Grace Mu Issue Brief 2

1
Controlling the Crisis: The Role of the International Community

in Protecting Climate Migrants
By: Grace Mu April 15, 2020
After an unusually hot summer decimated the crop industry in Honduras, indigenous farmer
Gilberto Ysais lost his job and only means of supporting his family. When the criminal gang
MS-13 threatened to recruit his 11-year-old son, Ysais was forced to take a leap of faith. He and
his son began a 2,000-mile hike to the Texas border, hoping they would be able to apply
for asylum once they reached the United States. Upon arrival, however, they were detained and
prepared for deportation. As of September of 2019, Ysais and his son were still waiting for news
about their claim for asylum under gang violence. Despite representing the central reason for
their escape, climate-related factors could not be considered in their case for asylum.1
Figure 1: World Bank estimated climate migrant totals by 2050 in highlighted regions 2
2
Climate change, which is perhaps the defining issue of our time, has been referred to as a “threat
multiplier,” meaning it has the potential to “exacerbate poverty, conflict, and instability.”3 In
other words, as weather events such as storms and droughts intensify, the poorest and smallest
nations will be disproportionately affected.4 Already, since 2008, an estimated 24 million people
have been forced to migrate every year because of devastating natural disasters.5 According to
the International Organization for Migration, by 2050, between 25 million and 1.5 billion people
will have fled their homes due to similar tragedies.6 Figure 1, which shows the World Bank’s
projection of the number of climate migrants by 2050, focuses on three different climate
situations in the regions of Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America.7 The scenarios
include “pessimistic” to describe a rise in temperature of 4.0 - 6.1°C, “more inclusive
development” to describe similar climate conditions but improved socioeconomic factors, and
“more-climate friendly” to represent a rise in temperature of 1.3 – 1.9 °C.8 Despite these
alarming estimates, as of now, international law does not formally recognize the existence of
“climate change refugees,” and therefore does not require nations to accept them.9 Ultimately,
disconnected mitigation efforts and the lack of a clear legal standing have left an ever-growing
climate migrant population vulnerable in the face of catastrophic environmental destruction.
The Climate Migrant Crisis

As highlighted by Walter Kälin, the Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on
the Human Rights for Internally Displaced Persons, there are a number of events that can lead to
climate-induced migration. These include “sudden-onset disasters” such as floods and storms,
“slow-onset disasters” such as rising sea levels, the sinking of “small island States,” the
designation of high-risk habitation areas, and unrest due to the depletion of natural resources.10
Figure 2 depicts the percentages of global displacement due to sudden-onset disasters, with
floods and storms seemingly representing the largest dangers. The Pacific island nations of
Tuvalu, Kiribati, and the Marshall Islands, as well as the Maldives in the Indian Ocean are
particularly vulnerable because they are impacted by both sudden-onset and slow-onset
disasters.11 Other regions, however, also face a risk of being significantly affected by climate
change. In Bangladesh, coastal flooding forces hundreds of thousands of people to regularly
relocate to the heavily populated slums of the capital, Dhaka.12 About 70% of the five million
people living in these slums were displaced from their homes due to environmental factors.13 In
3
West Africa, the disappearance of Lake Chad due to desertification has driven over four million
people into camps.14
Figure 2: The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre’s estimates of types of environmental

displacement 15
As is evident in both Bangladesh and West Africa, many climate migrants will begin by moving
within their nation’s borders. The World Bank estimates that 143 million people in Sub-Saharan
Africa, South Asia, and Latin America will "move within their own countries to escape the slow-
onset impacts of climate change.”16 However, for many of the small island nations who may see
their homes rendered completely uninhabitable due to rising sea levels, migration will need to be
international.17 This mass migration is expected to have a devastating economic impact. In a
small-scale example, 100 people in a Louisiana community needed to be relocated after their
island, the Isle de Jean Charles, was submerged under rising sea levels.18 The relocation process
to a town 40 miles inland took several years and $50 million.19 It is thus reasonable to conclude
that the relocation of entire nations will be exponentially more costly and time-consuming, yet
formal legislation regulating how these people will be relocated and under which protections is
nonexistent.
Currently, climate change is not seen as a valid reason for asylum in any country, since the
people do not fit into the traditional definition of refugees.20 As stated in the United Nations’
“1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,” a “refugee” is any person who has
4
crossed an international border “for a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of his or her
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.”21 Given
that this definition does not specify any climate-related factors, a more-widely accepted term for
a person displaced as a result of climate change is “climate migrant.” The International
Organization for Migration states that climate migrants are “persons or groups of persons who,
for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect
their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their homes or choose to do so, either
temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad."22
Yet, while the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) annually grants more than 20
million people escaping from political violence refugee status, no protection is given to the same
number of people annually fleeing from sudden weather hazards.23 Countries are not required to
accept climate migrants, and in nations such as the U.S. and Europe, aid following natural
disasters is temporary and does not facilitate full residency.24
Initiatives have begun to take shape, but a lack of widespread support means the world remains
severely underprepared for the predicted influx of migrants. More than 150 countries have
acknowledged the issue of climate migration, and in 2015, the Paris Agreement required the
creation of a task force to “address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate
change.”25 This, however, has done little to legally change the status of climate migrants or
guarantee them protections.26 While nations such as New Zealand and Australia have agreed to
accept displaced people, with New Zealand going as far as to suggest a new visa category for
migrants from the Pacific nations highlighted in Figure 3, nations such as India have expressed
concerns about needing to accommodate increasing numbers of people from Bangladesh.27 The
United States, widely considered a global leader, abstained from voting on the 2018 Global
Compact of Migration and plans to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. Ironically, this comes
after 2017 Hurricane María left about 2,300 Puerto Rican families without permanent housing.28
The Trump administration’s anti-environmental and anti-immigration policies have greatly
hindered the United States, normally the world’s number one migrant destination, from leading
the development of legally mandated climate migrant procedures.29
5
Figure 3: Graphic by Independent depicting migration paths of Pacific Islands 30
The Role of the United Nations

Better protecting the rights of climate migrants will require the involvement of the international
community. While individual nations are responsible for managing climate migration that occurs
within their borders, only intergovernmental agencies will be able to regulate an issue as
prominent and widespread as cross-border climate migration.31 Currently, the United Nations,
which is tasked with developing and enforcing solutions to global problems related to basic
human rights, is the only “truly global institution” that has the capabilities of doing so.32
As a result, the first step in the solution is for the UN secretary to designate one unit for response
to climate displacement.33 A reasonable choice is the United Nations Framework Convention of
Climate Change (UNFCCC) secretariat. The secretariat is currently tasked with the handling of
intergovernmental negotiations, analyzing and reviewing climate change information, and
overseeing the policies of the Convention.34 Given that climate migration is considered an
adaptation to climate change, and as defined in the Cancun Agreement, the UNFCCC is expected
to address adaptation issues, it seems reasonable for the secretariat to assume management of this
issue.35
As the chief organization, the UNFCCC secretariat would then be responsible for the
coordination of the cooperation of other UN branch organizations.36 Environmental migration
raises a plethora of problems related to human rights and socioeconomic development, so to
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ensure full consideration of all aspects of migration, the secretariat should seek to build
relationships with other UN organizations.37 These include the International Organization for
Migration, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the UN Development Program, the UN
Environmental Program, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the World Food
Program, and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.38
In addition to its secretariat leading environmental migration policies, the UNFCCC should
formally recognize the existence of climate migrants. Recognition would allow for
implementation in international law, a budget, and identification of who to protect and the
subsequent measures that need to be taken.39 It would thus guarantee that environmental migrants
are given the same legal protections as refugees, including a guarantee to civil, political,
economic, social, and cultural freedoms.40 As of May 2012, 194 countries and the European
Union officially endorsed the UNFCCC, so the legal recognition of climate migrants would be
nearly universally accepted.41 The UNFCCC’s negotiation and implementation procedures are
widely agreed upon amongst members, so mechanisms to protect climate migrants would be
approved with less delay and dissent than if an unrelated organization were developed to oversee
the management of these migrants.42 For funding, existing pledges, bilateral agreements, and
impositions on taxes on carbon trading from the original UNFCCC could be applied to climate
migration mitigation efforts. Adoption by the UNFCCC would also “ensure a fairer cost burden.”
Without recognition of the environmentally displaced, the vulnerable, developing countries
would bear most of the responsibility for the migrants because of many migrants’ inability to
travel extensively. An official legal recognition would force developed nations to assume some
of this responsibility and encourage contributions toward the logistics and costs of relocation.43
There are, however, several disadvantages that must be fully addressed before claiming
UNFCCC recognition is the ideal solution. In its conception, the UNFCCC was intended to
reduce the causes of climate change, not to focus on issues of widespread mobility. Despite this,
the Convention has seen limited success with ineffective policies such as the Kyoto Protocol. Its
newer adaptation strategies in the Copenhagen Accord and Cancun Agreement have proven
much more promising and illustrate the precedent for actively amending the Convention as need
arises. Additionally, the UNFCCC does not possess the ability to regulate its policies with
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sanctions, and therefore relies on “international peer pressure and the good intentions of
signatories.”44 This concern is easily assuaged with the UNFCCC secretariat enlisting the aid of
other UN branches. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the Environmental Program
have justice mechanisms in place that could impose the necessary sanctions to compel
cooperation.45 Adaptation funding being funneled toward local projects rather than global
initiatives has also been considered a possible obstacle.46 Once again, however, the
interconnection of UN organizations could allow for the enlistment of donor governments and
multilateral development banks to invest in aiding climate-sensitive nations.47
Prevention of Further Climate Displacement

Prevention of further climate displacement is the second important component of the solution.
Five to ten-year investments by member nations of the UN could fund projects in vulnerable
countries to increase their resilience to climate change. In West Africa, for example, investments
in irrigation infrastructure and food supplies as well as encouragement of regional water security
could alleviate some of the climate-related factors pushing people to migrate. Given its particular
status as a global leader, the United States has a large responsibility to contribute to foreign aid
efforts. One way in which the nation could accomplish this is through the creation of a single
fund dedicated toward environmental migration.48
Currently, the majority of the United States’ foreign aid operations are managed by the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID is responsible for overseeing four
different types of aid: long-term development (46%), military and security (33%), humanitarian
(14%), and political (11%).49 However, it is notable that there is not a specific type of aid
dedicated toward climate migration. Migration is implicitly accounted for in the long-term
development aid that funds the World Bank and the UN Development Program, as well as in the
humanitarian aid used to alleviate short term crises caused by natural or man-made disasters.50 If
a specialized fund were created within long-term development that could draw from the
Operations and Maintenance, Research and Development, and the Refugee Assistance funds, the
United States could centralize its aid efforts and restore its reputation on the international level.51
The new fund could partner with the United Kingdom’s Department for International
8
Development (DFID), Germany’s Society for International Cooperation (GIZ), and Japan’s
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to further the theme of international coordination.52
While there are not specific numbers available for how much the United States should contribute
to climate migration mitigation efforts in particular, increasing how much the nation spends on
foreign aid in general should ensure that a larger proportion of aid is being allocated toward
migration. In 2016, the United States spent $49 billion in foreign aid, which comprised about 1.2
percent of the federal budget.53 In terms of percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), this
number amounted to about 0.18 percent of GDP. In contrast, other developed nations such as
Sweden, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom spent 0.7
percent or more of GDP on foreign aid. In order to truly establish itself as a leader in the climate
migration crisis, the United States should thus increase its foreign aid spending to at least 0.7
percent of its GDP, a percentage that would allow it to meet the target set by the United Nations
for developed countries.54
The United States should also deploy its internal resources when necessary, which is already
illustrated in the U.S. Navy serving as an emergency hotline for international natural disasters.55
The Navy served as a line of first response for Haiti following the 2010 earthquake, for the
Philippines after the 2013 typhoon, and Nepal in the midst of the 2015 earthquake.56 In 2017,
when Hurricane María left mass chaos and destruction in its wake, U.S. military forces were
deployed to distribute basic necessities and assist in reconstruction efforts.57 With consistent
military responsiveness to large-scale natural disasters, the need for people to completely
abandon their homes will be diminished.58
A Call to Action
Ultimately, the best way to prepare for the predicted influx of climate migrants is to encourage
cooperation in the international community. This begins with the appointment of the UNFCCC
secretariat as the primary agency handling the environmental migration initiatives. The
secretariat should seek to cooperate with other related branches of the UN to ensure multiple
avenues for funding, a mechanism for legal enforcement, and full representation of the diverse
aspects of migration. The UNFCCC should also formally recognize climate migrants in order to
9
ensure they are granted the same basic protections as refugees. A legally enforceable recognition
would facilitate the creation of policies to mandate the processing of environmental migrants in a
fair and efficient manner.
On a federal level, the United States should do its part in contributing foreign aid. The nation
should seek to increase its foreign aid spending to about 0.7 percent of its GDP to match the
efforts made by other countries and establish itself as a global leader in the migration crisis.
Through the long-term development sector of USAID, the United States can create a directed
fund toward preventing migration and financing it once it occurs. This fund should then be
connected with similar funds of other developed nations to create a centralized system of aid.
Continued deployment of military resources to support developing nations following
environmental catastrophes should also reduce the number of people who need to cross borders
in search of new homes.
While in an ideal world, each individual nation would have detailed preparation plans for the
acceptance of climate migrants, from a practical standpoint, it is the responsibility of the United
Nations to act. The United Nations has the power to mandate international cooperation and
legally recognize climate migrants, restoring the basic rights and protections they deserve as
human beings.
1
Endnotes
Izzie Ramirez, “Climate Change Will Create 1.5 Billion Migrants by 2050 and We Have No Idea
Where They’ll Go,” Vice (September 2019), available at
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/59n9qa/climate-change-will-create-15-billion-migrants-by-2050-
and-we-have-no-idea-where-theyll-go (last accessed April 14 2020).
2
Jocelyn Timperley, “Expect tens of millions of internal climate migrants by 2050, says World Bank,”
Carbon Brief (March 2018), available at https://www.carbonbrief.org/expect-tens-of-millions-of-
internal-climate-migrants-by-2050-says-world-bank (last accessed April 14 2020).
3
Ramirez, “Climate Change Will Create 1.5 Billion Migrants by 2050 and We Have No Idea Where
They’ll Go.”
4
Tim McDonnell, “The Refugees the World Barely Pays Attention To,” NPR (June 2018), available at
https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/06/20/621782275/the-refugees-that-the-world-barely-
pays-attention-to (last accessed April 14 2020); Ramirez, “Climate Change Will Create 1.5 Billion
Migrants by 2050 and We Have No Idea Where They’ll Go.”
5
McDonnell, “The Refugees the World Barely Pays Attention To.”
6
They’ll Go;” Rafael Leal-Arcas, “Climate Migrants: Legal Options” Procedia – Social and Behavioral
Sciences 37 (2012): 86, available at
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877042812007562.
7
Timperley, “Expect tens of millions of internal climate migrants by 2050, says World Bank.”
8
Ibid.
9
They’ll Go.”
10
Leal-Arcas, “Climate Migrants: Legal Options,” p. 88.
11
Ibid.
12
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, “Global Displacement by Type of Hazard,” (July 2015),
available at https://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/global-estimates-2015-people-
displaced-by-disasters (last accessed April 14 2020).
16
Stewart M. Patrick, “How Should the World Respond to the Coming Wave of Climate Migrants?”
World Politics Review (2020): 1, available at http://ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/login?
url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=142309523&site=ehost-
live&scope=site; McDonnell, “The Refugees the World Barely Pays Attention To;” John Podesta, “The
Climate Crisis, Migration, and Refugees,” Brookings (July 2019), available at
https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-climate-crisis-migration-and-refugees/ (last accessed April 14
2020).
17
18
19
Ibid.
20
They’ll Go.”
21
Ibid.
22
Patrick, “How Should the World Respond to the Coming Wave of Climate Migrants?”
23
Ibid.
24
25
They’ll Go.”
26
Podesta, “The Climate Crisis, Migration, and Refugees.”
27
They’ll Go;” Leal-Arcas, “Climate Migrants: Legal Options,” p. 89.
28
29
They’ll Go.”
30
Tom Bawden, “Global warming: Thousands flee Pacific islands on front line of climate change,”
Independent (December 2015), available at https://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-
change/global-warming-thousands-flee-pacific-islands-on-front-line-of-climate-change-a6757796.html
(last accessed April 14 2020).
31
Christine Gibb and James Ford, “Should the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change recognize climate migrants?” 7 (4) (2012): 1, available at
https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/7/4/045601
32
Gibb and Ford, “Should the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change recognize
climate migrants?” p. 2.
33
34
United Nations Climate Change, “About the Secretariat,” UNFCCC, available at
https://unfccc.int/about-us/about-the-secretariat (last accessed April 14 2020).
35
36
37
Ibid.
38
39
40
41
42
climate migrants?” p. 2-3.
43
44
45
United Nations and the Rule of Law, “Refugee Law,” UN, available at
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/thematic-areas/international-law-courts-tribunals/refugee-law/ (last
accessed April 14 2020).
46
47
48
49
James McBride, “How Does the U.S. Spend Its Foreign Aid?” Council on Foreign Relations
(October 2018), available at https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-does-us-spend-its-foreign-aid (last
accessed April 15 2020).
50
Ibid.
51
52
Ibid.
53
McBride, “How Does the U.S. Spend Its Foreign Aid?”
54
Ibid.
55
56
Ibid.
57
Matthew Bell, “When disaster strikes, it’s the US military that’s often the most capable responder,”
PRI (September 2017), available at https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-09-29/when-disaster-strikes-its-
us-military-thats-often-most-capable-responder (last accessed April 14 2020).
58
Photo Citation:
Migrant Children on Mountain: Migrant Clinicians Network

https://www.migrantclinician.org/issues/climate-change-and-migration.html

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1

Controlling the Crisis: The Role of the International Community

The Climate Migrant Crisis

Figure 2: The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre’s estimates of types of environmental

Figure 3: Graphic by Independent depicting migration paths of Pacific Islands 30

The Role of the United Nations

Prevention of Further Climate Displacement

Migrant Children on Mountain: Migrant Clinicians Network

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