Silverio, the respondents claimed that they acquired successional rights over the land.
Thus, in
FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 184148 June 9, 2014
52. NORA B. CALALANG-PARULAN and ELVIRA B. CALALANG, Petitioners, vs. ROSARIO
CALALANG-GARCIA, LEONORA CALALANG-SABILE, and CARLITO S.
CALALANG, Respondents. D E C I S I O N VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision 1 dated December 21, 2007 and
Resolution2dated July 25, 2008 of the Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 72531. The CA modified the Decision3 dated July 10, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 21, of Malolos, Bulacan, in Civil Case No. 370-M-91.
The facts, as culled from the records, follow:
In a Complaint4 for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property filed with the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan on June 10, 1991, the respondents Rosario Calalang-Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile, and
Carlito S. Calalang asserted their ownership over a certain parcel of land against the petitioners Nora
B. Calalang-Parulan and Elvira B. Calalang. The said lot with an area of 1,266 square meters and
specifically identified as Lot 1132, Cad. 333, Bigaa Cadastre situated in Brgy. Burol 2nd, Municipality
of Balagtas, Province of Bulacan, was allegedly acquired by the respondents from their mother
Encarnacion Silverio, through succession as the latter’s compulsory heirs.
According to the respondents, their father, Pedro Calalang contracted two marriages during his
lifetime. The first marriage was with their mother Encarnacion Silverio. During the subsistence of this
marriage, their parents acquired the above-mentioned parcel of land from their maternal grandmother
Francisca Silverio. Despite enjoying continuous possession of the land, however, their parents failed to
register the same. On June 7, 1942, the first marriage was dissolved with the death of Encarnacion
Silverio.
On November 6, 1967, Pedro Calalang entered into a second marriage with Elvira B. Calalang who
then gave birth to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan and Rolando Calalang. According to the respondents, it
was only during this time that Pedro Calalang filed an application for free patent over the parcel of
land with the Bureau of Lands. Pedro Calalang committed fraud in such application by claiming sole
and exclusive ownership over the land since 1935 and concealing the fact that he had three children
with his first spouse. As a result, on September 22, 1974, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-28715 in favor of Pedro Calalang only.
On February 17, 1984, Pedro Calalang sold the said parcel of land to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan as
evidenced by a Deed of Sale6 executed by both Pedro Calalang and Elvira B. Calalang. Accordingly,
the Register of Deeds of Bulacan cancelled OCT No. P-2871 and issued Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 283321 in the name of Nora B. Calalang-Parulan. On December 27, 1989,7 Pedro Calalang
died.
The respondents assailed the validity of TCT No. 283321 on two grounds. First, the respondents
argued that the sale of the land was void because Pedro Calalang failed to obtain the consent of the
respondents who were co-owners of the same. As compulsory heirs upon the death of Encarnacion
alienating the land without their consent, Pedro Calalang allegedly deprived them of their pro indiviso
share in the property. Second, the respondents claimed that the sale was absolutely simulated as Nora
B. Calalang-Parulan did not have the capacity to pay for the consideration stated in the Deed of Sale.
In their Answer,8 the petitioners argued that the parcel of land was acquired during the second marriage
of Pedro Calalang with Elvira B. Calalang. They stressed that OCT No. P-2871 itself stated that it was
issued in the name of "Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba [Calalang]." Thus, the property
belonged to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Pedro Calalang and Elvira B. Calalang. The
petitioners likewise denied the allegation that the sale of the land was absolutely simulated as Nora B.
Calalang-Parulan was gainfully employed in Spain at the time of the sale. Moreover, they alleged that
the respondents did not have a valid cause of action against them and that their cause of action, if any,
was already barred by laches, estoppel and prescription. By way of counterclaim, the petitioners also
sought the payment to them of moral and exemplary damages plus costs of suit for the filing of the
clearly unfounded suit.
On July 10, 2001, the trial court rendered decision in favor of the respondents. The dispositive portion
of the RTC decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants in the
following manner:
1. Ordering the defendants to reconvey in favor of the plaintiffs, their rightful share
to three-fourth (3/4) of one-half (1/2) or a total of 474.75 square meters at 158.25
square meters for each of the three plaintiffs, namely: Rosario, Leonora, and Juanito
all surname[d] Calalang, of the real property covered by TCT No. 283321 of the
Registry of Deeds of Bulacan corresponding to their shares in the conjugal estate of
the late Encarnacion S. Calalang [sic];
2. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs the amount of ₱50,000.00 for moral
damages; ₱50,000.00 for attorney’s fees and another ₱50,000.00 for litigation
expenses.
3. Dismissing the defendants’ counterclaims.
With costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.9
The trial court declared that the parcel of land was jointly acquired by the spouses Pedro Calalang and
Encarnacion Silverio from the parents of the latter. Thus, it was part of the conjugal property of the
first marriage of Pedro Calalang. When this marriage was dissolved upon the death of Encarnacion
Silverio on June 7, 1942,the corresponding shares to the disputed property were acquired by the heirs
of the decedent according to the laws of succession. In particular, the trial court allocated half of the
disputed property to Pedro Calalang as his share in the conjugal partnership and allocated the other half
to the three respondents and Pedro Calalang to be divided equally among them. The trial court then
ordered all of Pedro’s share to be given to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan on account of the sale. The trial
court also ruled that because the application for free patent filed by Pedro Calalang was attended by
fraud and misrepresentation, Pedro Calalang should be considered as a trustee of an implied trust.
Aggrieved by the adverse ruling, the petitioners appealed the case to the CA which rendered the
assailed Decision on December 21, 2007. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads,
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the Decision dated July 10, 2001of the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, and against the defendants in
the following manner:
1. Ordering the defendants to reconvey in favor of the plaintiffs, their rightful share
to the property owned by their common father Pedro Calalang, equivalent to one
half(1/2) portion of the whole area or 633 square meters to be divided equally by the
three plaintiffs, namely:
Rosario, Leonora and Carlito, all surnamed Calalang, each getting an area
of 211 square meters of the property covered by TCT No. 2883321 of the
Registry of Deeds of Bulacan corresponding to their shares in the property
of their late father Pedro Calalang;
2. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs the amount of ₱50,000.00 for moral
damages; ₱50,000.00 for attorney’s fees and another ₱50,000.00 for litigation
expenses.
3. Dismissing the defendants’ counterclaims.
With costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.
The CA reversed the factual findings of the trial court and held that Pedro Calalang was the sole and
exclusive owner of the subject parcel of land. Firstly, it held that there was insufficient evidence to
prove that the disputed property was indeed jointly acquired from the parents of Encarnacion Silverio
during the first marriage. Secondly, the CA upheld the indefeasibility of OCT No. P-2871. It held that
although the free patent was issued in the name of "Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba
[Calalang]" this phrase was merely descriptive of the civil status of Pedro Calalang at the time of the
registration of the disputed property. Thus, contrary to the ruling of the trial court, upon the death of
Encarnacion Silverio on June 7, 1942, the respondents did not acquire any successional rights to the
parcel of land which was exclusively owned by Pedro Calalang. However, applying the rules of
succession, Pedro’s heirs namely, Rosario Calalang-Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile, Carlito
Calalang, Nora B. Calalang-Parulan, Elvira B. Calalang, and Rolando Calalang, succeeded Pedro to
the land in equal shares upon his death. Thus, the CA ordered the petitioners to reconvey in favor of
the respondents their rightful shares to the land. The CA ruled that the sale by Pedro Calalang to Nora
B. Calalang-Parulan was fraudulent and fictitious as the vendee was in bad faith and the respondents
were unlawfully deprived of their pro indiviso shares over the disputed property. As regards the issue
of prescription, the CA ruled that the prescriptive period for reconveyance of fraudulently registered
real property is ten years. Since the property was registered in the name of Nora in1984 and the action
for reconveyance was filed in 1991, the action has not yet prescribed.
On January 23, 2008, petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration. The CA, however, denied
their motion in its Resolution dated July 25, 2008.
Hence, this petition raising the sole issue:
Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in rendering its December 21, 2007 Decision modifying
the July 10, 2001 Decision of the trial court, and in issuing its July 25, 2008 Resolution denying
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration dated January 23, 2008. 11
Essentially, the only issue in this case is whether Pedro Calalang was the exclusive owner of the
disputed property prior to its transfer to his daughter Nora B. Calalang-Parulan.
The petitioners argue that the disputed property belonged to the conjugal partnership of the second
marriage of Pedro Calalang with Elvira B. Calalang as evidenced by OCT No. P-2871 which was
issued to Pedro Calalang during the subsistence of his marriage to Elvira B. Calalang. On the other
hand, the respondents claim that the disputed property was transferred by their maternal grandmother,
Francisca Silverio, to their parents, Pedro Calalang and Encarnacion Silverio, during the latter’s
marriage. Thus, the respondents argue that it belonged to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage
of Pedro Calalang with Encarnacion Silverio.
The petition is meritorious.
Preliminarily, we note that the resolution of the issue in this case requires a reevaluation of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties in order to trace the title of the disputed
property. What is involved is indeed a question of fact which is generally beyond the jurisdiction of
this Court to resolve in a petition for review on certiorari. 12 However, a recognized exception to the
rule is when the RTC and CA have conflicting findings of fact as in this case. 13 Here, while the trial
court ruled that the disputed property belonged to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage of
Pedro Calalang with Encarnacion Silverio, the court a quo declared that the evidence proved the sole
and exclusive ownership of the disputed property of Pedro Calalang.
We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and sustain the finding of the CA that Pedro
Calalang is the sole and exclusive owner of the disputed property.
The trial court ruled that the respondents were able to establish that Lot 1132, Cad. 333 originated
from the parents of Encarnacion, and therefore said property "either became property of Encarnacion
in her own right or jointly with her husband Pedro Calalang in 1936." In so ruling, the trial court relied
on the testimony of Rosario Calalang-Garcia that her parents built a nipa house on the subject lot and
lived there before and after World War II. The trial court further noted that Rosario’s testimony was
corroborated by her cousin and adjacent neighbor Manolo Calalang. 14
However, as correctly pointed out by the CA, a close perusal of the records of this case would show
that the records are bereft of any concrete proof to show that the subject property indeed belonged to
respondents’ maternal grandparents. The evidence respondents adduced merely consisted of
testimonial evidence such as the declaration of Rosario Calalang-Garcia that they have been staying on
the property as far as she can remember and that the property was acquired by her parents through
purchase from her maternal grandparents. However, she was unable to produce any document to
evidence the said sale, nor was she able to present any documentary evidence such as the tax
declaration issued in the name of either of her parents. Moreover, we note that the free patent was
issued solely in the name of Pedro Calalang and that it was issued more than 30 years after the death of
Encarnacion and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains of the first marriage. Thus, we
cannot subscribe to respondents’ submission that the subject property originally belonged to the
parents of Encarnacion and was acquired by Pedro Calalang and Encarnacion.
We likewise cannot sustain the argument of the petitioners that the disputed property belongs to the
conjugal partnership of the second marriage of Pedro Calalang with Elvira B. Calalang on the ground
that the title was issued in the name of "Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba [Calalang]."
The contents of a certificate of title are enumerated by Section 45 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree:
SEC. 45. Statement of personal circumstances in the certificate. – Every certificate of title shall set
forth the full names of all persons whose interests make up the full ownership in the whole land,
including their civil status, and the names of their respective spouses, if married, as well as their
citizenship, residence and postal address. If the property covered belongs to the conjugal partnership, it
shall be issued in the names of both spouses.1âwphi1
A plain reading of the above provision would clearly reveal that the phrase "Pedro Calalang, married to
Elvira Berba [Calalang]" merely describes the civil status and identifies the spouse of the registered
owner Pedro Calalang. Evidently, this does not mean that the property is conjugal. In Litam v.
Rivera,15 we declared:
Further strong proofs that the properties in question are the paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera,
are the very Torrens Titles covering said properties. All the said properties are registered in the name
of "Marcosa Rivera, married to Rafael Litam." This circumstance indicates that the properties in
question belong to the registered owner, Marcosa Rivera, as her paraphernal properties, for if they
were conjugal, the titles covering the same should have been issued in the names of Rafael Litam and
Marcosa Rivera. The words "married to Rafael Litam" written after the name of Marcosa Rivera, in
each of the above mentioned titles are merely descriptive of the civil status of Marcosa Rivera, the
registered owner of the properties covered by said titles.
It must likewise be noted that in his application for free patent, 16 applicant Pedro Calalang averred that
the land was first occupied and cultivated by him since 1935 and that he had planted mango trees,
coconut plants, caimito trees, banana plants and seasonal crops and built his house on the subject lot.
But he applied for free patent only in 1974 and was issued a free patent while already married to Elvira
B. Calalang. Thus, having possessed the subject land in the manner and for the period required by law
after the dissolution of the first marriage and before the second marriage, the subject property ipso jure
became private property and formed part of Pedro Calalang’s exclusive property. 17 It was therefore
excluded from the conjugal partnership of gains of the second marriage. 18
As the sole and exclusive owner, Pedro Calalang had the right to convey his property in favor of Nora
B. Calalang-Parulan by executing a Deed of Sale on February 17, 1984. The CA therefore erred in
ruling that Pedro Calalang deprived his heirs of their respective shares over the disputed property when
he alienated the same.
It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death. Article 777 of the
New Civil Code provides that "[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent." In Butte v. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., 19 we proclaimed the fundamental tenets
of succession:
The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in our Civil Code, and is
supported by other related articles. Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as of the time the
decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as of the same moment (Art. 908), and so is
the in officiousness of the donation inter vivas (Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit and
remission are valid only in the amount due and outstanding at the death of the testator (Art. 935), and
the fruits accruing after that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).
Thus, it is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang on December 27, 1989 that his heirs acquired their
respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso shares to his whole estate. At the time of the
sale of the disputed property, the rights to the succession were not yet bestowed upon the heirs of
Pedro Calalang. And absent clear and convincing evidence that the sale was fraudulent or not duly
supported by valuable consideration (in effect an in officious donation inter vivas), the respondents
have no right to question the sale of the disputed property on the ground that their father deprived them
of their respective shares. Well to remember, fraud must be established by clear and convincing
evidence. Mere preponderance of evidence is not even adequate to prove fraud. 20 The Complaint for
Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property must therefore be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 21,
2007 and Resolution dated July 25, 2008 of the Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 72531 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 370-M-91, or the Complaint for
Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property filed by the respondents with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 21 of Malolos, Bulacan, on June 10, 1991, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
Case digest
52. Calalang-Parulan vs. Calalang-Garcia GR. No. 184148
Topic: Succession, Successional rights
Principle:
It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death. Article 777 of the
New Civil Code provides that "[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent." In Butte v. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., we proclaimed the fundamental tenets of
succession:
The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in our Civil Code, and is
supported by other related articles. Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as of the time the
decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as of the same moment (Art. 908), and so is
the in officiousness of the donation inter vivas (Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit and
remission are valid only in the amount due and outstanding at the death of the testator (Art. 935), and
the fruits accruing after that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).
Facts:
In a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property, the respondents Rosario
Calalang-Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile, and Carlito S. Calalang asserted their ownership over a
certain parcel of land against the petitioners Nora B. Calalang-Parulan and Elvira B. Calalang. The said
lot was allegedly acquired by the respondents from their mother Encarnacion Silverio, through
succession as the latter’s compulsory heirs.
According to the respondents, their father, Pedro Calalang contracted two marriages during his
lifetime. The first marriage was with their mother Encarnacion Silverio. During the subsistence of this
marriage, their parents acquired the above-mentioned parcel of land from their maternal grandmother
Francisca Silverio. Despite enjoying continuous possession of the land, however, their parents failed to
register the same. On June 7, 1942, the first marriage was dissolved with the death of Encarnacion
Silverio.
On November 6, 1967, Pedro Calalang entered into a second marriage with Elvira B. Calalang who
then gave birth to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan and Rolando Calalang. According to the respondents, it
was only during this time that Pedro Calalang filed an application for free patent over the parcel of
land with the Bureau of Lands.
On February 17, 1984, Pedro Calalang sold the said parcel of land to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan.
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 283321 was issued in the name of Nora B. Calalang-Parulan.
On December 27, 1989,7 Pedro Calalang died.
The respondents assailed the validity of TCT No. 283321 arguing that the sale of the land was void
because Pedro Calalang failed to obtain the consent of the respondents who were co- owners of the
same.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents were deprived of their respective shares by reason of the sale.
Ruling:
No. It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death. Article 777 of
the New Civil Code provides that "[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
the death of the decedent." In Butte v. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., we proclaimed the fundamental
tenets of succession:
The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in our Civil Code, and is
supported by other related articles. Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as of the time the
decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as of the same moment (Art. 908), and so is
the in officiousness of the donation inter vivas (Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit and
remission are valid only in the amount due and outstanding at the death of the testator (Art. 935), and
the fruits accruing after that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).
Thus, it is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang on December 27, 1989 that his heirs acquired their
respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso shares to his whole estate. At the time of the
sale of the disputed property, the rights to the succession were not yet bestowed upon the heirs of
Pedro Calalang. And absent clear and convincing evidence that the sale was fraudulent or not duly
supported by valuable consideration (in effect an in officious donation inter vivas), the respondents
have no right to question the sale of the disputed property on the ground that their father deprived them
of their respective shares. Well to remember, fraud must be established by clear and convincing
evidence. Mere preponderance of evidence is not even adequate to prove fraud.20 The Complaint for
Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property must therefore be dismissed.
Bar-type Question:
A, is the child of B and C. During the subsistence of B and C’s marriage, they acquired a parcel of land
from C’s mother. Despite enjoying the continued possession of the said land, B and C failed to register
the same until the marriage was dissolved by reason of C’s death. After some time, B contracted a
second marriage with D. It was only during this time that B filed an application for free patent over the
parcel of land with the Bureau of Lands. Thereafter, B sold the land to Z. A new TCT was issued by
reason of the sale to Z. A now filed a case for the annulment of sale and reconveyance of the said
property on the ground that his father deprived him of his respective share. If you are the judge, would
you grant the petition?
Suggested Answer:
No. It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death. Article 777 of
the New Civil Code provides that "[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
the death of the decedent." In Butte v. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., we proclaimed the fundamental
tenets of succession:
The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in our Civil Code, and is
supported by other related articles. Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as of the time the
decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as of the same moment (Art. 908), and so is A parcel of land in the Barrio of Pinamopuan, of the Municipality of Capoocan, Province of Leyte.
the in officiousness of the donation inter vivas (Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit and
remission are valid only in the amount due and outstanding at the death of the testator (Art. 935), and A parcel of land with house and planted to coconuts in the Barrio of Sorsogon, Municipality of Sta.
the fruits accruing after that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948). Margarita, Province of Samar.

Thus, it is only upon B’s death that his heirs acquired their respective inheritances, entitling them to
their pro indiviso shares to his whole estate. At the time of the sale of the disputed property, the rights
to the succession were not yet bestowed upon the heirs of B. And absent clear and convincing evidence
that the sale was fraudulent or not duly supported by valuable consideration (in effect an in officious
donation inter vivas), A has no right to question the sale of the disputed property on the ground that
their father deprived them of their respective shares.
53. G.R. No. 191031, October 05, 2015 - DOLORES L. HACBANG AND BERNARDO J.
HACBANG, Petitioners, v. ATTY. BASILIO H. ALO, Respondent. SECOND DIVISION
BRION, J.:*
53. This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the 13 October 2009 Decision and the 21
January 2010 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R CV No. 83137.1 The CA affirmed
the Quezon City Regional Trial Court's (RTC) dismissal of the petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No.
Q 99-366602for lack of cause of action.
ANTECEDENTS
FIFTH: The other remaining half of my properties wherever they may be located, by these
presents I give, cede and hand over to my sister Dolores Hacbang, which properties are more
particularly described as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Fifty (50) percent of my stockholdings in the "SAMAR NAVIGATION CO. INC."
A piece of land with one house where the Botica San Antonio is located, in the Municipality of
Calbayog, Province of Samar.
A piece of land with house in Acedillo St., Municipality of Calbayog, Province of Samar.
A piece of land with 1 camarin in the barrio of Sorsogon, Municipality of Sta. Margarita, Province of
Samar.
Six (6) Parcels of land located in "NEW MANILA," Municipality of San Juan, Province of Rizal, in
7th St., described as follows: Block 7, Lots 16, 18, 20 and 22, and in 3rd Street, Block 3, Lots 4 and 6.

On 3 April 1937, Bishop Sofronio Hacbang (Bishop Sofronio) died leaving several properties behind. A piece of land situated in Espana St., Municipality of San Juan del Monte of the Province of
Rizal, marked as Lot 8-A, Block 17, of 1,403 square meters in area.4chanrobleslaw
Among these was Lot No. 8-A of subdivision Plan Psd-6227 located at España Street, San Juan,
Rizal,3covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (19896) 227644 (the subject lot).
On 16 April 1937, a petition for the probate of Bishop Sofronio's will and the settlement of his estate
was filed before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila. The petition was docketed as SP.
Bishop Sofronio was survived by his parents, Basilio and Maria Hacbang, and his siblings: Perfecto
Hacbang, Joaquin Hacbang, Lucia Teresita Hacbang, and Dolores Hacbang Alo. Petitioner Dolores L. PROC. No. 51199.
Hacbang is the grandchild of Perfecto while petitioner Bernardo Hacbang (Bernardo) is a son of
On 21 May 1937, the CFI admitted Bishop Sofronio's will to probate. 5
Joaquin. The respondent Basilio Alo is the son of Dolores.

Bishop Sofronio left a will denominated as Ultima Voluntad y Testamento. He left one-half of his The records are bare with respect to what happened next. They show, however, that the CFI ordered
the proceedings to be archived on 2 November 1957.
properties to his parents and devised the other half - including the subject lot - to his sister Dolores.
The pertinent portions of his will read:cralawlawlibrary
On 24 September 1971, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City appears to have issued TCT No.
169342over the subject lot in the name of respondent Basilio H. Alo. TCT No. 169342 cancelled TCT
FOURTH: By these presents I give, name, declare and institute as heirs my parents BASILIO
No. 117322/T-500. However, this Court cannot determine the circumstances surrounding the issuance
HACBANG and MARIA GABORNY DE HACBANG of one-half of all my properties, whether real,
of TCT No. 169342 or the relationship between TCT No. 117322/T-500 and TCT No. (19896) 227644
personal or mixed, in whatever place they may be found, whether they were acquired before or after
due to the inadequacy of the documents on record.
the execution of this testament, including all the properties that at the time of my death I may have the
power to dispose of by will, and which properties consist of the
On 17 March 1975, Dolores Hacbang Alo moved to revive the settlement proceedings because the CFI
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
had not yet completed adjudicating the properties.
Fifty (50) percent of the shares of stock that I own in the "SAMAR NAVIGATION CO. INC."
On 23 May 1975, the CFI denied the motion for revival because the order to archive "had long become
final and executory."6
A parcel of land with its camarin situated in the Municipality of Carigara, Province of Leyte.
On 1 February 1999, petitioners Dolores L. Hacbang and Bernardo filed a petition to cancel TCT No.
169342 on the ground that it was fraudulently secured. In support of their allegations, they submitted
the 5 March 1997 Investigation Report of Land Registration Authority (LRA) Investigator Rodrigo I.
Del Rosario. The report concluded that TCT No. 117322 was of "doubtful authenticity" and was
neither derived from TCT No. 117322 nor issued by the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on 24
September 1971 at 2:30 PM.
In his Answer dated 18 August 1999, Basilio denied all allegations of irregularity and wrongdoing. He
also moved to dismiss the petition because the petitioners were neither heirs nor devisees of Bishop
Sofronio and had no legal interest in the subject lot.
On 7 January 2003, the RTC dismissed the petition because the petitioners had no right to prosecute
the case on the subject lot. The RTC noted that Bishop Sofronio's will had already been admitted into
probate in 1937; thus, the intrinsic validity of the will is no longer in question. Though the settlement
proceedings were archived, Bishop Sofronio already designated his heirs: Bishop Sofronio's parents
were compulsory heirs entitled to half of his estate while the respondent's mother, Dolores Hacbang
Alo, was devised the remaining half (the free portion). Thus, the petitioners, who are neither
compulsory nor testamentary heirs, are not real parties in interest.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration which the RTC denied on 19 August 2003.
The petitioners appealed to the CA, arguing that: (1) Bishop Sofronio's will did not validly transfer the
subject property to Dolores Hacbang Alo; (2) the probate of the will is not conclusive as to the validity
of its intrinsic provisions; and (3) only a final decree of distribution of the estate vests title on the
properties from the estate on the distributees.7 The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R CV No. 83137.
They further argued that the distribution of the estate should be governed by intestate succession
because: (1) the subject property was not adjudicated; and (2) the settlement proceedings were
archived and dismissed. Thus, all the properties passed on to and became part of the estate of Bishop
Sofronio's parents. The petitioners concluded that they had legal interest in the subject lot as
representatives of their ascendants, the other children of Bishop Sofronio's parents.
In his appeal brief, the respondent insisted that the petitioners do not have a clear legal right to
maintain the suit because: (1) as collateral relatives, they cannot invoke the right of representation to
the estate of Bishop Sofronio; and (2) they are not real parties in interest and have no right of action
over the subject lot.
On 13 October 2009, the CA affirmed the RTC's order of dismissal. The CA held that the admission of
Bishop Sofronio's will to probate precluded intestate succession unless the will was intrinsically
invalid or failed to completely dispose of his estate. Contrary to the petitioners' contention, the
settlement proceedings were not dismissed but archived; the will did not lose its validity merely
because the proceedings were archived. Undoubtedly, Bishop Sofronio did not die intestate.
The CA denied the petitioners' claim to a right of inheritance by representation. It held that the
presence of Bishop Sofronio's parents during his death excluded his brothers and sisters from being
compulsory heirs; the petitioners cannot represent those who are hot entitled to succeed. Considering
that they are neither compulsory nor testamentary heirs, petitioners have no legal interest in the subject
property.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration which the CA denied on 21 January 2010. The denial paved
the way for the petitioners to file the present petition for review on certiorari.
THE PETITION
The petitioners argue: (1) that the CA erred when it failed to rule on the validity of TCT No. 169342;
(2) that the probate proceedings of the estate was dismissed, not archived; and (3) that the CA erred
when it used Bishop Sofronio's will as basis to declare that they are not real parties in interest.
In his Comment, the respondent maintained that the petitioners had no right over the property and
moved to dismiss the present petition.
OUR RULING
At the outset, this Court observes that the parties and even the lower courts erroneously applied the
provisions of the present Civil Code to the will and the estate of Bishop Sofronio. The law in force at
the time of the decedent's death determines the applicable law over the settlement of his estate. 8 Bishop
Sofronio died in 1937 before the enactment of the Civil Code in 1949. Therefore, the correct applicable
laws to the settlement of his estate are the 1889 Spanish Civil Code and the 1901 Code of Civil
Procedure.
In any case, under both the Spanish Code and our Civil Code, successional rights are vested at the
precise moment of the death of the decedent. Section 657 of the Spanish code
provides:cralawlawlibrary
Art. 657. Los derechos a la sucesion de una persona se transmiten desde el momento de su
muerte.9chanrobleslaw
The inheritance vests immediately upon the decedent's death without a moment's interruption. This
provision was later on translated and adopted as Article 777 of our Civil Code. 10
As a consequence of this principle, ownership over the inheritance passes to the heirs at
the precisemoment of death - not at the time the heirs are declared, nor at the time of the partition, nor
at the distribution of the properties. There is no interruption between the end of the decedent's
ownership and the start of the heir/legatee/devisee's ownership.
For intestate heirs, this means that they are immediately entitled to their hereditary shares in the estate
even though they may not be entitled to any particular properties yet. For legatees and devisees granted
specific properties, this means that they acquire ownership over the legacies and devises at that
immediate moment without prejudice to the legitimes of compulsory heirs.
Undoubtedly, Bishop Sofronio did not die intestate. He left a will that was probated in 1937. He left
half of his properties to his parents and the remaining half to his sister Dolores Hacbang Alo. The
admission of his will to probate is conclusive with respect to its due execution and extrinsic validity. 11
Unfortunately, the settlement proceedings were never concluded; the case was archived without any
pronouncement as to the intrinsic validity of the will or an adjudication of the properties. Because of
this, the petitioners posit that intestate succession should govern. They maintain that the entire
inheritance should have gone to Bishop Sofronio's parents, the petitioners' ascendants. Thus, they
claim to have a legal interest in the subject lot as representatives of the other children of Bishop
Sofronio's parents.
We do not find the petitioners' argument meritorious.
Our jurisdiction has always respected a decedent's freedom to dispose of his estate, whether under the
Spanish Civil Code or under the present Civil Code. Article 763 of the Spanish Code
provides:cralawlawlibrary
Art. 763. El que no tuviere herederos forzosos puede disponer por testamento de todos sus bienes o de
parte de ellos en favor de cualquiera persona que tenga capacidad para adquirirlos. El que tuviere
herederos forzosos solo podra disponer de sus bienes en la forma y con las limitaciones que se
establecen en la section quinta de este capitulo.chanrobleslaw
This provision states that a person without compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate, either in part or
in its entirety, in favor of anyone capacitated to succeed him; if the testator has compulsory heirs, he
can dispose of his property provided he does not impair their legitimes. This provision was later
translated and adopted as Article 842 of our Civil Code. 12
Our jurisdiction accords great respect to the testator's freedom of disposition. Hence, testate succession
has always been preferred over intestacy.13 As much as possible, a testator's will is treated and
interpreted in a way that would render all of its provisions operative. 14 Hence, there is no basis to apply
the provisions on intestacy when testate succession evidently applies.
Even though the CFI archived the settlement proceedings, there is no indication that it declared any of
the dispositions in the will invalid. The records are understandably bare considering the probate
proceedings were initiated as early as 1937. Nonetheless, we find no reason to doubt the intrinsic
validity of the will.
Bishop Sofronio was free to dispose of his estate without prejudice to the legitimes of his compulsory
heirs. Bishop Sofronio's only compulsory heirs were his parents.15 Their legitime was one-half of
Bishop Sofronio's estate.16 Considering that Bishop Sofronio gave his parents half of his estate, then he
was free to dispose of the free portion of his estate in favor of his sister, Dolores Hacbang Alo. Thus,
his will was intrinsically valid.
The CFPs failure to adjudicate the specific properties is irrelevant because Bishop Sofronio did not just
name his heirs; he also identified the specific properties forming part of their inheritance. The
dispositions in the will rendered court adjudication and distribution unnecessary.
The petitioners' contention that only a final decree of distribution of the estate vests title to the land of
the estate in the distributees is also incorrect. Again, ownership over the inheritance vests upon the
heirs, legatees, and devisees immediately upon the death of the decedent.
At the precise moment of death, the heirs become owners of the estate pro-indiviso. They become
absolute owners of their undivided aliquot share but with respect to the individual properties of the
estate, they become co-owners. This co-ownership remains until partition and distribution. Until then,
the individual heirs cannot claim any rights over a specific property from the estate. This is because the
heirs do not know which properties will be adjudicated to them yet. Hence, there is a need for a
partition before title over particular properties vest in the distributee-heirs.
However, heirs, legatees, and devisees bequeathed specific properties do not require Court
adjudication to identify which particular properties become theirs; the testator had already identified
these. From the very moment of the testator's death, title over these particular properties vests on the
heir, legatee, or devisee.
On 3 April 1937, title over the subject lot passed on to the respondent's mother, Dolores Hacbang Alo,
at the exact moment of her brother's death. From that moment on, she was free to dispose of the subject
lot as a consequence of her ownership.
On the other hand, Bishop Sofronio's parents, Basilio and Maria Gaborny Hacbang, never acquired the
title over the subject lot. Thus, it never became part of their estate. Clearly, the petitioners - who claim
to represent the children of Basilio and Maria Gaborny in the spouses' estate -have no legal right or
interest over the subject lot.
Every ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action - an act or omission that violates the
rights of the plaintiff.17 A cause of action requires:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) a legal right in favor of the plaintiff;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(2) a correlative duty of the defendant to respect the plaintiffs right; and
(3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the plaintiffs right. 18
Every action must also be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest: the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment. 19 These fundamental requirements are not
merely technical matters; they go into the very substance of every suit.
The petitioners came to the courts praying for the annulment of the respondent's title yet they failed to
show that they are entitled to even ask for such relief. They have no right over the subject lot and the
respondent has no legal obligation to them with respect to the subject lot. Even if we assume that the
respondent fraudulently or irregularly secured his certificate of title, the bottom-line is that the
petitioners have no legal standing to sue for the cancellation of this title. This right only belongs to the
rightful owner of the subject lot.
Judicial power is the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable.20 Courts settle real legal disputes involving the rights and
obligations between parties. If either of the parties is not the real party in interest, the Court cannot
grant the reliefs prayed for because that party has no legal right or duty with respect to his opponent.
Further litigation becomes an academic exercise in legal theory that eventually settles nothing - a waste
of time that could have been spent resolving actual justiciable controversies.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.Peralta,** Del Castillo, Leonen, and Jardeleza,*** JJ., concur.
53. Facts:
A petition for the probate of Bishop Sofronio's will and the settlement of his estate was filed and was
admitted thereafter to probate. Petitioner however filed a petition to cancel the registration of the
subject lot of the case because it was found out that it was registered in the name of respondent.
The RTC dismissed the petition because the petitioners had no right to prosecute the case on the
subject lot and noted that Bishop Sofronio's will had already been admitted into probate; thus, the
intrinsic validity of the will is no longer in question. Though the settlement proceedings were archived,
Bishop Sofronio already designated his heirs; thus, the petitioners, who are neither compulsory nor
testamentary heirs, are not real parties in interest.
The CA in turn, affirmed the RTC's order of dismissal and held that the admission of Bishop Sofronio's
will to probate precluded intestate succession unless the will was intrinsically invalid or failed to
completely dispose of his estate. Contrary to the petitioners' contention, the settlement proceedings
were not dismissed but archived; the will did not lose its validity merely because the proceedings were
archived, undoubtedly, Bishop Sofronio did not die intestate. The CA denied the petitioners' claim to a
right of inheritance by representation and cannot represent those who are hot entitled to succeed, thus,
the denial paved the way for the petitioners to file the present petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
1. WON the lower court erroneously applied the provision of the present civil code to the will and
estate of Bishop Sofronio. - YES
2. WON Bishop Sofronio died intestate. - NO
Held:
1. At the outset, this Court observes that the parties and even the lower courts erroneously applied the
provisions of the present Civil Code to the will and the estate of Bishop Sofronio. The law in force at
the time of the decedent's death determines the applicable law over the settlement of his estate. Bishop
Sofronio died in 1937 before the enactment of the Civil Code in 1949. Therefore, the correct applicable
laws to the settlement of his estate are the 1889 Spanish Civil Code and the 1901 Code of Civil
Procedure.
In any case, under both the Spanish Code and our Civil Code, successional rights are vested at the
precise moment of the death of the decedent. In any case, under both the Spanish Code and our Civil
Code, successional rights are vested at the precise moment of the death of the decedent. Section 657 of
the Spanish code provides:
Art. 657. Los derechos a la sucesion de una persona se transmiten desde el momento de su muerte.
(Rights to the estate of a person are transmitted from the time of his death.)
The inheritance vests immediately upon the decedent's death without a moment's interruption. This
provision was later on translated and adopted as Article 777 of our Civil Code.
As a consequence of this principle, ownership over the inheritance passes to the heirs at the precise
moment of death - not at the time the heirs are declared, nor at the time of the partition, nor at the
distribution of the properties. There is no interruption between the end of the decedent's ownership and
the start of the heir/legatee/devisee's ownership.
2. Undoubtedly, Bishop Sofronio did not die intestate. He left a will that was probated in 1937. He left
half of his properties to his parents and the remaining half to his sister Dolores Hacbang Alo. The
admission of his will to probate is conclusive with respect to its due execution and extrinsic validity.
Our jurisdiction has always respected a decedent's freedom to dispose of his estate, whether under the
Spanish Civil Code or under the present Civil Code.
This provision states that a person without compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate, either in part or
in its entirety, in favor of anyone capacitated to succeed him; if the testator has compulsory heirs, he
can dispose of his property provided he does not impair their legitimes. This provision was later
translated and adopted as Article 842 of our Civil Code.
Our jurisdiction accords great respect to the testator's freedom of disposition. Hence, testate succession
has always been preferred over intestacy. As much as possible, a testator's will is treated and
interpreted in a way that would render all of its provisions operative. Hence, there is no basis to apply
the provisions on intestacy when testate succession evidently applies.
54.FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 174489 April 11, 2012
ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR, ANTONIO L. MANGALINDAN,
ROSIE M. MATEO, NENITA A. PACHECO, VIRGILIO REGALA, JR., and RAFAEL
TITCO, Petitioners, vsE.LORENZO LAXA, Respondent.
 DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
It is incumbent upon those who oppose the probate of a will to clearly establish that the decedent was
not of sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution of said will. Otherwise, the state is duty-
bound to give full effect to the wishes of the testator to distribute his estate in the manner provided in
his will so long as it is legally tenable.1
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 of the June 15, 2006 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 which reversed the September 30, 2003 Decision 4 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Guagua, Pampanga in Special Proceedings No. G-1186. The assailed
CA Decision granted the petition for probate of the notarial will of Paciencia Regala (Paciencia), to
wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the appeal to be impressed with merit, the decision in SP.
PROC. NO. G-1186 dated 30 September 2003, is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered
GRANTING the petition for the probate of the will of PACIENCIA REGALA.
SO ORDERED.5
Also assailed herein is the August 31, 2006 CA Resolution6 which denied the Motion for
Reconsideration thereto.
Petitioners call us to reverse the CA’s assailed Decision and instead affirm the Decision of the RTC
which disallowed the notarial will of Paciencia.
Factual Antecedents
Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled "Tauli Nang
Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala" 7 (Will) in the Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981.
The Will, executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge Limpin), was read to
Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that
the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said
document on page 38 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof. 9
The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin), Francisco Garcia
(Francisco) and Faustino R. Mercado (Faustino). The three attested to the Will’s due execution by
affixing their signatures below its attestation clause10 and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4
thereof,11 in the presence of Paciencia and of one another and of Judge Limpin who acted as notary
public.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent
Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and
Katherine Ross Laxa, thus:
xxxx
Fourth - In consideration of their valuable services to me since then up to the present by the spouses
LORENZO LAXA and CORAZON F. LAXA, I hereby BEQUEATH, CONVEY and GIVE all my
properties enumerated in parcels 1 to 5 unto the spouses LORENZO R. LAXA and CORAZON F.
LAXA and their children, LUNA LORELLA LAXA and KATHERINE LAXA, and the spouses
Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa both of legal age, Filipinos, presently residing at Barrio Sta.
Monica, [Sasmuan], Pampanga and their children, LUNA LORELLA and KATHERINE ROSS
LAXA, who are still not of legal age and living with their parents who would decide to bequeath since
they are the children of the spouses;
xxxx
[Sixth] - Should other properties of mine may be discovered aside from the properties mentioned in
this last will and testament, I am also bequeathing and giving the same to the spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa
and Corazon F. Laxa and their two children and I also command them to offer masses yearly for the
repose of my soul and that of D[ñ]a Nicomeda Regala, Epifania Regala and their spouses and with
respect to the fishpond situated at San Antonio, I likewise command to fulfill the wishes of D[ñ]a
Nicomeda Regala in accordance with her testament as stated in my testament. x x x12
The filial relationship of Lorenzo with Paciencia remains undisputed. Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew
whom she treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated Paciencia as his own
mother.13 Paciencia lived with Lorenzo’s family in Sasmuan, Pampanga and it was she who raised and
cared for Lorenzo since his birth. Six days after the execution of the Will or on September 19, 1981,
Paciencia left for the United States of America (USA). There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family
until her death on January 4, 1996.
In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.
More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition 14 with
the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters
of Administration in his favor, docketed as Special Proceedings No. G-1186.
There being no opposition to the petition after its due publication, the RTC issued an Order on June 13,
200015allowing Lorenzo to present evidence on June 22, 2000. On said date, Dra. Limpin testified that
she was one of the instrumental witnesses in the execution of the last will and testament of Paciencia
on September 13, 1981.16 The Will was executed in her father’s (Judge Limpin) home office, in her
presence and of two other witnesses, Francisco and Faustino. 17 Dra. Limpin positively identified the
Will and her signatures on all its four pages.18 She likewise positively identified the signature of her
father appearing thereon.19 Questioned by the prosecutor regarding Judge Limpin’s present mental
fitness, Dra. Limpin testified that her father had a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo brain
surgery.20 The judge can walk but can no longer talk and remember her name. Because of this, Dra.
Limpin stated that her father can no longer testify in court. 21
The following day or on June 23, 2000, petitioner Antonio Baltazar (Antonio) filed an opposition 22 to
Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda
Regala Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to
Lorenzo.23
Barely a month after or on July 20, 2000, Antonio, now joined by petitioners Sebastian M. Baltazar,
Virgilio Regala, Jr., Nenita A. Pacheco, Felix B. Flores, Rafael Titco, Rosie M. Mateo (Rosie) and
Antonio L. Mangalindan filed a Supplemental Opposition24 contending that Paciencia’s Will was null
and void because ownership of the properties had not been transferred and/or titled to Paciencia before
her death pursuant to Article 1049, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. 25 Petitioners also opposed the
issuance of Letters of Administration in Lorenzo’s favor arguing that Lorenzo was disqualified to be
appointed as such, he being a citizen and resident of the USA. 26 Petitioners prayed that Letters of
Administration be instead issued in favor of Antonio.27
Later still on September 26, 2000, petitioners filed an Amended Opposition 28 asking the RTC to deny
the probate of Paciencia’s Will on the following grounds: the Will was not executed and attested to in
accordance with the requirements of the law; that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at
the time of its execution; that she was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or
threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence
by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; that the signature of Paciencia on the Will was
forged; that assuming the signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that
Paciencia did not intend the document to be her Will. Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Opposition
and Recommendation29 reiterating their opposition to the appointment of Lorenzo as administrator of
the properties and requesting for the appointment of Antonio in his stead.
On January 29, 2001, the RTC issued an Order30 denying the requests of both Lorenzo and Antonio to
be appointed administrator since the former is a citizen and resident of the USA while the latter’s claim
as a co-owner of the properties subject of the Will has not yet been established.
Meanwhile, proceedings on the petition for the probate of the Will continued. Dra. Limpin was
recalled for cross-examination by the petitioners. She testified as to the age of her father at the time the
latter notarized the Will of Paciencia; the living arrangements of Paciencia at the time of the execution
of the Will; and the lack of photographs when the event took place. 31
Aside from Dra. Limpin, Lorenzo and Monico Mercado (Monico) also took the witness stand. Monico,
son of Faustino, testified on his father’s condition. According to him his father can no longer talk and
express himself due to brain damage. A medical certificate was presented to the court to support this
allegation. 32
For his part, Lorenzo testified that: from 1944 until his departure for the USA in April 1980, he lived
in Sasmuan, Pampanga with his family and his aunt, Paciencia; in 1981 Paciencia went to the USA and
lived with him and his family until her death in January 1996; the relationship between him and
Paciencia was like that of a mother and child since Paciencia took care of him since birth and took him
in as an adopted son; Paciencia was a spinster without children, and without brothers and sisters; at the
time of Paciencia’s death, she did not suffer from any mental disorder and was of sound mind, was not
blind, deaf or mute; the Will was in the custody of Judge Limpin and was only given to him after
Paciencia’s death through Faustino; and he was already residing in the USA when the Will was
executed.33 Lorenzo positively identified the signature of Paciencia in three different documents and in
the Will itself and stated that he was familiar with Paciencia’s signature because he accompanied her in
her transactions.34 Further, Lorenzo belied and denied having used force, intimidation, violence,
coercion or trickery upon Paciencia to execute the Will as he was not in the Philippines when the same
was executed.35 On cross-examination, Lorenzo clarified that Paciencia informed him about the Will
shortly after her arrival in the USA but that he saw a copy of the Will only after her death. 36
As to Francisco, he could no longer be presented in court as he already died on May 21, 2000.
For petitioners, Rosie testified that her mother and Paciencia were first cousins. 37 She claimed to have
helped in the household chores in the house of Paciencia thereby allowing her to stay therein from
morning until evening and that during the period of her service in the said household, Lorenzo’s wife
and his children were staying in the same house.38 She served in the said household from 1980 until
Paciencia’s departure for the USA on September 19, 1981. 39
On September 13, 1981, Rosie claimed that she saw Faustino bring "something" for Paciencia to sign
at the latter’s house.40 Rosie admitted, though, that she did not see what that "something" was as same
was placed inside an envelope.41 However, she remembered Paciencia instructing Faustino to first look
for money before she signs them.42 A few days after or on September 16, 1981, Paciencia went to the
house of Antonio’s mother and brought with her the said envelope. 43 Upon going home, however, the
envelope was no longer with Paciencia.44 Rosie further testified that Paciencia was referred to as
"magulyan" or "forgetful" because she would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start
looking for it moments later.45 On cross examination, it was established that Rosie was neither a doctor
nor a psychiatrist, that her conclusion that Paciencia was "magulyan" was based on her personal
assessment,46 and that it was Antonio who requested her to testify in court. 47
In his direct examination, Antonio stated that Paciencia was his aunt.48 He identified the Will and
testified that he had seen the said document before because Paciencia brought the same to his mother’s
house and showed it to him along with another document on September 16, 1981. 49 Antonio alleged
that when the documents were shown to him, the same were still unsigned.50 According to him,
Paciencia thought that the documents pertained to a lease of one of her rice lands, 51 and it was he who
explained that the documents were actually a special power of attorney to lease and sell her fishpond
and other properties upon her departure for the USA, and a Will which would transfer her properties to
Lorenzo and his family upon her death.52 Upon hearing this, Paciencia allegedly uttered the following
words: "Why will I never [return], why will I sell all my properties?" Who is Lorenzo? Is he the only
[son] of God? I have other relatives [who should] benefit from my properties. Why should I die
already?"53 Thereafter, Antonio advised Paciencia not to sign the documents if she does not want to, to
which the latter purportedly replied, "I know nothing about those, throw them away or it is up to you.
The more I will not sign them."54 After which, Paciencia left the documents with Antonio. Antonio
kept the unsigned documents
and eventually turned them over to Faustino on September 18, 1981.55 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN MAKING
CONCLUSIONS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD;
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
III.
56
On September 30, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision denying the petition thus:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
WHEREFORE, this court hereby (a) denies the petition dated April 24, 2000; and (b) disallows the PETITIONERS FAILED TO PROVE THAT PACIENCIA WAS NOT OF SOUND MIND
notarized will dated September 13, 1981 of Paciencia Regala. AT THE TIME THE WILL WAS ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED 63

SO ORDERED.57 The pivotal issue is whether the authenticity and due execution of the notarial Will was sufficiently
established to warrant its allowance for probate.
The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of Rosie and concluded that at the time
Paciencia signed the Will, she was no longer possessed of sufficient reason or strength of mind to have Our Ruling
testamentary capacity.58
We deny the petition.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law is apparent from the face of the Will.
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and granted the probate of the Will of Paciencia. The
appellate court did not agree with the RTC’s conclusion that Paciencia was of unsound mind when she Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic validity of a Will in probate
executed the Will. It ratiocinated that "the state of being ‘magulyan’ does not make a person mentally proceedings.64 This is expressly provided for in Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which states:
unsound so [as] to render [Paciencia] unfit for executing a Will." 59 Moreover, the oppositors in the
probate proceedings were not able to overcome the presumption that every person is of sound mind. Rule 75
Further, no concrete circumstances or events were given to prove the allegation that Paciencia was
tricked or forced into signing the Will.60
Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration61 but the motion was denied by the CA in its Resolution62 dated
Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution. – No will shall pass either real or personal
August 31, 2006.
estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court. Subject to the right of appeal, such allowance
of the will shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
Hence, this petition.
Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator, being of sound mind,
Issues freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. 65 These formalities are
enshrined in Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
Petitioners come before this Court by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari ascribing upon the CA
the following errors: Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator
himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
I. direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED
THE PROBATE OF PACIENCIA’S WILL DESPITE RESPONDENT’S UTTER FAILURE The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the
TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 11, RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT; will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and
all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
II.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the
testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under
his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and
signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.
The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the Office of the
Clerk of Court.
Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the formalities laid
down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary
public, are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the
critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses signed the Will in the presence of
one another and that the witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator
and of one another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may
be authentic although they question her state of mind when she signed the same as well as the
voluntary nature of said act.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on
the shoulders of the petitioners.
Petitioners, through their witness Rosie, claim that Paciencia was "magulyan" or forgetful so much so
that it effectively stripped her of testamentary capacity. They likewise claimed in their Motion for
Reconsideration66 filed with the CA that Paciencia was not only "magulyan" but was actually suffering
from paranoia.67
We are not convinced.
We agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a
person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will. 68 Forgetfulness is not equivalent
to being of unsound mind. Besides, Article 799 of the New Civil Code states:
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his
reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury
or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the
estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.
In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencia’s forgetfulness, there is no
substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the
time of the execution of the Will. On the other hand, we find more worthy of credence Dra. Limpin’s
testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge Limpin’s house and
voluntarily executed the Will. "The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the
testator’s mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent." 69 More
importantly, a testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the execution of the Will and the
burden to prove otherwise lies on the oppositor. Article 800 of the New Civil Code states:
Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on
the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making
his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove
that the testator made it during a lucid interval.
Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month or less before
the making of the Will. Clearly, thus, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind lies
upon the shoulders of petitioners. However and as earlier mentioned, no substantial evidence was
presented by them to prove the same, thereby warranting the CA’s finding that petitioners failed to
discharge such burden.
Furthermore, we are convinced that Paciencia was aware of the nature of her estate to be disposed of,
the proper objects of her bounty and the character of the testamentary act. As aptly pointed out by the
CA:
A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the nature of the document she executed.
She specially requested that the customs of her faith be observed upon her death. She was well aware
of how she acquired the properties from her parents and the properties she is bequeathing to
LORENZO, to his wife CORAZON and to his two (2) children. A third child was born after the
execution of the will and was not included therein as devisee. 70
Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence and pressure,
fraud and trickery cannot be used as basis to deny the probate of a will.
An essential element of the validity of the Will is the willingness of the testator or testatrix to execute
the document that will distribute his/her earthly possessions upon his/her death. Petitioners claim that
Paciencia was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution
of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some
other persons for his benefit; and that assuming Paciencia’s signature to be genuine, it was obtained
through fraud or trickery. These are grounded on the alleged conversation between Paciencia and
Antonio on September 16, 1981 wherein the former purportedly repudiated the Will and left it
unsigned.
We are not persuaded.
We take into consideration the unrebutted fact that Paciencia loved and treated Lorenzo as her own son
and that love even extended to Lorenzo’s wife and children. This kind of relationship is not unusual. It
is in fact not unheard of in our culture for old maids or spinsters to care for and raise their nephews and
nieces and treat them as their own children. Such is a prevalent and accepted cultural practice that has
resulted in many family discords between those favored by the testamentary disposition of a testator
and those who stand to benefit in case of intestacy.
In this case, evidence shows the acknowledged fact that Paciencia’s relationship with Lorenzo and his
family is different from her relationship with petitioners. The very fact that she cared for and raised
Lorenzo and lived with him both here and abroad, even if the latter was already married and already
has children, highlights the special bond between them. This unquestioned relationship between
Paciencia and the devisees tends to support the authenticity of the said document as against petitioners’
allegations of duress, influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence, pressure, fraud, and
trickery which, aside from being factual in nature, are not supported by concrete, substantial and
credible evidence on record. It is worth stressing that bare arguments, no matter how forceful, if not
based on concrete and substantial evidence cannot suffice to move the Court to uphold said
allegations.71Furthermore, "a purported will is not [to be] denied legalization on dubious grounds.
Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its foundation, for even if a
will has been duly executed in fact, whether x x x it will be probated would have to depend largely on
the attitude of those interested in [the estate of the deceased]." 72
Court should be convinced by the evidence presented before it that the Will was duly executed.
Petitioners dispute the authenticity of Paciencia’s Will on the ground that Section 11 of Rule 76 of the
Rules of Court was not complied with. It provides:
RULE 76
Allowance or Disallowance of Will
Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for where will contested. – If the will is
contested, all the subscribing witnesses, and the notary in the case of wills executed under the Civil
Code of the Philippines, if present in the Philippines and not insane, must be produced and examined,
and the death, absence, or insanity of any of them must be satisfactorily shown to the court. If all or
some of such witnesses are present in the Philippines but outside the province where the will has been
filed, their deposition must be taken. If any or all of them testify against the due execution of the will,
or do not remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful credibility, the will may
nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of other witnesses and from all the
evidence presented that the will was executed and attested in the manner required by law.
If a holographic will is contested, the same shall be allowed if at least three (3) witnesses who know
the handwriting of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting
of the testator; in the absence of any competent witnesses, and if the court deem it necessary, expert
testimony may be resorted to. (Emphasis supplied.)
They insist that all subscribing witnesses and the notary public should have been presented in court
since all but one witness, Francisco, are still living.
We cannot agree with petitioners.
We note that the inability of Faustino and Judge Limpin to appear and testify before the court was
satisfactorily explained during the probate proceedings. As testified to by his son, Faustino had a heart
attack, was already bedridden and could no longer talk and express himself due to brain damage. To
prove this, said witness presented the corresponding medical certificate. For her part, Dra. Limpin
testified that her father, Judge Limpin, suffered a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo brain surgery. At
that time, Judge Limpin could no longer talk and could not even remember his daughter’s name so that
Dra. Limpin stated that given such condition, her father could no longer testify. It is well to note that at
that point, despite ample opportunity, petitioners neither interposed any objections to the testimonies of
said witnesses nor challenged the same on cross examination. We thus hold that for all intents and
purposes, Lorenzo was able to satisfactorily account for the incapacity and failure of the said
subscribing witness and of the notary public to testify in court. Because of this the probate of
Paciencia’s Will may be allowed on the basis of Dra. Limpin’s testimony proving her sanity and the
due execution of the Will, as well as on the proof of her handwriting. It is an established rule that "[a]
testament may not be disallowed just because the attesting witnesses declare against its due execution;
neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just because all the attesting witnesses declare in favor of
its legalization; what is decisive is that the court is convinced by evidence before it, not necessarily
from the attesting witnesses, although they must testify, that the will was or was not duly executed in
the manner required by law."73 1âwphi1
Moreover, it bears stressing that "[i]rrespective x x x of the posture of any of the parties as regards the
authenticity and due execution of the will x x x in question, it is the mandate of the law that it is the
evidence before the court and/or [evidence that] ought to be before it that is controlling." 74 "The very
existence of [the Will] is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed [testatrix] has willed that [her]
estate be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally
tenable, such desire be given full effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected
thereby."75 This, coupled with Lorenzo’s established relationship with Paciencia, the evidence and the
testimonies of disinterested witnesses, as opposed to the total lack of evidence presented by petitioners
apart from their self-serving testimonies, constrain us to tilt the balance in favor of the authenticity of
the Will and its allowance for probate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 15, 2006 and the Resolution dated
August 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

54. Baltazar v. Laxa
FACTS:
Paciencia was a 78 years old spinster when she made her last will and testament in the Pampango
dialect on Sept. 13, 1981. The will, executed in the house of retired Judge Limpin, was read to
Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that
the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said
document on page 3 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent
Lorenzo Laxa and his wife Corazon Laza and their children Luna and Katherine. Lorenzo is
Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated
Paciencia as his own mother. Six days after the execution of the Will, Paciencia left for USA. There,
she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death.
Four years after the death of Paciencia, Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga
for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor.
Antonio Baltazar, petitioner filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s petition and averred that the properties
subject of Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence,
Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo.
For petitioners, Rosie testified that her mother and Paciencia were first cousins and that that Paciencia
was referred to as magulyan or forgetful because she would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen
then start looking for it moments later. On cross examination, it was established that Rosie was neither
a doctor nor a psychiatrist, that her conclusion that Paciencia was magulyan was based on her personal
assessment.
Petitioners filed an Amended Opposition asking the RTC to deny the probate of Paciencias Will on the
grounds that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution, that she was
forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threat and that the execution of the Will
had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo.
Lorenzo testified that at the time of Paciencias death, she did not suffer from any mental disorder and
was of sound mind, was not blind, deaf or mute. Lorenzo belied and denied having used force,
intimidation, violence, coercion or trickery upon Paciencia to execute the Will as he was not in the
Philippines when the same was executed.
RTC denies the petition for probate of the will and concluded that when Paciencia signed the will, she
was no longer possessed of the sufficient reason or strength of mind to have the testamentary capacity.
On appeal, CA reversed the decision of the RTC and granted the probate of the will. The petitioner
went up to SC for a petition for review on Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the authenticity and due execution of the will was sufficiently established to warrant its
allowance for probate.
HELD:
Yes. A careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the formalities laid
down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary
public, are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the
critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will
in the presence of the testator and of one another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the
signature of Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although they question of her state of mind when
she signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said act.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on
the shoulders of the petitioners. The SC agree with the position of the CA that the state of being
forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a
Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Art. 799 of the NCC states:
“To be of unsound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning
faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other
cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the Will to know the nature of
the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.”
55. FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 147145 January 31, 2005
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA, BELINDA CAPONONG-
NOBLE, petitioner, vs.ALIPIO ABAJA and NOEL ABELLAR, respondents.
D E C I S I O N CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals of 12 January
2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 47644. The Court of Appeals sustained the Resolution3 of the Regional Trial
Court of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, Branch 61 ("RTC-Kabankalan"), admitting to probate the
last will and testament of Alipio Abada ("Abada").
The Antecedent Facts
Abada died sometime in May 1940.4 His widow Paula Toray ("Toray") died sometime in September
1943. Both died without legitimate children.
On 13 September 1968, Alipio C. Abaja ("Alipio") filed with the then Court of First Instance of As prayed for by counsel, Noel Abbellar11 is appointed administrator of the estate of Paula Toray who
Negros Occidental (now RTC-Kabankalan) a petition,5 docketed as SP No. 070 (313-8668), for the shall discharge his duties as such after letters of administration shall have been issued in his favor and
probate of the last will and testament ("will") of Abada. Abada allegedly named as his testamentary after taking his oath and filing a bond in the amount of Ten Thousand (₱10,000.00) Pesos.
heirs his natural children Eulogio Abaja ("Eulogio") and Rosario Cordova. Alipio is the son of
Eulogio. Mrs. Belinda C. Noble, the present administratrix of the estate of Alipio Abada shall continue
discharging her duties as such until further orders from this Court.
Nicanor Caponong ("Caponong") opposed the petition on the ground that Abada left no will when he
died in 1940. Caponong further alleged that the will, if Abada really executed it, should be disallowed SO ORDERED.12
for the following reasons: (1) it was not executed and attested as required by law; (2) it was not
intended as the last will of the testator; and (3) it was procured by undue and improper pressure and
The RTC-Kabankalan ruled on the only issue raised by the oppositors in their motions to dismiss the
influence on the part of the beneficiaries. Citing the same grounds invoked by Caponong, the alleged
petition for probate, that is, whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause as required by law. The
intestate heirs of Abada, namely, Joel, Julian, Paz, Evangeline, Geronimo, Humberto, Teodora and
RTC-Kabankalan further held that the failure of the oppositors to raise any other matter forecloses all
Elena Abada ("Joel Abada, et al."), and Levi, Leandro, Antonio, Florian, Hernani and Carmela Tronco other issues.
("Levi Tronco, et al."), also opposed the petition. The oppositors are the nephews, nieces and
grandchildren of Abada and Toray.
Not satisfied with the Resolution, Caponong-Noble filed a notice of appeal.
6
On 13 September 1968, Alipio filed another petition before the RTC-Kabankalan, docketed as SP No.
071 (312-8669), for the probate of the last will and testament of Toray. Caponong, Joel Abada, et al., In a Decision promulgated on 12 January 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Resolution of the
and Levi Tronco, et al. opposed the petition on the same grounds they cited in SP No. 070 (313-8668). RTC-Kabankalan. The appellate court found that the RTC-Kabankalan properly admitted to probate
the will of Abada.
On 20 September 1968, Caponong filed a petition7 before the RTC-Kabankalan, docketed as SP No.
069 (309), praying for the issuance in his name of letters of administration of the intestate estate of Hence, the present recourse by Caponong-Noble.
Abada and Toray.
The Issues
In an Order dated 14 August 1981, the RTC-Kabankalan admitted to probate the will of Toray. Since
the oppositors did not file any motion for reconsideration, the order allowing the probate of Toray’s The petition raises the following issues:
will became final and executory.8
1. What laws apply to the probate of the last will of Abada;
In an order dated 23 November 1990, the RTC-Kabankalan designated Belinda Caponong-Noble
("Caponong-Noble") Special Administratrix of the estate of Abada and Toray. 9 Caponong-Noble 2. Whether the will of Abada requires acknowledgment before a notary public; 13
moved for the dismissal of the petition for probate of the will of Abada. The RTC-Kabankalan denied
the motion in an Order dated 20 August 1991.10 3. Whether the will must expressly state that it is written in a language or dialect known to the
testator;
Sometime in 1993, during the proceedings, Presiding Judge Rodolfo S. Layumas discovered that in an
Order dated 16 March 1992, former Presiding Judge Edgardo Catilo had already submitted the case for 4. Whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause, and if so, whether the attestation clause
decision. Thus, the RTC-Kabankalan rendered a Resolution dated 22 June 1994, as follows: complies with the requirements of the applicable laws;

There having been sufficient notice to the heirs as required by law; that there is substantial compliance 5. Whether Caponong-Noble is precluded from raising the issue of whether the will of Abada
with the formalities of a Will as the law directs and that the petitioner through his testimony and the is written in a language known to Abada;
deposition of Felix Gallinero was able to establish the regularity of the execution of the said Will and
further, there being no evidence of bad faith and fraud, or substitution of the said Will, the Last Will
6. Whether evidence aliunde may be resorted to in the probate of the will of Abada.
and Testament of Alipio Abada dated June 4, 1932 is admitted and allowed probate.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the RTC-Kabankalan in admitting to probate the will of
Abada.
The Applicable Law
Abada executed his will on 4 June 1932. The laws in force at that time are the Civil Code of 1889 or
the Old Civil Code, and Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure 14 which governed the execution of
wills before the enactment of the New Civil Code.
The matter in dispute in the present case is the attestation clause in the will of Abada. Section 618 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, 15 governs the form of the attestation clause
of Abada’s will.16Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:
SEC. 618. Requisites of will. – No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to
17
pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the language or
dialect known by the testator and signed by him, or by the testator’s name written by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The testator or the person requested
by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each
and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters
placed on the upper part of each sheet. The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used,
upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or
caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three
witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of each other.
Requisites of a Will under the Code of Civil Procedure
Under Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the requisites of a will are the following:
(1) The will must be written in the language or dialect known by the testator;
(2) The will must be signed by the testator, or by the testator’s name written by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction;
(3) The will must be attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of each other;
(4) The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will must sign each and every page of the will on the left margin;
(5) The pages of the will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
each sheet;
(6) The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is
written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page of the will, or caused
some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three
witnesses, and the witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all pages of the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other.
Caponong-Noble asserts that the will of Abada does not indicate that it is written in a language or
dialect known to the testator. Further, she maintains that the will is not acknowledged before a notary
public. She cites in particular Articles 804 and 805 of the Old Civil Code, thus:
Art. 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in [a] language or dialect known to the testator.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.
xxx18
Caponong-Noble actually cited Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code.19 Article 804 of the Old
Civil Code is about the rights and obligations of administrators of the property of an absentee, while
Article 806 of the Old Civil Code defines a legitime.
Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code are new provisions. Article 804 of the New Civil Code is
taken from Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.20 Article 806 of the New Civil Code is taken
from Article 685 of the Old Civil Code21 which provides:
Art. 685. The notary and two of the witnesses who authenticate the will must be acquainted with the
testator, or, should they not know him, he shall be identified by two witnesses who are acquainted with
him and are known to the notary and to the attesting witnesses. The notary and the witnesses shall also
endeavor to assure themselves that the testator has, in their judgment, the legal capacity required to
make a will.
Witnesses authenticating a will without the attendance of a notary, in cases falling under Articles 700
and 701, are also required to know the testator.
However, the Code of Civil Procedure22 repealed Article 685 of the Old Civil Code. Under the Code of
Civil Procedure, the intervention of a notary is not necessary in the execution of any will.23 Therefore,
Abada’s will does not require acknowledgment before a notary public.1awphi1.nét
Caponong-Noble points out that nowhere in the will can one discern that Abada knew the Spanish
language. She alleges that such defect is fatal and must result in the disallowance of the will. On this
issue, the Court of Appeals held that the matter was not raised in the motion to dismiss, and that it is
now too late to raise the issue on appeal. We agree with Caponong-Noble that the doctrine of estoppel
does not apply in probate proceedings.24 In addition, the language used in the will is part of the
requisites under Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Court deems it proper to pass upon
this issue.
Nevertheless, Caponong-Noble’s contention must still fail. There is no statutory requirement to state in
the will itself that the testator knew the language or dialect used in the will. 25 This is a matter that a
party may establish by proof aliunde.26 Caponong-Noble further argues that Alipio, in his testimony,
has failed, among others, to show that Abada knew or understood the contents of the will and the
Spanish language used in the will. However, Alipio testified that Abada used to gather Spanish-
speaking people in their place. In these gatherings, Abada and his companions would talk in the
Spanish language.27 This sufficiently proves that Abada speaks the Spanish language.
The Attestation Clause of Abada’s Will
A scrutiny of Abada’s will shows that it has an attestation clause. The attestation clause of Abada’s
will reads:
Suscrito y declarado por el testador Alipio Abada como su ultima voluntad y testamento en presencia
de nosotros, habiendo tambien el testador firmado en nuestra presencia en el margen izquierdo de todas
y cada una de las hojas del mismo. Y en testimonio de ello, cada uno de nosotros lo firmamos en
presencia de nosotros y del testador al pie de este documento y en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada
una de las dos hojas de que esta compuesto el mismo, las cuales estan paginadas correlativamente con
las letras "UNO" y "DOS’ en la parte superior de la carrilla.28
Caponong-Noble proceeds to point out several defects in the attestation clause. Caponong-Noble
alleges that the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages on which the will is written.
The allegation has no merit. The phrase "en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las dos hojas
de que esta compuesto el mismo" which means "in the left margin of each and every one of the two
pages consisting of the same" shows that the will consists of two pages. The pages are numbered
correlatively with the letters "ONE" and "TWO" as can be gleaned from the phrase "las cuales estan
paginadas correlativamente con las letras "UNO" y "DOS."
Caponong-Noble further alleges that the attestation clause fails to state expressly that the testator
signed the will and its every page in the presence of three witnesses. She then faults the Court of
Appeals for applying to the present case the rule on substantial compliance found in Article 809 of the
New Civil Code.29
The first sentence of the attestation clause reads: "Suscrito y declarado por el testador Alipio Abada
como su ultima voluntad y testamento en presencia de nosotros, habiendo tambien el testador firmado
en nuestra presencia en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las hojas del mismo." The English
translation is: "Subscribed and professed by the testator Alipio Abada as his last will and testament in
our presence, the testator having also signed it in our presence on the left margin of each and every one
of the pages of the same." The attestation clause clearly states that Abada signed the will and its every
page in the presence of the witnesses.
However, Caponong-Noble is correct in saying that the attestation clause does not indicate the number
of witnesses. On this point, the Court agrees with the appellate court in applying the rule on substantial
compliance in determining the number of witnesses. While the attestation clause does not state the
number of witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows that three witnesses signed it.
This Court has applied the rule on substantial compliance even before the effectivity of the New Civil
Code. In Dichoso de Ticson v. De Gorostiza,30 the Court recognized that there are two divergent
tendencies in the law on wills, one being based on strict construction and the other on liberal
construction. In Dichoso, the Court noted that Abangan v. Abangan,31 the basic case on the liberal
construction, is cited with approval in later decisions of the Court.
In Adeva vda. De Leynez v. Leynez,32 the petitioner, arguing for liberal construction of applicable
laws, enumerated a long line of cases to support her argument while the respondent, contending that
the rule on strict construction should apply, also cited a long series of cases to support his view. The
Court, after examining the cases invoked by the parties, held:
x x x It is, of course, not possible to lay down a general rule, rigid and inflexible, which would be
applicable to all cases. More than anything else, the facts and circumstances of record are to be
considered in the application of any given rule. If the surrounding circumstances point to a regular
execution of the will, and the instrument appears to have been executed substantially in accordance
with the requirements of the law, the inclination should, in the absence of any suggestion of bad faith,
forgery or fraud, lean towards its admission to probate, although the document may suffer from some
imperfection of language, or other non-essential defect. x x x.
An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in permanent form, a record of the facts
attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the subscribing
witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be proved. (Thompson on Wills, 2d ed., sec. 132.) A will,
therefore, should not be rejected where its attestation clause serves the purpose of the law. x x
x 331a\^/phi1.net
We rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate of Abada’s will. Abada’s will clearly shows
four signatures: that of Abada and of three other persons. It is reasonable to conclude that there are
three witnesses to the will. The question on the number of the witnesses is answered by an examination
of the will itself and without the need for presentation of evidence aliunde. The Court explained the
extent and limits of the rule on liberal construction, thus:
[T]he so-called liberal rule does not offer any puzzle or difficulty, nor does it open the door to serious
consequences. The later decisions do tell us when and where to stop; they draw the dividing line with
precision. They do not allow evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the document or supply
missing details that should appear in the will itself.l^vvphi1.net They only permit a probe into the
will, an exploration within its confines, to ascertain its meaning or to determine the existence or
absence of the requisite formalities of law. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates uncertainty and
ought to banish any fear of dire results.34 (Emphasis supplied)
The phrase "en presencia de nosotros" or "in our presence" coupled with the signatures appearing on
the will itself and after the attestation clause could only mean that: (1) Abada subscribed to and
professed before the three witnesses that the document was his last will, and (2) Abada signed the will
and the left margin of each page of the will in the presence of these three witnesses.
Finally, Caponong-Noble alleges that the attestation clause does not expressly state the circumstances
that the witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the testator and of
each other. This Court has ruled:
Precision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is desirable. However, it is not imperative
that a parrot-like copy of the words of the statute be made. It is sufficient if from the language
employed it can reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what the law expects of it. 35
The last part of the attestation clause states "en testimonio de ello, cada uno de nosotros lo firmamos
en presencia de nosotros y del testador." In English, this means "in its witness, every one of us also
signed in our presence and of the testator." This clearly shows that the attesting witnesses witnessed
the signing of the will of the testator, and that each witness signed the will in the presence of one
another and of the testator.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 12 January 2001 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 47644.
Ruling of the Court:
The will should be allowed for having complied with the formalities required by law.
Oppositor asserts that the will of Abada does not indicate that it is written in a language or dialect
known to the testator. Further, she maintains that the will is not acknowledged before a notary public.
She points out that nowhere in the will can one discern that Abada knew the Spanish language. She
alleges that such defect is fatal and must result in the disallowance of the will. On this issue, the Court
of Appeals held that the matter was not raised in the motion to dismiss, and that it is now too late to
raise the issue on appeal. We agree that the doctrine of estoppel does not apply in probate proceedings.
In addition, the language used in the will is part of the requisites under Section 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure and the Court deems it proper to pass upon this issue. Nevertheless, the contention
must still fail. There is no statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the testator knew the
language or dialect used in the will. This is a matter that a party may establish by proof aliunde.
Oppositor further argues that Alipio, in his testimony, has failed, among others, to show that Abada
knew or understood the contents of the will and the Spanish language used in the will. However,
Alipio testified that Abada used to gather Spanish-speaking people in their place. In these gatherings,
Abada and his companions would talk in the Spanish language. This sufficiently proves that Abada
speaks the Spanish language.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

55. Facts of the Case:

Abada died sometime in May 1940. Abada allegedly named as his testamentary heirs his
natural children Eulogio Abaja and Rosario Cordova. Alipio is the son of Eulogio. The oppositors are
the nephews, nieces and grandchildren of Abada and Toray. They opposed the petition on the ground
that Abada left no will when he died in 1940. They further alleged that the will, if Abada really
executed it, should be disallowed for the following reasons: (1) it was not executed and attested as
required by law; (2) it was not intended as the last will of the testator; and (3) it was procured by undue
and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries. In an Order dated 14 August
1981, the RTC-Kabankalan admitted to probate the will of Toray. Since the oppositors did not file any
motion for reconsideration, the order allowing the probate of Toray's will became final and executory.
Not satisfied with the Resolution, Caponong-Noble filed a notice of appeal.

Issues of the Case:

Whether the will should be disallowed for not complying with the formalities required by law.