Refugees, Terrorism and Humanitarian Assistance

Author(s): ROBERTA COHEN

Source: In Defense of the Alien, Vol. 25 (2002), pp. 27-31
Published by: Center for Migration Studies of New York, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23141317
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 3

Refugees, Terrorism and

Humanitarian Assistance
ROBERTA COHEN

Brookings Institution

In the aftermath of September 11, the United Nations High Commissioner

for Refugees Ruud Lubbers commented: As emotions run high and while
Americans and the rest of the word grieve, we should refrain from point
ing fingers and inciting hatred against innocent groups such as refugees."1
Refugees, however, are not often perceived as "innocent." Since Sep
tember 11, a number of governments have been strengthening border con
trols, scrutinizing asylum-seekers more closely, and delaying refugee
admissions, on the grounds that refugees and asylum-seekers will become
a pipeline for terrorists to come into countries and stage attacks. This reac
tion, of course, is not only unfortunate but for the most part erroneous.
Refugees were not the ones who planned or implemented the September

1 Refugees, UNHCR, Vol. 4, No. 125,2001, p. 30.

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 In Defense of the Alien

11 attacks. Refugees, moreover, are the ones who flee civil war, violence,
and terrorism in search of international protection.
The stigma of refugees being linked to violence and terrorism, which
we hear so much about today, long predates September 11. One of the rea
sons for this stigma is a phenomenon called the militarization of refugee
camps, or the failure of the international community to disarm or expel
armed elements from refugee camps. This is a problem that ought to be
revisited post-September 11 with solutions actively promoted.
When large numbers of refugees are housed in camps and settlements
together with armed elements, they become identified with the combat
ants even though the bona fide refugees are often being intimidated,
harassed, and subjected to forced recruitment by the combatants. This
linkage to the combatants, moreover, makes them vulnerable to armed
attack by enemy forces. According to a recent report by the UN Secretary
General: "Entire camp populations can be held hostage by militias that
operate freely in the camps, spread terror, press-gang civilians, including
children, into serving their forces, sexually assault and exploit women,
and deliberately prevent displaced people from returning home. In addi
tion, humanitarian aid and supplies are often diverted to these armed ele
ments, depriving the intended civilian beneficiaries. Finally, blurred lines
between the civilian and military character of camps expose civilians
inside to the risk of attack by opposing forces, where camps are perceived
to serve as launching pads for renewed fighting."2
According to UNHCR, during the 1970s, the 1980s and throughout the
1990s, large numbers of bona fide refugees fleeing civil wars were housed
in camps where armed elements could not easily be distinguished from
the civilian population.3 The refugees as a result became targeted for
attack and the civilian character of the camps undermined.
One of the more notorious cases in the 1990s and one that occasioned

a great deal of outrage was the armed Rwandan refugee camps in Goma,
eastern Zaire. Armed Hutu groups, who had committed genocide in
Rwanda, dominated the camps and were plotting further armed struggle
against Rwanda as well as against Tutsi communities in Zaire. Yet in the
absence of any international action, humanitarian organizations were put
in the position of feeding and strengthening these armed elements in order

2Report of the UN Secretary-General to the Security Council on Protection of Civilians in

Armed Conflict, S/2001/331, 30 March 2001, para. 30.
3See The State of the World's Refugees, UNHCR, 2000, pp. 248-249.

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In Defense of the Alien 29

to continue to assist the bona fide refugees mixed in with them. To be sure,
several NGOs walked out, arguing that their aid was going to armed
groups and prolonging war and that their credibility was damaged, but
UNHCR and others remained, insisting that they did not have the luxury
to leave; doing so would put bona fide refugees at risk.
Helping armed groups in the course of helping refugees is not a new
phenomenon. In the 1980s, in Pakistan, the international community en
thusiastically helped the armed mujahadeen who dominated and occupied
the Afghan refugee villages. International humanitarian aid was diverted
and military support was readily provided to these armed groups. Indeed,
some of the refugee villages near the border had tanks and heavy artillery,
supplied by the United States among other governments. And that was
because the Cold War was on, and overturning the Soviet occupation was
deemed to override any humanitarian obligation to maintain the civilian
and humanitarian nature of the refugee camps. In a similar vein, opposing
the Vietnam-backed regime in Phnom Penh, Cambodia resulted in inter
national aid going to refugee camps on the Thai-Cambodian border that
were dominated in part by the Khmer Rouge, whose crimes against the
people of Cambodia violated all international standards. The aid in fact is
said to have helped keep the Khmer Rouge alive.4 In this case, however,
UNHCR would not work in these camps, which raises the question of
whether there should be situations where aid agencies refuse to be involved
in militarized refugee situations.
A new book coming out at the Brookings Institution, entitled Refugee
Manipulation: Politics and the Abuse of Human Suffering,5 points out that for
too long refugees have been manipulated and refugee camps have been
breeding grounds for warriors, who, with assistance from overseas dias
poras, host governments, and interested states, equip themselves for bat
tle. The editors of the book, Stephen Stedman and Fred Tanner, point out
that in the large number of civil wars since the end of the Cold War, the los
ers of the civil wars need not admit defeat if they can regroup in exile,
make use of refugees and obtain international assistance to recoup their
losses.

4 See note 5 below.

5The book contains chapters on refugees as resources in war (by editors Stephen Stedman
and Fred Tanner), case studies on Cambodian refugees on the Thai-Cambodian border
(Daniel Unger), Afghan refugees in Pakistan (Frederic Grare) and Rwandan refugees in Zaire
(Howard Adelman), and a chapter on legal and normative issues (Margaret McGuinness). Its
publication date is the end of 2002.

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 In Defense of the Alien

The book points out how ill equipped the international refugee regime
is to deal with this problem. One of the main reasons is that the problem is
essentially a political and security one, not a humanitarian issue. Political
solutions are needed to address protracted refugee situations and political
and security frameworks to manage militarized refugee situations. But the
political will to address the problem has largely been absent. Unfortunately,
humanitarian organizations have been for the most part left to fend for
themselves in addressing refugee security. At the time of the crisis in the
Goma camps, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the UN Secre
tary-General appealed to member states to assist in separating the armed
Hutu groups from the refugees, but no state came forward with military or
police forces. UNHCR in the end had to pay and equip a Zairian contingent
to establish some law and order in the camps, with mixed results. To its
credit, UNHCR also began to develop other initiatives. These include pro
grams to train and build the capacity of national police to handle refugee
security, such as in Tanzania, or deploying international police advisers,
such as in Macedonia during the Kosovo crisis. A particularly innovative
program has been introduced in Zambia where UNHCR, together with
Zambian authorities, have been screening Angolan refugees as they enter
the camps. They then place combatants, with their families, in separate
camps far from the border. This is an experiment worth watching with a
view to possible replication in other areas.
But in many other cases, UNHCR does not have the means, even with
the support of local authorities, to identify, intern, disarm and demobilize
armed elements in refugee camps. More robust international action is
required. A report of the UN Secretary-General devotes attention to this
issue and identifies a number of options. For example, it describes a recent
agreement between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)
and UNHCR to deploy assessment teams in crisis areas to evaluate secu
rity threats to refugee populations and then develop plans, including
action by the Security Council. It also encourages the Security Council to
approve procedures for the early separation of armed elements from civil
ians in camps, including the training and deployment of national and
international police forces to carry this out. It calls for the involvement of
regional organizations since such situations can destabilize entire regions
or sub-regions. It then graduates to the deployment of international mili
tary observers to monitor the situation in camps for refugees and inter
nally displaced persons when national forces of host governments are
unable to or unwilling to assume their responsibility and the presence of

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In Defense of the Alien

arms and combatants is suspected. Finally and as a last resort, it speaks of

the deployment of regional or international military forces to compel dis
armament of the combatants or armed elements.6
What is most important in the report is that it underscores that armed
refugee camps pose threats to regional and international peace and secu
rity and acknowledges that the humanitarian community cannot and
should not be left by itself to handle the problem. I would note that many
in the international community would like not to address this problem.
Some fear the costs of involvement, namely the political ramifications or
the potential casualties, or they want to leave their options open. After all,
one's person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter. But, it is timely to begin
to recognize that by trying to address the problem, we have a better chance
of protecting the security of bona fide refugees and of humanitarian work
ers, of maintaining the civilian and humanitarian nature of camps and set
tlements, and of preserving the credibility of humanitarian operations.

6See Report of the UN Secretary-General, S/2001/331.

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