ART 55 GROUNDS Court is generally bound to adopt the her and was mismanaging their • To allow the judicial
their • To allow the judicial separation of
Ong vs. Ong
The wife filed for a petition for legal
separation on the ground that her
married life was marked by physical
violence, threats, intimidation, and
grossly abusive conduct by her
husband to her and their children.
In one incident, the husband pointed
a gun at her and asked her to leave
the house.
The husband denied his wife’s
allegations.
The RTC and CA granted the wife’s
petition for legal separation, saying
that the wife and her sister’s
testimonies straightforward and
credible and the ground for legal
separation under Art. 55, par. 1 of
the Family Code, i.e., physical
violence and grossly abusive
conduct directed against the wife
were proven.
The husband contends that his wife
only wants legal separation so that
she could obtain control and
ownership of his properties.
Supreme Court Ruling
Generally, the SC cannot review
questions of fact, more so when the
CA upholds the findings of fact of the
trial court. In such instance, this
facts as determined by the lower
courts and the husband was not able
to show that his petition falls under
the circumstances allowing the SC to
perform a review of facts.
The findings of the RTC were affirmed
by the CA and are adequately
supported by the records. The
husband himself admitted that there
was no day that he did not quarrel
with his wife, which made his life
miserable, and he blames her for
being negligent of her wifely duties
and for not reporting to him the
wrongdoings of their children.
On the credibility of the wife’s
witnesses, relationship alone is
not reason enough to discredit
and label a witness's testimony
as biased and unworthy of credence
and a witness' relationship to one of
the parties does not automatically
affect the veracity of his or her
testimony.
It was established that the wife left
due to the husband’s abusive conduct,
such abandonment was with
justifiable cause.
The SC affirmed the CA and RTC’s
rulings.
Dela Cruz vs. Del Cruz
• The wife filed for (1) separation of
property, (2) monthly support,
alleging that her husband abandoned
conjugal partnership properties.
• They owned several properties and
business, as well as owed money
from banks secured by mortgages on
their properties.
• The husband then contended that
he had always visited the conjugal
home and had provided support for
the family despite his frequent
absences when he was in Manila to
supervise the expansion of their
business.
• For years, the husband had not
slept in the conjugal dwelling instead
stayed in his office at Texboard
Factory although he paid short visits
in the conjugal home, which was
affirmed by his wife.
• He also says that his intention
was never to abandon his wife
and children, but only to teach her a
lesson as she was quarrelsome and
extremely jealous of every woman.
• The wife found out that her husband
had a mistress, hence, the urgency of
the separation of property for the
fear that her husband might
squander and dispose the conjugal
assets in favor of the concubine.
• The CFI rendered judgment in favor
of the wife.
Supreme Court Ruling
property, there must be real
abandonment, and not mere
separation. The abandonment must
not only be physical estrangement
but also amount to financial and
moral desertion.
• Physical separation alone is not
the full meaning of the term
"abandonment", if the husband,
despite his voluntary departure
from the society of his spouse,
neither neglects the
management of the conjugal
partnership nor ceases to give
support to his wife.
• The husband has never desisted
in the fulfillment of his financial
obligation support of the family.
This negates the intention of
coming home to the conjugal
abode. The wife even testified that
the husband “paid short visits”
implying more than one visit.
• On the ground that the husband has
a concubine, we hold that the
evidence on record fails to
preponderate such claim.
• There is absolutely no evidence to
show that he has squandered the
conjugal assets. Upon the contrary,
he proved that through his industry
and zeal, the conjugal assets at the
time of the trial had increased to a
value of over a million pesos.
• In order for abuse to exist, there
must be a willful and utter disregard
of the interest of the partnership
evidenced by a repetition of
deliberate acts or omissions
prejudicial to the latter.
• If there is only physical
separation between the spouses
(and nothing more), engendered
by the husband’s leaving the
conjugal abode, but the husband
continues to manage the
conjugal properties with the
same zeal, industry, and
efficiency as he did prior to the
separation, and religiously gives
support to his wife and children,
as in the case at bar, we are not
disposed to grant the wife’s
petition for separation of
property.
• The decision regarding the
separation of property was reversed
but the decision regarding support
was affirmed.
ART 56 DEFENSES
CONDONATION
Bugayong vs. Ginez
• Husband, a serviceman in the US
Navy, married his wife while on
furlough leave.
• The couple came to an agreement
that the wife would stay with his
sisters who later moved in Manila.
Later, the wife left the dwelling of the
sisters-in-law and informed her
husband by letter that she had gone
to Pangasinan to reside with her
mother and later on moved to
Dagupan to study in a local college.
• The husband then began receiving
letters informing him of alleged acts
of infidelity of his wife. He admitted
that his wife informed him by letter
that a certain Eliong kissed her.
• All these communications,
prompted him to seek the advice of
the Navy Chaplain who asked him to
consult with the navy legal
department.
• The husband then went to
Pangasinan and looked for his wife.
They met in the house of the house of
his wife’s godmother.
• They proceeded to the house of the
husband’s cousin where they stayed
for 1 day and 1 night as husband and
wife. The next day, they slept
together in their own house.
• He tried to verify with his wife the
truth on the information he received
but instead of answering, she merely
packed up and left which he took as a
confirmation of the acts of infidelity.
• He then filed a complaint for legal
separation. The wife denied his
accusations.
• The wife moved to dismiss the
proceeding on the ground that the
cause of action, if any, is barred by
the statute of limitations, that
under the same assumption, the
acts charged have been
condoned by the husband, and
that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action sufficient for this
court to render a valid judgment.
Supreme Court Ruling
• Condonation is the forgiveness of a
marital offense constituting a ground
for legal separation.
• There was clearly a condonation
on the part of the husband for the
supposed ‘acts of rank infidelity
amounting to adultery’ committed by
his wife. A single voluntary act of
marital intercourse between the
parties ordinarily is sufficient to
constitute condonation and where
the parties live in the same house, it
is presumed that they live on terms
of matrimonial cohabitation.
• Furthermore, Art. 100 of the Civil
Code states that the legal separation
may be claimed only by the innocent
spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the
adultery or concubinage.
• The conduct of husband, despite his
belief that his wife was unfaithful,
deprives him, as alleged the
offended spouse, of any action
for legal separation against the
offending wife, because his said
conduct comes within the restriction
of Article 100 of the Civil Code.
Busuego vs. Office of the
Ombudsman Mindanao
• The wife filed for concubinage,
VAWC, and grave threats before the
Office of the Ombudsman against her
husband, Chief of the Davao Regional
Hospital.
• The wife saw evidence of the
husband’s infidelity but he denied it.
• The wife then flew to N.Y. USA to
work as a nurse. Her husband
opposed this, thus, before leaving, he
took his gun and pointed it at his
wife’s temple.
• The wife was eventually joined in
the US by her 2 children. One child
eventually returned to Davao City to
study medicine.
• The wife then learned that a woman
was living at their conjugal home.
When asked about it, he said that she
was a nurse at the Regional Hospital
and was allegedly raped by his
brother so he allowed her to sleep at
the maids’ quarters.
• The wife, with the help of her
children, gathered evidence against
the husband. She then filed a case
against her husband before the
Ombudsman, impleading the
mistresses who did not file an
answer.
• The ombudsman finds that there is
sufficient case for concubinage
against the husband and his mistress.
The other charges were dismissed for
lack of merit.
• The husband appeals to the SC
saying among others, that it glossed
over the wife’s condonation of
the supposed Concubinage when
she alleged in the complaint that
she had known of her husband’s
womanizing and believed him to
have changed his ways.
Supreme Court Ruling
• The Ombudsman has full
discretionary authority in the
determination of probable cause
during a preliminary investigation.
Courts are not empowered to
substitute their judgment for that of
the Ombudsman.
• On the argument that the wife had
pardoned his concubinage, having
admitted to knowing of his
womanizing and yet continuing with
their relationship as demonstrated in
his wife’s annual visits to him in
Davao City, we are not convinced.
• Indeed, the wife’s admission
was that she believed her
husband had stopped
womanizing, not that she had
knowledge of hisspecific acts of
concubinage, specifically keeping
them in the conjugal dwelling.
This admission set against the
specific acts of concubinage
listed in Article 334 of the
Revised Penal Code does not
amount to condonation.
• Their continued cohabitation as
husband and wife construed from
Rosa’s annual visits to Davao City
is not acquiescence to Alfredo’s
relations with his concubines.
• On that score, we have succinctly
held: We can find nothing in the
record which can be construed as
pardon or condonation. It is true
that the offended party has to a
considerable extent been patient
with her husband's shortcomings,
but that seems to have been due
to his promises of improvement;
nowhere does it appear that she
has consented to her husband's
immorality or that she has
acquiesced in his relations with
his concubine.
• The Ombudsman’s resolution was
affirmed.
CONSENT
People vs. Schneckenburger
• A Mexican married a Filipina. After
seven years of martial life, they
agreed, for reason of alleged
incompatibility of character, to live
separately each other, executing a
document to that effect.
• The husband, without leaving the
Philippines, secured a decree of
divorce from Mexico.
• The husband then contracted a
second marriage.
• The husband was charged, in 2
separate cases, for bigamy and
concubinage, by the 1st wife.
• He was convicted for bigamy but
the case for concubinage was
dismissed due to double jeopardy.
• The fiscal then appealed and the
dismissal was held by the court to be
premature, thus, he was convicted of
concubinage through reckless
imprudence. He appealed to the SC.
Supreme Court Ruling
• No double jeopardy - the defense of
bigamy for which he was convicted
and that of concubinage for which he
stood trial in the court are two
distinct offenses in the law.
• BIGAMY: celebration of second
marriage while the first is still
existing; offense against civil status
which may be prosecuted at the
instance of the state
• CONCUBINAGE: mere
cohabitation by the husband with a
woman who is not his wife; offense
against chastity and may be
prosecuted only at the instance
of the offended party
• Upon the other hand, the accused
should have been acquitted of
the crime of concubinage.
• The document executed by and
between the accused and the
complainant in which they agreed,
while illegal for the purpose for which
it was executed, constitutes
nevertheless a valid consent to the
act of concubinage within the
meaning of Art. 344 of the RPC.
• By such agreement, each party
clearly intended to forego the illicit
acts of the other.
• Previously, the court held that the
consent which bars the offended
party from instituting a criminal
prosecution in cases of adultery,
concubinage, seduction, abduction,
rape and acts of lasciviousness is
that which has been given
expressly or impliedly after the
crime has been committed. However,
in this case, the Court sees this to be
a narrow view.
• As the term "pardon"
unquestionably refers to the offense
after its commission, "consent"
must have been intended
agreeably with its ordinary usage,
to refer to the offense prior to its
commission. No logical difference can
indeed be perceived between prior
and subsequent consent, for in both
instances as the offended party has
chosen to compromise with his/her
dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy
to come to court and invoke its aid in
the vindication of the wrong
• Prior consent is as effective as
subsequent consent to bar the
offended party from prosecuting
the offense
• An agreement of the tenor entered
into between the parties herein,
operates, within the plain language
and manifest policy of the law, to bar
the offended party from prosecuting
the offense.
People vs. Sensano and Ramos
• Husband and wife, respectively,
were legally married. Later, the wife
abandoned her husband.
• She took her child and lived with
another man. He event went to
Hawaii, completely abandoning his
wife for more than seven years.
• Later, he returned and charged his
wife and her paramour with adultery.
The wife was found guilty.
• After serving her sentence, she
appealed to the municipal president
and the justice of the peace to send
for her husband so that she might
ask his pardon and beg him to
take her back. At the house of the
president she begged his pardon and
promised to be a faithful wife if
he would take her back.
• The husband refused to pardon her.
Having nowhere to go, she returned
to her paramour. The husband did
nothing to interfere with the
relations of his wife and her
paramour.
• Shortly thereafter. the husband left
for Hawaii where he remained for
seven years completely abandoning
his said wife and child. On his return
to the Philippines, he presented the
second charge of adultery here
involved with the sole purpose, as he
declared, of being able to obtain a
divorce under the provisions of Act
No. 2710.
Supreme Court Ruling
• The wife should be acquitted
because of the husband's conduct
warranted the inference that in truth,
as well as in fact, he had consented
to the philandering of his wife,
and therefore he is not authorized by
law to institute this criminal
proceeding.
Matubis vs. Praxedes
• Alleging abandonment and
concubinage, the wife filed a
complaint for Legal Separation and
change of surname against her
husband.
• The husband denied this and
claimed that it was the wife who left
their home.
• The husband and wife then
executed an agreement to live
separately from each other and “to
allow each other to get any mate
and live with as husband and wife
without any interference by any
of us, nor either of us can
prosecute the other for adultery
or concubinage or any other
crime or suit arising from our
separation.”
• The husband then began cohabiting
with another woman and they had a
child.
• After the trial, without the
defendant adducing any evidence,
the court a quo rendered
judgment holding that the acts of
defendant constituted
concubinage, a ground for legal
separation. It, however,
dismissed the complaint by stating
that the wife has consented to the
commission of concubinage by
her husband as evidenced by
their agreement.
Supreme Court Ruling
• The complaint was filed by the wife
outside the periods provided for by
law.
• The condonation and consent
here are not only implied but
expressed. The law (Art. 100 Civil
Code), specifically provides that
legal separation may be claimed
only by the innocent spouse,
provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the
adultery or concubinage.
• Having condoned and/or
consented in writing, the plaintiff
is now undeserving of the court’s
sympathy
MUTUAL GUILT OR
RECRIMINATION
Arroyo Jr. vs CA
• The husband filed for a criminal
case of adultery against his wife and
her paramour.
• The Regional Trial Court convicted
the wife and her paramour, based,
among others on the wife's admission
to her husband that she had sex with
her paramour.
• This decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
• The wife later filed a motion for
reconsideration or new trial
contending that a pardon had
been extended by her husband.
The husband filed a
manifestation praying for the
dismissal of the case as he had
"tacitly consented" to his wife's
infidelity.
Supreme Court Ruling
• The rule on pardon is found in
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides: "ARTICLE 344. The
crime of adultery and concubinage
shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended
spouse.”
• While there is a conceptual
difference between consent and
pardon in the sense that consent is
granted prior to the adulterous
act while pardon is given after
the illicit affair, nevertheless, for
either consent or pardon to
benefit the accused, it must be
given prior to the filing of a
criminal complaint.
• In this case, the pardon was
executed only after the trial court
had already rendered its
decision.
• While the crime of adultery cannot
be prosecuted without the offended
spouse’s complaint, once the
complaint has been filed, the control
of the case passes to the public
prosecutor. Enforcement of our
law on adultery is not exclusively,
nor even principally, a matter of
vindication of the private honor
of the offended
spouse; much less is it a matter
merely of personal or social hypocrisy.
Such enforcement relates, more
importantly, to protection of the basic
social institutions of marriage and the
family in the preservation of which
the State has the strongest interest;
the public policy here involved is of
the most fundamental kind.
• In the present case, no such
acquiescence can be implied: the
accused did not enter into any
agreement with her husband allowing
each other to marry or co-habit with
other persons; and the husband
promptly filed his complaint after
discovering the illicit affair.
• The husband’s manifestation
amounts in effect to an
attempted recantation of
testimony given by him before
the trial court. It is settled that
not all recantations by witnesses
should result in the granting of a
new trial. The timing of his
recantation was questionable. He had
2 prior instances to do so, but he
didn’t. The petition was denied.
COLLUSION
Brown vs. Yambao
• On July 4, 1955, the husband filed
a petition of legal separation. He
claims that his wife engaged in Supreme Court Ruling
adulterous relations with another of
• Collusion in matrimonial cases
whom she begot a baby girl; that he
being “the act of married persons
learned of his wife’s misconduct
in procuring a divorce by mutual
only in 1945, upon his release from
consent, whether by a
internment; that thereafter the
pre-concerted commission by
spouses lived separately and later
one of a matrimonial offense, or
executed a document (Annex A)
by failure, in pursuance of
liquidating their conjugal partnership
agreement, to defend divorce
and assigning certain properties to
proceedings” (Cyclopedia Law
the erring wife as her share.
Dictionary; Nelson, Divorce and
Separation, Sec. 500).
• The court subsequently declared
the wife in default, for failure to
• It was lawful for the fiscal to
answer in due time, despite service of
bring to light any circumstances
summons.
that could give rise to the
inference that the wife’s default
• During the fiscal’s cross
was calculated or agreed upon, to
examination, he learned that the enable the plaintiff to obtain the
husband-complainant also had decree of legal separation that he
an illicit affair with another sought without regard to the
woman and that they begotten legal merits of his case.
children
• Although prescription should
• Because of that, the petition for
ordinarily be alleged, this is not
legal separation was denied because,
so in legal separation or
while the wife’s adultery was
annulment proceedings.
established, Brown had incurred
in a misconduct of similar nature • Therefore, the court even by
that barred his right of action itself can take cognizance of
under Article 100, and that the
prescription of the case because
action to file legal separation has
said action involves public
prescribed as he only did this interest, and it is the policy of our
after ten years (1955 vs 1945). law that no such decree be issued
if any legal obstacles thereto
appear upon the record.
• The husband also questions the
actuation of the fiscal in examining
him, claiming that the fiscal had
• Hence, there being at least two well
intervened not for the state but established statutory grounds for
for the wife.
denying the remedy sought
(commission of similar offense by
petitioner and prescription of the
action), the dismissal is affirmed.
ART 58-60 PROCEDURE
Pacete vs. Carriaga
• The wife filed with the CFI a
declaration of nullity of the marriage
between her husband and his 2nd
wife, as well as for legal separation
and accounting and separation of
property of her marriage.
• The husband contracted a 2nd
marriage where they acquired
several properties and the husband
was unable to reach amicable
settlement with his 1st wife.
• Reconciliation was improbable since
the husband chose to live with his
2nd wife.
• The defendants were each served
with summons. They filed an
extension within which to file an
answer, which the court partly
granted. Due to unwanted
misunderstanding, particularly in
communication, the defendants
failed to file an answer on the date
set by the court.
• Thereafter, the 1st wife filed a
motion to declare the defendants in
default, which the court forthwith
granted.
The court received the 1st wife’s
evidence during the hearings held on
February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980.
• After trial, the CFI rendered a
decision in favor of the 1st wife on
March 17, 1980.
• The husband is claiming that the
CFI gravely abused its discretion in
denying petitioner’s motion for
extension of time to file their
answer, in declaring petitioners
in default and in rendering its
decision.
Supreme Court Ruling
• The Civil Code provides that “no
decree of legal separation shall be
promulgated upon a stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment. In
case of non-appearance of the
defendant, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to inquire
whether or not collusion between
parties exists. If there is no collusion,
the prosecuting attorney shall
intervene for the State in order to
take care that the evidence for the
plaintiff is not fabricated.”
• The above stated provision
calling for the intervention of the
state attorneys in case of
uncontested proceedings for
legal separation (and of
annulment of marriages, under
Article 88) is to emphasize that
marriage is more than a mere
contract.
Sabalones vs. CA
• Article 103 of the Civil Code, now • While assigned as an ambassador
Article 58 of the Family Code, further abroad, the husband left to his wife
mandates that an action for legal the administration of some of their
separation must “in no case be tried conjugal, properties for fifteen years.
before six months shall have elapsed
since the filing of the petition,”
obviously in order to provide the
• When he retired as ambassador, he
parties a “cooling-off” period. In
came back to the Philippines but not
this interim, the court should take
to his wife and their children.
steps toward getting the parties
to reconcile.
• The significance of the above • Four years later, he filed an action
substantive provisions of the law is for judicial authorization to sell a
further or underscored by the property belonging to the conjugal
inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 partnership, claiming that he would
of the Rules of Court which use the money for his treatment.
provides that no defaults in
actions for annulments of
marriage or for legal separation. • In her answer, the wife opposed the
authorization and filed a
• Therefore, if the defendant in an counterclaim for legal separation.
action for annulment of marriage
or for legal separation fails to
answer, the court shall order the
• The wife has been administering the
prosecuting attorney to
subject properties for almost
investigate whether or not
nineteen years now, apparently
collusion between the parties
without complaint on the part of the
exists, and if there is no collusion,
husband.
to intervene for the State in order
to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated.
• The wife then asked the court to
grant the decree of legal separation
• The decision of the CFI was set and order the liquidation of their
aside. conjugal properties, with forfeiture of
her husband's share therein because
of his adultery.
ART 61-64 EFFECTS
• The court found that the husband
had indeed contracted a bigamous
2nd marriage, to whom he had
returned upon his retirement in 1985
at a separate residence. The court
thus decreed the legal separation of
the spouses and the forfeiture of the
petitioner's share in the conjugal
properties, declaring as well that he
was not entitled to support from his
respondent wife.
• The husband then opposed this,
arguing that arguing that since the
law provides for a joint
administration of the conjugal
properties by the husband and wife,
no injunctive relief can be issued
against one or the other because no
right will be violated.
Supreme Court Ruling
• We agree with the respondent court
that pending the appointment of
an administrator over the whole
mass of conjugal assets, the
respondent court was justified in
allowing the wife to continue
with her administration. It was
also correct, taking into account the
evidence adduced at the hearing, in
enjoining the petitioner from
interfering with his wife's
administration pending resolution of
the appeal.
• The law does indeed grant to the
spouses joint administration over the
conjugal properties as clearly
provided in the above-cited Article
124 of the Family Code. However,
Article 61, also above quoted,
states that after a petition for
legal separation has been filed,
the trial court shall, in the
absence of a written agreement
between the couple, appoint
either one of the spouses or a
third person to act as the
administrator.
• While it is true that no formal
designation of the administrator
has been made, such designation
was implicit in the decision of the
trial court denying the petitioner
any share in the conjugal
properties (and thus also
disqualifying him as
administrator thereof).
• That designation was in effect
approved by the Court of Appeals
when it issued in favor of the
respondent wife the preliminary
injunction now under challenge.
ART 68-73 RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN
HUSBAND AND WIFE
Azcueta vs. Republic
• The wife filed a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of her
marriage on the ground that her
husband was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage.
• She complained that despite her
encouragement, her husband never
bothered to look for a job and
always depended on his mother
for financial assistance and for
his decisions.
• It was her mother –in-law who
found them a room paid the
monthly rental.
• The husband also pretended to
have found work and gave his wife
money which actually came from his
mother.
• Upon confronting him, the
husband cried like a child and he
only did that so that she will not
be nagging him anymore. Hetold
her his parents could support
their needs
• They had sex only once a month
which the wife never enjoyed.
When they discussed this, the
husband said that sex was sacred
and should not be enjoyed or
abused.
• The husband told her he was not
ready for a child.
• When the wife asked if they could
move to another place, the husband
did not agree and, after four
years of living together as
husband and wife, she was
forced to leave and see if he
would follow her. He did not.
• To support the petition, the wife
presented her husband’s cousin and a
psychiatrist as witness. The expert
noted that with Dependent
Personality Disorder as he was too
dependent on his mother so much so
that he cannot decide for himself.
According to Dr. Villegas, this kind of
problem was also severe because he
will not be able to make and to carry
on the responsibilities expected of a
married person. It was incurable
because it started in early
development and therefore deeply
ingrained into his personality.
• The RTC rendered the marriage
void ab initio but the CA reversed
this.
Supreme Court Ruling
• The husband was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital
duties because of his Dependent
Personality Disorder.
• The wife sufficiently discharged her
burden to prove her husband’s
psychological incapacity. What
matters is whether the totality of
evidence presented is adequate to
sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity.
• The wife’s testimony was
corroborated in material points by
her husband’s close relative, and
supported by the psychiatrist’s
testimony linking the manifestations
of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity
and the psychological disorder itself.
• This is not to say, however, that
anyone diagnosed with Dependent
Personality Disorder is automatically
deemed psychologically
incapacitated to perform his/her
marital obligations. The court must
evaluate the facts, as guided by
expert opinion, and carefully
examine the type of disorder and the
gravity thereof before declaring the
nullity of a marriage under Article 36.
Ilusorio vs. Bildner
• The wife the court to gain custody
(through a writ of habeas corpus) of
her husband of 30 years, an old
lawyer with vast properties. They
have separated for undisclosed
reasons. This was denied by the CA.
• The husband is contesting the CA
decision visitation rights to her
husband and to enjoin them from
enforcing the visitation right.
• Two of their children claimed that
their mother gave their father an
overdose of an antidepressant drug
which caused his health to
deteriorate.
Supreme Court Ruling
• Obviously, there was absence of
empathy between spouses, having
been separated from bed and board.
• Marital rights including overture
and living in conjugal dwelling may
not be enforced by the extra-ordinary
writ of habeas corpus.
• No court is empowered as a
judicial authority to compel a
husband to live with his wife. This
cannot be enforced by compulsion of
a writ of habeas corpus carried out by
sheriffs or by any other means
process. That is a matter beyond
judicial authority and is best left
to the man and woman’s free
choice.
• The CA exceeded its authority when
it awarded visitation rights in a
petition for habeas corpus because it
was never prayed for.
• We were not convinced that the
husband was mentally incapacitated
to choose whether to see his wife or
not. He was found to be of sound
mind and possesses the capacity
to make own choices.
• With his full mental capacity
coupled with the right of choice,
the husband may not be the
subject of visitation rights
against his free choice.
Otherwise, we will deprive him of
his right to privacy.
Tenchavez vs. Escaño
• A woman, without the knowledge of
her parents, secretly contracted a
valid marriage.
• The wife heard that her husband
was having an affair with another
woman.
Eventually, their relationship went
sour.
• The wife then went to the US where
she acquired a decree of absolute
divorce and she subsequently
married an American and obtained
US citizenship.
• The husband filed a complaint in the
CFI his wife and her parents, whom
he charged with having dissuaded
and discouraged their daughter from
joining her husband, and alienating
her affections, and against the
Roman Catholic Church, for having,
through its Diocesan Tribunal,
decreed the annulment of the
marriage, and asked for legal
separation and one million pesos
in damages. Vicenta’s parents
denied that they had in any way
influenced their daughter’s acts, and
counterclaimed for moral damages.
Supreme Court Ruling
• The divorce decree obtained by the
wife abroad is not valid under
Philippine laws. They are still legally
married.
• The acts of the wife in not
complying with her wifely duties,
deserting her husband without
any justifiable cause, leaving for
the United States in order to
secure a decree of absolute
divorce, and finally getting
married again are acts which
constitute a willful infliction of
injury upon the husband’s
feelings in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public
policy, thus entitling the husband
to a decree of legal separation
under our law on the basis of
adultery.
• The wife appears to have acted
independently and being of age, she
was entitled to judge what was best
for her and ask that her decisions be
respected. Her parents, in so doing,
certainly cannot be charged with
alienation of affections in the
absence of malice or unworthy
motives, which have not been shown,
good faith being always presumed
until the contrary is proved.
• The wife’s acts constitute a
willful infliction of injury upon
plaintiff’s feelings in a manner
“contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy” (Civ.
Code, Art. 21) for which Article
2219 (10) authorizes an award of
moral damages. The husband
was entitled to moral damages of
P25,000 only.
• The wife’s parents are entitled to
P5,000 only in moral and exemplary
damages.