ARTICLE III
120820 August 1, 2000
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
ARTICLE VIII
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and
legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and
shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
RULE 128
General Provisions
Section 1. Evidence defined. — Evidence is the means, sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining in a
judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact. (1)
Section 2. Scope. — The rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and
hearings, except as otherwise provided by law or these rules. (2a)
Section 3. Admissibility of evidence. — Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is
not excluded by the law of these rules. (3a)
Section 4. Relevancy; collateral matters. — Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as
to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be
allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability
of the fact in issue. (4a)
G.R. No.
SPS. FORTUNATO SANTOS and ROSALINDA R SANTOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. MARIANO R. CASEDA and CARMEN CASEDA, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 28, 1995, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 30955, which reversed and set aside the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
133, in Civil Case No. 89-4759. Petitioners (the Santoses) were the owners of a house and lot
informally sold, with conditions, to herein private respondents (the Casedas). In the trial court, the
Casedas had complained that the Santoses refused to deliver said house and lot despite repeated
demands. The trial court dismissed the complaint for specific performance and damages, but in the
Court of Appeals, the dismissal was reversed, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and a new one entered:
"1. GRANTING plaintiffs-appellants a period of NINETY (90) DAYS from the date of the
finality of judgment within which to pay the balance of the obligation in accordance with
their agreement;
"2. Ordering appellees to restore possession of the subject house and lot to the appellants
upon receipt of the full amount of the balance due on the purchase price; and
"3. No pronouncement as to costs.
"SO ORDERED."1
The undisputed facts of this case are as follows:
The spouses Fortunato and Rosalinda Santos owned the house and lot consisting of 350 square
meters located at Lot 7, Block 8, Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila, as evidenced
by TCT (S-11029) 28005 of the Register of Deeds of Parañaque. The land together with the house,
was mortgaged with the Rural Bank of Salinas, Inc., to secure a loan of P150,000.00 maturing on
June 16, 1987.
Sometime in 1984, Rosalinda Santos met Carmen Caseda, a fellow market vendor of hers in Pasay
City and soon became very good friends with her. The duo even became kumadres when Carmen
stood as a wedding sponsor of Rosalinda's nephew.
On June 16, 1984, the bank sent Rosalinda Santos a letter demanding payment of P16,915.84 in
unpaid interest and other charges. Since the Santos couple had no funds, Rosalinda offered to sell
the house and lot to Carmen. After inspecting the real property, Carmen and her husband agreed.
Sometime that month of June, Carmen and Rosalinda signed a document, which reads:
 "Received the amount of P54,100.00 as a partial payment of Mrs. Carmen Caseda to the
(total) amount of 350,000.00 (house and lot) that is own (sic) by Mrs. Rosalinda R.
Santos.
(Sgd.) Carmen H. Caseda
direct buyer
Mrs. Carmen Caseda
"(Sgd.) Rosalinda Del R. Santos
Owner
Mrs. Rosalinda R. Santos
House and Lot
Better Living Subd. Parañaque, Metro Manila
Section V Don Bosco St."2
The other terms and conditions that the parties agreed upon were for the Caseda spouses to pay: (1)
the balance of the mortgage loan with the Rural bank amounting to P135,385.18; (2) the real estate
taxes; (3) the electric and water bills; and (4) the balance of the cash price to be paid not later than
June 16, 1987, which was the maturity date of the loan.3
The Casedas gave an initial payment of P54,100.00 and immediately took possession of the
property, which they then leased out. They also paid in installments, P81,696.84 of the mortgage
loan. The Casedas, however, failed to pay the remaining balance of the loan because they suffered
bankruptcy in 1987. Notwithstanding the state of their finances, Carmen nonetheless paid in March
1990, the real estate taxes on the property for 1981-1984. She also settled the electric bills from
December 12, 1988 to July 12, 1989. All these payments were made in the name of Rosalinda Santos.
In January 1989, the Santoses, seeing that the Casedas lacked the means to pay the remaining
installments and/or amortization of the loan, repossessed the property. The Santoses then collected
the rentals from the tenants.
In February 1989, Carmen Caseda sold her fishpond in Batangas. She then approached petitioners
and offered to pay the balance of the purchase price for the house and lot. The parties, however,
could not agree, and the deal could not push through because the Santoses wanted a higher price.
For understandably, the real estate boom in Metro Manila at this time, had considerably jacked up
realty values. On August 11, 1989, the Casedas filed Civil Case No. 89-4759, with the RTC of Makati,
to have the Santoses execute the final deed of conveyance over the property, or in default thereof, to
reimburse the amount of P180,000.00 paid in cash and P249,900.00 paid to the rural bank, plus
interest, as well as rentals for eight months amounting to P32,000.00, plus damages and costs of
suit.1âwphi1.nêt
After trial on the merits, the lower court disposed of the case as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby ordered:
(a) dismissing plaintiff's (Casedas') complaint; and
(b) declaring the agreement; marked as Annex "C" of the complaint rescinded. Costs
against plaintiffs.
"SO ORDERED."4
Said judgment of dismissal is mainly based on the trial court's finding that:
"Admittedly, the purchase price of the house and lot was P485,385.18, i.e. P350,000.00 as
cash payment and P135,385.18, assumption of mortgage. Of it plaintiffs [Casedas] paid
the following: (1) P54,100.00 down payment; and (2) P81,694.64 installment payments
to the bank on the loan (Exhs. E to E-19) or a total of P135,794.64. Thus, plaintiffs were
short of the purchase price. They cannot, therefore, demand specific performance." 5
The trial court further held that the Casedas were not entitled to reimbursement of payments
already made, reasoning that:
"As earlier mentioned, plaintiffs made a total payment of P135,794.64 out of the purchase
price of P485,385.18. The property was in plaintiffs' possession from June 1984 to
January 1989 or a period of fifty-five months. During that time, plaintiffs leased the
property. Carmen said the property was rented for P25.00 a day or P750.00 a month at
the start and in 1987 it was increased to P2,000.00 and P4,000 a month. But the evidence
is not precise when the different amounts of rental took place. Be that as it may, fairness
demands that plaintiffs must pay defendants for the exercise of dominical rights over the
property by renting it to others. The amount of P2,000.00 a month would be reasonable
based on the average of P750.00, P2,000.00, P4,000.00 lease-rentals charged. Multiply
P2,000 by 55 months, the plaintiffs must pay defendants P110,000 for the use of the
property. Deducting this amount from the P135,794.64 payment of the plaintiffs on the
property the difference is P25,794.64. Should the plaintiffs be entitled to a
reimbursement of this amount? The answer is in the negative. Because of failure of
plaintiffs to liquidated the mortgage loan on time, it had ballooned from its original figure
of P135,384.18 as of June 1984 to P337,280.78 as of December 31, 1988. Defendants
[Santoses] had to pay the last amount to the bank to save the property from foreclosure.
Logically, plaintiffs must share in the burden arising from their failure to liquidate the
loan per their contractual commitment. Hence, the amount of P25,794.64 as their share in
the defendants' damages in the form of increased loan-amount, is reasonable."6
On appeal, the appellate court, as earlier noted, reversed the lower court. The appellate court held
that rescission was not justified under the circumstances and allowed the Caseda spouses a period
of ninety days within which to pay the balance of the agreed purchase price.
Hence, this instant petition for review on certiorari filed by the Santoses.
Petitioners now submit the following issues for our consideration:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS, HAS JURISDICTION TO DECIDE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT'S APPEAL INTERPOSING PURELY QUESTIONS OF LAW.
 WHETHER THE SUBJECT TRANSACTION IS NOT A CONTRACT OF ABSOLUTE SALE BUT
A MERE ORAL CONTRACT TO SELL IN WHICH CASE JUDICIAL DEMAND FOR RESCISSION
(ART. 1592,7 CIVIL CODE) IS NOT APPLICABLE.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT A JUDICIAL DEMAND FOR RESCISSION IS REQUIRED,
WHETHER PETITIONERS' DEMAND AND PRAYER FOR RESCISSION CONTAINED IN
THEIR ANSWER FILED BEFORE THE TRIAL SATISFIED THE SAID REQUIREMENT.
WHETHER OR NOT THE NON-PAYMENT OF MORE THAN HALF OF THE ENTIRE
PURCHASE PRICE INCLUDING THE NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE STIPULATION TO
LIQUIDATE THE MORTGAGE LOAN ON TIME WHICH CAUSED GRAVE DAMAGE AND
PREJUDICE TO PETITIONERS, CONSTITUTE SUBSTANTIAL BREACH TO JUSTIFY
RESCISSION OF A CONTRACT TO SELL UNDER ARTICLE 1191 8(CIVIL CODE).
On the first issue, petitioners argue that, since both the parties and the apellate court adopted the
findings of trial court,9 no questions of fact were raised before the Court of Appeals. According to
petitioners, CA-G.R. CV No. 30955, involved only pure questions of law. They aver that the court a
quo had no jurisdiction to hear, much less decide, CA-G.R. CV No. 30955, without running afoul of
Supreme Court Circular No. 290 (4) [c].10
There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to how the law is on
a certain set of facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the
truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.11 But we note that the first assignment of error submitted by
respondents for consideration by the appellate court dealt with the trial court's finding that herein
petitioners got back the property in question because respondents did not have the means to pay
the installments and/or amortization of the loan.12 The resolution of this question involved an
evaluation of proof, and not only a consideration of the applicable statutory and case laws. Clearly,
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 30955 did not involve pure questions of law, hence the Court of Appeals had
jurisdiction and there was no violation of our Circular No. 2-90.
Moreover, we find that petitioners took an active part in the proceedings before the Court of
Appeals, yet they did not raise there the issue of jurisdiction. They should have raised this issue at
the earliest opportunity before the Court of Appeals. A party taking part in the proceedings before
the appellate court and submitting his case for its decision ought not to later on attack the court's
decision for want of jurisdiction because the decision turns out to be adverse to him. 13
The second and third issues deal with the question: Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that a
judicial rescission of the agreement was necessary? In resolving both issues, we must first make a
preliminary determination of the nature of the contract in question: Was it a contract of sale, as
insisted by the respondents or a mere contract to sell, as contended by petitioners?
Petitioners argue that the transaction between them and respondents was a mere contract to sell,
and not a contract of sale, since the sole documentary evidence (Exh. D, receipt) referring to their
agreement clearly showed that they did not transfer ownership of the property in question
simultaneous with its delivery and hence remained its owners, pending fulfillment of the other
suspensive conditions, i.e. full payment of the balance of the purchase price and the loan
amortizations. Petitioners point to Manuel v. Rodriguez, 109 Phil. 1 (1960) and Luzon Brokerage Co.,
Inc. v. Maritime Building Co., Inc., 43 SCRA 93 (1972), where he held that article 1592 of the Civil
Code is inapplicable to a contract to sell. They charge the court a quo with reversible error in
holding that petitioners should have judicially rescinded the agreement with respondents when the
latter failed to pay the amortizations on the bank loan.
Respondents insist that there was a perfected contract of sale, since upon their partial payment of
the purchase price, they immediately took possession of the property as vendees, and subsequently
leased it, thus exercising all the rights of ownership over the property. This showed that transfer of
ownership was simultaneous with the delivery of the realty sold, according to respondents.
It must be emphasized from the outset that a contract is what the law defines it to be, taking into
consideration its essential elements, and not what the contracting parties call it.14 Article 145815 of
the Civil Code defines a contract of sale. Note that the said article expressly obliges the vendor to
transfer the ownership of the thing sold as an essential element of a contract of sale. 16 We have
carefully examined the contents of the unofficial receipt, Exh. D, with the terms and conditions
informally agreed upon by the parties, as well as the proofs submitted to support their respective
contentions. We are far from persuaded that there was a transfer of ownership simultaneously with
the delivery of the property purportedly sold. The records clearly show that, notwithstanding the
fact that the Casedas first took then lost possession of the disputed house and lot, the title to the
property, TCT No. 28005 (S-11029) issued by the Register of Deeds of Parañaque, has remained
always in the name of Rosalinda Santos.17 Note further that although the parties agreed that the
Casedas would assume the mortgage, all amortization payments made by Carmen Caseda to the
bank were in the name of Rosalinda Santos.18 We likewise find that the bank's cancellation and
discharge of mortgage dated January 20, 1990, was made in favor of Rosalinda Santos. 19 The
foregoing circumstances categorically and clearly show that no valid transfer of ownership was
made by the Santoses to the Casedas. Absent this essential element, their agreement cannot be
deemed a contract of sale. We agree with petitioner's averment that the agreement between
Rosalinda Santos and Carmen Caseda is a contract to sell. In contracts to sell, ownership is reserved
the by the vendor and is not to pass until full payment of the purchase price. This we find fully
applicable and understandable in this case, given that the property involved is a titled realty under
mortgage to a bank and would require notarial and other formalities of law before transfer thereof
could be validly effected.
In view of our finding in the present case that the agreement between the parties is a contract to
sell, it follows that the appellate court erred when it decreed that a judicial rescission of said
agreement was necessary. This is because there was no rescission to speak of in the first place. As
we earlier pointed, in a contract to sell, title remains with the vendor and does not pass on to the
vendee until the purchase price is paid in full, Thus, in contract to sell, the payment of the purchase
price is a positive suspensive condition. Failure to pay the price agreed upon is not a mere breach,
casual or serious, but a situation that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from
acquiring an obligatory force.20 This is entirely different from the situation in a contract of sale,
where non-payment of the price is a negative resolutory condition. The effects in law are not
identical. In a contract of sale, the vendor has lost ownership of the thing sold and cannot recover it,
unless the contract of sale is rescinded and set aside.21 In a contract to sell, however, the vendor
remains the owner for as long as the vendee has not complied fully with the condition of paying the
purchase. If the vendor should eject the vendee for failure to meet the condition precedent, he
is enforcing the contract and not rescinding it. When the petitioners in the instant case repossessed
the disputed house and lot for failure of private respondents to pay the purchase price in full, they
were merely enforcing the contract and not rescinding it. As petitioners correctly point out the
Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that petitioners should have judicially rescinded the contract
pursuant to Articles 1592 and 1191 of the Civil Code. Article 1592 speaks of non-payment of the
purchase price as a resolutory condition. It does not apply to a contract to sell. 22As to Article 1191, it
is subordinated to the provisions of Article 1592 when applied to sales of immovable
property.23Neither provision is applicable in the present case.
As to the last issue, we need not tarry to make a determination of whether the breach of contract by
private respondents is so substantial as to defeat the purpose of the parties in entering into the
agreement and thus entitle petitioners to rescission. Having ruled that there is no rescission to
speak of in this case, the question is moot.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 30955 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 133, with respect to the DISMISSAL of the complaint in Civil Case No. 89-4759, is
hereby REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ ., concur.
Bellosillo, J ., on official leave.
FACTUM PROBANDUM vs. FACTUM PROBANS
Evidence from Proof-Strictly evidence is the medium of proof whereas proof is the result of
evidence. Thus the materials consisting of the weapon used, the confession of the accused, the
testimony of the complainant and witnesses, the result of the paraffin test, will constitute the
evidence of guilt. Their combined effect will be Proof of guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt.
The two terms are often used interchangeably.
2. “Factum Probandum and “Factum Probans”. All litigations, whether civil or criminal, involve the
relationship between these two concepts.
a) Factum Probandum refers to the ultimate fact to be proven, or the proposition to be established.
That, which a party wants to prove to the court. E.g.: guilt or innocence; existence of a breach of
contract; existence of an obligation; the fact of payment; the injury or damage incurred.
b). Factum Probans refers to the evidentiary facts by which the factum probandum will be proved.
Examples: the written contract; the promissory note to prove the existence of an unpaid debt.
BAOC vs. CADAPAN G.R. Nos. 184461-62, May 31, 2011
Facts:
June 26, 2006, armed men abducted Sherlyn Cadapan (Sherlyn), Karen Empeño (Karen) and Manuel
Merino (Merino) (abductees) from a house in San Miguel, Hagonoy, Bulacan. The three were herded
onto a jeep bearing license plate RTF 597 that sped towards an undisclosed location.Spouses Asher
and Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeño filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court,
impleading then Generals Romeo Tolentino and Jovito Palparan (Gen. Palparan), Lt. Col. Rogelio
Boac (Lt. Col. Boac), Arnel Enriquez and Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson (Lt. Mirabelle) as respondents.
The Court issued a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals.
By Return of the Writ, the respondents in the habeas corpus petition denied that abductees are in
the custody of the military. Trial thereupon ensued at the appellate court. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the habeas corpus petition. The Court, however, further resolves to refer the case to the
Commission on Human Rights, the National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National
Police for separate investigations and appropriate actions as may be warranted by their findings
and to furnish the Court with their separate reports on the outcome of their investigations and the
actions taken thereon. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision.
Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeño filed before this Court a Petition for Writ of Amparo With
Prayers for Inspection of Place and Production of Documents The petition impleaded the same
respondents in the habeas corpus petition, with the addition of then President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, then Armed Forces of the Phil. (AFP) Chief of Staff Hermogenes Esperon Jr., then Phil.
National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Avelino Razon (Gen. Razon), Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado (Lt. Col.
Anotado) and Donald Caigas. Then President Arroyo was eventually dropped as respondent in light
of her immunity from suit while in office. By Resolution the Court issued a writ of amparo
returnable to the Special Former Eleventh Division of the appellate court, and ordered the
consolidation of the amparo petition with the pending habeas corpus petition. By Decision of the
appellate court granted the Motion for Reconsideration and ordered the immediate release of
Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.
Issue:
1. Whether the testimony of Raymond Manalo is credible;
2. Whether the chief of the AFP, the commanding general of the Philippine Army, as well as the heads
of the concerned units had command responsibility over the abduction and detention of Sherlyn,
Karen and Merino;
3. Whether there is a need to file a motion for execution to cause the release of the aggrieved parties;
and
4. Whether Court of Appeals erred in dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party
respondent in this case.
Held:
1. Yes, Raymond’s affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo
Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the
pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents, also corroborate
respondents’ accounts of the torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond
Manalo’s familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the “DTU,” as shown in his
 testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the “Division Training Unit,” firms up G.R. No. 184398 February 25, 2010
respondents’ story that they were detained for some time in said military facility. The corroborative
testimonies, in the same case, of Manalo’s brother Reynaldo and a forensic specialist, as well as
SILKAIR (SINGAPORE) PTE. LTD., Petitioner,
Manalo’s graphic description of the detention area. There is thus no compelling reason for the Court
vs.
to disturb its appreciation in Manalo’s testimony. The outright denial of petitioners Lt. Col. Boac, et
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
al. thus crumbles.
2. No, The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of
laws of war and armed combats. Command responsibility in its simplest terms, means the DECISION
“responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces
or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict.” In this sense,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907
adopted the doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding
a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the May 27, 2008 Decision1 and the
duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is “an omission mode of subsequent September 5, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc in C.T.A. E.B.
individual criminal liability,” whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his No. 267. The decision dated May 27, 2008 denied the petition for review filed by petitioner Silkair
subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (Singapore) Pte. Ltd., on the ground, among others, of failure to prove that it was authorized to
(citations omitted; emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied). It bears stressing that operate in the Philippines for the period June to December 2000, while the Resolution dated
command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity, and thus a substantive rule that September 5, 2008 denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
points to criminal or administrative liability. An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor
does it ascertain the criminal liability of individuals or entities involved. Neither does it partake of a
The antecedent facts are as follows:
civil or administrative suit. Rather, it is a remedial measure designed to direct specified courses of
action to government agencies to safeguard the constitutional right to life, liberty and security of
aggrieved individuals. An amparo proceeding does nor determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal Petitioner, a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Singapore with a Philippine
culpability for the disappearance or threats thereof or extrajudicial killings; it determines representative office in Cebu City, is an online international carrier plying the Singapore-Cebu-
responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance…for purposes of imposing Singapore and Singapore-Cebu-Davao-Singapore routes.
the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance…
3. No, Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, there is no need to file a motion for execution for an
Respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue is impleaded herein in his official capacity as head of
amparo or habeas corpus decision. Since the right to life, liberty and security of a person is at stake,
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), an attached agency of the Department of Finance which is
the proceedings should not be delayed and execution of any decision thereon must be expedited as
duly authorized to decide, approve, and grant refunds and/or tax credits of erroneously paid or
soon as possible since any form of delay, even for a day, may jeopardize the very rights that these
illegally collected internal revenue taxes.3
writs seek to immediately protect. The Solicitor General’s argument that the Rules of Court
supplement the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is misplaced. The Rules of Court only find suppletory
application in an amparo proceeding if the Rules strengthen, rather than weaken, the procedural On June 24, 2002, petitioner filed with the BIR an administrative claim for the refund of Three
efficacy of the writ. As it is, the Rule dispenses with dilatory motions in view of the urgency in Million Nine Hundred Eighty-Three Thousand Five Hundred Ninety Pesos and Forty-Nine Centavos
securing the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party. Suffice it to state that a motion for (₱3,983,590.49) in excise taxes which it allegedly erroneously paid on its purchases of aviation jet
execution is inconsistent with the extraordinary and expeditious remedy being offered by an fuel from Petron Corporation (Petron) from June to December 2000. Petitioner used as basis
amparo proceeding. In fine, the appellate court erred in ruling that its directive to immediately therefor BIR Ruling No. 339-92 dated December 1, 1992, which declared that the petitioner’s
release Sherlyn, Karen and Merino was not automatically executory. For that would defeat the very Singapore-Cebu-Singapore route is an international flight by an international carrier and that the
purpose of having summary proceedings in amparo petitions. Summary proceedings, it bears petroleum products purchased by the petitioner should not be subject to excise taxes under Section
emphasis, are immediately executory without prejudice to further appeals that may be taken 135 of Republic Act No. 8424 or the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
therefrom.
4. No, the Court finds the appellate court’s dismissal of the petitions against then President Arroyo
Since the BIR took no action on petitioner’s claim for refund, petitioner sought judicial recourse and
well-taken, owing to her immunity from suit at the time the habeas corpus and amparo petitions
filed on June 27, 2002, a petition for review with the CTA (docketed as CTA Case No. 6491), to
were filed. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
prevent the lapse of the two-year prescriptive period within which to judicially claim a refund under
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in
Section 2294 of the NIRC. Petitioner invoked its exemption from payment of excise taxes in
the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of
accordance with the provisions of Section 135(b) of the NIRC, which exempts from excise taxes the
State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important
entities covered by tax treaties, conventions and other international agreements; provided that the
that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend
country of said carrier or exempt entity likewise exempts from similar taxes the petroleum products
to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch,
sold to Philippine carriers or entities. In this regard, petitioner relied on the reciprocity clause under
only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the
Article 4(2) of the Air Transport Agreement entered between the Republic of the Philippines and the
discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily Republic of Singapore.
impairs the operation of the Government. Parenthetically, the petitions are bereft of any allegation
that then President Arroyo permitted, condoned or performed any wrongdoing against the three
missing persons. Section 135(b) of the NIRC provides:

SEC. 135. Petroleum Products Sold to International Carriers and Exempt Entities or Agencies. –
Petroleum products sold to the following are exempt from excise tax:
xxxx
(b) Exempt entities or agencies covered by tax treaties, conventions and other international
agreements for their use or consumption: Provided, however, That the country of said foreign
international carrier or exempt entities or agencies exempts from similar taxes petroleum products
sold to Philippine carriers, entities or agencies; x x x.
Article 4(2) of the Air Transport Agreement between the Philippines and Singapore, in turn,
provides:
ART. 4. x x x.
xxxx
(2) Fuel, lubricants, spare parts, regular equipment and aircraft stores introduced into, or taken on
board aircraft in the territory of one Contracting Party by, or on behalf of, a designated airline of the
other Contracting Party and intended solely for use in the operation of the agreed services shall,
with the exception of charges corresponding to the service performed, be exempt from the same
customs duties, inspection fees and other duties or taxes imposed in the territory of the first
Contracting Party, even when these supplies are to be used on the parts of the journey performed
over the territory of the Contracting Party in which they are introduced into or taken on board. The
materials referred to above may be required to be kept under customs supervision and control.
In a Decision5 dated July 27, 2006, the CTA First Division found that petitioner was qualified for tax
exemption under Section 135(b) of the NIRC, as long as the Republic of Singapore exempts from
similar taxes petroleum products sold to Philippine carriers, entities or agencies under Article 4(2)
of the Air Transport Agreement quoted above. However, it ruled that petitioner was not entitled to
the excise tax exemption for failure to present proof that it was authorized to operate in the
Philippines during the period material to the case due to the non-admission of some of its exhibits,
which were merely photocopies, including Exhibit "A" which was petitioner’s Certificate of
Registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Exhibits "P," "Q" and "R"
which were its operating permits issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to fly the Singapore-
Cebu-Singapore and Singapore-Cebu-Davao-Singapore routes for the period October 1999 to
October 2000.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the CTA First Division denied the same in a
Resolution6 dated January 17, 2007.
Thereafter, petitioner elevated the case before the CTA En Banc via a petition for review, which was
initially denied in a Resolution7 dated May 17, 2007 for failure of petitioner to establish its legal
authority to appeal the Decision dated July 27, 2006 and the Resolution dated January 17, 2007 of
the CTA First Division.
Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration. In the Resolution8 dated September 19, 2007, the
CTA En Bancset aside its earlier resolution dismissing the petition for review and reinstated the
same. It also required respondent to file his comment thereon.
On May 27, 2008, the CTA En Banc promulgated the assailed Decision and denied the petition for
review, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed Decision dated July 27, 2006 dismissing the instant petition on ground of failure of
petitioner to prove that it was authorized to operate in the Philippines for the period from June to
December 2000, is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that petitioner is further not found to
be the proper party to file the instant claim for refund.9
In a separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion,10 CTA Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta opined
that petitioner was exempt from the payment of excise taxes based on Section 135 of the NIRC and
Article 4 of the Air Transport Agreement between the Philippines and Singapore. However, despite
said exemption, petitioner’s claim for refund cannot be granted since it failed to establish its
authority to operate in the Philippines during the period subject of the claim. In other words,
Presiding Justice Acosta voted to uphold in toto the Decision of the CTA First Division.
Petitioner again filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in the Resolution dated
September 5, 2008. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari, which raises the following
issues:
I
Whether or not petitioner has substantially proven its authority to operate in the Philippines.
II
Whether or not petitioner is the proper party to claim for the refund/tax credit of excise taxes paid
on aviation fuel.
Petitioner maintains that it has proven its authority to operate in the Philippines with the admission
of its Foreign Air Carrier’s Permit (FACP) as Exhibit "B" before the CTA, which, in part, reads:
[T]his Board RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves to APPROVE the petition of SILKAIR (SINGAPORE)
PTE LTD., for issuance of a regular operating permit (Foreign Air Carrier’s Permit), subject to the
approval of the President, pursuant to Sec. 10 of R.A. 776, as amended by P.D. 1462. 11
Moreover, petitioner argues that Exhibits "P," "Q" and "R," which it previously filed with the CTA,
were merely flight schedules submitted to the CAB, and were not its operating permits. Petitioner
adds that it was through inadvertence that only photocopies of these exhibits were introduced
during the hearing.
Petitioner also asserts that despite its failure to present the original copy of its SEC Registration
during the hearings, the CTA should take judicial notice of its SEC Registration since the same was
already offered and admitted in evidence in similar cases pending before the CTA.
Petitioner further claims that the instant case involves a clear grant of tax exemption to it by law
and by virtue of an international agreement between two governments. Consequently, being the
entity which was granted the tax exemption and which made the erroneous tax payment of the
excise tax, it is the proper party to file the claim for refund.
In his Comment12 dated March 26, 2009, respondent states that the admission in evidence of
petitioner’s FACP does not change the fact that petitioner failed to formally offer in evidence the
original copies or certified true copies of Exhibit "A," its SEC Registration; and Exhibits "P," "Q" and
"R," its operating permits issued by the CAB to fly its Singapore-Cebu-Singapore and Singapore-
Cebu-Davao-Singapore routes for the period October 1999 to October 2000. Respondent
emphasizes that petitioner’s failure to present these pieces of evidence amounts to its failure to
prove its authority to operate in the Philippines.
Likewise, respondent maintains that an excise tax, being an indirect tax, is the direct liability of the
manufacturer or producer. Respondent reiterates that when an excise tax on petroleum products is
added to the cost of goods sold to the buyer, it is no longer a tax but becomes part of the price which
the buyer has to pay to obtain the article. According to respondent, petitioner cannot seek
reimbursement for its alleged erroneous payment of the excise tax since it is neither the entity
required by law nor the entity statutorily liable to pay the said tax.
After careful examination of the records, we resolve to deny the petition.
Petitioner’s assertion that the CTA may take judicial notice of its SEC Registration, previously
offered and admitted in evidence in similar cases before the CTA, is untenable.
We quote with approval the disquisition of the CTA En Banc in its Decision dated May 27, 2008 on
the non-admission of petitioner’s Exhibits "A," "P," "Q" and "R," to wit:
Anent petitioner’s argument that the Court in Division should have taken judicial notice of the
existence of Exhibit "A" (petitioner’s SEC Certificate of Registration), although not properly
identified during trial as this has previously been offered and admitted in evidence in similar cases
involving the subject matter between the same parties before this Court, We are in agreement with
the ruling of the Court in Division, as discussed in its Resolution dated April 12, 2005 resolving
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration on the court’s non-admission of Exhibits "A", "P", "Q" and
"R", wherein it said that:
"Each and every case is distinct and separate in character and matter although similar parties may
have been involved. Thus, in a pending case, it is not mandatory upon the courts to take judicial
notice of pieces of evidence which have been offered in other cases even when such cases have been
tried or pending in the same court. Evidence already presented and admitted by the court in a
previous case cannot be adopted in a separate case pending before the same court without the same
being offered and identified anew.
The cases cited by petitioner concerned similar parties before the same court but do not cover the
same claim. A court is not compelled to take judicial notice of pieces of evidence offered and
admitted in a previous case unless the same are properly offered or have accordingly complied with
the requirements on the rules of evidence. In other words, the evidence presented in the previous
cases cannot be considered in this instant case without being offered in evidence.
Moreover, Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that hearing is necessary
before judicial notice may be taken by the courts. To quote said section:
Sec. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. – During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or
on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the
parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on
request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if
such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.
Furthermore, petitioner admitted that Exhibit ‘A’ have (sic) been offered and admitted in evidence
in similar cases involving the same subject matter filed before this Court. Thus, petitioner is and
should have been aware of the rules regarding the offering of any documentary evidence before the
same can be admitted in court.
As regards Exhibit[s] ‘P’, ‘Q’ and ‘R’, the original copies of these documents were not presented for
comparison and verification in violation of Section 3 of Rule 130 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.
The said section specifically provides that ‘when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself x x x’. It is an
elementary rule in law that documents shall not be admissible in evidence unless and until the
original copies itself are offered or presented for verification in cases where mere copies are
offered, save for the exceptions provided for by law. Petitioner thus cannot hide behind the veil of
judicial notice so as to evade its responsibility of properly complying with the rules of evidence. For
failure of herein petitioner to compare the subject documents with its originals, the same may not
be admitted." (Emphasis Ours)
Likewise, in the Resolution dated July 15, 2005 of the Court in Division denying petitioner’s
Omnibus Motion seeking allowance to compare the denied exhibits with their certified true copies,
the court a quo explained that:
"Petitioner was already given enough time and opportunity to present the originals or certified true
copies of the denied documents for comparison. When petitioner received the resolution denying
admission of the provisionally marked exhibits, it should have submitted the originals or certified
true copies for comparison, considering that these documents were accordingly available. But
instead of presenting these documents, petitioner, in its Motion for Reconsideration, tried to hide
behind the veil of judicial notice so as to evade its responsibility of properly applying the rules on
evidence. It was even submitted by petitioner that these documents should be admitted for they
were previously offered and admitted in similar cases involving the same subject matter and
parties. If this was the case, then, there should have been no reason for petitioner to seasonably
present the originals or certified true copies for comparison, or even, marking. x x x."
In view of the foregoing discussion, the Court en banc finds that indeed, petitioner indubitably failed
to establish its authority to operate in the Philippines for the period beginning June to December
2000.13
This Court finds no reason to depart from the foregoing findings of the CTA En Banc as petitioner
itself admitted on page 914 of its petition for review that "[i]t was through inadvertence that only
photocopies of Exhibits ‘P’, ‘Q’ and ‘R’ were introduced during the hearing" and that it was "rather
unfortunate that petitioner failed to produce the original copy of its SEC Registration (Exhibit ‘A’)
for purposes of comparison with the photocopy that was originally presented."
Evidently, said documents cannot be admitted in evidence by the court as the original copies were
neither offered nor presented for comparison and verification during the trial. Mere identification of
the documents and the markings thereof as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary weight on them
as said documents have not been formally offered by petitioner and have been denied admission in
evidence by the CTA.
Furthermore, the documents are not among the matters which the law mandatorily requires the
Court to take judicial notice of, without any introduction of evidence, as petitioner would have the
CTA do. Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court reads:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. – A court shall take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history,
forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime
courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the
official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of
nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
Neither could it be said that petitioner’s SEC Registration and operating permits from the CAB are
documents which are of public knowledge, capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be
known to the judges because of their judicial functions, in order to allow the CTA to take
discretionary judicial notice of the said documents.15
Moreover, Section 3 of the same Rule16 provides that a hearing is necessary before judicial notice of
any matter may be taken by the court. This requirement of a hearing is needed so that the parties
can be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.
Given the above rules, it is clear that the CTA En Banc correctly did not admit petitioner’s SEC
Registration and operating permits from the CAB which were merely photocopies, without the
presentation of the original copies for comparison and verification. As aptly held by the CTA En
Banc, petitioner cannot rely on the principle of judicial notice so as to evade its responsibility of
properly complying with the rules of evidence. Indeed, petitioner’s contention that the said
documents were previously marked in other cases before the CTA tended to confirm that the
originals of these documents were readily available and their non-presentation in these proceedings
was unjustified. Consequently, petitioner’s failure to compare the photocopied documents with
their original renders the subject exhibits inadmissible in evidence.
Going to the second issue, petitioner maintains that it is the proper party to claim for refund or tax
credit of excise taxes since it is the entity which was granted the tax exemption and which made the
erroneous tax payment. Petitioner anchors its claim on Section 135(b) of the NIRC and Article 4(2)
of the Air Transport Agreement between the Philippines and Singapore. Petitioner also asserts that
the tax exemption, granted to it as a buyer of a certain product, is a personal privilege which may
not be claimed or availed of by the seller. Petitioner submits that since it is the entity which actually
paid the excise taxes, then it should be allowed to claim for refund or tax credit.
At the outset, it is important to note that on two separate occasions, this Court has already put to
rest the issue of whether or not petitioner is the proper party to claim for the refund or tax credit of
excise taxes it allegedly paid on its aviation fuel purchases. 17 In the earlier case of Silkair (Singapore)
Pte, Ltd. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,18involving the same parties and the same cause of
action but pertaining to different periods of taxation, we have categorically held that Petron, not
petitioner, is the proper party to question, or seek a refund of, an indirect tax, to wit:
The proper party to question, or seek a refund of, an indirect tax is the statutory taxpayer, the
person on whom the tax is imposed by law and who paid the same even if he shifts the burden
thereof to another. Section 130 (A) (2) of the NIRC provides that "[u]nless otherwise specifically
allowed, the return shall be filed and the excise tax paid by the manufacturer or producer before
removal of domestic products from place of production." Thus, Petron Corporation, not Silkair, is
the statutory taxpayer which is entitled to claim a refund based on Section 135 of the NIRC of 1997
and Article 4(2) of the Air Transport Agreement between RP and Singapore.
Even if Petron Corporation passed on to Silkair the burden of the tax, the additional amount billed to
Silkair for jet fuel is not a tax but part of the price which Silkair had to pay as a purchaser.
In the second Silkair19 case, the Court explained that an excise tax is an indirect tax where the
burden can be shifted or passed on to the consumer but the tax liability remains with the
manufacturer or seller. Thus, the manufacturer or seller has the option of shifting or passing on the
burden of the tax to the buyer. However, where the burden of the tax is shifted, the amount passed
on to the buyer is no longer a tax but a part of the purchase price of the goods sold.
Petitioner contends that the clear intent of the provisions of the NIRC and the Air Transport
Agreement is to exempt aviation fuel purchased by petitioner as an exempt entity from the payment
of excise tax, whether such is a direct or an indirect tax. According to petitioner, the excise tax on
aviation fuel, though initially payable by the manufacturer or producer, attaches to the goods and
becomes the liability of the person having possession thereof.
We do not agree. The distinction between a direct tax and an indirect tax is relevant to this issue. In
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, 20 this Court
explained:
Based on the possibility of shifting the incidence of taxation, or as to who shall bear the burden of
taxation, taxes may be classified into either direct tax or indirect tax.
In context, direct taxes are those that are exacted from the very person who, it is intended or
desired, should pay them; they are impositions for which a taxpayer is directly liable on the
transaction or business he is engaged in.
On the other hand, indirect taxes are those that are demanded, in the first instance, from, or are paid
by, one person in the expectation and intention that he can shift the burden to someone else. Stated
elsewise, indirect taxes are taxes wherein the liability for the payment of the tax falls on one person
but the burden thereof can be shifted or passed on to another person, such as when the tax is
imposed upon goods before reaching the consumer who ultimately pays for it. When the seller
passes on the tax to his buyer, he, in effect, shifts the tax burden, not the liability to pay it, to the
purchaser as part of the purchase price of goods sold or services rendered.
Title VI of the NIRC deals with excise taxes on certain goods. Section 129 reads as follows:
SEC. 129. Goods Subject to Excise Taxes. – Excise taxes apply to goods manufactured or produced in
the Philippines for domestic sale or consumption or for any other disposition and to things
imported. x x x.
As used in the NIRC, therefore, excise taxes refer to taxes applicable to certain specified or selected
goods or articles manufactured or produced in the Philippines for domestic sale or consumption or
for any other disposition and to things imported into the Philippines. These excise taxes may be
considered taxes on production as they are collected only from manufacturers and producers.
Basically an indirect tax, excise taxes are directly levied upon the manufacturer or importer upon
removal of the taxable goods from its place of production or from the customs custody. These taxes,
however, may be actually passed on to the end consumer as part of the transfer value or selling
price of the goods sold, bartered or exchanged.21
In Maceda v. Macaraig, Jr.,22 this Court declared:
"[I]ndirect taxes are taxes primarily paid by persons who can shift the burden upon someone else."
For example, the excise and ad valorem taxes that oil companies pay to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue upon removal of petroleum products from its refinery can be shifted to its buyer, like the
NPC, by adding them to the "cash" and/or "selling price."
And as noted by us in the second Silkair23 case mentioned above:
When Petron removes its petroleum products from its refinery in Limay, Bataan, it pays the excise
tax due on the petroleum products thus removed. Petron, as manufacturer or producer, is the
person liable for the payment of the excise tax as shown in the Excise Tax Returns filed with the BIR.
Stated otherwise, Petron is the taxpayer that is primarily, directly and legally liable for the payment
of the excise taxes. However, since an excise tax is an indirect tax, Petron can transfer to its
customers the amount of the excise tax paid by treating it as part of the cost of the goods and tacking
it on the selling price.
As correctly observed by the CTA, this Court held in Philippine Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue:
"It may indeed be that the economic burden of the tax finally falls on the purchaser; when it does the
tax becomes part of the price which the purchaser must pay."
Even if the consumers or purchasers ultimately pay for the tax, they are not considered the
taxpayers. The fact that Petron, on whom the excise tax is imposed, can shift the tax burden to its
purchasers does not make the latter the taxpayers and the former the withholding agent.
Petitioner, as the purchaser and end-consumer, ultimately bears the tax burden, but this does not
transform petitioner’s status into a statutory taxpayer.
Thus, under Section 130(A)(2) of the NIRC, it is Petron, the taxpayer, which has the legal personality
to claim the refund or tax credit of any erroneous payment of excise taxes. Section 130(A)(2) states:
SEC. 130. Filing of Return and Payment of Excise Tax on Domestic Products. –
(A) Persons Liable to File a Return, Filing of Return on Removal and Payment of Tax. –
(1) Persons Liable to File a Return. – x x x
(2) Time for Filing of Return and Payment of the Tax. – Unless otherwise
specifically allowed, the return shall be filed and the excise tax paid by the
manufacturer or producer before removal of domestic products from place of
production: x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Furthermore, Section 204(C) of the NIRC provides a two-year prescriptive period within
which a taxpayer may file an administrative claim for refund or tax credit, to wit:
SEC. 204. Authority of the Commissioner to Compromise, Abate, and Refund or Credit
Taxes. – The Commissioner may –
xxxx
(C) Credit or refund taxes erroneously or illegally received or penalties imposed without
authority, refund the value of internal revenue stamps when they are returned in good
condition by the purchaser, and, in his discretion, redeem or change unused stamps that
have been rendered unfit for use and refund their value upon proof of destruction. No
credit or refund of taxes or penalties shall be allowed unless the taxpayer files in writing
with the Commissioner a claim for credit or refund within two (2) years after the
payment of the tax or penalty: Provided, however, That a return filed showing an
overpayment shall be considered as a written claim for credit or refund. (Emphasis
supplied.)
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the proper party to question, or claim a refund or tax
credit of an indirect tax is the statutory taxpayer, which is Petron in this case, as it is the company on
which the tax is imposed by law and which paid the same even if the burden thereof was shifted or
passed on to another. It bears stressing that even if Petron shifted or passed on to petitioner the
burden of the tax, the additional amount which petitioner paid is not a tax but a part of the purchase
price which it had to pay to obtain the goods.
Time and again, we have held that tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions which represent a
loss of revenue to the government. These exemptions, therefore, must not rest on vague, uncertain
or indefinite inference, but should be granted only by a clear and unequivocal provision of law on
the basis of language too plain to be mistaken.24 Such exemptions must be strictly construed against
the taxpayer, as taxes are the lifeblood of the government.
In fine, we quote from our ruling in the earlier Silkair25 case:
The exemption granted under Section 135 (b) of the NIRC of 1997 and Article 4(2) of the Air
Transport Agreement between RP and Singapore cannot, without a clear showing of legislative
intent, be construed as including indirect taxes. Statutes granting tax exemptions must be construed
in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority, and if an
exemption is found to exist, it must not be enlarged by construction.
This calls for the application of the doctrine, stare decisis et non quieta movere.1avvphi1 Follow past
precedents and do not disturb what has been settled. Once a case has been decided one way, any
other case involving exactly the same point at issue, as in the case at bar, should be decided in the
same manner.26
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. We affirm the assailed Decision dated May
27, 2008 and the Resolution dated September 5, 2008 of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc in C.T.A.
E.B. No. 267. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ATCI Overseas Corporation v. Echin 632 SCRA 528 (2010)
ACTI v Echin
632 SCRA 528 (2010)
Facts:
1. Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf of its
principal co-
petitioner, the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the position of medical t
echnologist under a twoyear contract, denominated as a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA),
with a monthly salary of US$1,200.00.
2. Under the MOA, all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of 1 10. As to Ikdals liability, the appellate court held that under Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the
year and are covered by Kuwaits Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. 2. Migrant and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, corporate officers, directors and partners of a re
cruitment agency may themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the recruitment agency
for money claims and damages awarded to overseas workers.

3. Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from employment on Feb
ruary 11, 2001, she not having allegedly passed the probationary period.
11. MR denied, the present petition for review on certiorari was filed.

4. As the Ministry denied respondents reconsideration, she returned to the Philippines on March
17, 2001, shouldering her own air fare. 12. Petitioners Contention:

5. Respondent filed with the NLRC a complaint a. maintain that they should not be held liable because respondents employment contract specific
for illegal dismissal against petitioner ATCI as the local recruitment agency, represented by pe ally stipulates that her employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulation
titioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the foreign principal. s of Kuwait. They thus conclude that it was patent error for the labor tribunals and the appe
llate court to apply the Labor Code provisions governing probationary employment in deciding
the present case.

6. Labor Arbiter: finding that petitioners neither showed that there was just cause to warrant
respondents dismissal nor that she failed to qualify as a
regular employee, held that respondent was illegally dismissed and accordingly ordered petitio b. that even the POEA Rules relative to master employment contracts accord respect to
ners to pay her US$3,600.00, representing her salary for the three months unexpired portion of the customs, practices, company policies and labor laws and legislation of the host country.
her contract.

c. Finally, petitioners posit that assuming arguendo that Philippine labor laws are applicable, given
7. On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision that the foreign principal is
a government agency which is immune from suit, as in fact it did not sign any document
agreeing to be held jointly and solidarily liable, petitioner ATCI cannot likewise be held liable, more
so since the Ministrys liability had not been judicially determined as jurisdiction was not acquired
8. MR denied. over it.
They appealed to the CA, contending that their principal, the Ministry, being a foreign govern
ment agency, is immune from suit and, as such, the immunity extended to them; and that res
pondent was validly dismissed for her failure to meet the performance rating within the one
year period as required under Kuwaits Civil Service Laws. Petitioners further contended that I Issue:
kdal should not be liable as an officer of petitioner ATCI.

Held:
9. CA affirmed the NLRC Resolution and noted
that under the law, a private employment agency shall assume all responsibilities for the impl The petition fails. Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade responsibility for
ementation of the contract of employment of an overseas worker, hence, it can be sued jointl the money claims of
y and severally with the foreign principal for any violation of the recruitment agreement or OFWs which it deploys abroad by the mere expediency of claiming that its foreign principal i
contract of employment. s a government agency clothed with immunity from suit, or that such foreign principals liabili
ty must first be established before it, as agent, can be held jointly and solidarily liable.
The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of the state to protect The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws,
and alleviate the plight of the working class.[9] Verily, to allow petitioners to simply invoke the hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party
immunity from suit of invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of
its foreign principal or to wait for the judicial determination of the foreign principals liability the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
before petitioner can be held liable renders the law on joint and solidary liability inutile.
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an offici
al publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the rec
As to petitioners contentions that Philippine labor laws on ord, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a c
probationary employment are not applicable since it was expressly provided in respondents e ertificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a for
mployment contract, which she voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her engagement sh eign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul g
all be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules eneral, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the P
accord respect to such rules, customs and practices of the host country, the same was not hilippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by t
substantiated. he seal of his office. (emphasis supplied)

Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the parties who can esta
blish stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, including the l
aws which they wish to govern their respective obligations, as long as they are not contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy
is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation
must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court
having a seal, under the seal of such court.
To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following:

a. MOA between respondent and the Ministry, as represented by ATCI, which provides that the e
It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has mployee is subject to a probationary period of one year and that the host countrys Civil Serv
the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case, ice Laws and Regulations apply;
petitioners
failed to discharge. The Courts ruling in EDI<Staffbuilders Intl., v. NLRC[10] illuminates: b. a translated copy (Arabic to English) of the termination letter to respondent stating that she
did not pass the probation terms, without specifying the grounds therefor, and a translated c
opy of the certificate of termination,both of which documents were certified by Mr. Mustapha
Alawi, Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Lab Office of Consular Affairs Inslamic Certification and Translation Unit;
or Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for
termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci c. and respondents letter of reconsideration to the Ministry, wherein she noted that in her first
intentiones) to eight (8) months of employment, she was given a rating of Excellent albeit it changed due to
apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the termination changes in her shift of work schedule.
of the employment of Gran.
These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not sufficiently prove that res
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied pondent was validly terminated as a probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service
to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treat laws. Instead of submitting a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated an
ed as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter d translated by Embassy officials thereat, as required under the Rules, what petitioners sub
cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed mitted were mere certifications attesting only to the correctness of the translations of the
to know only domestic or forum law. Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertin MOA and the termination letter which does not prove at all
ent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the that Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from Philippine laws and that under such Kuwaiti
International Law doctrine of presumed*identity approach or processual presumptioncomes laws, respondent was validly terminated. Thus the subject certifications read:
into play.
Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is tha xxxx
t foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the is
sues presented before us.
This is to certify that the herein attached translation/s from Arabic to English/Tagalog and
or vice versa was/were presented to this Office for review and certification and the same wa
s/were
found to be in order. This Office, however, assumes no responsibility as to the contents of th
e document/s.
This certification is being issued upon request of the interested party for whatever legal
purpose it may serve. (emphasis supplied)
VDA. DE CATALAN V. CATALAN-LEE
G. R. No. 183622, [February 08, 2012]
DOCTRINE:
Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which maybe recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid ac-cording to their national law.
FACTS:
Orlando B. Catalan, a naturalized American citizen,allegedly obtained a divorce in the United States
from his first wife, Felicitas Amor. He then contracted a second marriage with petitioner.
When Orlando died intestate in the Philippines, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for the
issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate.
While the case was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from
his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC. The two cases were consolidated.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition filed by the respondent on the ground of litis
pendentia. Respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person qualified
to file the petition. Respondent further alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against
petitioner by Felicitas Amor contending that petitioner contracted a second marriage to Orlando
despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol.
However, the RTC acquitted petitioner of bigamy and ruled that since the deceasedwas a
divorced American citizen, and that divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the
marriage between him and petitioner was not valid. The RTC took note of the action for declaration
of nullity then pending filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It considered the
pending action to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petition-er for the crime of
bigamy. The RTC also found that petitioner had never been married to Bristol.
The RTC subsequently dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed by
petitioner and granted that of private respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A,
the RTC held that the marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting
when she married Orlando. The RTC held that petitioner was not an interested party who
may file said petition. The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the acquittal of petitioner in the crim. case for bigamy meant that the marriage with
Bristol was still valid.
2. Whether the divorce obtained abroad by Orlando may be recognized under Philippine
jurisdiction.
HELD:
It is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the
rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando. Petition is
partially granted. Case is remanded to RTC.
1. No. The RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC in Crim. Case
that petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. It concluded that, because petitioner was
acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with Bristol still existed and was valid.
2. Yes. Under the principles of comity, Philippine jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by
a spouse of for-eign nationality. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. Nonetheless, the fact of divorce
must still first be proven by the divorce decree itself. The best evidence of a judgment is the
judgment itself. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Moreover, the burden of proof lies with the “party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.” In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of
proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer;
and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they
introduce new matters. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s divorce
under the laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus,
there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence to
establish the fact of divorce.