The Global Refugee Crisis

Susan F. Martin

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Volume 17, Number 1, Winter/Spring

2016, pp. 5-11 (Article)

Published by Georgetown University Press

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/gia.2016.0000

For additional information about this article

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/615077

Access provided by University of South Dakota (30 Aug 2018 05:55 GMT)
The Global
Refugee Crisis
Susan F. Martin
I
nternational migration is one of the
most salient but poorly managed is-
sues on the twenty-first-century policy
agenda. At present, there are more than 232
million international migrants.1 All coun-
tries are affected by international migration,
either as sources, transit, and/or destina-
tions. Within the subject of migration, the
displacement of refugees and others fleeing
life-threatening situations is a particularly
pressing issue. Th e UN High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that
there were more than 60 million refugees
and internally displaced persons (IDPs) as
of the end of 2014, the largest number since
World War II.2 Syria is only the most visible
crisis, affecting some four million refugees
and about eight million internally displaced
persons. The impact on neighboring coun-
tries is enormous; for example, more than
25 percent of Lebanon’s population of four
million is now composed of Syrian refugees.
Mass movements within and from South
Sudan, Central African Republic, Ukraine,
and elsewhere further task the humanitarian
system. Refugees and IDPs from these situa-
tions are only the tip of the iceberg, as most
are in protracted situations, having been
displaced for decades with no solutions in
sight.
As of this writing, the European Union
has taken some initial steps to share the
responsibility for protecting asylum seek-
ers throughout the member states, but the
response has illustrated major fissures in
the common area. Some countries, espe-
Susan F. Martin is the Donald G. Herzberg Professor of International Migration at Georgetown University and previously
served as the Executive Director of the US Commission on Immigration Reform.
WINT ER/SPRIN G 20 1 6 , VOLUME XVII, N UMBER I
cially Germany and Sweden, have taken
in hundreds of thousands of Syrians and
other asylum seekers, whereas others, such
as Hungary, have adopted a hardline stance,
building fences rather than assisting those
who are attempting to enter the country.
In the meantime, few countries worldwide
have offered to resettle significant numbers
of Syrian refugees. And, troubling for all
refugees, contributions to the international
organizations that assist and protect such
populations worldwide are down. In early
September 2015, the World Food Program
announced that it had been forced to drop
30 percent of Syrian refugees in Jordan and
Lebanon from their caseload and reduce the
monthly value of food vouchers to fourteen
dollars per person per month. This occurred
just as the burden on neighboring countries
had reached such high levels that many of
the countries in the region were closing their
borders to new arrivals. Not surprisingly,
such policies have had ripple effects in en-
couraging those who could reach wealthier
countries to try to do so.
The failure to respond humanely and
effectively to such crises or to find durable
solutions for refugees is not new. Yet, there
have also been periods in which the inter-
national community has come together to
protect and assist refugees and displaced
persons. Usually, it has taken strong politi-
cal leadership to arrive at effective and hu-
mane responses. This article calls for greater
international solidarity in supporting refu-
gees and local host communities through in-
creased financial aid to countries of asylum
and expanded refugee resettlement. After
examining the historical record, the article
discusses some of the barriers to more effec-
tive responses today, such as donor fatigue
and ambivalent public opinion, and makes
5
SUSAN MAR T I N
recommendations to help ensure greater
protection in the future.
Historical Background
Much of the current international system for
the protection of refugees emanated from
the failure of the international community
to save refugees from Nazi Germany. As the
numbers of Jewish and other persecuted
populations from countries under German
domination increased during the 1930s,
they increasingly found closed doors.3 In
July 1938, an international conference at-
tended by representatives from thirty-two
nations convened in Evian to discuss the
problem of refugees from Nazi Germany.
The conference had a dual mission: to en-
courage countries to resettle refugees and to
persuade Germany to establish an orderly
emigration process. Although many words
of sympathy for the refugees were heard, few
concrete proposals came out of the confer-
ence. From the beginning it was clear that
not much would happen at the conference.
Some delegates spent far more time enjoy-
ing the Alps than they did discussing the
plight of the refugees. In calling for the
conference, US President Franklin Roo-
sevelt made it clear that he was not asking
any country, including the United States, to
change its refugee policy. Subsequently, no
government pledged to resettle significant
numbers of refugees (except for the Domin-
ican Republic’s rather vague offer).
Germany responded in November 1938
with Kristallnacht, a massive countrywide
attack on Jewish businesses and synagogues.
When the war started, mass incarceration
of Jews and others in concentration camps
increased, and Adolf Hitler launched the
Final Solution of genocide with the knowl-
edge that other countries would do little to
rescue the Jews. In 1943, the Allies proved
him correct when they assembled in Ber-
6 GEORGE T O W N J O U R NA L OF I N T E RNATI ONAL AFFAIRS
muda for further discussions of the refugee
problem. Th e UK delegation noted as a
complicating factor in devising new policies
on refugees that “[t]here is a possibility that
the Germans or their satellites may change
over from the policy of extermination to
one of extrusion, and aim as they did before
the war at embarrassing other countries by
flooding them with alien immigrants.”4 The
Bermuda conference dismissed what were
described by US diplomats as “more radi-
cal proposals,” including “negotiations with
Germany for the release of the Jewish popu-
lation . . . and the proposal to lift the block-
ade to allow departure of persecuted people
of Europe.”5 In setting out the criteria for
making recommendations, the conference
communiqué made clear that no actions
would be taken on behalf of refugees that
“interfered with or delayed the war efforts
of the United Nations.”6
With the liberation of the death camps in
1945, the ramifications of these policies be-
came clear. Millions died in the Holocaust.
Millions more had been displaced by the
conflict itself. Many refused to return home,
either because they had been persecuted by
their neighbors or because the Soviet Union
now dominated their homelands. A mas-
sive resettlement program, supported by
the United States, Canada, and Australia, in
particular, was launched to reduce the bur-
den on western European states and, consis-
tent with emerging Cold War foreign policy,
to provide tangible support for those who
opposed communism.
In 1950, the UNHCR was established to
protect and find solutions for the remaining
refugees in Europe. The following year saw
adoption of the 1951 UN Convention Re-
lating to the Status of Refugees, which de-
fined the category to include persons with
a well-founded fear of persecution on the
basis of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political

opinion. The principal obligation of parties
to the Convention was to refrain from forc-
ibly returning (refouling) refugees to where
they would suffer extreme harm. Although
initially applying only to Europe and to
those who became refugees prior to 1951,
the refugee system soon expanded to pro-
vide protection and assistance to refugees
worldwide.7
Although most refugee flows tended to be
addressed within the regions in which they
occurred, a number of large crises called for
international solidarity. As early as 1956,
the UNHCR was called upon to find new
homes for refugees escaping the Soviet sup-
pression of the Hungarian Revolution, lead-
ing to a large-scale resettlement program.
An even larger international effort was made
in regard to refugees from Vietnam, Cam-
bodia, and Laos; in 1979, the United States
chaired an international conference that
resulted in promises from the countries of
first asylum in the region to keep their bor-
ders open to refugees, resettlement commit-
ments from other countries to reduce the
burden on the first asylum countries, new
agreements regarding rescue at sea of those
attacked by pirates in the South China Sea,
and an agreement from Vietnam to establish
an orderly departure program. More than
twenty countries took more than six hun-
dred thousand Indochinese refugees in the
next several years. The 1998 Kosovar refugee
crises, during which Macedonia closed its
borders fearful of the security ramifications
of accepting the Kosovar, resulted in similar
responsibility-sharing responses from the
international community.
Today’s Refugee Crises
The solidarity expressed in these earlier cri-
ses appears to be in abeyance today. Th ere
are many forms of solidarity, but three types
stand out in today’s context—financial,
WINT ER/SPRIN G 20 1 6 , VOLUME XVII, N UMBER I
THE GLO BAL REFUGEE CRI SIS
geographic, and political. First, countries
share the financial burden of helping poorer
countries receiving refugees. This is the most
common form of solidarity. The humanitar-
ian aid system is organized around a num-
ber of international agencies, such as the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees and
nongovernmental organizations. Wealthier
donors support their operations, providing
funds to shelter, feed, provide services, and
protect refugees. At present, however, re-
sources to support refugees are significantly
below what is needed, given the large num-
ber of crises with which the humanitarian
system is coping. Reductions in donations
to humanitarian organizations mean very
real cuts to the refugees and internally dis-
placed persons at risk.
The solidarity expressed in these earlier
crises appears to be in abeyance today.
Second, countries share the responsibil-
ity of physically accepting refugees, as the
Southeast Asian refugee example above in-
dicates. Th e core of the refugee system is
non-refoulement—meaning countries do
not return refugees to where they would
be persecuted. Th is often means providing
asylum to those who cross international
borders. Solidarity often occurs through
resettlement programs organized by the
UNHCR to reduce pressures on countries of
first asylum and find solutions for refugees
who cannot return home. UNHCR reports
that about 960,000 refugees are in need of
resettlement in 2015. The total number of
resettlement slots worldwide is only eighty
thousand, however, not counting some spe-
cial programs recently announced for Syr-
ian refugees.8 About 90 percent of refugees
resettled in 2013 (the last year for which
specific information is available) went to the
7
SUSAN MAR T I N
United States, Australia, and Canada with
much smaller numbers provided by a range
of other countries.9
Third, at the political level countries can
work together to address the root and proxi-
mate causes of large-scale displacement. This
may be the most difficult path since it often
means intervening in conflicts that cause
mass movements. Often, the solidarity is
in addressing the proximate causes—mean-
ing that the focus is on the means by which
refugees seek safety (for example, closing
smuggling routes) or the specific triggers for
movement (for example, air drops of food
into besieged areas where people may starve
if they cannot leave). These actions do not
necessarily leave the affected people with
adequate alternatives to flight, however, and
may even make their situations more life-
threatening.
When has solidarity worked? Histori-
cally, a broad range of governments have
shared the responsibility for refugees when
three principal forces have been at work:
strong constituency support for generous
refugee policies in first asylum, donor, and
resettlement countries; consistency between
such policies and foreign policy objectives;
and broad recognition that the humanitar-
ian needs of the refugees require immedi-
ate action. Th ese three factors were largely
absent in the 1930s, leading to highly re-
strictive refugee policies. By contrast, in
the Hungarian and Southeast Asian refugee
crises of the 1950s and 1970s, respectively,
all three forces were present.10 Strong con-
stituencies of ethnic co-nationals and, in
the case of Southeast Asia, Vietnam War
veterans supported a forceful response; re-
settlement of those fleeing Communist
countries served Cold War foreign policy
interests; and media coverage highlighted
the humanitarian nature of the crisis. As a
result, there was strong support for the first
8 GEORGE T O W N J O U R NA L OF I N T E RNATI ONAL AFFAIRS
and second forms of solidarity—financial
aid and resettlement—although political
solutions, including prevention of displace-
ment after the Soviet invasion of Hungary
or the North Vietnamese victory against the
South, remained elusive until the Cold War
ended.
Crisis fatigue has been setting in just
when more funding and attention is
needed.
Why is solidarity so lacking today? There
are a number of factors at work. First, sel-
dom has the world seen as many massive
crises as are happening simultaneously to-
day. Although the humanitarian nature of
the crises is clear, there may well be crisis
fatigue. In its most recent report on global
refugee trends, UNHCR noted: “In the past
five years, at least 15 conflicts have erupted
or reignited: eight in Africa (Côte d’Ivoire,
Central African Republic, Libya, Mali,
northeastern Nigeria, Democratic Republic
of Congo, South Sudan and this year in Bu-
rundi); three in the Middle East (Syria, Iraq,
and Yemen); one in Europe (Ukraine) and
three in Asia (Kyrgyzstan, and in several areas
of Myanmar and Pakistan).”11 Each of these
has produced mass displacement. Given the
recent global economic crisis, donors have
been hard pressed to keep up with the de-
mands generated by these multiple crises
even with the emergence of new contribu-
tors to the humanitarian system, such as the
countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council.
Complicating the situation are numerous
natural disasters, such as the massively de-
structive earthquake in Haiti and Typhoon
Haiyan in the Philippines, which have also
called for significant donor attention. Crisis
fatigue has been setting in just when more

funding and attention to these situations is
needed but fiscal austerity is the order of the
day in many wealthy countries.
Constituency support is lacking in many
countries where public attitudes about refu-
gees and asylum seekers range from ambiva-
lent to hostile. Many forces shape these at-
titudes and their impact on public policy,
including a country’s past history, concerns
about religion and culture, and the positive
or negative exercise of political leadership,
among others.12 In contrast to the reaction
to refugees in the 1930s, levels of unemploy-
ment are not consistently associated with
public opposition to refugee burden sharing.
In July 2015, the unemployment rates in
Switzerland (3.1%), Germany (4.7%), and
the Czech Republic (5.1%) were among the
lowest in Europe, but public attitudes var-
ied considerably. A public opinion poll by
ZDF broadcasting found that 60 percent of
Germans felt that Germany could cope with
the large number of refugees arriving. At the
same time, a Basel University poll found that
almost 45 percent of Swiss respondents sup-
ported temporary closure of the border in
light of the refugee crisis in Europe, and 83
percent favored aid to developing countries
hosting refugees over admission of refugees
to their own territory. Czech public opinion
was even more opposed to the presence of
refugees, with 94 percent of Czechs in a poll
by Focus taking the position that the EU
should deport the refugees, and 44 percent
opposed to any help that the Czech Re-
public might provide.13 Similar diversity of
public opinion can be seen among countries
with high levels of unemployment.
The media has had important effects on
public opinion and government policies.
Persistent negative coverage of immigration
in some countries, such as the United King-
dom, has had carryover effects, leading to
more restrictive policy formulations that ap-
WINT ER/SPRIN G 20 1 6 , VOLUME XVII, N UMBER I
THE GLO BAL REFUGEE CRI SIS
ply to refugees as well as others attempting
entry. In the most recent refugee crisis in Eu-
rope, however, media coverage has brought
the human face of refugees to millions of
people—including the photo of a three-
year-old Syrian washed up on the shores of
the Mediterranean. Such coverage has gal-
vanized public support for refugees, includ-
ing large demonstrations in some countries,
and has led to some, albeit often symbolic,
changes in policy. For example, President
Obama announced that the United States
would resettle ten thousand additional Syr-
ians in this coming year, and Prime Minister
Cameron said the UK would accept twenty
thousand from countries of asylum over
a four-year period. Th ese represent small
but tangible examples of burden sharing.
A further example is the many Hungarians
who assisted asylum seekers trying to reach
Austria with food and water, train tickets,
and even shelter to try to blunt some of the
harsher effects of Hungarian government
policies. Such outpourings of public sup-
port in the face of government indifference
in previous crises, such as the one facing
Kosovar refugees in 1998, have led to larger-
scale relocations across the globe.
The foreign policy connections to the
current refugee crises are also weak com-
pared to the Cold War era. During the ear-
lier period, political leaders saw support for
refugees as an integral component of their
foreign policies. Ronald Reagan, referring
to Nicaraguan refugees, talked about them
“voting with their feet” against the Com-
munist regime they had left.14 Refugees
today may be seen as victims, on the one
hand, and potential security risks, on the
other, but seldom as integral parts of the
type of global foreign policy campaign that
was waged during the Cold War. Individual
governments may carve out special pro-
grams for refugees of special interest—such
9
SUSA N MAR T I N
as those who worked for their militaries as
interpreters—but these do not translate into
large-scale responsibility sharing.
Conclusion
At a time in which there are record numbers
of refugees and internally displaced persons,
many in desperate situations, the forces be-
hind piecemeal and inadequate responses
seem to predominate. Political leadership is
greatly needed to reverse today’s trends and
find new approaches that better protect, as-
sist, and find solutions for refugees and dis-
placed persons. The current crisis in Europe
could become a game changer. As discussed,
public opinion does seem to be shifting with
greater recognition of the seriousness of
the humanitarian crisis under way. Political
leadership is emerging, as witnessed by Ger-
man Chancellor Angela Merkel’s statements
of solidarity with the Syrian refugees seeking
safety in her country.
Political leadership is greatly needed
to reverse today’s trends and find new
approaches.
The World Humanitarian Summit, which
will take place in Istanbul in 2016, provides
an opportunity to reconsider the entire in-
ternational response to these situations of
mass displacement. An initiative of UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, the sum-
mit will bring together governments, hu-
manitarian organizations, people affected by
humanitarian crises, and the private sector
“to propose solutions to our most pressing
challenges and set an agenda to keep hu-
manitarian action fit for the future.”15 The
summit has four principal themes: humani-
tarian effectiveness, reducing vulnerability
and managing risk, transformation through
10 GEOR G E T O W N J OU R N A L OF I N T ERNATI ONAL AFFAIRS
innovation, and serving the needs of people
in conflict. All four apply to refugees and
displaced persons, although the fourth is
most pertinent as conflict is the backdrop
for most displacement. The agenda should
focus on increasing solidarity at all stages,
from early warning and prevention of dis-
placement, to emergency responses, pro-
tracted displacement, and, finally, durable
solutions. Steps needed to revitalize broad
responsibility sharing among governments
and other actors should be identified along
with concrete pledges to finance and imple-
ment these actions.
In the meantime, governments through-
out the world should do more to address the
current refugee crisis. All three forms of soli-
darity are needed: financial, geographic, and
political. Increasing the level of assistance
to refugees and host countries in the de-
veloping world is most crucial. Traditional
donors—the United States, the European
Union, Canada, Australia, and Japan—need
to ratchet up their contributions while pres-
suring newer donors such as the members
of the Gulf Cooperation Council to provide
higher levels of humanitarian aid. Signifi-
cant increases in aid would help refugees,
to be sure, but will also help the countries
that bear the highest costs of hosting those
who are displaced. Second, political leaders
need to educate their publics and themselves
about the importance of protection for ref-
ugees. Forcible return of asylum seekers to
countries in which they fear persecution or
serious threat to their lives not only violates
international law, but also violates every
principle of human decency. Next, there
needs to be at least a doubling of resettle-
ment quotas. Resettlement is by no means
a panacea and the numbers of resettlement
slots are unlikely to meet the full demand
for relocation. However, with a growing
number of refugees in protracted situations,
unable to return home and in restrictive

situations in countries of asylum, resettle-
ment can play an important role by provid-
ing solutions for those fortunate enough to
qualify. Finally, and most difficultly, world
leaders must accelerate efforts to find solu-
tions to the causes of refugee flight. As the
former UN High Commissioner for Refu-
gees Sadako Ogata famously said during
the Balkan wars, there are no humanitarian
solutions to humanitarian problems of this
type. Only political will and leadership will
address the conflicts and repressive regimes
currently besieging the world and creating
massive displacement.
Notes
1. United Nations Population Division, “Inter-
national Migration Report 2013” (New York:
2013).
2. United Nations High Commissioner for Ref-
ugees, “Global Trends 2014: World at War,”
http://www.unhcr.org/556725e69.html.
3. For fuller discussion of this period, see
Claudena Skran, Refugees in Inter-War Europe:
The Emergence of a Regime (Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1995), and Michael Marrus, The
Unwanted: European Refugees from the First
World War through the Cold War (Philadel-
phia: Temple University Press, 2002).
4. United States Department of State, Foreign
Relations of the United States Diplomatic Pa-
pers 1, no. 1 (Washington, DC: 1943): 134.
5. Ibid., 155.
6. Ibid., 174.
7. Palestinian refugees, however, fell outside the
UNHCR’s mandate because they were under
the mandate of another UN organization—
the UN Relief and Works Administration for
Refugees from Palestine.
8. United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, “UNHCR Projected Global Re-
settlement Needs 2015,” accessed November
1, 2015, http://www.unhcr.org/543408c4fda
.html.
9. Australia discontinued its expanded resettle-
ment program and is not expected to be a
WINTER/SPRIN G 20 1 6 , VOLUME XVII, NUMBE R I
T HE GLO BAL REFUGEE CRI SIS
major destination for resettled refugees in
2015.
10. See Gil Loescher and John A. Scanlon, Cal-
culated Kindness: Refugees and America’s Half-
Open Door, 1945 to the Present (New York:
Free Press, 1986).
11. United Nations High Commissioner for Ref-
ugees, “Worldwide Displacement Hits All-
Time High as War and Persecution Increase,”
accessed November 1, 2015, http://www.un
hcr.org/558193896.html.
12. Karen Jacobsen, “Factors Influencing the Pol-
icy Responses of Host Governments to Mass
Refugee Influxes,” International Migration
Review 30, no. 3 (Autumn 1996): 655–678.
In this seminal article, Jacobsen sets out the
following factors: the costs and benefits of
accepting international assistance, relations
with the sending country, political calcula-
tions about the local community’s absorption
capacity, and national security considerations
as well as bureaucratic politics and inertia.
13. Luke Graham, “How Europeans Have Re-
acted to Migrant Crisis,” CNBC, accessed
November 1, 2015, http://www.cnbc.com
/ 2015/09/08/how-europeans-have-reacted-to
-migrant-crisis.html. In this case, memories
might well be quite short as refugees from
Czechoslovakia received a warm welcome
when they fled the crackdown in 1968 that
ended the Prague Spring. A similar amnesia
seems to have taken hold of many (though
not all, as shown below) Hungarians whose
compatriots were accepted as refugees after
the Soviet invasion in 1956.
14. An analysis of the use of “voting with their feet”
rhetoric by the Reagan Administration can be
found in Norman L. Zucker and Naomi Flink
Zucker, Desperate Crossings: Seeking Refuge in
America (Armonk: ME Sharpe Inc., 1996).
15. See World Humanitarian Summit, “About the
World Humanitarian Summit,” accessed No-
vember 1, 2015, https://www.worldhumani
tariansummit.org/whs_about?utm_source=
About&utmmedium=banner&utm_cam
paign=WHS_FrontPage&utm_content=
Banner+Click.
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