RAMONITO MANABAN v. CA, GR NO.

150723, 2006-07- On 24 October 1996, Manaban was charged with the crime of
11 murder
Facts: On October 11, 1996, at around 1:25 o'clock in the When arraigned on 4 December 1996
morning, Joselito Bautista, a father and a member of the UP
Police Force, took his daughter, Frinzi, who complained of The prosecution presented six witnesses
difficulty in breathing, to the UP Health Center. There, the :
doctors prescribed certain medicines... to be purchased.
Needing money therefore, Joselito Bautista, who had taken Faustino Delariarte
alcoholic drinks earlier, proceeded to the BPI Kalayaan Branch SPO1 Dominador Salvador
to withdraw some money from its Automated Teller Machine
(ATM) Rodolfo Bilgera
Upon arrival at the bank, Bautista proceeded to the ATM booth Celedonia H. Tan
but because he could not effectively withdraw money, he Dr. Eduardo T. Vargas
started kicking and pounding on the machine. For said reason,
the bank security guard, Ramonito Manaban, approached and Editha Bautista
asked him what the problem was. Bautista... complained that
his ATM was retrieved by the machine and that no money Delariarte testified that in the early morning of 11 October
came out of it. After Manaban had checked the receipt, he 1996, their duty officer, Diosdado Morga, called him and
informed Bautista that the Personal Identification Number informed him that one of the guards stationed at the BPI
(PIN) entered was wrong and advised him to just return the Kalayaan Branch
next morning. This angered ("BPI Kalayaan") was involved in a shooting incident.
Bautista all the more and resumed pounding on the machine. SPO1 Salvador testified that... the duty desk officer SPO2
Manaban then urged him to calm down and referred him to Redemption Negre sent him, SPO1
their customer service over the phone. Still not mollified, Jerry Abad and SPO1 Ruben Reyes to BPI Kalayaan to
Bautista continued raging and striking the machine. When investigate an alleged shooting incident. SPO1 Salvador
Manaban could no longer pacify him, he fired a... warning testified that when they arrived at BPI Kalayaan, they were met
shot. That diverted the attention of Bautista. Instead of venting by Delariarte and Cancisio. Manaban then approached them
his ire against the machine, he confronted Manaban. After and surrendered his service firearm, a .38 caliber... revolver, to
some exchange of words, a shot rang out fatally hitting SPO1 Salvador.
Bautista.[4]
Dr. Vargas, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)... testified
that Bautista died of a gunshot wound. According to him, the
point of entry of the bullet was at the back, on the right side of
the body and... there was no exit point.
Bilgera testified that... he conducted a ballistic examination
Editha, the widow of Joselito Bautista, testified that she was
married to Bautista
According to Editha, her husband then left to withdraw money
at BPI Kalayaan for the purchase of medicines.
Later, she was fetched by members of the UP Police Force who
informed her that her husband had been shot. Editha claimed
that as a consequence of... her husband's death, she spent more
than P111,000
The Defense's Version
The defense presented four witnesses:
Manaban
Renz Javelona
Tan
Patrick Peralta
Manaban narrated that
Bautista tried to withdraw money from the ATM. Manaban
then saw Bautista pounding and kicking the ATM. When
Manaban asked Bautista what was the problem, Bautista
replied that no money came out from the machine. According...
to Manaban, Bautista appeared to be intoxicated.
Manaban looked at the receipt issued to Bautista and saw that
the receipt indicated that a wrong PIN was entered.
Javelona was an ATM Service Assistant of BPI. Javelona
testified that on 11 October 1996, between 1:30 a.m. and 2:00
a.m
The client, who was later identified as Bautista, complained:
"Nagwi-withdraw ako dito sa ATM
Kalayaan. Mali daw yung PIN ko, alam ko tama yung PIN ko.
Javelona tried to placate Bautista and advised him not to insert
his card anymore because it might be captured by the machine
and to try again later in the morning.
Tan, the Assistant Manager of BPI Kalaya... an... testified
that... she discovered that the ATM was out of order.
According to Tan, the ATM keyboard was not properly
mounted and the keys were damaged.
Peralta, a Customer Engineer Specialist, testified
BPI Kalayaan sought his assistance regarding their ATM.
According to Peralta, the ATM keyboard... was damaged and
mis-aligned.
The Trial Court's Ruling
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homicide, the Court hereby sentences the
accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from
FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision
Correccional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS... and ONE
(1) DAY of Pris[i]on Mayor, as maximum
Issues: The Respondent Court gravely erred in affirming the
erroneous factual appreciation and interpretation by the trial
court a quo in practically affirming the decision of the latter
court which are based on... a clear misappreciation of facts and
findings grounded... entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures "in a way probably not in accord with law or with
the applicable jurisprudence of the Supreme Court."
The Respondent Court gravely erred in ignoring petitioner's
self-defense on the sole fact that the entrance of the deceased
victim's wound was from the back.
The Respondent Court gravely erred in concluding that
petitioner failed to establish unlawful aggression just because
the holster of the victim was still in a lock position.
Granting arguendo that petitioner made a mistake in his
appreciation that there was an attempt on the part of the
deceased victim to draw his gun who executed "bumalikwas,"
such mistake of fact is deemed justified.
Finally, the Respondent Court gravely erred in awarding
exorbitant and baseless award of damages to the heirs of
deceased victim.
Ruling: The Court of Appeals' Ruling
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision. The Court of Appeals later reconsidered and modified
its decision with respect only to the award of loss of earning
capacity. Using the formula 2/3 [80 age at the time of death] x
[gross annual income 80% gross... annual income], the Court
of Appeals recomputed the award for loss of earning capacity.
In its Resolution dated 8 November 2001, the Court of Appeals
reduced the award for the loss of the victim's earning capacity
from P1,418,040 to P436,320.
The petition is partly meritorious.
Unlawful Aggression is an Indispensable Requisite of Self-
Defense
When the accused invokes self-defense, he in effect admits
killing the victim and the burden is shifted to him to prove that
he killed the victim to save his life.[27] The accused must
establish by clear and convincing evidence that all the
requisites of... self-defense are present.
Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault or at least a
threat to attack or inflict physical injury upon a person.
A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not considered
unlawful aggression... nless the threat is... offensive and
menacing, manifestly showing the wrongful intent to cause
injury.[35] There must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack
or imminent danger thereof, which puts the defendant's life in
real peril.[36]
In this case, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim.
The allegation of Manaban that Bautista was about to draw his
gun when he turned his back at Manaban is mere speculation.
Besides, Manaban was already aiming his loaded firearm at
Bautista when the latter turned his back. In that situation, it was
Bautista whose life was in... danger considering that Manaban,
who had already fired a warning shot, was pointing his firearm
at Bautista. Bautista, who was a policeman, would have
realized this danger to his life and would not have attempted to
draw his gun which was still inside a locked holster tucked in...
his waist. Furthermore, if Manaban really feared that Bautista
was about to draw his gun to shoot him, Manaban could have
easily disabled Bautista by shooting his arm or leg considering Net Earning
that Manaban's firearm was already aimed at Bautista.
Capacity
The trial court credited Manaban with two mitigating
circumstances: voluntary surrender and obfuscation. =
Life Expectancy x
It is undisputed that Manaban called the police to report the
shooting incident. When the police arrived, Manaban [Gross Annual
surrendered his service firearm and voluntarily went with the
police to the police station for investigation. Thus, Manaban is Income (GAI)
entitled to the benefit of the... mitigating circumstance of Living Expenses]
voluntary surrender.
=
On obfuscation, we find that the facts of the case do not entitle
Manaban to such mitigating circumstance. 2/3(80 age of deceased) x (GAI 50% of GAI)
In his testimony, Manaban admitted shooting Bautista because Using this formula, the indemnification for loss of earning
Bautista turned around and was allegedly about to draw his gun capacity should be:
to shoot Manaban. The act of Bautista in turning around is not Net Earning
unlawful and sufficient cause for Manaban to lose his reason
and shoot Bautista. That Capacity
Manaban interpreted such act of Bautista as preparatory to =
drawing his gun to shoot Manaban does not make Bautista's act
unlawful. 2/3 (80 36) x [P60,864 (50% x P60,864)]

The records[42] reveal that Bautista was 36 years old at the =

time of his death and not 26 years old as stated by the trial 29.33 x P30,432
court and the Court of Appeals.[43] Moreover, the annual
salary of Bautista at the time of his death was already =

P60,864 and not P60,600.[44] We likewise modify the formula P892,570.56

applied by the Court of Appeals in the computation of the
award for loss of earning capacity. In accordance with current
jurisprudence,[45] the formula for the indemnification... for
loss of earning capacity is:
Thus, we reduce the actual damages granted from P111,324 to
P69,500
We likewise reduce the indemnity for death from P75,000 to
P50,000 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the obfuscation are: (1) that there should be an act both unlawful
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 21 May 2001 and its and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (2) that
Resolution dated 8 November 2001. We find petitioner the act which produced the... obfuscation was not far removed
Ramonito Manaban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of
crime of Homicide. Applying... the Indeterminate Sentence time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal
Law and taking into account the mitigating circumstance of equanimity.[40]
voluntary surrender, Ramonito Manaban is hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from six years and one Award of Damages
day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day... of
reclusion temporal as maximum. Ramonito Manaban is ordered
to pay the heirs of Joselito Bautista: P892,570.56 as indemnity
for loss of earning capacity; P69,500 as actual damages; and
P50,000 as indemnity for death.
Principles: U... nder paragraph 1, Article 11 of the Revised
Penal Code, the three requisites to prove self-defense as a
justifying circumstance which may exempt an accused from
criminal liability are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means... employed to
prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the accused or the person defending
himself.[29] Unlawful aggression is an indispensable requisite
of self-defense.[30] Self-defense is... founded on the necessity
on the part of the person being attacked to prevent or repel the
unlawful aggression.[31] Thus, without prior unlawful and
unprovoked attack by the victim, there can be no complete or
incomplete self-defense.[32]
Voluntary Surrender and Obfuscation
Under paragraph 6, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, the
mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is
appreciated where the accused acted upon an impulse so...
powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation.
The requisites of the mitigating circumstance of passion or
SENOJA vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 160341 October 19, 2004
EXEQUIEL SENOJA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS: An Information was filed charging petitioner
Exequiel Senoja with homicide, the accusatory portion of
which reads:
That on April 16, 1997 at around 11 o’clock in the morning in
Barangay Zarah, San Luis, Aurora, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with intent to
kill, attack, assault, and use personal violence upon the person
of one Leon Lumasac by then and there stabbing him with a
bladed weapon locally known as "kolonyal" at the different
parts of his body thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal stab
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his
death thereafter.
The petitioner admitted killing the victim but invoked the
affirmative defense of self-defense. His version of the fatal
incident is that according to him Leon Lumasac walked back to
meet him and upon reaching him, the former suddenly and
treacherously hacked the left side of his head and right thigh;
because of unable to evade the treacherous attack by Leon
Lumasac who persisted in his criminal design, Exequiel Senoja
drew his "colonial" knife and stabbed Leon Lumasac in self-
defense, inflicting upon him multiple wounds which caused his
death.
Trial court rendered judgment against the petitioner, finding
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
In due course, the petitioner appealed the decision to the CA
which rendered judgment affirming, with modification, the
decision of the RTC. The petitioner now seeks relief from this
Court, contending that:
The Honorable Court of Appeals failed to appreciate vital facts
which, if considered, would probably alter the result of this
case on appeal finding appellant’s plea of self-defense credible.
ISSUE: Whether the accused acted in self defense.
RULING: No, The petition is denied.
Paragraph 1, Article 11, of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. – The following do not
incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided
that the following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden,
unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude.
Considering the number, nature and location of the wounds
sustained by the victim, the petitioner’s plea of self-defense is
incredible.
The question that must be resolved is whether or not the victim IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
was the unlawful aggressor as the appellant’s testimony DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
pictures him to be. The Court rules in the negative. The victim AFFIRMED.
had already left the hut and was ten (10) meters away from it.
There is no showing that the victim, who was drunk, was aware
that appellant was following him, or that the appellant called
out to him so that he (the victim) had to turn around and notice
him. It is clear that at that point in time, the victim was simply
walking toward his home; he had stopped being an aggressor.
It was the appellant who, smarting from the earlier incident in
the hut where Leon told him "hindi ka tatagal, sa loob ng
tatlong araw mayroong mangyayari sa iyo, kung hindi ngayon,
bukas" repeated three times, wanted a confrontation. Appellant
stabbed or poked the victim in the left buttock resulting in the
non-fatal wound, and when the latter turned around,
successively stabbed and hacked the victim in the armpit and
chest until he fell. In all, the victim suffered nine (9) wounds.

It is the well-considered finding of this Court that while Leon

Lumasac had ceased being the aggressor after he left the hut to
go home, accused Exequiel Senoja was now the unlawful
aggressor in this second phase of their confrontation. It bears
mentioning that appellant contradicted himself with respect for
(sic) the reason why he left the hut. First, it was to pacify Leon
and the second reason was that he was going home.

As for appellant’s injuries, it is clear that they were sustained in

the course of the victim’s attempt to defend himself as shown
by the lacerated wound on the victim’s left palm, a defensive
wound.
EDWIN RAZON Y LUCEA v. PEOPLE, GR NO. 158053,
2007-06-21
Facts: PO1 Francisco Chopchopen (Chopchopen) was
walking... at around midnight... when a taxicab driven by
Edwin Razon y Lucea (Razon) stopped beside him. Razon told
Chopchopen that he was held up by three men at Dreamland
Subdivision.
Chopchopen then asked Razon to go with him to the place of
the incident to check if the persons who held him up were still
there.
Chopchopen noticed a person lying on the ground... soaked in
blood and that he was hardly breathing.
The victim,... who was... later identified as Benedict Kent
Gonzalo (Gonzalo), was pronounced dead on arrival.
Upon questioning, Razon told Bumangil that he was held up by
three men, which included Gonzalo whom he stabbed in self-
defense.
He claimed... that... three men boarded his cab
Upon reaching their destination and while Razon was turning
the cab around, Gonzalo, who was seated behind the driver's
seat, declared a hold-up and poked a Batangas knife (veinte
nueve) at the right side of the base of Razon's neck.
Razon however was able to grab the knife and release his right
hand from Gonzalo's two companions. Gonzalo's companions
then went out of the cab and picked up stones.
Gonzalo followed and Razon ran after them. Gonzalo was
swinging his cane and it hit Razon on his right leg. Razon then
thought of his knife inside the cab and he went to get it and
confronted the... three by swinging his knife from left to right.
Gonzalo's companions ran away and Razon went back to his
cab and left.
Issues: Whether petitioner acted in self-defense.
Ruling: It is settled that when an accused admits killing the
victim but invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, the
accused assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible,
clear and convincing evidence
Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when
uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or
when it is extremely doubtful by itself.
Petitioner unequivocally admitted that after the three men went
out of his taxicab, he ran after them and later went back to his
cab to get his colonial knife; then he went down the canal to
swing his knife at the victim, wounding and killing him in the
process. Such can no... longer be deemed as self-defense.
It is settled that the moment the first aggressor runs away,
unlawful aggression on the part of the first aggressor ceases to
exist; and when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no
longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor;
otherwise, retaliation and not... self-defense is committed.
Even assuming that some danger did in fact exist, the
imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment
petitioner was able to disarm the victim by wresting the knife
from the latter.
With petitioner's failure to prove self-defense, the inescapable
conclusion is that he is guilty of homicide as correctly found by
the RTC.
MANUEL O. ORIENTE vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 155094 January 30, 2007
FACTS: On 16 March 1996, at around 10:00 o'clock in the
evening, Arnel Tanael was on his way to the house of Romulo
Cariño. He passed in front of the house of [petitioner] Manuel
Oriente and saw the latter and his companions having a
drinking spree at the terrace of the petitioner's house. He
arrived at Romulo's house where the latter was drinking beer
alone. Thereafter, Romulo went out of the house to buy
cigarettes. While watching television in the house of Romulo,
Arnel Tanael heard two gunshots. Hence, he rushed outside the
house to check on what the gunshots were all about.
Peeping through potted plants perched on top of a neighbor's
fence Tanael saw Romulo Cariño, Manuel Oriente, the latter's
daughter, Marilou Lopez and her husband, Paul Lopez and one
Rogelio Gascon arguing. He heard Paul Lopez telling Romulo
Cariño, "Ikaw Cariño, ang liit-liit mo, ang yabang mo!" Then
Tanael saw Marilou coming out from their house with a lead
pipe and handed it over to Paul. Paul then hit Romulo with a
lead pipe at his right arm. Accused-appellant got the lead pipe
from Paul and hit Romulo on his left eyebrow. Romulo reeled
and fell down. Upon seeing Romulo fall down, Arnel got
confused, hence, he went back inside the house and switched
off the light and turned the television off. He went outside
again and saw Romulo moaning. At this point, Paul Lopez was
already poking a gun at Romulo, then pulled the trigger twice
but the gun did not fire. Arnel then shouted, "Putang ina ninyo,
bakit niyo ginagawa iyan sa bayaw ko, bakit ninyo ginaganito
siya, ano ba ang kasalanan niya sa inyo." Oriente and his
company did not say anything. Romulo Cariño was brought by
Arnel to the East Avenue Medical Center where Romulo, two
hours after, passed away.
The accused pleaded self-defense, arguing that the victim was
the one who shot the gun and that he was only defending
himself and his family when he hit the victim. The RTC
rendered a Decision convicting the petitioner of the crime of
Homicide. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether accused may claim self-defense.
HELD: No. The petitioner emphasizes that the victim,
allegedly a troublemaker in the vicinity, was drunk, fired his
gun twice, and then proceeded towards the petitioner and his
companions. The Court is not convinced.
When self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to
the accused to show that the killing was legally justified.
Having owned the killing of the victim, the accused should be
able to prove to the satisfaction of the Court the elements of
self-defense in order to avail of this extenuating circumstance.
He must discharge this burden by clear and convincing
evidence. When successful, an otherwise felonious deed would
be excused, mainly predicated on the lack of criminal intent of
the accused.
Self-defense requires that there be (1) an unlawful aggression
by the person injured or killed by the offender, (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel that
unlawful aggression, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself. All these conditions
must concur. There can be no self-defense, whether complete
or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful
aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense.

Unlawful aggression, a primordial element of self-defense,

would presuppose an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or
imminent danger on the life and limb of a person — not a mere
threatening or intimidating attitude — but most importantly, at
the time the defensive action was taken against the aggressor.
To invoke self-defense successfully, there must have been an
unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the
accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon
the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the
attack.

The testimonies of the defense witnesses, including the

accused, that Cariño threatened the persons gathered in front of
Oriente's house with a gun is quite difficult to believe in view
of the admissions of the same defense witnesses, including the
accused, that Cariño was able to get up from the ground after
being hit and ran away with gun in hand. A person who was
already threatening to kill with a gun and who was then hit
with a piece of wood in a serious manner, can be reasonably
expected to make use thereof. Here, the defense makes a rather
unusual claim that Cariño simply ran away and did not use the
gun he was holding while running.
PEOPLE v. CUNIGUNDA BOHOLST-CABALLERO, GR
No. L-23249, 1974-11-25
Facts: PARRICIDE... to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment
of from EIGHT (8)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor in its medium
period, as the minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT
(8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal
Cunigunda Boholst and Francisco Caballero, both at the age of
twenty, were married on June 7, 1956
The marriage was not a happy one and before the end of the
year
1957 the couple separated.
At about midnight, Francisco Caballero and his companions...
proceeded home. On the way, they saw Francisco's wife,
Cunigunda standing
Cunigunda called Francisco and when the latter approached
her, Cunigunda suddenly stabbed Francisco with a knife
Dr. Cesar Samson, owner of the hospital, personally attended
to the victim and found a "punctured wound on... the left
lumbar region measuring 1 inch externally
Dr. Samson suggested that the patient be... transported to Cebu
City.[4] In the meantime, Cunigunda Caballero had gone to the
Police Department of Ormoc City, surrendered to desk sergeant
Restituto Mariveles and informed the latter that she stabbed her
husband.
While
Francisco Caballero was confined at the hospital, he was
interrogated by Patrolman Francisco Covero concerning the
identity of his assailant and he pointed to his wife Cunigunda...
in a piece of paper on which the victim affixed his
thumbmarked (Exhibit D) in the presence of his brother,
Cresencio Caballero, and another policeman... but the trip
proved futile because the victim died at noontime
After her marriage to Francisco Caballero on June 7, 1956,
appellant lived with her husband... in the house of her parents...
marked by frequent quarrels... caused by her husband's
"gambling, drinking, and serenading", and there were times
when he maltreated and beat her;... she and her husband
transferred to a house of their own, but a month had hardly
passed when Francisco left her and her child, and she had to...
go back to live with her parents who bore the burden of
supporting her and her child... she went to her husband and
asked for some help for her sick child but he drove her away
and said "I don't care if you all would... die"; in the evening of
January 2, 1958, she went out carolling with her friend,
Crispina Barabad, and several men... but before she could leave
the vicinity of the house of Crispina, she met her husband,
Francisco, who upon seeing her, held her by the collar of her
dress and asked her: "Where have you been prostituting?
Francisco then... held her by the hair, slapped her face until her
nose bled, and pushed her towards the ground; to keep herself
from falling she held on to his waist and as she did so her right
hand grasped the knife tucked inside the belt line on the left
side of his body; because her husband... continued to push her
down she fell on her back to the ground; her husband then knelt
over her, held her neck, and choked her saying: "Now is the
time I can do whatever I want. I will kill you"; because she
had "no other recourse" as she was being choked, she pulled...
out the knife of her husband and thrust it at him hitting the left
side of his body near the "belt line" just above his left thigh;
when she finally released herself from the hold of her husband
she ran home and on the way she threw the knife; in the
morning of January 3, she... went to town, surrendered to the
police, and presented the torn and blood-stained dress worn by
her on the night of the incident (see Exhibit I); Pat. Cabral then
accompanied her to look for the we... apon but because they
could not find it the policeman advised her to get any... knife,
Issues: did appellant stab her husband in the legitimate defense
of her person?
Ruling: We are constrained, however, to disagree with the
court a quo and depart from the rule that appellate courts will
generally not disturb the findings of the trial court on facts
testified to by the witnesses.
In the case of appellant Cunigunda Caballero, We find the
location of the fatal wound as a valuable circumstance which
confirms the plea of self-defense.
Another, is the lack of motive of appellant in attacking and
killing her husband on that particular night of January 2
Next to appellant's lack of motive for killing her husband, is
her conduct shortly after the occurrence.
The element of unlawful aggression has been clearly
established as pointed out above.
The third element of self-defense is lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, We find
that accused-appellant acted in the legitimate defense of her
person, and We accordingly set aside the judgment of
conviction and ACQUIT her with costs de oficio
Principles: To the Classicists in penal law, lawful defense is
grounded on the impossibility on the... part of the State to
avoid a present unjust aggression and protect a person
unlawfully attacked, and therefore it is inconceivable for the
State to require that the innocent succumb to an unlawful
aggression without resistance; while to the Positivists, lawful
defense is an... exercise of a right, an act of social justice done
to repel the attack of an aggressor
Our law on self-defense is found in Art. 11 of the Revised
Penal Code which provides:
"ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not
incur any criminal liability:
"1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights,
provided that the following circumstances concur:
"First. Unlawful aggression;
"Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it;
"Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself."... he who seeks justification for his
act must prove by clear and convincing evidence the presence
of the aforecited circumstances, the rationale being that having
admitted the wounding or killing of his adversary which is a...
felony, he is to be held criminally liable for the crime unless he
establishes to the satisfaction of the court the fact of legitimate
self-defense.
record discloses that the trial judge overlooked and did not give
due importance to one piece of evidence which more than the
testimony of any witness eloquently confirms the narration of
appellant on how she happened to stab her husband on that
unfortunate... night. We refer to the location of the wound
inflicted on the victim.
Thus, with her husband kneeling over her as she lay on her
back on the ground and his hand choking her neck, appellant,
as she said, had no other recourse but to pull out the knife
inserted at the left side of her husband's belt and plunge it at his
body hitting the left back... portion just below the waist,
described by the attending physician, Dr. Cesar Samson, as the
left lumbar region.
The fact that the blow landed in the vicinity from where the
knife was drawn is a strong indication of the truth of appellant's
testimony, for as she lay on the... ground with her husband bent
over her it was quite natural for her right hand to get hold of
the knife tucked in the left side of the man's belt and thrust it at
that section of the body nearest to her hand at the moment.
for even if it were true that the two knees of Francisco were on
his wife's right thigh, however, there is nothing in the record to
show that the right arm of the accused was held, pinned down
or rendered immobile, or that she pressed her elbow to... the
ground, as conjectured by the trial judge, in such a manner that
she could not reach for the knife.
The trial judge, however, failed to consider that it is humanly
impossible to have an exact and accurate reproduction or
reenactment of an occurrence especially if it involves the
participation... of persons other than the very protagonists of
the incident being reenacted.
My two hands held his waist line.
It is this particular location of the wound sustained by the
victim which strongly militates against the credibility of the
lone prosecution witness, Ignacio Barabad.
it would have been more natural and probable... for the weapon
to have been directed towards the front part of the body of the
victim such as his abdomen or chest, rather than at his back,
left side, just above the left thigh.
Although it is the general rule that the presence of motive in
the killing of a person is not indispensable to a conviction
especially where the... identity of the assailant is duly
established by other competent evidence or is not disputed, as
in this case, nonetheless, the absence of such motive is
important in ascertaining the truth as between two antagonistic
theories or versions of the killing.
While appellant admitted in the course of her testimony that
her marriage was not a happy one, that... she and her husband
separated in the month of October, 1957, and since then she
and her child lived with her parents who supported them,
nevertheless she declared that notwithstanding their separation
she still loved her husband
On the other hand, it was Francisco Caballero who had a
reason for attacking his wife, Cunigunda. Meeting his wife
unexpectedly at past midnight on the road, Francisco reacted
angrily, and suspecting that she was out for some bad purpose
he held her by the collar of her... dress and said: "Where have
you been prostituting?
Cunigunda went to the city and presented herself at the... police
headquarters where she reported that she stabbed her husband
and surrendered the blood-stained dress she wore that night.
We have gone over the stenographic transcript of the testimony
of appellant on direct examination and nowhere is there a
positive and direct statement of hers that she did not report that
she was choked by her husband.
We do not see, therefore, the alleged contradiction in
appellant's testimony which was singled out by His Honor as
one of his reasons for discrediting her plea of self-defense.
We find however no strong reason for disbelieving the accused
on this point. Appellant does not deny that she turned over
Exhibit C to Pat. Mariveles as the knife with which she stabbed
her husband but she claims that she did so upon advise of
another... policeman, Pat. Cabral, and it is quite significant that
the latter was not called upon by the prosecution to refute such
declaration.
Provocation is sufficient when it is proportionate to the
aggression, that is, adequate enough to impel one to attack the
person claiming... self-defense.
Undoubtedly appellant herein did not give sufficient
provocation to warrant the aggression or attack on her person
by her husband, Francisco. While it was understandable for
Francisco to be angry at his wife for finding her on the... road
in the middle of the night, however, he was not justified in
inflicting bodily punishment with an intent to kill
January 2 was indeed within the Christmas... season during
which by tradition people carol from house to house and
receive monetary gifts in a Christian spirit of goodwill.
People vs. Sumicad, 56 Phil. 643 (1932) Julian Sumicad was not materially to blame in bringing
Article 11 (Self Defense) about the trouble. Two of the elements of self-defense
were therefore clearly present, namely, that the deceased
FACTS: On the 23rd of February, 1931, Sumicad along was the aggressor and that there was lack of sufficient
with his fellow workers saw Segundo Cubol passing along provocation on the part of the accused.
their place. Sumicad demanded that his five and on half
days service should be paid. Cubol in shout asked for
clarification as to what Sumicad asked then hit Sumicad
with his fist. Sumicad rose from the log trying to escape,
but Cubol pursued him and continued striking him with
his fists. Sumicad continued to recede then found himself
cornered by a pile of logs.

Cubol lunged at Sumicad with evident intention of

wrestling the bolo of Sumicad. Sumicad struck Cubol and
delivered a blow on his right shoulder and two deep cuts
on his forehead. This was witnessed by Francisco
Villegeas. Villegeas turned to Sumicad and told to put up
his bolo and go to the poblacion. Sumicad testified that
Cubol attempted to draw a knife from his pocket when he
struck him with his bolo.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sumicad acted on self-defense.

Held: Yes.

Ratio: It is evident that the quarrel which resulted in the

death of Segundo Cubol was of his own making, and that
PEOPLE vs. GENOSA, G.R. No. 135981, January 15 2004.
FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa,
by his wife Marivic Genosa, appellant herein. During their first
year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently
thereafter, Ben changed and the couple would always quarrel
and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant
testified that every time her husband came home drunk, he
would provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever beaten
by her husband, she consulted medical doctors who testified
during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant and the
victim were quarreled and the victim beat the appellant.
However, appellant was able to run to another room. Appellant
admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun. The
information for parricide against appellant, however, alleged
that the cause of death of the victim was by beating through the
use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self defense and defense
of her unborn child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide with an aggravating circumstance of treachery and
imposed the penalty of death.
On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed
an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable
Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-
examination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of
Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to
determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband;
and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts’ reports in the
records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in
the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the
testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme
Court partly granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of
the appellant. It remanded the case to the trial court for
reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on
the “battered woman syndrome” plea. Testimonies of two
expert witnesses on the “battered woman syndrome”, Dra.
Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by the
trial court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court as
part of the records.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the
“battered woman syndrome” as constituting self defense.
2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to
prove that she is afflicted with the “battered woman
syndrome”.
A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is
repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological
behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he
wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women
include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship
with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered
woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least
twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship
with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in
the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.”
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is
characterized by the so-called “cycle of violence,” which has
three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute
battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least,
nonviolent) phase.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-
defense arising from the battered woman syndrome. First, each
of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have
characterized at least two battering episodes between the
appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute
battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must
have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of
an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that
she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the
time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not
necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused,
based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former
against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could
satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of
the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly
established.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle
of violence” supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben
and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering
incidents but appellant failed to prove that in at least another
battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar
pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in
regard to the third phase of the cycle.
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship
does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill
her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the
context of self-defense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is the rule
that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat
on one’s life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be
imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised
Penal Code provides that the following requisites of self-
defense must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3)
Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-
defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack --
or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a
person. In the present case, however, according to the
testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time
interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal
attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from
his violent behavior and escape to their children’s bedroom.
During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to
bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed
had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that
presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion
and obfuscation were, however, taken in favor of appellant. It
should be clarified that these two circumstances --
psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation --
did not arise from the same set of facts.
The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the
severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon
appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time
resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to
an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without
depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an
impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and
obfuscation, it has been held that this state of mind is present
when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable
burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or
by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To
appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should
concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to
produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far
removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable
length of time, during which the accused might recover her
normal equanimity.
2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense,
treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself.
Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is
preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased
may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated
aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in order to appreciate
alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must
have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific
purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from
any defense that might be put up by the party attacked.
The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have
naturally produced passion or obfuscation. The acute battering
she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse,
in spite of the fact that she was eight (8) months pregnant with
their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid
emotional and mental state, which overcame her reason and
impelled her to vindicate her life and that of her unborn child.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for
parricide. However, considering the presence of two (2)
mitigating circumstances and without any aggravating
circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six (6) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months
and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Inasmuch as
appellant has been detained for more than the minimum
penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of
Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody
upon due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless
she is being held for some other lawful cause.
NOTE: After this case was decided by the Supreme Court,
R.A. 9262, otherwise known as Anti-Violence Against Women
and their Children Act of 2004 was enacted. Sec. 26 of said law
provides that "xxx. Victim-survivors who are found by the
courts to be suffering from battered women syndrome do not
incur any criminal and civil liability nothwithstanding the
absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of
self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.xxx"
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, the mitigating circumstance No.7 of Article of RPC
vs. because the defendant acted with loss of reason and self-
RAFAEL BUMANGLAG, ET AL., defendants. - control upon seeing that Ribis was taking material
GREGORIO BUNDOC, appellant. possession of the palay.

FACTS: Herein defendant Rafael Bumanglag noticed that

he lost 40 bundles of palay which he keeps in his granary.
Upon his search of the following morning, he found them
on an inclosed field 100 meters away from his granary. He
waited on the said field along with 2 other companions to
know the person who got hold of his palays. A man
Guillermo Ribis arrived and approach the palay and
attempted to carry it but at that instant he was approached
by Bumanglag and his companions who assaulted the
presume with sticks and stabbing weapons and as a result
of the struggles, Ribis died.

ISSUE: Whether or not the justifying circumstances of

defense of property is presence in this case.

HELD: No, The supreme court held that there is no

unlawful aggression present in this case and there is
absence of other requisites which would fully or partially
exempt the accused from criminal responsibility.
However, the court took into consideration the presence of
People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389 (1983) 1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant
despite the fact that he acted indefense of his person. No. The
FACTS: courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of
Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by the house of thedefendant was indeed a form of aggression on
treachery) of David Fleischer andFlaviano Rubia. On August the part of the victim. However, thisaggression was not done
22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during the time the on the person of the victim but rather on his rights to property.
twowere constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from On thefirst issue, the courts did not err. However, in
getting into his house and rice mill.The defendant was taking a consideration of the violation of property rights,the courts
nap when he heard sounds of construction and found fence referred to Art. 30 of the civil code recognizing the right of
beingmade. He addressed the group and asked them to stop owners to close and fencetheir land.Although is not in dispute,
destroying his house and asking if theycould talk things over. the victim was not in the position to subscribe to the article
Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go ahead." becausehis ownership of the land being awarded by the
Defendantlost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his government was still pending, therefore puttingownership into
shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was runningtowards the jeep question. It is accepted that the victim was the original
where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the shooting, aggressor.2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-
Fleischer and Co.(the company of Fleischer's family) was appellant although he acted in defence of hisrights.Yes.
involved in a legal battle with the defendant and otherland However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-
settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time defense is applicable only ifthe 3 requirements are fulfilled.
of the shooting, the civilcase was still pending for annulment Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates these requisites:
(settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be
annulled). At time of the shooting, defendant had leased his
property from Fleisher (thoughcase pending and ownership
uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant received
letterterminating contract because he allegedly didn't pay
rent.He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land.
Shooting was barely 2 months afterletter. Defendant claims he
killed in defense of his person and property. CFI ruled
that Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation offset by the mitigatingcircumstance of
voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua,to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral
damages.
ISSUES: