proposals on behalf of
the their co-ventures, have considered the following main disposal options for four disused
offshore concrete platforms:
• Removal for onshore disposal
• Removal for deep water disposal
• Partial removal (cut down the structure down to -m to respect the IMO Guidelines)
• Leave in place
is report highlights the main findings on the four key elements in the comparative assess-
ment of each disposal option:
• Technical feasibility
• Safety for personnel
• Environmental impact
• Cost
is review identifies several uncertainties associated with the removal of both first and
second-generation concrete gravity structures such that a case-by-case evaluation will be
required to assess the specific circumstances for each installation. e first generation of
offshore concrete gravity platforms installed in the s were not designed or constructed
for future removal operations. Although provisions for removal were incorporated into the
design of later, second-generation concrete platforms, these may not be fully effective because
the obstacles to and hazards associated with removal were not appreciated.
An important development over the period of this review has been the introduction of a
comprehensive programme of consultation involving a wide range of stakeholders, experts
and other users of the sea to view the question of decommissioning from as many angles as
possible. is consultation and engagement process has been pivotal in arriving at balanced
conclusions in respect of the major decommissioning activity that has taken place between
 and .
©  OGP 
International Association of Oil & Gas Producers
e need for monitoring of concrete substructures left in place is highlighted. Concrete

structures left in the marine environment will degrade slowly and may be expected to remain
standing for  to  years. Shorter-term contamination of the marine environment due
to residual oil in storage chambers and pipe-work is not expected to be significant.
Future liability is addressed where the responsibility remains with present owners unless oth-
erwise agreed with the regulators. It is particularly the long-term liability that is of concern
for both the industry and the authorities.
 ©  OGP
Table of contents
1 Introduction................................................................................................................................................................ 4
2 Description of concrete gravity platforms ......................................................................................................... 5
. Design.................................................................................................................................................. 
. Construction........................................................................................................................................
. Installation...........................................................................................................................................
3 Population of concrete gravity platforms............................................................................................................ 8
. Concrete gravity platforms in the OSPAR Maritime Area.................................................................... 
. Concrete gravity platforms outside the OSPAR Maritime Area............................................................
4 International regulatory requirements for decommissioning ...................................................................... 10
5 Decommissioning alternatives ..............................................................................................................................11
. Removal .............................................................................................................................................. 
. Removal for deep water disposal .........................................................................................................
. Partial removal ....................................................................................................................................
. Leave in place......................................................................................................................................
6 Safety.......................................................................................................................................................................... 20
7 Environmental impact ............................................................................................................................................ 22
. Re-float for onshore disposal .............................................................................................................. 
. Deepwater disposal ............................................................................................................................ 
. Cutting to - metres.......................................................................................................................... 
. Leave in place..................................................................................................................................... 
. Long-term fate of concrete structures ................................................................................................. 
8 Monitoring ................................................................................................................................................................ 24
9 Liability....................................................................................................................................................................... 25
10 Cost............................................................................................................................................................................ 26
11 Decommissioning experience and future plans ............................................................................................... 27
. Recent work on disposal of concrete platforms ................................................................................... 
. Future decommissioning plans........................................................................................................... 
12 Public consultation.................................................................................................................................................. 29
13 Conclusions .............................................................................................................................................................. 30
Appendix 1– Concrete gravity platforms within the OSPAR Maritime Area......................................... 31
Appendix 2– Concrete gravity platforms outside the OSPAR Maritime Area ...................................... 33
Reference List .......................................................................................................................................................... 34
©  OGP 
 Introduction
In , the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers - OGP, (then the Oil Industry
International Exploration and Production Forum - E & P Forum) published a report (E&P
Forum report number ) on decommissioning offshore gravity-based concrete structures,
from the perspective of the international regulatory regime in force at that time. At its
Ministerial level conference in  Contracting Parties to the OSPAR Convention agreed
a new and binding Decision (Decision (/) on disposal of disused offshore installations.
At the heart of this Decision was the recognition that re-use, recycling or final disposal
on land will generally be the preferred option for decommissioning offshore installations.
Nonetheless, recognising the particular problems associated with the decommissioning large
concrete structures, the decision also set out conditions whereby these structures might be
left in place (wholly or partially) or dumped at sea, including a detailed consultation mecha-
nism that would engage all contracting parties. e final decision on decommissioning
would still reside with the national competent authority.
e objective of this document is to update the earlier  report, taking into account
knowledge and experience gained by the industry in the period  to  and in the light
of the new regulatory conditions for the North East Atlantic, focusing in particular on the
issues and risks associated with the decommissioning options considered.
 ©  OGP
 Description of
concrete gravity platforms
2.1 Design
A concrete gravity platform is one that is placed on the seabed and by its own weight is capa-
ble of withstanding the environmental forces it may be exposed to during its lifetime. Most
of the platforms are additionally stabilised by skirts that penetrate into the seabed.
ese platforms are huge in size and weight. Some of them are among the most impressive
structures ever built. e weights of the concrete substructures range from , tonnes to
,, tonnes, and support topsides weighing from between , to , tonnes.
Some of the concrete substructures have oil storage ranging from , to ,, bar-
rels (approximately , to , tonnes) (see Appendix  and  for further details).
Main purpose of most concrete gravity platforms was to provide storage facilities for oil at the
offshore location at a time when no, or few export pipelines were available for transport of oil
from the oil fields to shore. e aim was to provide sufficient storage capacity in the platform
base storage cells to enable continued production from the field. e stored oil would then
typically be pumped from the platform storage cells via an offloading system to shuttle tank-
ers. Concrete structures were also designed to provide sufficient support for topsides loads of
more than  tonnes
e requirement for new fixed concrete structures with offshore storage capabilities has grad-
ually decreased with the development of offshore pipeline infrastructure and the introduc-
tion of new technology including sub sea engineering, flexible risers and based on Floating
Production Storage and Offloading installations (FPSOs).
One advantage of the concrete gravity based structures compared with conventional piled
steel jacket structures, was that they could be floated/towed out to the installation site and
installed with the topsides already in place. e installation could thus to a great extent be
completed onshore/inshore before tow-out to the field, thereby minimising offshore hook-up
and commissioning work.
Since the s, several concrete platform designs have been developed. Most of the designs
have in common a base caisson (normally for storage of oil) and shafts penetrating the water
surface to give support for the topside structures. e shafts normally contain utility systems
for offloading, draw down and ballast operations, or they serve as drilling shafts.
e most common concrete designs are:
• Condeep (with one, two, three or four columns) – see Figure .
• ANDOC (with four columns) – see Figure .
• Sea Tank (with two or four columns) – see Figure .
• C G Doris – see Figure .
• Ove Arup – see Figure .
e first concrete gravity platform to be installed in the North Sea was a C G Doris platform,
the Ekofisk Tank, in Norwegian waters in June . During summer , three other con-
crete platforms were installed, two Condeeps and another C G Doris platform; all placed in
the UK sector of the North Sea.
After these first successful installations of concrete gravity platforms, a number of different
designs was developed. e last concrete platform was installed in .
©  OGP 
Figure 2.1: A typical Condeep design Figure 2.2: A typical ANDOC design (Anglo Figure 2.3 A typical Sea Tank Design
Dutch Offshore Concrete)
Figure 2.4 A typical concrete gravity platform Figure 2.5 platform where the base is of
designed by Doris Engineering concrete with storage capacity on
which a steel jack-up rig is fixed
2.2 Construction
e lower part of the concrete gravity structure includ-
ing the skirts, is built in a dry dock. When the lower
part of the caisson or storage tanks had been fabricated
and has reached a certain height, the concrete substruc-
ture is floated out of the dry dock and moored at an
inshore deep-water site where the pouring of concrete
continues. As the construction advances the structure
is more or less continuously ballasted down to main-
tain a workable height for slip-forming activities. e
outfitting of the shafts then takes place before the deck
structure is installed.
e topsides on some concrete substructures are installed inshore, in components, by a
heavy lift vessel before being towed offshore. On others, the deck structure and modules
are installed as a complete unit onto the concrete substructure in sheltered inshore waters.
e concrete substructure is ballasted with water so that only about  metres of the columns
protrude above water. Barges then position the complete topsides over the concrete columns.
e concrete substructure is then de-ballasted and gradually the weight of the topsides is
transferred onto the concrete substructure.
 ©  OGP
A number of incidents has shown the deep ballasting operation to be very critical as extreme
water pressure is applied to the concrete substructure. One concrete substructure collapsed
during such an operation in . e implosion that followed as it sank caused the concrete
substructure to be completely broken up. Other structures have shown severe cracking with-
out reaching a catastrophic stage. Such uncertainties in question be an important issue when
addressing the technical challenges of potential re-floating during decommissioning. ese
factors are discussed later in Section ..
A distinct benefit of installing the complete topsides with modules on the concrete substruc-
ture in sheltered waters is that most of the hook-up and commissioning work is performed
before towing the complete platform to its final location offshore. is has meant that the
platform could be operational very shortly after it was safely installed.
2.3 Installation
Concrete gravity platforms installed prior to
 were equipped with a simplified installation
system consisting of a combined water deple-
tion and grout system. is system was used for
drainage of water under the platform and in the
skirt compartments during platform installa-
tion. Following platform installation, the system
was used for placing grout under the platform,
thereby securing full contact between the plat-
form underside and the seabed.
Water and grout return lines were also installed. ese were used for draining out the dis-
placed water, while injecting grout under the platform and enabled the installation team to
check that the grout had been distributed evenly under the platform. e grout thus ensured
that the contact pressure was equally distributed over the foundation area. ere is, however,
uncertainty as to whether the grout would stick to the underside of the platform during a
removal attempt, or whether it would fall off when the platform lifts off from the seabed. A
sudden loss of the grout may have an adverse effect on the stability of the platform (see also
Section ..).
From , platforms installed in the North Sea (so-called second generation installa-
tions) were equipped with a more sophisticated installation system involving separate water
removal system for use in the installation phase. is system was not filled with grout during
the grouting operation but was sealed off. It was intended that this system could be used to
inject water under the platform in a controlled way during a possible re-float operation, in
order to assist in loosening the platform from the seabed.
©  OGP 
 Population of concrete gravity

platforms
3.1 Concrete gravity platforms in the OSPAR Maritime Area

e OSPAR region covers the whole of ��
the North East Atlantic area including the ��
North Sea. All together there are  con- ��

��
crete platforms in this maritime area (see
Appendix  for details). �
ere are  concrete gravity base plat- �

forms in Norwegian waters in water
depths from  to  metres. e earliest, �
the Ekofisk Tank, was installed in .
e largest concrete platform ever built is �
the “Troll Gas” platform installed in .
e UK sector has  concrete platforms, � ��
the majority of which were installed in Figure 3.1: Number of concrete platforms in
the s. e last concrete structure to the OSPAR Maritime Area
be installed was the “Harding” platform
in  (concrete base only). Two concrete platforms are located offshore the Netherlands
and one offshore Denmark. e “Arne South” platform in the Danish Sector was installed
in  and is the last concrete platform to be installed in the OSPAR Maritime Area. Of
the  concrete platforms in the North Sea,  have facilities for oil storage within the base
of the structure.
Figures ., . and . show respectively, the type (in terms of first or second generation),
location of the concrete gravity platforms within the OSPAR Maritime area as well as the
number in different water depths. e notation “second generation” indicates that removal
was addressed as a design condition during design and construction.
Figure 3.3 Number of Concrete Platforms per depth interval in the OSPAR Maritime Area
 ©  OGP
DRAUGEN
��
STATFJORD
��
C
�
DUNLIN A
�� A �
� C
B
� B GULLFAKS
A�
��
CORMORANT
�� A D
� �
C
�
BRENT
�� B
NINIAN CENTRAL
��
Norway
TROLL-A
��
OSEBERG-A
��
FRIGG-TP1
�� FRIGG-TCP2
��
FRIGG-CDP1
��
BERYL�A
��
HARDING
��
MCP-01
��
SLEIPNER-A
��
EKOFISK 2/4-T
��
SOUTH ARNE�A
��
Denmark
F3-FB-1P
��
��
UK RAVENSPURN��
NORTH��CP
��
Germany
��
HALFWEG
��
Netherlands
Figure 3.2 Locations of Concrete Platforms in the OSPAR Maritime Area
3.2 Concrete gravity platforms outside the OSPAR Maritime Area

Concrete has also been used for platform construction in other parts of the world, albeit to a
lesser extent than the North Sea: notably in Australia, where three structures were installed
in the mid-s; the recently installed Malampaya concrete structure in the Philippines; the
massive Hibernia platform offshore Canada, and two small structures in the shallow waters
of the Baltic. ese latter two platforms at Schwedeneck See are currently being decommis-
sioned, and removal is expected in the near future.
Details of the platforms are provided in Appendix .
©  OGP 
 International regulatory requirements

for decommissioning
Decommissioning procedures for disused offshore installations are generally set out in
national legislation, with accompanying guideline and practice documents. Internationally,
there are a number of agreements relating to aspects decommissioning, principally address-
ing partial removal and disposal at sea.
e IMO Guidelines and Standards for the removal of Offshore Installations adopted by
IMO Contracting States in , set out conditions for removal of installations with the aim
of protecting navigation and the safety of other legitimate users of the sea. In essence the
guidelines suggest that where complete removal is not possible, partial removal should leave
an unobstructed water column of  metres.
e London Convention  (formerly known as the London Dumping Convention) is an
agreement that regulates dumping material at sea (including offshore installations). e 
Protocol to the London Convention  categorises offshore installations as platforms or
other man-made structures at sea, and although the Protocol is not in force, the Contracting
Parties to the  Convention have adopted Guidelines for assessing disposal options.
In addition to being signatories to the London Convention, States littoral to the North
East Atlantic are also signatories to the OSPAR Convention. Annex  to the agreement
contains the provision relating to the prevention and elimination of pollution from offshore
installations. Although this Annex sets out general conditions, subsequent measures agreed
by Contracting Parties have tightened the regime as regards disposal at sea. In particular,
Decision / contains a virtual prohibition of disposal for all installations with a limited and
small number of exceptions including large concrete structures. Any proposal for disposal
at sea (including leaving in place is subject to an extensive international consultation exer-
cise, but with the final decision resting with the national competent authority (taking into
account the views of other Contracting States).
 ©  OGP
 Decommissioning alternatives
In the specific case of the OSPAR region, while the regulation allows for disposal at sea as a
decommissioning option, the option only relates to the concrete substructure. Topsides need
to be removed to land unless there are exceptional or unforeseen circumstances or where the
topside support structure is an integral part of the sub-structure. is is frequently the case
for concrete gravity structures.
Any recommendation to dispose of a concrete substructure at sea needs to be supported by
a detailed comparative assessment of the disposal options. e following sections set out the
main issues that need to be considered in determining the best disposal option for a concrete
substructure.
5.1 Removal
As explained in Section ., the first generation of offshore concrete gravity platforms
installed in the seventies were not designed or constructed for a future removal operation.
Later concrete platforms were designed with removal in mind, but the extent of the chal-
lenges and possible obstacles and hazards that might occur may not always have been fully
appreciated in the original design. Hence, the uncertainties identified in the first generation
concrete platforms may also be valid for the second-generation concrete substructures.
5.1.1 Removal method

For large concrete gravity platforms, the most likely removal method will, in essence, be to
reverse the method of installation. However, there are a number of issues that the installation
operation did not need to consider but that would require consideration upon removal.
All concrete platforms located in the North Sea today have been installed by controlling the
level of water ballast within the concrete substructure. When on location, a careful increase
of the water level allowed safe and accurate positioning of the platform. An adjustment of
the relative water levels in the cells of the caisson allowed an on-bottom correction to achieve
a true vertical position of the platform. On most of the structures significant amounts of
cement grout were injected under the base slab of the platforms to ensure a uniform distribu-
tion of loads on to the seabed.
In principle, a reverse installation could also minimise the offshore work by allowing removal
of all the topside facilities to shore. ese can then be removed in a sheltered location where
the weather conditions allow a more efficient execution of work.
However, studies have shown that weight increases during the operating phase may require
a significant amount of the topside loads to be removed before engaging in a re-float opera-
tion. is is because limited buoyancy may be available to lift the structure from the seabed.
A weight uncertainty also arises due sand produced from the reservoir trapped in the storage
cells, the possible adherence of under-base grout and soil, marine growth and the absorption
of water in the cement matrix. e exact weight of the topsides may also add to the uncer-
tainties as considerable amount of equipment have been added during an operational life
often more than  years. To secure an adequate weight tolerance for the re-float operation, a
number of offshore lifts may thus be required prior to removal in order to reduce the overall
weight.
All piping penetrations through the concrete hull below water level have to be closed to
ensure a watertight structure. Any excessive leaks will jeopardise the platform’s ability to
remain afloat in all phases until it is safely located in a dry dock for final deconstruction. is
period could last for up to three years after initial removal.
Essential equipment required during the re-float phase will be the water ballast systems
and pipe connections inside the concrete substructures. Originally, these systems ensured a
©  OGP 
gradual filling of water ballast to ensure a controlled touchdown on the seabed. On the first
generation of platforms, these ballast systems where typically only designed as installation
aids and not maintained or grouted up after the structure was in place.
On some structures it will be necessary to inject water under the base slab to mobilise addi-
tional upward force to be able to pull the base skirts out of the subsoil. is water injection
has to be carefully monitored in parallel with the water de-ballasting during the re-float
operations.
For safety reasons it is preferred that the re-float operations are performed with no personnel
on the platform.
e towing route to shore will have to be carefully evaluated to ensure sufficient draught
during the towing operation. Some structures may have such deep draughts that the inshore
sheltered areas that they can enter may be limited.
5.1.2 Technical uncertainties

Each of the platform designs described in Section  has its own features depending on the
service for which they were intended. e feasibility of a removal operation will depend on
clarification of a number of uncertainties that will exist, even if the concrete platform was
initially designed with future removal in mind.
Studies recently undertaken have identified the following main common uncertainties and
difficulties related to the removal of concrete gravity base structures. ese are:
• Sealing and testing of penetrations
• Structural integrity in re-float phase
• Under-base grout
• Sudden uncontrolled release
• Under base injection
• Mechanical systems
Sealing and testing of penetrations
Sealing of penetrations and cracks in the concrete substructures are seen as major concerns.
e problems include limited or no access to penetrations and cracks, inability to test a sealed
penetration, difficulties in detecting and sealing cracks etc. Conductor penetrations in drill
shafts may be particularly difficult to address. Although cracks may have been sealed during
the operational phase of the installation, these may re-open and cause leaks during re-floata-
tion and towing operation as the loads change.
Structural integrity in re-float phase
During the re-float operations the concrete platform may need to be de-ballasted to a greater
extent than during the installation. Additional uplift forces to overcome friction and suc-
tion in the seabed may be required. It may also be difficult to empty one cell or buoyancy
compartment during de-ballasting. is will require additional de-ballasting in the remain-
ing compartments to compensate for the non-emptied cell(s). is, in turn, may give high
differential pressures in the compartments, that may lead to total collapse if the structural
strength is exceeded.
A preventive measure would be to introduce compressed air into the cells. is would assist
in maintaining the overall structural integrity and mitigate the stresses in certain structural
elements. However, this must be carefully evaluated as it may introduce a risk of overstress-
ing vital structural parts. An excessive “pop-up” to a level where the air pressure exceeds the
 ©  OGP
ambient water pressure could introduce severe structural consequences, as well as being a
hazard to personnel and vessels involved in the re-float operation.
An excessive differential loading between the cells may cause collapse of internal walls on
some types of structures. is concern is also applicable if the platform experiences excessive
tilt during the re-float phase.
As each individual concrete structure has its own characteristics, a thorough structural
analysis checking all applicable load cases will be required to eliminate these uncertainties.
e current applicability of the codes used in the original design and any experience gained,
have to be duly considered. Over the last  years, the design codes have introduced more
stringent structural strength requirements. All structural analysis for removal operations
should therefore be based on conservative assumptions reflecting any deterioration and any
uncertainties that affect the design. e safety factor should not be lower than specified in
current design codes for construction, installations and operations.
is structural check will also be necessary for second-generation concrete platforms having
re-float as a load condition in the original design. Allowance must be made for designs that
did not fully recognise the challenges and possible obstacles that might occur during a re-
float operations; often taking place over  years after installation.
Under base grout
On some platforms, grout was injected under the slab to ensure a uniform soil pressure
after installation. Also, during completion of the production wells, grout was injected and
is expected to have been spread underneath and become attached to the slab. Prior to a re-
floatation there is no method available to assess the amount of grout under the base slab, or
whether or not the grout will remain attached to the base.
If a re-floatation is carried out and a large amount of grout is attached to the underside,
inshore deconstruction is not advisable, since there is no method to remove the grouting from
the underside within an acceptable risk. Both mechanical equipment and explosives have
been evaluated for use in detaching the grout. However, it should be noted that use of such
methods might cause a sudden release of a large amount of grout and cause instability of the
substructure causing it to sink.
Sudden uncontrolled release
After release from the seabed, the concrete platform could have unbalanced buoyancy that
could cause an uncontrolled release from the seabed. Uncertainties in platform weight and
centre of gravity, soil resistance, under base grout lost before, during or after re-float, and
possible soil suction may contribute to unbalanced buoyancy. Some platforms have an accu-
mulation of drill cuttings inside the concrete shafts. Deposits of produced sand in the storage
compartments also add to the uncertainty in knowing the exact weight of the structure. is
could lead to an unpredicted instability and pitching of the structure after being released
from the seabed.
Under base injection
Injection of water under the base slab will require certain strength in the upper soil layers
under the platform. Exceeding this threshold will result in failure of the soil, causing chan-
nelling or “piping” thus allowing water to escape preventing a pressure build-up under the
base. Placing gravel around the base of the substructure could in some instances reduce the
risk for developing channelling in the soil.
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Mechanical systems
e de-ballasting operations as well as any under base water injection will require mechani-
cal systems that are proven to be fully reliable in all functions and operations. e original
systems are very likely to have deteriorated after many years in seawater unless they have
been properly maintained and tested during the in-service life of the platform. Demanding
requirements on the durability and reliability of the system were not fully accounted for
during the design, as they would stay idle for decades prior to use, without the opportunity
to test the system. e original carbon steel piping may, therefore, have to be changed before
the system can be used. Part of the piping embedded in concrete may have to be flushed
and smaller diameter, flexible or expanding piping inserted into the old and deteriorated
pipelines. Prior to the operations, any parts used for removal must be thoroughly inspected,
tested and commissioned. However, it may often be difficult to inspect or even impossible to
replace these systems.
e only alternative is then to install an external ballast piping system linking each buoyancy
compartment together that would be located outside the concrete substructure. is will
involve additional risks with extensive use of divers. A new buoyancy system would require
penetrations to be made in the storage tanks that would introduce potential new points of
leakage.
An external system would also be exposed to dropped objects and impact from collision with
support vessels. Such operations have not been executed before and could add a considerable
cost to the project. Methods and procedures need to be developed and tested inshore before a
conclusion can be drawn on their feasibility. It is also questionable if such solutions will give
the required reliability needed to launch a re-float operation within the acceptance criteria.
Case-by-case evaluation
Finally, it is important to note that each platform will have its own and unique problems (for
example weight increases, stability, cracks, structural strength, high probability of leakage
etc), and that each platform therefore should be considered on a “case by case” basis. Only in-
depth studies for each installation can conclude whether its re-floatation is possible or not.
Appropriate risk analysis is a tool that can be used to establish the risk level compared to the
acceptance criteria set for similar offshore operations.
5.1.3 Towing
A towing operation to a sheltered inshore location needs to be considered before a full
removal is considered acceptable.
e major differences between an installation tow and a removal tow are related to the risk
of:
• Grout attached to the underside of the base slab can fall of and hit a live pipeline;
• Grout falling resulting in instability of the platform and causing it to sink;
• Major leakage may occur in sealed penetrations and cracks, causing the platform to sink
during an offshore or an inshore phase of the towing route (it could hit an offshore live
pipeline, block the entrance to a harbour etc).
Towing points on the concrete platform also need to be thoroughly inspected and tested and,
if necessary, replaced before a re-floatation and towing operation is attempted.
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5.1.4 Inshore/onshore deconstruction

e inshore and onshore deconstruction phase for a typical concrete substructure is esti-
mated to take two to four years. erefore, the concrete substructure needs to be kept float-
ing for at least two to three years. e concerns for the inshore deconstruction phase are
basically the same as for the re-floatation/ towing operation, however, there are differences,
as described below.
Detachment of grout from the underside of the base slab while the floating substructure is
being cut into small pieces represents an unsafe working site for personnel. Sudden loss of
grout is likely to cause instability of the substructure resulting in a tilt, and in a worst case
scenario, the sinking of the substructure.
If uncontrollable leaks arise due to failure of previously sealed penetrations, in-service dete-
rioration of the piping system and structure, or unpredictable loss of grout and soil from the
underside of the base slab, it could have catastrophic consequences resulting in loss of life.
If the structure sinks at an inshore location the environmental consequences may be more
severe than if it occurs at an offshore location. e increased consequences include the
assumption that more fuel will be required onboard the structure to keep the temporary
buoyancy system and other temporary systems running required for the deconstruction
work, and that the distance from the installation to shore will be only a few hundred metres.
On the other hand, it is assumed that any inshore releases can be managed more effectively
by use of pumps etc.
Concrete substructures that have been used for oil storage would be require cleaning to
remove any free oil that could be released prior to its onshore disposal and possibly before any
re-float operation is carried out. Of particular concern are the storage cells of the platforms
where no access is possible except via a piping system. Concrete is a semi permeable material
and it should be assumed that oil has penetrated into the pores of the concrete walls. e
extent of oil contamination of the concrete walls inside the storage cells is, however, con-
sidered to be relative small as the concrete material is normally very dense. Furthermore, a
layer of wax is likely to be deposited on the concrete walls, limiting the oil penetration into
the wall. It may be very difficult to remove the oil contained in the concrete pores by water
flushing, steam cleaning or other cleaning methods. us the reuse potential of this concrete
material may be limited to for example for use as road hardcore or landfill.
5.1.5 Reuse at another location

If a concrete platform can be safely removed from its present location within the acceptance
criteria set, a reuse at another location would then be evaluated. However, a number of cri-
teria have to be fulfilled at its new location such as: satisfactory soil condition, water depth,
environmental conditions, fulfilling current design codes and level of safety.
Reuse of the concrete substructure as, for example bridge foundation or quay support, could
be a practical solution compared to an expensive deconstruction work. Each platform would
have to be assessed for the particular re-use opportunities that may present themselves.
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5.2 Removal for deep water disposal

e activities in this alternative are essentially the same as those discussed in Section .
“Removal”. e main difference is that for this alternative the complete topsides (includ-
ing the main support frame) would need to be removed before the re-float of the concrete
substructure takes place. Alternatively, the topsides could be removed when the structure
is afloat at an inshore sheltered area, and then the concrete substructure could be towed to
an approved deep-water site for disposal. As much of the internal and external steelwork as
practicable is likely to be removed for reuse or recycling onshore.
Following the re-float operation, the concrete substructure will be towed to an approved
deep-water location. By taking water out of the cells and then submerging the substructure
by pumping water into the columns an “implosion” could occur, which would effectively
demolish the concrete. For some concrete substructures this method would not be possible
due to the design features. In those cases it is likely that the complete substructure would hit
the seabed and be severely deformed and disintegrate.

e technical uncertainties in the re-float stage are essentially those valid for the removal and
onshore disposal alternative described in Section ...
5.2.3 Towing operation

e risks associated with the towing operation are the similar to those for towing to an
inshore location. However, the towing route to a deepwater location for disposal may be
substantially longer than for removal to land and the weather conditions encountered might
be more severe. us the length of good weather periods may be critical.
5.3 Partial removal

Partial removal of a concrete substructure represents a removal of parts of the substructure to
such an extent that it fulfils the Guidelines given by the International Maritime Organization
(IMO), namely to leave a free water column of  metres above the remaining structure for
safety of navigation (see also Section ).

Mechanical Means
is option presupposes that all the topsides and the external/internal steel works are
removed and taken to shore for recycling or deconstruction before the deconstruction of the
concrete part commences. Offshore deconstruction alternative entails cutting the concrete
substructure into pieces at the offshore location. e concrete pieces are likely to be left next
to the remaining substructure. Alternatively they may be lifted on to a vessel and transported
to shore for recycling or deconstruction.
e internal steel outfitting in the shafts would be removed in reverse installation order to
the greatest extent possible. However, it may not be possible to remove some of the outfitting
before the concrete structure has been deconstructed down to the level of the actual outfit-
ting. e only controlled method of cutting reinforced concrete is by using cutting tools such
as diamond wire or saws controlled by divers. Use of explosives has been evaluated, but stud-
ies concluded that it could not be the preferred option as it is not possible to guarantee that
present methods will successfully cut the heavily reinforced, pre-stressed structure at the first
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attempt. e environmental consequences (noise and possible disturbance of fish and marine
mammals) may also be reasons for not using explosives.
Mechanical cutting the concrete shafts could either be done from inside a dry shaft or from
the outside. An external cofferdam would be required if making the cuts from the inside to
prevent ingress of water. Personnel would be required to operate the cutting machinery inside
the shaft.
For the concrete substructures of column and caisson types, the shafts can be cut to obtain
the required depth. However, if the top of the caisson reaches into the >-metre zone, parts
of the caisson would have to be removed. is would represent extensive additional under-
water work.
For concrete substructures with no shafts, the preferred cutting method would be to cut the
substructure down to - metres, piece by piece, either lifting away each piece or toppling
them outwards. e actual cutting operations would require extensive underwater works that
ideally should be performed by remotely operated means. However, extensive use of divers in
various operations would almost certainly be required.
Initiating structural collapse
is option pre-supposes the use of explosives to initiate structural collapse of the concrete
structure. e explosives may be placed on the outer surface and/or the inner surface of the
structure.
e platform is expected to remain as a “pulverised” heap of concrete and reinforcement on
the seabed, and may represent a hazard for bottom trawls. To make the site over-trawlable,
the remains of the structure may be re-distributed on the seabed and/or rock may be dumped
to cover the remnant structure. Rock dumping may also reduce minor leaching of hydro-
carbons to the water column (from residuals attached to the structure and any accumulated
drill cuttings).
All possible precautions would have to be taken to limit the effect that the explosives would
have on fish and other sea mammals present in the area. e time of the year selected for the
operation, the type of explosives and the position of the explosives on the structure etc, will
be important to limit the effect on the marine environment. However, despite all precau-
tions taken, it is inevitable that some fish would be killed within a few hundred metres of
the explosion.

e various methods proposed for cutting the concrete substructures down to - metres are
considered to be theoretically feasible although there are a number of critical operations that
would need to be proven. No experience exists today of cutting such heavily reinforced pre-
stressed concrete structural members under water. e traditional tools used on land such as
diamond wire or saw have not been exposed to underwater conditions such as the North Sea.
Studies have revealed that prior to launching any offshore works, extensive development and
testing of equipment will be required to prove its practical feasibility and efficiency.
Diamond wire tool
e most likely cutting technique is a diamond wire tool. Different contractors have
advanced this as a feasible method. However, the tool will need to be fabricated and tested
before a clear conclusion can be drawn on the capability of such a tool to cut reinforced con-
crete under compression.
In the past there have been difficulties with the diamond wire tool, especially if the material
to be cut is a “composite” material and under compression. Most of the load-bearing sections
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in any concrete substructure, including the concrete shafts, consist of high strength concrete
with an inner and outer dense layer of steel reinforcement and pre-stressing tendons in steel
ducts. e pre-stressing tendons ensure that the concrete section remains in compression at
extreme wave loads to avoid cracking in the concrete.
e pre-stressing tendons were installed in purpose-built ducts in the shafts, tensioned and
bonded to the structure by injection of grout in the annulus between the tendons and the
duct walls. If the bonding between the cable and the grout is not properly performed, an
enormous amount of energy could be released when the pre-stressing tendons are cut. e
effect on the concrete of such a release of energy is not fully understood.
Another problem, which has been experienced in the past, is controlling the tension in the
diamond wire. Any over-tensioning will cause the diamond wire to break. Excess trans-
verse feed velocity of the wire or the presence of vibrations in the tool/ wire could result in
over-tensioning the wire. If the wire breaks during the final cuts, the wire has to be cut and
abandoned, since the gap created by the wire will close due to shear leg effects or effect of the
tension wires. us, a new cut has to start above or below the previous cut.
Weaknesses have also been revealed in some of the diamond wire types making them unsuit-
able for cutting steel material.
Diamond saw tool
A diamond cutting saw is more likely to be used when access is restricted to only one face of
the concrete section to be cut. Studies have shown that the diameter of a diamond saw could
reach . metres to be able to cut structural elements with thickness  to  cm.
is cutting tool would require heavy support to be fixed to the concrete surface to guide the
cutting tool in a controlled manner. Jamming of the diamond saw is also very likely for the
same reason as described for the diamond wire tools.
Explosives
e ability of explosives to cut thick (up to one metre) concrete walls effectively underwater
with substantial amounts of pre-stressing and reinforcing steel is not well proven and involves
many uncertainties. e firing of explosive charges to topple the structures is a “point of no
return” and is likely to result in an unplanned situation from which it may be impossible or
extremely difficult and dangerous to recover.
Explosives may, however, be used to make the final cut to enable the toppling or bending of
a cut section outwards to reach the - metre requirement.
Structural stability
For the non-shaft concrete substructures, the cutting operation of structural members will
weaken the structural integrity gradually. By removing structural members the ability to
withstand wave forces will be reduced. If it is not possible to complete the work in one
summer season, it is very likely that the winter storms will deteriorate the structural strength
further; to such an extent that it will be hazardous to send divers back to resume the work
the following summer. e storage tanks will also be problematic to deconstruct, since there
are no practical methods to divide the structure into smaller parts underwater.
e other concern with this disposal option is the stability of the section for the period after
the final cuts are made until a heavy lift vessel lifts off the section.
e cuts have to be planned and performed in such a way, as to maintain the stability of the
section as long as possible. us, three or four sections of the circumference of the legs have
to remain intact until a sufficient weather window is forecasted. Holes therefore have to be
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pre-drilled into the concrete walls by divers or remote operated vehicle (ROV) to be able to
insert the diamond wire cutting tool and perform the cuts of the sections.
As mentioned above, the critical period will be when making the final cuts. If the cutting tool
fails during these final cuts the cut section may be lost if the weather worsens.
5.4 Leave in place

e leave-in-place alternative presupposes that the topsides are removed and taken to shore
for disposal and if considered a hazard, external steelwork would also be removed to shore.
5.4.1 Work to be done

e modules and support frames, forming the topsides, would be removed first. Before
removing the deck, the accessible steelwork inside the platform would be removed as far as
practicable.
On some concrete substructures the support frame consists of concrete beams, often forming
part of the main structure. In such cases it is likely that these structural parts would remain
with the concrete substructure.
Flushing and cleaning of any oil storage tanks would be performed to reduce the content
of hydrocarbon and other residuals to a minimum. e internal walls in the storage tanks
would not be exposed to the sea outside, but would remain protected inside the storage
tanks for natural degradation to take place as the concrete structure slowly deteriorates.
Environmental impact assessments are required to demonstrate that any impacts arising are
within acceptable limits.
e necessary navigation aids would be installed on the substructure in accordance with
applicable national and international requirements. e navigation system would be designed
in an easily maintained package with back-up systems (for example by means of a helicopter
but not dependent on a helicopter deck). A programme for maintaining a reliable navigation
system would be designed, agreed with the competent authorities and introduced.
Debris around the concrete substructure would be recovered, where practicable and brought
to shore.

Removal of topsides would include known technical operations, but could still be very chal-
lenging requiring detailed planning and control to prevent major unforeseen events.
e hydrocarbon and other residues left in the storage cells of the concrete substructures
present an additional challenge. e design allows the cells to be flushed through a com-
plex pipe work system, but on some platforms, this system provides the only access into the
cells. Rigorous inspection and conventional cleaning methods by scraping or through use
of solvents are either not feasible or environmentally unattractive. Both alternative access
and cleaning techniques would need to be developed or a thorough assessment performed
to demonstrate the acceptability of any potential impacts to the environment by the gradual
release and natural degradation process as the structure slowly deteriorates. See also Section
.
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 Safety
Health and safety of the workforce is crucial in any decommissioning work of offshore instal-
lations. e level of safety should be the same as during installation and operations and work
should be carried out in accordance with the principle that the risk for the workforce should
be as low as is reasonably practicable.
ere is very little experience of managing hazards and risks associated with offshore (and
onshore) decommissioning of gravity concrete structures. In each of the three large-scale
removal operations of steel structures conducted in the North Sea, there has been a fatality.
ese incidents all occurred when the structures were being dismantled in shore or on land.
Nonetheless it is clear that the risks to personnel both in the conduct established operations
and arising from the substantial technical and environmental uncertainties (for example cut-
ting, use of divers, lifting, towing) are significant and must be a major factor in defining the
best ‘disposal’ alternative for an individual installation.
To place the importance of safety in a ‘Regulatory Context’, the UK Health and Safety
Executive indicates that the risk of fatality for an individual shall not be greater than ×-
per year ( in ) and shall be as low as reasonable practicable. In practice a personnel
risk level considerably lower than this will be sought for in all decommissioning activities in
accordance with the principle that risks shall be as low as reasonably practicable.
Refloat for onshore disposal
ere is no experience to date in relation to removal and onshore disposal of concrete plat-
forms. Evaluations made in the planning of the Ekofisk  Disposal [] and the Frigg Field
Cessation Plan show that there is a significant risk to personnel in removing the concrete
substructures, even though personnel may not be on the structure during the re-float.
If a serious problem developed during the refloat or towing, it would be necessary to under-
take remedial works to remove the substructure in a damaged condition. e predicted
fatalities in that situation could be considerably higher than predicted for a straightforward
refloat operation.
Additional risks are introduced if the complete topsides are removed offshore prior to the
refloat operation. is risk may be less if the topsides are lifted off in an inshore sheltered
area. However, that reduced risk would be offset by an increased risk of having personnel
dismantle the concrete substructure whilst floating and dependent on the continued integrity
of the ballasting systems for the extended deconstruction period and the handling of material
to shore.
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Deepwater disposal
During the tow out to the deep-water location it is assumed that no personnel would be
onboard the platform. Preparations for sinking the concrete substructure are likely to be
made with people located on a nearby vessel. However, it may be necessary to put people on
board in the event of a failure of the mechanical systems initiating the sinking process. A
deep-water disposal of a concrete substructure would eliminate high risk to personnel during
inshore and onshore deconstruction phases.
Cutting down to -55 metres
Studies have shown that cutting the concrete shafts is likely to involve high risk to person-
nel. Even though much of the underwater work can be done by remotely operated vehicles
(ROV), extensive use of divers must be assumed. Diver interventions are likely to be required
to reduce the down time. Mechanical failures may require the work to be stopped and the
equipment brought up to the supporting vessel for repair.
If any unplanned events take place requiring additional works to meet the --metre require-
ment, the risk to personnel would obviously increase.
Leave in place
e topside removal phase will present certain risks where limited experience is available. e
installation of the deck structure with modules was often done by means of a “deck-mating”
with limited offshore lifts. Offshore removal cannot be achieved by reversing this process.
Removal of exterior steelwork will also expose personnel to risk although remote techniques
will be preferred. e impact of cleaning and inspection will need to be addressed as tech-
niques are developed. Ongoing monitoring and maintenance of navigation aids will also
need consideration.
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 Environmetal impact
Concrete and steel are not intrinsically polluting. With the exception of residual hydrocar-
bons leaking to the environment, the impacts of decommissioning large concrete gravity
structures both at the site of oil and gas production and inshore at dismantling locations will
largely relate to physical disturbance, and interference with amenities and other users of the
sea.
7.1 Re-float for onshore disposal

e environmental impact of the removal with onshore disposal will be most dominant
during the inshore and onshore deconstruction. e onshore deconstruction of the huge con-
crete substructure will cause aesthetic impacts such as visual effects, noise, smell and dust.
Noise is considered the most dominant factor. e sources of noise could be:
• Chipping of concrete with a hydraulic chisel hammer
• Crushing of concrete in a crushing mill
• Drilling and blasting concrete
• Noise from cranes and diesel engines
During the rather long period the concrete substructures may have to remain afloat during
deconstruction (two to three years), there will be a risk that the substructure could sink at
its inshore location. ere is a high probability of not being able to re-float the substructure
subsequently.
Environmental studies have shown that unlike steel structures, the significant energy con-
sumption (and consequent discharges of CO2 required to bring ashore and the recover of
the steel embedded within offshore concrete substructures, generally exceeds the energy
consumption and discharges required to replace that steel using iron ore.
7.2 Deepwater disposal

Disposal of the concrete substructures in deep water may cause minor environmental impact
due to leakage of oil from temporary tanks used for pumps necessary to control the buoyancy
of the structure during re-float, towing and sinking operations.
If the concrete substructure has been used for oil storage, residual sludge and other deposits
inside the storage tanks may have some local environmental impact at the disposal site. Even
though extensive flushing/ cleaning of the storage tanks will have been performed prior to
the re-float operation and tow to the deep water site, residual sludge and other deposits with
a high wax content will remain inside the tanks.
During the sinking process, it is likely that the platform will be more or less pulverised or
severely deformed due to overpressure and impact when it hits the sea bottom. e surfaces of
the inner storage tanks will immediately be exposed to seawater. However, since the residuals
are assumed to be relatively immobile (due to high wax content) and will be contained in
pores in the inner walls of the storage tanks, a very slow leaching of hydrocarbons from the
surfaces to the seawater is anticipated.
A seabed inspection and environmental survey will normally be performed prior to leaving
the deep-water site.
Deep-water disposal will eliminate major environmental impacts onshore during the decon-
struction phase.
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7.3 Cutting to -55 metres

is alternative may expose the oil storage tanks to the open sea if their distance below the
sea surface is less than  metres. Otherwise, the environmental impact would be the same as
described below for the leave-in-place option.
7.4 Leave in place

Long-term impact on the marine environment from any contents of the concrete substruc-
ture left in place for natural decay should be included in the environmental impact assess-
ment. In those cases where concentrations exceed agreed thresholds, preparation for disposal
should include measures to remove them or to reduce the quantities of these contaminants
to an acceptable level.
Flushing and cleaning of concrete substructures used for the storage of crude oil may be
required to reduce the content of hydrocarbon and other contaminants to an acceptable level.
Residual quantities of oil will remain adhered to the internal walls of the concrete storage
tanks and will not be exposed to the sea until the structure eventually breaks up.
Leaving a concrete substructure in place may limit the fishing activity in the vicinity of
the substructure. If debris in the area around the substructure is recovered, the chances of
snagging fishing gear should be considerably reduced. Removal of external steelwork on the
substructure will reduce debris littering the nearby seabed in future.
7.5 Long-term fate of concrete structures

Ultimately all the components and contents of a concrete substructure dumped at sea, par-
tially removed or left in place will corrode, decay, disintegrate and collapse onto the seabed.
Studies on long-term stability [] have considered the long-term effects of seawater and pres-
sure on concrete and concrete strength. Other aspects considered have been the mechanisms
associated with corrosion of reinforcement and bacterial attack in compartments where
hydrocarbons are stored. e overall conclusion of these studies is that concrete is a very
durable material where changes are measured in hundreds of years.
Initially concrete cover in the splash zone (the sea surface open to the action of wave erosion)
is likely to break away from the reinforcement after  years, but the remaining strength will
support the legs for several hundred years more until leg collapse is assumed to occur after
 to  years. e base cells could remain largely intact unless breached by falling debris
over  years and taking considerably longer to substantially disintegrate.
Once surface navigation aids can no longer be maintained, other electronic or physical
means of marking the remains would need to be considered.
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 Monitoring
Concrete substructures left in place will be equipped with navigation systems that fulfil both
national requirements as well as the International Maritime Organization requirements to
secure safe navigation for users of the sea. e navigation aids will be designed to ensure a
high level of reliability. ey will incorporate back-up systems should be serviced at regular
intervals.
To assist fishermen, some operators may introduce the position of the concrete substructure
into the “Fish SAFE” programme, presently in operation in the UK.
Regular surveillance would be carried out to check that the navigation aids are operational.
It is envisaged that the navigation aids will be designed in such a way as to allow them to be
changed out from a helicopter, thus obviating the need to man the platform for this purpose.
e responsibility for the maintenance of the navigation aids remains with the owners, unless
otherwise agreed with the authorities.
During the regular surveillance of the navigation aids it would be appropriate to make a
visual inspection of the general condition of the concrete substructure visible above the
water surface. Any unexpected deterioration should be evaluated to check if it represents any
hazard to the users of the sea.
For structures dumped at sea, occasional monitoring may be required to confirm the location
and condition of the structure on the seabed.
 ©  OGP
 Liability
e owners of installations at the time of decommissioning will normally continue to be the
owners of any residues, unless otherwise agreed with the authorities. e owners (in most
cases the licensees to a production licence) will be jointly and severally liable for damage
caused wilfully or inadvertently in connection with a disused facility left in place.
Any claims for compensation by third parties arising from damage caused by any remains
will be a matter for the owners and the affected parties and will be governed by the general
law.
Given the long term over which concrete structures are likely to persist in the marine envi-
ronment after decommissioning, there are unresolved considerations concerning liability
that require resolution.
©  OGP 
 Cost
e cost of bringing a concrete substructure to shore for reuse represents a considerable pro-
portion of the total cost of decommissioning. is needs to be considered in an economic
evaluation considering the benefit to society of reusing the substructures, for example as
bridge foundations. Significant economic risks would arise during a re-float operation due to
the uncertainties involved. is is particularly the case for the first generation concrete instal-
lations that were not designed for removal, but could be valid also for the second generation
platforms as the challenges of full removal were not properly understood during the design.
e cost of cleaning up the seabed after structural failure of the installation, during re-float
or towing is likely to be extremely high.
More than half of the cost of a decommissioning event may be expended before obtaining
sufficient confidence that a successful re-float can be performed within the set acceptance
criteria. is will also be reflected in the cost for deepwater disposal, even when the cost of
deconstruction inshore is not incurred.
ere will also be cost associated with installation and maintenance of navigational aids if a
structure is left in place.
e cost associated with leaving a concrete substructure in place will be related to cleaning
of the facilities of hydrocarbons if the substructure has been used for oil storage. External
steelwork attached to the concrete structure is likely to be removed.
e cost estimates presented for the Ekofisk Tank and the three concrete substructures on
the Frigg Field predict significant cost levels for removal and onshore deconstruction of con-
crete substructures. ey vary from about  MNOK or m to  MNOK or m
(assuming an exchange rate of . NOK per ) depending on the type of installation in
question. e cost of removing the topside facilities including the support frame, either off-
shore or inshore is an additional cost.
 ©  OGP
 Decommissioning experience and

future plans
11.1 Recent work on disposal of concrete platforms

A number of studies has been undertaken place since  when OSPAR Decision / was
introduced. Extensive studies have investigated the feasibility of removing concrete gravity
based substructures. e Cessation Plans for the Ekofisk I (operated by Phillips Petroleum
Company Norway in Stavanger) and the Frigg Field (operated by TotalFinaElf Exploration
Norge AS, in Stavanger), where there are respectively one and four concrete substructures,
have both been subject to detailed assessments in accordance to the framework given in
Annex  of OSPAR Decision /.
Further information about these two cessation plans with comprehensive reference
lists of performed studies can be found on the following web sites:
• Ekofisk  Cessation: http://www.phillips66.no/cessation
��
• Frigg Field Cessation: http://www.totalfinaelf.no/cessation
��
ese concrete substructures represent typical offshore concrete
gravity platforms in operation in the North Sea today. e
results of these in-depth studies have identified key
problem areas related to each of the above-mentioned ��
platforms, and have provided valuable input to this ��
report.
e two fields are located as follows
On the Norwegian Continental Shelf
Ekofisk Tank GBS, located on the Ekofisk Field [3],[4]
Frigg/TCP2, located on Frigg Field [5]
On the UK Continental Shelf
Frigg/CDP1, located on Frigg Field [5]
Frigg/TC1, located on Frigg Field [5]
As a result of their studies, the two operators of the four disused concrete platforms have
on behalf of the owners submitted a recommendation to the competent national authori-
ties to leave the substructures in place. Norway has performed the consultation process
requested by OSPAR regarding leaving in place the Ekofisk Tank GBS with its protective
barrier. OSPAR Contracting Parties did not raise any significant objection. e Norwegian
Storting (Parliament) has given the final approval for leaving in place the Ekofisk Tank with
its Protective Barrier. e three concrete substructures on the Frigg Field are at present under
consideration by the Norwegian and UK authorities.
©  OGP 
Another important source of knowledge has been obtained through a number generic stud-
ies. e most recent include:
In Norway
Summary report for Phase I and II: “Removal of Offshore Concrete Structures”, rev. , dated
.., Dr. tech. Olav Olsen, Oslo [].
In UK
Joint Industry Project: UKCS Decommissioning Study”, report No. -ER, dated 
January , W.S. Atkins, Aberdeen [].
e Dr Tech. Olav Olsen study looks at re-floatation and onshore deconstruction of specific
concrete installations. e WS Atkins study looks at different disposal options such as leave
in-place, partial removal etc., including safety, environmental and technical issues related to
the different options.
11.2 Future decommissioning plans

It is difficult to predict the exact time when an offshore installation will be decommissioned.
e main uncertainties are often the reservoir behaviour towards the end of production, as
well as the oil and gas price. An alternative use for the platform could also prolong its opera-
tional lifetime. At the time of preparation of this report, it expect that the major phase of
decommissioning will take place between  and , but some structures are designed
for operation until at least  (see Appendix ).
 ©  OGP
 Public consultation
e decommissioning of offshore oil and gas platforms, including gravity based concrete
structures, is controlled by a regulatory process set out by the relevant national Governments
having offshore activities in the OSPAR Maritime Area. For example the requirements for
public consultations in Norway and UK have subtle differences but many of the key princi-
ples are common (see references [], [] and []).
Part of this regulatory process includes the statutory consultation of various parties for
their views on the recommended disposal option. It has also become industry practice to go
beyond what is required by regulation. A much broader range of interested parties is invited
to comment at an early stage when disposal options are being developed. e stakeholders’
views are sought on issues raised and on how the assessment is conducted.
e industry has seen the importance of an open, transparent and inclusive decision-making
process since the Brent Spar incident in . All recent large-scale platform decommission-
ing now follow the pattern where technical options are developed in parallel with a dialogue
and consultation process with a wide group of stakeholders.
During the process of establishing a recommended disposal option for both the Ekofisk Tank
and the Frigg concrete platforms, an extensive communication strategy towards the various
stakeholder groups was adopted. e principle was to invite the stakeholder participation at
an early stage of the process.
After having identified the stakeholders with an interest in the decommissioning process,
they were asked to comment on development of scope of work and raise any issues or con-
cerns they would wish to see addressed. A number of additional studies were initiated as
a result of constructive proposals received, which are now part of the respective Cessation
Plans presented to the Authorities.
Up to two or three years may pass before a recommendation for disposal can be presented
and the stakeholders should be kept engaged and informed throughout this phase. A variety
of tools to communicate and involve interested parties may be used including meetings, let-
ters, websites, telephone calls, information bulletins, interactive events and presentations.
Offshore trips may be organised to allow the stakeholders to obtain an impression magnitude
of the structures and the challenges in decommissioning an offshore installation.
When a recommended disposal option
has emerged, further contact with the
stakeholders should be made explaining ��
the reason behind the recommendation. ��
��
��
e commitment to keep in close con-

��
��
tact with the Stakeholder groups does ��
not stop when a Cessation Plan has been

��
submitted to the authorities. e inten- ��
tions should be to keep the stakeholders
informed about the progress until the ��
��
approved decommissioning programme ��
is completed. ��
��
��
Figure . illustrates that practice for
public consultation adopted for the first
four decommissioned concrete installa- Figure 12.1: Principles adopted for recent Public Consultation of
tions in the OSPAR Maritime Area. Concrete Gravity Platforms in the North Sea
©  OGP 
 Conclusions
In the period  to , detailed consideration has been given to the decommissioning
of large concrete gravity based platforms in the North Sea. ese considerations have drawn
extensively upon the numerous studies as well as evaluations undertaken as part of the decom-
missioning projects for the Ekofisk  and the Frigg Field. ese studies have indicated:
• Each concrete gravity platform is unique and, as such, decommissioning of concrete
gravity platforms needs to be considered strictly on a case-by-case basis. Individual
concrete substructures have their own particular history and design features, and will
require specific studies to investigate the issues and risks associated with the different
decommissioning alternatives.
• e first generation of offshore concrete gravity platforms installed in the s were not
designed or constructed for future removal operations. Although provisions for removal
were included in the design of later concrete platforms, it appears that these may not be
fully effective because the obstacles and hazards were not fully recognised. Hence, the
uncertainties identified in first generation concrete platforms may also be applicable to
the second-generation platforms.
• Uncertainties associated with decommissioning include: structural integrity of the
concrete installation when it is released from the seabed; weight and buoyancy of the
re-floated structures; safety and issues associated with-long term liability.
• Effective consultation mechanisms have been developed to engage stakeholders and
other users of the sea in considering the options for decommissioning.
• A comprehensive environmental impact assessment (EIA), undertaken by independ-
ent parties, is a vital element when considering the implications of different disposal
alternatives. e environmental impact assessment should include consideration of the
long-term impact on the marine environment from any contaminants that may be left
in the substructure. It is important to allow the stakeholders to review and comment
upon both the proposed scope of work for the EIA and the subsequent outcome from
the assessment.
• Concrete structures left in place in the marine environment are extremely durable, will
degrade very slowly and may be expected to remain standing for  to  years.
• Contamination of the marine environment in the vicinity of the decommissioned instal-
lation is not expected to be significant, especially given strict controls on cleaning during
decommissioning.
• Costs of decommissioning will be significant irrespective of the ultimate outcome of the
consideration of a full range of options. For example, the cost of removal and onshore
deconstruction of a concrete platform is estimated to be in the range  MNOK/
m to  MNOK/m, depending on the type of platform (excluding the cost
of removal and disposal of the platform topsides). More than half this cost may be
expended before obtaining sufficient confidence that an operation to re-float the sub-
structure would be successful.
 ©  OGP
Appendix  Concrete Gravity Platforms within the

OSPAR Maritime Area
Concrete gravity based structures in the Norwegian Continental Shelf
Field Type Platform Operator Water Instal. Topsides Substructure Oil Designed Planned
function depth date weight weight (Te) storage ror decom
(m) (Te) incl. ballast (bbl) removal date
Ekofisk Tank+ Doris Oil Storage Phillips 70 1973 33,400 273 700 1,000,000 no 1999
Protective Norway 896 900
barrier
Frigg TCP2 Condeep Production TotalFinaElf 103 1977 22,900 229,200 no no 2004
(Norway)
Statfjord A Condeep Production/ Statoil 145 1977 41,300 254,000 1,200,000 no 2010
Drilling/Quarter
Gullfaks A Condeep Production/ Statoil 134 1986 47,500 651,000 1,195,000 yes 2016
Drilling/Quarter
Gullfaks B Condeep Drilling/Quarter Statoil 142 1987 27,000 583,500 no yes 2016
Gullfaks C Condeep Production/ Statoil 217 1989 52,000 784,000 2,000,000 yes 2016
Drilling/Quarter
Draugen Condeep Production/ Shell 250 1993 28,000 208,000 1,400,000 yes 2016
Drilling/Quarter (Norway)
Oseberg A Condeep Production/ Norsk 109 1988 37,000 320,000 no yes 2020
Quarter Hydro
Statfjord B Condeep Production/ Statoil 145 1981 42,200 434,000 1,900,000 yes 2010
Drilling/Quarter
Statfjord C Condeep Production/ Statoil 145 1984 48,100 358,000 1,900,000 yes 2014
Drilling/Quarter
Sleipner A Condeep Production/ Statoil 83 1992 37,000 788,000 no yes 2035
Drilling/Quarter
Troll Gas Condeep Production/ Statoil 330 1995 25,000 661,500 no yes 2046
Drilling/Quarter
Concrete gravity based structures in the UK Continental Shelf
Function Depth date Weight Weight (Te) Storage for decom
(m) (Te) incl. Ballast (bbl) Removal date
Frigg CDP1 Doris Production/ TotalFinaElf 98 1975 4,850 415,700 no no 2004
Drilling (Norway)
Frigg TP1 Sea Tank Production TotalFinaElf 103 1976 7,840 162,000 no no 2004
(Norway)
Dunlin A Andoc Drilling/ Shell 151 1977 19,294 228,611 838,200 no 2009
Production
Ninian Doris Drilling/ Kerr-McGee 135 1978 39,000 584,000 1,000,000 no 2009
Central Production
Cormorant A SeaTank Drilling/ Shell 150 1978 25,678 294,655 1,000,000 no 2010
Production
Brent B Condeep Drilling/ Shell 139 1975 23,424 165,664 1,100,000 no 2011
Production
Brent C SeaTank Drilling/ Shell 141 1978 29,874 287,542 600,000 no 2011
Production
Brent D Condeep Production/ Shell 142 1976 23,097 177,809 1,100,000 no 2011
Drilling
North Arup Production BP 43 1989 6,250 58,500 no yes 2014
Ravensburn
Harding Technip Drilling/ BP 110 1995 23,000 134,300 no yes 2015
(34m base Production
caisson)
Beryl A Condeep Drilling ExxonMobil 117 1975 20,000 494,000 900,000 no 2018
Production
MCP01 Doris Current use: TotalFinaElf 94 1976 13,000 376,000 no no 2020
Riser platform (UK)
©  OGP 
Concrete gravity based structures in Denmark and Netherlands
Function Depth date Weight Weight (Te) Storage for decom
(m) (Te) incl. Ballast (bbl) Removal date
South Arne Blocks Drilling/ Amerada 61 1999 7,100 100,000 550,000 2011
5604/29 + Production Hess
5604/30 - Denmark
Denmark
F/3 Block F/3 - Drilling/ NAM 42 1992 9,500 49 200 - 189,000 yes 2032
Netherlands Production - Netherlands (excl. steel
71.4x81.4m columns)
concrete
caisson
Halfweg Block Q/1 - Wellhead Unocal 30 1995 650 3,014 no yes 2007
Netherlands Netherlands including
legs
Note:
SouthArne: Concrete Gravity Base with a steel lattice drilling tower
Halfweg: Concrete base with a four leg jack-up which can be disconnected and refloated
 ©  OGP
Appendix  Concrete Gravity Platforms outside

the OSPAR Maritime Area
Concrete gravity based structures outside the OSPAR Maritime Area
function depth date weight weight (Te) storage ror decom
(m) (Te) incl. ballast (bbl) removal date
Bream Gippsland ExxonMobil 61 1996 800 44,200
Basin, SE Australia
Australia
West Tuna Gippsland ExxonMobil 61 1996 7,000 88,000
Basin, SE Australia
Australia
Wandoo WA-14-L - NW Production ExxonMobil 55m 1996 6,500 81,000 400,000
Shelf - Western Australia
Australia
Schwedeneck-See Baltic Sea, DCS Production RWE-DEA 26 1984 1,300 16,000 no Yes 2002
Germany
Schwedeneck-See Baltic Sea, DCS Production RWE-DEA 16 1984 1,300 14,000 no Yes 2002
Germany
Hibernia Offshore Drilling/ Mobil 80 1997 37,000 900,000 1,300,000
Newfoundland Production Canada
©  OGP 
Reference List
 OGP (. EP F) : “Decommissioning of Concrete Gravity Based Structures”, Report no. ./
, June 
 OSPAR Decision / on the Disposal of Disused Offshore Installations, issued in July .
 Ekofisk  Disposal: Impact Assessment, Environmental and Societal Impacts, dated  October .
 Ekofisk Tank Substructures, A summary of Disposal Option Assessments, dated  March .
 Frigg Field Cessation Plan, Second Draft, dated November .
 Summary report for Phase I and II: “Removal of Offshore Concrete Structures” , rev. , dated .., D.
. O O, Oslo
 Joint Industry Project: UKCS Decommissioning Study”, report No. -ER, dated  January , W.A.
A, Aberdeen
 “Guide to the classification of environmental quality in ords and coastal waters” , issued by the Norwegian
State Pollution Agency, SFT ..
 Norwegian Act of  November  No.  relating to petroleum activities
 e United Kingdom Petroleum Act 
 “Guidance Notes for Industry - Decommissioning of Offshore Installations and Pipelines under then Petroleum
Act ”, issued in .
 “Durability of high-strength offshore concrete structures” , presented at the th International Symposium on
Utilisation of High strength/high performance Concrete, June , Sandeord, Norway, by S M.
B, D. T. O O, N  J E C, Selmer ASA, Norway.
 ©  OGP
What is OGP?
e International Association of Oil & Gas Producers encompasses the world’s leading
private and state-owned oil & gas companies, their national and regional associations, and
major upstream contractors and suppliers.
Vision
• To work on behalf of all the world’s upstream companies to promote responsible and
profitable operations.
Mission
• To represent the interests of the upstream industry to international regulatory and
legislative bodies.
• To achieve continuous improvement in safety, health and environmental performance
and in the engineering and operation of upstream ventures.
• To promote awareness of Corporate Social Responsibility issues within the industry
and among stakeholders.
Objectives
• To improve understanding of the upstream oil and gas industry, its achievements and
challenges and its views on pertinent issues.
• To encourage international regulators and other parties to take account of the indus-
try’s views in developing proposals that are effective and workable.
• To become a more visible, accessible and effective source of information about the
global industry - both externally and within member organisations.
• To develop and disseminate best practices in safety, health and environmental per-
formance and the engineering and operation of upstream ventures.
• To improve the collection, analysis and dissemination of safety, health and environ-
mental performance data.
• To provide a forum for sharing experience and debating emerging issues.
• To enhance the industry’s ability to influence by increasing the size and diversity of
the membership.
• To liaise with other industry associations to ensure consistent and effective approaches
to common issues.
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Disposal of disused

offshore concrete gravity

Report No. 338

Consistent high quality database and guidelines

Internationally recognised source of industry information

e need for monitoring of concrete substructures left in place is highlighted. Concrete

 Population of concrete gravity

3.1 Concrete gravity platforms in the OSPAR Maritime Area

North Sea. All together there are  con- ��

ere are  concrete gravity base plat- �

Figure 3.2 Locations of Concrete Platforms in the OSPAR Maritime Area

3.2 Concrete gravity platforms outside the OSPAR Maritime Area

 International regulatory requirements

5.1.1 Removal method

5.1.2 Technical uncertainties

5.1.4 Inshore/onshore deconstruction

5.1.5 Reuse at another location

5.2 Removal for deep water disposal

5.2.1 Removal method

5.2.2 Technical uncertainties

5.2.3 Towing operation

5.3 Partial removal

5.3.1 Removal method

5.3.2 Technical uncertainties

5.4 Leave in place

5.4.1 Work to be done

5.4.2 Technical uncertainties

7.1 Re-float for onshore disposal

7.2 Deepwater disposal

7.3 Cutting to -55 metres

7.4 Leave in place

7.5 Long-term fate of concrete structures

 Decommissioning experience and

11.1 Recent work on disposal of concrete platforms

11.2 Future decommissioning plans

e commitment to keep in close con-

not stop when a Cessation Plan has been

Appendix  Concrete Gravity Platforms within the

Concrete gravity based structures in the UK Continental Shelf

Concrete gravity based structures in Denmark and Netherlands

Appendix  Concrete Gravity Platforms outside

Internet site: www.ogp.org.uk

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