Professional Documents
Culture Documents
M Leaf
Centre for Human Settlements, School of Community and Regional Planning, University of
British Columbia, 2206 East Mall, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z3, Canada
Received 19 December 1994; in revised form 30 March 1995
Abstract. Recent writings on Asian urbanization have stressed how the continuing outward
expansion of the largest metropolitan regions has been eroding the long-standing distinction
between rural and urban, particularly in terms of land use and economic structure. In this paper
I examine the cultural implications of this phenomenon by looking at recent changes in the
extended metropolitan region of Jakarta, Indonesia. Over the course of the 1980s, urbanization
trends in Jakarta's periphery have resulted in a greatly expanded interface between urban and
rural components of Indonesian society. Although this has created the opportunity for much
broader popular participation in the urban economy, it may also be fostering a new perception
within Indonesian society—that the primary social dichotomy lies not between the city and the
countryside but between socioeconomic classes.
their "orthogenetic" roles(1) of the past—if indeed these cities ever functioned as
places of orthogenetic change—is much more dubious.
In the same paper, Redfield and Singer also reiterated the idea that the develop-
ment of culture in the city can be sharply at odds with cultural development in the
countryside. By their thinking, a more pronounced heterogenetic role for the city
exacerbates the tensions between city and countryside, as the countryside is inher-
ently a place of cultural conservatism. Certainly the theme of the 'wicked city' is
long-standing in popular literature and folklore throughout the world, and it is
completely plausible that this moralistic view of the city becomes even more prevalent
during times of rapid social change. Given the pace of development in Indonesian
society since the ascendency of Suharto's New Order government in the late 1960s—
especially the urban-based changes in more recent years—one might therefore
expect that the cultural rift between city and countryside in Indonesia would be
widening at an increasing rate.
It is in the context of this issue—the relationship (or presumed relationship)
between city and countryside—that the question of the cultural significance of the
desakota becomes quite interesting. In a number of papers (Ginsburg et al, 1991;
McGee, 1989; McGee and Greenberg, 1992), McGee and others have argued that
the development of extensive zones of mixed land use amidst high rural population
densities on the peripheries of major Asian cities may be interpreted as an expres-
sion of the breakdown in the distinction between city and countryside. The
extended metropolitan region surrounding Indonesia's capital city, Jakarta, typifies
this description, and indeed, the descriptive term which McGee has championed in
the past few years is a portmanteau word comprised of two Indonesian terms
meaning rural (desa) and urban (kota). Proponents of the idea that in the desakota
we are witnessing the emergence of a significant new form of human settlement
support their position by reference to recent changes in land use (the intricate mix
of what are traditionally urban land uses and rural land uses), household economy
(the growing proportion of household income derived from nonagricultural work),
investment trends and technological innovations (the preference for industrialization
on the urban periphery and the outward expansion of the urban transportation
network), and a number of other societal changes (such as the growth in population
mobility and female participation in the labor force). If the combined effect of all
these trends truly is the integration of city and countryside under the aegis of the
desakota, what are the implications for the great cultural divide between urban
and rural?
This paper is a preliminary exploration of this question with reference to the
case of Jakarta. Consideration of the cultural significance of Jakarta's desakota
requires that we first have some understanding of the role of the city within the
development of national culture. Redfield and Singer's (1954) idea of a postcolonial
return to urban orthogenesis in the promotion of indigenous (but 'modern') culture
was proffered as a means of repairing the rupture between colonial urban center
and indigenous rural population. This is a view which contains a number of implicit
assumptions, not the least of which is the presumption of an unbridgeable gulf
between foreign and local cultures in the period of colonial domination (as
(1)
Redfield and Singer postulate two possible roles of urbanism in the transformation of
cultures: "orthogenetic" transformation is described as "culture carried forward" in the "city
of the moral order", in contrast to "heterogenetic" transformation in the "city of the technical
order", whereby "local cultures are disintegrated and new integrations of mind and society are
developed" (page 59).
Building the road for the BMW 1619
expressed in the opening quote), an idea which needs further consideration in light
of more recent studies of the development of 'third cultures' in the colonial period.(2)
The political implications of recaptured orthogenesis are straightforward: it was
hoped that the new capital could function as a center of politics representative of
the interests of the countryside, where the bulk of the population resides. Cultural
orthogenesis in the capital city was seen as one way of encouraging convergence
between city and countryside. The assumption here is that it is necessary for this
convergence to be based upon the culture of the countryside (assumed to be the
repository of tradition during the imposition of foreign colonial rule). In order for
the culture of the countryside to serve as the foundation for the culture of the new
nation, transformation in the leading cities must be orthogenetic. In contrast, a
heterogenetic capital, although still leading the cultural development of the nation,
would instead be leading it away from its precolonial (implying both indigenous and
rural) roots.
Jakarta continues to be heterogenetic in its nature, for although it is the cultural
and political center for the nation it is also Indonesia's main gateway to the rest of
the world.(3) Beyond this general point, one might find it difficult to characterize the
cultural role of the city, as this is certainly not a concept which allows for measure-
ment or quantification. It is my contention here that the intended cultural role of
the city is known through the particular developmental 'vision' of that city. Admit-
tedly this may also be criticized as a fairly ambiguous term, but in the case of
Jakarta at least, it is an idea which has a good deal of poignancy, for there exists a
particular ideal to which the decisionmakers of the city aspire, whether or not this
ideal is expressed in official planning documents.
It is also a vision which has changed over time. Sukarno's (President of the
Indonesian Republic, 1945-67) vision for Jakarta in the first decades of indepen-
dence was much more in line with what Redfield and Singer (1954) were hoping for
in their prescription for recaptured orthogenesis. The tendency toward monumen-
tality, although part of the iconography of socialism at the time, may also be
interpreted as an attempt to recreate the precolonial city of the royal court. In his
self-appointed role as master architect for the city of Jakarta,<4) the preeminent
tribute which Sukarno gave to the independence of the nation was Medan Merdeka,
the traditional alun-alun (royal-palace square) of the precolonial city blown up to
immense proportions and focused on the National Monument, a more literal inter-
pretation of paku buwono (the 'nail of the universe', in reference to the symbolic
role of the ruler) than anything which had existed in the precolonial past. Such
nationalistic posturing is quite contrary to the vision of Jakarta today, a vision
induced by the ascendency of private capital under the New Order government of
Suharto. To the extent that particular elements of Jakarta's desakota derive from
urbanization driven by this vision, the desakota is a New Order phenomenon.
In the third and fourth sections of this paper, I will look specifically at the
developmental 'vision' of the city, and its relationship to the emergence of the
desakota in the extended metropolitan region of Jakarta. Before I turn to this,
however, it is worthwhile to trace out some basic elements of Indonesian urbanism,
(2)
For example, see King (1976) on urban culture in British India, Taylor (1983) on the Dutch
East Indies, and more general treatments of the interaction between colonial and indigenous
cultures in King (1990) and Ross and Telkamp (1985).
<3> A good overview of Jakarta's economic role in linking Indonesia to the rest of the world is
given in Castles (1989).
(4)
In chapter 5 Abeyasekere (1989) describes Sukarno's efforts toward realizing his vision for
the city as "the beacon of the whole of humankind".
1620 M Leaf
<5> In the case of the city of Jogjakarta, Guinness (1986) describes the dichotomy as being both
in terms of courtiers and wong cilik ('little people', commoners) and in spatial terms between
the streetside neighborhoods of the elites and the back-alley settlements of the kampung.
(6> A range of perspectives can be found in the writings on Indonesia's informal sector, from
an emphasis on the labor-absorption capacity of the sector (Sethuraman, 1985) to the ques-
tion of its relationship to urban poverty (Ebery and Forbes, 1985) and household subsistence
production (Evers, 1980).
<7> The original setting of Batavia is generally now portrayed by historians as having had an
extremely unhealthy environment, as a result in large part to its low-land tropical setting. This
view is supported by historiographic sources which show extraordinarily high mortality rates
for the town's residents (see Wertheim, 1958). For an unconventional interpretation of the
governmental basis for Batavia's deteriorated environmental conditions, see Blusse (1985).
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(8
> Jellinek (1991) documents the shifting nature of these interdependent relationships in her
study of the Kebon Kacang kampung in Jakarta.
(9>See Wertheim (1956, pages 173-183) on Dutch attitudes toward the Indonesian urban
population during colonial times.
(10)
See Hugo et al (1987) for an overview of urban-rural linkages. Detailed treatments of
particular mechanisms of circular migration are given in Jellinek (1978) and in Forbes (1978).
(n) The growth of this 'Colt revolution' has reached the point where daily commuting from the
far periphery has now become commonplace, even for street traders. About an hour after the
9.00 PM closing time for the shops of Block M in the upscale district of Kebayoran Baru, one
can see minibuses from the far periphery (as evidenced by the color of their paint) waiting at
prearranged pick-up points to take many of Block M's fruit vendors home to the kampung for
the night.
1622 M Leaf
As Indonesia's middle class may indeed be limited only to the top quintile of urban
income distribution, the concept of 'consumer class' is a better descriptive term for
this segment of society.(12)
The emergence of this consumer class, and the degree to which this phenom-
enon is redefining the culture of the city, are indications of how Jakarta's role in the
transformation of culture truly is heterogenetic. Older standards and mores are
being replaced by new conceptualizations which accord better with modern con-
sumer ethics. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in Dick's (1985) analysis of the
meaning of equity in Indonesian society. Traditionally, the Javanese-peasant view of
equity is defined as cukupan ('sufficiency') ensured by a moral obligation of support
on the part of rulers—that is, a guaranteed 'right to subsistence'. In concert with the
emergence of consumerism and the expansion of capitalism under the New Order,
this older view is being replaced by expectations of steadily rising living standards
and the potential for finding new means (for example, through education and urban
employment) for social and material advancement. The predicament in this is
that the growth of consumerist ethics must at least be tolerated, if not actively
supported, by the state itself—for increasing consumption is inherent to the model
of development pursued by the New Order government—yet a rapid transition from
satisfaction with cukupan to a revolution of rising expectations may lead to the
growth of widespread dissatisfaction and social unrest when expectations are not met.
As the main propelling force in the restructuring of Jakarta under the New
Order regime is the expansion of the private capitalist sector, the growth of the
consumer class is an absolutely essential element in the shifting focus of urban
development. But if urban form is to continue to be a mechanism for mediation
between social classes, continued expansion of the capitalist city must include a
response to the persistence of urban dualism as well. As we shall see, the creation
of the desakota accomplishes both of these functions—whether by design or not—
both by responding to upper end consumption patterns and by creating the oppor-
tunity for a greater degree of participation by those in the lower half of the social
dichotomy.
Indah, where luxury housing and a golf course are to be built in a coastal wetland
reserve zone, are examples of how developments which are consistent with the
vision may be quite contrary to what is stipulated by formal planning.(13)
In contrast to the formal institutional basis of city planning, the determination of
the vision for the city (and its implementation) may be much more personalistic,
derived as it is from implicit agreement between the principal decisionmakers in the
urban realm (that is, the political elite) and the interests of private capital, who
command the resources to carry out such large-scale changes. In the case of
Jakarta, the major 'visionary' behind changes in the city is Ciputra, an Indonesian-
Chinese developer whose business has been built on his ability to act as an
intermediary between the wealthiest of Jakarta's capitalists and the regulators
of development in the city in his efforts to articulate and achieve new forms of
urban development. Not incidentally, recent major projects which he has instigated
include BSD and Kapuk Indah; in this way, he is widely touted within the Jakarta
business community as the man who sets the agenda for future trends in real-estate
development (Bondan and Tjipta, 1988). Because of his role as respected visionary,
and because of the extent of territories in and around the city which his associated
companies control or have controlled,(14) it can be argued that Ciputra has had a
greater influence on the formation of Jakarta's landscape than any other single
individual, including Sukarno.
In the case of Jakarta, the vision of the future city as a modern metropolis is
significant as it is the articulation of the commonality of interests between private
capital elites and political elites. For the political elites, achievement of this vision is
necessary to demonstrate the fruits of the developmentalist philosophy of the New
Order by presenting to the nation specific symbols of modernity (in this case, the
city itself). The vision also serves the needs of the rapidly expanding private
business sector, whose diversified interests now include the large-scale production
of modern suburban houses for the growing consumer classes in Indonesia's urban
society.
The vision of the future city is an essential element of the cultural meaning of
the city, and as such, it is in line with Redfield and Singer's (1954) idea that the
capital of the former colony must be oriented toward the determination of a distinct
national culture, despite the fact that this culture is not arising orthogenetically—
that is, from a basis of narrowly conceived 'indigenous' roots. This vision is also
instrumental in directing the development of the city's desakota, a form of devel-
opment which is generally acknowledged as being both largely unplanned and
following the interests of free-market capitalist development.
The most succinct summary expression of what Jakarta's developmental vision
means in social terms may be found in an ongoing program of the Indonesian
government to encourage competition between cities over the improvement of urban
living conditions. As part of this drive, each city is encouraged to adopt an exhorta-
tory slogan—usually reduced to an acronym—which is meant to demonstrate the
social goals of the city government in urban development. In the recently past
administration of Governor Wiyogo Atmodarminto, Jakarta was promoted as the
<13) Douglass (1991, page 259), in fact, declares Bumi Serpong Damai to be a "test case" of
planning's "ability to redirect development to its preferred growth centers". As the plans for
this new town presented a "sweeping challenge" to the planning efforts of the West Java
government, the ongoing implementation of this project demonstrates the dominance of the
private development sector over institutionalized planning.
<14) Regarding the activities of Ciputra's Sang Pelopor group and of the real-estate industry in
general, see Leaf (1991, chapter 6).
1624 M Leaf
"BMW City", shortened from the Indonesian terms "Bersih, Manusiawi, Wibawa"
(Clean, Humane, Powerful). The obvious and somewhat ironic meaning of the
slogan—a reference to the growing legion of a particular make of luxury automobile
on the city's major thoroughfares (and, not incidentally, the make preferred by the
governor himself)—has led cynical observers to interpret the slogan as "baik menurut
Wiyogo" ("good enough for Wiyogo"). The significance of this particular anecdote
lies in the divergence between the laudable goals for Jakartan society which are
expressed in the official translation of the slogan and the implication of whose
interests are actually being served in the further development of the city (that is, the
'BMW classes).
The most cynical critics in Jakarta read political meaning into this by pointing
out that this slogan indicates the degree to which the government is out of touch
with the people it ostensibly represents. By (perhaps inadvertently) demonstrating
the alliance between Jakarta's political leadership and those within the business
community who are articulating the city's developmental vision, the idea of Jakarta
as the BMW city is an apt metaphor for the sharp contrast between the vision-led
development which now characterizes capitalist investment in Jakarta and its region,
and the reality of daily life for the majority who are not able to benefit from the
expansion of market capitalism.
Table 1. Botabek population changes, 1980-1990 (source: calculated from Firman, 1992).
Population 1980
urban 228162 188668 638039 1054869
(14.92) (16.50) (25.58) (20.42)
rural 1301074 954774 1 8 5 6 250 4112098
(85.08) (83.50) (74.42) (79.58)
total 1529236 1143442 2494289 5 1 6 6 967
(100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00)
Population 1990
urban 1520837 1152883 1923446 4597166
(55.00) (54.78) (51.48) (53.42)
rural 1244321 951686 1812852 4008859
(45.00) (45.22) (48.52) (46.58)
total 2765158 2104569 3736298 8 606 025
(100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00)
Population change 1 9 8 0 - 9 0
urban 1292675 964215 1285407 3542297
(566.56) (511.06) (201.46) (335.80)
rural -56753 -3088 -43398 -103239
-(4.36) -(0.32) -(2.34) "(2.51)
total 1 2 3 5 922 961127 1242009 3439058
(80.82) (84.06) (49.79) (66.56)
a
The population of Botabek is the summation of that of Bogor, Tangerang, and Bekasi.
Note: The corresponding percentages are given in parentheses.
urban population comprised well over half of the total, whereas ten years earlier it
only comprised one fifth. These changes have been all the more dramatic in the
kabupaten of Tangerang and Bekasi (to the west and east, respectively), owing in
part to development policies favoring east-west expansion, but perhaps more
importantly to the higher initial base of urbanization in Bogor in 1980. Tangerang's
urban population grew by nearly 2 1 % per annum from little more than a quarter of
a million in 1980 to nearly 1.3 million in 1990. Bekasi's rate of urban population
growth was nearly as fast, from less than 200000 in 1980 to nearly one million
in 1990.
Because of the methods used here, these extraordinarily high rates of change
arise largely from the reclassification of existing populations, rather than purely
from population growth. The problem of reclassification or redefinition is generally
quite vexing to demographers as it indicates neither actual movement of population
nor changes due to natural growth (that is, the two conventional bases of the
urbanization process). In this instance, however, we are concerned as much about
the outward expansion of the urban environment as by the inward movement of
rural dwellers; it is therefore reasonable to argue that the ongoing process of
redefinition at the desa level properly captures the transition from rural-to-urban
settings which occurs in situ (as indicated, for example, by expanded access to urban
facilities as well as higher population densities). Even with the use of more standard
measures of demographic change, it is obvious that the population is growing
rapidly in the desakota. Overall per annum growth rates for the 1980s were in
excess of 6% both for Tangerang and for Bekasi, and more than 5% for the entire
Botabek region.
1626 M Leaf
These figures contrast markedly with demographic changes within the inner city.
Although census figures show that the population of DKI Jakarta is still growing at
a fast rate—at 2.4% per annum over the course of the 1980s, down from 3.8%
during the 1970s—most of this growth results from the conversion of what are still
fairly extensive agricultural lands at the edge of the urbanized area which nonethe-
less fall within the administrative bounds of the city.(18) Household-registration data
show that by the mid-1980s a number of inner-city kelurahan (subdistricts) were
actually experiencing population decline (according to Gardiner, 1989, appendix 1,
table 6), although it is unclear that this was the result of displacement of residents
because of the conversion from residential to commercial land uses, or simply from
the deconcentration of existing housing stock. The overall result of these trends has
been a rather drastic change in DKI Jakarta's share of the Jabotabek population,
from 55% in 1980 to only 48% in 1990, an appropriate bellwether indicator for the
ascendency of the desakota (JMDPR, 1993, table 2.1).
The analysis of census data is appropriate to understanding economic changes in
the desakota, as urban classification criteria include the source of household income.
Further gross evidence of the development of Jakarta's desakota may be obtained
from an examination of land-use changes for Botabek. This is an even cruder
method for examining the process, however, as data compilation has been spotty at
best. The most consistent source of information on land-use changes is from the
National Land Agency, which tracks location permits (ijin lokasi) given to formal
private developers. These data can be used only to give a rough indication of
trends, not only because of discrepancies in numbers between data sets compiled by
different offices within the National Land Agency, but because of the practice of
developers to use the permit process for speculative land holding, rather than for
immediate development.(19) This widespread abuse of the permit process means that
the analysis of permit data may result in an overestimate of actual land-use changes
by a half or more.(20) This is more than offset, however, by the fact that the permits
cover only those changes undertaken by what is considered to be the 'formal sector'
of land development. The myriad smaller scale changes undertaken at the level of
small enterprises or even individual households—that is, by the 'informal sector'—
never show up in such data compilations.
Even with these qualifications, the compilation of development-permit data over
a five-year period (1983/84 to 1987/88) gives an indication of the rapidity of land-
use changes on Jakarta's fringe (see table 2). For Botabek overall, more than 6% of
the total land area of the region was put under permit in this period, amounting to
more than 38 000 ha, the vast majority of which (86%) was designated for housing.
Most of the remaining 14% (over 5000 ha) was designated for industrial develop-
ment, a figure which in relative terms grossly underestimates the extent of industrial
(18) Although these lands are quickly being 'used up'—that is converted from wet rice farming
and orchards to real estate and kampung—as late as 1984 nearly 35% (22600 ha) of the total
land area of DKI Jakarta (65 300 ha) was nonurbanized open space, more than one third of
which (8100ha or 12% of the city total) was still in active agricultural production [according
to data in DKI Jakarta (1985)].
<19>Leaf (1991), Ferguson and Hoffman (1993), and Hoffman (1988), give varying estimates of
the scale of the private sector 'land bank' which results from the improper use of the permit
system.
(20> One means of estimating the proportion of land which is actually developed is to compare
data on issued permits with information on which lands have actually gone through the titling
process. Ferguson and Hoffman (1993, page 60) have found that in Botabek, only 28% of the
land under permit for housing has actually been issued title (as of 1988), in comparison with a
figure of 76% for elsewhere in West Java.
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Table 2. Botabek land area (hectares) under permit for development, 1983/84-1987/88
(source: unpublished data, Badan Pertanahan Nasional).
Permit area
housing 27114 2 719 3 507 33 340
other 1100 1639 2469 5 208
total 28 214 4358 5 976 38 548
Total land area 131282 138700 334794 604776
Permits as % of total 21.49 3.14 1.78 6.37
a
The area of Botabek is the summation of that of Bogor, Tangerang, and Bekasi.
(21
> According to official figures, approximately 15 200 ha of land in Jabotabek is actually
zoned for industrial development, with more than 10000 ha of this in Botabek; yet, according
to recent planning documents (JMDPR, 1993), estimates of the amount of land held for
industrial development in Jabotabek run as high as 40 000 ha.
(22> According to data compiled in JMDPR, 1993, annex 3, the lack of new town development
in the southernmost kabupaten, Bogor, might be considered to be the outcome of deliberate
planning policy to redirect metropolitan growth to the east and west in order to take pressure
off the city's aquifer recharge zone to the south. A more likely explanation probably derives
from the historically higher land prices in the kabupaten, because of the presence of the city
of Bogor and the development boom in the town of Depok (on the DKI Jakarta border) which
followed upon the decision to relocate the campus of the University of Indonesia there.
The result is not necessarily less housing development (for as can be seen from table 1, the
population in the kabupaten rose by nearly 50% over the course of the 1980s), but a more
atomized pattern of development instead of large-scale speculative building.
<23) Firman and Dharmapatni (1994), in fact, report a figure of 8100 ha under permit for
housing in Bekasi by 1991, a three-fold increase in four years.
1628 M Leaf
<24) As the growth in traffic arises primarily from the restructuring of land uses throughout the
metropolitan region, recent efforts at traffic-alleviation planning (such as the designation of
the Sudirman-Thamrin corridor as a "three in one" zone—that is, for mandatory car
pooling—during the morning commute) amount to a response to symptoms, rather than to
root causes.
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(25
>A prime example of a superblock is the Sudirman Central Business District, now in its
initial stages of construction. When completed, this project may contain as many as four five-
star hotels, eleven office buildings (possibly as tall as 60 stories), eight condominium buildings
(with 2330 units), and two blocks of low-cost housing (totalling 400 units) in a secured
compound of nearly 45 ha in the midst of the Golden Triangle (see Asia Money 1993; Warta
Ekonomi 1991, page 38).
<26)This is a process which is facilitated by the development permit process which was put
into place in the 1970s (see Leaf, 1991, chapter 4). Since 1990, the process has been
extended to accommodate inner-city commercial development as well.
<27) Anecdotal evidence, based on interviews with National Land Agency officials, 1990.
1630 M Leaf
(28) Firman a n c i Dharmapatni (1994) point out in particular how the reduction in 1989 of
the minimum requirement for foreign investment from US$1 million to US$250000 has
prompted a rapid increase in the types of direct foreign investment from Japan, Korea, and
Taiwan which are concentrating in the Botabek region.
<29> JMDPR (1993), for example, refers to one report which suggests that of the 18 000 ha in
industrial estates in West Java, only 1045 ha have been developed.
Building the road for the BMW 1631
The convergence of these three elements—more money, more time, and the
emergence of a sizable leisure industry to respond to these favorable market condi-
tions—is having a tremendous impact on the landscape of the desakota. Leisure
development is in fact defining the outer boundary of the advance of urban culture
on the countryside. As golf courses, in particular, require large amounts of land,
developers are looking to ever more remote locations in pursuit of cheap land.(30)
The result is the introduction of the cutthroat tactics of the urban land market far
into the countryside, as evidenced by the recent controversy in Cimacan, where
villagers were compensated at negligible rates when their lands were acquired by
developers from Jakarta.(31)
Golf is not the only recreational land use which is pushing outward the bound-
aries of the desakota. Increasingly the desire on the part of urban consumers is to
take their weekends in romanticized back-to-nature settings. The implication of this
leisure-market trend has been felt most acutely in the highland zone of the Puncak,
between Bogor and Bandung, where environmental problems resulting from rampant
development aimed at domestic weekend tourists has required the extreme measure
of a presidential decree in order to control development (Keputusan Presiden Nomor
79, 1985, discussed in Douglass, 1991).
5.5 Other elements
There are a number of other elements of the desakota which should also be
considered as important, in particular roadway development and agriculture. Like
many of the other land uses considered here, the development of roads occurs by a
range of both planned and unplanned processes. At one end (the planned end), the
construction of roadways is clearly part of the vision-led planning process, as the
exclusivity of the toll road system of highways favors the modern aspiration of
private automobile ownership. At the other (unplanned) end, roadways not only
provide access to the growing kampung settlements of the urban periphery, but
create locational differentiation according to this access, thereby planting the seeds
of future differential land prices at the edge of the urban region. The mix of
planned and unplanned processes of road construction creates ongoing problems for
ex post planning, as roadways are the leading component of infrastructure expan-
sion in this rapidly urbanizing region.
The issue of agriculture is indeed quite contentious, as any view of advancing
urbanization is matched by the obverse consideration of retreating agriculture. The
'loss' of agricultural lands which are inherent in the growth of the desakota must be
offset by either greater strains on the productivity of existing farmlands or further
upland expansion at the edge of the outer periphery of agriculture.
In this brief review of selected elements of Jakarta's desakota I have emphasized
those activities which are associated with the formal economy, despite the observa-
tion that the bulk of land uses in Botabek may be said to fall within the purview of
the 'informal' sector of the economy. Yet each of these formal land-use categories is
in reality matched (or exceeded) by adjacent informal forms of the same or similar
activities. Enclaves of real-estate housing appear as islands in a sea of kampung
settlements, the modern new pasar swalayan (supermarket) forfeits a part of its park-
ing lot to accommodate a periodic early morning market, and small factories seem
(3°) This is in addition to the trend among the highest end housing developments (including
new towns) to include an integral golf course as a selling point for the project.
(31)The Cimacan controversy is one of a number of land dispute cases used by Lucas (1992)
to illustrate both the complexity of Indonesian land-rights issues and the relationship between
state and citizenry in the current context of development.
1632 M Leaf
to have escaped from the authorized industrial estate, only to pop up in the middle
of distant rice fields. It is the quotidian nature of these seeming incongruities which
is at the heart of social and economic relationships in the urban periphery.
(32> In Bangkok, for example, the relationship between the growth in urban land prices and
the displacement of the inner-city poor has been documented and studied for some time
(Boonyabancha, 1983; Pornchokchai, 1992). One useful tool for examining this relationship
is the analysis of urban land price gradients, as demonstrated by Dowall and Leaf (1991) in
their comparison of Jakarta, Bangkok, and Karachi. The argument that inner-city displace-
ments are directly linked to macroeconomic performance also lies at the heart of Ward's
(1993) analysis of trends in Latin American cities, in which he attributed the relative lack of
"gentrification" to the current slow growth conditions in the region.
Building the road for the BMW 1633
the basis for the further development of a modern national culture? In many
respects, Indonesian culture is undergoing profound changes. The introduction of
modern communication and transportation technologies is expanding the notional
definition of urban culture. However, it is in the desakota—the extended geographical
region of metropolitan influence—that an environment is being created for face-to-
face interaction between urban and rural populations at a scale hitherto unknown.
This situation, therefore, holds the potential for further eroding the idea that the
principal social schism of Indonesian society lies between city and countryside. If
the older social dichotomy was more explicitly in terms of urban and rural cultures,
it may increasingly come to be seen that the dichotomy which is being sustained by
recent forms of urban development—including the desakota—is between social classes.
The implications of these issues for cultural transformation and social sustain-
ability may be of less immediate concern than the problem of the ecological
sustainability of the desakota as a human-settlement form. From the experience so
far, it is questionable whether the short-term time horizon which drives vision-
propelled urban development, as described here, can be reconciled with the idea of
environmental management for the long-term viability of the urban region.(33) The
extended metropolitan region of Jakarta holds the potential for greatly increased
environmental degradation. In comparison with inner districts of the city, the
desakota is characterized both by less stringent environmental standards as well as
by lower capacity for enforcement. Not only is this 'regulatory infrastructure'
insufficient for the scale of the phenomenon, but the other channel through which
governments intervene to mitigate the negative impacts of urbanization—physical
infrastructure—is lacking as well. The environmental impacts of poor water supply
and sanitation facilities and the continued growth in the number of internal combus-
tion engines will only compound the problems of dispersed industrial development
in the desakota. All indications are that if the 'BMW City' is to progress forward, it
will need a better road on which to travel. It is becoming increasingly clear that the
construction of this road will have significant environmental and social costs.
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