E.
EJUSDEM GENERIS - Of the same kind,
class, or nature.In statutory construction, the
“ejusdem generis rule” is that where general
words follow an enumeration of persons or
things, by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be
construed in their widest extent, but are to be
held as applying only to persons or things of
the same general kind or class as those
specifically mentioned.
LIWAG VS HAPPY GLEN LOOP
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
FACTS: the owner of lot 11, block no. 5
which houses the water tank was sold to
Hermogenes, after he died, his wife wrote a
letter to respondent to remove the overhead
water tank in the parcel of land to which the
latter denied.
Issue: w/n the water facility constitutes as an
amenity in an open space thus complying with
the law?
Held: yes. Lot 11, Block 5 of Happy Glen Loop
Subdivision forms part of its open space
The term open space is defined in P.D. 1216 as
an area reserved exclusively for parks,
playgrounds, recreational uses, schools, roads,
places of worship, hospitals, health
centers, barangay centers and other similar
facilities and amenities.
The principle of ejusdem generis states that
where a general word or phrase follows an
enumeration of words of the same class, the
general word or phrase is to be construed to
include or to be restricted to things resembling,
or of the same kind of those specifically
mentioned.
Applying this principle to the afore-quoted
Section 1 of P.D. 1216, we find that the
enumeration refers to areas reserved for the
common welfare of the community. Thus, the
phrase other similar facilities and amenities
should be interpreted in like manner.
Here, the water facility was undoubtedly
established for the benefit of the community.
We therefore rule that, based on the principle
of ejusdem generis , the location of the water
facility in the Subdivision must form part of
the area reserved for open space.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS CA
FACTs:
Petitioner contends that the importation of the
foodstuffs in question is prohibited and the
articles thus imported may be subject to
forfeiture under Sec. 2530 (f) and 102 (k) of the
Tariff and Customs Code. The foodstuffs in
question being articles of prohibited importation
cannot be released under bond.
ISSUE:
W/N the imported foodstuffs in question are not
contraband, and are not as stated by
Respondent Court, among the prohibited
importations enumerated in Sec. 102 of the
Tariff and Customs Code therefore these
foodstuffs may be released under bond as
provided in Sec. 2301 of the same code.
HELD:
Yes. The imported foodstuffs are considered
prohibited importation under Sec.
102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code.
Respondents contend that this last paragraph
must, by application of the principles of ejusdem
generis, be restricted only to those articles the
importation of which is "absolutely prohibited,"
or to contraband. This contention is not
acceptable. In the first place, the specific things
enumerated in paragraphs (a) to (j), inclusive, of
Section 102 have no distinguishable common
characteristics and they differ greatly from one
another, and the rule of ejusdem
generis "applies only where the specific words
preceding the general expression are of the
same nature. Where they are of different
genera, the meaning of the general word
remains unaffected by its connection with them."
Section 102 has 2 classes (qualifiedly prohibited
and absolutely prohibited)
If the importation in question was made contrary
to Central Bank circulars, then said importation
is an importation prohibited by law. That
importation, even if it be termed "importation
effected contrary to law", as respondents call it,
is nonetheless a "prohibited importation." .

CIR VS AMERICAN EXPRESS
FACTS: respondent requests for a
refund of their input tax from 1997
Ground: 1997 Tax Code, which held that “xxx
Any input tax attributable to the purchase of
capital goods or to zero-rated sales by a VAT-
registered person may at his option be
refunded or credited against other internal
revenue taxes, subject to the provisions of
Section 112.”
In addition, respondent relied on VAT Ruling
No. 080-89, which read, “In Reply, please be
informed that, as a VAT registered entity
whose service is paid for in acceptable foreign
currency which is remitted inwardly to the
Philippine and accounted for in accordance
with the rules and regulations of the Central
Bank of the Philippines, your service income is
automatically zero rated xxx”
Issue: W/N AMEX Phils is entitled to
refund
Held: yes
Ejusdem Generis is inapplicable
First, although the regulatory provision contains
an enumeration of particular or specific words,
followed by the general phrase "and other
similar services," such words do not constitute
a readily discernible class and are patently not
of the same kind.72 Project studies involve
investments or marketing; information services
focus on data technology; engineering and
architectural designs require creativity. Aside
from calling for the exercise or use of mental
faculties or perhaps producing written technical
outputs, no common denominator to the
exclusion of all others characterizes these
three services. Nothing sets them apart from
other and similar general services that may
involve advertising, computers, consultancy,
health care, management, messengerial work -
- to name only a few.
Second, there is the regulatory intent to give
the general phrase "and other similar services"
a broader meaning.73 Clearly, the preceding
phrase "as well as" is not meant to limit the
effect of "and other similar services."
Third, and most important, the statutory
provision upon which this regulation is based is
by itself not restrictive. The scope of the word
"services" in Section 102(b)(2) of the Tax Code
is broad; it is not susceptible of narrow
interpretation.
F. EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSION
ALTERIUS &CASUS OMISSUS
Express mention of one person, thing or
consequence implies the exclusion of all
others.
States that a person, object or thing omitted
from an enumeration must be held to have
been omitted intentionally.
BENJAMIN ROMUALDEZ VS MARCELO
FACTS: Romualdez is being charged w
violations of sec 7 of RA 3019 for failure to file
his Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net
Worth during his tenure as Ambassador and as
Technical Assistant in the DFA
He claims that the Office of the Ombudsman
gravely abused its discretion in recommending
the filing of 24 informations against him for the
violation of the Anti-graft and corruption
practices act.
That he cannot revive the cases w/c were
previously dismissed by the Sandiganbyayan.
The ombudsman however contends that the
dismissal of the informations in the cases does
not mean that petitioner was exempt from
criminal prosecution when there are new
information that may be filed should they find
probable cause in the investigation.
P: term of
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the
prescription shall begin to run from the day of
the commission of the violation of the law, and
if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and
punishment. The running of the prescriptive
period shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of
Act No. 3326 did not provide that the absence
of the accused from the Philippines prevents
the running of the prescriptive period. Thus, the
only inference that can be gathered from the
foregoing is that the legislature, in enacting Act
No. 3326, did not consider the absence of the
accused from the Philippines as a hindrance to
the running of the prescriptive
period. Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. To elaborate, -
Indeed, it is an elementary rule of
statutory construction that the express
mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others. This
rule is expressed in the familiar maxim
"expressio unius est exclusio alterius."
Where a statute, by its terms, is
expressly limited to certain matters, it
may not, by interpretation or
construction, be extended to others. The
rule proceeds from the premise that the
legislature would not have made
specified enumerations in a statute had
the intention been not to restrict its
meaning and to confine its terms to
those expressly mentioned.41
Had the legislature intended to include the
accused’s absence from the Philippines as a
ground for the interruption of the prescriptive
period in special laws, the same could have
been expressly provided in Act No. 3326.
Thus, for offenses allegedly committed by the
petitioner from 1962 up to March 15, 1982, the
same shall prescribe in 10 years. On the other
hand, for offenses allegedly committed by the
petitioner during the period from March 16,
1982 until 1985, the same shall prescribe in 15
years.
In view of the foregoing, the applicable 10-and-
15-year prescriptive periods in the instant case,
were not interrupted by any event from the time
they began to run on May 8, 1987. As a
consequence, the alleged offenses committed
by the petitioner for the years 1963-1982
prescribed 10 years from May 8, 1987 or on
May 8, 1997. On the other hand, the alleged
offenses committed by the petitioner for the
years 1983-1985 prescribed 15 years from May
8, 1987 or on May 8, 2002.
Therefore, when the Office of the Special
Prosecutor initiated the preliminary
investigation of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-
13429 on March 3, 2004 by requiring the
petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit, the
alleged offenses subject therein have already
prescribed. Indeed, the State has lost its right
to prosecute petitioner for the offenses subject
of Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending
before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case
Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
SAN PABLO MANUFACTURING CORP VS
CIR
San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation (SPMC)
is a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of milling, manufacturing and
exporting of coconut oil and other allied
products. It was assessed and ordered to pay
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
miller’s tax and manufacturer’s sales
tax, among other deficiency taxes, for taxable
year 1987 particularly on SPMC’s sales of
crude oil to United Coconut Chemicals, Inc.
(UNICHEM) while the deficiency sales tax was
applied on its sales of corn and edible oil as
manufactured products. SPMC opposed the
assessments. The Commissioner denied its
protest. SPMC appealed the denial of its
protest to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) by
way of a petition for review. docketed as CTA
Case No. 5423. It insists on the liberal
application of the rules because, on the merits
of the petition, SPMC was not liable for the 3%
miller’s tax. It maintains that the crude oil which
it sold to UNICHEM was actually exported by
UNICHEM as an ingredient of fatty acid and
glycerine, hence, not subject to miller’s tax
pursuant to Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code.
Since UNICHEM, the buyer of SPMC’s milled
products, subsequently exported said products,
SPMC should be exempted from the miller’s
tax.
ISSUE:
Whether or not SPMC’s sale of crude coconut
oil to UNICHEM was subject to the 3% miller’s
task.
HELD:
NO. Petition was denied.
RATIO:
The language of the exempting clause of
Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code was clear.
The tax exemption applied only to the
exportation of rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra
by-products and dessicated coconuts, whether
in their original state or as an ingredient or part
of any manufactured article or products, by the
proprietor or operator of the factory or by the
miller himself.
Where the law enumerates the subject or
condition upon which it applies, it is to be
construed as excluding from its effects all those
not expressly mentioned. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. Anything that is not included
in the enumeration is excluded therefrom and a
meaning that does not appear nor is intended
or reflected in the very language of the statute
cannot be placed therein. The rule proceeds
from the premise that the legislature would not
have made specific enumerations in a statute if
it had the intention not to restrict its meaning
and confine its terms to those expressly
mentioned.
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius is a canon of restrictive interpretation.
Its application in this case is consistent with the
construction of tax exemptions in strictissimi
juris against the taxpayer. To allow SPMC’s
claim for tax exemption will violate these
established principles and unduly derogate
sovereign authority.
COA VS PROVINCE OF CEBU
FACTS:
In the audit of accounts conducted by the
Commission on Audit (COA) of the Province of
Cebu, it appeared that the salaries and
personnel-related benefits of the teachers
appointed by the province for the extension
classes were charged against the provincial
SEF. Likewise charged to the SEF were the
college scholarship grants of the
province. Consequently, the COA issued
Notices of Suspension to the province of
Cebu, saying that disbursements for the
salaries of teachers and scholarship grants are
not chargeable to the provincial SEF.
With the effectivity of the Local Government
Code of 1991, petitioner contends that R.A. No.
5447 was repealed
Invoking the legal maxim "expressio unius est
exclusio alterius," petitioner alleges that since
salaries, personnel-related benefits and
scholarship grants are not among those
authorized as lawful expenditures of the SEF
under the Local Government Code, they should
be deemed excluded therefrom.
Even under the doctrine of necessary
implication, the allocation of the SEF for the
establishment and maintenance of extension
classes logically implies the hiring of teachers
who should, as a matter of course be
compensated for their services.
The SEF may be expended only for the salaries
and personnel-related benefits of teachers
appointed by the local school boards in
connection with the establishment and
maintenance of extension classes. Extension
classes as referred to mean additional classes
needed to accommodate all children of school
age desiring to enter in public schools to acquire
basic education.
ith respect, however, to college scholarship
grants, a reading of the pertinent laws of the
Local Government Code reveals that said
grants are not among the projects for which the
proceeds of the SEF may be appropriated. It
should be noted that Sections 100 (c) and 272
of the Local Government Code substantially
reproduced Section 1, of R.A. No. 5447. But,
unlike payment of salaries of teachers which
falls within the ambit of "establishment and
maintenance of extension classes" and
"operation and maintenance of public schools,"
the "granting of government scholarship to poor
but deserving students" was omitted in Sections
100 (c) and 272 of the Local Government
Code. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus
est. A person, object, or thing omitted from an
enumeration in a statute must be held to have
been omitted intentionally. It is not for this Court
to supply such grant of scholarship where the
legislature has omitted it.
G. REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS
GUTIERREZ VS COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE
Before the 15th Congress opened its first
session, private respondents known as the
Baraquel group filed an impeachment complaint
against petitioner, upon the endorsement of
Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and
Walden Bello.
A day after the opening of the 15th Congress,
the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives transmitted the impeachment
complaint to House Speaker Feliciano
Belmonte, Jr. who directed the Committee on
Rules to include it in the Order of Business.
Private respondents collectively known as the
Reyes group filed another impeachment
complaint against petitioner with a resolution of
endorsement by Party-List Representatives Neri
Javier Colmenares, et al.
The Secretary General transmitted the Reyes
group’s complaint to Speaker Belmonte who
also directed the Committee on Rules to include
it in the Order of Business.
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution,
found the two complaints, which both allege
culpable violation of the Constitution and
betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance.
Petitioner filed with this Court the present
petition with application for injunctive
reliefs. The Court En Banc RESOLVED to
direct the issuance of a status quo ante order
and to require respondents to comment on the
petition in 10 days.
Respondents raise the impropriety of the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition. They
argue that public respondent was not exercising
any judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function
in taking cognizance of the two impeachment
complaints as it was exercising a political act
that is discretionary in nature, and that its
function is inquisitorial that is akin to a
preliminary investigation.
Petitioner invokes the Court’s expanded
certiorari jurisdiction, using the special civil
actions of certiorari and prohibition as
procedural vehicles.
Following the principle of reddendo singula
singulis, the term "cases" must be distinguished
from the term "proceedings. Rather, the
proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified
complaint is filed and referred to the Committee
on Justice for action. This is the initiating step
which triggers the series of steps that follow.
To the argument that only the House of
Representatives as a body can initiate
impeachment proceedings because Section 3
(1) says "The House of Representatives shall
have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment," This is a misreading of said
provision and is contrary to the principle of
reddendo singula singulis by equating
"impeachment cases" with "impeachment
proceeding."
From the records of the Constitutional
Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two
former Constitutional Commissioners, it is
without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers
to the filing of the impeachment complaint
coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of
said complaint.
Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the
Constitution reads: “No impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one
year.” However, the term “initiate” means to file
the complaint and take initial action on it. The
initiation starts with the filing of the complaint
which must be accompanied with an action to
set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing
of the impeachment complaint coupled with
Congress’ taking initial action of said
complaint. The initial action taken by the House
on the complaint is the referral of the complaint
to the Committee on Justice.
CITY OF MANILA VS LAGUIO
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development
Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in
the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels
and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria
Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel
although duly accredited with the DOT as a
hotel.
Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN
ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE
ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF
BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS
OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT,
SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-
MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES
FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited
establishments such as bars, karaoke bars,
motels and hotels from operating in the Malate
District which was notoriously viewed as a red
light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate
Tourist Development Corporation avers that the
ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and
motels in the enumeration of places offering
amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates
that they do not market such nor do they use
women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also
avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only
regulate motels but cannot prohibit their
operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance
is a valid exercise of Police Power as provided
as well in the LGC. The City likewise
emphasized that the purpose of the law is to
promote morality in the City.
It is important to distinguish the punishable
activities from the establishments themselves.
That these establishments are recognized
legitimate enterprises can be gleaned from
another Section of the Code. Section 131
under the Title on Local Government Taxation
expressly mentioned proprietors or operators of
massage clinics, sauna, Turkish and Swedish
baths, hotels, motels and lodging houses as
among the "contractors" defined in paragraph
(h) thereof. The same Section also defined
"amusement" as a "pleasurable diversion and
entertainment," "synonymous to relaxation,
avocation, pastime or fun;" and "amusement
places" to include "theaters, cinemas, concert
halls, circuses and other places of amusement
where one seeks admission to entertain
oneself by seeing or viewing the show or
performances." Thus, it can be inferred that the
Code considers these establishments as
legitimate enterprises and activities. It is well to
recall the maxim reddendo singula
singulis which means that words in different
parts of a statute must be referred to their
appropriate connection, giving to each in its
place, its proper force and effect, and, if
possible, rendering none of them useless or
superfluous, even if strict grammatical
construction demands otherwise. Likewise,
where words under consideration appear in
different sections or are widely dispersed
throughout an act the same principle applies.120
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the
Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions
of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the
statute had already converted the residential
Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area.
The decree allowed the establishment and
operation of all kinds of commercial
establishments except warehouse or open
storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair
shop, gasoline service station, light industry
with any machinery or funeral establishment.
The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and
to have force and effect, it must not only be
within the powers of the council to enact but
the same must not be in conflict with or
repugnant to the general law.
H. PROVISOS, EXCEPTIONS AND SAVING CIR VS FILIPINAS
CLAUSES
FACTS:
FERNANDEZ VS NLRC
Respondent, an insurance company, was
FACTS: engaged in business as a real

estate dealer. RA 1612 amended the National

Internal Revenue Code and provided

for a scale of graduated rates; this took effect

on August of 1956. Petitioner assessed

against the respondent taxes (to which the

insurance company has already paid in

full on January 1956) for the year 1956 based

on RA 1612. Respondent appealed to

the Court of Tax Appeals the erroneous

assessment of the petitioner and was granted

a decision in favor of it.

ISSUE:

W/N RA 1612 should be applied retroactively.

HELD:

No. As a rule, laws have no retroactive effect,

unless the contrary is provided.

The rule applies with greater force to the case

at bar, considering that RA 1612,

which imposes the new and higher taxes,

expressly provides that said Act shall take

effect upon its approval.

It is also to be observed that said House Bill No. 5819

as originally presented, was expressly intended to
amend certain provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code dealing on fixed taxes on business.
The provisions in respect of fixed tax on
occupation were merely subsequently added. This
would seem to indicate that the proviso in question
was intended to cover not only fixed taxes on
occupation, but also fixed taxes on business. (Senate
Congressional Record, March 7, 1957, p. 444.)The
fact that said proviso was placed only at the end of
paragraph "(B) On occupation" is not, therefore, view
of the circumstances, decisive and unmistakable
indication that Congress limited the proviso to
occupation taxes.

Even though the primary purpose of the

proviso is to limit restrain the general
language of a statute, the legislature,
unfotunately, does not always use it with
technical correctness; consequently, where its
use creates an ambiguity, it is the duty of the
court to ascertain the legislative intention,
through resort to usual rules of construction
applicable to statutes, generally an give it
effect even though the statute is thereby
enlarged, or the proviso made to assume the
force of an independent enactment and
although a proviso as such has no existence
apart from provision which it is designed to
limit or to qualify. (Statutory Construction by E.
T. Crawford, pp. 604-605.)

. . . When construing a statute, the reason for

its enactment should be kept in mind, and the
statute should be construe with reference to
its intended scope and purpose. (Id. at p.
249.)

On the general principle of prospectivity of statute on

the language of Republic Act 1612 itself, especially
Section 21 thereof, and on the basis of its intended
scope and purpose as disclosed in the Congressional
Record we find ourselves in agreement with the Court
of Tax Appeals.