Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Welfare State
The welfare state concept is found in the constitutional clause on the promotion of social
justice.
Purpose:
a. To ensure the well-being and economic security of all the people, and
b. In the pledge of protection to labor with specific authority to regulate the relations
between landowners and tenants and between labor and capital.
Evidently, the sanctions imposed in both Agabon and Jaka proceed from the necessity to deter employers
from future violations of the statutory due process rights of employees. In similar regard, the Court deems it
proper to apply the same principle to the case at bar for the reason that an employer’s contractual breach
of its own company procedure – albeit not statutory in source – has the parallel effect of violating the
laborer’s rights. Suffice it to state, the contract is the law between the parties and thus, breaches of the
same impel recompense to vindicate a right that has been violated. Consequently, while the Court is wont
to uphold the dismissal of Alcaraz because a valid cause exists, the payment of nominal damages on
account of Abbott’s contractual breach is warranted in accordance with Article 2221 of the Civil Code.
PEREZ Doctrine
Between an employer and an employee, the latter is oftentimes on the losing or inferior
position. Without the mandatory requirement of a hearing, employees may be unjustly
terminated from their work, effectively losing their means of livelihood. The right of persons to
their work is considered a property right which is well within the meaning of the constitutional
guarantee. Depriving employees their job without due process essentially amounts to a
deprivation of property without due process.
The indispensability of a hearing is advantageous to both the employer and the employee
because they are given the opportunity to settle the dispute or resort to the use of alternative
dispute resolution to deflect the filing of cases with the NLRC and later the courts. It is
important that a hearing is prescribed by the law since this is the best time that the possibility
of a compromise agreement or a settlement can be exhaustively discussed and entered into.
During this hearing, the relations of the parties may not be that strained and, therefore, they
are more likely receptive to a compromise. Once dismissal is ordered by the employer, the
deteriorated relationship renders the possibility of an amicable settlement almost nil. Thus, a
hearing can help the parties come up with a settlement that will benefit them and encourage
an out-of-court settlement which would be less expensive, creating a "win-win" situation for
them. Of course the compromise agreement, as a product of the settlement, should be
subscribed and sworn to before the labor official or arbiter.
Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory due
process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the
employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights.
The indemnity to be imposed should be stiffer to discourage the abhorrent practice of "dismiss
now, pay later," which we sought to deter in the Serrano ruling. The sanction should be in the
nature of indemnification or penalty and should depend on the facts of each case, taking into
special consideration the gravity of the due process violation of the employer.
To dismiss an employee, the law requires not only the existence of a just and valid cause but
also enjoins the employer to give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself. Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for termination by the
employer: (a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders
of his employer or the latter's representative in connection with the employee's work; (b) gross
and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee
of the trust reposed in him by his employer or his duly authorized representative;
(d)commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or
any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and (e) other
causes analogous to the foregoing.
Sameer Doctrine
When a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution,
the nullity cannot be cured by a reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar
law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional
remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse
conclusion.
Clemens v. Nolting,
G.R. No. L-17959 (1922)
The prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not absolute and unqualified. In
spite of the constitutional prohibition and the fact that both parties are of full age and
competent to contract, it does not necessarily deprive the State of the power to interfere
where the parties do not stand upon an equality, or where the public health demands that
one party to the contract shall be protected against himself.
Right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances is, together with
freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm
of constitutional protection.
Due Process
Twin-Notice Requirement
EDDIE MANUEL, ROMEO BANA, ROGELIO PAGTAMA, JR. and JOEL REA
vs.
N.C. CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY, JOHNNY LIM, ANITA SY and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (SECOND DIVISION),
G.R. No. 127553 November 28, 1997
Right to Counsel Not Applicable in Administrative Cases
The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case
under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer
a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who had been
taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating
statements. It is when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The right to counsel
attaches only upon the start of such investigation. Therefore, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (3)
Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admission made in a criminal investigation but not to those
made in an administrative investigation.
QUIRICO LOPEZ
vs.
ALTURAS GROUP OF COMPANIES and/or MARLITO UY
G.R. No. 191008 April 11, 2011
Lopez Doctrine
The right to counsel and the assistance of one in investigations involving termination cases is neither
indispensable nor mandatory, except when the employee himself requests for one or that he
manifests that he wants a formal hearing on the charges against him. In petitioner’s case, there is no
showing that he requested for a formal hearing to be conducted or that he be assisted by counsel.
Verily, since he was furnished a second notice informing him of his dismissal and the grounds therefor,
the twin-notice requirement had been complied with to call for a deletion of the appellate court’s award
of nominal damages to petitioner.
This is a doctrine in agency stating that the principal is chargeable with and bound by the
knowledge of or notice to his agent received while the agent was acting as such.
Any of the acts mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b) win constitute recruitment and placement
even if only one prospective worker is involved. The proviso merely lays down a rule of evidence that
where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more
prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the
act of recruitment and placement. The words "shall be deemed" create that presumption.
The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement of
workers. Any of the acts mentioned in Art. 13(b) will constitute recruitment and placement even if only
one prospective worker is involved.
License Requirement
It is the lack of the necessary license or authority to recruit and deploy workers, either locally or
overseas, that renders the recruitment activity unlawful or criminal. To prove illegal recruitment,
therefore, the State must show that the accused gave the complainants the distinct impression that she
had the power or ability to deploy the complainants abroad in a manner that they were convinced to
part with their money for that end.
The absence of receipts in a criminal case for illegal recruitment does not warrant the acquittal of the
accused and is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. As long as the witnesses had positively shown
through their respective testimonies that the accused is the one involved in the prohibited recruitment,
he may be convicted of the offense despite the want of receipts.
The Statute of Frauds and the rules of evidence do not require the presentation of receipts in order to
prove the existence of recruitment agreement and the procurement of fees in illegal recruitment cases.
The amounts may consequently be proved by the testimony of witnesses.
It is necessary that the prosecution prove the concurrence of the following elements: (1) the offender
undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" under Article 13 (b) of
the labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code (now
Section 6 of RA 8042) and (2) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him
to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers. In the case of illegal recruitment in large scale,
a third element is added: that the offender commits any of the acts of recruitment and placement against
three or more persons, individually or as a group.
Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that
foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the
issues presented before us.
CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT
Labor Standards
Maternity Children’s Hospital v. Secretary of Labor,
Labor Standards
the minimum requirements prescribed by existing laws, rules and regulations relating to
wages, hours of work, cost-of-living allowance and other monetary and welfare benefits,
including occupational, safety and health standards.
Judy Philippines, Inc. v NLRC,
Mutual obligation
The employer's obligation to give his workers just compensation and treatment carries with
it the corollary right to expect from the workers adequate work, diligence and good conduct.
Idle time
The idle time that an employee may spend for resting and dining which he may leave the
spot or place of work though not the premises of his employer, is not counted as working
time only where the work is broken or is not continuous.
Commuting time
Employees performing tasks during their commute which are not merely incidental to the
employee’s job, and are primarily for the benefit of the employer (such as a company
driver performing a carpool service for co- workers according to an agreement with the
company), are entitled to overtime pay.
No work, no pay
General Rule: If there is no work performed by the employee, there can be no wage or pay.
Exception: Unless the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was prevented by
management or was illegally locked out, suspended or dismissed.
International School Alliance of Educators v. Hon. Quisumbing,
Employees working in the Philippines, if they are performing similar functions and
responsibilities under similar working conditions, should be paid equally. If an employer
accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees
perform equal work.
General Rule: The age-old rule governing the relation between labor and capital or
management and employee is that a "fair day's wage for a fair day's labor." It is hardly
fair or just for an employee or laborer to fight or litigate against his employer on the
employer's time.
Exception: When the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked
out, suspended or dismissed, or otherwise illegally prevented from working.
Non-diminution of benefits
If the following are met, then the employer cannot remove or reduce benefits:
1. Ripened company policy – Benefit is founded on a policy which has ripened into a
practice over a long period;
2. Practice is consistent and deliberate; and
3. Not due to error in the construction or application of a doubtful or difficult question of
law. [Globe Mackay Cable v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-74156 (1988)]
4. The diminution or discontinuance is done unilaterally by the employer.
Fuji Television Network Inc v. Espiritu,
Brent doctrine
When the following indicators are present, fixed-term employment is valid:
1. Fixed period of employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties
absent any circumstance vitiating consent
2. It satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt each other on more or less
equal footing with no moral dominance exercised by one over the other.
JULIANA VDA. DE LICARDO, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, Maria
Teresa, Maria Luisa and Jesus, all surnamed Licardo,
vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and OTIS ELEVATOR COMPANY
G.R. No. L-35745 July 30, 1982
"street peril" principle
The general rule is that "in the absence of special circumstances, an employee injured, in
going to, or coming from his place of work is excluded from the benefits of workmen's
compensation acts." The reason given is that accidents do not arise out of and in the course
of employment. (Iloilo Dock and Engineering Co. vs. WCC, 26 SCRA 102; Afable vs. Singer
Sewing Machine Co., 58 Phil. 39).
The primordial consideration is whether or not such work is an employee's daily, normal
routine work.
EXCEPTIONS
This rule, however, admits of exceptions. The very case of Afable says that "we do not of
course mean to imply that an employee can never recover for injuries suffered while on his
way to and from work. That depends on the nature of his employment." The case of Iloilo
Dock Engineering Co. even enumerates four well-recognized exceptions, to wit:
(1) where the employee is proceeding to or from his work on the premises of his employer;
(2) where the employee is about to enter or about to leave the premises of his employer
by way of the exclusive or customary means of ingress and egress;
(3) where the employee is charged, while on his way to or from his place of employment or
at his home, or during his employment, with some duty or special errand connected with his
employment; and
4) where the employer, as an incident of the employment, provides the means of
transportation to and from his place of employment.
Where an employee was accidentally injured while running to his place of work to avoid rain,
slipped and fell into a ditch in front of the factory's main gate, as a result of which he died the
next day, this Court ruled that when the employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably
proximate to the place of work, while going to and from his work, such an injury is deemed to
have arisen out of and in the course of employment. (Philippine Fiber Processing Co., Inc. vs.
Fermina Ampil 99 Phil. 1050)
Where the truck involved in the accident was the service truck of the employer furnished by
the latter to convey its workers home from work, the accident arose out of or in the course of
employment, said this Court citing the following:
Off-premise injuries to and from work, in both liberal and narrow states, are
compensable (1) if the employee is on the way to or from work in a vehicle
owned or supplied by the employer, whether in a public (e.g. the employer's
street car) or private conveyance. ... (Workmen's Compensation Law by
Horovitz, p. 162)
(Philippine Engineer's Syndicate, Inc. vs. Flora S. Martin and WCC, 4 SCRA 356)
Where injuries are sustained by a workman who is provided with transportation while going to
or coming from his work, they are considered as arising out of and in the course of his
employment, and therefore, are compensable. (Talisay-Silay Milling Co., inc. vs. WCC, 21
SCRA 366)
Where a school teacher was on her way home from school and would continue to perform
other school works in connection with her employment as school teacher, her taking the ride
in that fatal vehicle can be treated as a necessary incident to her school work, thus her heirs
were entitled to the benefits arising from her death as having occurred in connection with her
duty. (Bael vs. WCC, 75 SCRA 181)
Where the employer remunerates the employee for transportation expenses and agreed to
shoulder 75% of her transportation expenses when the employer assigned her to take the
place of another teacher in a different place not her regular place of work, said employee was
entitled to a disability compensation for she was injured while performing an act — travelling
home from school, which was a necessary incident to her employment. (Ollero vs. WCC, 84
SCRA 695)
Where the records show that the deceased was a college professor of the University of
Mindanao Tagum Branch), a place about 60 kilometers from Davao City and that the
respondent fatted to disprove the claim of petitioner that the deceased at the time of his death
was going to attend a conference at the University of Mindanao in Davao City for which he
was called, the foregoing is sufficient to create a disputable presumption that the deceased
was in the performance of an official mission for the school at the time of the accident and
that his death was therefore compensable. (Galindez vs. WCC and University of Mindanao,
79 SCRA 332)
Where the record establishes that claimant petitioner was on his way to Mariveles in a
passenger bus in line of duty in order to discharge his mission as RCA retail inspector to
supervise the unloading of the RCA rice when the bus turned turtle in a vehicular accident and
caused him serious injury that resulted in the amputation of his left leg, the resulting disability
was undoubtedly compensable within the "going to and coming from rule" and the dismissal
of the claim is untenable. (Unite vs. WCC, 90 SCRA 313)
MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION, EDUARDO U. MANESE and NORWEGIAN
CRUISE LINE,
vs.
HENRY M. SIMBAJON,
G.R. No. 203472 July 9, 2014
For work-related illnesses acquired by seafarers from the time the 2010 amendment to the
POEA-SEC took effect, the declaration of disability should no longer be based on the
number of days the seafarer was treatedor paid his sickness allowance, but rather on the
disability grading he received, whether from the companydesignated physician or from the
third independent physician, if the medical findings of the physician chosen by the seafarer
conflicts with that of the company-designated doctor.
Hobson’s choice
The employees, even if given the option to retire, be retrenched or dismissed, were made
to understand that they had no choice but to leave the company. More bluntly stated, they were
forced to swallow the bitter pill of dismissal but afforded a chance to sweeten their separation
from employment. They either had to voluntarily retire, be retrenched without receiving any
benefits at all. All that the employees were offered was a choice on the means or method of
terminating their services but never as to the status of their employment. In short, they were
never asked if they wanted to work for the petitioner-company.
Employer-Employee Relationship
Brotherhood Labor Unity Movement of the PH v. Zamora,
Four-Fold Test
1. Selection and engagement of the
employee;
2. Payment of wages;
3. Power of dismissal; and
4. Employer’s power to control the employee’s conduct with respect to the means and
methods by which the work is to be accomplished
Lirio v. Genovia,
Power to control
This is the most important element when determining the existence of an EER. It pertains not
only to results, but also to the means and methods to attain those results.
Sevilla v. CA,
Two-tiered approach
1. Control Test (refer to the Four-Fold Test)
2. Underlying economic realities within the activity or relationship
No particular form of evidence is required to prove the EER. Any competent and relevant
evidence to prove the relationship may be admitted. For, if only documentary evidence would
be required to show that relationship, no scheming employer would ever be brought before the
bar of justice, as no employer would wish to come out with any trace of the illegality he has
authored considering that it should take much weightier proof to invalidate a written
instrument.
Management retains the prerogative, whenever exigencies of the service so require, to change the
working hours of its employees. So long as such prerogative is exercised in good faith for the
advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights
of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements, this Court will uphold such exercise.
Management Prerogative
Labor Unions
NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTELS, RESTAURANTS AND ALLIED
INDUSTRIES- MANILA PAVILION HOTEL CHAPTER
vs.
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS,
HOLIDAY INN MANILA PAVILION HOTEL LABOR UNION AND ACESITE PHILIPPINES
HOTEL CORPORATION
G.R. No. 181531 July 31, 2009
For there to be a valid certification election, majority of the bargaining unit must have voted
AND the winning union must have garnered majority of the valid votes cast.
The true importance of ascertaining the number of valid votes cast is for it to serve as basis
for computing the required majority, and not just to determine which union won the elections.
The opening of the segregated but valid votes has thus become material. To be sure, the
conduct of a certification election has a two-fold objective: to determine the appropriate
bargaining unit and to ascertain the majority representation of the bargaining representative, if
the employees desire to be represented at all by anyone. It is not simply the determination of
who between two or more contending unions won, but whether it effectively ascertains the will
of the members of the bargaining unit as to whether they want to be represented and which
union they want to represent them.
Considering that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject matter of this case, these tribunals may proceed to try the case even if the rules of
conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum, this being an
exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed.
Basso may conveniently resort to our labor tribunals as he and CMI had physical presence in the
Philippines during the duration of the trial. CMI has a Philippine branch, while Basso, before his
death, was residing here.
Thus, it could be reasonably expected that no extraordinary measures were needed for the
parties to make arrangements in advocating their respective cases.
Choice-of-law rules
Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as property right, contract
claim) and a connecting fact or point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of
celebration, the place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing.
Pursuant to Saudi Arabian Airlines, we hold that the "test factors," "points of contact" or
"connecting factors" in this case are the following:
(1) The nationality, domicile or residence of Basso;
(2) The seat of CMI;
(3) The place where the employment contract has been made, the locus actus;
(4) The place where the act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of
performance of contractual duties;
(5) The intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their
agreement, the lex loci intentionis; and
(6) The place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable
injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function
of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental
principles of Conflict of Laws.