Bill of Rights

SOME RECENT SC
DECISIONS ON THE
BILL OF RIGHTS
PREPARED FOR BIT COLLEGE OF LAW STUDENTS
AS SUPPLEMENTAL READING MATERIAL
JOY ANGELICA P. SANTOS DOCTOR
PROFESSOR, BIT COLLEGE OF LAW
SEPTEMBER 2023
IMPORTANCE OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS
Former Chief Justice Reynato Puno has said:
The sole purpose of government is to promote, protect
and preserve these [human] rights. And when
government not only defaults in its duty but itself violates
the very rights it was established to protect, it forfeits its
authority to demand obedience of the governed and
could be replaced with one to which the people consent.
(Concurring Opinion of Chief Justice Puno in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, 454 Phil. 504, 2003).
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Due Process and Equal Protection
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Due Process Clause
Equal Protection of the Laws
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The Due Process Clause
a) Life includes the right of an individual to his body in its completeness, free from
dismemberment, and extends to the use of God-given faculties which make life enjoyable
[Justice Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law, pp. 320321]. See: Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200.
b) Liberty includes “the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint
or servitude, x x x (It) includes the right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful
ways x x x” [Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 660],
c) Property is anything that can come under the right of ownership and be the subject of
contract. It represents more than the things a person owns; it includes the right to secure, use and
dispose of them [Torraco v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197]. (Nachura, Political Law Reviewer 2014)
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Question
RA7160 reclassified the position of a provincial administrator from
a career service to a primarily confidential, non-career service
position which position is co-terminus with the term of the
governor. Gonzales, who was appointed to the position on a
permanent basis prior to RA7160 assails the reclassification,
claiming that the law should not be retroactively applied to her,
as she is a permanent appointee. She argues that the law is
violative of the due process clause since it deprives her of her right
to security of tenure and to her right to public office. Is Gonzales
correct?
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Camarines Norte Gov’t v. Gonzales
G.R. No. 185740, July 23, 2013
The arguments presented by the parties and ruled upon
by the CA reflect a conceptual entanglement between the
nature of the position and an employee’s right to hold a
position. These two concepts are different. The nature of
a position may change by law according to the dictates
of Congress. The right to hold a position, on the other
hand, is a right that enjoys constitutional and statutory
guarantee, but may itself change according to the nature
of the position.
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G.R. No. 185740, July 23, 2013
Congress has the power and prerogative to introduce substantial changes in
the provincial administrator position and to reclassify it as a primarily
confidential, non-career service position. Flowing from the legislative power
to create public offices is the power to abolish and modify them to meet the
demands of society; Congress can change the qualifications for and shorten
the term of existing statutory offices. When done in good faith, these acts
would not violate a public officer’s security of tenure, even if they result in his
removal from office or the shortening of his term. Modifications in public
office, such as changes in qualifications or shortening of its tenure, are made in
good faith so long as they are aimed at the office and not at the incumbent.
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G.R. No. 185740, July 23, 2013
Moreover, it is a basic tenet in the country's constitutional system that "public office is a public
trust," and that there is no vested right in public office, nor an absolute right to hold office. No
proprietary title attaches to a public office, as public service is not a property right. Excepting
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be
said to have any vested right in an office. The rule is that offices in government, except those
created by the constitution, may be abolished, altered, or created anytime by statute. And any
issues on the classification for a position in government may be brought to and determined by the
courts.
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What about the right to employment, trade
or profession?
While an employee's right to security of tenure does not give him such a
vested right to his position, it bears stressing that employment is not merely a
contractual relationship. In the life of most workers, it assumes the nature of
a property right which may spell the difference of whether or not a family will
have food on their table, roof over their heads and education for their
children. In termination cases, therefore, the burden of proof rests upon the
employer to show that the dismissal is for a just and valid cause, and failure to
do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal. (Convoy
Marketing Corp. v. Albia, G.R. No. 194969, October 07, 2015
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Because employment is a property right,
For a worker's dismissal to be considered valid, it must comply with both procedural and
substantive due process. The legality of the MANNER of dismissal constitutes procedural due
process, while the legality of the ACT of dismissal constitutes substantive due process.
Procedural due process in dismissal cases consists of the twin requirements of notice and
hearing. The employer must furnish the employee with two written notices before the
termination of employment can be effected: (1) the first notice apprises the employee of the
particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the second notice informs
the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him. Before the issuance of the second notice,
the requirement of a hearing must be complied with by giving the worker an opportunity to be
heard. It is not necessary that an actual hearing be conducted.
Substantive due process, on the other hand, requires that dismissal by the employer be made
under a just or authorized cause under Articles 282
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to 284 of the Labor Code.
The first notice
1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes or
grounds for termination against them, and a directive that the employees are given the
opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable period.
"Reasonable opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means every kind of assistance that management must
accord to the employees to enable them to prepare adequately for their defense. This should be construed as a
period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to give the employees an opportunity to study
the accusation against them, consult a union official or lawyer, gather data and evidence, and decide on the
defenses they will raise against the complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare
their explanation and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts and circumstances that
will serve as basis for the charge against the employees. A general description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly,
the notice should specifically mention which company rules, if any, are violated and/or which among the grounds
under Art. 282 is being charged against the employees.
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The Second Written Notice
(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing or
conference wherein the employees will be given the opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify their
defenses to the charge against them; (2) present evidence in support of their defenses; and (3) rebut
the evidence presented against them by the management. During the hearing or conference, the
employees are given the chance to defend themselves personally, with the assistance of a
representative or counsel of their choice. Moreover, this conference or hearing could be used by the
parties as an opportunity to come to an amicable settlement.
(3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall serve the
employees a written notice of termination indicating that: (1) all circumstances involving the charge
against the employees have been considered; and (2) grounds have been established to justify the
severance of their employment.
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Aspects of due process
a) Substantive. This serves as a restriction on government's law- and rulemaking powers. The
requisites are:
i) The interests of the public, in general, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
intervention of the State. [See discussion on Police Power, Chapter IV.]
ii) The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not
unduly oppressive on individuals.
b) Procedural. This serves as a restriction on actions of judicial and quasijudicial agencies of

government.
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Requisites of Procedural Due Process
• i) An impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it.
• ii) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant and over the
property which is the subject matter of the proceeding.
• iii) The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard. (can be waived, not all cases
require a trial-type hearing.)
• iv) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. no decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based
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Requisites of administrative due process
Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, quoted below:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A
decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity,
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(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be
substantial. "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
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The first of the enumerated rights pertains to the substantive rights of a party at the hearing stage of
the proceedings.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements are reinforcements of
the right to a hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable at the deliberative stage, as the decision
maker decides on the evidence presented during the hearing.11 These standards set forth the guiding
considerations in deliberating on the case and are the material and substantial components of decision
making.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of the decision of a quasi-judicial body,
further complements the hearing and decision-making due process rights and is similar in substance to
the constitutional requirement that a decision of a court must state distinctly the facts and the law
upon which it is based.
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Cudia v. CA, G.R. No. 211362
February 24, 2015
Cudia was dismissed for violating the PMA Honor Code when he lied about his reasons on being late.
He appealed his dismissal, reasoning that he was not afforded to counsel during the administrative
proceedings. You are a Supreme Court justice. Decide brilliantly and intelligently.
Cudia is mistaken since representation by counsel is not required in an administrative proceedings that
are non-criminal in nature, especially when the respondent such as Cudia intelligently defended himself.
Cudia was facing charges in an administrative proceeding that is non-criminal in nature. where the
hearing is investigative and not adversarial and the government does not proceed through counsel,
where the individual concerned is mature and educated, where his knowledge of the events x x x should
enable him to develop the facts adequately through available sources, and where the other aspects of
the hearing taken as a whole are fair, due process does not require representation by counsel.
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Equal Protection of the Law
All persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. Natural and juridical
persons are entitled to this guarantee; but with
respect to artificial persons, they enjoy the
protection only insofar as their property is
concerned.
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Requisites of Valid Classification
• Substantial Distinction (real and substantial differences)
• Germane to the purpose of the law (distinctions which are the bases for the
classification should have a reasonable relation to the purpose of the law.)
• c) Not limited to existing conditions only.
• d) Must apply equally to all members of the same class.
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Three (3) tests to determine the
reasonableness of a classification:
A statute that treats one class differently from another class will not violate the equal protection
clause as long as the classification is valid. In Samahan ng Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City
(G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017) this Court summarized the three (3) tests to determine the
reasonableness of a classification:
1. The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of
fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii)
burdens suspect classes.
2. The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a classification does not involve suspect classes
or fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based on
gender and legitimacy. * A "suspect class" is defined as "a class saddled with such disabilities,
or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process.
3. The rational basis test applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests.
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Maomag Company obtained a loan and mortgaged its
three commercial properties to First Bohol Bank.
Maomag Company failed to pay its loans so First Bohol
Bank foreclosed its properties. Three months after, First
Bohol Bank consolidated ownership over Maomag
Company’s three properties in accordance with Section
47 of RA8791 or the General Banking Law of 2002 which
reduced the redemption period for juridical entities
compared to the one (1) year redemption period given to
natural persons. You are the lawyer for Maomag. Will you
contest Section 47 of RA8791 for being violative of the
equal protection clause? Why?
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No, Section 47 of RA8791 does not violate the equal protection clause.
The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege. It does not require absolute
equality, but merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.
Equal protection permits of reasonable classification. One class may be treated differently from another where 1) the groupings are
based on reasonable and real distinctions; 2) If classification is germane to the purpose of the law, 3) concerns all members of the class,
and 4) applies equally to present and future conditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee. In the instant
case, there is valid classification since all the requisites for valid classification are present.
Section 47 or RA8791 treats juridical persons and natural persons differently on the basis of reasonable and real distinctions. The
difference in the treatment of juridical persons and natural persons was based on the nature of the properties foreclosed — whether
these are used as residence, for which the more liberal one-year redemption period is retained, or used for industrial or
commercial purposes, in which case a shorter term is deemed necessary to reduce the period of uncertainty in the ownership of
property and enable mortgagee banks to dispose sooner of these acquired assets.
Section 47 is also germane to the purpose of the law. The General Banking Law of 2000, crafted in the aftermath of the 1997 Southeast
Asian financial crisis, sought to reform the General Banking Act of 1949 by fashioning a legal framework for maintaining a safe and
sound banking system. In this context, the amendment introduced by Section 47 embodied one of such safe and sound practices
aimed at ensuring the solvency and liquidity of our banks.
This law applies to all members of the same class; and applies equally to present and future conditions- the Supreme Court applied
Section 47 of RA8791 in Goldenway Merchandising Corporation v. Equitable PCI Bank (2013), White Marketing Development
Corporation v. Grandwood Furniture and Woodwork (2016); and ZOMER DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC., v CA, CEBU CITY AND
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 194461, January 07, 2020)
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Right Against Unreasonable Searches
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
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Requisites of a valid warrant
• (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined personally by the
judge. Probable cause means that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought
in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
• (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. To enable the law
enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent
them from seizing the wrong items; and (2) leave said peace officers with no discretion regarding
the articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches and seizures. It is not, however,
required that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave
no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. Should bear direct relation to the
offense for which the warrant is being issued. In addition, under the Rules of Court, the
following personal property may be the subject of a search warrant: (i) the subject of the
offense; (ii) fruits of the offense; or (iii) those used or intended to be used as the means of
committing an offense.
• (3) a search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense. JAPSD
Rule 126, Sections 4 and 5 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provide for
the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant, to wit:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized
which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing

the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record
their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.
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Right Against Unreasonable Searches and
Seizures
• The right is personal; it may be invoked only by the person entitled to it [Stonehill v. Diokno, 20
SCRA 383]. As such, the right may be waived [Lopez v. Commissioner of Customs, 68 SCRA 320],
either expressly or impliedly [People v. Malasugui, infra.], but the waiver must be made by the
person whose right is invaded, not by one who is not duly authorized to effect such waiver
[People v. Damaso, 212 SCRA 457].
• The right applies as a distraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with
the enforcement of the law. The protection cannot extend to acts committed by private individuals
so as to bring them within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government (Nachura,
2014)
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Mila was convicted for illegal possession of drugs, after her apartment was searched and 400 kilograms
of marijuana was recovered in a cabinet hidden behind a false wall. She appealed, arguing for the first
time that the search was illegal. Is she correct?
Mila is correct, the search was valid because she waived her right to a valid search.
Mila failed to lodge any objection to the legality of the search warrant and the
admissibility of the evidence obtained from the search and consequently, her right
was deemed waived when no objection was raised by Mila during trial. For sure, the
right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures, like any other right, can
be waived and the waiver may be made expressly or impliedly. (People v. Magayon,
G.R. No. 238873, September 16, 2020 citing People v. Nunez)
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Several Counts of a Certain Specific Offense
In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA , there were several counts of the
offense of copyright infringement and the search warrant
uncovered several contraband items in the form of pirated
videotapes is not to be confused with the number of offenses
charged. The search warrant did not violate the one-specific-offense
rule.
In Laud v. People , Search Warrant No. 09-14407 was adjudged valid

as it was issued only for one specific offense - that is, for Murder,
albeit for six (6) counts.
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Question
Special Investigator Albert Froilan Gaerlan (SI Gaerlan) filed a Sworn Application
for a Search Warrant before the RTC, Makati City, Branch 63, for the purpose of
conducting a search of the office premises of respondents Amador Pastrana and
Rufina Abad at Room 1908, 88 Corporate Center, Valero Street, Makati City. SI
Gaerlan alleged that he received confidential information that respondents were
engaged in a scheme to defraud foreign investors. Special Investigator Gaerlan
averred that the scheme not only constituted estafa under Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), but also a violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8799 or
the Securities Regulation Code (SRC).
You are the judge. Will you issue the search warrant? (People v. Pastrana, G.R. No.
196045, February 21, 2018)
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People v. Pastrana,
G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018
No, I will deny the application for a search warrant. The application did not state one specific offense.
It included violation of the SRC which covers several penal provisions AND estafa, which could be
committed in a number of ways.
(In the Pastrana case, Search Warrant No. 01-118 is null and void for having been issued for more than
one specific offense).
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People v. Pastrana,
G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018
In Stonehill v. Diokno, the Court, in declaring as null and void the search warrants which were issued
for "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code," stated:
In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with
respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges
who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular
acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of
fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," - as
alleged in the aforementioned applications - without reference to any determinate provision of said
laws; or
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People v. Pastrana,
G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018
In Stonehill v. Diokno, the Court, in declaring as null and void the search warrants which were issued
for "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code," stated:
…To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile
and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or
passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional
provision above quoted-to outlaw the so called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what
would happen, in times of keen political strife,
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People v. Pastrana,
G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018
In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Alvarez, the Court further ruled:
In the determination of probable cause, the court must necessarily determine whether an offense
exists to justify the issuance or quashal of the search warrant because the personal properties that
may be subject of the search warrant are very much intertwined with the "one specific offense"
requirement of probable cause. The only way to determine whether a warrant should issue in
connection with one specific offense is to juxtapose the facts and circumstances presented by the
applicant with the elements of the offense that are alleged to support the search warrant. x x x x
The one-specific-offense requirement reinforces the constitutional requirement that a search

warrant should issue only on the basis of probable cause. Since the primary objective of applying
for a search warrant is to obtain evidence to be used in a subsequent prosecution for an offense for
which the search warrant was applied, a judge issuing a particular warrant must satisfy himself that
the evidence presented by the applicant establishes the facts and circumstances relating to this
specific offense for which the warrant is sought andJAPSD
issued. x x x
People v. Pastrana,
G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018
Compare Pastrana with
In Olaes v. People, even though the search warrant merely stated that it was issued in connection
with a violation of R.A. No. 6425, the Court did not nullify the same for it was clear in the body
that it was issued for the specific offense of possession of illegal narcotics, viz:
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection with Violation
of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, it is clearly recited in the
text thereof that [t]here is probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias Debie and alias Baby
of No. 628 Cornia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, [have] in their possession and control and
custody of marijuana dried stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and
exempt narcotics preparations which is the subject of the offense stated above. Although the
specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the
specific offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause.
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People v. Pastrana,
G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018
In People v. Dichoso, the search warrant was also for violation of R.A. No. 6425, without specifying
what provisions of the law were violated. The Court upheld the validity of the warrant:
Appellants' contention that the search warrant in question was issued for more than one (1) offense,
hence, in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He engages in
semantic juggling by suggesting that since illegal possession of shabu, illegal possession of
marijuana and illegal possession of paraphernalia are covered by different articles and sections
of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the search warrant is clearly for more than one (1) specific
offense. In short, following this theory, there should have been three (3) separate search
warrants, one for illegal possession of shabu, the second for illegal possession of marijuana and
the third for illegal possession of paraphernalia. This argument is pedantic. The Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into
prohibited and regulated drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely
related or which belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus
be validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
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People v. Pastrana,
G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018
Meanwhile, in Prudente v. Dayrit, the search warrant was captioned: For

Violation of P.D. No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.), the Court held
that while "illegal possession of firearms is penalized under Section 1 of P.D.
No. 1866 and illegal possession of explosives is penalized under Section 3
thereof, it cannot be overlooked that said decree is a codification of the various
laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives; such illegal
possession of items destructive of life and property are related offenses or
belong to the same species, as to be subsumed within the category of illegal
possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866."
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Police Officers Rey and Lilia went to serve a search warrant upon Gerry and Andres. The search
warrant was issued by the judge for violation of Republic Act R.A.) No. 6425, otherwise known as
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. Gerry and Andres were found
sleeping together in one queen sized bed in a room of the third floor of their house. Gerry and
Andres were handcuffed and brought to the sala on the first floor. The police officers along with
the barangay captain and two municipal councilors conducted the search and insde the cabinet of
Gerry was found two plastic bags of shabu weighing .05 grams each. Gerry and Andres were
charged of possession of illegal drugs.
Gerry and Andres defended themselves that the search was illegal because they were not present
during the search at the third floor. The police officers said the search was legal because there
were actually three witnesses during the search, the barangay captain and two municipal
councilors. The PNP New Rules on Engagement makes it mandatory the presence of at least two
witnesses during the conduct of the search.
Who is correct?
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Estores v. People
(G.R. No. 192332, January 11, 2021)
Gerry and Andres are correct because the rules of court, which establishes a hierarchy as to who
witnesses the search prevails over the PNP New Rules of Engagement.
Section 8, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that:
SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two witnesses. - No search of a
house, room, or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant
thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age
and discretion residing in the same locality.
In People v. Go [Bulauitan v. People, G.R. No. 218891, September 19, 2016 citing People v. Go,
457 Phil. 885 (2003)] the Supreme Court clarified that the Rules of Court clearly and explicitly
establishes a hierarchy among the witnesses in whose presence the search of the premises
must be conducted. Thus, a search under the strength of a warrant is required to be witnessed
by the lawful occupant of the premises sought to be searched. Only upon their absence may
two (2) persons of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality be made to stand as
their replacements. This is the rule notwithstanding that the PNP New Rules on Engagement
makes it mandatory the presence of at least two witnesses during the conduct of the search.
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Estores v. People
(G.R. No. 192332, January 11, 2021)
As between the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure and the PNP New Rules on Engagement,
the former shall prevail. The power of the Court to promulgate rules emanates from Section 5
paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, that is:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. [Emphasis ours.]
JAPSD
Estores v. People
(G.R. No. 192332, January 11, 2021)
Section 8, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which requires the presence of the lawful
occupant of the place to be searched or any member of his or her family; and in the absence thereof, the
presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality, enforces
and protects Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which speaks of the right against unreasonable
search and seizure, to wit:
SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Thus, the power of the Court to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights as sanctioned by the 1987 Constitution cannot be encroached upon by the executive department,
more specifically, by the issuance by the PNP of its Rules of Engagement.
JAPSD
When searches are reasonable even when
warrantless (Pp. V Cogaed, )
• (1) a "warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest,“
• (2) search of "evidence in 'plain view,"'
• (3) "search of a moving vehicle,"
• (4) "consented warrantless search[es],"
• (5) "customs search,"
• (6) "stop and frisk," and
• (7) "exigent and emergency circumstances."
JAPSD
Stop and Frisk
• the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for
weapon(s) or contraband." Thus, the allowable scope of a "stop and frisk" search is limited to a
"protective search of outer clothing for weapons.“
• Law enforcers do not have unbridled discretion in conducting "stop and frisk" searches. While
probable cause is not required, a "stop and frisk" search cannot be validated on the basis of a
suspicion or hunch. Law enforcers must have a genuine reason to believe, based on their
experience and the particular circumstances of each case, that criminal activity may be afoot.
Reliance on one (1) suspicious activity alone, or none at all, cannot produce a reasonable search.
JAPSD
Stop and Frisk, Suspicious Activity
• Manalili v. Court of Appeals, the police officers conducted surveillance operations in Caloocan City
Cemetery, a place reportedly frequented by drug addicts. They chanced upon a male person who
had "reddish eyes and [was] walking in a swaying manner.“
• In People v. Solayao, the police officers were conducting an intelligence patrol to verify reports on
the presence of armed persons within Caibiran. They met a group of drunk men, one (1) of whom
was the accused in a camouflage uniform. When the police officers approached, his companions
fled leaving behind the accused who was told not to run away. One (1) of the police officers
introduced himself and seized from the accused a firearm wrapped in dry coconut leaves.
JAPSD
Is the Stop and Frisk valid?
the police officers received information that a certain Marvin Buya
would be transporting marijuana. A passenger jeepney passed
through the checkpoint set up by the police officers. The driver then
disembarked and signaled that two (2) male passengers were
carrying marijuana. The police officers approached the two (2) men,
who were later identified as Victor Cogaed (Cogaed) and Santiago
Dayao, and inquired about the contents of their bags. Upon further
investigation, the police officers discovered three (3) bricks of
marijuana in Cogaed's bag.
JAPSD
Consented Warrantless Search
Lilia was walking with her boyfriend at JA Clarin. Suddenly

police officers pointed guns at them and told them to empty
their pockets. The boyfriend’s pockets yielded four sachets of
shabu. Lilia and the boyfriend contested the warrantless search.
The police argued that their silence or lack of resistance proved
consent to the warrantless search.
a. If you were the boyfriend’s lawyer, what is your basis to
contest the arrest?
b. Was there consent to the warrantless search?
JAPSD
• For the valid waiver of a constitutional right, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly,
that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of
such right; and thirdly, that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right
[De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil 689].
• The validity of a consented warrantless search is determined by the totality of the
circumstances. This may involve an inquiry into the environment in which the consent was given
such as "the presence of coercive police procedures.“
• Mere passive conformity or silence to the warrantless search is only an implied acquiescence,
which amounts to no consent at all.
JAPSD
• The question whether consent to a search was, in fact, voluntary, is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of all the circumstances: the age of the defendant, whether he
was in a public or secluded location, whether he objected to the search or passively looked
on, the education and intelligence of the defendant, the presence of coercive police
procedure, the defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence will be found, the nature of
police questioning, the environment in which the questioning took place, and the possible
vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that has the burden of
proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the necessary consent was obtained and that
it was voluntarily and freely given [Caballes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, January 15,
2002]
JAPSD
Search of a Moving Vehicle
The rules governing searches and seizures have been liberalized
when the object of a search is a vehicle for practical purposes.
Police officers cannot be expected to appear before a judge and
apply for a search warrant when time is of the essence
considering the efficiency of vehicles in facilitating transactions
involving contraband or dangerous articles. However, the
inherent mobility of vehicles cannot justify all kinds of searches.
Law enforcers must act on the basis of probable cause.
JAPSD
Checkpoint Search
• Checkpoints per se are valid.
• They are allowed in exceptional circumstances to protect the lives of
individuals and ensure their safety.
• They are also sanctioned in cases where the government's survival is in
danger.
• Considering that routine checkpoints intrude "on [a] motorist’s right to 'free
passage'" to a certain extent, they must be "conducted in a way least
intrusive to motorists." The extent of routine inspections must be limited to
a visual search. Routine inspections do not give law enforcers carte blanche
to perform warrantless searches.
JAPSD
Motor Vehicle Search Upon Checkpoint
You are aboard your motorcycle and then suddenly, police officers stopped you and
ordered you to remove your jacket. You refused as you had nothing underneath your
jacket. You where charged with resistance and disobedience to a person in authority.
What is your defense?
In Valmonte v. De Villa, this Court clarified that "[f]or as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle
is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an
individual's right against unreasonable search[es]." Thus, a search where an "officer
merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein" is not unreasonable.
JAPSD
Motor Vehicle Search Upon Checkpoint
• However, an extensive search may be conducted on a vehicle at a checkpoint
when law enforcers have probable cause to believe that the vehicle's passengers
committed a crime or when the vehicle contains instruments of an offense.
• Thus, routinary and indiscriminate searches of moving vehicles are allowed if they
are limited to a visual search. This holds especially true when the object of the
search is a public vehicle where individuals have a reasonably reduced expectation
of privacy. On the other hand, extensive searches are permissible only when they
are founded upon probable cause. Any evidence obtained will be subject to the
exclusionary principle under the Constitution.
JAPSD
Tipped Search
• That the object of a warrantless search is allegedly inside a moving vehicle does not
justify an extensive search absent probable cause. Moreover, law enforcers cannot act
solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information. A tip is still hearsay no matter
how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of
any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion.
• Although this Court has upheld warrantless searches of moving vehicles based on
tipped information, there have been other circumstances that justified warrantless
searches conducted by the authorities.
JAPSD
Tip + Suspicious Behavior = Valid Search
In People v. Breis,apart from the tipped information they received, the law
enforcement agents observed suspicious behavior on the part of the
accused that gave them reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being
committed. The accused attempted to alight from the bus after the law
enforcers introduced themselves and inquired about the ownership of a box
which the accused had in their possession. In their attempt to leave the bus,
one (1) of the accused physically pushed a law enforcer out of the
way. Immediately alighting from a bus that had just left the terminal and
leaving one's belongings behind is unusual conduct.
JAPSD
Tip + Suspicious Behavior + Smells Marijuana =
Valid Search
In People v. Mariacos, a police officer received information that a
bag containing illegal drugs was about to be transported on a
passenger jeepney. The bag was marked with "O.K." On the basis
of the tip, a police officer conducted surveillance operations on
board a jeepney. Upon seeing the bag described to him, he peeked
inside and smelled the distinct odor of marijuana emanating from
the bag. The tipped information and the police officer's personal
observations gave rise to probable cause that rendered the
warrantless search valid.
JAPSD
Tip + Surveillance = Valid Search
The police officers in People v. Ayangao and People v.
Libnao likewise received tipped information regarding the
transport of illegal drugs. In Libnao, the police officers had
probable cause to arrest the accused based on their three
(3)-month long surveillance operation in the area where the
accused was arrested. On the other hand, in Ayangao, the
police officers noticed marijuana leaves protruding through
a hole in one (1) of the sacks carried by the accused.
JAPSD
Flight/Heightened Security
• There are different hybrids of reasonable warrantless searches. There are searches based
on reasonable suspicion as in Posadas v. Court of Appeals where this Court justified the
warrantless search of the accused who attempted to flee with a buri bag after the police
officers identified themselves.
• On the other hand, there are reasonable searches because of heightened security. In Dela
Cruz v. People, the search conducted on the accused was considered valid because it was
done in accordance with routine security measures in ports. This case, however, should
not be construed to apply to border searches. Border searches are not unreasonable per
se; there is a "reasonable reduced expectation of privacy" when travellers pass through
or stop at airports or other ports of travel.
JAPSD
Rebel and Entrapment
• In Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, the Supreme Court held that rebellion is a continuing
offense. Accordingly, a rebel may be arrested at any time, with or without a warrant, as he
is deemed to be in the act of committing the offense at any time of day or night.
• An arrest made after an entrapment operation does not require a warrant of arrest; it is
reasonable and valid under Sec. 5 (a), Rule 113 [People v. Bohol, G.R. No. 171729, July 28,
2008].
• A “buy-bust” operation is a valid in flagrante arrest.
JAPSD
Warrantless Arrests
Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
• (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO
ARREST);
• (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it (HOT PURSUIT ARREST); and
• (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another (ESCAPEE PRISONER ARREST).
JAPSD
In flagrante delicto arrest (Cogaed and
Malado, 2021)
The validity of this warrantless arrest requires compliance with the OVERT ACT TEST
[F]or a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two

elements must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he [or she] has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer."
JAPSD
HOT PURSUIT ARREST
• The rule requires that an offense has just been committed. It connotes "immediacy in
point of time. "That a crime was in fact committed does not automatically bring the
case under this rule. An arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court entails
a time element from the moment the crime is committed up to the point of arrest.
• Law enforcers need not personally witness the commission of a crime. However, they
must have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances indicating that the person
sought to be arrested committed it.
JAPSD
People v. Gerente
• The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his
companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they
inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of
wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to
death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the
policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under
those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent
death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him,
they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his
arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two
companions did.
JAPSD
Tip as basis?
• In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto
arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a
crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a passenger who did not exhibit
any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers that would incite
suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the
tip they received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a
warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the person to be arrested indicating
that a crime has just been committed, was being committed, or is about to be
committed.
JAPSD
Hearsay Tip
A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have
personal knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to
be arrested has just committed a crime. This is what gives rise to probable cause that
would justify a warrantless search under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
JAPSD
Warrantless Arrests, Consequences
Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7,
2017
• The invalidity of an arrest leads to several consequences
among which are:
• (a) the failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of an
accused;
• (b) criminal liability of law enforcers for illegal arrest; and
• (c) any search incident to the arrest becomes invalid thus
rendering the evidence acquired as constitutionally
inadmissible.
JAPSD
Warrantless Arrests
Nevertheless, failure to timely object to the illegality of an arrest does not preclude
an accused from questioning the admissibility of evidence seized. The
inadmissibility of the evidence is not affected when an accused fails to question the
court's jurisdiction over his or her person in a timely manner. Jurisdiction over the
person of an accused and the constitutional inadmissibility of evidence are
separate and mutually exclusive consequences of an illegal arrest. (Veridiano)
JAPSD
Privacy
• Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
• (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
JAPSD
Privacy
• Inviolability. Exceptions: (a) Lawful order of the court; or (b) When public safety or
order requires otherwise, as may be provided by law.
• 2. The guarantee includes within the mantle of its protection tangible, as well as
intangible, objects. Read R.A. 4200 [Anti-Wire-Tapping Act]
JAPSD
ZONES OF PRIVACY
(Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335,
February 11, 2014)
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of
intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process.
The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right
to privacy is a "constitutional right" and "the right most valued by civilized men," but also from our
adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, "no one shall be
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy" and "everyone has the right to the protection of
the law against such interference or attacks."
JAPSD
Zones of Privacy
Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against
unreasonable searchesand seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let alone,
and (b) the right to privacy of communication and correspondence. In assessing the
challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a
court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of
privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable
government intrusion.
JAPSD
Three Strands of the Right to Privacy
• (1) locational or situational privacy - Refers to the privacy that is felt in physical
space, such as that which may be violated by trespass and unwarranted search and
seizure.
• (2) informational privacy - Usually defined as the right of individuals to control

information about themselves.
• (3) decisional privacy -Usually defined as the right of individuals to make certain
kinds of fundamental choices with respect to their personal and reproductive
autonomy.
JAPSD
Exercise
Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island vessel.
He frequently traveled, "coming back and forth taking a
vessel."At around 12:00 noon of May 11, 2007, Dela Cruz was
at a pier of the Cebu Domestic Port to go home to Iloilo. While
buying a ticket, he allegedly left his bag on the floor with a
porter. It took him around 15 minutes to purchase a ticket.
Dela Cruz then proceeded to the entrance of the terminal and
placed his bag on the x-ray scanning machine for inspection.
The operator of the x-ray machine saw firearms inside Dela
Cruz's bag. Dela Cruz was convicted of illegal possession of
firearms. He says he must be acquitted because the search is
a violation of his right to privacy. Is he correct?
JAPSD
Dela Cruz v. People (Written by J. Leonen)
G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016
Routine baggage inspections conducted by port
authorities, although done without search warrants, are
not unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional
provisions protecting privacy should not be so literally
understood so as to deny reasonable safeguards to
ensure the safety of the traveling public.
JAPSD
G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016
For a full understanding of the nature of the constitutional rights involved, we will
examine three (3) points of alleged intrusion into the right to privacy of petitioner:
first, when petitioner gave his bag for x-ray scanning to port authorities;
second, when the baggage inspector opened petitioner's bag and called the Port
Authority Police; and
third, when the police officer opened the bag to search, retrieve, and seize the
firearms and ammunition.
JAPSD
G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016
As to the first intrusion:
The first point of intrusion occurred when petitioner presented his bag for inspection to port personnel—the x-ray
machine operator and baggage inspector manning the x-ray machine station. With regard to searches and
seizures, the standard imposed on private persons is different from that imposed on state agents or authorized
government authorities.
In People v. Marti, the private forwarding and shipping company, following standard operating procedure, opened
packages sent by accused Andre Marti for shipment to Zurich, Switzerland and detected a peculiar odor from the
packages.The representative from the company found dried marijuana leaves in the packages. He reported the
matter to the National Bureau of Investigation and brought the samples to the Narcotics Section of the Bureau for
laboratory examination.Agents from the National Bureau of Investigation subsequently took custody of the illegal
drugs. Andre Marti was charged with and was found guilty of violating Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act.
This court held that there was no unreasonable search or seizure.The evidence obtained against the accused
was not procured by the state acting through its police officers or authorized government agencies. The Bill of
Rights does not govern relationships between individuals; it cannot be invoked against the acts of private
individuals
JAPSD
G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016
BUT port security personnel's functions having the color of state-
related functions and deemed agents of government, Marti is
inapplicable in the present case. Nevertheless, searches pursuant to
port security measures are not unreasonable per se. The security
measures of x-ray scanning and inspection in domestic ports are akin
to routine security procedures in airports.
JAPSD
G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016
In People v. Suzuki, the accused "entered the pre-departure area of the
Bacolod Airport Terminal." He was "bound for Manila via flight No. 132 of
the Philippine Airlines and was carrying a small traveling bag and a box
marked 'Bongbong's piaya."The accused "proceeded to the 'walk through
metal detector,' a machine which produces a red light and an alarm once it
detects the presence of metallic substance or object.""Thereupon, the red
light switched on and the alarm sounded, signifying the presence of
metallic substance either in his person or in the box he was carrying." When
the accused was asked to open the content of the box, he answered "open,
open."Several packs of dried marijuana fruiting tops were then found inside
the box. Suzuki argued that the box was only given to him as "pasalubong"
by a certain Pinky, whom he had sexual relations with the night before. He
did not know the contents of the box.
JAPSD
G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016
The reason behind it is that there is a reasonable reduced expectation of privacy
when coming into airports or ports of travel
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property
to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With
increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation's
airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on
baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures
suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects
are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the
gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel.
Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs and notices in their airline
tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would
be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)crala
JAPSD
G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016
Was the search rendered unreasonable at the second point of intrusion—when the baggage
inspector opened petitioner's bag and called the attention of the port police officer?
No.The port personnel's actions proceed from the authority and policy to ensure the safety of
travelers and vehicles within the port. At this point, petitioner already submitted himself and his
belongings to inspection by placing his bag in the x-ray scanning machine.
The presentation of petitioner's bag for x-ray scanning was voluntary. Petitioner had the choice
of whether to present the bag or not. He had the option not to travel if he did not want his bag
scanned or inspected. X-ray machine scanning and actual inspection upon showing of probable
cause that a crime is being or has been committed are part of reasonable security regulations to
safeguard the passengers passing through ports or terminals.
JAPSD
G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016
A third point of intrusion to petitioner's right to privacy occurred during petitioner's
submission to port security measures. However, he VOLUNTARILY submitted
himself to port authorities at this point.
Similar to the accused in People v. Kagui Malasugui and People v. Omaweng who
permitted authorities to search their persons and premises without a warrant,
petitioner is now precluded from claiming an invalid warrantless search when he
voluntarily submitted to the search on his person. In addition, petitioner's consent to
the search at the domestic port was not given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances.
JAPSD
G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016
The consented search conducted on petitioner's bag is different from a customs
search.
Customs searches, as exception to the requirement of a valid search warrant, are

allowed when "persons exercising police authority under the customs law . . . effect
search and seizure ... in the enforcement of customs laws.“ The Tariff and Customs
Code provides the authority for such warrantless search.
JAPSD
G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016
Hence, to be a valid customs search, the requirements are: (1)
the person/s conducting the search was/were exercising
police authority under customs law; (2) the search was for the
enforcement of customs law; and (3) the place searched is not
a dwelling place or house. Here, the facts reveal that the
search was part of routine port security measures. The search
was not conducted by persons authorized under customs law.
It was also not motivated by the provisions of the Tariff and
Customs Code or other customs laws. Although customs
searches usually occur within ports or terminals, it is
important that the search must be for the enforcement of
customs laws.
JAPSD
Vivares and Suzara v. St. Theresa’s College
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014
Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were, during the
period material, graduating high school students at St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City.
Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were
about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of
themselves clad only in their undergarments. They posted this picture on FB including other
pictures showing they were drinking alcohol and other pictures showing them wearing skimpy
clothing. As a result STS barred them from joining the commencement exercises scheduled on
March 30, 2012. Their parents filed a case in court claiming that the action of STS in viewing the
FB accounts of their daughters is an invasion of the right to privacy. The action sought the
issuance of a writ of habeas data. Will the petition prosper?
JAPSD
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014
What is a writ of habeas data:
The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty
or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party. It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce
one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to
control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is
being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
JAPSD
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014
Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational privacy, a
habeas data petition will not prosper. Viewed from the perspective of the case at bar,this
requisite begs this question: given the nature of an online social network (OSN)––(1) that it
facilitates and promotes real-time interaction among millions, if not billions, of users, sans the
spatial barriers, bridging the gap created by physical space; and (2) that any information
uploaded in OSNs leaves an indelible trace in the provider’s databases, which are outside the
control of the end-users––is there a right to informational privacy in OSN activities of its users?
Before addressing this point, We must first resolve the procedural issues in this case.
JAPSD
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014
• Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that said user,
in this case the children of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private, through the
employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. And this intention can
materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools.
• In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber world, of the user’s
invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of
a privacy tool to grant or deny access to his or her post or profile detail should not be denied the
informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies said choice. Otherwise, using these privacy tools
would be a feckless exercise, such that if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal information
to his or her Facebook page and sets its privacy level at "Only Me" or a custom list so that only the user or a
chosen few can view it, said photo would still be deemed public by the courts as if the user never chose to
limit the photo’s visibility and accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools
of their function but it would also disregard the very intention of the user to keep said photo or information
within the confines of his or her private space. JAPSD
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her students,
who are the minors’ Facebook "friends," showed her the photos using their own Facebook
accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be able to view the allegedly private
posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students, and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore,
that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at
large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is "Public," it can be surmised that the
photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that
petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they
cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The ensuing
pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez is most instructive:
JAPSD
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014
[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all
privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances such as here, where the Defendant
did not employ protective measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page
or the photograph itself.
Also, United States v. Maxwell held that "[t]he more open the method of transmission is, the less
privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large inthe chat room or e-mail
that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy."
JAPSD
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to "Friends" is no
assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the
source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own
Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or
not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective
Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the
privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."
JAPSD
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014
This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebook’s proclivity towards user
interaction and socialization rather than seclusion or privacy, as it encourages broadcasting of
individual user posts. In fact, it has been said that OSNs have facilitated their users’ self-tribute,
thereby resulting into the "democratization of fame."Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even a
post, with visibility set at "Friends Only" cannot easily, more so automatically, be said to be "very
private," contrary to petitioners’ argument.
JAPSD
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014
. It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your children’s ears." This means that self-
regulation on the part of OSN users and internet consumers in general is the best means of
avoiding privacy rights violations. As a cyberspace community member, one has to be proactive in
protecting his or her own privacy. It is in this regard that many OSN users, especially minors, fail.
Responsible social networking or observance of the "netiquettes on the part of teenagers has been
the concern of many due to the widespread notion that teenagers can sometimes go too far since
they generally lack the people skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a public
forum.
JAPSD
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014
It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and
activities and must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant.
Demanding relief from the courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves take utmost care in
safeguarding a right which they allege to have been violated. These are indispensable. We cannot
afford protection to persons if they themselves did nothing to place the matter within the confines
of their private zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to learn the use of privacy tools, to use
them if they desire to keep the information private, and to keep track of changes in the available
privacy settings, such as those of Facebook, especially because Facebook is notorious for changing
these settings and the site's layout often.
JAPSD
OCA v. Judge Yu
(A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, March 14, 2017)
Judge Yu wrote this message to Judge San Gaspar-Gito's Facebook account with the subject Meal
Stub, to wit:
Eliza B. Yu 9:20am
MEAL STUB
dear ems, i sent your meal stub at your yahoo account to honor you this national heroes day. it's good you gave
me an idea of your preferred sexual position, there's no need to study that 69, you'll get it from me
spontaneously ... that's easy, pulled down your underwear, and eat what's in between your thighs ... but you have
to pay me $10 first ... He He He! take care and see you later... (Bold emphasis supplied)
Judge Yu was charged of disgraceful and immoral conduct, and conduct unbecoming of a public
officer. She invokes her right to privacy and claims that the letter and all the obscene messages she
sent to Judge Gito is a violation of this right, hence these are inadmissible under the exclusionary rule.
Is she correct? JAPSD
OCA v. Judge Yu
(A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, March 14, 2017)
The exclusionary rule, or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine,
presupposes a violation of law on the part of the agents of the
Government, and bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures expressly defined under
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. The exclusionary rule under
Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution refers to the prohibition against the issuance of general
warrants that encourage law e nforcers to go on
fishing expeditions
JAPSD
OCA v. Judge Yu
(A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, March 14, 2017)
Judge Yu did not specify that the State had unlawfully intruded into her privacy. The
subjects of the present inquiry were the messages sent by her to Judge San Gaspar-
Gita. Regardless of the mode of their transmission, the ownership of the messages
pertained to the latter as the recipient.
Considering that it was the latter who granted access to such messages, there was
no violation of Judge Yu's right to privacy. As such, the grant of access by Judge San
Gaspar-Gito did not require the consent of Judge Yu as the writer. To recall, the Court
directed the MISO to retrieve the messages for purposes of these cases. Based on
the certification issued by the authorized MISO personnel, the messages were
extracted from the Yahoo and Facebook accounts of Judge San Gaspar-Gito with the
use of her officialworkstation. Hence, the exclusionary rule did not apply.
JAPSD
Does SPAM entering your emails or
advertisements appearing in your newsfeed
violate your right to privacy?
No. Firstly, the government presents no basis for holding that unsolicited electronic ads reduce the
"efficiency of computers." Secondly, people, before the arrival of the age of computers, have already
been receiving such unsolicited ads by mail. These have never been outlawed as nuisance since
people might have interest in such ads. What matters is that the recipient has the option of not
opening or reading these mail ads. That is true with spams. Their recipients always have the option to
delete or not to read them.
To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even
unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech
which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed
forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. The State cannot rob him of this right
without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements
are legitimate forms of expression. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014
JAPSD
Freedom of Expression
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or
of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
JAPSD
• Preferred right: stands on a higher level than substantive economic freedom or
other liberties (Chavez v. NTC, et. al., G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008)
• Foundation of all other rights: Freedom of speech is an indispensable condition for

nearly every other form of freedom. our history shows that the struggle to protect
the freedom of speech, expression and the press was, at bottom, the struggle for
the indispensable preconditions for the exercise of other freedoms.[30] For it is only
when the people have unbridled access to information and the press that they will
be capable of rendering enlightened judgments. In the oft-quoted words of
Thomas Jefferson, we cannot both be free and ignorant.
JAPSD
What does freedom of expression mean
Freedom of speech and of the press means something more than the right to
approve existing political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to
official measures, and to take refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any matter
of public consequence.[When atrophied, the right becomes meaningless. The right
belongs as well -- if not more – to those who question, who do not conform, who
differ.
JAPSD
What does freedom of expression mean
The ideas that may be expressed under this freedom are confined not only to those
that are conventional or acceptable to the majority. To be truly meaningful, freedom
of speech and of the press should allow and even encourage the articulation of the
unorthodox view, though it be hostile to or derided by others; or though such view
“induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or
even stirs people to anger.” To paraphrase Justice Holmes, it is freedom for the
thought that we hate, no less than for the thought that agrees with us.
JAPSD
Scope of Freedom of Expression
• extends protection to nearly all forms of communication (speech, print and
assembly regarding secular as well as political causes, and is not confined to any
particular field of human interest), so as to enable members of society to cope
with the exigencies of their period
• The constitutional protection assures the broadest possible exercise of free
speech and free press for religious, political, economic, scientific, news, or
informational ends, inasmuch as the Constitution's basic guarantee of freedom to
advocate ideas is not confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or
shared by a majority.
JAPSD
Aspects of Freedom of Expression
1. Freedom from censorship or prior restraint - Prior restraint refers to official governmental
restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or
dissemination. Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom from government
censorship of publications, whatever the form of censorship, and regardless of whether it
is wielded by the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the government.
2. Freedom from subsequent punishment - Without this assurance, the individual would
hesitate to speak for fear that he might be held to account for his speech, or that he might
be provoking the vengeance of the officials he may have criticized. However, this freedom
is not absolute, and may be properly regulated in the interest of the public. Accordingly,
the State may validly impose penal and/or administrative sanctions
JAPSD
Examples of Prior Restraint
• Governmental acts that require approval of a proposal to publish;
• Licensing or permits as prerequisites to publication including the payment of
license taxes for the privilege to publish;
• Injunctions against publication.
• Closure of the business and printing offices of certain newspapers, resulting in the
discontinuation of their printing and publication,
JAPSD
Prior Restraint, the O’brien Test
A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if

1. If it is within the constitutional power of the Government,
2. If it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
3. If the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
4. If the incident restriction on alleged [freedom of speech & expression] is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
JAPSD
A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on
content is given the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive impact.
Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will
it pass constitutional muster,
with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality.
JAPSD
Tests of valid governmental interference
a. Clear and present danger rule - The clear and present danger rule rests on the premise that
speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an
evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule requires that the evil consequences sought to
be prevented must be substantive, “extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high.”
b. Dangerous Tendency Rule - if the words uttered create a dangerous tendency of an evil which
the State has the right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is sufficient if the natural
tendency and the probable effect of the utterance were to bring about the substantive evil that
the legislative body seeks to prevent.
c. Balancing of Interests Test. “When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order,
and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional, or partial abridgment of speech, the duty of
the courts is to determine which of the two conflicting interests demands the greater protection
under the particular circumstances presented”
JAPSD
Is the COMELEC correct?
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the
San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in
size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin
contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or
Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case.
This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team
Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were
classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the
RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising
“Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay”.
COMELEC demanded the Diocese of Bacolod to remove the tarpaulin otherwise the latter will be
charged with an election offense. JAPSD
Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015
No, COMELEC has the power to regulate campaign materials as per the Constitution and laws; BUT
ONLY AMONG candidates and political parties. The Diocese of Bacolod, et. al., are not candidates.
Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the
enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in elections.
Same with Sanidad v. COMELEC involved the rules promulgated by COMELEC during the plebiscite for
the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region. Columnist Pablito V. Sanidad questioned the
provision prohibiting journalists from covering plebiscite issues on the day before and on plebiscite
day. Sanidad argued that the prohibition was a violation of the “constitutional guarantees of the
freedom of expression and of the press. . . .” We held that the “evil sought to be prevented by this
provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a
candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time.” This court found that “[m]edia
practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise
holders nor the candidates[,]” thus, their right to expression during this period may not be regulated
by COMELEC JAPSD
Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015
Why do we need to protect the freedom of expression?
1. Because the people have a right to participate in public affairs, including the right to criticize
government actions.
2. Free speech should be encouraged under the concept of a market place of ideas.
3. Free speech involves self-expression that enhances human dignity.
4. Expression is a marker for group identity.
5. The Bill of Rights, free speech included, is supposed to “protect individuals and minorities against
majoritarian abuses perpetrated through [the] framework [of democratic governance].
6. Free speech must be protected under the safety valve theory. This provides that “nonviolent
manifestations of dissent reduce the likelihood of violence[.]
JAPSD
Freedom from punishment. What is not
allowed:
JAPSD
Was there illegal assembly?
Since 16 May 2007, officers and members of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Davao City Water District
(NAMADACWAD) have been staging pickets in front of the DCWD Office during their lunch breaks to
air their grievances about the non-payment of their Collective Negotiation Agreement (CNA)
incentives and their opposition to DCWD's privatization and proposed One Hundred Million Peso
Loan. On 09 November 2007, NAMADACWAD agreed to wear t-shirts on which was printed the
following: "CNA Incentive Ihatag Na, Dir. Braganza Pahawa Na!”. This was during the celebration of
the Water Districts 34th Anniversary where a sportsfest was being held. Some officials of
NAMADACWAD also posted flyers and posters in the premises of the water district. The officers and
members of NAMADACWAD were all dismissed for violating the CSC prohibition on mass actions
among government employees. Was the action of NAMADACWAD members in wearing t-shirts
airing their grievances considered prohibited mass action?
JAPSD
DAVAO CITY WATER
DISTRICT v. ARANJUEZ
G.R. No. 194192, June 16, 2015
• Sections 5 and 6 of CSC Resolution No. 021316 states:
Section 5. Definition of Prohibited Concerted Mass Action. - As used in this Omnibus Rules, the phrase
"prohibited concerted activity or mass action" shall be understood to refer to any collective activity
undertaken by government employees, by themselves or through their employees
organizations, with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize
their demands of force concession, economic or otherwise, from their respective agencies or the
government. It shall include mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature.
Section 6. Permissible Concerted Mass Action. - A concerted activity or mass action done outside of
government office hours shall not be deemed a prohibited concerted activity or mass action
within the contemplation of this omnibus rules provided the same shall not occasion or result in the
disruption of work or service. JAPSD
DAVAO CITY WATER
G.R. No. 194192, June 16, 2015
The operative phrases are "any collective activity" and "work stoppage or service disruption." Without
the intent at work stoppage or service disruption, the concerted activity is not prohibited. The time
and place of the activity are not determinative of the prohibition. Whether done within government
hours, a concerted activity is allowed if it is without any intent at work stoppage.
JAPSD
DAVAO CITY WATER
G.R. No. 194192, June 16, 2015
It is correct to conclude that those who enter government service are subjected to a different degree
of limitation on their freedom to speak their mind; however, it is not tantamount to the
relinquishment of their constitutional right of expression otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason
of their employment. Unarguably, a citizen who accepts public employment "must accept certain
limitations on his or her freedom." But there are some rights and freedoms so fundamental to liberty
that they cannot be bargained away in a contract for public employment. It is the Court's
responsibility to ensure that citizens are not deprived of these fundamental rights by virtue of
working for the government.
JAPSD
DAVAO CITY WATER
G.R. No. 194192, June 16, 2015
GSIS v. Villaviza (GSIS case).41 It was there ruled that the acts of GSIS employees wearing similarly
colored shirts while attending a public hearing inside the GSIS Office, with clenching of fists and
orating against the then President Winston Garcia, were not constitutive of a prohibited activity but
were only an exercise of their constitutional freedom of expression.
JAPSD
DAVAO CITY WATER
G.R. No. 194192, June 16, 2015
The GSIS case pronounced:
Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person in the land to voice out
their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their rights and interests. Civil Service
does not deprive them of their freedom of expression. It would be unfair to hold that by joining the
government service, the members thereof have renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom
can be reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away.47
In simple paraphrase we say, regulation of the freedom of expression is not removal of the
constitutional right.
JAPSD
DAVAO CITY WATER
G.R. No. 194192, June 16, 2015
Justice Leonen (Concurring)
Freedom of expression is guaranteed in its fullest outside government but, perhaps, more regulated
when one assumes the role of a public officer. The right to speech is inherent. However, the act of
joining a government office should be construed as an understanding that the individual's exercise of
this basic right is subsumed by the necessity of providing public sendees to the greater majority.
The limits are inherent in the nature of governance. The Constitution states that "[p]ublic officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."
JAPSD
DAVAO CITY WATER
G.R. No. 194192, June 16, 2015
Republic Act No. 671319 known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officials and
Employees thus provides for the following norms of conduct:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. -(A) Every public official and
employee shall observe the following as.standards of personal conduct in the discharge and
execution of official duties:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(a) Commitment to public interest. - Public officials and employees shall always uphold the public
interest over and above personal interest. All government resources and powers of their respective
offices must be employed and used efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically, particularly to
avoid wastage in public funds and revenues.
JAPSD
DAVAO CITY WATER
G.R. No. 194192, June 16, 2015
Public accountability and a commitment to giving

priority to the public interest above private ones
demand some level of limitation on the exercise of the
right to freedom of expression by government
employees.
JAPSD
Freedom of Religion
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
JAPSD
Freedom of Religion
One of our fundamental differences lies in our chosen religion. Some
put their faith in a god different from ours, while some may not
believe in a god at all. Nevertheless, despite the inconveniences this
difference may cause us, we must accept it unconditionally for only
upon acceptance of the fact that we are different from each other
will we learn to respect one another. (RE: LETTER OF TONY Q. V
ALENCIANO, HOLDING OF RELIGIOUS RITUALS AT THE HALL
OF JUSTICE BUILDING IN QUEZON CITY, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC,
March 7, 2017)
JAPSD
Topics
FREEDOM TO
FREE
BELIEVE
EXERCISE Conscientious Accommodation
CLAUSE objector / Benevolent
neutrality
FREEDOM TO ACT
FREEDOM OF
ON ONE’S BELIEF
RELIGION
Strict neutrality
NON-
ESTABLISHMEN
T CLAUSE No public resources
should benefit any
or all religion
JAPSD
Two-fold nature of the free-exercise clause
[T]he constitution embraces two concepts, that is, freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is
absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for
the protection of society. The freedom to act must have appropriate definitions to preserve the
enforcement of that protection. In every case, the power to regulate must be so exercised, in attaining
a permissible end, as not to unduly infringe on the protected freedom.
In a nutshell, the Constitution guarantees the freedom to believe absolutely, while the freedom to act
based on belief is subject to regulation by the State when necessary to protect the rights of others and
in the interest of public welfare.
JAPSD
Freedom to Believe
• 1) Freedom to Believe
• The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the
hereafter. He may indulge his own theories about life and death; worship any god
he chooses, or none at all; embrace or reject any religion; acknowledge the
divinity of God or of any being that appeals to his reverence; recognize or deny the
immortality of his soul - in fact, cherish any religious conviction as he and he alone
sees fit. However absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile and
heretical to the majority, he has full freedom to believe as he pleases. He may not
be required to prove his beliefs. He may not be punished for his inability to do so.
Religion, after all, is a matter of faith. "Men may believe what they cannot prove."
Every one has a right to his beliefs and he may not be called to account because he
cannot prove what he believes.
JAPSD
Freedom to Act on One’s Beliefs
• (2) Freedom to Act on One's Beliefs
• But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the
public, his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the
State. As great as this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all other rights
guaranteed in the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a proper regard for the
rights of others.
• It is error to think that the mere invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the
State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The inherent police
power can be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society. And this
is true even if such practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not
merely for the purpose of evading the reasonable requirements or prohibitions of
the law.
JAPSD
Accommodation/ Benevolent Neutrality
• Accommodation, Not Establishment of Religion

• In order to give life to the constitutional right of freedom of religion, the State adopts a policy
of accommodation. Accommodation is a recognition of the reality that some governmental
measures may not be imposed on a certain portion of the population for the reason that
these measures are contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the
exercise of the right does not impair the public welfare, the attempt of the State to
regulate or prohibit such right would be an unconstitutional encroachment. (In re Valenciano,
A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)
JAPSD
In Estrada v. Escritor, the Court adopted a policy of benevolent neutrality:
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government
policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the government's favored form
of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their
purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or
institution's religion. As Justice Brennan explained, the "government [may] take religion into
account ... to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation
individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create
without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish."
[Emphases supplied]
JAPSD
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions,
accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government’s favored form of
religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. “The
purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or
institution’s religion.”[216] “What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration
of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its
‘burdensome effect,’ whether by the legislature or the courts.” (Escritor as quoted in Imbong)
JAPSD
Conscientious Objector
The case of Gerona v. Secretary of Education (G.R. No. L-13954 August 12, 1959) cited
Hamilton vs. University of California, 293 U.S. 243, 79 L. ed. 343 where The University of California
received endowment and support from the State legislature under certain conditions such as that
any resident of California of the age of 14 years or upward of approved moral character shall have
the right to enter the University as a student and receive instructions therein. The University as part
of its curriculum and instruction required military science and tactics in the Reserve Officers Training
Corps. Hamilton conformed to all requirements of the University except taking the course in military
science and tactics and for this the regents of the University suspended them. Appellants were
members of the Methodist Espiscopal Church and of the Epworth League. For many years their
fathers have been ordained ministers of that church. They believed that war and preparation for war
is a violation of their religious belief. In other words, they were conscientious objectors to war. They
believed that war, training for war, and military training were immoral, wrong and contrary to the
letter and spirit of the teaching of God and precepts of the Christian religion. They petitioned for
exemption from the military science and tactics course but the regents refused to make military
training optional or to exempt them and they were suspended.
JAPSD
Conscientious Objector
A conscientious objector is an "individual who has claimed the right to refuse to perform military
service"[1] on the grounds of freedom of thought, conscience, or religion.[2]
In some countries, conscientious objectors are assigned to an alternative civilian service as a
substitute for conscription or military service. Some conscientious objectors consider themselves
pacifist, non-interventionist, non-resistant, non-aggressionist, anti-imperialist or antimilitarist.
On March 8, 1995, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights resolution 1995/83 stated that
"persons performing military service should not be excluded from the right to have conscientious
objections to military service."[3] This was re-affirmed in 1998, when resolution 1998/77 recognized
that "persons [already] performing military service may develop conscientious
objections."[4][5][6][7] A number of organizations around the world celebrate the principle on May
15 as International Conscientious Objectors Day.[8] The term has also been extended to objecting to
working for the military–industrial complex due to a crisis of conscience
JAPSD
Non-establishment Clause
• The non-establishment clause reinforces the wall of separation between Church
and State. It simply means that the State cannot set up a Church; nor pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religion, or prefer one religion over another nor force
nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his will or
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion; that the state cannot
punish a person for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for
church attendance or nonattendance; that no tax in any amount, large or small,
can be levied to support any religious activity or institution whatever they may be
called or whatever form they may adopt or teach or practice religion; that the
state cannot openly or secretly participate in the affairs of any religious
organization or group and vice versa.36 Its minimal sense is that the state cannot
establish or sponsor an official religion.
JAPSD
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with
religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government
to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the government to
restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular
religion and, thus, establish a state religion.
JAPSD
• Father Bernas further elaborated on this matter, as follows:
• "In effect, what non-establishment calls for is government neutrality in religious matters. Such
government neutrality may be summarized in four general propositions: (1) Government must
not prefer one religion over another or religion over irreligion because such preference would
violate voluntarism and breed dissension; (2) Government funds must not be applied to religious
purposes because this too would violate voluntarism and breed interfaith dissension; (3)
Government action must not aid religion because this too can violate voluntarism and breed
interfaith dissension; [and] (4) Government action must not result in excessive entanglement
with religion because this too can violate voluntarism and breed interfaith dissension."
JAPSD
Accommodation v. Establishment
Establishment entails a positive action on the part of the State. Accommodation, on the other
hand, is passive. In the former, the State becomes involved through the use of government
resources with the primary intention of setting up a state religion. In the latter, the State, without
being entangled, merely gives consideration to its citizens who want to freely exercise their
religion.
Thus, our Constitution also prohibits the registration of religious sects and denominations as
political parties(Sec 2[5] Art. IX-C) and excludes the religious sector in the allocation of party-list
representatives for the lower house( Section 5[2] Art.VI)
JAPSD
As per Escritor
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve
contradictory purposes. They have a single goal—to promote freedom of individual
religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits
government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and
practice, while the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the
two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the
carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices.
JAPSD
In re Valenciano
In his first Letter,1 dated January 6, 2009, Valenciano reported that the basement of the Hall of Justice of
Quezon City (QC) had been converted into a Roman Catholic Chapel, complete with offertory table, images
of Catholic religious icons, a canopy, an electric organ, and a projector. He believed that such practice
violated the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State and the constitutional
prohibition against the appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of a sect, church,
denomination, or any other system of religion.
Valenciano further averred that the holding of masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice showed that
it tended to favor Catholic litigants; that the rehearsals of the choir caused great disturbance to other
employees; that the public could no longer use the basement as resting place; that the employees and
litigants of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), Branches 82 and 83 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Legal
Library, Philippine Mediation Center, and Records Section of the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC) could not
attend to their personal necessities such as going to the lavatories because they could not traverse the
basement between 12:00 o'clock noontime and 1: 15 o'clock in the afternoon; that the court employees
became hostile toward each other as they vied for the right to read the epistle; and that the water supply in
the entire building was cut off during the mass because the generator was turned off to ensure silence.
JAPSD
Imbong v. Ochoa
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental
actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the
government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to
exercise their religion without hindrance. “The purpose of accommodation is to
remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s
religion.”[216] “What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a
declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its
application or its ‘burdensome effect,’ whether by the legislature or the courts.”[
JAPSD
In re Valenciano
A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)
1. Does the holding of masses at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice violate the
constitutional principle of separation of church and state?
2. Does the holding of masses at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice violate the
constitutional prohibition against appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of any
sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion?
JAPSD
In re Valenciano
A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)
The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

The Court once pronounced that "our history, not to speak of the history of
mankind, has taught us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for
occasions might arise when the state will use the church, and the church the state,
as a weapon in the furtherance of their respective ends and aims."
JAPSD
In re Valenciano
A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)
• Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of separation of Church

and State. In fact, these two principles are in perfect harmony with each other.
• The State is aware of the existence of religious movements whose members
believe in the divinity of Jose Rizal. Yet, it does not implement measures to
suppress the said religious sects. Such inaction or indifference on the part of the
State gives meaning to the separation of Church and State, and at the same time,
recognizes the religious freedom of the members of these sects to worship their
own Supreme Being.
JAPSD
In re Valenciano
A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)
• As pointed out by Judge Lutero, "the Roman Catholics express their worship
through the holy mass and to stop these would be tantamount to repressing the
right to the free exercise of their religion. Our Muslim brethren, who are
government employees, are allowed to worship their Allah even during office
hours inside their own offices. The Seventh Day Adventists are exempted from
rendering Saturday duty because their religion prohibits them from working on a
Saturday. Even Christians have been allowed to conduct their own bible studies in
their own offices. All these have been allowed in respect of the workers' right to
the free exercise of their religion. xxx"26
• Clearly, allowing the citizens to practice their religion is not equivalent to a fusion
of Church and State.
• No Compelling State Interest
JAPSD
In re Valenciano , A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)
Religious freedom, however, is not absolute. It cannot have its way if there is a compelling state interest. To successfully invoke
compelling state interest, it must be demonstrated that the masses in the QC Hall of Justice unduly disrupt the delivery of public
services or affect the judges and employees in the performance of their official functions. In Estrada v. Escritor,27 the Court
expounded on the test as follows:
The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects
on the state's interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would
protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However,
not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental .right that enjoys a
preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This
right is sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of
limited government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty
God in order to build a just and humane society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a right with just a
colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental
right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the
state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In determining which shall prevail between the
state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The "compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering
religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to the paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in
Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by upholding the
paramount interests of the state, seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be preserved.137 [Citations
omitted] [Emphases supplied]
JAPSD
In re Valenciano
A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)
Guided by the foregoing, it is our considered view that the holding of Catholic masses at the
basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not a case of establishment, but merely accommodation.
First, there is no law, ordinance or circular issued by any duly constitutive authorities
expressly mandating that judiciary employees attend the Catholic masses at the
basement. Second, when judiciary employees attend the masses to profess their faith, it is at
their own initiative as they are there on their own free will and volition, without any coercion
from the judges or administrative officers. Third, no government funds are being spent
because the lightings and airconditioning continue to be operational even if there are no
religious rituals there. Fourth, the basement has neither been converted into a Roman
Catholic chapel nor has it been permanently appropriated for the exclusive use of its
faithful. Fifth, the allowance of the masses has not prejudiced other religions.
JAPSD
In re Valenciano
A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)
• Section 29 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides, "No public money or property shall be
appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of
any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest,
preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or
government orphanage or leprosarium."
• The word "apply" means "to use or employ for a particular purpose."40 "Appropriate" means "to
prescribe a particular use for particular moneys or to designate or destine a fund or property for a
distinct use, or for the payment of a particular demand."
JAPSD
In re Valenciano
A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)
• Thus, the words "pay" and "employ" should be understood to mean that what is prohibited is the
use of public money or property for the sole purpose of benefiting or supporting any church. The
prohibition contemplates a scenario where the appropriation is primarily intended for the
furtherance of a particular church.
• It has also been held that the aforecited constitutional provision "does not inhibit the use of public
property for religious purposes when the religious character of such use is merely incidental to a
temporary use which is available indiscriminately to the public in general." Hence, a public street
may be used for a religious procession even as it is available for a civic parade, in the same way that
a public plaza is not barred to a religious rally if it may also be used for a political assemblage.
JAPSD
In re Valenciano
A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)
n relation thereto, the phrase "directly or indirectly" refers to the manner of appropriation of
public money or property, not as to whether a particular act involves a direct or a mere incidental
benefit to any church. Otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have placed it before
"use, benefit or support" to describe the same. Even the exception to the same provision bolsters
this interpretation. The exception contemplates a situation wherein public funds are paid to a
priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary because they rendered service in
the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium. That a
priest belongs to a particular church and the latter may have benefited from the money he
received is of no moment, for the purpose of the payment of public funds is merely to
compensate the priest for services rendered and for which other persons, who will perform the
same services will also be compensated in the same manner.
JAPSD
Valmores v. MSU, G.R. No. 217453, July
19, 2017
Denmark S. Valmores (Valmores) is a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, whose
fundamental beliefs include the strict observance of the Sabbath as a sacred day. As such, petitioner
Valmores joins the faithful in worshipping and resting on Saturday, the seventh day of the week, and
refrains from non-religious undertakings from sunset of Friday to sunset of Saturday.
Valmores is enrolled as a student of medicine at the Mindanao State University. Sometimes, his
classes were moved from the regular weekdays to Saturdays. At one time, he missed his exams in
Risto-Pathology laboratory examination held on September 13, 2015, a Saturday; and was
subsequently given a failing grade. Valmores sought for reconsideration from his teacher but was
refused.
JAPSD
19, 2017
Valmores argues that he is bound by his religious convictions to refrain from all secular activities
on Saturdays, a day that is deemed holy by his church.
On the other hand, MSU‘s refusal to excuse petitioner Valmores from Saturday classes and
examinations fundamentally rests only on the fact that there were other Seventh-day Adventists
who had successfully completed their studies at the MSU-College of Medicine. Even worse,
respondents suggest that the "sacrifices" of other students of the common faith justified their
refusal to give petitioner Valmores exceptional treatment.
Who is correct? MSU or Valmores?
JAPSD
19, 2017
Valmores is correct. The Bill of Rights guarantees citizens the freedom to act on their individual
beliefs and proscribes government intervention unless necessary to protect its citizens from injury
or when public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience requires it. The faculty members of the
MSU-College of Medicine, were duty-bound to protect and preserve petitioner Valmores' religious
freedom.
MSU claims that the "sacrifices" of other students of the common faith justified their refusal to give
Valmores exceptional treatment. This is non-sequitur. Respondents brush aside petitioner Valmores'
religious beliefs as if it were subject of compromise; one man's convictions and another man's
transgressions are theirs alone to bear. That other fellow believers have chosen to violate their creed
is irrelevant to the case at hand, for in religious discipline, adherence is always the general rule, and
compromise, the exception.
JAPSD
19, 2017
While in some cases the Court has sustained government regulation of religious rights, the Court
fails to see in the present case how public order and safety will be served by the denial of petitioner
Valmores' request for exemption. Neither is there any showing that petitioner Valmores' absence
from Saturday classes would be injurious to the rights of others. X x x
What is certain, as gathered from the foregoing, is that respondents' concerted refusal to
accommodate petitioner Valmores rests mainly on extralegal grounds, which cannot, by no stretch
of legal verbiage, defeat the latter's constitutionally-enshrined rights. That petitioner Valmores is
being made by respondents to choose between honoring his religious obligations and finishing his
education is a patent infringement of his religious freedoms. As the final bulwark of fundamental
rights, this Court will not allow such violation to perpetuate any further.
JAPSD
19, 2017
Every person is free to tread the far territories of their conscience, no matter where they may lead -
for the freedom to believe and act on one's own convictions and the protection of such freedom
extends to all people, from the theistic to the godless. The State must, as a matter of duty rather
than consequence, guarantee that such pursuit remains unfettered.
As representatives of the State, educational institutions are bound to safeguard the religious
freedom of their students. Thus, to such end, our schools carry the responsibility to restrict its own
academic liberties, should they collide with constitutionally preferred rights.
JAPSD
Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of
Schools of Cebu, G.R. Nos. 95770 and 95887,
March 1, 1993
We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national
anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group which admittedly comprises a "small portion of
the school population" will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught and
uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for
national heroes" (Gerona vs. Sec. of Education, 106 Phil. 2, 24 ). After all, what the petitioners seek only is
exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where they may study the
Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of government, and learn not only the arts, sciences,
Philippine history and culture but also receive training for a vocation or profession and be taught the virtues of
"patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and
moral and spiritual values["] (Sec. 3 [2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the curricula. Expelling or banning
the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation that this court had feared in Gerona.
Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their
religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities.
Xxx
Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will
violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty
of the State to "protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education x x x and to make such
education accessible to all" (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).
JAPSD
Liberty of Abode
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.cralaw
JAPSD
Exercise
Under DOJ Circular No. 41 the DOJ Secretary may issue a Hold Departure Order (HDO) against an
accused in criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the MTC and against defendants, respondents and
witnesses in labor or administrative cases. He may also issue a Wait List Order (WLO) against the
accused in criminal cases pending before the RTC. The DOJ Secretary may likewise issue WLO against
respondents in criminal cases pending preliminary investigation, petition for review or motion for
reconsideration before the DOJ. He also has the authority to issue a HDO or WLO motu proprio.
Is DOJ Circular No. 41 constitutional?
JAPSD
Genuino v. De Lima, and companion cases
G.R. Nos. 197930, 199034, & 199046, April 17, 2018
…there are only three considerations that may permit a restriction on the right to travel: national
security, public safety or public health. As a further requirement, there must be an explicit provision
of statutory law or the Rules of Court providing for the impairment. The requirement for a legislative
enactment was purposely added to prevent inordinate restraints on the person's right to travel by
administrative officials who may be tempted to wield authority under the guise of national security,
public safety or public health. This is in keeping with the principle that ours is a government of laws
and not of men and also with the canon that provisions of law limiting the enjoyment of liberty should
be construed against the government and in favor of the individual.
JAPSD
G.R. Nos. 197930, 199034, & 199046, April 17, 2018
…the liberty of abode may only be impaired by a lawful order of the court and, on the one hand,
the right to travel may only be impaired by a law that concerns national security, public safety or
public health. Therefore, when the exigencies of times call for a limitation on the right to travel, the
Congress must respond to the need by explicitly providing for the restriction in a law. This is in
deference to the primacy of the right to travel, being a constitutionally-protected right and not simply
a statutory right, that it can only be curtailed by a legislative enactment.
JAPSD
G.R. Nos. 197930, 199034, & 199046, April 17, 2018
Some statutory limitations [to the right to travel] are the following:
1] The Human Security Act of 2010 or [R.A.] No. 9372. The law restricts the right to travel of an individual
charged with the crime of terrorism even though such person is out on bail.
2] The Philippine Passport Act of 1996 or R.A. No. 8239. Pursuant to said law, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs or
his authorized consular officer may refuse the issuance of, restrict the use of, or withdraw, a passport of a
Filipino citizen.
3] The "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003" or R.A. No. 9208. Pursuant to the provisions thereof, the [BI], in
order to manage migration and curb trafficking in persons, issued Memorandum Order Radir No. 2011-011,
allowing its Travel Control and Enforcement Unit to "offload passengers with fraudulent travel documents,
doubtful purpose of travel, including possible victims of human trafficking" from our ports.
JAPSD
G.R. Nos. 197930, 199034, & 199046, April 17, 2018
Some statutory limitations [to the right to travel] are the following:
4] The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 or R. A. No. 8042, as amended by R.A. No.
10022. In enforcement of said law, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) may
refuse to issue deployment permit to a specific country that effectively prevents our migrant workers
to enter such country.
5] The Act on Violence against Women and Children or R.A. No. 9262. The law restricts movement of
an individual against whom the protection order is intended.
6] Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 or R.A. No. 8043. Pursuant thereto, the Inter-Country Adoption
Board may issue rules restrictive of an adoptee's right to travel "to protect the Filipino child from
abuse, exploitation, trafficking and/or sale or any other practice in connection with adoption which is
harmful, detrimental, or prejudicial to the child." JAPSD
G.R. Nos. 197930, 199034, & 199046, April 17, 2018
In any case, when there is a dilemma between an
individual claiming the exercise of a constitutional right
vis-a-vis the state's assertion of authority to restrict the
same, any doubt must, at all times, be resolved in favor
of the free exercise of the right, absent any explicit
provision of law to the contrary.
JAPSD
G.R. Nos. 197930, 199034, & 199046, April 17, 2018
The DOJ stresses the necessity of the restraint imposed in DOJ Circular No. 41 in that to allow the
petitioners, who are under preliminary investigation, to exercise an untrammelled right to travel,
especially when the risk of flight is distinctly high will surely impede the efficient and effective
operation of the justice system. The absence of the petitioners, it asseverates, would mean that the
farthest criminal proceeding they could go would be the filing of the criminal information since they
cannot be arraigned in absentia.
It bears emphasizing that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is an implement of due process
which essentially benefits the accused as it accords an opportunity for the presentation of his side
with regard to the accusation. The accused may, however, opt to waive his presence in the
preliminary investigation. In any case, whether the accused responds to a subpoena, the investigating
prosecutor shall resolve the complaint within 10 days after the filing of the same.
JAPSD
G.R. Nos. 197930, 199034, & 199046, April 17, 2018
The point is that in the conduct of a preliminary investigation, the presence of the accused is not
necessary for the prosecutor to discharge his investigatory duties. If the accused chooses to waive his
presence or fails to submit countervailing evidence, that is his own lookout. Ultimately, he shall be
bound by the determination of the prosecutor on the presence of probable cause and he cannot claim
denial of due process.
The DOJ therefore cannot justify the restraint in the liberty of movement imposed by DOJ Circular
No. 41 on the ground that it is necessary to ensure presence and attendance in the preliminary
investigation of the complaints. There is also no authority of law granting it the power to compel the
attendance of the subjects of a preliminary investigation, pursuant to its investigatory powers under
E.O. No. 292. Its investigatory power is simply inquisitorial and, unfortunately, not broad enough to
embrace the imposition of restraint on the liberty of movement.
JAPSD
G.R. Nos. 197930, 199034, & 199046, April 17, 2018
The DOJ's reliance on the police power of the state cannot also be countenanced. Police power
pertains to the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare." "It may be said to be that inherent and plenary
power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of
society."Verily, the exercise of this power is primarily lodged with the legislature but may be wielded
by the President and administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels,
including the barangay, by virtue of a valid delegation of power.
JAPSD
G.R. Nos. 197930, 199034, & 199046, April 17, 2018
t bears noting, however, that police power may only be validly exercised if (a) the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the
State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought
to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.115
On its own, the DOJ cannot wield police power since the authority pertains to Congress. Even if it
claims to be exercising the same as the alter ego of the President, it must first establish the presence
of a definite legislative enactment evidencing the delegation of power from its principal. This, the DOJ
failed to do. There is likewise no showing that the curtailment of the right to travel imposed by DOJ
Circular No. 41 was reasonably necessary in order for it to perform its investigatory duties.
JAPSD
G.R. Nos. 197930, 199034, & 199046, April 17, 2018
In any case, the exercise of police power, to be valid, must be reasonable and not repugnant to the
Constitution.116 It must never be utilized to espouse actions that violate the Constitution. Any act,
however noble its intentions, is void if it violates the Constitution.117 In the clear language of the
Constitution, it is only in the interest of national security, public safety and public health that the right
to travel may be impaired. None one of the mentioned circumstances was invoked by the DOJ as its
premise for the promulgation of DOJ Circular No. 41.
JAPSD
G.R. Nos. 197930, 199034, & 199046, April 17, 2018
1. DOJ Circular No. 41 is not a law. It is not a legislative enactment which underwent the scrutiny and
concurrence of lawmakers, and submitted to the President for approval. It is a mere
administrative issuance apparently designed to carry out the provisions of an enabling law which
the former DOJ Secretary believed to be Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, otherwise known as the
"Administrative Code of 1987." She opined that DOJ Circular No. 41 was validly issued pursuant to
the agency's rule-making powers provided in Sections 1 and 3, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 1 of E.O.
No. 292 and Section 50, Chapter 11, Book IV of the mentioned Code.DOJ Circular #41 has no legal
basis.
2. The Administrative Code upon which DOJ relies does not contain provisions that authorizes the
DOJ to issue HDOs or WLOs.
JAPSD
G.R. Nos. 197930, 199034, & 199046, April 17, 2018
The right to travel is part of the "liberty" of which a citizen cannot be deprived without due process of
law. It is part and parcel of the guarantee of freedom of movement that the Constitution affords its
citizen. Pertinently, Section 6, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Xxx
Liberty under the foregoing clause includes the right to choose one's residence, to leave it whenever
he pleases and to travel wherever he wills. Thus, in Zacarias Villavicencio vs. Justo Lucban, the Court
held illegal the action of the Mayor of Manila in expelling women who were known prostitutes and
sending them to Davao in order to eradicate vices and immoral activities proliferated by the said
subjects. It was held that regardless of the mayor's laudable intentions, no person may compel
another to change his residence without being expressly authorized by law or regulation.
JAPSD
G.R. Nos. 197930, 199034, & 199046, April 17, 2018
It bears reiterating that the power to issue HDO is inherent to the courts. The courts may issue a HDO
against an accused in a criminal case so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. It does not
require legislative conferment or constitutional recognition; it co-exists with the grant of judicial
power. In Defensor-Santiago vs. Vasquez,136 the Court declared, thus:
Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of
jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers
as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or essential to the existence,
dignity and functions of the court, as well as to the due administration of justice; or are directly
appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and include the power
to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants. The inherent
powers of the courts are essential in upholding its integrity and largely beneficial in keeping the
people's faith in the institution by ensuring that it has the power and the means to enforce its
jurisdiction.
JAPSD
G.R. Nos. 197930, 199034, & 199046, April 17, 2018
As regards the power of the courts to regulate foreign travels, the Court, in Leave Division, explained:
With respect to the power of the Court, Section 5 (6), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. This provision
empowers the Court to oversee all matters relating to the effective supervision and management of all courts
and personnel under it. Recognizing this mandate, Memorandum Circular No. 26 of the Office of the President,
dated July 31, 1986, considers the Supreme Court exempt and with authority to promulgate its own rules and
regulations on foreign travels. Thus, the Court came out with OCA Circular No. 49-2003 (B).
Where a person joins the Judiciary or the government in general, he or she swears to faithfully adhere to, and
abide with, the law and the corresponding office rules and regulations. These rules and regulations, to which
one submits himself or herself, have been issued to guide the government officers and employees in the
efficient performance of their obligations. When one becomes a public servant, he or she assumes certain duties
with their concomitant responsibilities and gives up some rights like the absolute right to travel so that public
service would not be prejudiced. JAPSD
G.R. Nos. 197930, 199034, & 199046, April 17, 2018
It is therefore by virtue of its administrative supervision over all courts and personnel that this Court came out
with OCA Circular No. 49-2003, which provided for the guidelines that must be observed by employees of the
judiciary seeking to travel abroad. Specifically, they are required to secure a leave of absence for the purpose of
foreign travel from this Court through the Chief Justice and the Chairmen of the Divisions, or from the Office of
the Court Administrator, as the case maybe. This is "to ensure management of court dockets and to avoid
disruption in the administration of justice."139
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 is therefore not a restriction, but more properly, a regulation of the employee's leave
for purpose of foreign travel which is necessary for the orderly administration ofjustice. To "restrict" is to restrain
or prohibit a person from doing something; to "regulate" is to govern or direct according to rule.140 This
regulation comes as a necessary consequence of the individual's employment in the judiciary, as part and parcel
of his contract in joining the institution. For, if the members of the judiciary are at liberty to go on leave any
time, the dispensation ofjustice will be seriously hampered. Short of key personnel, the courts cannot properly
function in the midst of the intricacies in the administration of justice. At any rate, the concerned employee is
not prevented from pursuing his travel plans without complying with OCA Circular No. 49-2003 but he must be
ready to suffer the consequences of his non-compliance.
JAPSD
G.R. Nos. 197930, 199034, & 199046, April 17, 2018
The regulation of the foreign travels of government employees was deemed necessary "to promote
efficiency and economy in the government service." The objective was clearly administrative
efficiency so that government employees will continue to render public services unless they are given
approval to take a leave of absence in which case they can freely exercise their right to travel. It should
never be interpreted as an exception to the right to travel since the government employee during his
approved leave of absence can travel wherever he wants, locally or abroad. This is no different from
the leave application requirements for employees in private companies.
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The Right to Travel
refers to the right to move freely from the Philippines to other countries or within the
Philippines. It is a right embraced within the general concept of liberty. Liberty - a birthright of
every person - includes the power of locomotion and the right of citizens to be free to use their
faculties in lawful ways and to live and work where they desire or where they can best pursue
the ends of life.
The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and exercise their other rights,
such as the rights to education, free expression, assembly, association, and religion. (SPARK v.
Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)
JAPSD
Right to Travel
The inter-relation of the right to travel with other fundamental rights was briefly rationalized in City of
Maquoketa v. Russell,as follows:
Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, speech, assembly, and association require one
to move about, such movement must necessarily be protected under the First Amendment.
Restricting movement in those circumstances to the extent that First Amendment Rights cannot be exercised
without violating the law is equivalent to a denial of those rights. One court has eloquently pointed this out:
We would not deny the relatedness of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to freedom of travel
and movement. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to their church, their freedom to worship is
impaired. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to the meeting hall, freedom of assembly is
effectively blocked. If, for any reason, people cannot safely walk the sidewalks or drive the streets of a
community, opportunities for freedom of speech are sharply limited. Freedom of movement is inextricably
involved with freedoms set forth in the First Amendment. (Emphases supplied) (SPARK v. Quezon City, G.R.
No. 225442, August 8, 2017) JAPSD
Exercise
The Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) assailed the constitutionality of the curfew
ordinances, claiming that these deprive minors of the e right to travel without substantive due
process. The curfew ordinances have the following purposes: promotion of juvenile safety and
prevention of juvenile crime. Is SPARK correct?
…grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions

even if made against fundamental rights. Specifically on the freedom to move
from one place to another, jurisprudence provides that this right is not
absolute. As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State may impose
limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are
provided by law. JAPSD
(SPARK v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442,
August 8, 2017)
The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile safety and
prevention of juvenile crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The restriction on the
minor's movement and activities within the confines of their residences and their immediate vicinity
during the curfew period is perceived to reduce the probability of the minor becoming victims of or
getting involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the second requirement, i.e., that the
limitation "be provided by law," our legal system is replete with laws emphasizing the State's duty
to afford special protection to children, i.e., RA 7610, as amended, RA 9775. RA 9262, RA 9851, RA
9344, RA 1036, RA 9211, RA8980, RA9288, and Presidential Decree (PD) 603,107 as amended.
JAPSD
August 8, 2017)
See Section 2 of RA 7610, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE,
EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," otherwise known as
"SPECIAL PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION ACT" (July 27, 1992).
99 See Section 2 of RA 9775, entitled "AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING THE CRIME OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES
THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," otherwise known as the "ANTI-CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ACT OF 2009," approved on November 17,
2009.
100 See Sections 2 and 4 of RA 9262, entitled "AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR
PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENAL TIES THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," otherwise known as the "ANTI-
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004" (March 27, 2004).
101 See Section 2 of RA 9851, entitled "AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING CRIMES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW,
GENOCIDE AND OTHER CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, ORGANIZING JURISDICTION, DESIGNATING SPECIAL COURTS, AND FOR RELATED
PURPOSES" otherwise known as the "PHILIPPINE ACT ON CRIMES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, GENOCIDE, AND OTHER
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY," approved on December 11, 2009.
102 See Section 2 of RA 9344.

JAPSD
August 8, 2017)
103 See Sections 3 (a) and (b) of RA 10364, entitled "AN ACT EXPANDING REPUBLIC ACT No. 9208, ENTITLED 'AN ACT TO INSTITUTE POLICIES
TO ELIMINATE TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ESPECIALLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN, ESTABLISHING THE NECESSARY INSTITUTIONAL
MECHANISMS FOR THE PROTECTION AND SUPPORT OF TRAFFICKED PERSONS, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATIONS AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES," OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "EXPANDED ANTI-TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ACT OF 2012," approved on February 6, 2013.
104 See Section 32 (b) of RA 9211, entitled "AN ACT REGULATING THE PACKAGING, USE, SALE, DISTRIBUTION AND ADVERTISEMENTS OF
TOBACCO PRODUCTS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," otherwise known as ''TOBACCO REGULATION ACT OF 2003"(September 2, 2003).
105 See Sections 2 and 3 of RA 8980, entitled "AN ACT PROMULGATING A COMPREHENSIVE POLICY AND A NATIONAL SYSTEM FOR EARLY
CHILDHOOD CARE AND DEVELOPMENT (ECCD), PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," otherwise known as "ECCD
ACT" (May 22, 2001 ).
106 See Sections 2 and 3 of RA 9288, entitled "AN ACT PROMULGATING A COMPREHENSIVE POLICY AND A NATIONAL SYSTEM FOR
ENSURING NEWBORN SCREENING," otherwise known as the "NEWBORN SCREENING ACT OF 2004" (May 10, 2004).
107 See Articles 1, 3, and 8 of PD 603, entitled "THE CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CODE," approved on December 10, 1974.
JAPSD
August 8, 2017)
Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly authorizes local
government units, through their city or municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children. It reads:
Article 139. Curfew Hours for Children. - City or municipal councils may prescribe such curfew hours
for children as may be warranted by local conditions. The duty to enforce curfew ordinances shall
devolve upon the parents or guardians and the local authorities.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact curfew ordinances (as what respondents
have done in this case) and enforce the same through their local officials. In other words, PD 603
provides sufficient statutory basis - as required by the Constitution - to restrict the minors' exercise
JAPSD
of the right to travel.
August 8, 2017)
The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are likewise
constitutionally permissible. In this relation, this Court recognizes that minors do possess and enjoy
constitutional rights,108 but the exercise of these rights is not co-extensive as those of adults.109
They are always subject to the authority or custody of another, such as their parent/s and/or
guardian/s, and the State.110 As parens patriae, the State regulates and, to a certain extent,
restricts the minors' exercise of their rights, such as in their affairs concerning the right to vote,111
the right to execute contracts,112 and the right to engage in gainful employment.113 With respect
to the right to travel, minors are required by law to obtain a clearance from the Department of
Social Welfare and Development before they can travel to a foreign country by themselves or with a
person other than their parents.114 These limitations demonstrate that the State has broader
authority over the minors' activities than over similar actions of adults,115 and overall, reflect the
State's general interest in the well-being of minors.116 Thus, the State may impose limitations on
the minors' exercise of rights even though these limitations do not generally apply to adults.
JAPSD
August 8, 2017)
In Bellotti,117the US Supreme Court identified three (3) justifications for the differential treatment
of the minors' constitutional rights. These are: first, the peculiar vulnerability of children; second,
their inability to make critical decisions in an informed and mature manner; and third, the
importance of the parental role in child rearing:118
[On the first reason,] our cases show that although children generally are protected by the same
constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to
adjust its legal system to account for children's vulnerability and their needs for 'concern, ...
sympathy, and ... paternal attention.x x x.
[On the second reason, this Court's rulings are] grounded [on] the recognition that, during the
formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and
judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them. x x x.
JAPSD
August 8, 2017)
xxxx
[On the third reason,] the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children justifies
limitations on the freedoms of minors. The State commonly protects its youth from adverse
governmental action and from their own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or
involvement in important decisions by minors. x x x.
xxxx
x x x Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important
to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free
society meaningful and rewarding.119 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
JAPSD
August 8, 2017)
Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts,120 the US Supreme Court acknowledged the heightened
dangers on the streets to minors, as compared to adults:
A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young
people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this against impeding
restraints and dangers within a broad range of selection. Among evils most appropriate for such
action are the crippling effects of child employment, more especially in public places, and the
possible harms arising from other activities subject to all the diverse influences of the [streets]. It is
too late now to doubt that legislation appropriately designed to reach such evils is within the state's
police power, whether against the parent's claim to control of the child or one that religious scruples
dictate contrary action.
JAPSD
August 8, 2017)
It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the primary use of highways. But
even in such use streets afford dangers for them not affecting adults. And in other uses, whether in
work or in other things, this difference may be magnified.121 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
For these reasons, the State is justified in setting restrictions on the minors' exercise of their travel
rights, provided, they are singled out on reasonable grounds.
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Closure of Boracay (Zabal v. Duterte, G.R.
No. 238467, February 12, 2019)
In fine, this case does not actually involve the right to travel in its essential sense contrary to what
petitioners want to portray. Any bearing that Proclamation No. 475 may have on the right to travel
is merely corollary to the closure of Boracay and the ban of tourists and non-residents therefrom
which were necessary incidents of the island's rehabilitation. There is certainly no showing that
Proclamation No. 475 deliberately meant to impair the right to travel. The questioned proclamation
is clearly focused on its purpose of rehabilitating Boracay and any intention to directly restrict the
right cannot, in any manner, be deduced from its import. This is contrary to the import of several
laws recognized as constituting an impairment on the right to travel which directly impose
restriction on the right
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Right to information
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used
as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
JAPSD
Was there a violation on the right to
information?
On May 23, 2005, the Committee on Tariff and Related Matters (CTRM), an office under the National
Economic Development Authority (NEDA), held a meeting in which it resolved to recommend to
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo the lifting of the suspension of the tariff reduction schedule on
petrochemicals and certain plastic products, thereby reducing the Common Effective Preferential Tariff
(CEPT) rates on products covered by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 161 from 7% or 10% to 5% starting July
2005.
On June 9, 2005, Wilfredo A. Paras (Paras), then the Chairman of the Association of Petrochemical
Manufacturers of the Philippines (APMP), the main industry association in the petrochemical sector,
wrote to the CTRM Secretariat, through its Director Brenda Mendoza (Director Mendoza), to request a
copy of the minutes of the meeting held on May 23, 2005. Director Mendoza denied the request.
JAPSD
Sereno v. CTRM, et. al.
G.R. No. 175210, Feb 1, 2016
The constitutional guarantee of the right to information on matters of public concern enunciated in
Section 7 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution complements the State’s policy of full public disclosure
in all transactions involving public interest expressed in Section 28 of Article II of the 1987
Constitution. These provisions are aimed at ensuring transparency in policy-making as well as in the
operations of the Government, and at safeguarding the exercise by the people of the freedom of
expression. In a democratic society like ours, the free exchange of information is necessary, and can
be possible only if the people are provided the proper information on matters that affect them. But
the people’s right to information is not absolute. According to Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,18
the constitutional guarantee to information "does not open every door to any and all information."19
It is limited to matters of public concern, and is subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.20 Likewise, the State’s policy of full public disclosure is restricted to transactions involving
public interest, and is further subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law.
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G.R. No. 175210, Feb 1, 2016
Two requisites must concur before the right to information may be compelled by writ of mandamus.
Firstly, the information sought must be in relation to matters of public concern or public interest.
And, secondly, it must not be exempt by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
As to the first requisite, there is no rigid test in determining whether or not a particular information is
of public concern or public interest.22 Both terms cover a wide-range of issues that the public may
want to be familiar with either because the issues have a direct effect on them or because the issues
"naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen."23 As such, whether or not the information
sought is of public interest or public concern is left to the proper determination of the courts on a
case to case basis.
JAPSD
G.R. No. 175210, Feb 1, 2016
The Philippine petrochemical industry centers on the manufacture of plastic and other related
materials, and provides essential input requirements for the agricultural and industrial sectors of the
country. Thus, the position of the petrochemical industry as an essential contributor to the overall
growth of our country’s economy easily makes the information sought a matter of public concern or
interest.
JAPSD
G.R. No. 175210, Feb 1, 2016
The second requisite is that the information requested must not be excluded by law from the
constitutional guarantee. In that regard, the Court has already declared that the constitutional
guarantee of the people’s right to information does not cover national security matters and
intelligence information, trade secrets and banking transactions and criminal matters.25 Equally
excluded from coverage of the constitutional guarantee are diplomatic correspondence, closed-door
Cabinet meeting and executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal
deliberations of the Supreme Court.26 In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,27 the Court has ruled
that the right to information does not extend to matters acknowledged as "privileged information
under the separation of powers," which include "Presidential conversations, correspondences, or
discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings."28 Likewise exempted from the right to
information are "information on military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national
security, and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the
prosecution of the accused."
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G.R. No. 175210, Feb 1, 2016
CTRM is exempted from divulging the minutes of the meeting since the May 23, 2005 meeting was
classified as a closed-door Cabinet meeting by virtue of the committee’s composition and the nature
of its mandate dealing with matters of foreign affairs, trade and policy-making. They assert that the
information withheld was within the scope of the exemption from disclosure because the CTRM
meetings were directly related to the exercise of the sovereign prerogative of the President as the
Head of State in the conduct of foreign affairs and the regulation of trade, as provided in Section 3 (a)
of Rule IV of the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 6713.
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G.R. No. 175210, Feb 1, 2016
It is always necessary, given the highly important and complex powers to fix tariff rates vested in the
President,31 that the recommendations submitted for the President’s consideration be well-thought
out and well-deliberated. The Court has expressly recognized in Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority32 that "a frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of
publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-
making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power." In Almonte v.
Vasquez,33 the Court has stressed the need for confidentiality and privacy, stating thusly: "A President
and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and
making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except
privately."34 Without doubt, therefore, ensuring and promoting the free exchange of ideas among
the members of the committee tasked to give tariff recommendations to the President were truly
imperative.
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G.R. No. 175210, Feb 1, 2016
Every claim of exemption, being a limitation on a right constitutionally granted to the people, is
liberally construed in favor of disclosure and strictly against the claim of confidentiality. However, the
claim of privilege as a cause for exemption from the obligation to disclose information must be
clearly asserted by specifying the grounds for the exemption.35 In case of denial of access to the
information, it is the government agency concerned that has the burden of showing that the
information sought to be obtained is not a matter of public concern, or that the same is exempted
from the coverage of the constitutional guarantee.36 We reiterate, therefore, that the burden has
been well discharged herein.
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G.R. No. 175210, Feb 1, 2016
In Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita,38 we have said that executive privilege is properly invoked in
relation to specific categories of information, not to categories of persons. As such, the fact that
some members of the committee were not part of the President’s Cabinet was of no moment. What
should determine whether or not information was within the ambit of the exception from the
people’s right to access to information was not the composition of the body, but the nature of the
information sought to be accessed. A different holding would only result to the unwanted situation
wherein any concerned citizen, like the petitioner, invoking the right to information on a matter of
public concern and the State's policy of full public disclosure, could demand information from any
government agency under all conditions whenever he felt aggrieved by the decision or
recommendation of the latter.
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Right to Organize
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to
form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution states:

Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. It
shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.
xxx
JAPSD
Right to Organize
In relation thereto, Article 3 of the Labor Code provides:
Article 3. Declaration of basic policy. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.
As Article 246 (now 252) of the Labor Code provides, the right to self-organization includes the right to
form, join or assist labor organizations for the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives
of their own choosing and to engage in lawful concerted activities for the same purpose for their
mutual aid and protection. This is in line with the policy of the State to foster the free and voluntary
organization of a strong and united labor movement as well as to make sure that workers participate in
policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights, duties and welfare.
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Right to Organize
The right to form a union or association or to self-organization comprehends two notions, to wit:
(a) the liberty or freedom, that is, the absence of restraint which guarantees that the employee
may act for himself without being prevented by law; and
(b) the power, by virtue of which an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an
association.
In view of the revered right of every worker to self-organization, the law expressly allows and even
encourages the formation of labor organizations.
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Labor Organizations
A labor organization is defined as "any union or association of employees which exists in whole or
in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and
conditions of employment.“ A labor organization has two broad rights:
(1) to bargain collectively - To bargain collectively is a right given to a union once it registers itself
with the DOLE.
(2) to deal with the employer concerning terms and conditions of employment. Dealing with the
employeris a generic description of interaction between employer and employees concerning
grievances, wages, work hours and other terms and conditions of employment, even if the
employees' group is not registered with the DOLE.
JAPSD
Two Groups: Union v. Associations
A union refers to any labor organization in the private sector organized for collective bargaining
and for other legitimate purpose, while a workers' association is an organization of workers
formed for the mutual aid and protection of its members or for any legitimate purpose other
than collective bargaining.
Many associations or groups of employees, or even combinations of only several persons, may
qualify as a labor organization yet fall short of constituting a labor union. While every labor union is
a labor organization, not every labor organization is a labor union. The difference is one of
organization, composition and operation.
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Union v. Association
A cursory reading of the law demonstrates that a common element between unionism and the
formation of LMCs is the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Where neither party
is an employer nor an employee of the other, no duty to bargain collectively would exist. In the
same manner, expressed in Article 255 (now 261) is the requirement that such workers be
employed in the establishment before they can participate in policy and decision making
processes.
In contrast, the existence of employer-employee relationship is not mandatory in the formation

of workers' association. What the law simply requires is that the members of the workers'
association, at the very least, share the same interest. The very definition of a workers' association
speaks of "mutual aid and protection."
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AIM OF THE LAW IS EMPLOYEE
PARTICIPATION
Collective bargaining is just one of the forms of employee participation. Despite so much interest
in and the promotion of collective bargaining, it is incorrect to say that it is the device and no other,
which secures industrial democracy. It is equally misleading to say that collective bargaining is the
end-goal of employee representation. Rather, the real aim is EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION in
whatever form it may appear, bargaining or no bargaining, union or no union.Any labor
organization which may or may not be a union may deal with the employer. This explains why a
workers' association or organization does not always have to be a labor union and why employer-
employee collective interactions are not always collective bargaining.
JAPSD
Examples of Limitations on the Right to
Organize
1. The Labor Code specifically disallows managerial employees from joining, assisting or forming
any labor union.
2. Supervisory employees, while eligible for membership in labor organizations, are proscribed
from joining the collective bargaining unit of the rank and file employees.
3. Even government employees have the right to self-organization, not for purposes of collective
bargaining, but simply for the furtherance and protection of their interests.
JAPSD
Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hanjin
Shipyard v. Bureau of Labor Relations
G.R. No. 211145, October 14, 2015
On February 16, 2010, the Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard, an association with 120
members, filed an application for registration of its name with the DOLE. DOLE subsequently
issued its certificate of registration..
On March 15, 2010, filed a petition with DOLE-Pampanga praying for the cancellation of
registration of Samahan's association on the following grounds:
1. Its members did not fall under any of the types of workers enumerated in the second sentence of
Article 243 (now 249). Hanjin opined that only ambulant, intermittent, itinerant, rural workers, self-
employed, and those without definite employers may form a workers' association. It further
posited that one third (1/3) of the members of the association had definite employers and the
continued existence and registration of the association would prejudice the company's goodwill.
1. The Samahan committed misrepresentation because some of its members were not employees
of Hanjin.
JAPSD
The workers should decide: to join or not
to join; to form an assn or a union
The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the right to refuse
or refrain from exercising the said right. It is self-evident that just as no one should
be denied the exercise of a right granted by law, so also, no one should be compelled
to exercise such a conferred right. Also inherent in the right to self-organization is
the right to choose whether to form a union for purposes of collective bargaining or
a workers' association for purposes of providing mutual aid and protection.
The right to form a workers' association is not exclusive to ambulant, intermittent

and itinerant workers. The option to form or join a union or a workers' association
lies with the workers themselves, and whether they have definite employers or not.
JAPSD
Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hanjin
Shipyard v. Bureau of Labor Relations
G.R. No. 211145, October 14, 2015
How will you resolve Hanjin’s
second ground in opposing the
formation of the association?
JAPSD
Just compensation for private property
taken for public use.
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
Requisites of lawful taking:

• The government must enter the private property;
• The entrance into the private property must be indefinite or permanent;
• There is color of legal authority in the entry into the property;
• The property is devoted to public use or purpose;
• The use of property for public use removed from the owner all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
JAPSD
Eminent Domain
Eminent domain is the inherent power of a nation or a sovereign state to take, or sanction the taking
of, private property for a public use without the owner's consent, conditioned upon payment of just
compensation.13 In other words, eminent domain is a coercive measure on the part of the state
whereby private interests are impaired for the general welfare.
Thus, in order for the State to exercise its power of eminent domain, the following requirements
must be present: (a) that it is for a particular purpose; and (b) that just compensation is paid to the
property owner.
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Just Compensation
Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator, the true measure of which is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. Further, it does
not only refer to the payment of the correct amount but also to the payment within a reasonable
time from its taking because without prompt payment, the compensation cannot be considered
just. In other words, just compensation in the context of eminent domain or expropriation
proceedings pertains to the timely or prompt payment of an adequate value sufficient to recoup
the loss suffered by the property owner.
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The Jose Gamir-Consuelo Diaz Heirs Association, Inc. is an owner of a parcel of land with an area of
1836 square meters. In 2005, the company and DPWH executed a Deed of Absolute Sale where the
property was sold at P275,099.24. The taking of the property by DPWH, however, was in 1957. In
2006, the company sued DPWH for interest on the value of the property for the period 1957 to 2005,
claiming that just compensation entails not only payment of the correct amount but also the prompt
payment of such a correct amount. If you were the judge, will you favor the Jose Gamir-Consuelo
Diaz Heirs Association, Inc.? Why?
JAPSD
RP (DPWH) v. Jose Gamir-Consuelo Diaz Heirs
Assn, Inc.
G.R. No. 218732, November 12, 2018
The company is not correct, the concept of just compensation is relevant in cases of eminent domain.
This is not a case of eminent domain but of voluntary sale. Consequently, the provisions on
obligations and contracts as per Civil Code is applicable.
Essentially, expropriation is an involuntary sale where the landowner is practically an unwilling

seller.17 Provided all the requisites for its exercise are present, a private individual cannot resist the
state's exercise of its inherent power of eminent domain. Nevertheless, there is nothing that
precludes the government from entering into a negotiated sale with a private landowner to acquire a
property to be devoted for a public purpose. In fact, expropriation proceedings or court intervention
would be unnecessary should a deed of sale be executed where the parties come to an agreement as
to the price of the property to be sold.
JAPSD
RP (DPWH) v. Jose Gamir-Consuelo Diaz Heirs
Assn, Inc.
G.R. No. 218732, November 12, 2018
X x x, the award of legal interest in cases where the government acquires private property through
voluntary sale is not a matter of law. Unlike in cases where the state exercises its power of eminent
domain or a party initiates expropriation proceedings and other similar actions, in negotiated sale,
there is an existing contract that governs the relations of the parties and determines their respective
rights and obligations. In turn, these contractual stipulations should be complied with in good faith,
unless they are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policies.28 Hence, the
laws relating to contracts should govern in case of controversy in their application.
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Was there lawful taking?
The Sps. Llamas owned certain properties in what used to be Sucat Road ( now Katipunan Avenue).
The DPWH started taking portions of the Llamas property, with an area of more or less 300 square
meters for the main road. When the Sps. Llamas demanded payment for their property, DPWH
countered that the portions of the Llamas property were no longer private property on account of
Section 31 of PD957 or the Subdivision and Condominium Buyer’s Protective Decree. The first
paragraph of Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 957 spells out the minimum area requirement for
roads and other open spaces in subdivision projects. Its second paragraph spells out taxonomic or
classification parameters for areas reserved for parks, playgrounds, and for recreational use. It also
requires the planting of trees. The last paragraph of Section 31 requires—note the use of the word
"shall"—subdivision developers to donate to the city or municipality with territorial jurisdiction over
the subdivision project all such roads, alleys, sidewalks, and open spaces. It also imposes upon cities
and municipalities the concomitant obligation or compulsion to accept such donations.
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DPWH v. Sps. Llamas,
GR. No. 194190, January 25, 2017
The last paragraph of Section 31 is oxymoronic. One cannot speak of a donation and compulsion in the
same breath.
A donation is, by definition, "an act of liberality." Article 725 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 725. Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor
of another, who accepts it.
To be considered a donation, an act of conveyance must necessarily proceed freely from the donor's
own, unrestrained volition. A donation cannot be forced: it cannot arise from compulsion, be borne by
a requirement, or otherwise be impelled by a mandate imposed upon the donor by forces that are
external to him or her. Article 726 of the Civil Code reflects this commonsensical wisdom when it
specifically states that conveyances made in view ofJAPSD
a "demandable debt" cannot be considered true
or valid donations.
GR. No. 194190, January 25, 2017
In jurisprudence, animus donandi (that is, the intent to do an act of liberality) is an indispensable
element of a valid donation, along with the reduction of the donor's patrimony and the corresponding
increase in the donee's patrimony.50
Section 31's compulsion to donate (and concomitant compulsion to accept) cannot be sustained as
valid. Not only does it run afoul of basic legal concepts; it also fails to withstand the more elementary
test of logic and common sense. As opposed to this, the position that not only is more reasonable and
logical, but also maintains harmony between our laws, is that which maintains the subdivision owner's
or developer's freedom to donate or not to donate. This is the position of the 1998 White Plains
Decision. Moreover, as this 1998 Decision has emphasized, to force this donation—and to preclude any
compensation—is to suffer an illegal taking.
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GR. No. 194190, January 25, 2017
The Court of Appeals correctly stated that a "positive act"51 must first be made by the "owner-
developer before the city or municipality can acquire dominion over the subdivision roads."52 As there
is no such thing as an automatic cession to government of subdivision road lots, an actual transfer
must first be effected by the subdivision owner: "subdivision streets belonged to the owner until
donated to the government or until expropriated upon payment of just compensation."53 Stated
otherwise, "the local government should first acquire them by donation, purchase, or expropriation, if
they are to be utilized as a public road."
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GR. No. 194190, January 25, 2017
This Court's 2014 Decision in Republic v. Ortigas (2014) succinctly captures all that we have previously
stated:
Delineated roads and streets, whether part of a subdivision or segregated for public use, remain
private and will remain as such until conveyed to the government by donation or through
expropriation proceedings. An owner may not be forced to donate his or her property even if it has
been delineated as road lots because that would partake of an illegal taking. He or she may even
choose to retain said properties.
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Non-Imparment Clause
Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
The non-impairment clause was first incorporated into the United States Constitution after the American
Revolution, an unstable time when worthless money was routinely issued and the States enacted moratorium
laws to extend periods to pay contractual obligations that further contributed to the lack of confidence to the
monetary system during that time.156 These practices were prohibited under the clause to limit State
interference with free markets and debtor-creditor relationships.157
The clause was first adopted in our jurisdiction through the Philippine Bill of 1902 and, similar to the due
process clause, has consistently appeared in subsequent Constitutions.
Since the non-impairment clause was adopted here, this Court has said that its purpose is to protect purely
private agreements from State interference.158 This is to "encourage trade and credit by promoting confidence
in the stability of contractual relations."
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There are views, however, that the non-impairment clause is obsolete and redundant because
contracts are considered property, and thus, are protected by the due process clause. On the other
hand, studies show why the non-impairment clause should be maintained. Aside from its traditional
purpose of prohibiting State interference in purely private transactions, the non-impairment clause
serves as a guarantee of the separation of powers between the judicial and legislative branches of the
government.160 The non impairment clause serves as a check on the legislature "to act only through
generally applicable laws prescribing rules of conduct that operate prospectively." 161
This approach, called the institutional regularity approach, was applied in United States v. Diaz Conde
and R. Conde.
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It is claimed that the institutional regularity approach "offers the soundest theoretical basis for
reviving the [non-impairment clause] as a meaningful constitutional constraint."164 It is consistent
with the government's right to regulate itself, but prevents "majoritarian abuse."165 With the non-
impairment clause, legislature cannot enact "retroactive laws, selective laws, and laws not supported
by a public purpose."166
At any rate, so long as the non-impairment clause appears in the Constitution, it may be invoked to
question the constitutionality of State actions.
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There is an impairment when, either by statute or any administrative rule issued in the exercise of the agency's
quasi-legislative power, the terms of the contracts are changed either in the time or mode of the performance
of the obligation. There is likewise impairment when new conditions are imposed or existing conditions are
dispensed with.
Not all contracts, however, are protected under the non-impairment clause. Contracts whose subject matters
are so related to the public welfare are subject to the police power of the State and, therefore, some of its
terms may be changed or the whole contract even set aside without offending the Constitution; otherwise,
"important and valuable reforms may be precluded by the simple device of entering into contracts for the
purpose of doing that which otherwise may be prohibited."
Likewise, contracts which relate to rights not considered property, such as a franchise or permit, are also not
protected by the non-impairment clause. The reason is that the public right or franchise is always subject to
amendment or repeal by the State, the grant being a mere privilege. In other words, there can be no vested
right in the continued grant of a franchise. Additional conditions for the grant of the franchise may be made and
the grantee cannot claim impairment.
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QUESTION
In 2012, DOLE issued Department Order No. 118-12, elaborating on the part-fixed-part-performance-
based compensation system referred to in the LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 2012-
001.Department Order No. 118-12, among others, provides for the rule for computing the fixed and
the performance-based component of a public utility bus driver's or conductor's wage. The Provincial
Bus Operators Assn of the Philippines contested this department order, claiming that it impairs the
obligation of contracts. It argued that the boundary payment scheme that it entered into with their
bus drivers and conductors is a valid contract that should not be interfered with by government. Is the
bus association correct?
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Prov’l Bus Operators Assn of the Phils, et. al.
v. DOLE, et. al., G.R. No. 202275, July 17,
2018
No, the bus association is not correct. Similar to the right to due process, the right to non-impairment yields to
the police power of the State.
For one, the relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual as provided in Article 1700 of the Civil
Code.183 By statutory declaration, labor contracts are impressed with public interest and, therefore, must yield to
the common good. Labor contracts are subject to special laws on wages, working conditions, hours of labor, and
similar subjects. In other words, labor contracts are subject to the police power of the State.
As previously discussed on the part on due process, Department Order No. 118-12 was issued to grant bus
drivers and conductors minimum wages and social welfare benefits. Further, petitioners repeatedly admitted
that in paying their bus drivers and conductors, they employ the boundary system or commission basis,
payment schemes which cause drivers to drive recklessly. Not only does Department Order No. 118-12 aim to
uplift the economic status of bus drivers and conductors; it also promotes road and traffic safety.
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Prov’l Bus Operators Assn of the Phils, et. al.
v. DOLE, et. al., G.R. No. 202275, July 17,
2018
Further, certificates ofpub1ic convenience granted to bus operators are subject to amendment. When
certificates of public convenience were granted in 2012, Memorandum Circular No. 2011-004 on the
"Revised Terms and Conditions of [Certificates of Public Convenience] and Providing Penalties for
Violations Thereof” was already in place. This Memorandum Circular, issued before Memorandum
Circular No. 2012-001, already required public utility vehicle operators to comply with labor and social
legislations. Franchise holders cannot object to the reiteration made in Memorandum Circular No.
2012-001.
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Free Access to Indigents
Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not
be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
This guarantee of free access to the courts is extended to litigants who may be indigent by exempting
them from the obligation to pay docket and filing fees. But not everyone who claims to be indigent
may demand free access to the courts. In Re: Query of Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi Re Exemption from
Legal and Filing Fees of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. (2009), the Court has declared that the
exemption may be extended only to natural party litigants; the exemption may not be extended to
juridical persons even if they worked for indigent and underprivileged people because the
Constitution has explicitly premised the free access clause on a person's poverty,' a condition that
only a natural person can suffer.
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To prevent the abuse of the exemption, therefore, the Court has incorporated Section 21, Rule 3 and
Section 19, Rule 141 in the Rules of Court in order to set the guidelines implementing as well as
regulating the exercise of the right of free access to the courts. The procedure governing an
application for authority to litigate as an indigent party as provided under Section 21, Rule 3 and
Section 19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court have been synthesized in Algura v. The Local Government
Unit of the City of Naga.
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Algura stipulates that when the application to litigate as an indigent litigant is filed,
1. the trial court shall scrutinize the affidavits and supporting documents submitted by the applicant to
determine if he complies with the income and property standards prescribed in the present Section 19 of
Rule 141-that his gross income and that of his immediate family do not exceed an amount double the
monthly minimum wage of an employee; and that he does not own real property with a fair market value of
more than P300,000.00;
2. that if the trial court finds that he meets the income and property requirements, the authority to litigate as
indigent litigant is automatically granted, and the grant is a matter of right;
3. that, however, if the trial court finds that one or both requirements have not been met, it should then set a
hearing to enable the applicant to prove that he has "no money or property sufficient and available for
food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family;"
4. that in that hearing, the adverse party may adduce countervailing evidence to disprove the evidence
presented by the applicant;
5. or the payment of the prescribed fees shall be made, without prejudice to other sanctions that the trial
court may impose.
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1. that, afterwards, the trial court will rule on the application depending on the evidence adduced;
2. that, in addition, Section 21 of Rule 3 provides that the adverse party may later still contest the
grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court, possibly based
on newly discovered evidence not obtained at the time the application was heard;
3. that, if the trial court determines after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a
person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be
assessed and collected by the clerk of court; and
4. that if payment is not made within the time fixed by the trial court, execution shall issue
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QUESTION
Pangkatan, a businessman contracted the services of Maghuyop and Bangkiao to bring his goods from
Pagadian to Margozatubig, Zamboanga del Sur. Along the way, Maghuyop and Bangkiao parked their
van on the road, and a truck subsequently hit the van leaving Pangkatan injured. He filed a suit for
damages and engaged the services of the Public Attorney’s Office to advance his cause. The court
decided in his favour and Maghuyop and Bangkiao were directed to pay him damages. Maghuyop and
Bangkiao, however, questioned the decision, claiming that the lower court failed to obtain jurisdiction
over Pangkatan’s case since he is not an indigent litigant, being a businessman. They claim that he can
never satisfy the requirements in the Rules of Court with respect to the income and landholdings of an
indigent litigant. Are they correct?
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Pangkatan v. Maghuyop and Bangkiao
G.R. No. 194412, Nov. 16, 2016
No, Maghuyop and Bangkiao are not correct. Earlier, the Supreme Court through Circular No. 67-2007
required the PAO to comply with the Rules of Court with respect to providing proof of an indigent
litigant. The passage of Republic Act 9406 (An Act Reorganizing and Strengthening the Public
Attorney’s Office) changed this as the SC came up with Circular No. 121-2007 wherein all clients of the
PAO were declared exempt from payment of docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action
in court whether as an original proceeding or on appeal.
The SC’s acknowledgment of the exemption allowed to the clients of the PAO pursuant to Section
16D of the Administrative Code of 1987, as amended by Republic Act No. 9406, was not an abdication
of its rule-making power but simply its recognition of the limits of that power; and that, in particular,
such acknowledgment reflected a keen awareness that, in the exercise of its rule-making power, it
may not dilute or defeat the right of access to justice of indigent litigants.
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Rights of an Accused under Custodial
Investigation
• Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
• (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited.
• (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
• (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as
compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.
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Miranda Rights During Custodial Investigation
The above provision in the Constitution embodies what jurisprudence has termed as "Miranda
rights." The Miranda doctrine requires that: (a) any person under custodial investigation has the right
to remain silent; (b) anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has the
right to talk to an attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel present when being
questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he
so desires.14 The said rights are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the State as
would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily
telling the truth.
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The "investigation" in Section 12, paragraph 1 of the Bill of Rights pertains to "custodial
investigation." Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled
out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask
questions on the suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission.16
This Court expounded in People v. Marra:17
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It
is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to
focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of
interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating
JAPSD statements that the rule begins to operate.
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7438 reinforced the constitutional mandate and expanded the definition of custodial
investigation.1âwphi1 This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police officer must be
apprised of their Miranda rights.19 The same pressures of a custodial setting exist in this scenario. A portion of
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7438 reads:
SEC. 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or under Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public Officers. -
xxxx
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who
is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the
liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law. JAPSD
Miranda rights are intended to protect ordinary citizens from the pressure of custodial setting.24 In
the case of Luz v. People25 citing Berkemer v. McCarty,26 it was explained that:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or
trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the "inherently compelling pressures" "generated by
the custodial setting itself," "which work to undermine the individual's will to resist," and as much as
possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the
fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by in-
custody questioning of persons suspected of misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons
suspected of felonies.
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People v. Cabanada,
G.R. No. 221424, July 19, 2017
On April 12, 2009, an Easter Sunday, Catherine Victoria (Catherine) and her family visited her mother
in Bulacan. Their helper, Cabanada was left at the house since she was not feeling well and would
rather clean the house. The family returned at 9:30 p.m. of the same day. The next day, asked her
husband Victor Victoria (Victor) for the ₱47,000.00 he was supposed to give for their household
expenses. Victor went to his service vehicle to get the money he kept in the glove compartment, and
was surprised that ₱20,000.00 was missing. When Victor informed her, Catherine checked their room
and discovered that several pieces of her jewelry were also missing. She immediately called the
Mandaluyong Police Station to report the incident.
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People v. Cabanada,
G.R. No. 221424, July 19, 2017
In the course of the interview at the Victoria's residence, Cabanada admitted to PO2 Maximo
Cotoner, Jr. (PO2 Cotoner) that she took the money. She led them to her room and took a pouch
(white envelope) containing ₱16,000.00 cash. She also showed a white leather wallet containing the
missing master key of Victor's vehicle. Thereafter, Cabanada was brought at the Criminal
Investigation Unit (CIU) for further investigation. At the CIU, Cabanada apologized to Catherine, and
admitted that she still had some of the missing jewelry in her house at Panatag Compound,
Welfareville, Mandaluyong City. The police went to her house and recovered the Technomarine,
Pierre Cardin, Relic and Santa Barbara watches and a pair of earrings with diamonds placed in a tool
box.
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People v. Cabanada,
G.R. No. 221424, July 19, 2017
Was Cabanada under custodial investigation when:
1) She was interviewed at the house of the Victorias by PO2 Cotoner?
2) She was at the CIU where she admitted the crime, apologized to Catherine, and told the police
that the other jewelries can be found at her house in Panatag Compound, Welfareville, Mandaluyong
City?
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People v. Cabanada,
G.R. No. 221424, July 19, 2017
Cabanada was not under custodial investigation when she made the confession, without counsel, to
PO2 Cotoner that she took the missing ₱20,000.00. The prosecution established that the confession
was elicited during the initial interview of the police after Catherine called to report the missing
money and personal effects. The investigation was still a general inquiry of the crime and has not
focused on a particular suspect. Also, she admitted to the crime while at the residence of her
employer, thus, she was not yet taken into custody or otherwise deprived of her freedom.
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People v. Cabanada,
G.R. No. 221424, July 19, 2017
The circumstances surrounding Cabanada's appearance before the police station falls within the
definition of custodial investigation. Despite the claim that she was not considered as a suspect at
that time, the fact remains that she confessed to having committed the crime and was able to
produce the money from her room. The investigation, therefore, ceased to be a general inquiry even
if they contemplated that she was covering for someone.
The subsequent confession of Cabanada at the CIU office can be considered as having been done in a
custodial setting because (1) after admitting the crime, Cabanada was brought to the police station
for further investigation; (2) the alleged confession happened in the office of the chief; (3) PO2
Cotoner was present during Cabanada's apology and admission to Catherine. The compelling
pressures of custodial setting were present when the accused was brought to the police station
along with Catherine.
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People v. Quitola,
G.R. No. 200537, July 13, 2016
Maria Fe Valencia y Supan was found inside her rented room at Nice Place Compound, Bgy.
Nancayasan, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan. A follow-up investigation yielded that Quitola was the
outgoing security guard at the time of the incident of the compound. The police visited Quitola at his
rented place but he was no longer there. A coffee vendor told the police that Quitola bought coffee
from her just about the time of the incident, and she noticed that Quitola’s arm was bleeding. She
also saw Quitola and his wife leave the compound premises with the use of Valencia’s black car.
Quitola was subsequently apprehended in Aklan. He was interviewed by Joana Fe Tacason (Tacason),
ABS-CBN field reporter. The interview was conducted inside the detention cell. During said
interview, accused-appellant voluntarily relayed to Tacason that at early dawn of March 15, 2008, he
was in the apartment of the deceased because he tried to borrow money from her. He narrated that
deceased refused to lend him money. In frustration, he got money from deceased's bag he saw lying
on top of the table.When asked what happened next, accused-appellant responded with "Hindi ko
na alam ang sumunod na nangyari. " The interview was taped and was aired the next day.
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People v. Quitola,
G.R. No. 200537, July 13, 2016
The extra-judicial confession given by accused-appellant during the interview conducted by the field
reporter is admissible in evidence. Accused-appellant asserts that the confession was involuntarily
given and was made under extreme fear because he was interviewed while he was inside the
detention cell and while surrounded by police officers. We are not persuaded. That the confession
was given without the assistance of counsel and was therefore involuntary is immaterial. We have
consistently held that the Bill of Rights does not concern itself with relations between private
individuals.The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents; thus,
accused-appellant's confession to field reporter Tacason is not covered by Section 12(1) and (3) of
Article III of the Constitution.
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People v. Quitola,
G.R. No. 200537, July 13, 2016
Furthermore, accused-appellant would have this Court believe that the confession was given under
a tense and fearful atmosphere, similar to that of a custodial investigation. In a previous case -with
similar circumstances, We observed that the presence of the police officers did not exert any undue
pressure or influence on the accused, coercing him into giving his confession. The interview was not
in the nature of a custodial investigation as the response of the accused-appellant was made in
answer to questions asked by the reporter and not by the police. There is no showing that the field
reporter colluded with the police authorities to elicit inculpatory evidence against accused-appellant.
Neither is there anything on record which suggests that the reporter was instructed by the police to
extract information from him. Moreover, accused-appellant could have refused to be interviewed,
but instead, he agreed. A review of the taped interview would show that he answered the questions
freely and spontaneously.
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People v. Quitola,
G.R. No. 200537, July 13, 2016
This Court has held that ''the voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language such
that it: upon its face, the confession exhibits no sign of suspicious circumstances tending to cast
doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details which could be supplied only by the accused
reflecting spontaneity and coherence which, psychologically, cannot be associated with a mind to
which violence and torture have been applied, it maybe considered voluntary." In the often cited
case of United States v. De los Santos, We stated:
"If a confession be free and voluntary-the deliberate act of the accused with a full comprehension of
its significance, there is no impediment to its admission as evidence, and it then becomes evidence
of a high order; since it is supported by the presumption-a very strong one-that no person of normal
mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator of a crime, especially if it
be a serious crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience."
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People v. Paris and Fernandez,
G.R. No. 218130, February 14, 2018
Fernandez was arrested and brought to the Binmaley Police Station at 6:00 a.m. on June 16, 2011
and was asked if he was the one responsible for the crime and if he would rather admit the same.
The police suspected him of killing his fellow worker and for robbing their employer. He was
subjected to questioning at 6AM. At about 1PM of the same day, Atty. Francisco, the legal
consultant of the mayor of Binmaley, Pangasinan assisted him to make a written confession of his
crime.
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People v. Paris and Fernandez,
G.R. No. 218130, February 14, 2018
“any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. x x x It begins when there is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and the investigation. has started to focus on a
particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a
confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense.
In this case, Fernandez was not assisted by counsel at all times during his custodial investigation. The
records show that Fernandez was assisted by Atty. Francisco only during the time he executed his
extrajudicial confession. However, no lawyer assisted Fernandez at the time he was arrested and
brought to the police station to answer questions about the robbery with homicide.
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Right to Bail
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
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Right to Bail
Bail is the security given for the temporary release of a person who has been arrested and detained
but "whose guilt has not yet been proven" in court beyond reasonable doubt.91 The right to bail is
cognate to the fundamental right to be presumed innocent. In People v. Fitzgerald:
The right to bail emanates from the [accused's constitutional] right to be presumed innocent. It is
accorded to a person in the custody of the law who may, by reason of the presumption of innocence
he [or she] enjoys, be allowed provisional liberty upon filing of a security to guarantee his [or her]
appearance before any court, as required under specified conditions. (c.f. People v. Escobar, G.R. No.
214300, July 24, 2017)
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Bail protects the right of the accused to due
process and to be presumed innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.18
The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by the
constitutional right to be released on bail,19 and further binds the court to wait until after trial to
impose any punishment on the accused.
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing additional crimes.
The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the
accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose. Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in
his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the society’s interest in assuring the accused’s
presence at trial. (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015)
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Right to Bail
Bail may be a matter of right or judicial discretion. The accused has the right to bail if the offense
charged is "not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment" before conviction by the
Regional Trial Court.94However, if the accused is charged with an offense the penalty of which is
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment-"regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution"-
and when evidence of one's guilt is not strong, then the accused's prayer for bail is subject to the
discretion of the trial court.
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Right to Bail
• Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states:
• Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. - All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a
matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this
Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
• ....
• Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. - No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless
of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
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Right to Bail
the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment;29 or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another
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crime during the pendency of the appeal.
Right to Bail
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in
criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned
Citizens v. Elma ,30 "such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the
degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional
liberty." It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion
on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution.
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Right to Bail
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral,34 to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or
require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its
sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise
petition should be denied.
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Enrile is entitled to bail because
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities
upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is
highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or
otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not
ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder
and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the
legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a
flight risk.40 With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long years of public
service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification for his
admission to bail
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Right to Bail
Escobar, a resort owner in Laguna was charged of kidnapping the daughter of a wealthy businessman
for ransom. At the RTC, Escobar filed a petition to post bail but was denied in his first application.
After a few years, he again filed the same petition but the same was denied on the ground of res
judicata. Was the RTC correct in denying the second petition for bail?
Res judicata applies only in a final judgment in a civil case,1 not in an interlocutory order in a criminal
case.2 An order disposing a petition for bail is interlocutory.3 This order does not attain finality when a
new matter warrants a second look on the application for bail. (People v. Escobar, G.R. No. 214300,
July 24, 2017)
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Presumed Innocent
• Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law.
• (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
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Presumption of Innocence stronger than
presumption of regular performance of duties
We have usually presumed the regularity of performance of their official duties in favor of the members of buy-
bust teams enforcing our laws against the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Such presumption is based on three
fundamental reasons, namely: first, innocence, and not wrongdoing, is to be presumed; second, an official oath
will not be violated; and, third, a republican form of government cannot survive long unless a limit is placed
upon controversies and certain trust and confidence reposed in each governmental department or agent by
every other such department or agent, at least to the extent of such presumption. But the presumption is
rebuttable by affirmative evidence of irregularity or of any failure to perform a duty. Judicial reliance on the
presumption despite any hint of irregularity in the procedures undertaken by the agents of the law will thus be
fundamentally unsound because such hint is itself affirmative proof of irregularity.
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty stands only when no reason exists in the records
by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of official duty. And even in that instance the presumption
of regularity will not be stronger than the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere
rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent. (Pp. v Arposeple, G.R.
No. 205787, November 22, 2017)
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Right to Counsel
Inacay was charged of estafa for failing to remit Php53,170.00 to his employer. During the court
proceedings, he was represented by a certain Atty. Eulogia B. Manila. He was convicted. On appeal, he
learned that this Atty. Eulogia B. Manila was not actually a lawyer. He obtained a certification from the
Office of the Bar Confidant that indeed, there is no lawyer with that name. He now claims he was
deprived of due process because he was not duly represented by counsel. Is he correct?
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Inacay v. People,
G.R. No. 223506, November 28, 2016
In criminal cases, the right of the accused to be assisted by counsel is immutable.1âwphi1 Otherwise,
there will be a grave denial of due process. The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental
principle of due process which basically means that a person must be heard before being
condemned.15 "Thus, even if the judgment had become final and executory, it may still be recalled,
and the accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel."16
"The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all times. More so, in the case of an on-going
litigation, it is a right that must be exercised at every step of the way, with the lawyer faithfully
keeping his client company."17 Unless the accused is represented by a lawyer, there is great danger
that any defense presented in his behalf will be inadequate considering the legal perquisites and
skills needed in the court proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of due process.
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Inacay v. People,
G.R. No. 223506, November 28, 2016
n People v. Santocildes, Jr.,19 the Court held that:
The presence and participation of counsel in criminal proceedings should never be taken lightly.
Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in
the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but
because he does not know how to establish his innocence. The right of an accused to counsel is
guaranteed to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system where the accused is pitted against
the awesome prosecutory machinery of the State. Such a right proceeds from the fundamental
principle of due process which basically means that a person must be heard before being
condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere
formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.
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Inacay v. People,
G.R. No. 223506, November 28, 2016
In this case, Inacay, during the proceedings before the trial court and the appellate court, was
represented by Manila who, based on the Certification issued by the OBC, is not a lawyer. At that
time, Inacay had no inkling that he was being represented by a sham lawyer. It was only when his
conviction of the offense charged was upheld by the appellate court did Inacay learn that Manila is
not a lawyer. Clearly, Inacay was not assisted by counsel in the proceedings before the lower courts
and, hence, was denied of due process.
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Right to confront witnesses
• The right to confrontation of a witness is one of the fundamental basic rights of an
accused. It is ingrained in our justice system and guaranteed by no less than the
1987 Constitution as stated under its Article III, Section 14(2), to wit:
• Section 14. (1) x x x
• (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (Emphasis supplied)
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• The right to confrontation is part of due process not only in criminal proceedings
but also in civil proceedings as well as in proceedings in administrative tribunals
with quasi-judicial powers.42 It has a two-fold purpose: (1) primarily, to afford the
accused an opportunity to test the testimony of the witness by cross-examination;
and (2) secondarily, to allow the judge to observe the deportment of the witness.
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Will deposition under Section 23 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure disallow the
accused to confront the prosecution witnesses?
No, there is no violation of constitutional right of the accused to confront the

prosecution witnesses, as per the case of Mary Jane Veloso’s deposition while in
Indonesia (People v. Sergio and Lacanilao, G.R. No. 240053, October 09, 2019)
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• True, Cristina and Julius have no opportunity to confront Mary Jane face to face in light of the
prevailing circumstance.ℒαwρhi৷ However, the terms and conditions laid down by the trial court
ensure that they are given ample opportunity to cross-examine Mary Jane by way of written
interrogatories so as not to defeat the first purpose of their constitutional right. To recall, the trial
court requires Cristina and Julius, through their counsel, to file their comment and may raise
objections to the proposed questions in the written interrogatories submitted by the prosecution.
The trial court judge shall promptly rule on the objections. Thereafter, only the final questions
would be asked by the Consul of the Philippines in Indonesia or his designated representative.
The answers of Mary Jane to the propounded questions must be written verbatim, and a
transcribed copy of the same would be given to the counsel of the accused who would, in turn,
submit their proposed cross interrogatory questions to the prosecution. Should the prosecution
raised any objection thereto, the trial court judge must promptly rule on the same, and the final
cross interrogatory questions for the deposition of Mary Jane will then be conducted. Mary Jane's
answers in the cross interrogatory shall likewise be taken in verbatim and a transcribed copy
thereof shall be given to the prosecution. People v. Sergio and Lacanilao, G.R. No. 240053,
October 09, 2019) JAPSD
The second purpose of the constitutional right to confrontation has likewise been
upheld. As aptly stated in the terms and conditions for the taking of deposition, the
trial court judge will be present during the conduct of written interrogatories on
Mary Jane. This will give her ample opportunity to observe and to examine the
demeanor of the witness closely. Although the deposition is in writing, the trial court
judge can still carefully perceive the reaction and deportment of Mary Jane as she
answers each question propounded to her both by the prosecution and the defense.
People v. Sergio and Lacanilao, G.R. No. 240053, October 09, 2019)
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ndubitably, the constitutional rights of Cristina and Julius are equally safeguarded.
The parameters laid down by the trial court are sufficient in detail ensuring that
Mary Jane will give her testimony under oath to deter lying by the threat of perjury
charge. She is still subjected to cross-examination so as to determine the presence
of any falsehood in her testimony. Lastly, the guidelines enable the trial court judge
to observe her demeanor as a witness and assess her credibility. People v. Sergio and
Lacanilao, G.R. No. 240053, October 09, 2019)
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Finally, it must be mentioned that a "dying declaration" is one of the recognized
exceptions to the right to confrontation.44 In the case at bar, it will not be amiss to
state that Mary Jane's deposition through written interrogatories is akin to her dying
declaration. There is no doubt that Mary Jane will be answering the written
interrogatories under the consciousness of an impending death - or execution by a
firing squad to be exact. To stress, Mary Jane has been convicted by final judgment
and sentenced to death by firing squad. Mary Jane has already availed of all
available legal remedies and there is no expectation that her conviction will be
overturned by the Indonesian authorities. People v. Sergio and Lacanilao, G.R. No.
240053, October 09, 2019)
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Writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended
Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it.
Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity. In such
cases, the person is not under any lawful process and is continuously being illegally detained. (In the
Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Datukan Malang Salibo, G.R. No. 197597, 08 April 2015)
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Right to be informed of the nature
In People v. Flores, Jr., 48 as reiterated in the more recent cases of People v. Pangilinan49
and People v. Dadulla,50 the Court ruled that the constitutional right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him cannot be waived for reasons
of public policy. Hence, it is imperative that the complaint or information filed against the
accused be complete to meet its objectives. As such, an indictment must fully state the
elements of the specific offense alleged to have been committed. For an accused cannot be
convicted of an offense, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the
complaint or information.51 In other words, the complaint must contain a specific allegation
of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged, the accused being
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. 52
Under Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, an accused's
failure to raise an objection to the insufficiency or defect in the information would not
amount to a waiver of any objection based on said ground or irregularity. (Guellos, et. al. v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 177000, June 19, 2017)
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In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus
of Datukan Malang Salibo, G.R. No. 197597, 08
April 2015
Upon coming home from his pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia, Datukan Malang Salibo learned that he was
being mistaken as the person “Butukan S. Malang” who was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of
murder for allegedly participating in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. Butukan S.
Malang had a pending warrant of arrest issued by the trial court in People of the Philippines v. Datu
Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. Immediately, Datukan went to the Datu Hofer Police Station in
Maguindanao to clear his name but upon arrival at the station, he was arrested and brought to
Quezon City to face trial as Butukan S. Malang. Datukan Malang Salibo filed a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The PNP reasoned that he cannot file this petition as he has
already been restrained by virtue of a warrant of arrest which is a lawful order of a court. Will his
petition prosper?
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April 2015
Called the “great writ of liberty[,]”76 the writ of habeas corpus “was devised and exists as a speedy
and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom.” The remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary and summary in nature,
consistent with the law’s “zealous regard for personal liberty.”
Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus “shall extend to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.” The primary purpose of
the writ “is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.” “Any restraint which will preclude freedom of
action is sufficient.”
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April 2015
The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any offense
so as to entitle a person to the efficient remedy of habeas corpus. It may be
availed of as a post-conviction remedy84 or when there is an alleged
violation of the liberty of abode.85 In other words, habeas corpus effectively
substantiates the implied autonomy of citizens constitutionally protected in
the right to liberty in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.86 Habeas
corpus being a remedy for a constitutional right, courts must apply a
conscientious and deliberate level of scrutiny so that the substantive right to
liberty will not be further curtailed in the labyrinth of other processes.8
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April 2015
The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on the petition for the issuance of the
writ. It is the writ that commands the production of the body of the person allegedly restrained of his
or her liberty. On the other hand, it is in the final decision where a court determines the legality of the
restraint.
Between the issuance of the writ and the final decision on the petition for its issuance, it is the
issuance of the writ that is essential. The issuance of the writ sets in motion the speedy judicial inquiry
on the legality of any deprivation of liberty. Courts shall liberally issue writs of habeas corpus even if
the petition for its issuance “on [its] face [is] devoid of merit[.]” Although the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus may be suspended in cases of invasion, rebellion, or when the public safety requires it,
the writ itself may not be suspended.
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April 2015
It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of
liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the court. The restraint then has become legal,
and the remedy of habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic (Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court).
However, the Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 221,
Quezon City in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. charged and accused
Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo, of 57 counts of murder in connection with the
Maguindanao Massacre. Furthermore, petitioner Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant.
Hence his petition will prosper.
JAPSD
Speedy Trial
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
his right applies to all cases pending before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies; it is
"not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or
administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial. In this accord, any
party to a case may demand expeditious action to [sic] all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice." It "includes within its contemplation the periods before, during and after
trial," such as preliminary investigations and fact-finding investigations conducted by the Office of
the Ombudsman.
JAPSD
Almeda v. Ombudsman,
G.R. No. 204267, July 25, 2016
In 2001, petitioner Luz S. Almeda, then Schools Division Superintendent of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DepEd), Surigao del Norte, and several other public officers and
employees were charged administratively and criminally before the Ombudsman, in connection with
the alleged improper use and disbursement of the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) allotted to
petitioner’s co-respondent Constantino H. Navarro, Jr. (Navarro), Surigao del Norte Congressman, and
implemented through the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and the DepEd. The
charges relate to the purchase of computers for the schools. The Ombudsman found probable cause
but Almeda filed a Motion for Reconsideration. It was only in 2012 that her motion was denied. Almeda
invokes her right to speedy trial.
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G.R. No. 204267, July 25, 2016
T]he right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely hinged towards the objective of spurring
dispatch in the administration of justice but also to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding a
criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time. Akin to the right to speedy trial, its
‘salutary objective’ is to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of
litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible
with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. This
looming unrest as well as the tactical disadvantages carried by the passage of time should be weighed
against the State and in favor of the individual. x x x37
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G.R. No. 204267, July 25, 2016
[T]he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only
when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a
long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is
the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial,
or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the
defendant are weighed, and such factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendant's
assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are
considered.
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G.R. No. 204267, July 25, 2016
"The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to
each case."39 For this reason, "[a] balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the
accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis."40
Regarding delays, it may be said that "[i]t is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes
delay as it usually operates in his favor, especially if he greatly fears the consequences of his trial and
conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to
expire."41 These principles should apply to respondents in other administrative or quasi-judicial
proceedings as well. It must also be remembered that generally, respondents in preliminary
investigation proceedings are not required to follow up on their cases; it is the State’s duty to expedite
the same "within the bounds of reasonable timeliness."
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G.R. No. 204267, July 25, 2016
A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the duty of insuring
that the trial is consistent with due process.43
"It is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated by the Constitution,
regardless of whether the (respondent) did not object to the delay or that the delay was with his
acquiescence provided that it was not due to causes directly attributable to him."44 Failure or inaction
may not have been deliberately intended, yet unjustified delay nonetheless causes just as much
vexation and oppression.45 Indeed, delay prejudices the accused or respondent – and the State just
the same.
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G.R. No. 204267, July 25, 2016
x x x Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was
designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and
concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these,
the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews
the fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recall
accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still
disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often,
hostility. His financial resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to
public obloquy.
Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its case beyond
reasonable doubt.1âwphi1 The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the government
to carry its burden. x x x
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G.R. No. 204267, July 25, 2016
Not only should the adjudication of cases be "done in an orderly manner that is in accord with the
established rules of procedure but must also be promptly decided to better serve the ends of justice.
Excessive delay in the disposition of cases renders the rights of the people guaranteed by the
Constitution and by various legislations inutile."47
Finally, the Court has held that inordinate delay in resolving a criminal complaint is violative of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and to the speedy disposition of cases, which
warrants the dismissal of the criminal case.
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G.R. No. 204267, July 25, 2016
1. First of all, the preliminary investigation proceedings in said case took more than 11 long years to
resolve, or from March 23, 2001 when the proceedings were initiated and docketed,49 to September 6,
2012.
2. Secondly, the delay in the proceedings was caused solely by the repeated indorsement of the
Ombudsman and the OSP, which may be attributed to the Ombudsman’s failure to realize that
petitioner was not under the jurisdiction of the OSP or the Sandiganbayan.
3. Third, petitioner had no hand in the delay.
4. Fourth, the pendency of OMB-MIN-01-0183 undoubtedly prejudiced petitioner. The case hung like a
hangman’s cord above her all these years, causing distress, anxiety, and embarrassment. As was held
in the Corpuz50case, the passage of time affects the parties’ and their witnesses’ ability to prepare a
cogent case or defense; secure witnesses; and preserve honor and reputation, financial resources,
memory, and evidence.
5. Finally, the Ombudsman's explanation for the delay is not at all acceptable.
JAPSD
Cagang v. Ombudsman,
G.R. No. 206438, G.R. Nos. 210141-42, July
31, 2018)
In 2003, the Ombudsman initiated criminal and administrative proceedings against the officials of
Saranggani province for malversing Php61M, channelling these to ghost NGOs, Pos, and
cooperatives. Since there were many officials involved, the first set of these cases were against
Governor Miguel D. Escobar, Vice Governor Felipe Constantino, Board Members, and several
employees of the Office of the Vice Governor of Sarangani and the Office of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. In 2010, the Sandiganbayan dismissed this case. In 2011, the Ombusdman filed
another case against some officials under the Vice Governor, namely Cagang, Camanay, Amelia
Carmela Constantino Zoleta (Zoleta), Macagcalat, and Mangalen. Cagang seeks dismissal, invoking
his right to speedy trial. Should the case be dismissed?
JAPSD
G.R. No. 206438, G.R. Nos. 210141-42, July
31, 2018)
The right to a speedy trial is invoked against the courts in a criminal prosecution. The right to speedy
disposition of cases, however, is invoked even against quasi-judicial or administrative bodies in civil, criminal, or
administrative cases before them. As Abadia v. Court of Appeals75 noted:
The Bill of Rights provisions of the 1987 Constitution were precisely crafted to expand substantive fair trial
rights and to protect citizens from procedural machinations which tend to nullify those rights. Moreover,
Section 16, Article III of the Constitution extends the right to a speedy disposition of cases to cases "before all
judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies." This protection extends to all citizens, including those in the
military and covers the periods before, during and after the trial, affording broader protection than Section
14(2) which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial. 76
Both rights, nonetheless, have the same rationale: to prevent delay in the administration of justice. In Corpuz v.
Sandiganbayan:
JAPSD
G.R. No. 206438, G.R. Nos. 210141-42, July
31, 2018)
The Radical Relief Doctrine – a case gets dismissed when there is inordinate delay.
Some Factors to Determinate the Existence of Inordinate Delay (Leonen):

1. Political motivation (Tatad v. Sandiganbayan - 974 report against Tatad was only acted upon by
the Tanodbayan when Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos in 1979)
2. Angchangco v. Ombudsman: For all these past 6 years, petitioner has remained under a cloud,
and since his retirement in September 1994, he has been deprived of the fruits of his retirement
after serving the government for over 42 years all because of the inaction of respondent
Ombudsman. If we wait any longer, it may be too late for petitioner to receive his retirement
benefits, not to speak of clearing his name. This is a case of plain injustice which calls for the
issuance of the writ prayed for.
JAPSD
G.R. No. 206438, G.R. Nos. 210141-42, July
31, 2018)
This Court, however, emphasized that "[a] mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not
sufficient" 101 to rule that there was inordinate delay. Thus, it qualified the application of the Tatad
doctrine in cases where certain circumstances do not merit the application of the "radical relief'
sought.
Test:
The Barker balancing test provides that courts must consider the following factors when
determining the existence of inordinate delay: first, the length of delay; second, the reason for
delay; third, the defendant's assertion or non-asse1iion of his or her right; and fourth, the prejudice to
the defendant as a result of the delay.
JAPSD
G.R. No. 206438, G.R. Nos. 210141-42, July
31, 2018)
To summarize, inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of a preliminary investigation violates the
accused's right to due process and the speedy disposition of cases, and may result in the dismissal of the
case against the accused. The burden of proving delay depends on whether delay is alleged within the periods
provided by law or procedural rules. If the delay is alleged to have occurred during the given periods, the
burden is on the respondent or the accused to prove that the delay was inordinate. If the delay is alleged to
have occurred beyond the given periods, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove that the delay was
reasonable under the circumstances and that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.
The determination of whether the delay was inordinate is not through mere mathematical reckoning but
through the examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. Courts should appraise a
reasonable period from the point of view of how much time a competent and independent public officer would
need in relation to the complexity of a given case. If there has been delay, the prosecution must be able to
satisfactorily explain the reasons for such delay and that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result.
The timely invocation of the accused's constitutional rights must also be examined on a case-to-case basis.
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G.R. No. 206438, G.R. Nos. 210141-42, July
31, 2018)
As to Cagang:
1. …despite the pendency of the case since 2003, petitioner only invoked his right to speedy
disposition of cases when the informations were filed on November 1 7, 2011. Admittedly, while there
was delay, petitioner has not shown that he asserted his rights during this period, choosing instead to
wait until the information was filed against him with the Sandiganbayan.
2. The records of the case show that the transactions investigated are complex and numerous. As
respondent points out, there were over a hundred individuals investigated, and eventually, 40 of
them were determined to have been involved in 81 different anomalous transactions. Delays in the
investigation and review would have been inevitable in the hands of a competent and independent
Ombudsman.
3. Prejudicial to the State. "[T]he State should not be prejudiced and deprived of its right to prosecute
the criminal cases simply because of the ineptitude or nonchalance of the Office of the
Ombudsman."168 The State is as much entitled to due process as the accused.
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Mode of analysis in situations where the right
to speedy disposition of cases or the right to
speedy trial is invoked.
(as per Cagang v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 206438, G.R. Nos. 210141-42, July 31, 2018)
1. First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial. While the
rationale for both rights is the same, the right to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal
prosecutions against courts of law. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, may be
invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial. What is important is that the
accused may already be prejudiced by the proceeding for the right to speedy disposition of cases
to be invoked.
2. Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to a conduct of a
preliminary investigation. This Court acknowledges, however, that the Ombudsman should set
reasonable periods for preliminary investigation, with due regard to the complexities and
nuances of each case. Delays beyond this period will be taken against the prosecution. The period
taken for fact-finding investigations prior to the filing of the formal complaint shall not be
included in the determination of whether there JAPSD
has been inordinate delay.
Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If the right is invoked within the
given time periods contained in current Supreme Court resolutions and circulars, 171 and the time periods that
will be promulgated by the Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the burden of proving that the right was
justifiably invoked. If the delay occurs beyond the given time period and the right is invoked, the prosecution
has the burden of justifying the delay.
If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove first, whether the case is motivated by malice or clearly
only politically motivated and is attended by utter lack of evidence, and second, that the defense did not
contribute to the delay.
Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must prove first, that it followed the
prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case; second,
that the complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and third, that no
prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.
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Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must consider the entire
context of the case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity of the
issues raised. Exceptions:
1. malicious prosecution such as when the case is politically motivated or when there is continued
prosecution despite utter lack of evidence. Malicious intent may be gauged from the behavior of
the prosecution throughout the proceedings.
1. Another exception would be the waiver of the accused to the right to speedy disposition of cases
or the right to speedy trial. If it can be proven that the accused acquiesced to the delay, the
constitutional right can no longer be invoked.
In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must be properly laid out and
discussed by the relevant court. JAPSD
Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must be timely raised. The
respondent or the accused must file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or
procedural periods. Otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition of
cases.
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Can’t Witness Against Himself/ Herself
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
The right against self-incrimination, when applied to a criminal trial, is contained in this terse
injunction - no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. In other words, he may
not be required to take the witness stand. He can sit mute throughout the proceedings. His right to
counsel is expressed in the same laconic style: he shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel. This means inversely that the criminal prosecution cannot proceed without having a
counsel by his side.
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De Castro v. People,
G.R. No. 171672, February 2, 2015
Marietta de Castro was convicted of four counts of estafa through falsification of a commercial
document committed on separate occasions in October and November 1993 by forging the
signatures of bank depositors Amparo Matuguina and Milagrosa Cornejo in withdrawal slips thereby
withdrawing from these accounts 65K and 2K respectively. As basis of the convictions, the court
used her extrajudicial confession which she submitted to BPI during the administrative investigation
related to these unauthorized withdrawals.
On appeal, de Castro invokes her right against self-incrimination. She claims her extrajudicial
confession was obtained in violation of this right. Is she correct?
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De Castro v. People
G.R. No. 171672, February 2, 2015
…the accused in the case before us may not be said to be under custodial investigation. She was not
even being investigated by any police or law enforcement officer. She was under administrative
investigation by her superiors in a private firm and in purely voluntary manner. She was not
restrained of her freedom in any manner. She was free to stay or go. There was no evidence that she
was forced or pressured to say anything. It was an act of conscience that compelled her to speak, a
true mental and moral catharsis that religion and psychology recognize to have salutary effects on
the soul. In this setting, the invocation of the right to remain silent or to counsel is simply irrelevant.
…her investigation as a bank employee by her employer did not come under the coverage of the
Constitutionally protected right against self-incrimination, right to counsel and right to due process
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De la Cruz v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014
Jaime Dela Cruz was arrested for extortion. He was told to undergo a urine test. He vehemently
refused, claiming that the same is a violation of his right to privacy and against self-incrimination. Is
he correct in asserting his right against self-incrimination?
In Gutang v. People, the petitioner therein and his companions were arrested in connection with the
enforcement of a search warrant in his residence. A PNP-NARCOM team found and confiscated
shabu materials and paraphernalias. The petitioner and his companions in that case were also asked
to give urine samples, which yielded positive results. Later, the petitioner therein was found guilty
of the crime of illegal possession and use of prohibited drugs. Gutang claimed that the latter’s urine
sample was inadmissible in evidence, since it was derived in effect from an uncounselled
extrajudicial confession.
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G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014
In the Gutang et al.case, the Court clarified that "what the Constitution prohibits is the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his
body in evidence, when it may be material." The situation in Gutangwas categorized as falling
among the exemptions under the freedom from testimonial compulsion since what was sought to
be examined came from the body of the accused. The Court said:
This was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was not meant to unearth
undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation. In fact,
the record shows that petitioner and his co-accused were not compelled to give samples of their
urine but they in fact voluntarily gave the same when they were requested to undergo a drug test.
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G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in
evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the
accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not
required. (People vs. Olvis, 238 Phil. 513 [1987])
The essence of the right against self incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of
evidence against himself through a testimonial act. (People vs. Casinillo, 213 SCRA 777 [1992];
People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455 [1994]; People vs. Rondero, 378 Phil. 123 [1999])
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G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014
Hence,it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical
examination to determine her pregnancy; (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 [1920]) and an accused
may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body
for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by
his victim;(U.S. vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 [1912]) to expel morphine from his mouth; (U.S. vs. Ong Siu
Hong, 36 Phil. 735 [1917]) to have the outline of his foot traced todetermine its identity with bloody
footprints; (U.S. vs. Salas, 25 Phil. 337 [1913]; U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 308 [1921]) and to be
photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to
enable the foregoing things to be done.(People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244 [1950])28 (Emphasis
supplied)
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G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014
We emphasize that the circumstances in Gutangare clearly different from the circumstances of
petitioner in the instant case. First, Gutang was arrested in relation to a drug case. Second, he
volunteered to give his urine. Third, there were other pieces of evidence that point to his culpability
for the crimes charged. In the present case, though, petitioner was arrested for extortion; he
resisted having his urine sample taken; and finally, his urine sample was the only available
evidencethat was used as basis for his conviction for the use of illegal drugs.
The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.
It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also
asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his
efforts proved futile, because he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those
circumstances. JAPSD
Section 18
• Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs
and aspirations.
• (2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
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Involuntary Servitude, Meaning
Involuntary servitude denotes a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another (Hodges
vs. U.S., 203 U.S. 1; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) or the condition of one
who is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment, and against his will, to labor for another,
whether he is paid or not (Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., p. 961) as per SC decision in Aclaracion v.
Gatmaitan, G.R. No. L-39115 May 26, 1975).
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Involuntary Servitude as Defined in RA10364
(Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of
2012)
(f) Involuntary Servitude – refers to a condition of enforced and compulsory service induced by
means of any scheme, plan or pattern, intended to cause a person to believe that if he or she did not
enter into or continue in such condition, he or she or another person would suffer serious harm or
other forms of abuse or physical restraint, or threat of abuse or harm, or coercion including depriving
access to travel documents and withholding salaries, or the abuse or threatened abuse of the legal
process.
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Imbong v. Ochoa
Doctors claim that the RH law encouraging them to extend pro bono services for RH operations is
violative of their constitutional right against involuntary servitude. Are they correct?
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest
that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and
promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a
privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this
power includes the power of Congress263 to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of
professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the
public safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such
right altogether.
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Imbong v. Ochoa
Doctors claim that the RH law encouraging them to extend pro bono services for RH operations is
violative of their constitutional right against involuntary servitude. Are they correct?
Moreover, …, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats,
intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion. A reading of the assailed provision,
however, reveals that it only encourages private and non- government reproductive healthcare
service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no
penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive
healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish to
provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no
compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While
the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court
does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed
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by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.
PHAPi v. Medaldea, G.R. No. 234448,
November 6, 2018
R.A. No. 10932 makes it unlawful to request, solicit, demand or accept deposit or advance payment as
a prerequisite not only for confinement or medical treatment but also for administering basic
emergency care.
Phapi argues that "basic emergency care" and "emergency treatment and support" as defined under
R.A. No. 10932 imposes upon the physician, the hospital, its management and staff the untenable
duties to actually prevent death, permanent disability, permanent injury to or loss of an unborn baby
or its non-institutional delivery and to sufficiently address an emergency situation and in case of a
woman in active labor, to ensure the safe delivery of the baby. Echoing Lucas, et al. v. Dr. Tuano,
petitioner emphasizes that a physician is not an insurer of the good result of treatment. Petitioner
thus argues that the duty imposed by R.A. No. 10932, being predicated on the achievement of an end
that is impossible to guarantee, amounts to a denial of due process.
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November 6, 2018
aims to strike down the fines imposed under Section 4 for being unjust, excessive, and oppressive as
they are not commensurate to the act or omission that is being penalized. Petitioner also questions
the solidary liability for damages under Section 4 insofar as it generally makes "other officers" of the
health facility solidarily liable with the president, chairman, members of the board of directors or
trustees.
The presumption of liability spelled under Section 5 of R.A. No.10932 is also being assailed for being
repugnant to the constitutional presumption of innocence. It is the contention of petitioner that the
presumption of liability clause allows for a presumption of generalized liability, i.e., administrative,
civil and criminal, upon the occurrence of death, permanent disability and serious impairment of the
health condition of the patient or her unborn child after the denial of the patient's admission due to a
hospital policy of demanding deposits or advance payments.
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November 6, 2018
PHApi seeks to strike down as unconstitutional the exclusion of the basic emergency care of patients
not classified as poor, indigent or marginalized from PhilHealth reimbursement, PCSO assistance
and tax deductibility under Sections 7 and 8 of R.A. No. 10932 for being violative of the equal
protection clause.
Illustrating its argument, petitioner contends that these prov1s10ns would allow a hospital who treats
a poor patient to receive PhilHealth reimbursement, PCSO assistance and tax deduction, and yet the
hospital who treats a patient not classified as poor, indigent or marginalized will not be allowed a
similar PhilHealth reimbursement, PCSO assistance and tax deduction. It is likewise the view of
petitioner that the law, insofar as it obliges hospitals, its staff and management to render services to
patients not classified as poor, indigent, or marginalized without the corresponding reimbursement,
assistance and tax deduction, amounts to involuntary servitude.
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November 6, 2018
.
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No degrading or inhuman punishment
• Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for
it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
• (2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against

any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities
under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
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RP v. Dela Merced and Sons., G.R. No. 201501,
January 22, 2018
The Guadalupe Commercial Complex is a commercial building owned and operated by Dela Merced &
Sons.Situated alongside the Pasig River, the complex operates a wet market and houses eateries or
kitchenettes in the same building. On 13 July 2006, the Environmental Management Bureau-National Capital
Region (EMB-NCR) of the DENR inspected the Guadalupe Commercial Complex. The inspection team found
that Dela Merced & Sons had violated the following: 1) Section 1 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2004-26 for
operating air pollution source installations (generator set) without a permit to operate; and 2) Section 27(i) of
R.A. 9275 for operating a facility that discharged regulated water pollutants without a discharge permit.
De la Merced was found to have violated the Clean Water Act of 2004 (RA9275) and was imposed a fine. The
fine covered the alleged 398 days that Dela Merced & Sons had violated R.A. 9275. The rate was ₱10,000 per
day of violation in accordance with Sec. 28 of the law. The period covered was from 12 October 2006- when the
collected effluent from the facility failed the DENR Effluent Standards-to 13 November 2007, which marked the
end of the period when, by the next day, the sampling gathered by the EMB-NCR had already passed the DENR
Standards. Dela Merced claims that the fine imposed is excessive.
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January 22, 2018
The constitutional prohibition on the imposition of excessive fines applies only to criminal
prosecutions.56 In contrast, this case involves an administrative proceeding and, contrary to the
supposition of Dela Merced & Sons,57 the fine imposed is not a criminal penalty. Hence, the
proscription under Article III, Section 19 is inapplicable to this case. X x x
For a penalty to be considered obnoxious to the Constitution, it needs to be more than merely being
harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe. To come under the prohibition, the penalty must be
flagrantly and plainly oppressive or so disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the
moral sense of all reasonable persons as to what is right and proper under the circumstances.Dela
Merced & Sons failed to satisfy these jurisprudential standards.
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January 22, 2018
In questioning the constitutionality of the fine, Dela Merced & Sons merely alleges that the amount is
"exorbitant,"61 "arbitrary, unconscionable,"62 and "too excessive as to cause grave impact on the
business operations, nay [the] very survival of petitioner as a business entity [and] its employees as a
whole."63 These unsubstantiated allegations are not enough to strike down the fine as
unconstitutional for being excessive.
Moreover, Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275 cannot be declared unconstitutional simply because the fine imposed
may cause grave impact on Dela Merced & Sons' business operations. Indeed, the possibility that a
law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional.
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January 22, 2018
Also, it should be noted that the basis for the amount of fine imposed by the PAB and the CA (i.e.
₱10,000 per day of violation) is the minimum imposable amount under the law. Since penalties are
prescribed by statute, their formulation is essentially and exclusively legislative. Having no authority
to modify the penalties already prescribed, the courts can only interpret and apply them.65 As held in
US. v. Borromeo, "[t]he fixing of penalties for the violation of statutes is primarily a legislative
function, and the courts hesitate to interfere, unless the fine provided for is so far excessive as to
shock the sense of mankind.
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January 22, 2018
The importance of water resources for our existence cannot be overstated. These resources are vital
not only for our individual well-being, but also for the survival of society as a whole. Yet, we have
continued to abuse them, as if they were inexhaustible.
Pollution has been a perennial problem affecting our water resources. In his sponsorship speech for
the Clean Water Bill, one senator cited the Pasig River to illustrate this point. He said, "[i]f we were to
present a body of water that typifies the chronic water pollution problem in the country, nothing
leads us closer than the notoriously polluted Pasig River. x x x Pasig River is considered biologically
dead x x x. [It] is just one of the bodies of water that has been severely prostituted."76 This is the
same river to which the Guadalupe Commercial Complex has discharged its wastewater.
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January 22, 2018
Our legislators saw the need for a concerted effort of the government and society to abate, control,
and prevent the pollution of our country's water resources.78 Hence, the Clean Water Act was
enacted in the hope that "this vital measure will offer the future generation an abundant supply of
potable water, clean rivers to swim [in], and a better access to safe water for their daily use."
All of us benefit from clean water, and we are all responsible for its preservation. Dela Merced & Sons
is no exception. Thus, we should all do our part in the protection and conservation of our water
resources. As the authors of the Clean Water Act have reminded us, we must use our water wisely, for
it is the selfsame prosperity we ought to hand down to our children.
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Maturan v. COMELEC and Patiño,
G.R. No. 227155, March 28, 2017
On October 16, 2015, Maturan filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Provincial Governor
of Basilan to be contested in the 2016 National and Local Elections. Allan Patiño, claiming to be a
registered voter of Basilan, filed a petition for the disqualification of the petitioner on the ground that
based on the list issued by the COMELEC Campaign Finance Officer the latter had failed to file his
Statement of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE) corresponding to the 2010 and 2013 elections.
The COMELEC upheld Patino and imposed the penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public
office on Maturan.
Maturan claims that the penalty of perpetual disqualification is cruel and degrading which is
constitutionally proscribed. Is he correct?
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G.R. No. 227155, March 28, 2017
We have always deferred to the wisdom of Congress in enacting a law. We can only enforce a statute
like R.A. No. 7166 unless there is a clear showing that it contravenes the Constitution. The petitioner
has not demonstrated herein how R.A. No. 7166 could have transgressed the Constitution. On the
contrary, a review of R.A. No. 7166 convincingly indicates that perpetual disqualification from public
office has been prescribed as a penalty for the repeated failure to file the SOCE and does not
constitute cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment.
We have already settled that the constitutional proscription under the Bill of Rights extends only to
situations of extreme corporeal or psychological punishment that strips the individual of his humanity.
The proscription is aimed more at the form or character of the punishment rather than at its severity
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G.R. No. 227155, March 28, 2017
…the Court has elucidated in Lim v. People, to wit:
Settled is the rule that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel, degrading or disproportionate
to the nature of the offense unless it is flagrantly and plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate
to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community. It takes more than merely
being harsh, excessive, out of proportion or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution.
Based on this principle, the Court has consistently overruled contentions of the defense that the
penalty of fine or imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is cruel and degrading.
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G.R. No. 227155, March 28, 2017
In People vs. Tongko, this Court held that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is
generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of its
duration or amount, and applies to punishments which never existed in America or which public
sentiment regards as cruel or obsolete. This refers, for instance, to those inflicted at the whipping post
or in the pillory, to burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling and the like. The fact
that the penalty is severe provides insufficient basis to declare a law unconstitutional and does not, by
that circumstance alone, make it cruel and inhuman.
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Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for
debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
The ruling of Colinares v. Court of Appeals was sustained in Hur Tin Yang v. RP (G.R. No. 195117,
August 14, 2013) on the basis of Section 20:
The practice of banks of making borrowers sign trust receipts to facilitate collection of loans and place
them under the threats of criminal prosecution should they be unable to pay it may be unjust and
inequitable. if not reprehensible. Such agreements are contracts of adhesion which borrowers have
no option but to sign lest their loan be disapproved. The resort to this scheme leaves poor and hapless
borrowers at the mercy of banks and is prone to misinterpretation x x x.
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Double Jeopardy
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
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Double Jeopardy
Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 and 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure strictly adhere to the
constitutional proscription against double jeopardy and provide for the requisites in order for
double jeopardy to attach. For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur:
(1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime
charged;
(2) a court of competent jurisdiction;
(3) the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and
(4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.
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Exceptions to the Rule on Double
Jeopardy
(1) Where there has been deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of
a mistrial, or
(2) Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional
circumstances.
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GMA v. RP, G.R. No. 220598, April 18,
2017
The constitutional prohibition against placing a person under double jeopardy for the same offense
bars not only a new and independent prosecution but also an appeal in the same action after
jeopardy had attached. 14 As such, every acquittal becomes final immediately upon promulgation
and cannot be recalled for correction or amendment. With the acquittal being immediately final,
granting the State's motion for reconsideration in this case would violate the Constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy because it would effectively reopen the prosecution and subject
the petitioners to a second jeopardy despite their acquittal.
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2017
It is cogent to remind in this regard that the Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy
provides to the accused three related protections, specifically:
protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal;
protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and
protection against multiple punishments for the same offense.
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2017
The rationale for the three protections is expounded in United States v. Wilson: 16
The interests underlying these three protections arc quite similar. When a defendant has been once
convicted and punished for a particular crime, principles of fairness and finality require that he not be
subjected to the possibility of further punishment by being again tried or sentenced for the same
offense. Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall 163 (1874); In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889). When a defendant has
been acquitted of an offense, the Clause guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make
repeated attempts to convict him, "thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal,
and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the
possibility that, even though innocent, he may be found guilty."
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Ex post facto/ Bill of Attainder
Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
No ex post facto law may be enacted, and no law may be construed in such fashion as to permit a
criminal prosecution offensive to the ex post facto clause. (RP v. Judge Eugenio, G.R. No. 174629,
February 14, 2008). It is settled that an ex post facto law is limited in its scope only to matters
criminal in nature (RP v. Rosemoor Mining and Dev’t Corp., G.R. No. 149927, March 30, 2004).
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a

particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain
individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack
of judicial trial. (BOCEA v. Teves, G.R. No. 181704, December 6, 2011)
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Six Recognized Instances of an Ex Post
Facto Law
1) it criminalizes and punishes an action that was done before the passing of the law and that was
innocent when it was done;
2) it aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when it was committed;
3) it changes the punishment and inflicts one that is greater than that imposed by the law annexed
to the crime when it was committed;
4) it alters the legal rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon a less or different testimony
than that required by the law at the time of the commission of the offense;
5) it assumes the regulation of civil rights and remedies only, but in effect imposes a penalty or a
deprivation of a right as a consequence of something that was considered lawful when it was
done; and
6) it deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he or she become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or an acquittal or the proclamation of an
amnesty. (RP v. Rosemoor Mining and Dev’t Corp.,JAPSDG.R. No. 149927, March 30, 2004)
Bill of Attainder
Bills of attainder are an ancient instrument of tyranny. In England a few centuries back, Parliament
would at times enact bills or statutes which declared certain persons attainted and their blood
corrupted so that it lost all heritable quality (Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L.Ed. 366 [1867]). In
more modern terms, a bill of attainder is essentially a usurpation of judicial power by a legislative
body. It envisages and effects the imposition of a penalty — the deprivation of life or liberty or
property — not by the ordinary processes of judicial trial, but by legislative fiat. While cast in the form
of special legislation, a bill of attainder (or bill of pains and penalties, if it prescribed a penalty other
than death) is in intent and effect a penal judgment visited upon an identified person or group of
persons (and not upon the general community) without a prior charge or demand, without notice and
hearing, without an opportunity to defend, without any of the civilized forms and safeguards of the
judicial process as we know it (People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 [1972]; Cummings and Missouri, 4 Wall.
277, 18 L. Ed. 356 [1867]; U.S. v. Lovett, 328, U.S. 303, 90 L.Ed. 1252 [1945]; U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,
14 L.Ed. 2d. 484 [1965]. Such is the archetypal bill of attainder wielded as a means of legislative
oppression. x x x (Concurring Opinion of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in Tuason v. Register of Deeds,
Caloocan City (No. L-70484, January 29, 1988, 157 SCRA 613 as cited in BOCEA v. Teves, G.R. No.
181704 : December 6, 2011) JAPSD

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SOME RECENT SC

Due Process Clause

Equal Protection of the Laws

b) Procedural. This serves as a restriction on actions of judicial and quasijudicial agencies of

SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing

In Laud v. People , Search Warrant No. 09-14407 was adjudged valid

The one-specific-offense requirement reinforces the constitutional requirement that a search

Meanwhile, in Prudente v. Dayrit, the search warrant was captioned: For

Lilia was walking with her boyfriend at JA Clarin. Suddenly

• A “buy-bust” operation is a valid in flagrante arrest.

[F]or a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two

• (2) informational privacy - Usually defined as the right of individuals to control

Customs searches, as exception to the requirement of a valid search warrant, are

• Foundation of all other rights: Freedom of speech is an indispensable condition for

A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if

Public accountability and a commitment to giving

• Accommodation, Not Establishment of Religion

The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

• Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of separation of Church

Who is correct? MSU or Valmores?

Is DOJ Circular No. 41 constitutional?

…grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions

102 See Section 2 of RA 9344.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution states:

In contrast, the existence of employer-employee relationship is not mandatory in the formation

The right to form a workers' association is not exclusive to ambulant, intermittent

Requisites of lawful taking:

Essentially, expropriation is an involuntary sale where the landowner is practically an unwilling

This Court expounded in People v. Marra:17

1) She was interviewed at the house of the Victorias by PO2 Cotoner?

No, there is no violation of constitutional right of the accused to confront the

Some Factors to Determinate the Existence of Inordinate Delay (Leonen):

• (2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against

A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a

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