X.

LATIN RULES
VERBA LEGIS NON EST RECENDENDUM

G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992

GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IMELDA SALAZAR, respondents.

Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner.

Gerardo S. Alansalon for private respondent.

ROMERO, J.:

For private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, it would seem that her close association with Delfin
Saldivar would mean the loss of her job. In May 1982, private respondent was employed by Globe-
Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GMCR) as general systems analyst. Also employed by
petitioner as manager for technical operations' support was Delfin Saldivar with whom private
respondent was allegedly very close.

Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company equipment and spare parts
worth thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were missing, caused the investigation of
the latter's activities. The report dated September 25, 1984 prepared by the company's internal
auditor, Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicated that Saldivar had entered into a partnership styled Concave
Commercial and Industrial Company with Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager of Elecon
Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier of petitioner often recommended by Saldivar. The report
also disclosed that Saldivar had taken petitioner's missing Fedders airconditioning unit for his own
personal use without authorization and also connived with Yambao to defraud petitioner of its
property. The airconditioner was recovered only after petitioner GMCR filed an action for replevin
against Saldivar.1

It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that Imelda Salazar violated company
reglations by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the company's interests. Evidence
showed that she signed as a witness to the articles of partnership between Yambao and Saldivar. It
also appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of the Fedders airconditioner
but failed to inform her employer.

Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, petitioner company placed private respondent
Salazar under preventive suspension for one (1) month, effective October 9, 1984, thus giving her
thirty (30) days within which to, explain her side. But instead of submitting an explanations three (3)
days later or on October 12, 1984 private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal
suspension, which she subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave
benefits, 13th month pay and damages, after petitioner notified her in writing that effective November
8, 1984, she was considered dismissed "in view of (her) inability to refute and disprove these
findings. 2

After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated July 16, 1985, ordered petitioner company to
reinstate private respondent to her former or equivalent position and to pay her full backwages and
other benefits she would have received were it not for the illegal dismissal. Petitioner was also
ordered to pay private respondent moral damages of P50,000.00. 3

On appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations, Commission in the questioned resolution
dated December 29, 1987 affirmed the aforesaid decision with respect to the reinstatement of private
respondent but limited the backwages to a period of two (2) years and deleted the award for moral
damages. 4

Hence, this petition assailing the Labor Tribunal for having committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding that the suspension and subsequent dismissal of private respondent were illegal and in
ordering her reinstatement with two (2) years' backwages.

On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for petitioner GMCR.

The inestigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin Saldivar's acts in conflict with his
position as technical operations manager, necessitated immediate and decisive action on any
employee closely, associated with Saldivar. The suspension of Salazar was further impelled by th.e
discovery of the missing Fedders airconditioning unit inside the apartment private respondent shared
with Saldivar. Under such circumstances, preventive suspension was the proper remedial recourse
available to the company pending Salazar's investigation. By itself, preventive suspension does, not
signify that the company has adjudged the employee guilty of the charges she was asked to answer
and explain. Such disciplinary measure is resorted to for the protection of the company's property
pending investigation any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee. 5

Thus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated Salazar's right to due process
when she was promptly suspended. If at all, the fault, lay with private respondent when she ignored
petitioner's memorandum of October 8, 1984 "giving her ample opportunity to present (her) side to
the Management." Instead, she went directly to the Labor Department and filed her complaint for
illegal suspension without giving her employer a chance to evaluate her side of the controversy.

But while we agree with the propriety of Salazar's preventive suspension, we hold that her eventual
separation from employment was not for cause.

What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful dismissal so as to "make whole" the victim who has
not merely lost her job which, under settled Jurisprudence, is a property right of which a person is not
to be deprived without due process, but also the compensation that should have accrued to her
during the period when she was unemployed?

Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:

Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate
the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An
employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the
time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement. 6 (Emphasis supplied)

Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor
Code:
 Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employments, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause as provided in the Labor
Code or when authorized by existing laws.

Sec. 3. Reinstatement. — An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall by

entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to backwages."7 (Emphasis
supplied)

Before proceeding any furthers, it needs must be recalled that the present Constitution has gone
further than the 1973 Charter in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to marginalized groups
of society, including labor. Given the pro-poor orientation of several articulate Commissioners of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986, it was not surprising that a whole new Article emerged on Social
Justice and Human Rights designed, among other things, to "protect and enhance the right of all the
people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural
inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good." 8 Proof of the
priority accorded to labor is that it leads the other areas of concern in the Article on Social
Justice, viz., Labor ranks ahead of such topics as Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform, Urban
Land Roform and Housing, Health, Women, Role and Rights of Poople's Organizations and Human
Rights.9

The opening paragraphs on Labor states

The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for
all.

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of
work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits is may be provided by law. 10 (Emphasis
supplied)

Compare this with the sole.provision on Labor in the 1973 Constitution under the Article an
Declaration of Principles and State Policies that provides:

Sec. 9. The state shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality
in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and
regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State shall ensure the rights
of workers to self-organization, collective baegaining, security of tenure, and just and
humane conditions of work. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration. 11

To be sure, both Charters recognize "security of tenure" as one of the rights of labor which the State
is mandated to protect. But there is no gainsaying the fact that the intent of the framers of the present
Constitution was to give primacy to the rights of labor and afford the sector "full protection," at least
greater protection than heretofore accorded them, regardless of the geographical location of the
workers and whether they are organized or not.

It was then CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who substantially
contributed to the present formulation of the protection to labor provision and proposed that the same
be incorporated in the Article on Social Justice and not just in the Article on Declaration of Principles
and State Policies "in the light of the special importance that we are giving now to social justice and
the necessity of emphasizing the scope and role of social justice in national development." 12

If we have taken pains to delve into the background of the labor provisions in our Constitution and the
Labor Code, it is but to stress that the right of an employee not to be dismissed from his job except for
a just or authorized cause provided by law has assumed greater importance under the 1987
Constitution with the singular prominence labor enjoys under the article on Social Justice. And this
transcendent policy has been translated into law in the Labor Code. Under its terms, where a case of
unlawful or unauthorized dismissal has been proved by the aggrieved employee, or on the other
hand, the employer whose duty it is to prove the lawfulness or justness of his act of dismissal has
failed to do so, then the remedies provided in Article 279 should find, application. Consonant with this
liberalized stance vis-a-vis labor, the legislature even went further by enacting Republic Act No. 6715
which took effect on March 2, 1989 that amended said Article to remove any possible ambiguity that
jurisprudence may have generated which watered down the constitutional intent to grant to labor "full
protection." 13

To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence to show an authorized, much less a legal,
cause for the dismissal of private respondent, she had every right, not only to be entitled to
reinstatement, but ay well, to full backwages." 14

The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment of
backwages is, in the former, to restore the dismissed employee to her status before she lost her job,
for the dictionary meaning of the word "reinstate" is "to restore to a state, conditione positions etc.
from which one had been removed"15 and in the latter, to give her back the income lost during the
period of unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past, would perforce make her "whole."

Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been thwarted when reinstatement has not been
forthcoming and the hapless dismissed employee finds himself on the outside looking in.

Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the Court for denying reinstatement under
the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto; that reinstatement can no longer be effected in
view of the long passage of time (22 years of litigation) or because of the realities of the
situation; 16 or that it would be "inimical to the employer's interest; " 17 or that reinstatement may no
longer be feasible; 18 or, that it will not serve the best interests of the parties involved; 19 or that the
company would be prejudiced by the workers' continued employment; 20 or that it will not serve any
prudent purpose as when supervening facts have transpired which make execution on that score
unjust or inequitable 21 or, to an increasing extent, due to the resultant atmosphere of "antipathy and
antagonism" or "strained relations" or "irretrievable estrangement" between the employer and the
employee. 22

In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered the payment of backwages and separation
pay 23 or solely separation pay. 24

In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. In the first place the wording of the
Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement. . . . and to his full backwages. . . ." 25 Under the principlesof statutory
construction, if a statute is clears plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the
maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the
words employed by, the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the
court from construing it differently. 26 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words,
to:have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found
in the statute.27 Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no
departure. Neither does the provision admit of any qualification. If in the wisdom of the Court, there
may be a ground or grounds for non-application of the above-cited provision, this should be by way of
exception, such as when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations
between the employer and the employee.

In such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a position where he enjoys
the trust and confidence of his employer; and that it is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere of
antipathy and antagonism may be generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and productivity of
the employee concerned.

A few examples, will suffice to illustrate the Court's application of the above principles: where the
employee is a Vice-President for Marketing and as such, enjoys the full trust and confidence of top
management; 28 or is the Officer-In-Charge of the extension office of the bank where he works; 29 or is
an organizer of a union who was in a position to sabotage the union's efforts to organize the workers
in commercial and industrial establishments; 30 or is a warehouseman of a non-profit organization
whose primary purpose is to facilitate and maximize voluntary gifts. by foreign individuals and
organizations to the Philippines; 31 or is a manager of its Energy Equipment Sales. 32

Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately. Otherwisey

reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is invariably engendered between
the parties as a result of litigation. That is human nature. 33

Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting one's right;
otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could be easily separated from the service, by
merely paying his separation pay on the pretext that his relationship with his employer had already
become strained. 34

Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as systems analyst is one that
may be characterized as a position of trust and confidence such that if reinstated, it may well lead to
strained relations between employer and employee. Hence, this does not constitute an exception to
the general rule mandating reinstatement for an employee who has been unlawfully dismissed.

On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence reposed in her by engaging in transactions that
may have created conflict of interest situations? Petitioner GMCR points out that as a matter of
company policy, it prohibits its employees from involving themselves with any company that has
business dealings with GMCR. Consequently, when private respondent Salazar signed as a witness
to the partnership papers of Concave (a supplier of Ultra which in turn is also a supplier of GMCR),
she was deemed to have placed. herself in an untenable position as far as petitioner was concerned.

However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public respondent that such a circumstance did not create
a conflict of interests situation. As a systems analyst, Salazar was very far removed from operations
involving the procurement of supplies. Salazar's duties revolved around the development of systems
and analysis of designs on a continuing basis. In other words, Salazar did not occupy a position of
trust relative to the approval and purchase of supplies and company assets.

In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on loss of confidence. As we
have held countless times, while loss of confidence or breach of trust is a valid ground for
terminations it must rest an some basis which must be convincingly established. 35 An employee who
not be dismissed on mere presumptions and suppositions. Petitioner's allegation that since Salazar
and Saldivar lived together in the same apartment, it "presumed reasonably that complainant's
sympathy would be with Saldivar" and its averment that Saldivar's investigation although unverified,
was probably true, do not pass this Court's test. 36 While we should not condone the acts of disloyalty
of an employee, neither should we dismiss him on the basis of suspicion derived from speculative
inferences.

To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar's dismissal would be most inequitous because
the bulk of the findings centered principally oh her friend's alleged thievery and anomalous
transactions as technical operations' support manager. Said report merely insinuated that in view of
Salazar's special relationship with Saldivar, Salazar might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar's
questionable activities. Direct evidence implicating private respondent is wanting from the records.

It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report came out after Saldivar had already resigned
from GMCR on May 31, 1984. Since Saldivar did not have the opportunity to refute management's
findings, the report remained obviously one-sided. Since the main evidence obtained by petitioner
dealt principally on the alleged culpability of Saldivar, without his having had a chance to voice his
side in view of his prior resignation, stringent examination should have been carried out to ascertain
whether or not there existed independent legal grounds to hold Salatar answerable as well and,
thereby, justify her dismissal. Finding none, from the records, we find her to have been unlawfully
dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission
dated December 29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner GMCR is ordered to REINSTATE private
respondent Imelda Salazar and to pay her backwages equivalent to her salary for a period of two (2)
years only.

This decision is immediately executory.

VERBA LEGIS NON EST RECENDENDUM

G.R. No. 109005 January 10, 1994

JUAN D. VICTORIA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JESUS JAMES CALISIN, respondents.

Juan D. Victoria for himself and in his own behalf.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to section 2,
Article IX of the Constitution, to set aside (a) the Resolution of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) dated January 22, 1993, which certified respondent James Calisin as the highest
ranking member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Albay and (b) its Resolution
dated February 22, 1993, which denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner.

The issue in the case at bench is the ranking of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
Province of Albay for purposes of succession.
In the May 11, 1992 Elections, the following candidates from the first, second and third districts of the
Province of Albay were elected and proclaimed as members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, to wit:

FIRST DISTRICT

Name No. of Votes Garnered

1. Jesus James Calisin 28,335 votes

2. Vicente Go, Sr. 17,937 votes
3. Clenio Cabredo 16,705 votes

SECOND DISTRICT

1. Juan D. Victoria 32,918 votes

2. Jesus Marcellana 26,030 votes
3. Lorenzo Reyeg 23,887 votes

THIRD DISTRICT

1. Ramon Fernandez, Jr. 19,315 votes

2. Masikap Fontanilla 19,241 votes
3. Arturo Osia 17,778 votes
4. Nemesio Baclao 17,545 votes

(Rollo, pp. 27-28)

Due to the suspension of Governor Romeo Salalima of the Province of Albay, Vice-Governor Danilo
Azana automatically assumed the powers and functions of the governor, leaving vacant his post as
vice-governor. Under the law, Azana's position as vice-governor should be occupied by the highest
ranking Sangguniang member, a post being contested by petitioner and private respondent.

In answer to private respondent's petition for his declaration as senior Sanggunian member for the
Province of Albay, the COMELEC issued a resolution dated January 22, 1993, certifying him as first
in the order of ranking with petitioner herein as second ranking member. The COMELEC based its
certification on the number of votes obtained by the Sanggunian members in relation to the number of
registered voters in the district.

Thus, on February 15, 1993, Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III of the Department of Interior and Local
Government designated private respondent as acting Vice-Governor of the province.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution which was denied on
February 22, 1993.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner claims that the ranking of the Sanggunian members should not only be based on the
number of votes obtained in relation to the total number of registered voters, but also on the number
of voters in the district who actually voted therein. He further argues that a district may have a large
number of registered voters but only a few actually voted, in which case the winning candidate would
register a low percentage of the number of votes obtained. Conversely, a district may have a smaller
number of registered voters but may have a big voters' turn-out, in which case the winning candidate
would get a higher percentage of the votes. Applying his formula, petitioner would come out to be the
highest ranking Sanggunian member.

Petitioner gives the following illustration:

1. for private respondent.

107,216 (actually voted)

—————————— x 28,335 (votes obtained) = 23.40%
129,793 (registered voters)

(Rollo, pp. 24, 25 and 30)

2. for petitioner

121,423 (actually voted)

—————————— x 32,918 (votes obtained) = 25.84%
154,665 (registered voters)

(Rollo, p. 9).

We are not persuaded.

The Local Government provides:

Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Office of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor,
and Vice-Mayor. — (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or
mayor, the vice-governor or
vice-mayor concerned shall become governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs
in the offices of the governor, vice-governor, mayor, or vice-mayor, the highest ranking
Sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking
Sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice-governor, mayor or vice-mayor,
as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically
by the other Sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein.

xxx xxx xxx

For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the Sanggunian shall
be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning
candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district in the immediately
preceding local election. (Emphasis ours)

The COMELEC came up with the following ranking of the top three Sanggunian members:

——————————————————————————————
NAME District Registered Votes Percent Rank
of Elected Voters Obtained Dist'n
Candidates
 ——————————————————————————————
ALBAY

CALISIN,
JESUS JAMES B. 1st 130,085 28,335 21.78 1st

VICTORIA,
JUAN D. 2nd 155.318 32,918 21.19 2nd

MARCELLANA
JESUS, M. 2nd 155.318 26,030 16.76 3rd
——————————————————————————————
(Rollo, p. 14)

The law is clear that the ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion
of the votes obtained by each winning candidate of the total number of registered voters who actually
voted. In such a case, the Court has no recourse but to merely apply the law. The courts may not
speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Pascual v. Pascual-
Bautista, 207 SCRA 561 [1992]).

In the case of Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,
206 SCRA 710 (1992), we held that:

. . . Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statue is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given it literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or
verba legis derived from the maxim, index animi sermo est (speech is the index of
intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a
statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it
differently. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used
words advisely, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found
in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there
should be no departure. . .

Petitioner's contention is therefore untenable considering the clear mandate of the law, which leaves
no room for other interpretation but it must very well be addressed to the legislative branch and not to
this Court which has no power to change the law.

Considering the foregoing, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in
issuing the Resolution dated January 22, 1993.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

VERBA LEGIS NON EST RECENDENDUM

G.R. No. 216691 July 21, 2015

MARIA ANGELA S. GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE ALEJANDRE P. PAYUMO III, Respondents.
 DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Nature of the Case

Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in conjunction with Rule 64 of the Rules of Court,
praying for the annulment of the September 10, 20141 and January 29, 20152 Resolutions of public
respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec), acting through its First Division and En Banc,
respectively, in Case No. EAC [AEL] 11-2014. The assailed rulings reinstated the election protest of
private respondent Jose Alejandre Payumo III (Payumo) and effectively reversed the trial court’s
ruling that it was filed out of time.

The Facts

Petitioner Maria Angela S. Garcia (Garcia) and Payumo were candidates for the mayoralty race of
Dinalupihan, Bataan during the May 13, 2013 national and local elections. In the poll’s conclusion,
Garcia was proclaimed winner for having garnered 31,138 votes as against Payumo’s 13,292. The
Office of the Election of Dinalupihan then released to Payumo a certified copy of the printed
Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation (printed COCP), bearing May 15, 2013 as the date
of proclamation of the winning mayoralty candidate. As per the records, the printed COCP reflected
the signatures and thumbprints of the members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC).3

On May 27, 2013, Payumo lodged an election protest4 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5 in
Balanga, Bataan (RTC), docketed as Election Protest No. DH-001-13, citing the alleged prevalence of
fraud and irregularities in all the clustered precincts of Dinalupihan, heightened by the Precinct Count
Optical Scan (PCOS) machines’ unreliability, casting doubt on the results of the counting and
canvassing of votes.5 Anent the timeliness of the recourse, Payumo claimed that from May 15, 2013,
the proclamation date appearing on the printed COCP, he had ten (10) days, or until May 25, 2013,
within which to challenge the election results. He added that since May 25, 2913 falls on a Saturday,
he filed his protest on the immediately succeeding working day, Monday, May 27, 2013. 6

In answer,7 Garcia belied the allegations of fraud and urgently moved for the dismissal of Payumo’s
protest. She claimed that she was proclaimed mayor on May 14, not May 15, 2013, as indicated in
the manual Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation (manual COCP)8 issued by
Dinalupihan’s MBOC. She, thus, argued that the election protest was filed beyond the mandatory ten-
day (10-day) reglementary period for filing an election protest, which, as she claimed in this case,
lasted only until May 24, 2013, a Friday. On the ground of belated filing, Garcia urged the RTC to
dismiss the election protest outright.9

On July 1, 2013, the RTC heard the motion for preliminary determination of the affirmative defense of
prescription. Members of the MBOC of Dinalupihan took the witness stand and testified that Garcia
was proclaimed on May 14, 2013 at around 5:00PM.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Giving credence to petitioner’s assertion, the RTC, through its Order10 dated February 18, 2014,
dismissed Payumo’s protest for being barred by the statue of limitations. The fallo of the Order
reads.11

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the election protest filed by protestant Jose Alejandre P. Payumo III
on May 27, 2013 is hereby DISMISSED for having been filed one day beyond the non-extendible
period provided under Rule 2, Section 7, in relation to Rule 2, Section 12 (c), of A.M. No. 10-4-1-SC,
the 2010 Rules of Procedure in Election Contests before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal
Officials.

SO ORDERED.

In disposing the case, the trial court cited and relied on the individual declarations of the Chairman
and the two members of the MBOC of Dinalupihan, Bataan, as well as on the manual COCP, as
sufficient proof that Garcia’s proclamation took place on May 14, 2013. 12

Undaunted, Payumo appealed the dismissal with the Comelec, docketed as EAC (EAL) No. 11-2014,
alleging that he cannot be faulted for relying on the May 15, 2013 date indicated in the printed COCP
since it was the official Comelec document signed by all the members of Dinalupihan’s MBOC; that
the manual COCP was only received by Garcia, and no one else; and that he had no representative
when Garcia was allegedly proclaimed the winner.

Rulings of the COMELEC

The Comelec First Division, by its September 10, 2014 Resolution, granted Payumo’s appeal thusly:13

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is GRANTED. The Order dated February 17, 2014
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Regional Trial Court of Balanga, Bataan, Branch 5
is hereby ordered to proceed with the adjudication of RTC-EP Case No. DH-001-13 and resolve the
same with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

Ratiocinating in the following wise:14

Evidently, appellant could not be faulted for not relying on the COCP dated May 15, 2013 because
that was the only document officially furnished him. He was unaware of the alleged Manual COCP
dated May 14, 2013. The election officer himself admitted to the trial court that he could not
remember if he had posted a copy of the May 14, 2013 Manual COCP on the bulletin board of the
Sangguniang Bayan as required by Comelec Resolution No. 9648. Neither did he furnish a copy
thereof to the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan and the Municipal Treasurer.

Additionally, the Comele First Division relied on the case of Federico v. Comelec 15 (Federico) and
held that the 10-day reglementary period ought to be reckoned from the time a party became in good
faith of the issuance of the COCP, which in this case, according to public respondent, is May 15,
2013, as indicated in the printed COCP Payumo received. 16

On reconsideration, the Comelec En Banc, by its assailed Resolution dated January 29, 2015,
affirmed the holding of the First Division and disposed Garcia’s motion in the following wise. 17

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission En Ban RESOLVES to DENY the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Protestee-Appellee Maria Angela S. Garcia for failing to show any reversible
error on the part of the First Division UPHOLD its Resolution dated 10 September 2014 granting
Protestant-Appellant Payumo’s Appeal.

SO ORDERED.
As held by the En Banc:

It would be tantamount to injustice should the 10-day period to file the Election Protest in this case be
reckoned or counted from May 14, 2013, the date indicated in the Manual COCVP as Protestee-
Appelle Garcia’s proclamation as winner since its copy was not even furnished to Protestant-
Appellant Payumo. Clearly, Protestant-Appellant Payumo’s only source of information as to the date
of the proclamation of Protestess-Appelle Garcia was the printed COCVP. It indicated 15 May 2013
as the date of Protestee-Appellee Garcia’s proclamation as winner. Thus, his reliance on 15 May
2013, as the reckoning date of the 10-day period to file his Election Protest was in good faith.18

Hence, the instant recourse.

The Issue

Succinctly put, the issue in extant case boils down to whether or not Payumo’s election protest was
filed out of time. On the main, Garcia contends that the reckoning date of the 10-day reglementary
period is from the actual date of proclamation, which is May 14, 2013. Meanwhile, Payumo counters
that Garcia was proclaimed on May 15, 2013, and assuming arguendo that it was done on May 14,
2013, as Garcia insists the proclamation date to be, he cannot be faulted for relying on the date
appearing on the printed COCP he received.

Respondent Comelec’s Consolidated Comment, filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, echoes
the sentiment of Payumo that the latter could not have known that Garcia was proclaimed on May 14,
2015 because the printed COCP, which was furnished him, stated otherwise. The Comelec likewise
alleged that Garcia failed to establish that Payumo had a representative present at the exact moment
Garcia was proclaimed winner and, thus, assuming that it were true, he could not have known that
Garcia was already declared winner on May 14, 2015.

The Court's Ruling

We grant the petition.

Garcia’s Proclamation Date

Pivotal in resolving whether or not Payumo’s election protest is barred by the statute of limitations is
ascertaining when the MBOC proclaimed Garcia as the winning mayoralty candidate. The
significance of verifying this proclamation date is underscored by Rule 2, Section 12 (c), in relation to
Sec. 7 of the same rule, A.M. No. 10-4-1 SC,19 otherwise known as the 2010 Rules of Procedure in
Election Contests before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal Officials, which provisions pertinently
state:

Section 12. Summary dismissal of election contest. – the court shall summarily dismiss, motu proprio,
an election protest, counter-protest or petition for quo warranto on any of the following grounds:

(a) The court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter;

(b) The petition is insufficient in form and content as required under Section 10;

(c) The petition is filed beyond the period prescribed in these Rules;
 (d) The filling fee is not paid within the period for filling the election protest or petition for quo
warranto; and

(e) In a protest case where cash deposit is required, the deposit is not paid within five (5) days
from the filling of the protest.

Section 7. Period to file protest or petition; non-extendible. – The election protest or petition for quo
warranto shall be filed within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days counted from the date of
proclamation.

Jurisprudence teaches that the rule prescribing the 10-day reglementary period is mandatory and
jurisdictional, and that the filing of an election protest beyond the period deprives the court of
jurisdiction over the protest. Violation of this rule should neither be taken lightly nor brushed aside as
a mere procedural lapse that can be overlooked. The rule is not a mere technicality but an essential
requirement, the non-compliance of which would oust the court of jurisdiction over the case.20

Aware of the repercussions that befall an election protest belatedly filed, the private parties herein
advance two conflicting dates whence the reglementary period should reckon. But between the two
proposed reckoning date, May 14, 2013, as claimed by petitioner, appears to be the correct date of
proclamation.

As can be recalled, the RTC, on July 1, 2013, conducted a motion hearing to determine the timeliness
of the election protest. Records reveal that during the said proceeding, the members of the MBOC
testified in the following manner:21

Court:

Please take your seats. So, Election Officer Leonilo Miguel, Municipal Treasurer Lani Penaflor. Ms.
Socorro Sacdalan, the resolution of the Motion to Resolve Affirmative Defense on the ground that the
protest was filed out of time will be resolved base on the answers that you will give this afternoon. So,
the first question of the Court is that, when did you officially proclaim the winning candidate, the
protestee, Maria Angela S. Garcia? You give your answers one by one. So, for Election Officer Mr.
Miguel, what is your answer?

Leonilo Miguel:

Sir, we proclaimed Maria Angela Garcia on May 14.

Court:

What time?

Leonilo Miguel:

At almost 5:00 o’clock, sir.

Court:

So, take your seat first. And then Municipal Treasurer Lani Penaflor, as part of the members of the
[MBOC] of Dinalupihan, when did you officially proclaim Maria Angela Garcia as the winning mayor of
Dinalupihan, Bataan?
Lani Penaflor:

Can I give my statement, sir?

Court:

Please give up (sic).

Lani Penaflor:

I, Lani Penaflor, vice-chairman of the [MBOC], do hereby certify that our functions based on general
instructions and minutes on the consolidation, canvass and transmission of votes cannot proceed on
the second step due to the problem occurred on the memory card of precinct No. 15 of Brgy. Bangal,
we resulted to only 98.75% of votes canvass as of May 14, 2013. Due to this situation, the legal
counsel of candidate Herminia Roman and Renato Matawaran cited Resolution 9700 and used it as
basis to proclaim the winner since votes cast on precinct no. 15, Brgy, Bangal, will not affect the
result and raking of local candidates. The members who waited for the instructions of Atty. Rafael
Olano, Regional Election Director who will proceed to the process of Resolution 9700 and request
threshold that this group canvass to be used for the preparation of Manual Certificate of Canvass of
Votes and Proclamation of the winning candidate. I do also certify the I signed last May 14, 2013 the
Manual Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation of the winning candidates pursuant to Comelec
Resolution No. 9700. On May 15, 2013 the password has been received and the CCS will then
proceed to the second step of the general instruction and steps presented on the CCS laptop.
Afterwhich the CCS then automatically proceed on the generation and printing of CEF No. 29, COCP
and other documents related thereto. I again certify that last May 15, 2013, signed the generated
reports by the CCS, one of which is CEF No. 29, Certificate of Cancass and Proclamation of winning
candidates in compliance with the general instruction. Then we proceed on electronically transmitting
the result after signing all the documents as prescribed by the GI and generated by the CCS. I
assumed that our Election Officer strictly follows the rule on the investigation of Comelec election
forms and reports set forth by the Commission on Elections. Thank you.

Court:

Okay, thank you. Ms. Socorro Sacdalan, again, as a member of the [MBOC], Dinalupihan, Bataan,
when did you proclaim Maria Angela Garcia as the winning mayor for Dinalupihan, Bataan?

Socorro Sacdalan:

We proclaimed the winning candidate, Maria Angela S. Garcia, on May 14, 2013. Sir.

Court:

What time, if you recall?

Socorro Sacdalan:

At around 5:oo o’clock p.m., sir.

As the members of the MBOC individually declared, Garcia was proclaimed winner of the mayoralty
race on May 14, 2013, not on May 15, 2013 as what erroneously appears on the printed COCP.
What is more, the testimony of municipal treasurer Lani Penaflor (Penaflor), vice-chairperson of the
MBOC, conveys an explanation for the discrepancy between the dates appearing on the manual and
printed COCP’s- that on May 14, 2013, at around 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Garcia was
proclaimed the winner after 98.75% of votes were already canvassed; that the proclamation was
done in light of the fact that the number of voters in the unaccounted clustered precinct could no
longer affect the result of the recently concluded polls; that the lowering of the threshold was
approved by the Regional Election Director; and that the manual COCP was prepared reflecting the
result of the elections.

The procedure followed by the MBOC, as outlined by Penaflor, is consistent with Comelec Resolution
No. 9700,22 wherein the Commission resolved, among others, that:

1. The Municipal, City. Provincial, District, and Regional Boards of Canvassers shall proclaim
the winning candidates on the basis of the last "Group Canvass Report" generated by the
CCS. By manually preparing a Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation of Winning
Candidates. supported by a copy of the last generated "Grouped Canvass Report", even if not
all results are received by their respective CCS: Provided, That, the standing of the candidates
will not be affected by the results not yet transmitted to, and received by, the CCS, without
prejudice to the ranking of the winning candidates. For this purpose, attached as Annex "A" is
the format of the Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation to be manually prepared by the
boards of canvassers;

2. The Regional Election Directors are approve requests of boards of canvassers in their
respective regions to lower the canvassing threshold to enable said boards to generate the
certificate of canvass for transmission to the next level of canvassing, For this purpose, the
National Support Center shall provide all Regional Election Directors with the "ADMIN
USERNAME" and corresponding "PASSWORD" needed to lower canvassing threshold, and
the appropriate instructions on how to set the lowered coming from the said board.

Apparently, contrary to Payumo’s assertion, the manual COCP is the official Comelec document in
cases wherein the canvassing threshold is lowered, In fact, clear from the language of the Resolution
is that the winners, in such instances, are proclaimed "by manually preparing a Certificate of Canvass
and Proclamation of Winning Candidate," the format for which is appended to Comelec Resolution
No. 9700. It is incorrect to state, therefore, that only the printed COCP can serve as basis for
ascertaining the date of Garcia’s proclamation. As in this case, it is the manual COCP which contains
the true and exact date of Garcia’s proclamation – May 14, 2013, not the printed COCP.

Payumo’s reliance on the date appearing on the printed COCP is misplaced. To be sure, Comelec
Resolution No. 9700 is explicit that the printed COCP becomes necessary only for purposes of
transmitting the results to the next level canvassing, and not for proclaiming the winning candidates,
insofar as local government units whose canvassing thresholds have been lowered are concerned.
The manual COCP, in such cases, are more controlling. Furthermore, it appears that May 15, 2013 is
the date the printed COCP was generated, which, as the members of the MBOC claimed, the
Comelec-issued laptop does not allow to be modified.23 And as justified by the MBOC, they were only
able to produce the printed COCP on May 15, 2013, the day after the actual proclamation, because
that was only when they were able to retrieve from the Regional Election Director the username and
password for generation the document, denominated as CEF 29. 24

As aptly concluded by the RTC.25

The declaration made by the individual members of the MBOC that the proclamation of protestee
[herein private respondent] was done on May 14, 2013, coupled with the issuance of the manual
certificate of canvass and proclamation on the same date, is sufficient proof that protestee’s
proclamation was in fact done on May 14, 2013 and not on May 15, 2013. The printed certificate of
canvass and proclamation already on May 15, 2013 was not meant to supersede the proclamation
already been done on May 14, 2013, but only to comply with the "official format" of the COMELEC,
according to Municipal Election Officer Miguel. The printed document merely affirmed what had
already been accomplished with the manually written document.

Having established that Garcia was proclaimed the winning mayoralty candidate on May 14, 2013, it
is then plain to see that Payumo’s election protest, dated May 27, 2013, was filed beyond the 10-day
reglementary period and ought to be dismissed outright.

The ruling Federico v. Comelec is not a precedent to the instant case

Payumo next seeks refuge under the case of Federico, in which the Court indeed nullified the
proclamation of therein petitioner Renato Federico (Federico) as mayor of Santo Tomas, Batangas
even though private respondent Osmundo Maligaya (Maligaya) filed the election protest more than
ten (10) days after such fact. There, the Court reckoned the 10-ady prescriptive period not from the
date of proclamation but from the date of proclamation but from the date Maligaya received notice of
the event, rendering the actual date of proclamation immaterial. It is this holding in Federico that
Payumo adamantly urges that We apply.

The argument is specious.

Guilty of reiteration, Rule 2, Sec. 7 of A.M. No. 10-4-1 SC provides:

Section 7. Period to file protest or petition; non-extendible. – The election protest or petition for quo
warranto shall be filed within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days counted from the date of
proclamation.

The above provision is the procedural equivalent of Sec. 251 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise
known as the Omnibus Election Code, which states:

Sec. 251. Election contests for municipal offices. – A sworn petition contesting the election of a
municipal officer shall be filed with the proper regional trial court by any candidate who has duly filed
a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten days after proclamation
of the results of the election.

As can be gleaned, Sec. 251 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that the 10-day period ought to
be reckoned from the date of proclamation and not from the date of notice. As the elementary rule in
statutory construction goes, when the words and phrases of a statute are clear and unequivocal, their
meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean
exactly what is says.26 This is known as the plain-meaning or verbal egis rule, expressed in the Latin
maxim "verba legis non est recedendum," or "from the words of a statute there should be no
departure."27 Since the afore-quoted provision, as couched, us clear and free from ambiguity, its
literal meaning must be applied without attempted interpretation.28

The rationale behind the non-extendible 10-day prescriptive period is not difficult to deduce – every
candidate interested in the outcome of the election is expected to be vigilant enough in protecting his
or her votes and would, therefore, enlist the aid of volunteer pool watchers in every clustered precinct
to guard against or document possible irregularities, or that the candidate would personally be
present at or, at the very least, would send representatives to the to the canvassing areas to ensure
the proper tallying of votes and to monitor the real-time results of the elections as they are
electronically transmitted. Consequently, they are expected to know of the exact moment the winning
candidate is proclaimed by the board of canvassers concerned.

True, Federico appears to have deviated from the wording of Sec. 251 of the Omnibus Election Code
but that is only due to the peculiarities of the said case. It must be stressed that Our ruling in Federico
was based on considerations not in all fours with the case at bar.

Recapitulating Federico, the MBOC of Santo Tomas, Bantangas, on May 11, 2010, printed a COCP
showing "SANCHEZ Edna P." (Edna) as the winning mayoralty Candidate. The prompted Maligaya to
file a Petition to Annul Proclamation against Edna Sanchez on May 20, 2010. However, the petition
was later withdrawn, as agreed upon by the parties, leading to the case’s dismissal. Unknown to
Maligaya, a second print-out of the COCP was then issued by the MBOC, bearing the same date
"May 11, 2010," crediting the same number of votes garnered by Edna to Federico after the latter
allegedly substituted Edna as mayoralty candidate. Federico, through the second print-out, was then
declared the winning mayoralty candidate. Claiming that Maligaya only found out this fact on May 27,
2010, he filed an election protest against Federico on June 1, 2010.

Affirming the Comelec’s ruling that the election protest against Federico was timely filed, the Court
ratiocinated thusly:29

It has been argued that there is no evidence that Maligaya became aware of the issuance of the
second COCVP in favor of Federico only on May 27, 2010. In this regard, the Court believes that the
actions taken by Maligaya after the elections and the separate proclamations of Edna and Federico
strongly indicate that he was telling the truth. Indeed, there is no rhyme or reason why he should file a
petition questioning the proclamation of Edna if he had knowledge of the subsequent proclamation of
Federico. The Court adopts with approbation his reasoning on the matter. Thus:

5.35. Private respondent pursued and prosecuted this case with the knowledge that it was Edna
Sanchez who was proclaimed, until he came to know of the alleged proclamation of respondent
Federico on May 27, 2010. Consequently, he filed another petition on June 1, 2010, this time against
Federico, to annul his proclamation. The June 1, 2010 petition was filed within ten days from the
knowledge of the alleged proclamation of Federico.

5.36. The filing of SPC NO. 10-022 demonstrates that private respondent Maligaya believed in good
faith that it was Edna Sanchez that was proclaimed and that he did not initially know that there was a
COCVP in the name of Federico. SPC No. 10-022 is also a proof that petitioner did not dilly daily in
protecting his rights. There simply is no reason and it runs counter to human conduct for Maligaya to
file a petition for annulment of proclamation of Edna Sanchez if he knew all along that it was Federico
who was proclaimed.

5.37. In the same manner, the filing of the present petition against Federico shows that the
proclamation of Federico was fraudulent or at least made surreptitiously.1âwphi1 Had Maligaya
known of the proclamation of Federico, he should have outrightly filed the petition for annulment of
proclamation against Federico. But because it was made without any notice to the herein private
respondent, he only knew of it on May 27, 2010, thus, the petition on June 1, 2010. Private
respondent did not certainly sleep on his rights as he filed the proper petition within the prescribed
period. He could not be penalized for belated filing when, as shown above, the COCVP of Federico
was surreptitiously accomplished. Thus, the Comelec En Banc did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in upholding the interest of herein private respondent Maligaya.

To begin with, we have considered in Federico the fact that petitioner Federico therein could not have
validly substituted Edna as mayoralty candidate in Santo Tomas, Batangas, and that as a non-
candidate in the mayoralty race, he cannot legally be declared and proclaimed the winner. Thus, the
nullity of the substitution consequently led to the nullity of the proclamation.30 Here lies the difference.

More importantly, the circumstances in Federico that (1) there were actually two different
proclamations made by the MBOC, and (2) that the second proclamation was surreptitiously made
were essential in Our ruling therein. This is in stark contrast with the case at bench where there was
only one proclamation, which was, by no means, clandestinely made. Here, there is no dispute that
there was only one mayoralty candidate proclaimed winner. Thus, the only issues pertain to when
such proclamation was done, and which document accurately reported the same. In addition, there
was no allegation whatsoever of a surreptitious proclamation for Garcia’s proclamation was, in fact,
publicly announced. As culled from the records, the members of the MBOC testified that Garcia was
proclaimed on May 14, 2013 in a well-attended ceremony.31

Atty. Pomer:

When you said you raised the hand of the winning candidate, protestee, Maria Angela Garcia, at 5:00
o’clock in the afternoon of May 14, 2013, were there persons present?

Leonilo Miguel:

Yes, sir/

Atty. Pomer:

Would you know if among those who were present there was a representative from the protestant,
Payumo?

Socorro Sacdalan:

I am not aware if there are representatives of the protestant because there were many persons,
people inside the center.

Court:

Question from the Court. Which exact place you said you proclaimed Maria Angela Garcia at
5:00p.m. on May 14?

Leonilo Miguel:

At the session hall of the Sangguniang Bayan of Dinalupihan, Bataan.

Court:

So, Atty. Pomer, do you have any other questions?

Atty. Pomer:

Yes, Your Honor. Were there other winning candidates that you proclaimed on that occasion aside
from the protestee?

Leonilo Miguel:
Yes, sir. We proclaimed the vice-mayor and the eight (8) councilors.

Court:

Same, May 14, 5:00 o’clock?

Leonilo Miguel:

Yes, sir.

Atty. Pomer:

So, the proclamation tool placed (sic) in the session hall. Was that in the same place the canvassing
took placed (sic)?

Leonilo Miguel:

Yes, sir.

Atty. Pomer:

And that during the canvassing, there were watchers and lawyers of the candidates present, is it not?

Leonilo Miguel:

Yes, sir.

Indeed, there is a substantial distinction between the extant case and Federico which, in the latter,
prevented Maligaya, through no fault of his own, from filing an election protest within the period
prescribed.

Petitioner Payumo cannot be deemed to have acted in good faith

Further constrasting the case at bar with Federico, herein petitioner Payumo’s claim of good faith in
relyin on the printed COCP fails to persuade.

"Good faith" is an intangible and abstract quality with no techinal meaning or statutory definition, and
it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of
design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. It implies honesty of intention, and
freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. 32

Here, knowledge of Garcia’s May 14, 2013 proclamation is attributable to Payumo since he was
represented by one Fernando Manalili (Manalili) during the canvassing proceeding, as per the
minutes prepared by the MBOC.33 Hornbook doctrine is that notice to the agent is notice to the
principal.34 And as appearing in the minutes, several representatives were fielded by the Liberal
Party, the political banner under which Payumo filed his candidacy, to monitor the results real-time.35

May 13-14, 2013

1. Atty. Mary Kristine Reyes Chu NUP/Ma. Angela Garcia – Albert Garcia
 2. Atty. Lowell John J. Fetizanan Nationalist Peoples Coalition Party

3. Atty. Norby Caparas Herminia B. Roman

4. Atty. Honey Lynco Liberal Party

5. Fernando P. Manalili Liberal Party (Jojo Payumo)

6. Ramon Alfonso T. Munez Liberal Party

7. Bohjee Bobby A. Yap Liberal Party

8. Bro. Roy Quiambao PPCRV

9. Reymond Fontailla Paralegal

10. Janette Oftana Watcher

11. Harold Cacacho Watcher

12. Carlos Caringal Lawyer

Noteworthy is that apart from Manilili, Payumo had other representatives present during the
canvassing on May 13-14, 2013. Thus, even if we entertain Payumo’s postulation that Manilili did not
stay long enough to witness the canvassing proceedings from start to finish, and that he was
allegedly not present at least during Garcia’s proclamation, we, nevertheless, still cannot give
credence to petitioner’s claim of good faith. Payumo cannot plausibly feign ignorance of Garcia’s
proclamation since knowledge of such fact is attributable to him not only through Manalili, but also
through the other party representatives. Consequently, Payumo is then barred from otherwise
claiming that Garcia was proclaimed mayor on May 14, 2013.

Moreover, the fact that Payumo only received a copy of the printed, and not the manual COCP, is of
no moment. For as the losing candidate, he is not, under the Comelec rules, even entitled to be
furnished a copy of the COCP. Section 30 of Comelec Resolution No. 9648 36 provides that insofar as
the electoral candidates are concerned, only the winners are entitled to a copy of the COCP, viz:

Sec. 30. Distribution of COCP and SOVs. – The Board shall generate and print sufficient copies of
the COCP and one (1) copy of the SOV to be distributed as follows:

a. MBOC/CBOC

1. To the Election Records and Statistics Department (ERSD) of the commission;

2. To be posted on the bulletin board of the municipal hall, supported by SOVP;

3. To the Chairman, MBOC/CBOC;

4. To the Secretary, Sangguniang Bayan/Panlungsod;

5. To the Municipal Treasurer;

 6. To a winning Candidate for Mayor; Winning Candidate for Vice- Mayor; and

7. To each winning Candidate for members of the Sangguniang Bayan/Panlungsod.

The wording of the afore-quoted rule is pregnant with meaning. First, its literal interpretation is that
only the winning candidates have the demandable right to be furnished a copy of the COCP. Second,
it amplifies the general rule that the prescriptive period ought to be reckoned from the actual date of
proclamation, not from notice through service of a COCP, since the losing candidates are not even
required to be served a copy of the COCP in the first place. Lastly, it warns the candidates to be more
vigilant in monitoring the results of the elections for them to be conscious of the deadline for filing an
election protest, should they opt to contest the results.

In sum, the Court maintains the general rule that the reglementary period for instituting an election
period should be reckoned from the actual date of proclamation, not from the date of notice. Absent
any circumstances analogous to the factual milieu of Federico, a relaxation of the rules will not be
warranted.

Finally, as regards the MBOC’s alleged disregard of the requirement under Comelec Resolution No.
9648 to post copies of the COCP in the designated areas, and to serve them to the other winning
candidates, needless to say that they do not and could not invalidate Garcia’s proclamation. Neither
do they toll the 10-day period to file an election protest in this case since Payumo is still deemed
aware of the results by way of notice to his agent or agents. Instead, these alleged omissions merely
expose the members of the MBOC to possible liability should it be proven that they deviated from
procedure, which issue is not yet ripe for Us to decide.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed September
10, 2014 and January 29, 2015 Resolutions of the Commission on Elections in Case No. EAC [AEL]
11-2014 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the February 17, 2014 Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 5 in Balanga, Bataan, dismissing Petitioner Jose Alejandre Payumo III’s
election protest for being barred by the statute of limitations is hereby REINSTATED.

DURA LEX SED LEX

G.R. No. L-12088 December 23, 1959

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MORO SUMAGUINA MACARANDANG, defendant-appellant.

Valeriano V. Rovira for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Assistant Solicitor General Florencio Villamor for
appellee.

PARAS, C. J.:

Moro Sumaguina Macarandang was accused an, after trial, convicted of the crime of illegal possesion
of fire-arms in the Court of First Instance of Lanao under the following information:
 That on or about June 8, 1954, in the Municipality of Marantao, Province of Lanao, Republic of
the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep and have his custody and control
one Riot Gun, Winchester, 12 GA. SN-924131 and (8) rounds of ammunitions, without firs
having obtained in proper license or permit therefore from competent authority.

In the present appeal the accused, admitting the ownership and of the firearm and ammunitions in
question, invokes as his legal excuse or authority therefor, the appointment issued him by Governor
Dimakuta as secret agent on October 1, 1953, which reads as follows:1awphi1.net

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

For having shown good faith by previously surrending to this Office a firearm, Datu Sumaguina
Macarandang of Kamalig, Marantao, Lanao, has been appointed SECRET AGENT of peace
and order campaigns and detention of crimes. Accordingly, he is hereby authorized to hold and
carry in his possession one (1) Riot Winchester Shotgun, 12 GA. Serial No. 942131 with
twenty(20) rounds of ammunitions for the successful execution of his hazardous mission.

Datu Sumaguina Macarandang shall personally report to me from time to time all activities and
whereabouts of lawless and wanted elements roaming in the Municipal District of Marantoa, as
well as all matters affecting tranquility therein existing.lawphi1.net

It may be true that, as held by the trial court, the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm
license or permit; but section 879 of the Revise Administrative Code provides, as shown at lease by
the subject matter therefor, that "peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the
issuance of license to possess firearms. The appointment of the accused as secret agent to the assist
in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detention of crimes, sufficiently put him within
the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly
covered by section 879.

DURA LEX SED LEX

G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.

Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R. Rosete and Solicitor
O. C. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:

The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether or not the
appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would
constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition. We hold that it does not.

The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14, 1962
reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section
878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one
home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition,
without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding
authorities. Contrary to law."

When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the outset asked the
counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accused was found in possession of the gun
involved in this case, that he has neither a permit or license to possess the same and that we can
submit the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm
without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal an
assurance that he would not question the authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being that
only a question of law would be submitted for decision, he explicitly specified such question to be
"whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm."

Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he could pass on
their authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal.
22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information was found in his possession
on August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license or permit
thereof from the corresponding authority?" The accused, now the appellant, answered categorically:
"Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and
his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused admits."

Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision." Counsel for the
accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the
Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962; 1 another document likewise
issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and
Quezon City on a confidential mission;2 the oath of office of the accused as such secret agent,3 a
certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov.
Leviste.4 Counsel for the accused then stated that with the presentation of the above exhibits he was
"willing to submit the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and
qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of
firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties were given time to file their respective
memoranda.1äwphï1.ñët

Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the
crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year
and one day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him are
forfeited in favor of the Government."

The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must be
affirmed.

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to
. . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or
implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
ammunition."5 The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued
to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine
Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial
governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and
guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of
such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties." 6

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt.
Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction
and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them."7 The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.

Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agent was acquitted on
appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the
category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered
by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to set aside the
clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts
with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

DURA LEX SED LEX

G.R. No. L-22291 November 15, 1976

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JESUS SANTAYANA Y ESCUDERO, defendant-appellant.

Ernesto C. Hidalgo and Enrique Jocson for appellant.

Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Trial Attorney
Josefina Domingo de Leon for appellee.

CONCEPCION, JR., J:

Accused, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was found guilty of the crime of illegal possesion of firearms
and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years and
to pay the costs.

The essential facts are not in dispute. On February 19, 1962, accused Jesus Santayana, was
appointed as "Special Agent" 1 by then Colonel Jose C. Maristela, Chief of the CIS. On March 9,
1962, a Memorandum Receipt 2 for equipment was issued in the name of the accused regarding one
pistol Melior SN-122137 with one (1) mag and stock. Col. Maristela likewise issued an undated
certification 3 to the effect that the accused was an accredited member of the CIS and the pistol
described in the said Memorandum Receipt was given to him by virtue of his appointment as special
agent and that he was authorized to carry and possess the same in the performance of his official
duty and for his personal protection. On October 29, 1962, the accused was found in Plaza Miranda
in possession of the above-described pistol with four rounds of ammunition, cal. 25, without a license
to possess them. An investigation was conducted and thereupon, a corresponding complaint was
filed against the accused. The case underwent trial after which the accused was convicted of the
crime charged with its corresponding penalty. Hence, the case was appealed to US and the accused
assigned three errors allegedly committed by the trial court in disposing of this case.

Of these assigned errors, the two main issued posed are whether or not the present subject matter
falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court pursuant to Republic Act No. 2613; and
whether or not the appointment of the appellant as special agent of the CIS which apparently
authorizes him to carry and posses firearms exempts him from securing a license or permit
corresponding thereto.

Resolving the issue of jurisdiction, there is no doubt that under Section 87 of Republic Act No. 286, as
amended by Republic Act No. 2613, the justice over cases of illegal possession of firearms. But
equally the Court of First Instance of Manila, which took cognizance of this case had jurisdiction over
the offense charged because under Section 44 of Republic Act No. 296, Court of First Instance have
original jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for
more than six (6) months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos (P200.00)"; and the offense
charged in the information is punishable by imprisonment for a period of not less than one (1) year
and one (1) day nor more than five (5) years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less than
one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or more than five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).

From the foregoing, it is evident that the jurisdiction of the Municipal Courts over Criminal Cases in
which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for not more than six (6) months or fine of not
more than two hundred (P200.00) pesos or both such imprisonment and fine is exclusive and original
to said courts. But considering that the offense of illegal possession of firearms with which the
appellant was charged is penalized by imprisonment for a period of not less than one (1) year and
one (1) day or more than five (5) years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less than one
thousand (P1,000.00) pesos or more than five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos (Republic Act No. 4), the
offense, therefore, does not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Court. The
Court of First Instance has concurrent jurisdiction over the same.

As to the second issue to be resolved, there is no question that appellant was appointed as CIS
secret agent with the authority to carry and possess firearms. 4 Indeed, appellant was issued a
firearm in the performance of his official duties and for his personal protection. 5 It also appears that
appellant was informed by Col. Maristela that it was not necessary for him to apply for a license or to
register the said firearm because it was government property and therefore could not legally be
registered or licensed in appellant's name. 6 Capt. Adolfo M. Bringas from whom appellant received
the firearm also informed the latter that no permit to carry the pistol was necessary "because you are
already appointed as CIS agent."

At the time of appellant's apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing is enunciated in the case of
People vs. Macarandang 7 wherein We held that the appointment of a civilian as "secret agent to
assist in the maintenace of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him
within the category of a 'peace officer' equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly
covered by Section 879." The case of People vs. Mapa 8 revoked the doctrine in the Macarandang
case only on August 30, 1967. Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of
appellant's appointment as secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for possession of the pistol in
question.

Wherefore, and conformably with the recommendation of the Solicitor General, the decision appealed
from is hereby reversed and appellant Jesus Santayana y Escudero is hereby acquitted. The bond for
his provisional release is cancelled. Costs de oficio.

RATIO LEGIS EST ANIMA LEGIS

G.R. No. 123169 November 4, 1996

DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:

Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won
during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was
filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition
signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13,
1995.1 At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement
provided by law. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioner's
opposition. On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on
December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action No. 2254-AF, with
the trial court issuing a temporary restraining order. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial
court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to
explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall
election was without COMELEC approval.2

In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall
election an January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction.
On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and required the Office of the
Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment on the petition. In view of the Office of
the Solicitor General's manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the COMELEC, the
latter through its law department filed the required comment. Petitioner thereafter filed a reply. 3

Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that "no recall shall take place within
one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding
a regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now
barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first
Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. In support thereof, petitioner cites Associated
Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court considered the SK election as a
regular local election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a regular local election, hence no
recall election can be had for barely four months separate the SK election from the recall election. We
do not agree.

The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:

Sec. 74. Limitations on Recall. — (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a
recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.

(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.
 [Emphasis added]

It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to
the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and
kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.4 The evident intent of Section 74 is to
subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b)
construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official
may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office. Thus,
subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the SK election
will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of
removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election
which is set by R.A No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within
the purview of the phrase "regular local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall
election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.

In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature
intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in
the enactment of a statute.5 An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or
provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated,
repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory. 6

It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony
with the Constitution.7 Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code,
specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section
3 of Article X of the Constitution to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanism of recall, initiative, and referendum . . . ."

Moreover, petitioner's too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot
countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition:

We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather
than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually
found not in "the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth". . .8

The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this
case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.

Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit
necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one
year immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the
next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose
the official's replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a
successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of
the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where
the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the
electorate.

Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under Section
74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular election involving the barangay office concerned
is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled on May 1997. 9
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic. The
temporary restraining order issued by the Court on January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall election
should be as it is hereby made permanent.

RATIO LEGIS EST ANIMA LEGIS

G.R. No. 176951 November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President

JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF
CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in
his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO, PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN,
PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL
SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR; and MUNICIPALITY
OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI,
CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF
GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF
PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF
TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF
CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and
CITY OF TAGUM, petitioners-in-intervention.

x-----------------------------x

G.R. No. 177499 November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President

JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF
CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in
his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN, PROVINCE OF BASILAN;
MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK, PROVINCE OF KALINGA; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN,
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC, PROVINCE OF ILOCOS
NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF MATI, PROVINCE OF DAVAO ORIENTAL; and MUNICIPALITY OF
GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI,
CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF
GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF
PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF
TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF
CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and
CITY OF TAGUM, petitioners-in-intervention.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --x

G.R. No. 178056 November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President
JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF
CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in
his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN
DEL NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF CEBU; and MUNICIPALITY OF EL
SALVADOR, MISAMIS ORIENTAL, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI,
CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF
GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF
PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF
TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF
CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and
CITY OF TAGUM, petitioners-in-intervention.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

These are consolidated petitions for prohibition1 with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo,
City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas2 assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws
and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from
conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.

The Facts

During the 11th Congress,3 Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities.
However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.

During the 12th Congress,4 Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009),5 which took
effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing
the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100
million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel,
"the mad rush" of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal
Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. 6

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress7 adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29,8 which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009
the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11 th Congress. However, the
12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress,9 the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint
Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to
approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities
filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a
common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in
RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also
approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June
2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws10) on various dates from March to July 2007
without the President's signature.11

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each
respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection
clause.12 Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce
the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same
amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code. 13

The Issues

The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:

1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and

2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petitions.

The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective,
not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became
law more than five years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city
in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair
and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.

Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to
any statutory construction.

Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage
of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government
Code.

Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not
extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection
clause.

Preliminary Matters

Prohibition is the proper action for testing the constitutionality of laws administered by the
COMELEC,14 like the Cityhood Laws, which direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites in
implementation of the Cityhood Laws. Petitioner League of Cities of the Philippines has legal standing
because Section 499 of the Local Government Code tasks the League with the "primary purpose of
ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting city government administration and securing,
through proper and legal means, solutions thereto." 15 Petitioners-in-intervention,16 which are existing
cities, have legal standing because their Internal Revenue Allotment will be reduced if the Cityhood
Laws are declared constitutional. Mayor Jerry P. Treñas has legal standing because as Mayor of Iloilo
City and as a taxpayer he has sufficient interest to prevent the unlawful expenditure of public funds,
like the release of more Internal Revenue Allotment to political units than what the law allows.

Applying RA 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law

RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 during the 11 th Congress. This law specifically amended
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, which now provides:

Section 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be
converted into a component city if it has a locally generated average annual income, as
certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos
(P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices,
and if it has either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by
the Land Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as
certified by the National Statistics Office.

The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit
or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and
bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is
composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two
(2) or more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20
million to P100 million. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does
not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement.

Prior to the enactment of RA 9009, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress.
Thirty-three cityhood bills became law before the enactment of RA 9009. Congress did not act on
24 cityhood bills during the 11th Congress.
During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, exempting
from the income requirement of P100 million in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills
were not acted upon during the 11th Congress. This Resolution reached the Senate. However, the
12th Congress adjourned without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution
No. 29 filed between November and December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in
Congress, individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows:

Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income
requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.

This common provision exempted each of the 16 municipalities from the income requirement
of P100 million prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009. These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from March to July 2007 after President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them.

Indisputably, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity of RA 9009. RA 9009
became effective on 30 June 2001 or during the 11th Congress. The 13th Congress passed in
December 2006 the cityhood bills which became law only in 2007. Thus, respondent
municipalities cannot invoke the principle of non-retroactivity of laws.17 This basic rule has no
application because RA 9009, an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws, is not being applied retroactively
but prospectively.

Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All Criteria

Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)

The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established
in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government
Code.18 The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria
necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress
cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.

The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation of a city. No
other law, not even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of the
Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same
uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code. Any
derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section
10, Article X of the Constitution.

RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement
from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence,
from that moment the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to
become a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income
requirement.
In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even
though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood
Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the
increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus
patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Cityhood Laws Violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution

Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local Government Code are essential to
implement a fair and equitable distribution of national taxes to all local government units. Section 6,
Article X of the Constitution provides:

Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes
which shall be automatically released to them. (Emphasis supplied)

If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory, there can be no
fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.

A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal, should not receive the
same share in national taxes as a city with an annual income of P100 million or more. The criteria of
land area, population and income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, must
be strictly followed because such criteria, prescribed by law, are material in determining the "just
share" of local government units in national taxes. Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income
criterion in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, they prevent the fair and just distribution of
the Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution.

Section 450 of the Local Government Code is Clear,

Plain and Unambiguous

There can be no resort to extrinsic aids – like deliberations of Congress – if the language of the law is
plain, clear and unambiguous. Courts determine the intent of the law from the literal language of the
law, within the law's four corners.19 If the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts
simply apply the law according to its express terms. If a literal application of the law results in
absurdity, impossibility or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction
like the legislative history of the law.20

Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local Government Code, did not provide
any exemption from the increased income requirement, not even to respondent municipalities whose
cityhood bills were then pending when Congress passed RA 9009. Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contains no exemption whatsoever. Since the law is
clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the
increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law in applying
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009.

The 11th Congress' Intent was not Written into the Local Government Code

True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent municipalities from RA 9009, as shown
by the various deliberations on the matter during the 11 th Congress. However, Congress did not write
this intended exemption into law. Congress could have easily included such exemption in RA 9009
but Congress did not. This is fatal to the cause of respondent municipalities because such exemption
must appear in RA 9009 as an amendment to Section 450 of the Local Government Code. The
Constitution requires that the criteria for the conversion of a municipality into a city, including any
exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code. Congress cannot
prescribe such criteria or exemption from such criteria in any other law. In short, Congress cannot
create a city through a law that does not comply with the criteria or exemption found in the
Local Government Code.

Section 10 of Article X is similar to Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting Congress
from creating private corporations except by a general law. Section 16 of Article XII provides:

The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization,
or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be
created or established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to
the test of economic viability. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Congress must prescribe all the criteria for the "formation, organization, or regulation" of private
corporations in a general law applicable to all without discrimination.21 Congress cannot create a
private corporation through a special law or charter.

Deliberations of the 11th Congress on Unapproved Bills Inapplicable

Congress is not a continuing body.22 The unapproved cityhood bills filed during the 11th Congress
became mere scraps of paper upon the adjournment of the 11 th Congress. All the hearings and
deliberations conducted during the 11th Congress on unapproved bills also became worthless upon
the adjournment of the 11th Congress. These hearings and deliberations cannot be used to
interpret bills enacted into law in the 13th or subsequent Congresses.

The members and officers of each Congress are different. All unapproved bills filed in one Congress
become functus officio upon adjournment of that Congress and must be re-filed anew in order to be
taken up in the next Congress. When their respective authors re-filed the cityhood bills in 2006 during
the 13th Congress, the bills had to start from square one again, going through the legislative mill just
like bills taken up for the first time, from the filing to the approval. Section 123, Rule XLIV of the Rules
of the Senate, on Unfinished Business, provides:

Sec. 123. x x x

All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1)
Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if presented for the first time.
(Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, Section 78 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, on Unfinished Business, states:

Section 78. Calendar of Business. The Calendar of Business shall consist of the following:

a. Unfinished Business. This is business being considered by the House at the time of
its last adjournment. Its consideration shall be resumed until it is disposed of. The
Unfinished Business at the end of a session shall be resumed at the commencement of
the next session as if no adjournment has taken place. At the end of the term of a
Congress, all Unfinished Business are deemed terminated. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved cityhood bills, as well as the
deliberations during the 12th and 13th Congresses on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA
9009 certain municipalities, have no legal significance. They do not qualify as extrinsic aids in
construing laws passed by subsequent Congresses.

Applicability of Equal Protection Clause

If Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contained an exemption to
the P100 million annual income requirement, the criteria for such exemption could be scrutinized for
possible violation of the equal protection clause. Thus, the criteria for the exemption, if found in the
Local Government Code, could be assailed on the ground of absence of a valid classification.
However, Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain
any exemption. The exemption is contained in the Cityhood Laws, which are unconstitutional because
such exemption must be prescribed in the Local Government Code as mandated in Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution.

Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, such exemption would still be unconstitutional for
violation of the equal protection clause. The exemption provision merely states, "Exemption from
Republic Act No. 9009 ─ The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement
prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009." This one sentence exemption provision contains no
classification standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities from those that are
not exempted.

Even if we take into account the deliberations in the 11 th Congress that municipalities with pending
cityhood bills should be exempt from the P100 million income requirement, there is still no valid
classification to satisfy the equal protection clause. The exemption will be based solely on the fact
that the 16 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in the 11th Congress when RA 9009 was
enacted. This is not a valid classification between those entitled and those not entitled to exemption
from the P100 million income requirement.

To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on substantial distinctions, rationally
related to a legitimate government objective which is the purpose of the law,23 not limited to existing
conditions only, and applicable to all similarly situated. Thus, this Court has ruled:

The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the
following conditions:

1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;

2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;

3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class. 24

There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the
11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill
in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the
purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 th Congress does not
affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in
the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending
cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion − mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the
11th Congress − is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-
viable municipalities from converting into cities.

Municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills were not informed that a pending cityhood bill in
the 11th Congress would be a condition for exemption from the increased P100 million income
requirement. Had they been informed, many municipalities would have caused the filing of their own
cityhood bills. These municipalities, even if they have bigger annual income than the 16 respondent
municipalities, cannot now convert into cities if their income is less than P100 million.

The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition
existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This
violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. This
requirement is illustrated in Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck,25 where the challenged law allowed
milk dealers engaged in business prior to a fixed date to sell at a price lower than that allowed to
newcomers in the same business. In Mayflower, the U.S. Supreme Court held:

We are referred to a host of decisions to the effect that a regulatory law may be prospective in
operation and may except from its sweep those presently engaged in the calling or activity to
which it is directed. Examples are statutes licensing physicians and dentists, which apply only
to those entering the profession subsequent to the passage of the act and exempt those then
in practice, or zoning laws which exempt existing buildings, or laws forbidding slaughterhouses
within certain areas, but excepting existing establishments. The challenged provision is
unlike such laws, since, on its face, it is not a regulation of a business or an activity in
the interest of, or for the protection of, the public, but an attempt to give an economic
advantage to those engaged in a given business at an arbitrary date as against all those
who enter the industry after that date. The appellees do not intimate that the classification
bears any relation to the public health or welfare generally; that the provision will discourage
monopoly; or that it was aimed at any abuse, cognizable by law, in the milk business. In the
absence of any such showing, we have no right to conjure up possible situations which might
justify the discrimination. The classification is arbitrary and unreasonable and denies the
appellant the equal protection of the law. (Emphasis supplied)

In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique
advantage based on an arbitrary date − the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the
11th Congress - as against all other municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of
RA 9009.

Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the
classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16
respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can.
Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions and declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws,
namely: Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408,
9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.

MENS LEGISLATORES

[G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971.]

 CORNELIA MATABUENA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PETRONILA CERVANTES, Defendant-
Appellee.

Alegre, Roces, Salazar & Sañez, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Fernando Gerona, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE; DONATIONS BY

REASON OF MARRIAGE; PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING
MARRIAGE; APPLICABLE TO COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP. — While Art. 133 of the Civil Code
considers as void a "donation between the spouses during the marriage", policy considerations of the
most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should
apply to a common-law relationship. A 1954 Court of Appeals decision Buenaventura v. Bautista, (50
O.G. 3679) interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code speaks unequivocally. If the policy of
the law is, in the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit
donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; ‘porque no se
engañen despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno,’ [according to] the Partidas
(Part. IV, Tit. Xl, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale ‘Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur’ of the
Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the
same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without benefit of nuptials. For
it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater
influence of one party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is
correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr.
1), it would not be just that such donations should subsist lest the condition of those who incurred
guilt should turn out to be better. So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law,
reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to
concubinage.

2. ID.; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; SURVIVING SPOUSE; RULE WHERE A

SISTER SURVIVES WITH THE WIDOW. — The lack of validity of the donation made b~ the
deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive
right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and
the defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March 28. 1962. She is therefore his widow. As
provided in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the
surviving sister to the other half.

DECISION

FERNANDO, J.:

A question of first impression is before this Court in this litigation. We are called upon to decide
whether the ban on a donation between the spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law
relationship. 1 The plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to the deceased Felix
Matabuena, maintains that a donation made while he was living maritally without benefit of marriage
to defendant, now appellee Petronila Cervantes, was void. Defendant would uphold its validity. The
lower court, after noting that it was made at a time before defendant was married to the donor,
sustained the latter’s stand. Hence this appeal. The question, as noted, is novel in character, this
Court not having had as yet the opportunity of ruling on it. A 1954 decision of the Court of Appeals,
Buenaventura v. Bautista, 2 by the then Justice J. B. L. Reyes, who was appointed to this Court later
that year, is indicative of the appropriate response that should be given. The conclusion reached
therein is that a donation between common-law spouses falls within the prohibition and is "null and
void as contrary to public policy." 3 Such a view merits fully the acceptance of this Court. The
decision must be reversed.

In the decision of November 23, 1965, the lower court, after stating that in plaintiff’s complaint alleging
absolute ownership of the parcel of land in question, she specifically raised the question that the
donation made by Felix Matabuena to defendant Petronila Cervantes was null and void under the
aforesaid article of the Civil Code and that defendant on the other hand did assert ownership
precisely because such a donation was made in 1956 and her marriage to the deceased did not take
place until 1962, noted that when the case was called for trial on November 19, 1965, there was
stipulation of facts which it quoted. 4 Thus: "The plaintiff and the defendant assisted by their
respective counsels, jointly agree and stipulate: (1) That the deceased Felix Matabuena owned the
property in question; (2) That said Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor
of Defendant, Petronila Cervantes over the parcel of land in question on February 20, 1956, which
same donation was accepted by defendant; (3) That the donation of the land to the defendant which
took effect immediately was made during the common law relationship as husband and wife between
the defendant-done and the now deceased donor and later said donor and done were married on
March 28, 1962; (4) That the deceased Felix Matabuena died intestate on September 13, 1962; (5)
That the plaintiff claims the property by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative
of the deceased by virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962 and had the land
declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon’" 5

The judgment of the lower court on the above facts was adverse to plaintiff. It reasoned out thus: "A
donation under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil Code is void if made between the spouses during
the marriage. When the donation was made by Felix Matabuena in favor of the defendant on
February 20, 1956, Petronila Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were not yet married. At that time they
were not spouses. They became spouses only when they married on March 28, 1962, six years after
the deed of donation had been executed." 6

We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation
between the spouses during the marriage," policy considerations of the most exigent character as
well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law
relationship. We reverse.

1. As announced at the outset of this opinion, a 1954 Court of Appeals decision, Buenaventura v.
Bautista, 7 interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code 8 speaks unequivocally. If the policy of
the law is, in the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit
donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; ‘porque no se
engañen despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno [according to] the Partidas (Part
IV, Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale ‘Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur’ of the Pandects
(Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the same
prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials. For it
is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater
influence of one party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is
correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr.
1), ‘it would not be just that such donations should subsist, lest the condition of those who incurred
guilt should turn out to be better.’ So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law,
reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to
concubinage." 9

2. It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence of the above pronouncement, any other
conclusion cannot stand the test of scrutiny. It would be to indict the framers of the Civil Code for a
failure to apply a laudable rule to a situation which in its essentials cannot be distinguished.
Moreover, if it is at all to be differentiated, the policy of the law which embodies a deeply-rooted
notion of what is just and what is right would be nullified if such irregular relationship instead of being
visited with disabilities would be attended with benefits. Certainly a legal norm should not be
susceptible to such a reproach. If there is ever any occasion where the principle of statutory
construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written, this is it.
Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained. Whatever
omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied
by an adherence to its avowed objective. In the language of Justice Pablo: "El espiritu que informa la
ley debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicación de sus disposiciones.’’ 10

3. The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does
not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of
Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage
on March 28, 1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to
one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other half. 11

WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965 dismissing the complaint with costs is
reversed. The questioned donation is declared void, with the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro
indiviso heirs to the property in question recognized. The case is remanded to the lower court for its
appropriate disposition in accordance with the above opinion. Without pronouncement as to costs.

MENS LEGISLATORES
[G.R. No. L-8639. March 23, 1956.]
In the Matter of the Adoption of the Minors Pablo Vasquez Ernesto Vasquez, Maria Lourdes
Vasquez and Elizabeth Prasnik. LEOPOLDO PRASNIK, Petitioner-Appellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellant.

DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Leopoldo Prasnik filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition seeking to adopt Pablo
Vasquez, Ernesto Vasquez, Maria Lourdes Vasquez and Elizabeth Prasnik who are the minor children
of Paz Vasquez. He claims that they are also his children but without the benefit of marriage and he
desires to adopt them to promote their best interest and well-being. Since at the hearing of the
petition Petitioner acknowledged that they are his natural children, the Solicitor General opposed the
petition on the plea that he could not legally adopt them for the reason that Article 338 of the new Civil
Code which allows a natural child to be adopted by his natural father refers only to a child who has not
been acknowledged as natural child. At first the court upheld the opposition but, on a motion for
reconsideration, the court reconsidered its decision and granted the petition. Hence this appeal.
Leopoldo Prasnik was formerly married to one Catherine Prasnik but their marriage was dissolved by
virtue of a decree of divorce issued on December 12, 1947 by the Circuit Court of Miami, Dade Country,
Florida, U.S.A. Thereafter, he and Paz Vasquez lived together as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage and out of this relation four children were born who are the minors he is now seeking to
adopt. He claims that it is his intention to marry Paz Vasquez as soon as he is granted Philippine
citizenship for which he has already applied and in the meantime he wants to adopt them in order that
no one of his relatives abroad could share in his inheritance. He averred that he had no child with his
former wife and acknowledged said minors as his natural children.
Article 338 of the new Civil Code provides that a natural child may be adopted by his natural father or
mother. The Solicitor General interprets this provision in the sense that in order that a natural child may
be adopted by his natural father or mother there should not mediate between them an acknowledgment
of the status of natural child by the father or mother as otherwise the adoption would be repugnant to
Article 335 of the same Code which denies adoption to one who has an acknowledged natural child.
And since Petitioner has expressly admitted in open court that the minors subject of this proceeding
are his natural children, he is therefore disqualified to adopt under the law.
We do not agree to this interpretation. Apparently, Article 338 above adverted to merely refers to the
adoption of a natural child and not to one who has already been recognized, but there is nothing therein
which would prohibit the adoption of an acknowledged natural child even if the law does not expressly
say so. The reason for the silence of the law is obvious. That law evidently intends to allow adoption
whether the child be recognized or not. If the intention were to allow adoption only to unrecognized
children, as contended, then the provision of Article 338 would be of no useful purpose because such
children could have been validly adopted even without it. And we say so because a natural child not
recognized has no right whatever 1 and being considered legally a total stranger to his parents, he may
be adopted under Article 337. The same cannot be said with regard to an acknowledged natural child
because, his filiation having already been established, his adoption cannot be made under the general
principles governing adoption (2 Manresa 5th ed., 80). There is therefore need of an express provision
allowing the adoption of an acknowledged natural child as an exception to the rule and that is what is
contemplated in the article we are considering.
The Solicitor General, in his opposition to the petition, invokes Article 335 of the new Civil Code which
provides that a person who has an acknowledged natural child cannot adopt and considering
that Petitioner has acknowledged the minors in question as his children, he contends that he is
disqualified from adopting them under that article. We believe that the Solicitor General has not made
a correct interpretation of that article for he is confusing the children of the person adopting with the
minors to be adopted. A cursory reading of said article would reveal that the prohibition merely refers
to the adoption of a minor by a person who has already an acknowledged natural child and it does not
refer to the adoption of his own children even if he has acknowledged them as his natural children.
It may be contended that the adoption of an acknowledged natural child is unnecessary because there
already exists between the father and the child the relation of paternity and filiation which is precisely
the purpose which adoption seeks to accomplish through legal fiction. But it should be borne in mind
that the rights of an acknowledged natural child are much less than those of a legitimate child and it is
indeed to the great advantage of the latter if he be given, even through legal fiction, a legitimate status.
And this view is in keeping with the modern trend of adoption statutes which have been adopted
precisely to encourage adoption (In re Havagord’s Estate, 34 S. D. 131, 147 N. W. 378). Under this
modern trend, adoption is deemed not merely an act to establish the relation of paternity and filiation
but one which may give the child a legitimate status. It is in this sense that adoption is now defined as
“a juridical act which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from
legitimate paternity and filiation” (4 Valverde, 473).
The cases cited by the Solicitor General are not in point. 2 In said cases the Petitioners had legitimate
children of their own and so their petitions were denied. They are indeed disqualified from adopting
under the law. In the present case however, Petitioner does not have any legitimate children and his
main desire is to give a legitimate status to his four natural children. This attitude, far from being
opposed, should be encouraged. This is in keeping with the modern trend of the law concerning
adoption (In re Havagord’s Estate, supra).
The decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
EXPRESSIO UNIUS EXT EXCLUSION ALTERIUS
[G.R. No. 2122. September 13, 1905. ]

PEDRO T. ACOSTA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAVID FLOR, Defendant-Appellee.

W .A. Kincaid, for Appellant.

Hartigan, Marple, Solignac & Gutierrez, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. ACTION TO REMOVE A PUBLIC OFFICER. — A private person can not maintain an action for the
removal of a public officer unless he alleges that he is entitled to the same office. (Secs. 197 to 216,
Code of Civil Procedure.)

2. ID — When such an allegation is made but not proven, the court is justified in dismissing the case
without inquiring into the right of the defendant to retain the office.

DECISION

MAPA, J. :

It is alleged in the complaint that at the municipal elections held on the 1st day of December, 1903, in
the town of Laoag, Province of Ilocos Norte, the plaintiff and the defendant were candidates for the
office of municipal president of the said town; that as a result of the said election the plaintiff was
elected to the said office by a majority of 100 votes, and that notwithstanding this fact the defendant
has usurped said office and unlawfully held the same since the plaintiff was the person entitled to the
exercise of said office. The complaint further sets out other acts in regard to illigalities alleged to have
been committed during the election. The prayer of the complaint is to the effect that judgment be
entered against the defendant, excluding him from the exercise of such office and that the plaintiff be
declared to be entitled to the same and that he be given possession thereof, and for such other and
further relief as the facts in the case would warrant in favor of the plaintiff.

The case having proceeded to trial, the plaintiff introduced various witnesses, all and each of whom
testified to facts which, if true, would more or less gravely affect the legality of the election. Not a
single witness, however, confirmed the allegations contained in the complaint, to the effect that the
plaintiff had obtained a majority of 100 votes at the said election, nor can it be inferred from the
evidence introduced by the plaintiff that he, as a result of the said election, or for any other reason,
was entitled to the office of municipal president of Laoag, now held by the defendant.

In view of the evidence introduced at the trial by the plaintiff, and before the defendant had presented
his, the court, on the latter’s motion, acquitted the defendant, imposing the costs upon the plaintiff.
The court based its action upon the following grounds: (1) That the plaintiff could not maintain the
action brought by him because he had failed to establish his alleged right to the exercise of the office
in question; and (2) that there was no necessity to inquire into the right of the defendant to hold the
said office for the reason that this question had already been determined by the provincial board after
a consideration of the various protests presented to it in regard to irregularities committed during the
last election held at Laoag for the office of municipal president and other municipal officials, and for
the further reason that the presumption is that a person holding a public office was duly appointed of
elected thereto.

The plaintiff excepted to this ruling of the court, moved for a new trial, and thereafter brought the case
to this court for review. An examination of the evidence of record supports the finding of the court
below to the effect that the plaintiff has failed to prove in any way, shape, or form that he was entitled
to the office in question, as alleged by him in his complaint. There is no dispute upon this question.
The appellant, himself, when the motion of the defendant to dismiss was argued, and from the
decision of which he appealed to this court, clearly admitted that he had failed to establish his right to
the exercise of the office in question. (Page 17 of the bill of exceptions.) And on page 52 of his brief,
he also assumes that he had been unable to establish his alleged right to the office in question.

The question that we have to decide, therefore, is whether, notwithstanding what has already been
said, and notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff has failed to show that he had any right to the
office of municipal president of Laoag, he can maintain an action such as this for the purpose of
excluding the defendant from the exercise of said office on account of illegalities alleged to have been
committed in the elections.

The right to maintain such an action is especially and expressly governed by the provisions of
sections 197 to 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The code, after enumerating in sections 197 and 198 the cases in which such an action may be
brought and the persons against whom they may be brought, goes on to determine with careful
distinction those who have the right to maintain such action.

Section 199 provides that "the Attorney-General of the Islands, or the fiscal of any province, when
directed by the Chief Executive of the Islands, must commence any such action; and when upon
complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the two preceding
sections can be established by proof, he must commence such action."cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 200 provides that "the Attorney-General of the Islands or the fiscal for a province, may, at his
own instance, bring such an action, or he may, on leave of the court in which the action is to be
commenced, or a judge thereof in vacation, bring the action upon the relation of and at the request of
another person; but, if the action is brought at the request of and upon the relation of another person,
the officer bringing it may require an indemnity for expenses and costs of the action, to be given to
him by the party at whose request and upon whose relation the same is brought, before commencing
it."cralaw virtua1aw library

Finally, section 201, under the heading "An individual may commence such action," provides as
follows: "A person claiming to be entitled to a public office, unlawfully held and exercised by another,
may bring an action therefor."cralaw virtua1aw library

If the legislator had intended to give to all citizens alike the right to maintain an action for usurpation
of public office, he would have plainly said so in order to avoid doubt on a subject of such far-reaching
importance. A simple provision would have sufficed for this purpose. Far from it, the legislator has on
the contrary especially and specifically provided in sections 199, 200, and 201 who must and who
may bring such actions; and it is very clear that it was his intention to give such right to those
expressly mentioned in the above-cited sections and to no other, following the well- known rule of law
"inclusio unius est exclusio alterius." It has been noticed that the above referred to three sections only
mention the Attorney- General, the provincial fiscal, and the individual claiming to be entitled to the
office unlawfully held and exercised by another. It is to be inferred from this last provision that the
individual who does not claim to have such a right can not bring an action for usurpation of public
office.

This inference is supported by the provisions of section 202 which says that when the action is
against a person for usurping an office, the complaint shall set fort the name of the person who claims
to be entitled thereto, with an averment of his right to the same. Why should this be required as an
essential requisite if it were not necessary that the individual bringing the action should claim the right
to exercise the office in question?

Our opinion is that the law has reserved to the Attorney-General and to the provincial fiscals, as the
case may be, the right to bring such action, and in but one case does the law authorize an individual
to bring such an action, to wit, when that person claims to have the right to the exercise of the office
unlawfully held and exercised by another. Aside from this case an individual can not maintain such
action. The law, in our opinion, does not allow of any other construction. If an individual, whether or
not he has the right to the office alleged to have been usurped by another were to be permitted to
maintain such an action, it would serve no purpose and section 201 would be evidently superfluous. It
would be a useless and redundant provision of the code.

As a consequence of what has been said no individual can bring a civil action relating to the
usurpation of a public office without averring that he has a right to the same; and at any stage of the
proceedings, if it be shown that such individual has no such right, the action may be dismissed
because there is no legal ground upon which it may proceed when the fundamental basis of such
action is destroyed as is the case here. This is what actually happened in this case. After all of the
evidence presented by the plaintiff had been introduced, it was found, and he himself so admitted that
he had failed to establish in any way, shape, or form that he had any right to the office of municipal
president of the town of Laoag as he had alleged in his complaint without foundation for such
allegation. Consequently the judge very properly acquitted the defendant of the complaint.

The appellant contends that the court below should have first inquired into the right of the defendant
to the office in question and that no other question can be raised or investigated until this point has
been determined, and alleges that the question of the right of the plaintiff to the said office does not
arise until it has been determined that the defendant is not entitled to the exercise of such office. In
support of his contention he relies upon the provisions of section 202 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

This section provides as follows: "When the action is against a person for usurping an office, the
complaint shall set forth the name of the person who claims to be entitled thereto, with an averment of
his right to the same; and that the defendant is unlawfully in possession of the same; and judgment
may be rendered upon the right of the defendant, and also upon the right of the person so averred to
be entitled, or only upon the right of the defendant, as justice requires."cralaw virtua1aw library

From the words above italicized the appellant infers that the court below should have first passed
upon the right of the defendant and afterwards upon the right of the plaintiff. In our opinion this should
be done at the same time and in the same judgment. It is immaterial what method the court may
follow in the statement and determination of the questions in the rendition of his judgment because
even though the court may pass upon the right of the plaintiff first, and the right of the defendant
afterwards, or vice versa, this procedure would not vitiate the judgment, provided the court does not
fail to state therein what the rights of the contending parties to the office are. But all of this, of course,
presupposes that the action has been properly brought and duly prosecuted to a judgment. This, at
the same time, presupposes that the plaintiff had a right to maintain his action upon the evidence
submitted by him at the trial. It is impossible to prosecute a suit without a cause of action. Therefore,
whenever before judgment it is conclusively proven that the plaintiff has no right to maintain the action
since he has not the essential conditions required by law in order to bring and maintain such action,
his complaint should be dismissed and it becomes unnecessary to pass upon the right of the
defendant who has a perfect right to the undisturbed possession of his office, unless the action is
brought by a person having a right to maintain the same under the law.

It may be said that under section 202 the court may only pass upon the right of the defendant when
the justice of the case so demands. This is true, but this only refers to cases where the action is
brought by the Attorney- General o* by the provincial fiscal, as the case may be. In such cases it is
not necessary that there be a person claiming to be entitled to the office alleged to have been
usurped, because although be no such person, as in the case of a vacant office, for instance, the
fiscal could and even should bring such action against the person usurping the office in accordance
with the provisions of sections 200 and 199, respectively, as the case may be. The manner in which
judgment should be rendered according to section 202 perfectly meets the various cases provided for
in the three preceding sections; and it becomes the duty of the court to pass upon the rights of the
defendant only whenever it is not an essential requisite for the due prosecution of the action that
there be a person claiming to be entitled to the office thus usurped, something which only happens
where the Attorney-General or the fiscal of any province brings the action against the usurper.

As a result of the foregoing, we can not here pass upon the validity or nullity of the election of the
defendant, for the reason, among others which it is not necessary to state here, that the defendant
has no right to maintain such an action as this.

The order of the court below appealed from, is hereby affirmed. After the expiration of twenty days let
judgment be entered in accordance herewith and let the case be remanded to the court from whence
it came for further proceedings in accordance with the law. So ordered.

EXPRESSIO UNIUS EXT EXCLUSION ALTERIUS

G.R. No. 181517 July 6, 2015

GREEN STAR EXPRESS, INC. and FRUTO SAYSON, JR., Petitioners,

vs.
NISSIN-UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For resolution is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which petitioners Green
Star Express, Inc. and Fruto Sayson, Jr. brought before the Court, assailing the Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 17, 2007 and its Resolution2 dated January 22, 2008 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 86824. The CA nullified the Resolution dated May 5, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, in Civil Case No. SPL-0969, and dismissed the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction.

The following are the antecedents of the case:

On February 25, 2003, a Mitsubishi L-300 van which Universal Robina Corporation ( URC) owned
figured in a vehicular accident with petitioner Green Star Express, Inc.' s (Green Star) passenger bus,
resulting in the death of the van's driver. Thus, the bus driver, petitioner Fruto Sayson, Jr., was
charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

Thereafter, Green Star sent a demand letter to respondent NissinUniversal Robina Corporation
(NURC) for the repair of its passenger bus amounting to ₱567, 070.68. NURC denied any liability
therefore and argued that the criminal case shall determine the ultimate liabilities of the parties.
Thereafter, the criminal case was dismissed without prejudice, due to insufficiency of evidence.

Sayson and Green Star then filed a complaint for damages against NURC before the R TC of San
Pedro, Laguna. Francis Tinio, one of NURC's employees, was the one who received the summons.
On February 6, 2004, NURC filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming lack of jurisdiction due to improper
service.

On May 5, 2004, the RTC issued a Resolution denying NURC's motion to dismiss. It ruled that there
was substantial compliance because there was actual receipt of the summons by NURC. The
dispositive portion of said Resolution thus reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, defendant's "Motion to Dismiss" is hereby DENIED. 3

Since its Motion for Reconsideration was denied, NURC elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for
Certiorari. On September 17, 2007, the CA reversed the RTC ruling, hence:

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions, dated May
5, 2004 and dated July 26, 2004, of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, in
Civil Case No. SPL-0969, are hereby NULLIFIED and a new one rendered granting Petitioner's
Motion to Dismiss, dated February 3, 2004. Private Respondents' Amended Complaint for Damages
filed against Petitioner Nissin-Universal Robina Corporation is accordingly dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.4

Aggrieved, Green Star and Sayson moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, this
petition.

The lone issue is whether or not the summons was properly served on NURC, vesting the trial court
with jurisdiction.

The petition is benefit of merit.

It is a well-established rule that the rules on service of summons upon a domestic private juridical
entity must be strictly complied with. Otherwise, the court cannot be said to have acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant.5

NURC maintains that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it as the summons was received by its
cost accountant, Francis Tinio.1âwphi1 It argues that under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of
Court, which provides the rule on service of summons upon a juridical entity, in cases where the
defendant is a domestic corporation like NURC, summons may be served only through its
officers.6 Thus:

Section 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. – When the defendant is a corporation,
partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality,
service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel.7

This provision replaced the former Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court which read:

Section 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. - If the defendant is a
corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered, service may
be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. 8

In the past, the Court upheld service of summons upon a construction project manager, a
corporation’s assistant manager, and ordinary clerk of a corporation, private secretary of corporate
executives, retained counsel, and officials who had control over the operations of the corporation like
the assistant general manager or the corporation’s Chief Finance and Administrative Officer. The
Court then considered said persons as "agent" within the contemplation of the old rule. Notably,
under the new Rules, service of summons upon an agent of the corporation is no longer
authorized,9 The rule now likewise states "general manager" instead of "manager"; "corporate
secretary" instead of merely "secretary"; and "treasure" instead of "cashier." 10 It has now become
restricted, limited, and exclusive only to the persons enumerated in the aforementioned provision,
following the rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one person excludes all others,
or expression unions est exclusion alterius. Service must, therefore, be made only on the person
expressly listed in the rules.11 If the revision committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of
summons, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language. 12

Here, Tinio, a, member of NURC’s accounting staff, received the summons on January 22, 2004.
Green star claims that it was received upon instruction of Junadette Avedillo. The general manager of
the corporation. Such fact, however, does not appear in the Sheriff’s Return.13 The Return did not
even state whether Avedillo was present at the time the summons was received by Tinio, the
supposed assistant manager. Green Star further avers that the sheriff tendered the summons, but
Avedillo simply refused to sign and receive the same. She then allegedly instructed Tinio to just
receive it in her behalf. However, Green Star never presented said sheriff as witness during the
hearing of NURC’s motion to dismiss to attest to said claim. And while the sheriff executed an
affidavit which appears to support such allegation, the same was likewise not presented as evidence.
It was only when the case was already before the CA that said affidavit first surfaced. Since the
service of summons was made on a cost accountant, which is not one of the designated persons
under Section 11 of Rule 14, the trial court did not vadily acquire jurisdiction over NURC, 14 although
the corporation may have actually received the summons.15 To rule otherwise will be an outright
circumvention of the rules, aggravating further the delay in the administration of justice. 16

At this juncture, it is worth emphasizing that notice to enable the other party to be heard and to
present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative or judicial
proceedings. The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process.
Corporations would be easily deprived of their right to present their defense in a multi-million peso
suit, if the Court would disregard the mandate of the Rules on the service of summons. 17

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated September 17, 2007
and Resolution dated January 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86824 are hereby AFFIRMED.

EXPRESSIO UNIUS EXT EXCLUSION ALTERIUS

G.R. No. 172087 March 15, 2011

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), Petitioner,
vs.
THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE (BIR), represented herein by HON. JOSE MARIO
BUÑAG, in his official capacity as COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Public
Respondent,
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, who are persons acting for, in behalf, or under the authority of
Respondent. Public and Private Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For resolution of this Court is the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition1 with prayer for the issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, dated April 17, 2006, of petitioner
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), seeking the declaration of nullity of
Section 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9337 insofar as it amends Section 27 (c) of the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1997, by excluding petitioner from exemption from corporate income tax for being
repugnant to Sections 1 and 10 of Article III of the Constitution. Petitioner further seeks to prohibit the
implementation of Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Revenue Regulations No. 16-2005 for being
contrary to law.

The undisputed facts follow.

PAGCOR was created pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1067-A2 on January 1, 1977.
Simultaneous to its creation, P.D. No. 1067-B3 (supplementing P.D. No. 1067-A) was issued
exempting PAGCOR from the payment of any type of tax, except a franchise tax of five percent (5%)
of the gross revenue.4 Thereafter, on June 2, 1978, P.D. No. 1399 was issued expanding the scope
of PAGCOR's exemption.5

To consolidate the laws pertaining to the franchise and powers of PAGCOR, P.D. No. 1869 6 was
issued. Section 13 thereof reads as follows:

Sec. 13. Exemptions. — x x x

(1) Customs Duties, taxes and other imposts on importations. - All importations of equipment,
vehicles, automobiles, boats, ships, barges, aircraft and such other gambling paraphernalia,
including accessories or related facilities, for the sole and exclusive use of the casinos, the
proper and efficient management and administration thereof and such other clubs, recreation
or amusement places to be established under and by virtue of this Franchise shall be exempt
from the payment of duties, taxes and other imposts, including all kinds of fees, levies, or
charges of any kind or nature.

Vessels and/or accessory ferry boats imported or to be imported by any corporation having
existing contractual arrangements with the Corporation, for the sole and exclusive use of the
casino or to be used to service the operations and requirements of the casino, shall likewise be
totally exempt from the payment of all customs duties, taxes and other imposts, including all
kinds of fees, levies, assessments or charges of any kind or nature, whether National or Local.

(2) Income and other taxes. - (a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form, income or
otherwise, as well as fees, charges, or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local,
shall be assessed and collected under this Franchise from the Corporation; nor shall any form
of tax or charge attach in any way to the earnings of the Corporation, except a Franchise Tax
 of five percent (5%)of the gross revenue or earnings derived by the Corporation from its
operation under this Franchise. Such tax shall be due and payable quarterly to the National
Government and shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or assessments of any kind,
nature or description, levied, established, or collected by any municipal, provincial or national
government authority.

(b) Others: The exemption herein granted for earnings derived from the operations
conducted under the franchise, specifically from the payment of any tax, income or
otherwise, as well as any form of charges, fees or levies, shall inure to the benefit of
and extend to corporation(s), association(s), agency(ies), or individual(s) with whom the
Corporation or operator has any contractual relationship in connection with the
operations of the casino(s) authorized to be conducted under this Franchise and to
those receiving compensation or other remuneration from the Corporation as a result of
essential facilities furnished and/or technical services rendered to the Corporation or
operator.

The fee or remuneration of foreign entertainers contracted by the Corporation or operator in

pursuance of this provision shall be free of any tax.

(3) Dividend Income. − Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, in the event the
Corporation should declare a cash dividend income corresponding to the participation of the
private sector shall, as an incentive to the beneficiaries, be subject only to a final flat income
rate of ten percent (10%) of the regular income tax rates. The dividend income shall not in
such case be considered as part of the beneficiaries' taxable income; provided, however, that
such dividend income shall be totally exempted from income or other form of taxes if invested
within six (6) months from the date the dividend income is received in the following:

(a) operation of the casino(s) or investments in any affiliate activity that will ultimately
redound to the benefit of the Corporation; or any other corporation with whom the
Corporation has any existing arrangements in connection with or related to the
operations of the casino(s);

(b) Government bonds, securities, treasury notes, or government debentures; or

(c) BOI-registered or export-oriented corporation(s).7

PAGCOR's tax exemption was removed in June 1984 through P.D. No. 1931, but it was later restored
by Letter of Instruction No. 1430, which was issued in September 1984.

On January 1, 1998, R.A. No. 8424,8 otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code of
1997, took effect. Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424 provides that government-owned and controlled
corporations (GOCCs) shall pay corporate income tax, except petitioner PAGCOR, the Government
Service and Insurance Corporation, the Social Security System, the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation, and the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, thus:

(c) Government-owned or Controlled Corporations, Agencies or Instrumentalities. - The provisions of

existing special general laws to the contrary notwithstanding, all corporations, agencies or
instrumentalities owned and controlled by the Government, except the Government Service and
Insurance Corporation (GSIS), the Social Security System (SSS), the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation (PHIC), the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), and the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), shall pay such rate of tax upon their taxable
income as are imposed by this Section upon corporations or associations engaged in similar
business, industry, or activity.9

With the enactment of R.A. No. 933710 on May 24, 2005, certain sections of the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1997 were amended. The particular amendment that is at issue in this case is
Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337, which amended Section 27 (c) of the National Internal Revenue Code of
1997 by excluding PAGCOR from the enumeration of GOCCs that are exempt from payment of
corporate income tax, thus:

(c) Government-owned or Controlled Corporations, Agencies or Instrumentalities. - The provisions of

existing special general laws to the contrary notwithstanding, all corporations, agencies, or
instrumentalities owned and controlled by the Government, except the Government Service and
Insurance Corporation (GSIS), the Social Security System (SSS), the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation (PHIC), and the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), shall pay such rate of
tax upon their taxable income as are imposed by this Section upon corporations or associations
engaged in similar business, industry, or activity.

Different groups came to this Court via petitions for certiorari and prohibition11 assailing the validity
and constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337, in particular:

1) Section 4, which imposes a 10% Value Added Tax (VAT) on sale of goods and properties;
Section 5, which imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods; and Section 6, which imposes a
10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties, all contain a uniform
proviso authorizing the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to
raise the VAT rate to 12%. The said provisions were alleged to be violative of Section 28 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution, which section vests in Congress the exclusive authority to fix the
rate of taxes, and of Section 1, Article III of the Constitution on due process, as well as of
Section 26 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which section provides for the "no amendment
rule" upon the last reading of a bill;

2) Sections 8 and 12 were alleged to be violative of Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, or
the guarantee of equal protection of the laws, and Section 28 (1), Article VI of the Constitution;
and

3) other technical aspects of the passage of the law, questioning the manner it was passed.

On September 1, 2005, the Court dismissed all the petitions and upheld the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 9337.12

On the same date, respondent BIR issued Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 16-2005,13 specifically
identifying PAGCOR as one of the franchisees subject to 10% VAT imposed under Section 108 of the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended by R.A. No. 9337. The said revenue
regulation, in part, reads:

Sec. 4. 108-3. Definitions and Specific Rules on Selected Services. —

xxxx

(h) x x x

Gross Receipts of all other franchisees, other than those covered by Sec. 119 of the Tax Code,
regardless of how their franchisees may have been granted, shall be subject to the 10% VAT
imposed under Sec.108 of the Tax Code. This includes, among others, the Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), and its licensees or franchisees.

Hence, the present petition for certiorari.

PAGCOR raises the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT RA 9337, SECTION 1 (C) IS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO FOR BEING
REPUGNANT TO THE EQUAL PROTECTION [CLAUSE] EMBODIED IN SECTION 1, ARTICLE III
OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.

II

WHETHER OR NOT RA 9337, SECTION 1 (C) IS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO FOR BEING
REPUGNANT TO THE NON-IMPAIRMENT [CLAUSE] EMBODIED IN SECTION 10, ARTICLE III OF
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.

III

WHETHER OR NOT RR 16-2005, SECTION 4.108-3, PARAGRAPH (H) IS NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO FOR BEING BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE BASIC LAW, RA 8424, SECTION 108,
INSOFAR AS THE SAID REGULATION IMPOSED VAT ON THE SERVICES OF THE PETITIONER
AS WELL AS PETITIONER’S LICENSEES OR FRANCHISEES WHEN THE BASIC LAW, AS
INTERPRETED BY APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, DOES NOT IMPOSE VAT ON PETITIONER
OR ON PETITIONER’S LICENSEES OR FRANCHISEES.14

The BIR, in its Comment15 dated December 29, 2006, counters:

SECTION 1 OF R.A. NO. 9337 AND SECTION 13 (2) OF P.D. 1869 ARE BOTH VALID AND
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OF LAWS THAT SHOULD BE HARMONIOUSLY CONSTRUED
TOGETHER SO AS TO GIVE EFFECT TO ALL OF THEIR PROVISIONS WHENEVER POSSIBLE.

II

SECTION 1 OF R.A. NO. 9337 IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 1 AND SECTION 10, ARTICLE III
OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.

III

BIR REVENUE REGULATIONS ARE PRESUMED VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL UNTIL

STRICKEN DOWN BY LAWFUL AUTHORITIES.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), by way of Manifestation In Lieu of Comment,16 concurred
with the arguments of the petitioner. It added that although the State is free to select the subjects of
taxation and that the inequity resulting from singling out a particular class for taxation or exemption is
not an infringement of the constitutional limitation, a tax law must operate with the same force and
effect to all persons, firms and corporations placed in a similar situation. Furthermore, according to
the OSG, public respondent BIR exceeded its statutory authority when it enacted RR No. 16-2005,
because the latter's provisions are contrary to the mandates of P.D. No. 1869 in relation to R.A. No.
9337.

The main issue is whether or not PAGCOR is still exempt from corporate income tax and VAT with
the enactment of R.A. No. 9337.

After a careful study of the positions presented by the parties, this Court finds the petition partly
meritorious.

Under Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 27 (c) of the National Internal Revenue Code of
1977, petitioner is no longer exempt from corporate income tax as it has been effectively omitted from
the list of GOCCs that are exempt from it. Petitioner argues that such omission is unconstitutional, as
it is violative of its right to equal protection of the laws under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution:

Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,17 this Court expounded the meaning and scope of equal protection,
thus:

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as
to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be
treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The
guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws
which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances. The "equal protection of the
laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." It limits governmental discrimination. The equal
protection clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned.

xxxx

Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the classification is reasonable,
the law may operate only on some and not all of the people without violating the equal protection
clause. The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. To be valid, it must
conform to the following requirements:

1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.

2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.

3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.

4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.18

It is not contested that before the enactment of R.A. No. 9337, petitioner was one of the five GOCCs
exempted from payment of corporate income tax as shown in R.A. No. 8424, Section 27 (c) of which,
reads:

(c) Government-owned or Controlled Corporations, Agencies or Instrumentalities. - The provisions of

existing special or general laws to the contrary notwithstanding, all corporations, agencies or
instrumentalities owned and controlled by the Government, except the Government Service and
Insurance Corporation (GSIS), the Social Security System (SSS), the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation (PHIC), the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), and the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), shall pay such rate of tax upon their taxable
income as are imposed by this Section upon corporations or associations engaged in similar
business, industry, or activity.19

A perusal of the legislative records of the Bicameral Conference Meeting of the Committee on Ways
on Means dated October 27, 1997 would show that the exemption of PAGCOR from the payment of
corporate income tax was due to the acquiescence of the Committee on Ways on Means to the
request of PAGCOR that it be exempt from such tax.20 The records of the Bicameral Conference
Meeting reveal:

HON. R. DIAZ. The other thing, sir, is we --- I noticed we imposed a tax on lotto winnings.

CHAIRMAN ENRILE. Wala na, tinanggal na namin yon.

HON. R. DIAZ. Tinanggal na ba natin yon?

CHAIRMAN ENRILE. Oo.

HON. R. DIAZ. Because I was wondering whether we covered the tax on --- Whether on a universal
basis, we included a tax on cockfighting winnings.

CHAIRMAN ENRILE. No, we removed the ---

HON. R. DIAZ. I . . . (inaudible) natin yong lotto?

CHAIRMAN ENRILE. Pati PAGCOR tinanggal upon request.

CHAIRMAN JAVIER. Yeah, Philippine Insurance Commission.

CHAIRMAN ENRILE. Philippine Insurance --- Health, health ba. Yon ang request ng Chairman, I will
accept. (laughter) Pag-Pag-ibig yon, maliliit na sa tao yon.

HON. ROXAS. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if in the revenue gainers if we factored in an amount that
would reflect the VAT and other sales taxes---

CHAIRMAN ENRILE. No, we’re talking of this measure only. We will not --- (discontinued)

HON. ROXAS. No, no, no, no, from the --- arising from the exemption. Assuming that when we
release the money into the hands of the public, they will not use that to --- for wallpaper. They will
spend that eh, Mr. Chairman. So when they spend that---

CHAIRMAN ENRILE. There’s a VAT.

HON. ROXAS. There will be a VAT and there will be other sales taxes no. Is there a quantification? Is
there an approximation?

CHAIRMAN JAVIER. Not anything.

HON. ROXAS. So, in effect, we have sterilized that entire seven billion. In effect, it is not circulating in
the economy which is unrealistic.

CHAIRMAN ENRILE. It does, it does, because this is taken and spent by government, somebody
receives it in the form of wages and supplies and other services and other goods. They are not being
taken from the public and stored in a vault.

CHAIRMAN JAVIER. That 7.7 loss because of tax exemption. That will be extra income for the
taxpayers.

HON. ROXAS. Precisely, so they will be spending it.21

The discussion above bears out that under R.A. No. 8424, the exemption of PAGCOR from paying
corporate income tax was not based on a classification showing substantial distinctions which make
for real differences, but to reiterate, the exemption was granted upon the request of PAGCOR that it
be exempt from the payment of corporate income tax.

With the subsequent enactment of R.A. No. 9337, amending R.A. No. 8424, PAGCOR has been
excluded from the enumeration of GOCCs that are exempt from paying corporate income tax. The
records of the Bicameral Conference Meeting dated April 18, 2005, of the Committee on the
Disagreeing Provisions of Senate Bill No. 1950 and House Bill No. 3555, show that it is the legislative
intent that PAGCOR be subject to the payment of corporate income tax, thus:

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. RECTO). Yes, Osmeña, the proponent of the amendment.

SEN. OSMEÑA. Yeah. Mr. Chairman, one of the reasons why we're even considering this VAT bill is
we want to show the world who our creditors, that we are increasing official revenues that go to the
national budget. Unfortunately today, Pagcor is unofficial.

Now, in 2003, I took a quick look this morning, Pagcor had a net income of 9.7 billion after paying
some small taxes that they are subjected to. Of the 9.7 billion, they claim they remitted to national
government seven billion. Pagkatapos, there are other specific remittances like to the Philippine
Sports Commission, etc., as mandated by various laws, and then about 400 million to the President's
Social Fund. But all in all, their net profit today should be about 12 billion. That's why I am questioning
this two billion. Because while essentially they claim that the money goes to government, and I
will accept that just for the sake of argument. It does not pass through the appropriation
process. And I think that at least if we can capture 35 percent or 32 percent through the
budgetary process, first, it is reflected in our official income of government which is applied to
the national budget, and secondly, it goes through what is constitutionally mandated as
Congress appropriating and defining where the money is spent and not through a board of
directors that has absolutely no accountability.

REP. PUENTEBELLA. Well, with all due respect, Mr. Chairman, follow up lang.

There is wisdom in the comments of my good friend from Cebu, Senator Osmeña.

SEN. OSMEÑA. And Negros.

REP. PUENTEBELLA. And Negros at the same time ay Kasimanwa. But I would not want to put my
friends from the Department of Finance in a difficult position, but may we know your comments on
this knowing that as Senator Osmeña just mentioned, he said, "I accept that that a lot of it is going to
spending for basic services," you know, going to most, I think, supposedly a lot or most of it should go
to government spending, social services and the like. What is your comment on this? This is going to
affect a lot of services on the government side.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. LAPUS). Mr. Chair, Mr. Chair.

SEN. OSMEÑA. It goes from pocket to the other, Monico.

REP. PUENTEBELLA. I know that. But I wanted to ask them, Mr. Senator, because you may have
your own pre-judgment on this and I don't blame you. I don't blame you. And I know you have your
own research. But will this not affect a lot, the disbursements on social services and other?

REP. LOCSIN. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, if I can add to that question also. Wouldn't it be easier
for you to explain to, say, foreign creditors, how do you explain to them that if there is a fiscal gap
some of our richest corporations has [been] spared [from] taxation by the government which is one
rich source of revenues. Now, why do you save, why do you spare certain government corporations
on that, like Pagcor? So, would it be easier for you to make an argument if everything was exposed to
taxation?

REP. TEVES. Mr. Chair, please.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. LAPUS). Can we ask the DOF to respond to those before we call
Congressman Teves?

MR. PURISIMA. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Yes, from definitely improving the collection, it will help us because it will then enter as an
official revenue although when dividends declare it also goes in as other income. (sic)

xxxx

REP. TEVES. Mr. Chairman.

xxxx

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. LAPUS). Congressman Teves.

REP. TEVES. Yeah. Pagcor is controlled under Section 27, that is on income tax. Now, we are
talking here on value-added tax. Do you mean to say we are going to amend it from income tax
to value-added tax, as far as Pagcor is concerned?

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. RECTO). No. We are just amending that section with regard to the
exemption from income tax of Pagcor.

xxxx

REP. NOGRALES. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. LAPUS). Congressman Nograles.

REP. NOGRALES. Just a point of inquiry from the Chair. What exactly are the functions of Pagcor
that are VATable? What will we VAT in Pagcor?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. LAPUS). This is on own income tax. This is Pagcor income tax.

REP. NOGRALES. No, that's why. Anong i-va-Vat natin sa kanya. Sale of what?

xxxx

REP. VILLAFUERTE. Mr. Chairman, my question is, what are we VATing Pagcor with, is it the . . .

REP. NOGRALES. Mr. Chairman, this is a secret agreement or the way they craft their contract,
which basis?

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. RECTO). Congressman Nograles, the Senate version does not discuss
a VAT on Pagcor but it just takes away their exemption from non-payment of income tax.22

Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception.23 The burden of proof rests upon the party
claiming exemption to prove that it is, in fact, covered by the exemption so claimed. 24 As a rule, tax
exemptions are construed strongly against the claimant. 25 Exemptions must be shown to exist clearly
and categorically, and supported by clear legal provision. 26

In this case, PAGCOR failed to prove that it is still exempt from the payment of corporate income tax,
considering that Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337 amended Section 27 (c) of the National Internal Revenue
Code of 1997 by omitting PAGCOR from the exemption. The legislative intent, as shown by the
discussions in the Bicameral Conference Meeting, is to require PAGCOR to pay corporate income
tax; hence, the omission or removal of PAGCOR from exemption from the payment of corporate
income tax. It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one person,
thing, act, or consequence excludes all others as expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.27 Thus, the express mention of the GOCCs exempted from payment of corporate
income tax excludes all others. Not being excepted, petitioner PAGCOR must be regarded as coming
within the purview of the general rule that GOCCs shall pay corporate income tax, expressed in the
maxim: exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis.28

PAGCOR cannot find support in the equal protection clause of the Constitution, as the legislative
records of the Bicameral Conference Meeting dated October 27, 1997, of the Committee on Ways
and Means, show that PAGCOR’s exemption from payment of corporate income tax, as provided in
Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424, or the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, was not made
pursuant to a valid classification based on substantial distinctions and the other requirements of a
reasonable classification by legislative bodies, so that the law may operate only on some, and not all,
without violating the equal protection clause. The legislative records show that the basis of the grant
of exemption to PAGCOR from corporate income tax was PAGCOR’s own request to be exempted.

Petitioner further contends that Section 1 (c) of R.A. No. 9337 is null and void ab initio for violating the
non-impairment clause of the Constitution. Petitioner avers that laws form part of, and is read into, the
contract even without the parties expressly saying so. Petitioner states that the private
parties/investors transacting with it considered the tax exemptions, which inure to their benefit, as the
main consideration and inducement for their decision to transact/invest with it. Petitioner argues that
the withdrawal of its exemption from corporate income tax by R.A. No. 9337 has the effect of
changing the main consideration and inducement for the transactions of private parties with it; thus,
the amendatory provision is violative of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.

Petitioner’s contention lacks merit.

The non-impairment clause is contained in Section 10, Article III of the Constitution, which provides
that no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. The non-impairment clause is limited
in application to laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any
manner changing the intention of the parties.29 There is impairment if a subsequent law changes the
terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon
or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties.30

As regards franchises, Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution 31 provides that no franchise or right
shall be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal
by the Congress when the common good so requires.32

In Manila Electric Company v. Province of Laguna,33 the Court held that a franchise partakes the
nature of a grant, which is beyond the purview of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.34 The
pertinent portion of the case states:

While the Court has, not too infrequently, referred to tax exemptions contained in special franchises
as being in the nature of contracts and a part of the inducement for carrying on the franchise, these
exemptions, nevertheless, are far from being strictly contractual in nature. Contractual tax
exemptions, in the real sense of the term and where the non-impairment clause of the Constitution
can rightly be invoked, are those agreed to by the taxing authority in contracts, such as those
contained in government bonds or debentures, lawfully entered into by them under enabling laws in
which the government, acting in its private capacity, sheds its cloak of authority and waives its
governmental immunity. Truly, tax exemptions of this kind may not be revoked without impairing the
obligations of contracts. These contractual tax exemptions, however, are not to be confused with tax
exemptions granted under franchises. A franchise partakes the nature of a grant which is beyond the
purview of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. Indeed, Article XII, Section 11, of the 1987
Constitution, like its precursor provisions in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, is explicit that no
franchise for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except under the condition that such
privilege shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress as and when the common
good so requires.35

In this case, PAGCOR was granted a franchise to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs and
other recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming pools, i.e., basketball, football, lotteries, etc.,
whether on land or sea, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines. 36 Under
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, PAGCOR’s franchise is subject to amendment, alteration or
repeal by Congress such as the amendment under Section 1 of R.A. No. 9377. Hence, the provision
in Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424 by withdrawing the
exemption of PAGCOR from corporate income tax, which may affect any benefits to PAGCOR’s
transactions with private parties, is not violative of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.

Anent the validity of RR No. 16-2005, the Court holds that the provision subjecting PAGCOR to 10%
VAT is invalid for being contrary to R.A. No. 9337. Nowhere in R.A. No. 9337 is it provided that
petitioner can be subjected to VAT. R.A. No. 9337 is clear only as to the removal of petitioner's
exemption from the payment of corporate income tax, which was already addressed above by this
Court.

As pointed out by the OSG, R.A. No. 9337 itself exempts petitioner from VAT pursuant to Section 7
(k) thereof, which reads:

Sec. 7. Section 109 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Section 109. Exempt Transactions. - (1) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (2) hereof, the
following transactions shall be exempt from the value-added tax:

xxxx

(k) Transactions which are exempt under international agreements to which the Philippines is a
signatory or under special laws, except Presidential Decree No. 529.37

Petitioner is exempt from the payment of VAT, because PAGCOR’s charter, P.D. No. 1869, is a
special law that grants petitioner exemption from taxes.

Moreover, the exemption of PAGCOR from VAT is supported by Section 6 of R.A. No. 9337, which
retained Section 108 (B) (3) of R.A. No. 8424, thus:

[R.A. No. 9337], SEC. 6. Section 108 of the same Code (R.A. No. 8424), as amended, is hereby
further amended to read as follows:

SEC. 108. Value-Added Tax on Sale of Services and Use or Lease of Properties. —

(A) Rate and Base of Tax. — There shall be levied, assessed and collected, a value-added tax
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of gross receipts derived from the sale or exchange of services,
including the use or lease of properties: x x x

xxxx

(B) Transactions Subject to Zero Percent (0%) Rate. — The following services performed in the
Philippines by VAT-registered persons shall be subject to zero percent (0%) rate;

xxxx

(3) Services rendered to persons or entities whose exemption under special laws or international
agreements to which the Philippines is a signatory effectively subjects the supply of such services to
zero percent (0%) rate;

x x x x38

As pointed out by petitioner, although R.A. No. 9337 introduced amendments to Section 108 of R.A.
No. 8424 by imposing VAT on other services not previously covered, it did not amend the portion of
Section 108 (B) (3) that subjects to zero percent rate services performed by VAT-registered persons
to persons or entities whose exemption under special laws or international agreements to which the
Philippines is a signatory effectively subjects the supply of such services to 0% rate.

Petitioner's exemption from VAT under Section 108 (B) (3) of R.A. No. 8424 has been thoroughly and
extensively discussed in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Acesite (Philippines) Hotel
Corporation.39 Acesite was the owner and operator of the Holiday Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel. It leased
a portion of the hotel’s premises to PAGCOR. It incurred VAT amounting to ₱30,152,892.02 from its
rental income and sale of food and beverages to PAGCOR from January 1996 to April 1997. Acesite
tried to shift the said taxes to PAGCOR by incorporating it in the amount assessed to PAGCOR.
However, PAGCOR refused to pay the taxes because of its tax-exempt status. PAGCOR paid only
the amount due to Acesite minus VAT in the sum of ₱30,152,892.02. Acesite paid VAT in the amount
of ₱30,152,892.02 to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, fearing the legal consequences of its
non-payment. In May 1998, Acesite sought the refund of the amount it paid as VAT on the ground
that its transaction with PAGCOR was subject to zero rate as it was rendered to a tax-exempt entity.
The Court ruled that PAGCOR and Acesite were both exempt from paying VAT, thus:

xxxx

PAGCOR is exempt from payment of indirect taxes

It is undisputed that P.D. 1869, the charter creating PAGCOR, grants the latter an exemption from the
payment of taxes. Section 13 of P.D. 1869 pertinently provides:

Sec. 13. Exemptions. —

xxxx

(2) Income and other taxes. - (a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise,
as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local, shall be assessed
and collected under this Franchise from the Corporation; nor shall any form of tax or charge attach in
any way to the earnings of the Corporation, except a Franchise Tax of five (5%) percent of the gross
revenue or earnings derived by the Corporation from its operation under this Franchise. Such tax
shall be due and payable quarterly to the National Government and shall be in lieu of all kinds of
taxes, levies, fees or assessments of any kind, nature or description, levied, established or collected
by any municipal, provincial, or national government authority.

(b) Others: The exemptions herein granted for earnings derived from the operations conducted under
the franchise specifically from the payment of any tax, income or otherwise, as well as any form of
charges, fees or levies, shall inure to the benefit of and extend to corporation(s), association(s),
agency(ies), or individual(s) with whom the Corporation or operator has any contractual relationship in
connection with the operations of the casino(s) authorized to be conducted under this Franchise and
to those receiving compensation or other remuneration from the Corporation or operator as a result of
essential facilities furnished and/or technical services rendered to the Corporation or operator.

Petitioner contends that the above tax exemption refers only to PAGCOR's direct tax liability and not
to indirect taxes, like the VAT.

We disagree.

A close scrutiny of the above provisos clearly gives PAGCOR a blanket exemption to taxes with no
distinction on whether the taxes are direct or indirect. We are one with the CA ruling that PAGCOR is
also exempt from indirect taxes, like VAT, as follows:

Under the above provision [Section 13 (2) (b) of P.D. 1869], the term "Corporation" or operator refers
to PAGCOR. Although the law does not specifically mention PAGCOR's exemption from indirect
taxes, PAGCOR is undoubtedly exempt from such taxes because the law exempts from taxes
persons or entities contracting with PAGCOR in casino operations. Although, differently worded, the
provision clearly exempts PAGCOR from indirect taxes. In fact, it goes one step further by granting
tax exempt status to persons dealing with PAGCOR in casino operations. The unmistakable
conclusion is that PAGCOR is not liable for the P30, 152,892.02 VAT and neither is Acesite as the
latter is effectively subject to zero percent rate under Sec. 108 B (3), R.A. 8424. (Emphasis supplied.)

Indeed, by extending the exemption to entities or individuals dealing with PAGCOR, the legislature
clearly granted exemption also from indirect taxes. It must be noted that the indirect tax of VAT, as in
the instant case, can be shifted or passed to the buyer, transferee, or lessee of the goods, properties,
or services subject to VAT. Thus, by extending the tax exemption to entities or individuals
dealing with PAGCOR in casino operations, it is exempting PAGCOR from being liable to
indirect taxes.

The manner of charging VAT does not make PAGCOR liable to said tax.

It is true that VAT can either be incorporated in the value of the goods, properties, or services sold or
leased, in which case it is computed as 1/11 of such value, or charged as an additional 10% to the
value. Verily, the seller or lessor has the option to follow either way in charging its clients and
customer. In the instant case, Acesite followed the latter method, that is, charging an additional 10%
of the gross sales and rentals. Be that as it may, the use of either method, and in particular, the first
method, does not denigrate the fact that PAGCOR is exempt from an indirect tax, like VAT.

VAT exemption extends to Acesite

Thus, while it was proper for PAGCOR not to pay the 10% VAT charged by Acesite, the latter is not
liable for the payment of it as it is exempt in this particular transaction by operation of law to pay the
indirect tax. Such exemption falls within the former Section 102 (b) (3) of the 1977 Tax Code, as
amended (now Sec. 108 [b] [3] of R.A. 8424), which provides:

Section 102. Value-added tax on sale of services.- (a) Rate and base of tax - There shall be levied,
assessed and collected, a value-added tax equivalent to 10% of gross receipts derived by any person
engaged in the sale of services x x x; Provided, that the following services performed in the
Philippines by VAT registered persons shall be subject to 0%.

xxxx

(3) Services rendered to persons or entities whose exemption under special laws or international
agreements to which the Philippines is a signatory effectively subjects the supply of such services to
zero (0%) rate (emphasis supplied).

The rationale for the exemption from indirect taxes provided for in P.D. 1869 and the extension of
such exemption to entities or individuals dealing with PAGCOR in casino operations are best
elucidated from the 1987 case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. John Gotamco & Sons,
Inc., where the absolute tax exemption of the World Health Organization (WHO) upon an international
agreement was upheld. We held in said case that the exemption of contractee WHO should be
implemented to mean that the entity or person exempt is the contractor itself who constructed the
building owned by contractee WHO, and such does not violate the rule that tax exemptions are
personal because the manifest intention of the agreement is to exempt the contractor so that no
contractor's tax may be shifted to the contractee WHO. Thus, the proviso in P.D. 1869, extending the
exemption to entities or individuals dealing with PAGCOR in casino operations, is clearly to proscribe
any indirect tax, like VAT, that may be shifted to PAGCOR. 40

Although the basis of the exemption of PAGCOR and Acesite from VAT in the case of The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Acesite (Philippines) Hotel Corporation was Section 102 (b) of
the 1977 Tax Code, as amended, which section was retained as Section 108 (B) (3) in R.A. No.
8424,41 it is still applicable to this case, since the provision relied upon has been retained in R.A. No.
9337.421avvphi1

It is settled rule that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to
implement said law, the basic law prevails, because the said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the
terms and provisions of the basic law.43 RR No. 16-2005, therefore, cannot go beyond the provisions
of R.A. No. 9337. Since PAGCOR is exempt from VAT under R.A. No. 9337, the BIR exceeded its
authority in subjecting PAGCOR to 10% VAT under RR No. 16-2005; hence, the said regulatory
provision is hereby nullified.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 9337, amending
Section 27 (c) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, by excluding petitioner Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation from the enumeration of government-owned and controlled
corporations exempted from corporate income tax is valid and constitutional, while BIR Revenue
Regulations No. 16-2005 insofar as it subjects PAGCOR to 10% VAT is null and void for being
contrary to the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended by Republic Act No. 9337.

EXPRESSIO UNIUS EXT EXCLUSION ALTERIUS

G.R. No. L-48468-69 November 22, 1989

ORLANDO PRIMERO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents.

Luis R. Reyes for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:

Before the then Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Orlando Primero was charged with the crimes of
Acts of Lasciviousness and Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon.

The complaint for Acts of Lasciviousness reads:

That on or about 5:30 P.M., November 12,1975 in the municipality of Camiling, Province
of Tarlac, the abovenamed accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, while armed with a deadly weapon (bayonet) and by means of force and
intimidation and with lewd designs committed lascivious acts upon the person of the
undersigned complainant at Brgy. Pindangan 2nd, Camiling Tarlac by then and there
embracing, touching and fondling the breast and private parts of the undersigned
against the complainants' will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Camiling Tarlac. (Decision, pp. 28-29, Rollo)

While the Provincial Fiscal, filed an Information for Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon, to wit:

That on or about November 12, 1975, at about 5:30 in the afternoon, at Barangay
Pindangan 2nd, in the Municipality of Camiling, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said Orlando Primero did then and
there Willfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry outside of his residence a deadly
weapon, to wit: a bayonet, 19-1/2" long, which was not then being used as a necessary
tool or implement to earn a living or being used in connection therewith, but was used in
 the commission of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness for which he was charged in
Crim. Case No. 1184 of this Honorable Court.

Contrary to Law.

Tarlac, Tarlac, February 19, 1976. (p. 29, Rollo)

The aforementioned offenses were jointly tried for having been committed on the same occasion.

The evidence for the prosecution, as found by the respondent appellate Court is as follows:

During the time material to this case Angelita Maycong was about 24 years old, single
and a resident of Pindangan II, Camiling, Tarlac (p. 16, tsn., August 5,1976).

On or about November 12, 1975, on their way home from Tarlac where they joined a
parade (p. 30, tsn., August 30, 1976), Angelita Maycong and one Elena Garcia saw
Orlando Primero emerge suddenly from the talahib along their path, brandishing a
bayonet at them (p. 17, tsn., August 5, 1976). Elena Garcia ran away (p. 6, tsn., August
30,1976). Angelita Maycong descended on the 'pilapil' to her left side and also tried to
run away (p. 18, tsn, August 5, 1976). Unfortunately, Angelita stumbled, as a result of
which, Orlando grabbed her and pinned her down on the ground (Ibid), He held her
neck with his right hand and held her breasts with the left hand and kissed her right
cheek (pp. 19, 20, tsn., August 5,1976). Fighting back, she kicked Orlando near his
organ and struck him with left hand (p. 20, Ibid.; p. 27, tsn., August 5,1976). In the
struggle, Angelita was able to get the bayonet (p. 2, Ibid).

In the meantime, Elena Garcia shouted for help (p. 20, tsn., August 5, 1976). Angelita
also shouted for help (p. 20, Ibid).

Upon seeing the bayonet in the possession of Angelita, Orlando Primero ran away (p.
23, tsn., August 5, 1976). Not long after, the father of Angelita Maycong, who was then
tending his farm from where he heard the shouts for help, arrived (Ibid). Having teamed
of the attempt made on the honor of her daughter, father and daughter reported the
matter to the Barrio Captain (Ibid). The bayonet was surrendered to the police force of
Camiling, Tarlac. (pp. 3-5, Solicitor's Brief) (Decision, p. 10, Rollo).

The defendant, in turn, claims that the filing of these two (2) criminal accusations was motivated by
revenge. He testified that he and the complainant were sweethearts who were engaged to get
married. He lived in the house of the complainant for three (3) months where he was practically
treated by the father of the complainant, Florentino Maycong, as a son-in-law helping in the farm work
and in the daily chores in the house. However, the planned marriage did not take place because the
complainant's family wanted an ostentations ceremony which he (defendant) could not afford. As an
alternative, defendant suggested to complainant that they elope but the latter refused. Subsequently,
the defendant left the complainant and married another woman, a decision which was allegedly
resented by the complainant.

Furthermore, defendant raises the defense of alibi. It is argued that at the time the incident was
allegedly committed, he was in Paniqui, Tarlac harvesting palay with some other farm laborers. He
maintained that he worked there from 6 o'clock in the morning to past 6 o'clock in the evening of
November 12, 1975. The foregoing testimony of the defendant was corroborated by Cipriano Sudaria
and Teodoro Cayabyab.
After trial, the lower court convicted the defendant of the two (2) offenses charged in the two (2)
separate informations and sentenced him as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Orlando Primero guilty beyond reasonable doubt in
Crim. Case No. I 1 84 of the offense of Acts of Lasciviousness punishable under Article
336 of the Revised Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to a term of TWO (2) YEARS,
FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS
of prision correccional, medium period, and in Crim. Case No. 1195 on the charge of
Illegal Possession of a Deadly Weapon, punishable under PD 9, he is further sentenced
to a prison term of TEN (10) YEARS which is the maximum term imposed by the law,
with cost.

The bayonet, Exh. A, is ordered confiscated and once this decision becomes final, the
same shall be forwarded to the 184th PC Company, Paniqui, Tarlac for disposition
according to law. (p. 12, Rollo)

On appeal, the respondent Court rendered a decision, * the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, affirming the judgment of conviction in both offenses but modifying the
penalty imposed by the lower court, We hereby sentence the defendant to the following:

1. As regards to the accusation of acts of lasciviousness the defendant is hereby

sentenced to a penalty of Six (6) Months of Arrests Mayor to Four (4) Years of Prision
Correccional; and

2. As regards the violation of Presidential Decree No. 9 the defendant is hereby

sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of Five (5) Years as minimum to Ten (10) Years
as maximum. The bayonet, Exhibit A is ordered confiscated in favor of the government.
(pp. 1516, Rollo)

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

The respondent Court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses.

II

The respondent Court failed to pass upon the contention that bayonet is not one of the
weapons the carrying of which outside one's residence is punished under Section 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 9.

III

The respondent Court erred in its non-consideration of the defense of alibi interposed by
the defendant.

After a careful perusal of the entire record of this case, We find no cogent reason to disturb the
findings of the respondent Court.
With regard to the issue of credibility, We cannot acquiesce with the argument raised by the petitioner
that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, being close relatives, (father and niece) of the
complainant, should not be given weight and should be considered biased and self-serving. Be it
remembered that mere relations cannot militate against the credibility of a witness. Neither could it
distort the testimony due from such witnesses. In point is the ruling in the case of People v.
Libed reported in 14 SCRA 410:

The fact alone of relationship to the victim does not destroy a witness' credibility. It is not
to be lightly supposed that the relatives of the deceased would callously violate their
conscience ... by blaming it on persons whom they know to be innocent thereof.

In this regard, it is relevant to restate herein that the trial court, which had the opportunity of observing
the demeanor and deportment of the witnesses, found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses to
have the hallmarks of truth and credibility. Thus, the trial court pertinently observed:

The Court is inclined to believe the claim of the complainant. Angelita Maycong, her
father Florentino Maycong, and her companion Elena Garcia, appear to be credible
witnesses. They impressed the Court as being innocent farm folks, and while
appearance may be deceiving, their story is not incredible and was entirely believable,
Being an unmarried woman and in the prime of her maidenhood (she was 25 years of
age when she testified on August 5,1976), what reason would Angelita have for
unnecessarily exposing herself if indeed the story of the accused violating her honor
was not true. Her story was corroborated in material aspects by the two other
witnesses, her companion Elena Garcia and her father Florentino Maycong. (Decision,
p. 12 Rollo)

Accordingly, it need not be emphasized that the trial court's finding that the testimonies of the
witnesses were reliable, being supported by evidence of record, should be given credence. Thus, on
matters of credibility the findings of the trial court are accorded the highest respect (People v.
Cabanit, 139 SCRA 94; People v. Jones, 137 SCRA 166; People v. Canamo, 138 SCRA 141; People
v. Pasco, Jr., 137 SCRA 137; Guita v. CA, 139 SCRA 576).

Anent the second issue, We regret to say that the same is bereft of merit. It is worth noting that the
dispositive portion of the respondent Court's decision makes mention of violation by the petitioner of
P.D. No. 9 for which he was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years as minimum to
ten (10) years as maximum, and wherein the bayonet was ordered confiscated in favor of the
government. It goes without saying that the Court of Appeals would not have sustained the trial
court's finding of petitioner's guilt as to the charge of illegal possession of deadly weapon were it not
convinced that a bayonet is a "bladed, pointed or blunt weapon" decreed unlawful under P.D. No. 9.

It can not be disputed that, ordinarily, the enumeration of specified matters in a statute is construed
as an exclusion of matters not enumerated unless a different intention appears. However, the
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is only an auxiliary rule of statutory construction. It is not
of universal application—neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering
legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly
indicated purpose of the legislature (Statutory Construction, Martin, sixth edition, 1984, pp. 71-72).
Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular persons or
things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why other ... things not so enumerated should not
have been included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so including them, the maxim expressio
unius est exclusio alterius should not be invoked (Ibid, p. 79). Applying the same in the instant case, it
cannot be convincingly argued that a bayonet is not a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon, possession of
which outside of one's residence is decreed by P.D. No. 9 to be illegal. True enough, if the carrying
outside one's residence of such weapons as fan knife, "balisong" or club, which are less deadly than
the bayonet, are prohibited under the law, there is no logical reason why the bayonet should be
exempted from the prohibition.

Finally, as regards the defense of alibi, not only is it a weak defense but also it cannot prevail over the
positive Identification of the accused and by credible prosecution witnesses (People v. Obenque, 147
SCRA 448; People v. Pacada, Jr., 142 SCRA 427; People v. Canturia, 139 SCRA 280). Moreover,
defendant failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the incident.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against
petitioner.

EXPRESSIO UNIUS EXT EXCLUSION ALTERIUS

G.R. No. 169435 February 27, 2008

MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal Mayor,

CAROLINE ARZADON-GARVIDA, petitioner,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF MARCOS, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal Mayor,
SALVADOR PILLOS, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

AS the law creating a municipality fixes its boundaries, settlement of boundary disputes between
municipalities is facilitated by carrying into effect the law that created them.

Any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law creating a municipality is not the
carrying into effect of that law but its amendment, which only the Congress can do. 1

For Our review on certiorari is the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) reversing to a certain extent
that3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Laoag City, Ilocos Norte, in a case that originated
from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Ilocos Norte about the boundary dispute between the
Municipalities of Marcos and Nueva Era in Ilocos Norte.

The CA declared that Marcos is entitled to have its eastern boundary extended up "to the boundary
line between the province of Ilocos Norte and Kalinga-Apayao."4 By this extension of Marcos' eastern
boundary, the CA allocated to Marcos a portion of Nueva Era's territory.

The Facts

The Municipality of Nueva Era was created from the settlements of Bugayong, Cabittaoran,
Garnaden, Padpadon, Padsan, Paorpatoc, Tibangran, and Uguis which were previously organized
as rancherias, each of which was under the independent control of a chief. Governor General Francis
Burton Harrison, acting on a resolution passed by the provincial government of Ilocos Norte, united
these rancherias and created the township of Nueva Era by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No.
66 5 dated September 30, 1916.
The Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was created on June 22, 1963 pursuant to Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3753 entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Marcos in the Province of Ilocos
Norte." Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753 provides:

SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit in
the Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from the said
municipality and constituted into a new and separate municipality to be known as the
Municipality of Marcos, with the following boundaries:

On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barrios
Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by the
Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East, by
the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by the Padsan River which is at the
same time the boundary between the municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and
Southwest, by the boundary between the municipalities of Batac and Dingras.

The Municipality of Marcos shall have its seat of government in the barrio of Biding.

Based on the first paragraph of the said Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753, it is clear that Marcos shall be
derived from the listed barangays of Dingras, namely: Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan,
Ragas and Agunit. The Municipality of Nueva Era or any of its barangays was not mentioned. Hence,
if based only on said paragraph, it is clear that Nueva Era may not be considered as a source of
territory of Marcos.

There is no issue insofar as the first paragraph is concerned which named only Dingras as the mother
municipality of Marcos. The problem, however, lies in the description of Marcos' boundaries as stated
in the second paragraph, particularly in the phrase: "on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province
boundary."

It must be noted that the term "Mt. Province" stated in the above phrase refers to the present
adjoining provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Kalinga and Apayao, which were then a
single province.

Mt. Province was divided into the four provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-
Apayao by virtue of R.A. No. 4695 which was enacted on June 18, 1966. On February 14, 1995, the
province of Kalinga-Apayao, which comprises the sub-provinces of Kalinga and Apayao, was further
converted into the regular provinces of Kalinga and Apayao pursuant to R.A. No. 7878.

The part of then Mt. Province which was at the east of Marcos is now the province of Apayao. Hence,
the eastern boundary referred to by the second paragraph of Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753 is the
present Ilocos Norte-Apayao boundary.

On the basis of the said phrase, which described Marcos' eastern boundary, Marcos claimed that the
middle portion of Nueva Era, which adjoins its eastern side, formed part of its territory. Its reasoning
was founded upon the fact that Nueva Era was between Marcos and the Ilocos Norte-Apayao
boundary such that if Marcos was to be bounded on the east by the Ilocos Norte-Apayao boundary,
part of Nueva Era would consequently be obtained by it.6

Marcos did not claim any part of Nueva Era as its own territory until after almost 30 years, 7 or only on
March 8, 1993, when its Sangguniang Bayan passed Resolution No. 93-015.8 Said resolution was
entitled: "Resolution Claiming an Area which is an Original Part of Nueva Era, But Now Separated
Due to the Creation of Marcos Town in the Province of Ilocos Norte."
Marcos submitted its claim to the SP of Ilocos Norte for its consideration and approval. The SP, on
the other hand, required Marcos to submit its position paper.9

In its position paper, Marcos alleged that since its northeastern and eastern boundaries under R.A.
No. 3753 were the Burnay River and the Ilocos Norte-Mountain Province boundary, respectively, its
eastern boundary should not be limited to the former Dingras-Nueva Era boundary, which was
coterminous and aligned with the eastern boundary of Dingras. According to Marcos, its eastern
boundary should extend further to the east or up to the Ilocos-Norte-Mt. Province boundary pursuant
to the description of its eastern boundary under R.A. No. 3753.10

In view of its claim over the middle portion of Nueva Era, Marcos posited that Nueva Era was cut into
two parts. And since the law required that the land area of a municipality must be compact and
contiguous, Nueva Era's northern isolated portion could no longer be considered as its territory but
that of Marcos'. Thus, Marcos claimed that it was entitled not only to the middle portion 11 of Nueva
Era but also to Nueva Era's isolated northern portion. These areas claimed by Marcos were
within Barangay Sto. Niño, Nueva Era.

Nueva Era reacted to the claim of Marcos through its Resolution No. 1, Series of 1993. It alleged that
since time immemorial, its entire land area was an ancestral domain of the "tinguians," an indigenous
cultural community. It argued to the effect that since the land being claimed by Marcos must be
protected for the tinguians, it must be preserved as part of Nueva Era.12

According to Nueva Era, Marcos was created out of the territory of Dingras only. And since R.A. No.
3753 specifically mentioned seven (7) barrios of Dingras to become Marcos, the area which should
comprise Marcos should not go beyond the territory of said barrios. 13

From the time Marcos was created in 1963, its eastern boundary had been considered to be aligned
and coterminous with the eastern boundary of the adjacent municipality of Dingras. However, based
on a re-survey in 1992, supposedly done to conform to the second paragraph of Section 1 of R.A. No.
3753, an area of 15,400 hectares of Nueva Era was alleged to form part of Marcos. 14 This was the
area of Barangay Sto. Niño, Nueva Era that Marcos claimed in its position paper.

On March 29, 2000, the SP of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era. The fallo of its
decision15 reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Body has no alternative but to dismiss, as it
hereby DISMISSES said petition for lack of merit. The disputed area consisting of 15,400
hectares, more or less, is hereby declared as part and portion of the territorial jurisdiction of
respondent Nueva Era.16

R.A. No. 3753 expressly named the barangays that would comprise Marcos, but none of Nueva
Era's barangays were mentioned. The SP thus construed, applying the rule of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, that no part of Nueva Era was included by R.A. No. 3753 in creating Marcos. 17

The SP ratiocinated that if Marcos was to be bounded by Mt. Province, it would encroach upon a
portion, not only of Nueva Era but also of Abra. Thus:

x x x Even granting, for the sake of argument, that the eastern boundary of Marcos is indeed
Mountain Province, Marcos will then be claiming a portion of Abra because the province,
specifically Barangay Sto. Niño, Nueva Era, is actually bounded on the East by the Province of
Abra. Abra is situated between and separates the Provinces of Ilocos Norte and Mountain
Province.
 This is precisely what this body would like to avoid. Statutes should be construed in the light of
the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given
such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief and secure the benefits
intended.18 (Citations omitted)

The SP further explained:

Invariably, it is not the letter, but the spirit of the law and the intent of the legislature that is
important. When the interpretation of the statute according to the exact and literal import of its
words would lead to absurdity, it should be construed according to the spirit and reason,
disregarding if necessary the letters of the law. It is believed that congress did not intend to
have this absurd situation to be created when it created the Municipality of Marcos. This body,
by the mandate given to it by the RA 7160 otherwise known Local Government Code, so
believes that respondent Nueva Era or any portion thereof has been excluded from the ambit
of RA 3753. Under the principle of "espressio (sic) unios (sic) est exclusio alterius," by
expressly naming the barangays that will comprise the town of Marcos, those not mentioned
are deemed excluded. In Republic Act 4354, where Section 2 thereof enumerated the barrios
comprising the City of Davao excluding the petitioner Barrio Central as part of the said City, the
court held that there arose a prima facie conclusion that the said law abolished Barrio Central
as part of Davao City.

Historically, the hinterlands of Nueva Era have been known to be the home of our brothers and
sisters belonging to peculiar groups of non-(C)hristian inhabitants with their own rich customs
and traditions and this body takes judicial notice that the inhabitants of Nueva Era have
proudly claimed to be a part of this rich culture. With this common ancestral heritage which
unfortunately is absent with Marcos, let it not be disturbed.19 (Emphasis ours and citations
omitted)

RTC Decision

On appeal by Marcos, the RTC affirmed the decision of the SP in its decision 20 of March 19, 2001.
The dispositive part of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of

the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte is hereby AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.21

The RTC reasoned out in this wise:

The position of the Municipality of Marcos is that the provision of R.A. 3753 as regards its
boundary on the East which is the "Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province" should prevail.

On the other hand, the Municipality of Nueva Era posits the theory that only the barrios of the
Municipality of Dingras as stated in R.A. 3753 should be included in the territorial jurisdiction of
the Municipality of Marcos. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan agreed with the position of Nueva
Era.

xxxx
 An examination of the Congressional Records during the deliberations of the R.A. 3753
(House Bill No. 3721) shows the Explanatory Note of Congressman Simeon M. Valdez,
2nd District, Ilocos Norte, to wit:

EXPLANATORY NOTE

This bill seeks to create in the Province of Ilocos Norte a new municipality to be known
as the Municipality of Marcos, to be comprised by the present barrios of Capariaan,
Biding Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit, all in the Municipality of Dingras of
the same province. The seat of government will be in the sitio of San Magro in the
present barrio of Ragas.

xxxx

On the other hand, the Municipality of Dingras will not be adversely affected too much
because its finances will still be sound and stable. Its capacity to comply with its
obligations, especially to its employees and personnel, will not be diminished nor its
operations paralyzed. On the contrary, economic development in both the mother and
the proposed municipalities will be accelerated.

In view of the foregoing, approval of this bill is earnestly requested.

(Sgd.) SIMEON M. VALDEZ

Congressman, 2nd District
Ilocos Norte22

Parenthetically, the legislative intent was for the creation of the Municipality of Marcos,
Ilocos Norte from the barrios (barangays) of the Municipality of Dingras, Ilocos Norte
only. Hence, the Municipality of Marcos cannot add any area beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of the Municipality of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. This conclusion might have been
different only if the area being claimed by the Municipality of Marcos is within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Dingras and not the Municipality of Nueva
Era. In such case, the two conflicting provisions may be harmonized by including such
area within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Dingras as within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Municipality of Marcos.23 (Emphasis ours)

CA Disposition

Still determined to have a more extensive eastern boundary, Marcos filed a petition for review24 of the
RTC decision before the CA. The issues raised by Marcos before the CA were:

1. Whether or not the site of Hercules Minerals and Oil, Inc. which is within a Government
Forest Reservation in Barangay Sto. Niño, formerly of Nueva Era, is a part of the newly
created Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte.

2. Whether or not the portion of Barangay Sto. Niño on the East which is separated from
Nueva Era as a result of the full implementation of the boundaries of the new Municipality of
Marcos belongs also to Marcos or to Nueva Era.25

The twin issues involved two portions of Nueva Era, viz.: (1) middle portion, where Hercules Minerals
and Oil, Inc. is located; and (2) northern portion of Nueva Era, which, according to Marcos, was
isolated from Nueva Era in view of the integration to Marcos of said middle portion.
Marcos prayed before the CA that the above two portions of Nueva Era be declared as part of its own
territory. It alleged that it was entitled to the middle portion of Nueva Era in view of the description of
Marcos' eastern boundary under R.A. No. 3753. Marcos likewise contended that it was entitled to the
northern portion of Nueva Era which was allegedly isolated from Nueva Era when Marcos was
created. It posited that such isolation of territory was contrary to law because the law required that a
municipality must have a compact and contiguous territory.26

In a Decision27 dated June 6, 2005, the CA partly reversed the RTC decision with the following
disposition:

WHEREFORE, we partially GRANT the petition treated as one for certiorari. The Decisions
of both the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Regional Trial Court of Ilocos
Norte are REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they made the eastern boundary of the
municipality of Marcos co-terminous with the eastern boundary of Dingras town, and another is
rendered extending the said boundary of Marcos to the boundary line between the province of
Ilocos Norte and Kalinga-Apayao, but the same Decisions are AFFIRMED with respect to the
denial of the claim of Marcos to the detached northern portion of barangay Sto. Niño which
should, as it is hereby ordered to, remain with the municipality of Nueva Era. No costs.

SO ORDERED.28

In concluding that the eastern boundary of Marcos was the boundary line between Ilocos Norte and
Kalinga-Apayao, the CA gave the following explanation:

Clearly then, both the SP and the RTC erred when they ruled that the eastern boundary of Marcos is
only coterminous with the eastern boundary of the adjacent municipality of Dingras and refused to
extend it up to the boundary line between the provinces of Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province
(Kalinga-Apayao). R.A. No. 3753, the law creating Marcos, is very explicit and leaves no room for
equivocation that the boundaries of Marcos town are:

"On the Northwest by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barrios
Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the Northeast,
by the Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios Agunit and
Naglayaan; on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South
by the Padsan River, which is at the same time the boundary between the municipalities
of Banna and Dingras; on the West and Southwest by the boundary between the
municipalities of Batac and Dingras."

To stop short at the eastern boundary of Dingras as the eastern boundary also of Marcos and
refusing to go farther to the boundary line between Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province
(Kalinga-Apayao) is tantamount to amending the law which Congress alone can do. Both the
SP and RTC have no competence to undo a valid act of Congress.

It is not correct to say that Congress did not intend to take away any part of Nueva Era and
merge it with Marcos for it is chargeable with conclusive knowledge that when it provided that
the eastern boundary of Marcos is the boundary line between Ilocos Norte and Mountain
Province, (by the time of both the SB and RTC Decision was already Kalinga-Apayao), it would
be cutting through a portion of Nueva Era. As the law is written so must it be applied. Dura lex
sed lex!29
The CA likewise held that the province Abra was not located between Marcos and Kalinga-Apayao;
and that Marcos would not encroach upon a portion of Abra for it to be bounded by Kalinga-Apayao,
to wit:

Nueva Era's contention that to lay out the eastern jurisdiction of Marcos to the boundary line
between Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province (Kalinga-Apayao) would mean annexing part of
the municipality of Itnig, province of Abra to Marcos as Abra is between Ilocos Norte and
Mountain Province is geographically erroneous. From Nueva Era's own map of Region 1,
which also depicts the locations of Kalinga-Apayao, Abra, Mountain Province, Benguet and
Nueva Vizcaya after the partition of the old Mountain Province into the provinces of Kalinga-
Apayao, Ifugao, Mountain Province and Benguet, the province of Abra is situated far to the
south of Kalinga Apayao and is between the latter and the present Mountain Province, which is
farther south of Abra. Abra is part of the eastern boundary of Ilocos Sur while Kalinga-Apayao
is the eastern boundary of Ilocos Norte. Hence, in no way will the eastern boundary of the
municipality of Marcos encroach upon a portion of Abra.30

However, Marcos' claim over the alleged isolated northern portion of Nueva Era was denied. The CA
ruled:

Going now to the other area involved, i.e., the portion of Sto. Niño that is separated from its
mother town Nueva Era and now lies east of the municipalities of Solsona and Dingras and
north of Marcos, it bears stressing that it is not included within the area of Marcos as defined
by law. But since it is already detached from Sto. Niño, Marcos is laying claim to it to be
integrated into its territory by the SP because it is contiguous to a portion of said municipality.

We hold that the SP has no jurisdiction or authority to act on the claim, for it will necessarily
substantially alter the north eastern and southern boundaries of Marcos from that defined by
law and unduly enlarge its area. Only Congress can do that. True, the SP may substantially
alter the boundary of a barangay within its jurisdiction. But this means the alteration of the
boundary of a barangay in relation to another barangay within the same municipality for as
long as that will not result in any change in the boundary of that municipality. The area in
dispute therefore remains to be a part of Sto. Niño, a barangay of Nueva Era although
separated by the newly created Marcos town pursuant to Section 7(c) of the 1991 Local
Government Code which states:

SEC. 7. Creation and Conversion. - As a general rule, the creation of a local

government unit or its conversion from one level to another shall be based on verifiable
indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:

xxxx

(c) Land Area. - It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or more islands or is
separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly identified
by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such
basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace. 31

The CA also expressed the view that Marcos adopted the wrong mode of appeal in bringing the case
to it. The case, according to the CA, was appealable only to the RTC. Nonetheless, despite its
pronouncement that the case was dismissible, the CA took cognizance of the same by treating it as
one for certiorari, to wit:
 A final word. At the outset, we agonized over the dilemma of choosing between dismissing
outright the petition at bar or entertaining it. This is for the simple reason that a petition for
review is a mode of appeal and is not appropriate as the Local Government Code provides for
the remedy of appeal in boundary disputes only to the Regional Trial Court but not any further
appeal to this Court. Appeal is a purely statutory right. It cannot be exercised unless it is
expressly granted by law. This is too basic to require the citation of supporting authority.

xxxx

By the same token, since the Local Government Code does not explicitly grant the right of
further appeal from decisions of the RTCs in boundary disputes between or among local
government units, Marcos town cannot exercise that right from the adverse decision of the
RTC of Ilocos Norte. Nonetheless, because of the transcendental legal and jurisdictional
issues involved, we solved our inceptive dilemma by treating the petition at bar as a special
civil action for certiorari.32

Nueva Era was not pleased with the decision of the CA. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.

Issues

Nueva Era now raises the following issues:

a) Whether or not, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction on the Petition for Review on Appeal,
since Sec. 119 of the Local Government Code, which provides that "An appeal to the Decision
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is exclusively vested to the Regional Trial Court, without
further Appeal to the Court of Appeals";

b) Whether or not, the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion, in treating the Petition
for Review On Appeal, filed under Rule 45, Revised Rules of Court, as a Petition
for Certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court;

c) Whether or not, the Court of Appeals erred in its appreciation of facts, in declaring that
MARCOS East is not coterminous with the Eastern boundary of its mother town-Dingras. That
it has no factual and legal basis to extend MARCOS territory beyond Brgys. Agunit (Ferdinand)
and Culao (Elizabeth) of Marcos, and to go further East, by traversing and
disintegrating Brgy. Sto. Niño, and drawing parallel lines from Sto. Niño, there lies Abra, not
Mt. Province or Kalinga-Apayao.33

Basically, there are two (2) issues to resolve here: (1) whether or not the mode of appeal adopted by
Marcos in bringing the case to the CA is proper; and (2) whether or not the eastern boundary of
Marcos extends over and covers a portion of Nueva Era.

Our Ruling

Marcos correctly appealed the RTC judgment via petition for review under Rule 42.

Under Section 118(b) of the Local Government Code, "(b)oundary disputes involving two (2) or more
municipalities within the same province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang
panlalawigan concerned." The dispute shall be formally tried by the said sanggunian in case the
disputing municipalities fail to effect an amicable settlement.34
The SP of Ilocos validly took cognizance of the dispute between the parties. The appeal of the SP
judgment to the RTC was likewise properly filed by Marcos before the RTC. The problem, however,
lies in whether the RTC judgment may still be further appealed to the CA.

The CA pronounced that the RTC decision on the boundary dispute was not appealable to it. It ruled
that no further appeal of the RTC decision may be made pursuant to Section 119 of the Local
Government Code35 which provides:

SECTION 119. Appeal. - Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any
party may elevate the decision of the sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court
having jurisdiction over the area in dispute. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the appeal
within one (1) year from the filing thereof. Pending final resolution of the disputed area prior to
the dispute shall be maintained and continued for all legal purposes.

The CA concluded that since only the RTC was mentioned as appellate court, the case may no
longer be further appealed to it. The CA stated that "(a)ppeal is a purely statutory right. It cannot be
exercised unless it is expressly granted by law. This is too basic to require the citation of supporting
authority."36

The CA, however, justified its taking cognizance of the case by declaring that: "because of the
transcendental legal and jurisdictional issues involved, we solved our inceptive dilemma by treating
the petition at bar as a special civil action for certiorari."37

The CA erred in declaring that only the RTC has appellate jurisdiction over the judgment of the SP.

True, appeal is a purely statutory right and it cannot be exercised unless it is expressly granted by
law. Nevertheless, the CA can pass upon the petition for review precisely because the law allows it.

Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by R.A.
No. 7902,38 vests in the CA the appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, among others.39 B.P. Blg. 129 has been further supplemented by the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides for the remedy of appeal via petition for review under
Rule 42 to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

Thus, the CA need not treat the appeal via petition for review filed by Marcos as a petition
for certiorari to be able to pass upon the same. B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which is supplemented by
Rule 42 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, gives the CA the authority to entertain appeals of such
judgments and final orders rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

At the time of creation of Marcos, approval in a plebiscite of the creation of a local government
unit is not required.

Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.40

The purpose of the above constitutional provision was acknowledged by the Court through Justice
Reynato S. Puno in Miranda v. Aguirre,41 where it was held that:
 The 1987 Constitution, more than any of our previous Constitutions, gave more reality to the
sovereignty of our people for it was borne out of the people power in the 1986 EDSA
revolution. Its Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable practice in the past whereby
local government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis of the vagaries
of politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the consent of the people of the local
government unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism to any
exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries
of local government units. It is one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity
decide on a matter that affects them - direct democracy of the people as opposed to
democracy thru people's representatives. This plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the
philosophy of the Constitution granting more autonomy to local government units. 42

Nueva Era contends that the constitutional and statutory43 plebiscite requirement for the creation of a
local government unit is applicable to this case. It posits that the claim of Marcos to its territory should
be denied due to lack of the required plebiscite.

We agree with Nueva Era's contention that Marcos' claim over parts of its territory is not tenable.
However, the reason is not the lack of the required plebiscite under the 1987 and 1973 constitutions
and the Local Government Code of 1991 but other reasons as will be discussed below.

At the time Marcos was created, a plebiscite was not required by law to create a local government
unit. Hence, Marcos was validly created without conducting a plebiscite. As a matter of fact, no
plebiscite was conducted in Dingras, where it was derived.

Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward.44 It is the basic norm that provisions
of the fundamental law should be given prospective application only, unless legislative intent for its
retroactive application is so provided.45

In the comparable case of Ceniza v. Commission on Elections46 involving the City of Mandaue, the
Court has this to say:

Petitioners assail the charter of the City of Mandaue as unconstitutional for not having been
ratified by the residents of the city in a plebiscite. This contention is untenable. The
Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the
boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new
requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in
character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into
existence on June 21, 1969.47 (Citations omitted and underlining supplied).

Moreover, by deciding this case, We are not creating Marcos but merely interpreting the law that
created it. Its creation was already a fait accompli. Therefore, there is no reason for Us to further
require a plebiscite.

As pointed out by Justice Isagani Cruz, to wit:

Finally, it should be observed that the provisions of the Constitution should be given only a
prospective application unless the contrary is clearly intended. Were the rule otherwise, rights
already acquired or vested might be unduly disturbed or withdrawn even in the absence of an
unmistakable intention to place them within the scope of the Constitution. 48

No part of Nueva Era's territory was taken for the creation of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753.
Only the barrios (now barangays) of Dingras from which Marcos obtained its territory are named in
R.A. No. 3753. To wit:

SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit in
the Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from the said
municipality and constituted into a new and separate municipality to be known as the
Municipality of Marcos, with the following boundaries:

Since only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos' source of territory, Nueva Era's
territory is, therefore, excluded.

Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion
of another thing not mentioned. If a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate,
everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and effect. 49 This
rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and natural workings of
the human mind.50

Had the legislature intended other barangays from Nueva Era to become part of Marcos, it could
have easily done so by clear and concise language. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain
matters, it may not by interpretation or construction be extended to other matters. 51 The rule proceeds
from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had
the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.52

Moreover, since the barangays of Nueva Era were not mentioned in the enumeration
of barangays out of which the territory of Marcos shall be set, their omission must be held to have
been done intentionally. This conclusion finds support in the rule of casus omissus pro omisso
habendus est, which states that a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held
to have been omitted intentionally.53

Furthermore, this conclusion on the intention of the legislature is bolstered by the explanatory note of
the bill which paved the way for the creation of Marcos. Said explanatory note mentioned only
Dingras as the mother municipality of Marcos.

Where there is ambiguity in a statute, as in this case, courts may resort to the explanatory note to
clarify the ambiguity and ascertain the purpose and intent of the statute. 54

Despite the omission of Nueva Era as a mother territory in the law creating Marcos, the latter still
contends that said law included Nueva Era. It alleges that based on the description of its boundaries,
a portion of Nueva Era is within its territory.

The boundaries of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 read:

On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barrios
Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by the
Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East, by
the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by the Padsan River which is at the
same time the boundary between the municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and
Southwest, by the boundary between the municipalities of Batac and Dingras.

Marcos contends that since it is "bounded on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary," a
portion of Nueva Era formed part of its territory because, according to it, Nueva Era is between the
Marcos and Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary. Marcos posits that in order for its eastern side to
reach the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary, it will necessarily traverse the middle portion of Nueva
Era.

Marcos further claims that it is entitled not only to the middle portion of Nueva Era but also to its
northern portion which, as a consequence, was isolated from the major part of Nueva Era.

We cannot accept the contentions of Marcos.

Only Dingras is specifically named by law as source territory of Marcos. Hence, the said description
of boundaries of Marcos is descriptive only of the listed barangays of Dingras as a compact and
contiguous territory.

Considering that the description of the eastern boundary of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 is
ambiguous, the same must be interpreted in light of the legislative intent.

The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application. 55 We thus
uphold the legislative intent to create Marcos out of the territory of Dingras only.

Courts must give effect to the general legislative intent that can be discovered from or is unraveled by
the four corners of the statute, and in order to discover said intent, the whole statute, and not only a
particular provision thereof, should be considered.56 Every section, provision or clause of the statute
must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the
legislature. The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law, and
every part of the act is to be taken into view.57

It is axiomatic that laws should be given a reasonable interpretation, not one which defeats the very
purpose for which they were passed. This Court has in many cases involving the construction of
statutes always cautioned against narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat the purpose of the
legislature and stressed that it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid
such a deplorable result (of injustice or absurdity) and that therefore "a literal interpretation is to be
rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results."58

Statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be
remedied. Thus, in construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the
statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may
consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. 59

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is

partly REVERSED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Ilocos Norte is Reinstated.

ESJUDEM GENERIS

G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970

AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Amelito R. Mutuc in his own behalf.

Romulo C. Felizmena for respondent.

FERNANDO, J.:

The invocation of his right to free speech by petitioner Amelito Mutuc, then a candidate for delegate to
the Constitutional Convention, in this special civil action for prohibition to assail the validity of a ruling
of respondent Commission on Elections enjoining the use of a taped jingle for campaign purposes,
was not in vain. Nor could it be considering the conceded absence of any express power granted to
respondent by the Constitutional Convention Act to so require and the bar to any such implication
arising from any provision found therein, if deference be paid to the principle that a statute is to be
construed consistently with the fundamental law, which accords the utmost priority to freedom of
expression, much more so when utilized for electoral purposes. On November 3, 1970, the very same
day the case was orally argued, five days after its filing, with the election barely a week away, we
issued a minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition prayed for. This opinion is intended to
explain more fully our decision.

In this special civil action for prohibition filed on October 29, 1970, petitioner, after setting forth his
being a resident of Arayat, Pampanga, and his candidacy for the position of delegate to the
Constitutional Convention, alleged that respondent Commission on Elections, by a telegram sent to
him five days previously, informed him that his certificate of candidacy was given due course but
prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers,
an order which, according to him, is "violative of [his] constitutional right ... to freedom of
speech."1 There being no plain, speedy and adequate remedy, according to petitioner, he would seek
a writ of prohibition, at the same time praying for a preliminary injunction. On the very next day, this
Court adopted a resolution requiring respondent Commission on Elections to file an answer not later
than November 2, 1970, at the same time setting the case for hearing for Tuesday November 3,
1970. No preliminary injunction was issued. There was no denial in the answer filed by respondent on
November 2, 1970, of the factual allegations set forth in the petition, but the justification for the
prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, 2which made it unlawful
for candidates "to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda
gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials,
wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign
origin."3 It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped
voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the above statute subject to
confiscation. It prayed that the petition be denied for lack of merit. The case was argued, on
November 3, 1970, with petitioner appearing in his behalf and Attorney Romulo C. Felizmena arguing
in behalf of respondent.

This Court, after deliberation and taking into account the need for urgency, the election being barely a
week away, issued on the afternoon of the same day, a minute resolution granting the writ of
prohibition, setting forth the absence of statutory authority on the part of respondent to impose such a
ban in the light of the doctrine of ejusdem generis as well as the principle that the construction placed
on the statute by respondent Commission on Elections would raise serious doubts about its validity,
considering the infringement of the right of free speech of petitioner. Its concluding portion was
worded thus: "Accordingly, as prayed for, respondent Commission on Elections is permanently
restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid
order banning the use of political jingles by candidates. This resolution is immediately executory." 4

1. As made clear in our resolution of November 3, 1970, the question before us was one of power.
Respondent Commission on Elections was called upon to justify such a prohibition imposed on
petitioner. To repeat, no such authority was granted by the Constitutional Convention Act. It did
contend, however, that one of its provisions referred to above makes unlawful the distribution of
electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods
or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words
"and the like."5 For respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify such an order. We
view the matter differently. What was done cannot merit our approval under the well-known principle
of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of
the same kind or class as those specifically referred to.6 It is quite apparent that what was
contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of
inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.

The more serious objection, however, to the ruling of respondent Commission was its failure to
manifest fealty to a cardinal principle of construction that a statute should be interpreted to assure its
being in consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any constitutional command or
prescription.7 Thus, certain Administrative Code provisions were given a "construction which should
be more in harmony with the tenets of the fundamental law." 8 The desirability of removing in that
fashion the taint of constitutional infirmity from legislative enactments has always commended itself.
The judiciary may even strain the ordinary meaning of words to avert any collision between what a
statute provides and what the Constitution requires. The objective is to reach an interpretation
rendering it free from constitutional defects. To paraphrase Justice Cardozo, if at all possible, the
conclusion reached must avoid not only that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that
score.9

2. Petitioner's submission of his side of the controversy, then, has in its favor obeisance to such a
cardinal precept. The view advanced by him that if the above provision of the Constitutional
Convention Act were to lend itself to the view that the use of the taped jingle could be prohibited, then
the challenge of unconstitutionality would be difficult to meet. For, in unequivocal language, the
Constitution prohibits an abridgment of free speech or a free press. It has been our constant holding
that this preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the
dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. What
respondent Commission did, in effect, was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil against which
this constitutional right is directed. Nor could respondent Commission justify its action by the
assertion that petitioner, if he would not resort to taped jingle, would be free, either by himself or
through others, to use his mobile loudspeakers. Precisely, the constitutional guarantee is not to be
emasculated by confining it to a speaker having his say, but not perpetuating what is uttered by him
through tape or other mechanical contrivances. If this Court were to sustain respondent Commission,
then the effect would hardly be distinguishable from a previous restraint. That cannot be validly done.
It would negate indirectly what the Constitution in express terms assures. 10

3. Nor is this all. The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for
the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is
a postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority
accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments of
government in the discharge of the functions with which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield
obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in the
enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority, whether substantive
or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard
what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is
called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial
review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is
a logical corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any
governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being
the supreme law.

To be more specific, the competence entrusted to respondent Commission was aptly summed up by
the present Chief Justice thus: "Lastly, as the branch of the executive department — although
independent of the President — to which the Constitution has given the 'exclusive charge' of the
'enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections,' the power of decision
of the Commission is limited to purely 'administrative questions.'" 11 It has been the constant holding
of this Court, as it could not have been otherwise, that respondent Commission cannot exercise any
authority in conflict with or outside of the law, and there is no higher law than the Constitution. 12 Our
decisions which liberally construe its powers are precisely inspired by the thought that only thus may
its responsibility under the Constitution to insure free, orderly and honest elections be adequately
fulfilled. 13 There could be no justification then for lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from
respondent Commission, the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free
speech. Petitioner's case, as was obvious from the time of its filing, stood on solid footing.

WHEREFORE, as set forth in our resolution of November 3, 1970, respondent Commission is

permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with
its aforesaid order banning the use of political taped jingles. Without pronouncement as to costs.

ESJUDEM GENERIS

[G.R. No. 5000. March 11, 1909. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VICTOR SANTO NIÑO, Defendant-Appellee.

Attorney-General Villamor, for Appellant.

No appearance, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION’ FIREARMS; CONCEALED WEAPONS NOT PARTICULARLY

SPECIFIED. — The phrase "or other deadly weapon" in Act No. 1780, an Act prohibiting the carrying
of concealed weapons, includes arms which are of a different class from those particularly specified
in the law.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE OF "EJUSDEM GENERIS." — The rule of ejusdem generis can not be applied
in the construction of Act No. 1780, by reason of the proviso contained therein.

DECISION

WILLARD, J. :

Act No. 1780 is entitled as follows: "An Act to regulate the importation, acquisition, possession, use,
and transfer of firearms, and to prohibit the possession of same except in compliance with the
provisions of this Act."cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 26 of this Act is in part as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It shall be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any bowie knife, dirk, dagger,
kris, or other deadly weapon: Provided, That this prohibition shall not apply to firearms in possession
of persons who have secured a license therefor or who are entitled to carry same under the
provisions of this Act."cralaw virtua1aw library

The amended complaint in this case is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The undersigned accuses Victor Santo Nino of the violation of Act No. 1780, committed as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about the 16th day of August, 1908, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said
Victor Santo Nino, voluntarily, unlawfully, and criminally, had in his possession and concealed about
his person a deadly weapon, to wit: One (1) iron bar, about 15 inches in length provided with an iron
ball on one end and a string on the other to tie to the wrist, which weapon had been designed and
made for use in fighting, and as a deadly weapon.

"With violation of the provisions of section 26 of Act No. 1780 of the Philippine Commission."cralaw
virtua1aw library

A demurrer to this complaint was sustained in the court below the Government has appealed.

The basis for the holding of the court below was that —

"The words or other deadly weapon’ only signify a kind of weapon included within the preceding
classification. In other words, the rule of ejusdem generis must be applied in the interpretation of this
law, which rule is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"‘The most frequent application of this rule is found where specific and generic terms of the same
nature are employed in the same act, the latter following the former. While in the abstract, general
terms are to be given their natural and full signification, yet where they follow specific words of a like
nature they take their meaning from the latter, and are presumed to embrace only things or persons
of the kind designated by them.’"

In short, the court below held that the carrying of a revolver concealed about the person would not be
a violation of this Act. The rule of construction above referred to is resorted to only for the purpose of
determining what the intent of the legislature was in enacting the law. If that intent clearly appears
from other parts of the law, and such intent thus clearly manifested is contrary to the result which
would reached by application of the rule of ejusdem generis, the latter must give way. In this case the
proviso of the Act clearly indicates that in the view of the legislature the carrying of an unlicensed
revolver would be a violation of the Act. By the proviso it manifested its intention to include in the
prohibition weapons other than the armas blancas therein specified.

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

ESJUDEM GENERIS

G.R. No. 119122 August 8, 2000

PHILIPPINE BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, AND COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondents.

PURISIMA, J.:

At bar is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a review of the
decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 34095 which affirmed the decision of the Court
of Tax Appeals in C.T.A. Case No. 4419.

The facts that matter are as follows:

On June 21, 1989, the petitioner received an assessment letter from the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (respondent Commissioner) for the payment of deficiency amusement tax computed thus:

Deficiency Amusement
Tax

Total gross receipts 1987 P19,970,928.00

===========

15% tax due thereon 2,995,639.20

Less: Tax paid 602,063.35

Deficiency amusement tax P2,393,575.85

Add: 75% surcharge 1,795,181.89

20% interest (2 years) 1,675,503.10

P5,864,260.84

Total Amount Due & ===========

Collectible

On July 18, 1989, petitioner contested the assessment by filing a protest with respondent
Commissioner who denied the same on November 6, 1989.

On January 8, 1990, petitioner filed a petition for review2 with the Court of Tax Appeals (respondent
CTA) questioning the denial by respondent Commissioner of its tax protest.

On December 24, 1993, respondent CTA dismissed petitioner's petition, holding:

"WHEREFORE, in all the foregoing, herein petition for review is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit and the Petitioner is hereby ORDERED to PAY to the Respondent the amount of
P5,864,260.84 as deficiency amusement tax for the year 1987 plus 20% annual delinquency
interest from July 22, 1989 which is the due date appearing on the notice and demand of the
 Commissioner (i.e. 30 days from receipt of the assessment) until fully paid pursuant to the
provisions of Sections 248 and 249 (c) (3) of the Tax Code, as amended."3

Petitioner presented a motion for reconsideration4 of the said decision but the same was denied by
respondent CTA in a resolution5 ALF dated April 8, 1994. Thereafter and within the reglementary
period for interposing appeals, petitioner appealed the CTA decision to the Court of Appeals.

On November 21, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered its questioned Decision, 6 affirming the
decision of the CTA and dismissing petitioner's appeal. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of said decision but to no avail. The same was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution 7 dated
January 31, 1995. Hence, this petition.1âwphi1.nêt

Undaunted, petitioner found its way to this Court via the present petition, contending that:

"1. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the jurisdiction to collect amusement
taxes of PBA games is vested in the national government to the exclusion of the local
governments.

"2. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that Section 13 of the Local Tax Code of
1973 limits local government units to theaters, cinematographs, concert halls, circuses and
other places of amusement in the collection of the amusement tax.

"3. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that Revenue Regulations No. 8-88 dated
February 19, 1988 is an erroneous interpretation of law.

"4. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in giving retroactive effect to the revocation of Revenue
Regulations 8-88.

"5. Respondent Court of Appeals erred when it failed to consider the provisions of P.D. 851 the
franchise of Petitioner, Section 8 of which provides that amusement tax on admission receipts
of Petitioner is 5%.

"6. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the cession of advertising and streamer
spaces in the venue to a third person is subject to amusement taxes.

"7. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the cession of advertising and streamer
spaces inside the venue is embraced within the term 'gross receipts' as defined in Section 123
(6) of the Tax Code.

"8. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the amusement tax liability of Petitioner
is subject to a 75% surcharge."

The issues for resolution in this case may be simplified as follows:

1. Is the amusement tax on admission tickets to PBA games a national or local tax? Otherwise put,
who between the national government and local government should petitioner pay amusement taxes?

2. Is the cession of advertising and streamer spaces to Vintage Enterprises, Inc. (VEI) subject to the
payment of amusement tax?
3. If ever petitioner is liable for the payment of deficiency amusement tax, is it liable to pay a seventy-
five percent (75%) surcharge on the deficiency amount due?

Petitioner contends that PD 231, otherwise known as the Local Tax Code of 1973, transferred the
power and authority to levy and collect amusement taxes from the sale of admission tickets to places
of amusement from the national government to the local governments. Petitioner cited BIR
Memorandum Circular No. 49-73 providing that the power to levy and collect amusement tax on
admission tickets was transferred to the local governments by virtue of the Local Tax Code; and BIR
Ruling No. 231-86 which held that "the jurisdiction to levy amusement tax on gross receipts from
admission tickets to places of amusement was transferred to local governments under P.D. No. 231,
as amended."8 Further, petitioner opined that even assuming arguendo that respondent
Commissioner revoked BIR Ruling No. 231-86, the reversal, modification or revocation cannot be
given retroactive effect since even as late as 1988 (BIR Memorandum Circular No. 8-88), respondent
Commissioner still recognized the jurisdiction of local governments to collect amusement taxes.

The Court is not persuaded by petitioner's asseverations.

The laws on the matter are succinct and clear and need no elaborate disquisition. Section 13 of the
Local Tax Code provides:

"SECTION 13. Amusement tax on admission. — The province shall impose a tax on admission
to be collected from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinematographs, concert
halls, circuses and other places of amusement . . ."

The foregoing provision of law in point indicates that the province can only impose a tax on admission
from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinematographs, concert halls, circuses and
other places of amusement. The authority to tax professional basketball games is not therein
included, as the same is expressly embraced in PD 1959, which amended PD 1456 thus:

"SECTION 44. Section 268 of this Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:

'Sec. 268. Amusement taxes. — There shall be collected from the proprietor, lessee or
operator of cockpits, cabarets, night or day clubs, boxing exhibitions, professional
basketball games, Jai-Alai, race tracks and bowling alleys, a tax equivalent to:

'1. Eighteen per centum in the case of cockpits;

'2. Eighteen per centum in the case of cabarets, night or day clubs;

'3. Fifteen per centum in the case of boxing exhibitions;

'4. Fifteen per centum in the case of professional basketball games as envisioned in
Presidential Decree No. 871. Provided, however. That the tax herein shall be in lieu of
all other percentage taxes of whatever nature and description;

'5. Thirty per centum in the case of Jai-Alai and race tracks; and

'6. Fifteen per centum in the case of bowling alleys of their gross receipts, irrespective of
whether or not any amount is charged or paid for admission. For the purpose of the
amusement tax, the term gross receipts' embraces all the receipts of the proprietor,
 lessee or operator of the amusement place. Said gross receipts also include income
from television, radio and motion picture rights, if any. (A person or entity or association
conducting any activity subject to the tax herein imposed shall be similarly liable for said
tax with respect to such portion of the receipts derived by him or it.)

'The taxes imposed herein shall be payable at the end of each quarter and it shall be
the duty of the proprietor, lessee, or operator concerned, as well as any party liable,
within twenty days after the end of each quarter, to make a true and complete return of
the amount of the gross receipts derived during the preceding quarter and pay the tax
due thereon. If the tax is not paid within the time prescribed above, the amount of the
tax shall be increased by twenty-five per centum, the increment to be part of the tax.

'In case of willful neglect to file the return within the period prescribed herein, or in case
a false or fraudulent return is willfully made, there shall be added to the tax or to the
deficiency tax, in case any payment has been made on the basis of the return before
the discovery of the falsity or fraud, a surcharge of fifty per centum of its amount. The
amount so added to any tax shall be collected at the same time and in the same
manner and as part of the tax unless the tax has been paid before the discovery of the
falsity or fraud, in which case, the amount so assessed shall be collected in the same
manner as the tax." (emphasis ours)

From the foregoing it is clear that the "proprietor, lessee or operator of . . . professional basketball
games" is required to pay an amusement tax equivalent to fifteen per centum (15%) of their gross
receipts to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, which payment is a national tax. The said payment of
amusement tax is in lieu of all other percentage taxes of whatever nature and description.

While Section 13 of the Local Tax Code mentions "other places of amusement", professional
basketball games are definitely not within its scope. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where
general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as
applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. 9 Thus, in
determining the meaning of the phrase "other places of amusement", one must refer to the prior
enumeration of theaters, cinematographs, concert halls and circuses with artistic expression as their
common characteristic. Professional basketball games do not fall under the same category as
theaters, cinematographs, concert halls and circuses as the latter basically belong to artistic forms of
entertainment while the former caters to sports and gaming.

A historical analysis of pertinent laws does reveal the legislative intent to place professional
basketball games within the ambit of a national tax. The Local Tax Code, which became effective on
June 28, 1973, allowed the province to collect a tax on admission from the proprietors, lessees, or
operators of theaters, cinematographs, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement. On
January 6, 1976, the operation of petitioner was placed under the supervision and regulation of the
Games and Amusement Board by virtue of PD 871, with the proviso (Section 8) that ". . . all
professional basketball games conducted by the Philippine Basketball Association shall only be
subject to amusement tax of five per cent of the gross receipts from the sale of admission tickets."
Then, on June 11, 1978, PD 1456 came into effect, increasing the amusement tax to ten per cent,
with a categorical referral to PD 871, to wit, "[t]en per centum in the case of professional basketball
games as envisioned in Presidential Decree No. 871 . . ." Later in 1984, PD 1959 increased the rate
of amusement tax to fifteen percent by making reference also to PD 871. With the reference to PD
871 by PD 1456 and PD 1959, there is a recognition under the laws of this country that the
amusement tax on professional basketball games is a national, and not a local, tax. Even up to the
present, the category of amusement taxes on professional basketball games as a national tax
remains the same. This is so provided under Section 125 10 of the 1997 National Internal Revenue
Code. Section 14011 of the Local Government Code of 1992 (Republic Act 7160), meanwhile, retained
the areas (theaters, cinematographs, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement) where
the province may levy an amusement tax without including therein professional basketball games.

Likewise erroneous is the stance of petitioner that respondent Commissioner's issuance of BIR Ruling
No. 231-8612 and BIR Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 8-8813 — both upholding the authority of
the local government to collect amusement taxes — should bind the government or that, if there is
any revocation or modification of said rule, the same should operate prospectively.

It bears stressing that the government can never be in estoppel, particularly in matters involving
taxes. It is a well-known rule that erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers
do not preclude subsequent correct application of the statute, and that the Government is never
estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents.14

Untenable is the contention that income from the cession of streamer and advertising spaces to VEI
is not subject to amusement tax. The questioned proviso may be found in Section 1 of PD 1456 which
states:

"SECTION 1. Section 268 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, as amended, is
hereby further amended to read as follows:

'Sec. 268. Amusement taxes. — There shall be collected from the proprietor, lessee or
operator of cockpits, cabarets, night or day clubs, boxing exhibitions, professional
basketball games, Jai-Alai, race tracks and bowling alleys, a tax equivalent to:

xxx xxx xxx

of their gross receipts, irrespective of whether or not any amount is charged or paid for
admission. For the purpose of the amusement tax, the term gross receipts' embraces all the receipts
of the proprietor, lessee or operator of the amusement place. Said gross receipts also include income
from television, radio and motion picture rights, if any. (A person, or entity or association conducting
any activity subject to the tax herein imposed shall be similarly liable for said tax with respect to such
portion of the receipts derived by him or it.)" (emphasis ours)

The foregoing definition of gross receipts is broad enough to embrace the cession of advertising and
streamer spaces as the same embraces all the receipts of the proprietor, lessee or operator of the
amusement place. The law being clear, there is no need for an extended interpretation. 15

The last issue for resolution concerns the liability of petitioner for the payment of surcharge and
interest on the deficiency amount due. Petitioner contends that it is not liable, as it acted in good faith,
having relied upon the issuances of the respondent Commissioner. This issue must necessarily fail as
the same has never been posed as an issue before the respondent court. Issues not raised in the
court a quo cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.16

All things studiedly considered, the Court rules that the petitioner is liable to pay amusement tax to
the national government, and not to the local government, in accordance with the rates prescribed by
PD 1959.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the Decisions of the Court of Appeals and Court of Tax
Appeals dated November 21, 1994 and December 24, 1993, respectively AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.1âwphi1.nêt
 ESJUDEM GENERIS

G.R. No. 148408 July 14, 2006

CONCEPCION PARAYNO, petitioner,

vs.
JOSE JOVELLANOS and the MUNICIPALITY OF CALASIAO, PANGASINAN,* respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court questioning the
resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed the petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition, with prayer for issuance of a preliminary and mandatory injunction, filed by petitioner
Concepcion Parayno against respondents Jose Jovellanos and the Municipality of Calasiao,
Pangasinan.

Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents
of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or transfer of
the station to another location. The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police,
Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their advise, the
Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of location of petitioner's
gasoline station. In Resolution No. 50, it declared:

a) xxx the existing gasoline station is a blatant violation and disregard of existing law to wit:

The Official Zoning Code of Calasiao, Art. 6, Section 44,1 the nearest school building
which is San Miguel Elementary School and church, the distances are less than 100
meters. No neighbors were called as witnesses when actual measurements were done
by HLURB Staff, Baguio City dated 22 June 1989.

b) The gasoline station remains in thickly populated area with commercial/residential buildings,
houses closed (sic) to each other which still endangers the lives and safety of the people in
case of fire. Moreover, additional selling and storing of several LPG tanks in the station (sic).

c) The residents of our barangay always complain of the irritating smell of gasoline most of the
time especially during gas filling which tend to expose residents especially children to frequent
colds, asthma, cough and the like nowadays.

d) xxx the gasoline station violated Building and Fire Safety Codes because the station has
2nd floor storey building used for business rental offices, with iron grilled windows, no firewalls.
It also endangers the lives of people upstairs.

e) It hampers the flow of traffic, the gasoline station is too small and narrow, the entrance and
exit are closed to the street property lines. It couldn't cope situation (sic) on traffic because the
place is a congested area.2

Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the SB resolution but it was denied. Hence, she filed a
special civil action for prohibition and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan
City, Branch 44 against respondents. The case, docketed as SP Civil Case No. 99-03010-D, was
raffled to the sala of Judge Crispin Laron.

Petitioner claimed that her gasoline station was not covered by Section 44 of the Official Zoning Code
since it was not a "gasoline service station" but a "gasoline filling station" governed by Section 21
thereof. She added that the decision of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), 3 in a
previous case filed by the same respondent Jovellanos against her predecessor (Dennis Parayno),
barred the grounds invoked by respondent municipality in Resolution No. 50. In the HLURB case,
respondent Jovellanos opposed the establishment of the gas station on the grounds that: (1) it was
within the 100-meter prohibited radius under Section 44 and (2) it posed a pernicious effect on the
health and safety of the people in Calasiao.

After the hearing on the propriety of issuing a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction,
the trial court ruled:

There is no basis for the court to issue a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction. Albeit, Section 44 of the Official Zoning Code of respondent municipality does
not mention a gasoline filling station, [but] following the principle of ejusdem generis, a
gasoline filling station falls within the ambit of Section 44.

The gasoline filling station of the petitioner is located under the establishment belonging to the
petitioner and is very near several buildings occupied by several persons. Justice dictates
that the same should not be allowed to continue operating its business on that
particular place. Further, the gasoline filling station endangers the lives and safety of
people because once there is fire, the establishment and houses nearby will be razed to
the ground.4(emphasis supplied)

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the decision but it was denied by the trial court.

Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,5 with a
prayer for injunctive relief. She ascribed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, on the part of Judge Laron who dismissed her case.

After the CA dismissed the petition, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied. Hence, this appeal.

Before us, petitioner insists that (1) the legal maxim of ejusdem generis did not apply to her case; (2)
the closure/transfer of her gasoline filling station by respondent municipality was an invalid exercise of
the latter's police powers and (3) it was the principle of res judicata that applied in this case.6

We find merit in the petition.

The Principle of Ejusdem Generis

We hold that the zoning ordinance of respondent municipality made a clear distinction between
"gasoline service station" and "gasoline filling station." The pertinent provisions read:

xxx xxx xxx

Section 21. Filling Station. A retail station servicing automobiles and other motor vehicles with
gasoline and oil only.7
 xxx xxx xxx

Section 42. Service Station. A building and its premises where gasoline oil, grease, batteries,
tires and car accessories may be supplied and dispensed at retail and where, in addition, the
following services may be rendered and sales and no other.

a. Sale and servicing of spark plugs, batteries, and distributor parts;

b. Tire servicing and repair, but not recapping or regrooving;

c. Replacement of mufflers and tail pipes, water hose, fan belts, brake fluids, light bulbs,
fuses, floor mats, seat covers, windshield wipers and wiper blades, grease retainers,
wheel, bearing, mirrors and the like;

d. Radiator cleaning and flushing;

e. Washing and polishing, and sale of automobile washing and polishing materials;

f. Grease and lubricating;

g. Emergency wiring repairs;

h. Minor servicing of carburators;

i. Adjusting and repairing brakes;

j. Minor motor adjustments not involving removal of the head or crankcase, or raising
the motor.8

xxx xxx xxx

It is evident from the foregoing that the ordinance intended these two terms to be separate and
distinct from each other. Even respondent municipality's counsel admitted this dissimilarity during the
hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction. Counsel in fact admitted:

1. That there exist[ed] an official zoning code of Calasiao, Pangasinan which [was] not yet
amended;

2. That under Article III of said official zoning code there [were] certain distinctions
made by said municipality about the designation of the gasoline filling station and that
of the gasoline service station as appearing in Article III, Nos. 21 and 42, [respectively];

3. That the business of the petitioner [was] one of a gasoline filling station as defined in
Article III, Section 21 of the zoning code and not as a service station as differently
defined under Article 42 of the said official zoning code;

4. That under Section 44 of the official zoning code of Calasiao, the term filling station
as clearly defined under Article III, Section 21, [did] not appear in the wordings
thereof;9(emphasis supplied)
The foregoing were judicial admissions which were conclusive on the municipality, the party making
them.10 Respondent municipality thus could not find solace in the legal maxim of ejusdem
generis11 which means "of the same kind, class or nature." Under this maxim, where general words
follow the enumeration of particular classes of persons or things, the general words will apply only to
persons or things of the same general nature or class as those enumerated. 12 Instead, what applied
in this case was the legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius which means that the express
mention of one thing implies the exclusion of others.13 Hence, because of the distinct and definite
meanings alluded to the two terms by the zoning ordinance, respondents could not insist that
"gasoline service station" under Section 44 necessarily included "gasoline filling station" under
Section 21. Indeed, the activities undertaken in a "gas service station" did not automatically embrace
those in a "gas filling station."

The Exercise of Police Powers

Respondent municipality invalidly used its police powers in ordering the closure/transfer of petitioner's
gasoline station. While it had, under RA 7160,14 the power to take actions and enact measures to
promote the health and general welfare of its constituents, it should have given due deference to the
law and the rights of petitioner.

A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the
following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the interference of the State and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive.15 The first requirement refers to the equal protection clause and the second, to the due
process clause of the Constitution.16

Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due process clause when it passed Resolution No.
50. While it maintained that the gasoline filling station of petitioner was less than 100 meters from the
nearest public school and church, the records do not show that it even attempted to measure the
distance, notwithstanding that such distance was crucial in determining whether there was an actual
violation of Section 44. The different local offices that respondent municipality tapped to conduct an
investigation never conducted such measurement either.

Moreover, petitioner's business could not be considered a nuisance which respondent municipality
could summarily abate in the guise of exercising its police powers. The abatement of a nuisance
without judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas station is not a
nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate safety of persons and property,17 hence, it cannot be
closed down or transferred summarily to another location.

As a rule, this Court does not pass upon evidence submitted by the parties in the lower courts.18 We
deem it necessary, however, to recall the findings of the HLURB which petitioner submitted as
evidence during the proceedings before the trial court, if only to underscore petitioner's compliance
with the requirements of law before she put up her gasoline station.

Another factor that should not be left unnoticed is the diligence exercised by [petitioner] in
complying with the requirements of the several laws prior to the actual implementation of the
project as can be attested by the fact that [petitioner] has secured the necessary building
permit and approval of [her] application for authority to relocate as per the letter of the Energy
Regulatory Board xxx.19

On the alleged hazardous effects of the gasoline station to the lives and properties of the people of
Calasiao, we again note:
 Relative to the allegations that the project (gasoline station) is hazardous to life and property,
the Board takes cognizance of the respondent's contention that the project "is not a fire hazard
since petroleum products shall be safely stored in underground tanks and that the installation
and construction of the underground tanks shall be in accordance with the Caltex Engineering
Procedures which is true to all gasoline stations in the country. xxx

Hence, the Board is inclined to believe that the project being hazardous to life and
property is more perceived than factual. For, after all, even the Fire Station Commander,
after studying the plans and specifications of the subject proposed construction, recommended
on 20 January 1989, "to build such buildings after conform (sic) all the requirements of PP
1185." It is further alleged by the complainants that the proposed location is "in the
heart of the thickly populated residential area of Calasiao." Again, findings of the
[HLURB] staff negate the allegations as the same is within a designated
Business/Commercial Zone per the Zoning Ordinance. xxx20 (emphasis supplied)

The findings of fact of the HLURB are binding as they are already final and conclusive vis-à-vis the
evidence submitted by respondents.

The Principle of Res Judicata

Petitioner points out that the HLURB decision in the previous case filed against her predecessor
(Dennis Parayno) by respondent Jovellanos had effectively barred the issues in Resolution No. 50
based on the principle of res judicata. We agree.

Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and
matters determined in the former suit.21 For res judicata to apply, the following elements must be
present: (1) the judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment must be on the merits; (3) it must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties and (4)
there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause
of action.22

Respondent municipality does not contest the first, second and third requisites. However, it claims
that it was not a party to the HLURB case but only its co-respondent Jovellanos, hence, the fourth
requisite was not met. The argument is untenable.

The absolute identity of parties is not required for the principle of res judicata to apply.23 A shared
identity of interests is sufficient to invoke the application of this principle. 24 The proscription may not
be evaded by the mere expedient of including an additional party. 25 Res judicata may lie as long as
there is a community of interests between a party in the first case and a party in the second case
although the latter may not have been impleaded in the first. 26

In the assailed resolution of respondent municipality, it raised the same grounds invoked by its co-
respondent in the HLURB: (1) that the resolution aimed to close down or transfer the gasoline station
to another location due to the alleged violation of Section 44 of the zoning ordinance and (2) that the
hazards of said gasoline station threatened the health and safety of the public. The HLURB had
already settled these concerns and its adjudication had long attained finality. It is to the interest of the
public that there should be an end to litigation by the parties over a subject matter already fully and
fairly adjudged. Furthermore, an individual should not be vexed twice for the same cause.27

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed resolution of the Court of the Appeals
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Municipality of Calasiao is hereby directed to cease and
desist from enforcing Resolution No. 50 against petitioner insofar as it seeks to close down or transfer
her gasoline station to another location.

CASSUS OMISSUS PRO OMISSO HABENDUS EST

G.R. No. 14129 July 31, 1962

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.

Padilla Law Office for defendant-appellee.

REGALA, J.:

This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
dismissing the information against the defendant.

The records show that the statement of the case and the facts, as recited in the brief of plaintiff-
appellant, is complete and accurate. The same is, consequently, here adopted, to wit:

In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance of
that Province, defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the
finding a probable cause that the crime charged as committed by defendant. Thereafter, the
trial started upon defendant's plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information
on the ground that as justice of the peace the defendant is one of the officers enumerated in
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding
that a justice of the peace is within the purview Section 54. A second motion was filed by
defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs.
Macaraeg, (CA-G.R. No. 15613-R, 54 Off. Gaz., pp. 1873-76) where it was held that a justice
of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
Acting on this second motion to dismiss, the answer of the prosecution, the reply of the
defense, and the opposition of the prosecution, the lower court dismissed the information
against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense.

Both parties are submitting this case upon the determination of this single question of law: Is a justice
the peace included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code?

Section 54 of the said Code reads:

No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the
Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no
classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any
manner in a election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve
public peace, if he is a peace officer.

Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not comprehended among the officers
enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. He submits the aforecited section was taken
from Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, which provided the following:
 SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. — No judge of the First Instance,
justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or employee
of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall
aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part therein
otherwise than exercising the right to vote.

When, therefore, section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words "justice of the peace,"
the omission revealed the intention of the Legislature to exclude justices of the peace from its
operation.

The above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. It is to be noted that under Section 449 of the
Revised Administrative Code, the word "judge" was modified or qualified by the phrase "of First
instance", while under Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, no such modification exists. In other
words, justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative
Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance and justice
of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity therefore to include justices of the
peace in the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader
term, "judge." It was a term not modified by any word or phrase and was intended to comprehend all
kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, Judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations,
judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace.

It is a well known fact that a justice of the peace is sometimes addressed as "judge" in this
jurisdiction. It is because a justice of the peace is indeed a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by
virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority (U.S. v. Clark, 25 Fed. Cas. 441, 422). According
to Bouvier Law Dictionary, "a judge is a public officer lawfully appointed to decide litigated questions
according to law. In its most extensive sense the term includes all officers appointed to decide
litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is
said, who are judges of facts."

A review of the history of the Revised Election Code will help to justify and clarify the above
conclusion.

The first election law in the Philippines was Act 1582 enacted by the Philippine Commission in 1907,
and which was later amended by Act. Nos. 1669, 1709, 1726 and 1768. (Of these 4 amendments,
however, only Act No. 1709 has a relation to the discussion of the instant case as shall be shown
later.) Act No. 1582, with its subsequent 4 amendments were later on incorporated Chapter 18 of the
Administrative Code. Under the Philippine Legislature, several amendments were made through the
passage of Acts Nos. 2310, 3336 and 3387. (Again, of these last 3 amendments, only Act No. 3587
has pertinent to the case at bar as shall be seen later.) During the time of the Commonwealth, the
National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 23 and later on enacted Commonwealth Act No.
357, which was the law enforced until June 1947, when the Revised Election Code was approved.
Included as its basic provisions are the provisions of Commonwealth Acts Nos. 233, 357, 605, 666,
657. The present Code was further amended by Republic Acts Nos. 599, 867, 2242 and again, during
the session of Congress in 1960, amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 3036 and 3038. In the history of our
election law, the following should be noted:

Under Act 1582, Section 29, it was provided:

No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for elections, nor shall he be eligible during
the time that he holds said public office to election at any municipal, provincial or Assembly
election, except for reelection to the position which he may be holding, and no judge of the
First Instance, justice of the peace, provincial fiscal, or officer or employee of the Philippine
 Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or influence in any manner
or take part in any municipal, provincial, or Assembly election under the penalty of being
deprived of his office and being disqualified to hold any public office whatsoever for a term of 5
year: Provide, however, That the foregoing provisions shall not be construe to deprive any
person otherwise qualified of the right to vote it any election." (Enacted January 9, 1907; Took
effect on January 15, 1907.)

Then, in Act 1709, Sec. 6, it was likewise provided:

. . . No judge of the First Instance, Justice of the peace provincial fiscal or officer or employee
of the Bureau of Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or
influence in any manner to take part in any municipal provincial or Assembly election. Any
person violating the provisions of this section shall be deprived of his office or employment and
shall be disqualified to hold any public office or employment whatever for a term of 5 years,
Provided, however, that the foregoing provisions shall not be construed to deprive any person
otherwise qualified of the right to vote at any election. (Enacted on August 31, 1907; Took
effect on September 15, 1907.)

Again, when the existing election laws were incorporated in the Administrative Code on March 10,
1917, the provisions in question read:

SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. — No judge of the First Instance,
justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or employee
of the Philippine Constabulary or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall
aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part therein
otherwise than exercising the right to vote. (Emphasis supplied)

After the Administrative Code, the next pertinent legislation was Act No. 3387. This Act reads:

SEC. 2636. Officers and employees meddling with the election. — Any judge of the First
Instance, justice of the peace, treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province, any officer or
employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of the police of any municipality, or any officer or
employee of any Bureau of the classified civil service, who aids any candidate or violated in
any manner the provisions of this section or takes part in any election otherwise by exercising
the right to vote, shall be punished by a fine of not less than P100.00 nor more than P2,000.00,
or by imprisonment for not less than 2 months nor more than 2 years, and in all cases by
disqualification from public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage for a period of 5 years.
(Approved December 3, 1927.) (Emphasis supplied.)

Subsequently, however, Commonwealth Act No. 357 was enacted on August 22, 1938. This law
provided in Section 48:

SEC. 48. Active Interventation of Public Officers and Employees. — No justice, judge, fiscal,
treasurer or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, the Constabulary of
the national, provincial, municipal or rural police, and no classified civil service officer or
employee shall aid any candidate, nor exert influence in any manner in any election nor take
part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace
officer.

This last law was the legislation from which Section 54 of the Revised Election Code was taken.
It will thus be observed from the foregoing narration of the legislative development or history of
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code that the first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was
effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as averred by
defendant-appellee. Note carefully, however, that in the two instances when the words "justice of the
peace" were omitted (in Com. Act No. 357 and Rep. Act No. 180), the word "judge" which preceded in
the enumeration did not carry the qualification "of the First Instance." In other words, whenever the
word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance", the words "justice of the peace"
would follow; however, if the law simply said "judge," the words "justice of the peace" were omitted.

The above-mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology would seem to justify the conclusion that
when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in Rep. Act No. 180, it did not intend to
exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as already
comprehended in the broader term "judge".

It is unfortunate and regrettable that the last World War had destroyed congressional records which
might have offered some explanation of the discussion of Com. Act No. 357 which legislation, as
indicated above, has eliminated for the first time the words "justice of the peace." Having been
completely destroyed, all efforts to seek deeper and additional clarifications from these records
proved futile. Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn from the historical background of Rep. Act No. 180
is sufficiently borne out by reason hid equity.

Defendant further argues that he cannot possibly be among the officers enumerated in Section 54
inasmuch as under that said section, the word "judge" is modified or qualified by the phrase "of any
province." The last mentioned phrase, defendant submits, cannot then refer to a justice of the peace
since the latter is not an officer of a province but of a municipality.

Defendant's argument in that respect is too strained. If it is true that the phrase "of any province"
necessarily removes justices of the peace from the enumeration for the reason that they are
municipal and not provincial officials, then the same thing may be said of the Justices of the Supreme
Court and of the Court of Appeals. They are national officials. Yet, can there be any doubt that
Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals are not included in the prohibition? The
more sensible and logical interpretation of the said phrase is that it qualifies fiscals, treasurers and
assessors who are generally known as provincial officers.

The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee.
Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been
omitted intentionally. If that rule is applicable to the present, then indeed, justices of the peace must
be held to have been intentionally and deliberately exempted from the operation of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code.

The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus omisus" can operate and apply
only if and when the omission has been clearly established. In the case under consideration, it has
already been shown that the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the
enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. Rather, they were
merely called by another term. In the new law, or Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, justices of
the peace were just called "judges."

In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus omisus" to this case, defendant-appellee cites
authorities to the effect that the said rule, being restrictive in nature, has more particular application to
statutes that should be strictly construed. It is pointed out that Section 54 must be strictly construed
against the government since proceedings under it are criminal in nature and the jurisprudence is
settled that penal statutes should be strictly interpreted against the state.
Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict interpretation of penal statutes, defendant asserts
that the spirit of fair play and due process demand such strict construction in order to give "fair
warning of what the law intends to do, if a certain line is passed, in language that the common world
will understand." (Justice Holmes, in McBoyle v. U.S., 283 U.S. 25, L. Ed. 816).

The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is
criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has
been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already mentioned,
there has been no such omission. There has only been a substitution of terms.

The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be
considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. This has been recognized time and
again by decisions of various courts. (3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 56.) Thus, cases will
frequently be found enunciating the principle that the intent of the legislature will govern (U.S. vs.
Corbet, 215 U.S. 233). It is to be noted that a strict construction should not be permitted to defeat the
policy and purposes of the statute (Ash Sheep Co. v. U.S., 252 U.S. 159). The court may consider the
spirit and reason of a statute, as in this particular instance, where a literal meaning would lead to
absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers (Crawford,
Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294). A Federal District court in the U.S. has well said:

The strict construction of a criminal statute does not mean such construction of it as to deprive
it of the meaning intended. Penal statutes must be construed in the sense which best
harmonizes with their intent and purpose. (U.S. v. Betteridge 43 F. Supp. 53, 56, cited in 3
Sutherland Statutory Construction 56.)

As well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, the language of criminal statutes,
frequently, has been narrowed where the letter includes situations inconsistent with the legislative
plan (U.S. v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354; See also Ernest Brunchen, Interpretation of the Written Law (1915)
25 Yale L.J. 129.)

Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the purpose of the statute
is to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and
various judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the Court of Agrarian
Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition under the old statute, are now within its
encompass. If such were the evident purpose, can the legislature intend to eliminate the justice of the
peace within its orbit? Certainly not. This point is fully explained in the brief of the Solicitor General, to
wit:

On the other hand, when the legislature eliminated the phrases "Judge of First Instance" and
justice of the peace", found in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, and used
"judge" in lieu thereof, the obvious intention was to include in the scope of the term not just one
class of judges but all judges, whether of first Instance justices of the peace or special courts,
such as judges of the Court of Industrial Relations. . . . .

The weakest link in our judicial system is the justice of the peace court, and to so construe the
law as to allow a judge thereof to engage in partisan political activities would weaken rather
than strengthen the judiciary. On the other hand, there are cogent reasons found in the
Revised Election Code itself why justices of the peace should be prohibited from
electioneering. Along with Justices of the appellate courts and judges of the Court of First
Instance, they are given authority and jurisdiction over certain election cases (See Secs. 103,
104, 117-123). Justices of the peace are authorized to hear and decided inclusion and
 exclusion cases, and if they are permitted to campaign for candidates for an elective office the
impartiality of their decisions in election cases would be open to serious doubt. We do not
believe that the legislature had, in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, intended to create
such an unfortunate situation. (pp. 708, Appellant's Brief.)

Another factor which fortifies the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the administrative or
executive department has regarded justices of the peace within the purview of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code.

In Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. v. The Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Justice, etc. (G.R. No. L-
12601), this Court did not give due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction against the respondents, for not setting aside, among others, Administrative Order No. 237,
dated March 31, 1957, of the President of the Philippines, dismissing the petitioner as justice of the
peace of Carmen, Agusan. It is worthy of note that one of the causes of the separation of the
petitioner was the fact that he was found guilty in engaging in electioneering, contrary to the
provisions of the Election Code.

Defendant-appellee calls the attention of this Court to House Bill No. 2676, which was filed on
January 25, 1955. In that proposed legislation, under Section 56, justices of the peace are already
expressly included among the officers enjoined from active political participation. The argument is that
with the filing of the said House Bill, Congress impliedly acknowledged that existing laws do not
prohibit justices of the peace from partisan political activities.

The argument is unacceptable. To begin with, House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed amendment to
Rep. Act No. 180 as a whole and not merely to section 54 of said Rep. Act No. 180. In other words,
House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed re-codification of the existing election laws at the time that it was
filed. Besides, the proposed amendment, until it has become a law, cannot be considered to contain
or manifest any legislative intent. If the motives, opinions, and the reasons expressed by the
individual members of the legislature even in debates, cannot be properly taken into consideration in
ascertaining the meaning of a statute (Crawford, Statutory Construction, Sec. 213, pp. 375-376),
a fortiori what weight can We give to a mere draft of a bill.

On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee's contention that justices of the peace are not
covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To accept it is to render ineffective a policy
so clearly and emphatically laid down by the legislature.

Our law-making body has consistently prohibited justices of the peace from participating in partisan
politics. They were prohibited under the old Election Law since 1907 (Act No. 1582 and Act No.
1709). Likewise, they were so enjoined by the Revised Administrative Code. Another which
expressed the prohibition to them was Act No. 3387, and later, Com. Act No. 357.

Lastly, it is observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of "expressio
unius, est exclusion alterius" in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the peace are not covered by
Section 54. Said the Court of Appeals: "Anyway, guided by the rule of exclusion, otherwise known
as expressio unius est exclusion alterius, it would not be beyond reason to infer that there was an
intention of omitting the term "justice of the peace from Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. . . ."

The rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice of the peace from the
purview of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals has given the reason for the
exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the rule of expressio
unius est exclusion alterius has been erroneously applied. (Appellant's Brief, p. 6.)
 Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular persons
or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why other persons or things not so
enumerated should not have been included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so
including them, the maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius, should not be invoked.
(Blevins v. Mullally 135 p. 307, 22 Cal. App. 519.) .

FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside
and this case is remanded for trial on the merits.

CASSUS OMISSUS PRO OMISSO HABENDUS EST

G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C.
TUPAS, JR., Respondents.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration1 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on
behalf of the respondents, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents), duly opposed2 by the petitioner, former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez
(petitioner).

By way of recapitulation, the present action stemmed from the unexpected departure of former Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona on May 29, 2012, and the nomination of petitioner, as his potential
successor. In his initiatory pleading, petitioner asked the Court to determine 1] whether the first
paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allows more than one (1) member of
Congress to sit in the JBC; and 2] if the practice of having two (2) representatives from each House of
Congress with one (1) vote each is sanctioned by the Constitution.

On July 17, 2012, the Court handed down the assailed subject decision, disposing the same in the
following manner:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar
Council is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to
reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its
proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

This disposition is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

On July 31, 2012, following respondents’ motion for reconsideration and with due regard to Senate
Resolution Nos. 111,3 112,4 113,5 and 114,6 the Court set the subject motion for oral arguments on
August 2, 2012.7 On August 3, 2012, the Court discussed the merits of the arguments and agreed, in
the meantime, to suspend the effects of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July
17, 2012 Decision which decreed that it was immediately executory. The decretal portion of the
August 3, 2012 Resolution8 reads:

WHEREFORE, the parties are hereby directed to submit their respective MEMORANDA within ten
(10) days from notice. Until further orders, the Court hereby SUSPENDS the effect of the second
paragraph of the dispositive portion of the Court’s July 17, 2012 Decision, which reads: "This
disposition is immediately executory."9

Pursuant to the same resolution, petitioner and respondents filed their respective memoranda. 10

Brief Statement of the Antecedents

In this disposition, it bears reiterating that from the birth of the Philippine Republic, the exercise of
appointing members of the Judiciary has always been the exclusive prerogative of the executive and
legislative branches of the government. Like their progenitor of American origins, both the Malolos
Constitution11 and the 1935 Constitution12 vested the power to appoint the members of the Judiciary
in the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. It was during these
times that the country became witness to the deplorable practice of aspirants seeking confirmation of
their appointment in the Judiciary to ingratiate themselves with the members of the legislative body. 13

Then, under the 1973 Constitution,14 with the fusion of the executive and legislative powers in one
body, the appointment of judges and justices ceased to be subject of scrutiny by another body. The
power became exclusive and absolute to the Executive, subject only to the condition that the
appointees must have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.

Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of political
pressure and partisan activities,15 the members of the Constitutional Commission saw it wise to
create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President.

Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment
process, and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). The Framers carefully worded Section 8,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution in this wise:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.

From the moment of the creation of the JBC, Congress designated one (1) representative to sit in the
JBC to act as one of the ex-officio members.16 Pursuant to the constitutional provision that Congress
is entitled to one (1) representative, each House sent a representative to the JBC, not together, but
alternately or by rotation.

In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially altered.1âwphi1 An eighth
member was added to the JBC as the two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting
simultaneously in the JBC, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.17

In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each.18 It has been the situation since then.

Grounds relied upon by Respondents

Through the subject motion, respondents pray that the Court reconsider its decision and dismiss the
petition on the following grounds: 1] that allowing only one representative from Congress in the JBC
would lead to absurdity considering its bicameral nature; 2] that the failure of the Framers to make the
proper adjustment when there was a shift from unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain oversight; 3]
that two representatives from Congress would not subvert the intention of the Framers to insulate the
JBC from political partisanship; and 4] that the rationale of the Court in declaring a seven-member
composition would provide a solution should there be a stalemate is not exactly correct.

While the Court may find some sense in the reasoning in amplification of the third and fourth grounds
listed by respondents, still, it finds itself unable to reverse the assailed decision on the principal issues
covered by the first and second grounds for lack of merit. Significantly, the conclusion arrived at, with
respect to the first and second grounds, carries greater bearing in the final resolution of this case.

As these two issues are interrelated, the Court shall discuss them jointly.

Ruling of the Court

The Constitution evinces the direct action of the Filipino people by which the fundamental powers of
government are established, limited and defined and by which those powers are distributed among
the several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic. 19 The
Framers reposed their wisdom and vision on one suprema lex to be the ultimate expression of the
principles and the framework upon which government and society were to operate. Thus, in the
interpretation of the constitutional provisions, the Court firmly relies on the basic postulate that the
Framers mean what they say. The language used in the Constitution must be taken to have been
deliberately chosen for a definite purpose. Every word employed in the Constitution must be
interpreted to exude its deliberate intent which must be maintained inviolate against disobedience and
defiance. What the Constitution clearly says, according to its text, compels acceptance and bars
modification even by the branch tasked to interpret it.

For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain oversight in order to justify
constitutional construction. As stated in the July 17, 2012 Decision, in opting to use the singular letter
"a" to describe "representative of Congress," the Filipino people through the Framers intended that
Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the
Constitution could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided, as can be read in its other provisions.

A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were indeed adjusted as to be
in tune with the shift to bicameralism. One example is Section 4, Article VII, which provides that a tie
in the presidential election shall be broken "by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the
Congress, voting separately."20 Another is Section 8 thereof which requires the nominee to replace
the Vice-President to be confirmed "by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress,
voting separately."21 Similarly, under Section 18, the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be revoked or continued by the Congress, voting
separately, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members." 22 In all these provisions, the bicameral
nature of Congress was recognized and, clearly, the corresponding adjustments were made as to
how a matter would be handled and voted upon by its two Houses.

Thus, to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section 8, Article VIII, by sheer inadvertence, to
their decision to shift to a bicameral form of the legislature, is not persuasive enough. Respondents
cannot just lean on plain oversight to justify a conclusion favorable to them. It is very clear that the
Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional representation in the JBC
because it was not in the exercise of its primary function – to legislate. JBC was created to support
the executive power to appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was merely assigned a
contributory non-legislative function.

The underlying reason for such a limited participation can easily be discerned. Congress has two (2)
Houses. The need to recognize the existence and the role of each House is essential considering that
the Constitution employs precise language in laying down the functions which particular House plays,
regardless of whether the two Houses consummate an official act by voting jointly or separately.
Whether in the exercise of its legislative23 or its non-legislative functions such as inter alia, the power
of appropriation,24 the declaration of an existence of a state of war,25 canvassing of electoral returns
for the President and Vice-President,26 and impeachment,27 the dichotomy of each House must be
acknowledged and recognized considering the interplay between these two Houses. In all these
instances, each House is constitutionally granted with powers and functions peculiar to its nature and
with keen consideration to 1) its relationship with the other chamber; and 2) in consonance with the
principle of checks and balances, as to the other branches of government.

In checkered contrast, there is essentially no interaction between the two Houses in their participation
in the JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the
screening and nomination of judicial officers. Rather, in the creation of the JBC, the Framers arrived
at a unique system by adding to the four (4) regular members, three (3) representatives from the
major branches of government - the Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman (representing the Judicial
Department), the Secretary of Justice (representing the Executive Department), and a representative
of the Congress (representing the Legislative Department). The total is seven (7), not eight. In so
providing, the Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature, not because it was in the interest of
a certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a major branch of government.

On this score, a Member of Congress, Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, from the Second District of
Maguindanao, submitted his well-considered position28 to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno:

I humbly reiterate my position that there should be only one representative of Congress in the JBC in
accordance with Article VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution x x x.

The aforesaid provision is clear and unambiguous and does not need any further interpretation.
Perhaps, it is apt to mention that the oft-repeated doctrine that "construction and interpretation come
only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them."

Further, to allow Congress to have two representatives in the Council, with one vote each, is to
negate the principle of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the
Constitution.

In view of the foregoing, I vote for the proposition that the Council should adopt the rule of single
representation of Congress in the JBC in order to respect and give the right meaning to the above-
quoted provision of the Constitution. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

On March 14, 2007, then Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, also a JBC Consultant,
submitted to the Chief Justice and ex-officio JBC Chairman his opinion,29 which reads:

8. Two things can be gleaned from the excerpts and citations above: the creation of the JBC is
intended to curtail the influence of politics in Congress in the appointment of judges, and the
understanding is that seven (7) persons will compose the JBC. As such, the interpretation of two
votes for Congress runs counter to the intendment of the framers. Such interpretation actually gives
Congress more influence in the appointment of judges. Also, two votes for Congress would increase
the number of JBC members to eight, which could lead to voting deadlock by reason of even-
numbered membership, and a clear violation of 7 enumerated members in the Constitution.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In an undated position paper,30 then Secretary of Justice Agnes VST Devanadera opined:

As can be gleaned from the above constitutional provision, the JBC is composed of seven (7)
representatives coming from different sectors. From the enumeration it is patent that each category of
members pertained to a single individual only. Thus, while we do not lose sight of the bicameral
nature of our legislative department, it is beyond dispute that Art. VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987
Constitution is explicit and specific that "Congress" shall have only "xxx a representative." Thus, two
(2) representatives from Congress would increase the number of JBC members to eight (8), a
number beyond what the Constitution has contemplated. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In this regard, the scholarly dissection on the matter by retired Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, a
former JBC consultant, is worth reiterating.31 Thus:

A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission reveals that the composition of the JBC
reflects the Commission’s desire "to have in the Council a representation for the major elements of
the community." xxx The ex-officio members of the Council consist of representatives from the three
main branches of government while the regular members are composed of various stakeholders in
the judiciary. The unmistakeable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1) was to treat each ex-officio member
as representing one co-equal branch of government. xxx Thus, the JBC was designed to have seven
voting members with the three ex-officio members having equal say in the choice of judicial
nominees.

xxx

No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress in the JBC and the exercise by
Congress of its legislative powers under Article VI and constituent powers under Article XVII of the
Constitution. Congress, in relation to the executive and judicial branches of government, is
constitutionally treated as another co-equal branch in the matter of its representative in the JBC. On
the other hand, the exercise of legislative and constituent powers requires the Senate and the House
of Representatives to coordinate and act as distinct bodies in furtherance of Congress’ role under our
constitutional scheme. While the latter justifies and, in fact, necessitates the separateness of the two
Houses of Congress as they relate inter se, no such dichotomy need be made when Congress
interacts with the other two co-equal branches of government.

It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three governmental branches to assign the same
weight to considerations that any of its representatives may have regarding aspiring nominees to the
judiciary. The representatives of the Senate and the House of Representatives act as such for one
branch and should not have any more quantitative influence as the other branches in the exercise of
prerogatives evenly bestowed upon the three. Sound reason and principle of equality among the
three branches support this conclusion. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]

The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of Representatives in the JBC
and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or
the House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress. It may
be a constricted constitutional authority, but it is not an absurdity.

From this score stems the conclusion that the lone representative of Congress is entitled to one full
vote. This pronouncement effectively disallows the scheme of splitting the said vote into half (1/2),
between two representatives of Congress. Not only can this unsanctioned practice cause disorder in
the voting process, it is clearly against the essence of what the Constitution authorized. After all,
basic and reasonable is the rule that what cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly.
To permit or tolerate the splitting of one vote into two or more is clearly a constitutional circumvention
that cannot be countenanced by the Court. Succinctly put, when the Constitution envisioned one
member of Congress sitting in the JBC, it is sensible to presume that this representation carries with
him one full vote.

It is also an error for respondents to argue that the President, in effect, has more influence over the
JBC simply because all of the regular members of the JBC are his appointees. The principle of
checks and balances is still safeguarded because the appointment of all the regular members of the
JBC is subject to a stringent process of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, which is
composed of members of Congress.

Respondents’ contention that the current irregular composition of the JBC should be accepted, simply
because it was only questioned for the first time through the present action, deserves scant
consideration. Well-settled is the rule that acts done in violation of the Constitution no matter how
frequent, usual or notorious cannot develop or gain acceptance under the doctrine of estoppel or
laches, because once an act is considered as an infringement of the Constitution it is void from the
very beginning and cannot be the source of any power or authority.

It would not be amiss to point out, however, that as a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law;
it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative
as if it has not been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative
facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not
nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair play. To reiterate the doctrine enunciated in Planters
Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation:32

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity
and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a
statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on
those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of
unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a
municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.33

Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that
notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior
official actions are nonetheless valid.

Considering that the Court is duty bound to protect the Constitution which was ratified by the direct
action of the Filipino people, it cannot correct what respondents perceive as a mistake in its mandate.
Neither can the Court, in the exercise of its power to interpret the spirit of the Constitution, read into
the law something that is contrary to its express provisions and justify the same as correcting a
perceived inadvertence. To do so would otherwise sanction the Court action of making amendment to
the Constitution through a judicial pronouncement.

In other words, the Court cannot supply the legislative omission. According to the rule of casus
omissus "a case omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted." 34 "The principle proceeds from a
reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative
enumeration."35 Pursuant to this, "the Court cannot under its power of interpretation supply the
omission even though the omission may have resulted from inadvertence or because the case in
question was not foreseen or contemplated." 36 "The Court cannot supply what it thinks the legislature
would have supplied had its attention been called to the omission, as that would be judicial
legislation."37

Stated differently, the Court has no power to add another member by judicial construction.

The call for judicial activism fails to stir the sensibilities of the Court tasked to guard the Constitution
against usurpation. The Court remains steadfast in confining its powers in the sphere granted by the
Constitution itself. Judicial activism should never be allowed to become judicial exuberance.38 In
cases like this, no amount of practical logic or convenience can convince the Court to perform either
an excision or an insertion that will change the manifest intent of the Framers. To broaden the scope
of congressional representation in the JBC is tantamount to the inclusion of a subject matter which
was not included in the provision as enacted. True to its constitutional mandate, the Court cannot
craft and tailor constitutional provisions in order to accommodate all of situations no matter how ideal
or reasonable the proposed solution may sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the Court declines.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents is hereby DENIED.

The suspension of the effects of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012
Decision of the Court, which reads, "This disposition is immediately executory," is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

NOSCITUR A SOCIIS

G.R. No. L-39419 April 12, 1982

MAPALAD AISPORNA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DE CASTRO, J.:

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner-accused Aisporna seeks the reversal of the decision dated
August 14, 1974 1 in CA-G.R. No. 13243-CR entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
Mapalad Aisporna, defendant-appellant" of respondent Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the
City Court of Cabanatuan 2 rendered on August 2, 1971 which found the petitioner guilty for having
violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act (Act No. 2427, as amended) and sentenced her to pay a
fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

Petitioner Aisporna was charged in the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the
Insurance Act on November 21, 1970 in an information 3 which reads as follows:

That on or before the 21st day of June, 1969, in the City of Cabanatuan, Republic of the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously act as agent in the
solicitation or procurement of an application for insurance by soliciting therefor the
application of one Eugenio S. Isidro, for and in behalf of Perla Compania de Seguros,
Inc., a duly organized insurance company, registered under the laws of the Republic of
 the Philippines, resulting in the issuance of a Broad Personal Accident Policy No. 28PI-
RSA 0001 in the amount not exceeding FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) dated
June 21, 1969, without said accused having first secured a certificate of authority to act
as such agent from the office of the Insurance Commissioner, Republic of the
Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The facts, 4 as found by the respondent Court of Appeals are quoted hereunder:

IT RESULTING: That there is no debate that since 7 March, 1969 and as of 21 June,
1969, appellant's husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna was duly licensed by Insurance
Commission as agent to Perla Compania de Seguros, with license to expire on 30 June,
1970, Exh. C; on that date, at Cabanatuan City, Personal Accident Policy, Exh. D was
issued by Perla thru its author representative, Rodolfo S. Aisporna, for a period of
twelve (12) months with beneficiary as Ana M. Isidro, and for P5,000.00; apparently,
insured died by violence during lifetime of policy, and for reasons not explained in
record, present information was filed by Fiscal, with assistance of private prosecutor,
charging wife of Rodolfo with violation of Sec. 189 of Insurance Law for having, wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously acted, "as agent in the solicitation for insurance by soliciting
therefore the application of one Eugenio S. Isidro for and in behalf of Perla Compaña de
Seguros, ... without said accused having first secured a certificate of authority to act as
such agent from the office of the Insurance Commission, Republic of the Philippines."

and in the trial, People presented evidence that was hardly disputed, that
aforementioned policy was issued with active participation of appellant wife of Rodolfo,
against which appellant in her defense sought to show that being the wife of true agent,
Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy was merely a
renewal and was issued because Isidro had called by telephone to renew, and at that
time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note on top of her husband's
desk to renew ...

Consequently, the trial court found herein petitioner guilty as charged. On appeal, the trial court's
decision was affirmed by the respondent appellate court finding the petitioner guilty of a violation of
the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act. Hence, this present recourse was filed on
October 22, 1974. 5

In its resolution of October 28, 1974, 6 this Court resolved, without giving due course to this instant
petition, to require the respondent to comment on the aforesaid petition. In the comment 7 filed on
December 20, 1974, the respondent, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, submitted
that petitioner may not be considered as having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act. 8 On April
3, 1975, petitioner submitted his Brief 9 while the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondent, filed
a manifestation 10 in lieu of a Brief on May 3, 1975 reiterating his stand that the petitioner has not
violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.

In seeking reversal of the judgment of conviction, petitioner assigns the following errors 11 allegedly
committed by the appellate court:

1. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT RECEIPT

OF COMPENSATION IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE CRIME DEFINED
BY THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 189 OF THE INSURANCE ACT.
 2. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING DUE WEIGHT TO
EXHIBITS F, F-1, TO F-17, INCLUSIVE SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH PETITIONER'S
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING HEREIN

PETITIONER.

We find the petition meritorious.

The main issue raised is whether or not a person can be convicted of having violated the first
paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act without reference to the second paragraph of the same
section. In other words, it is necessary to determine whether or not the agent mentioned in the first
paragraph of the aforesaid section is governed by the definition of an insurance agent found on its
second paragraph.

The pertinent provision of Section 189 of the Insurance Act reads as follows:

No insurance company doing business within the Philippine Islands, nor any agent
thereof, shall pay any commission or other compensation to any person for services in
obtaining new insurance, unless such person shall have first procured from the
Insurance Commissioner a certificate of authority to act as an agent of such company
as hereinafter provided. No person shall act as agent, sub-agent, or broker in the
solicitation of procurement of applications for insurance, or receive for services in
obtaining new insurance, any commission or other compensation from any insurance
company doing business in the Philippine Islands, or agent thereof, without first
procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, which
must be renewed annually on the first day of January, or within six months thereafter.
Such certificate shall be issued by the Insurance Commissioner only upon the written
application of persons desiring such authority, such application being approved and
countersigned by the company such person desires to represent, and shall be upon a
form approved by the Insurance Commissioner, giving such information as he may
require. The Insurance Commissioner shall have the right to refuse to issue or renew
and to revoke any such certificate in his discretion. No such certificate shall be valid,
however, in any event after the first day of July of the year following the issuing of such
certificate. Renewal certificates may be issued upon the application of the company.

Any person who for compensation solicits or obtains insurance on behalf of any
insurance company, or transmits for a person other than himself an application for a
policy of insurance to or from such company or offers or assumes to act in the
negotiating of such insurance, shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this
section, and shall thereby become liable to all the duties, requirements, liabilities, and
penalties to which an agent of such company is subject.

Any person or company violating the provisions of this section shall be fined in the sum
of five hundred pesos. On the conviction of any person acting as agent, sub-agent, or
broker, of the commission of any offense connected with the business of insurance, the
Insurance Commissioner shall immediately revoke the certificate of authority issued to
him and no such certificate shall thereafter be issued to such convicted person.

A careful perusal of the above-quoted provision shows that the first paragraph thereof prohibits a
person from acting as agent, sub-agent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for
insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner,
while its second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of this section and,
finally, the third paragraph thereof prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation.

The respondent appellate court ruled that the petitioner is prosecuted not under the second
paragraph of Section 189 of the aforesaid Act but under its first paragraph. Thus —

... it can no longer be denied that it was appellant's most active endeavors that resulted
in issuance of policy to Isidro, she was there and then acting as agent, and received the
pay thereof — her defense that she was only acting as helper of her husband can no
longer be sustained, neither her point that she received no compensation for issuance
of the policy because

any person who for compensation solicits or obtains insurance on behalf

of any insurance company or transmits for a person other than himself an
application for a policy of insurance to or from such company or offers or
assumes to act in the negotiating of such insurance, shall be an insurance
agent within the intent of this section, and shall thereby become liable to
all the duties, requirements, liabilities, and penalties, to which an agent of
such company is subject. paragraph 2, Sec. 189, Insurance Law,

now it is true that information does not even allege that she had obtained the insurance,

for compensation

which is the gist of the offense in Section 189 of the Insurance Law in its 2nd paragraph,
but what appellant apparently overlooks is that she is prosecuted not under the 2nd but
under the 1st paragraph of Sec. 189 wherein it is provided that,

No person shall act as agent, sub-agent, or broker, in the solicitation or

procurement of applications for insurance, or receive for services in
obtaining new insurance any commission or other compensation from any
insurance company doing business in the Philippine Island, or agent
thereof, without first procuring a certificate of authority to act from the
insurance commissioner, which must be renewed annually on the first day
of January, or within six months thereafter.

therefore, there was no technical defect in the wording of the charge, so that Errors 2
and 4 must be overruled. 12

From the above-mentioned ruling, the respondent appellate court seems to imply that the definition of
an insurance agent under the second paragraph of Section 189 is not applicable to the insurance
agent mentioned in the first paragraph. Parenthetically, the respondent court concludes that under the
second paragraph of Section 189, a person is an insurance agent if he solicits and obtains an
insurance for compensation, but, in its first paragraph, there is no necessity that a person solicits an
insurance for compensation in order to be called an insurance agent.

We find this to be a reversible error. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the definition of
an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is intended to define the word
"agent" mentioned in the first and second paragraphs of the aforesaid section. More significantly, in
its second paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the definition of an insurance agent is within the
intent of Section 189. Hence —
 Any person who for compensation ... shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this
section, ...

Patently, the definition of an insurance agent under the second paragraph holds true with respect to
the agent mentioned in the other two paragraphs of the said section. The second paragraph of
Section 189 is a definition and interpretative clause intended to qualify the term "agent" mentioned in
both the first and third paragraphs of the aforesaid section.

Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph to the agent mentioned in the
first and second paragraphs would give harmony to the aforesaid three paragraphs of Section 189.
Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular
words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the
whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in
order to produce harmonious whole. 13 A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give
effect to all its provisions whenever possible. 14 The meaning of the law, it must be borne in mind, is
not to be extracted from any single part, portion or section or from isolated words and phrases,
clauses or sentences but from a general consideration or view of the act as a whole. 15 Every part of
the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context. This means that every part of the statute
must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment, not separately and independently. 16 More importantly, the doctrine of associated
words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous
in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and
specific by considering the company in which it is found or with which it is associated. 17

Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph is also
applicable to the agent mentioned in the first paragraph, to receive a compensation by the agent is an
essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of the aforesaid section. The appellate court
has established ultimately that the petitioner-accused did not receive any compensation for the
issuance of the insurance policy of Eugenio Isidro. Nevertheless, the accused was convicted by the
appellate court for, according to the latter, the receipt of compensation for issuing an insurance policy
is not an essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act.

We rule otherwise. Under the Texas Penal Code 1911, Article 689, making it a misdemeanor for any
person for direct or indirect compensation to solicit insurance without a certificate of authority to act
as an insurance agent, an information, failing to allege that the solicitor was to receive compensation
either directly or indirectly, charges no offense. 18 In the case of Bolen vs. Stake, 19 the provision of
Section 3750, Snyder's Compiled Laws of Oklahoma 1909 is intended to penalize persons only who
acted as insurance solicitors without license, and while acting in such capacity negotiated and
concluded insurance contracts for compensation. It must be noted that the information, in the case at
bar, does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance contracts by the accused with Eugenio Isidro
was one for compensation. This allegation is essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the
accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in Our jurisprudence that to warrant conviction,
every element of the crime must be alleged and proved. 20

After going over the records of this case, We are fully convinced, as the Solicitor General maintains,
that accused did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the accused is acquitted of the crime
charged, with costs de oficio.

GENERAL TERMS MAY BE RESTRICTED BY SPECIFIC WORDS

G.R. No. L-14787 January 28, 1961

COLGATE-PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINE, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ as Auditor General and ISMAEL MATHAY as AUDITOR OF THE
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. is a corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws engaged in the manufacture of toilet preparations and household remedies. On
several occasions, it imported from abroad various materials such as irish moss extract, sodium
benzoate, sodium saccharinate precipitated calcium carbonate and dicalcium phosphate, for use as
stabilizers and flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures. For every importation made of these
materials, the petitioner paid to the Central Bank of the Philippines the 17% special excise tax on the
foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges incident thereto,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, as amended, commonly known as the Exchange Tax Law.

On March 14, 1956, the petitioner filed with the Central Bank three applications for refund of the 17%
special excise tax it had paid in the aggregate sum of P113,343.99. The claim for refund was based
on section 2 of Republic Act 601, which provides that "foreign exchange used for the payment of the
cost, transportation and/or other charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of . . .
stabilizer and flavors . . . shall be refunded to any importer making application therefor, upon
satisfactory proof of actual importation under the rules and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to
section seven thereof." After the applications were processed by the officer-in-charge of the
Exchange Tax Administration of the Central Bank, that official advised, the petitioner that of the total
sum of P113,343.99 claimed by it for refund, the amount of P23,958.13 representing the 17% special
excise tax on the foreign exchange used to import irish moss extract, sodium benzoate and
precipitated calcium carbonate had been approved. The auditor of the Central Bank, however,
refused to pass in audit its claims for refund even for the reduced amount fixed by the Officer-in-
Charge of the Exchange Tax Administration, on the theory that toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are
not exempt under section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law.

Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the latter or, December 4, 1958 affirmed the ruling of
the auditor of the Central Bank, maintaining that the term "stabilizer and flavors" mentioned in section
2 of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the preparation or manufacture of food or
food products. Not satisfied, the petitioner brought the case to this Court thru the present petition for
review.

The decisive issue to be resolved is whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the
importation of dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed
by the Exchange Tax Law, (Republic Act No. 601) so as to entitle it to refund under section 2 thereof,
which reads as follows:

SEC, 2. The tax collected under the preceding section on foreign exchange used for the
payment of the cost, transportation and/or other charges incident to importation into the
Philippines of rice, flour, canned milk, cattle and beef, canned fish, soya beans, butterfat,
chocolate, malt syrup, tapioca, stabilizer and flavors, vitamin concentrate, fertilizer, poultry
feed; textbooks, reference books, and supplementary readers approved by the Board of
 Textbooks and/or established public or private educational institutions; newsprint imported by
or for publishers for use in the publication of books, pamphlets, magazines and newspapers;
book paper, book cloth, chip board imported for the printing of supplementary readers
(approved by the Board of Textbooks) to be supplied to the Government under contracts
perfected before the approval of this Act, the quantity thereof to be certified by the Director of
Printing; anesthetics, anti-biotics, vitamins, hormones, x-ray films, laboratory reagents,
biologicals, dental supplies, and pharmaceutical drugs necessary for compounding medicines;
medical and hospital supplies listed in the appendix to this Act, in quantities to be certified by
the Director of Hospitals as actually needed by the hospitals applying therefor; drugs and
medicines listed in the said appendix; and such other drugs and medicines as may be certified
by the Secretary of Health from time to time to promote and protect the health of the people of
the Philippines shall be refunded to any importer making application therefor, upon satisfactory
proof of actual importation under the rules and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to
section seven thereof." (Emphasis supplied.)

The ruling of the Auditor General that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in the law refers only to
those materials actually used in the preparation or manufacture of food and food products is based,
apparently, on the principle of statutory construction that "general terms may be restricted by specific
words, with the result that the general language will be limited by the specific language which
indicates the statute's object and purpose." (Statutory Construction by Crawford, 1940 ed. p. 324-
325.) The rule, however, is, in our opinion, applicable only to cases where, except for one general
term, all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class. In the case at bar, it is
true that the term "stabilizer and flavors" is preceded by a number of articles that may be classified as
food or food products, but it is likewise true that the other items immediately following it do not belong
to the same classification. Thus "fertilizer" and "poultry feed" do not fall under the category of food or
food products because they are used in the farming and poultry industries, respectively. "Vitamin
concentrate" appears to be more of a medicine than food or food product, for, as matter of fact,
vitamins are among those enumerated in the list of medicines and drugs appearing in the appendix to
the law. It should also here be stated that "cattle", which is among those listed preceding the term in
question, includes not only those intended for slaughter but also those for breeding purposes. Again,
it is noteworthy that under, Republic Act No. 814 amending the above-quoted section of Republic Act
No. 601, "industrial starch", which does not always refer to food for human consumption, was added
among the items grouped with "stabilizer and flavors". Thus, on the basis of the grouping of the
articles alone, it cannot validly be maintained that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in the
above-quoted provision of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the manufacture of
food and food products. This view is supported by the principle "Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos
distinguire debemos", or "where the law does not distinguish, neither do we distinguish". (Ligget &
Myers Tobacco Company vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 53 Off. Gaz. No. 15, page 4831). Since
the law does not distinguish between "stabilizer and flavors" used in the preparation of food and those
used in the manufacture of toothpaste or dental cream, we are not authorized to make any distinction
and must construe the words in their general sense. The rule of construction that general and
unlimited terms are restrained and limited by particular recitals when used in connection with them,
does not require the rejection of general terms entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in ascertaining
the intention of the legislature and is to be taken in connection with other rules of construction. (See
Handbook of the Construction and Interpretation of Laws by Black, p. 215.216, 2nd ed.)

Having arrived at the above conclusion, we deem it now idle to pass upon the other questions raised
by the parties.

WHEREFORE, the decision under review is reversed and the respondents are hereby ordered to
audit petitioners applications for refund which were approved by the Officer-in-Charge of the
Exchange Tax Administration in the total amount of P23,958.13.