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Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
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Philos Stud (2013) 164:371-392
DOI 1 0. 1 007/s 1 1098-012-9860-4
Giuseppe Primiero
1 Introduction
The recent debate on the epistemology of the notion of information and the widely
discussed disagreement concerning its veridical nature, was ignited by the following
definition:1
1 The definition was first given in (Floridi 2004), republished as (Chapter 2, Floridi 2011a).
G. Primiero (13)
FWO - Research Foundation Flanders, Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Ghent
University, Belgium, UK
e-mail: Giuseppe.Primiero@UGent.be
G. Primiero
IEG, Oxford University, Oxford, UK
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372 G. Primiero
DEF Semantic
The resultin
partially - to
between infor
(Floridi 2005)
alethically ne
information: a
be accounted fo
but untrue dat
information. Th
formal analysis
p, where I is fo
operator. This
the axioms of
epistemic logics
logic being of
number issu of
raised and a re
Besides the pu
between infor
knowledge enc
informed to k
(Floridi 2010a
veridicality t
(NTA), which
knowledge co
embedded int
knowledge by
belongs. Such
supporting /?,
Floridi considers such information to be the answer to what he calls 'how come'
questions (HC-questions): any standalone instance of information poses a set of HC-
questions concerning the path of events that generated the scenario described by
p (genealogical HC-questions), the mechanism or the way in which the scenario
described in p was determined (functional HC-questions), and the purpose to which
the scenario described in p is devoted (teleological HC-questions). The information
conveyed by the answers to such questions provides the explanation for p.
For many of its defenders (as e.g. Grice and Dretske), the veridicality thesis
seems to endure a classical (corri spondentist) theory of truth. Nonetheless, DEF and
2 It will appear clearly from the next few lines in this introduction that this problem has a
complementary question: what is the difference between information and belief? Both questions account
for the role of information theories and philosophy of information in the traditional debates in formal
epistemology. but only the former will be tackled here.
3 This article was republished as (Chapter 10, Floridi 201 la).
4 Republished as (Chapter 12, Floridi 201 la).
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Offline and online data 373
<0 Springer
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374 G. Primiero
The notion of
approaches to kn
notion of verific
In the present p
from this latter
information ch
definition of in
alethic/non-ale
framework whi
We define fun
meaningful pro
of a positive ale
admit refutati
characterization
rather just be
Functional Info
assumed to be tr
the latter is tru
Infons. This bri
the constructiv
information with
for which the V
VPT Truth is de
This is a well-
knowledge and t
principle with r
process of upgra
let us start with
A "The use of a
This propositi
procedure is per
to use the locker
allows me to infer that
B "It is true that using a locker at the library requires a 5p coin (because so has
been checked out)"
and for the epistemic definition of truth, using the definition of information that is
endorsed by DEF
10 For a theory that fully integrates a constructivist approach to knowledge with the already mentioned
NT A, see (Floridi 201 lb).
11 See (Martin-Löf 1984, 1987, 1996).
Notice that the process of verification and validation required in the account of truth as correctness by
Floridi plays a very similar role. See (pp. 193-195, Floridi 201 la).
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Offline and online data 375
C' can be easily reformulated in instructional terms: "Insert a 5p coin to use the
locker at the library"; or in conditional terms: "If you want to use a locker at the
library, you need to insert a 5p coin". It seems that the only evident way to account
for the meaning of this sentence in the context of a functional notion of information
is to start from a weakening of the inference from A to B. As truth is given by
verification, the obvious step is to find the corresponding logical notion that
weakens the verification process.13 Assumptions can be used in this role:
B' is clearly a necessary condition for the formulation of C', whereas its truth is
not. To explain B' is sufficient to say that a verification is missing, but nonetheless
admissible: I never was at the library or - to say the least - I never used the lockers
before, but it is not immediately evident that the requirement of a 5p coin is false: it
is an epistemically meaningful content, acceptable against the agent's actual
knowledge state. A' becomes what is known in the philosophical literature inspired
by Constructivism as a judgement-candidate. C' formulates this epistemic state
which holds under condition of such unverified but admissible content. Notice that
we have modified the use of the informational content from a statai state ("I am
informed") to a dynamic processual state ("I receive the information"). In turn, the
inference from C to C relies obviously on the reduction of admissibility to
verification:
D "I receive the information that the use of a locker at the library requires a 5p
coin. If that is true (provided I verify that to be the case) I am informed that the
13 ECDI is located by definition on the side of epistemic theories of meaning, endorsing an understanding
of meaning and truth in terms of verification. This costructionist approach is to be traced back to the work
of Dummett, see in particular (Dummett 1978) and (Dummett 1991). In the Dummettian tradition, when
truth is taken to be weakly central to the meaning-theory, then knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is
equated with knowledge of its truth-conditions, but in addition some further explanation is required,
consisting of the ability of laying down the assertion conditions for that sentence. In particular, to
understand a mathematical formula, it is necessary to be able to distinguish between mathematical
constructions which do and which do not constitute proofs of it. Notoriously, this extends easily to a
theory of meaning as use in the Wittgensteinean tradition. As the next following lines of this introduction
are meant to show, ECDI builds on this basis allowing for distinct levels of justification, in order to
account for the various modes in which assertions present truths. In particular, our approach is founded on
a logical theory of forms of judgements which allows to avoid the collapse into a pragmatic approach to
meaning, as a theory of successful assertions of truth.
Springer
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376 G. Primiero
use of a locker
have one such
The epistemic s
notion from th
it. It misses the
data. We shall
representing a
It seems essen
operation to k
epistemology t
We will show h
process of expla
In the followin
survey of the n
towards the tr
definition of in
a common grou
extension of ou
we finally tack
namely by foc
upgraded infor
2 NTA and th
The Network T
notion of seman
Non-reflective
mean to unders
the decrypting
considered in
knowledge, bu
concerning the
knowledge stat
information pac
independent. Se
permit each inf
fulfilling the er
A rather cruc
structure is giv
accounted content and the network itself: in order for a network to be able to
account for a certain fact, it has to provide all the needed answers and its content has
to be no smaller than what allowed by the network's capacity. This property,
formally corresponding to the calculation of the maximum flow in a network,
satisfies the apparently trivial observation that an explanation of p is correct if and
only if it applies correctly to p. This can be reformulated as the De-coupling Test :
Springer
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Offline and online data 377
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378 G. Primiero
Judgements ar
construction or
A is true:
a:A
J - A true
In this case, the justification a can be categorical or analytical, i.e. when it needs no
further conditions than what expressed in a itself. Such a justification would be the one
appropriate for a judgement that requires only analytical skills in order to be
understood. Otherwise, the justification can be dependent from a context of conditions
needed for asserting a. These external conditions are what makes it possible to
formulate the relevant justification. Formally, for any proposition A which is declared
true, an appropriate verification a will be valid on the basis of a number of propositions
A' , . . An' for each of such proposition Ah an appropriate verification is assumed.
Each such assumption x, will need to be verified (formally, jS-reduced to a
corresponding proof-term a¡) in order to prove a:A and so to assert A true :
[x'ļa'':A',. . .,[xnla„'-.A„
a:A
Shifting from one subject to another (or to the same subject in a different
situation) requires switching from one context of conditions to a new one, hence
formulating a new perspective under which the validity of A is questioned. In
particular, for any two equivalent propositions A = B, equivalent constructions or
justifications are required and general formal rules of identity hold both at the level
of constructions and propositions, which corresponds formally to defining a-rules on
terms. This notion of identity satisfies standard definitional and equality properties.
Contextually justified judgements and their identity conditions are crucial to
show that functional information passes the de-coupling test. We recast a
contextually derived judgement J as a semantic infon; the functional infons on
^ Springer
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Offline and online data 379
To see how this principle applies, let us return to our example from the previous
section:
r ="I receive the information that the use of a locker at the library requires a 5p
coin".
[xJaA : Ai for every A¡ e T = "verify that the use of a locker at the library
requires a 5p coin".
J = "(as r is verified) I am informed that the use of a locker at the library requires
a 5p coin (and I can use it, e.g. because I have one such coin in my pocket)"
The set of functional infons in T formulates the conditions under which J holds,
r h J. Identical claims need to have identical (or reducible) conditions, T h /, T' h
/,/ = / =*r = r'; non-reducible contexts provide different conditions, thus
leading to non reducible semantic infons. The obtaining of the claim in J is
constrained to the satisfaction of its conditions, [jt i/a¡] : A¿, VA/ G T, which generates
a user-based - but not relativistic - perspective. Notice that J is closed under logical
consequence, whereas T is not.
The non-relativistic nature of the formal approach here endorsed is, of course,
crucial. The verificationist approach, equipped with definitional equality (reflexive,
symmetric, transitive) ensures that this (perspectivist) notion of truth is actually
based on a normalized notion of justification. This means that two equivalent
propositions A and A' will have correspondingly equivalent justifications a and
a!, whose formal identity is provable, i.e. either one will be the normal form of the
other, or it exists a third justification a" to which both a and a' reduce. It is therefore
not admissible for a subject to assert the truth of A without relying on a justification
a which is in turn reducible to the corresponding normal form. The contextual
nature of our justifications allows nonetheless such a term to assume different forms
and in particular to have appropriate set of assertion conditions, whose unique
requirement is the reducibility to corresponding terms.
For the definition of functional information Gettierization is avoided in the same
terms as it is for the perspectivist epistemology, namely because functional infons
constitute the set of conditions for certain true contents to hold. As explained above,
formulating a believed content means to formulate the corresponding justification;
in order to formulate and correctly assert the latter, appropriate assertion conditions
will be required. Hence, semantic infons are coupled to the relevant set of functional
infons. So the De-coupling Test is passed in the following form:
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380 G. Primiero
formal framew
information) a
admissible cont
truthful data an
â Springer
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Offline and online data 381
a : N
N : set ; 0 : N; ' -
' s(a ) : N.
It is on the basis of such typing rules that the use of assumptions becomes
admissible, for example in a ¿-abstraction rule:
a : N b:N(x:N)
({x)b)(a) = b[a/x ] : N[a/*].
Hence, at the first level of typing, one is considering the evaluation of the
concrete level of meaning, obtained by performing the operation and getting the
value by substitution of bounded variables, as in the expression b[a/x' : N[a/*].
The level of meaning expressed by the object b coincides with the predication that it
belongs to the type N. A different level of typing is at stake when considering the
role of bounded variables for expression of the form b : N(x : N), where x is
abstracted from a : N, which expresses meaningfulness for the dependent judge-
ment. At this level, one uses the meaningfulness of N abstracted from the
appropriate constructor (that is, without the related value), in order to proceed in the
construction of a new object.
Hence, meaning and meaningfulness are at two distinct levels of abstraction
within our type-theoretical framework: the latter concerning types and typed
variables, the former concerning typed values.20 Nonetheless, the notion of
assumption involved by the dependent judgement in the second premise of the rule
of /-abstraction does not really express the idea of refutable content we are after. It
is bounded with respect to the introduced type by the first premise, where a
construction for that object is obtained beforehand and it is not meant to interpret
any refutability on contents. We need instead to interpret such a dependent
judgement as a derivation from an open assumption, i.e. our aim is to provide an
interpretation of meaningfulness independent from evaluation. This can be
formulated in a type system that allows for the following set of typing rules:
a:A r
A type
a: A _
A true
~7~~r
-«A - ► _ L
â Springer
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382 G. Primiero
a : A A true b :B
a(b) :A - > B
A typeinf b:B[x:A] ^ t t
,, v, Z ,
((x)b):A ,, v, , D Btrue
(Va,-
Aļ t
( 3a¡
where
Aty
, /f v w v
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Offline and online data 383
functional abstraction). To
actually only blind (lucky)
the case of admitting tru
contents. The set of typin
(message) in terms of fun
construction bring the r
functional infons - express
data in terms of the distin
A notion of semantic info
fulness + verification* seem
Its functional counterpart
single epistemic state, is suf
content in view of her pres
of conditions that make tru
user generated and user d
dynamics of changing cont
performed on functional in
transmitted over to other st
communication happens (in
agent) without verification
contents in contexts: these
collectively opaque and non
Definition 2 {Functional
well-formed, meaningful,
â Springer
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384 G. Primiero
whereas for t
requirement is
ensure that no
level, one also h
of valid inform
data and where
it, turning it in
reformulate th
functional inf
Accessibility P
to refer to meta
preserving acc
obvious enrichm
3.1 Epistemic
The notion of
literature durin
modality as an
focus on the
necessary that
truth condition
different accou
where one gets
of the standar
alternative (acc
2009b) offers p
One starts by
conditions for
satisfied condit
judgement-cand
judgement exp
Provided the c
knowledge (th
necessity for '3
22 As explained in
23 Standard refere
2008).
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Offline and online data 385
0(Atrue) => K (A
By this rule, one accounts for judgements whose conditions have been verified,
therefore allowing provability of the conclusion.
The extension that preserves refutable assumptions, inducing possibility on the
conclusion, is given as follows (as in the previous rule, J stands for a formula of the
form (A true)):
26 See also (Bellin et al. 2001) for a formal language that requires the same kind of rules.
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386 G. Primiero
rVi^2 An.,„
□r, OJi h OJ2
This reading extends the previous interpretation of necessity as proof-co
to the assertion conditions of hypothetical judgements, preserving the form
knowledge contents epistemically weaker than strictly proved ones.
To express data accessibility, one needs to modify modal contexts so ob
view of multi-modalities to distinguish different information sources (or
states of the same source). Multi-modalities can be introduced in terms of
extension operation. We say that a type A is true in a context V | A (T exte
A) if the judgement J = A true is justified by a¡ : A in context T,
construction contains all satisfied conditions in T and it remains valid un
extension T | A; then A is said to be globally valid under T | A; other
judgement J is justified by x¡ : A in context T, i.e. its construction depend
variables in V or in some extension T | A; then A is said to be locally vali
r I A. The context extension operation allows to mimic syntactically the
accessibility so that judgemental modal operators express that a pr
somewhere or everywhere, with respect to contexts.27 A signed (modal) con
can now be extended in view of a differently signed (modal) context oA j
o = {□,<>}). A re-definition of modal judgements is now possible in vi
derivability from multi-modal contexts:
The meaning of the epistemic state derivable from a modal context is dictated by
the modalities constraining the relevant contexts. A multi-modal context T,¡j is a
context extension (in the following will abbreviate Z,¿)
o ¡r I oy A = {o/(y4 true), . . o ¡{N true), o j(Otrue)};
27 Our distinction between terms and modal operators is technically the same distinction obtained
(Moody 2003) by distinguishing between variables for different kind of hypotheses and labels to refer
locations of such constructors. The complete formal analysis of the properties of the extension to mult
modalities in connection to distributed computing is presented in (Primiero 2010). See also (Primiero an
Taddeo 201 1) for the use of this framework to formalize communications characterized by trust.
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Offline and online data 387
Definition 3(Offline data) Data is in offline status when it is not validly accessed
by any admissible network source.
â Springer
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388 G. Primiero
r, I X;:A h Btrue* ta
A . - -
OçL A h o . i j {Btrue)
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Offline and online data 389
28 See (Primiero and Taddeo 2011) for the formal details concerning equivalence with common and
distributed knowledge.
29 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reliability_of_Wikipedia. See also (Viegas et al. 2004) and (Besiki et al.
2008) for studies on the practice of work organization and cooperation in online encyclopedias.
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390 G. Primiero
that collaborat
via contextual
entry by peer
contributors.
information (tr
as functional in
new peer whic
contains: when
access the entry
the entry bec
existence of a p
entry, its cont
peer accessing
In reality, this
should be consi
can arise on is
general represe
paradigms in sc
older data can
processes. It als
the highest sta
this reading, as
is attributed t
truthfulness b
the content to
network. Only
extensions beco
5 Conclusions
In this paper, our first concern was to highlight the fundamental role of the notion
functional information in the formal epistemology of information theori
Functional information fulfills the weaker role in the epistemic family of concep
including semantic information and knowledge: with respect to the compan
semantic notion it lacks the alethic characterization, with respect to knowledge
lacks verifiability at any point of the network it flows in.
Its importance is, in the first place, given by the need for resolving the deba
concerning the Veridicality Thesis: functional information is typically the notion
information that grounds semantic information and that still admits the possibility o
turning into misinformation. In the second place, functional information shows th
epistemic theories of truth are needed in the context of formal theories
information, as they encapsulate the most needed notions of verification a
30 For the implementation of trust relations over communications in the form of contextual judgemen
see the already mentioned (Primiero and Taddeo 201 1).
â Springer
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Offline and online data 391
falsification as a medium
We have shown how this h
being affected by basic pr
and Gettierization (of t
information share with se
fulness, but obviously not
they are the medium of co
us to an analysis of data l
have been used. As a result
the bridging operation of
of data among admissible
online and offline data,
acquisition processes.
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