PHILJUST

LAWS ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

Dean Hilario Justino F. Morales
Bar Review Lecturer

Public Officers
01. Are the following persons considered public officers under the law and therefore can be
charged for violation of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, before the
Sandiganbayan: (1) Chairman of the National Centennial Commission (2) University
of the Philippines Student Regent (3) Employees and officials of the Philippine
National Construction Corporation
ANSWERS: (1) YES. The characteristics of a public office include the delegation of sovereign functions,
its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and
the designation of the position as an office. The NCC was precisely created to ensure a more coordinated
and synchronized celebrations of the Philippine Centennial and wider participation from the government
and non-government or private organizations and to rationalize the relevance of historical links with other
countries and to carry them out into effect. Thus, the NCC performs executive functions. The executive
power “is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the
laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.” The executive function, therefore
concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth by law. (Laurel vs. Desierto, 381 SCRA 48)
(2) YES. Although she is not a public officer with salary grade 27 and a mere regular tuition fee-
paying student, it is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in PD 1606, including presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. Compensation is not an essential element of public office.
Delegation of sovereign functions to be exercised by her for the benefit of the public makes one a public
officer. The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution.
(Serena vs. Sandiganbayan, 542 SCRA 224)
(3) NO. Employees and officials of the PNCC are not public officers within the coverage of RA 3019,
as amended, inasmuch as PNCC has no original charter as it was incorporated under the general law on
corporations and the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over them. (Macalino vs. Sandiganbayan, 376
SCRA 452)
02. Who is an accountable public officer? Are municipal mayors accountable public
officers?
ANSWER: Under the government Auditing Code of the Philippines, an accountable public officer is a public
officer who, by reason of his office, is accountable for public funds or property. Section 340 of the Local
government Code expanded this definition by including “any officer of the local government unit whose
duty permits or requires the possession or custody of local government funds shall be accountable and
responsible for the safekeeping thereof x x x. Other local officials, though not accountable by the nature of
their duties, may likewise be similarly held accountable through their participation in the use or application
thereof.” Thus, local government officials become accountable public officers either (1) because of the
nature of their functions or (2) on account of their participation in the use or application of public funds.
Section 102(1) of the Government Auditing Code provides that “The head of any agency of the
government is immediately and primarily responsible for all government funds and property pertaining to
his agency.” Since municipal mayors are chief executives of their respective municipalities, they are
accountable public officers. And as such, they are obliged to liquidate and settle disallowed cash advances
within the allowable period, without prejudice to their right to recover it from persons who were solidarily
liable with them. Failing to return the disallowed cash advances, the funds were deemed illegally or
improperly used or applied and they may be held liable for violation of Article 218 of the Revised penal
Code. (Frias, Sr. vs. People, GR No. 171437,October 4, 2007)
03. Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned and controlled corporations organized and
incorporated under the Corporation Code for purposes of the provisions of RA 3019, the

Page 1 of 15
 Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
ANSWER: YES. The fact that the legislature, in mandating the inclusion of “presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government-owned and controlled corporations” within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, has consistently refrained from making distinctions with respect to the manner of their
creation clearly reveals its intention to include such officials of GOCC’s with original charters and those
organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
whenever they are involved in graft and corruption. (People vs. Sandiganbayan, 452 SCRA 413).
(1)

De Facto Officer
04. Distinguish a de facto officer from a de jure officer; a de facto from a usurper.
ANSWER: A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colourable authority to
appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also be
one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is
meant authority derived from an appointment, however, irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a
mere volunteer . (Funa v Agra, GR No. 191644, February 19, 2013)
v A de facto officer is one who assumed office under the color of a known appointment or election
but which appointment is void for reasons that the officer is not eligible, while a de jure officer is one who is
in all respects legally appointed or elected and qualified to exercise the office. A de facto officer has
possession and performs the duties under a colorable title without being technically qualified in all points of
law to act while a de jure officer has a lawful or legal title to the office. A de facto officer holding of office
rests on reputation while a de jure officer holding of office rests on right. A de facto officer may be ousted
in a direct proceeding (quo warranto) against him but a de jure officer cannot be removed through a direct
proceeding .
A de facto officer has color of right or title to office while a usurper has neither color of right or title
to office. The acts of a de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure, insofar as the
public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned while the acts of a usurper are absolutely
void. A de facto officer may be entitled to compensation for actual services rendered while a usurper is not
entitled at all to compensation.
05. Are the acts of a de facto officer valid? Is he entitled to compensation?
ANSWER: The acts of a de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer,
insofar as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned. (Funa. Agra, GR No.
191644, February 19, 2013) The lawful acts, insofar as the rights of third persons are concerned are, if
done within the scope and by the apparent authority of the office, considered valid and binding. However,
the de facto officer cannot benefit from his own status because public policy demands that unlawful
assumption of public office be discouraged. A de facto officer is entitled to emoluments for actual service
rendered, and he cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office because his acts
are valid as those of a de jure officer.
Appointments
06. Is the constitutional prohibition on the so-called Presidential “midnight appointments”
applicable to appointments made by a local chief executive?
ANSWER: NO. The constitutional prohibition on the so-called “midnight appointments,” specifically those
made within two months immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President
or Acting President. There is no law that prohibits local elective officials for making appointments during
the last days of their tenure absent fraud on their part, when such appointments are not tainted by
irregularities or anomalies which breach laws and regulations governing appointment. (De Rama vs. CA,
353 SCRA 650)
However, Memorandum Circular No. 9 s. 2003 issued by the Civil Service Commission pursuant
to CSC Resolution No. 030918 dated August 28, 2003, states that all appointments of whatever nature or
status issued within 45 days before any national or local elections shall be disapproved, subject to the
exception pursuant to Section 262 (g) of the Omnibus Election Code. The CSC MC further states that all
appointments issued by elective appointing officials after elections up to June 30 shall be disapproved
except if the appointee is fully qualified for the position and had undergone regular screening processes
before the Election Ban as shown in the Personnel Selection Board (PSB) report or minutes of meeting.
07. Marco was appointed as Cooperative Development Specialist II simultaneous with 25
Page 2 of 15
other applicants in various positions, five (5) days before the end of Governor Ong’s term.
Before the election ban on appointment, he has undergone regular screening process
conducted by the Personnel Selection Board which found him qualified for the position. The
incoming administration questioned the validity of his appointment as violative of the CSC rule
imposing a prohibition on midnight appointment. Decide.
ANSWER: Although Marco’s appointment was made five days before the end of Governor Ong’s term, he
was fully qualified for the position and had undergone regular screening process conducted by the
Personnel Selection Board. Moreover, although issued in bulk, the 26 appointments can hardly be
classified as “mass appointment”, and this per se does not invalidate the appointment. Considering that
Marco has already accepted his appointment by the time the Province prevented him from assuming his
office, his appointment remains effective up to the present. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission
correctly ordered the Province to reinstate Marco to his position and to pay him back salaries from July
2004 when the Province prevented him from reporting for work up to his actual reinstatement. (Provincial
Government of Aurora v. Marco GR No. 202331, April 22, 2015)
Nepotism
08. Who can be held liable for nepotism? What are the exceptions thereto?
ANSWER: The following can be held liable for nepotism: 1) appointing authority 2) recommending
authority 3) head of office and immediate supervisor. These persons must be related to the appointee
within the third
(2)
degree (national positions) or fourth degree (local positions) of consanguinity or affinity. By way of
exception, the following shall not be covered by the prohibition on nepotism: (1) persons employed in a
confidential capacity (2) teachers (3) physicians, and (4) members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.
The prohibition against nepotism is intended to apply to natural persons. Hence, respondent’s
Cortes’ appointment as Information Officer V in the CHR by the Commission En Banc, where his father is
a member, is covered by the prohibition. Commissioner Mallari’s abstention from voting did not cure the
nepotistic character of the appointment because the evil sought to be avoided by the prohibition still exists.
His mere presence during the deliberation for the appointment of Information Officer V created an
impression of influence and cast doubt on the impartiality and neutrality of the Commission En Banc. (Civil
Service Commission v. Cortes, GR No. 200103, April 23, 2014)
09. Does having the same family name, or middle name with the appointing authority
constitute nepotism?
ANSWER: NO. Having the same family name, or middle name with the appointing authority, does not
nepotism make. Besides, the law does not absolutely prohibit persons from being appointed to an office
the appointing authority of which is a relative so long as such relation, by consanguinity or affinity, is not
within the prohibited third degree. (Municipality of Butig, Lanao del Sur vs. Court of Appeals, 477 SCRA
115)

10. Can the President still make appointment to the judiciary during the so-called midnight
appointment ban period?
ANSWER: The President can make appointments to the Supreme Court two months before a
presidential election until the end of his term but not to the rest of the Judiciary like the Court of
Appeals. Under Section4 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution, vacancies in the Supreme Court shall
be filled within ninety (90) days from the occurrence of the vacancy. Under Section 9, Article VIII
of the Constitution, vacancies in the lower courts shall be filled within ninety (90) days from
submission of the list of nominees. These appointments are screened by the Judicial and Bar
Council, and the process necessarily precludes or prevents the President from making purely
political appointments to the courts, which is what is sought to be prevented by the prohibition.
(De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, GR No. 191002, April 20, 2010, 615 SCRA 666)
Security of Tenure in Career Executive Service
11. How is security of tenure acquired in the Career Executive Service?
ANSWER: The guarantee of security of tenure is a concept which is applicable only to first and second-
level employees in the civil service. For members of the Career Executive Service, security of tenure does
Page 3 of 15
not extend to the particular positions to which they may be appointed but to the rank to which they are
appointed by the President. (Osea vs. Malaya, GR No. 139821, January 30, 2002; Dimayuga vs.
Benedicto, GR No. 144154, January 30, 2002 and Ignacio vs. CSC, 464 SCRA 220)

Appointments, assignments, reassignments and transfer in the Career Executive Service are
based on rank. Security of tenure in the Career Executive Service is thus acquired with respect to rank and
not to position. Mobility and flexibility in the assignment of personnel, to better cope with the exigencies of
public service, is the distinguishing feature of the Career Executive Service. (Secretary of Justice vs.
Bacal, GR No. 139382, December 6, 2000)
Grounds for disciplinary action
12. Does dishonesty, as ground of disciplinary action against a public officer, need to be
committed in the course of the performance of duty by the person charged?
ANSWER: NO. The rule is that dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the
course of the performance of duty by the person charged. If a government officer or
employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or misconduct, even if said defects of
character are not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office. The
principle is that when an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the
punishment of such officer or employee but the improvement of the public service and the
preservation of the public faith and confidence in the government. (Remolana vs. CA, 362
SCRA 304)
13. Can employees in the public service engage in strike, mass leaves or walkouts?
ANSWER: NO. Employees in the public service may not engage in strike, mass leaves, walkouts and
other forms of mass action that will lead in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. The right
of government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or associations only, without
including the right to strike. (Gisete vs. CA, 444 SCRA 51)
14. Can a government official or employee who is on AWOL be dismissed from
service?
ANSWER: YES. Section 63 of CSC Res. No. 983142 already allows the dismissal of a government official
or employee who is on AWOL without prior notice. But the government official or employee who is on
AWOL shall be informed of his separation from the service not later than 5 days from its effectivity. (Petilla
vs. CA, 424 SCRA, 254)
(3)

15. Is summary dismissal allowed by law?

ANSWER: The provision on summary dismissal of public officers (when the charge is serious and
evidence of guilt is strong; when a respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged, and there is
reasonable ground to believe that he is guilty of the present charge; and when respondent is notoriously
undesirable) has been repealed as the same violates the fundamental right of due process. However,
summary dismissal remains in the police and military service as these personnel carry the badge of the
law.
15. Who has the power to dismiss Philippine National Police members? What are the
grounds for summary dismissal of PNP members?
ANSWER: The power to dismiss PNP members is not only the prerogative of the Peoples’ Law
Enforcement Board (PLEB) but concurrently exercised by the PNP Chief and Regional Directors. Once a
complaint is filed with any of the disciplinary authorities under RA 6975, the latter shall acquire exclusive
original jurisdiction over the case although other disciplinary authority has concurrent jurisdiction over the
case. The grounds for summary dismissal of PNP members are serious charges including charges for
commission of heinous crimes and those committed by organized/syndicated crime groups wherein the
PNP members are involved, gunrunning, illegal logging, robbery, kidnapping for ransom, white slave trade;
illegal recruitment, carnapping, smuggling, piracy, drug trafficking, falsification of land title and other
government forms, large scale swindling, film piracy, counterfeiting and bank fraud. (Quiambao vs. CA, 454
SCRA 17)
16. Give the effects of the following:
(1) Withdrawal of an administrative/civil complaint upon the case;

Page 4 of 15
 (2) Dismissal of the criminal action, upon the administrative case; and
(3) Cessation from office of respondent judge due to death, upon the administrative
complaint.
ANSWERS:
(1) The withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent
from administrative disciplinary action. (Aranes vs. Occiano, 380 SCRA 402 and Araza vs. Sheriffs Garcia
and Tonga, A.M. No. P-00-1363, February 8, 2000) An affidavit of desistance will not automatically result to
the dismissal of an administrative case or the exoneration of the respondent. (Jacobs vs. Tambo, 369
SCRA 148)
A complaint for misconduct, malfeasance or misfeasance against a public officer or employee
cannot just be withdrawn at anytime by the complainant. This is because there is a need to maintain faith
and confidence of the people in the government and its agencies and instrumentalities. (Tecson vs.
Sandiganbayan, GR. No. 123045, November, 1999) Proceedings in such case should not be made to
depend on the whims and caprices of the complainants who are in a real sense, the only witness therein .
(Florendo vs. Enrile, 239 SCRA 22).
(2) Considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, the procedure to be followed and the sanctions
imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not
necessarily be binding on the other. (Ocampo vs. Office of the Ombudsman, GR No. 114683, January 18,
2000).
(3) Cessation from office of respondent judge due to death does not per se warrant the dismissal of the
administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service. Since the instant administrative
complaint was filed before respondent’s death, the Court retains authority to pursue the administrative
complaint against him. The judge was ordered to pay a fine of PhP5,000.00 to be taken from his retirement
benefit in view of his demise. (Cabanero vs. Canon, 365 SCRA 425)
17. May a public officer be validly be found guilty of another offense other than the
designated offense or offenses with which he is charged in an administrative case?
ANSWER: YES. The designation of the offense or offenses with which a person is charged in an
administrative case is not controlling and one may be found guilty of another offense, where the substance
of the allegations and evidence presented sufficiently proves guilt. (Avenido vs. CSC, GR No.177666 April
30, 2008)
18. What procedure should be followed in administrative investigations involving a public
school teacher conducted by the Department of Education?
ANSWER: RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically covers
administrative proceedings involving public school teachers, expressly provides that the committee to hear
public school teachers’ administrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the
division as chairman, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers’
organization and a supervisor of the division. Where the various committees formed by the DepEd to hear
administrative charges against respondents did not include “a representative of the local or, in its absence,
any existing provincial or national teacher’s organization as required by law, these committees were
deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily
void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of respondents. The inclusion of a
representative of a teacher’s organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial
tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard.
Mere membership of said teachers in their respective teachers’ organization does not ipso facto make
them authorized representatives of such organization. The teachers’ organization possesses the right to
indicate its choice of representative to be included by the DepEd in the investigating committee. Such right
to designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of education or the director of public schools or their
underlings. (Fabella vs. CA 282 SCRA256)
(4)
While the ruling in the Fabella applies to public school teachers charged with violations of civil
service laws, rules and regulations in administrative proceedings initiated by the DepEd Secretary, the
same does not apply where the charges against the public school teachers are for violations of RA 6713,
known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employee, where the acts or
omissions complained of relate to respondents’ conduct as public official and employee, if not outright graft
and corruption. (Ombudsman vs. Masing, 542 SCRA 253)

Page 5 of 15
Right to Formal Investigation
19. The Provincial Vice Governor and the Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan filed
an administrative complaint against the Provincial Governor with the Office of the President for
grave misconduct and abuse of authority because he allegedly tried to intimidate them to
approve a bank loan. The respondent Governor was ordered to file an answer and not a motion
to dismiss. After filing three (3) motions for extension of time to file an answer, his counsel filed
a motion to dismiss which was denied and the parties were required to submit their position
papers. Respondent Governor filed his answer but it was considered instead as his position
paper. He then filed a motion for formal investigation which was also denied. On the basis of
their position papers a decision was rendered finding the governor guilty. Is the denial of the
motion for formal investigation proper?
ANSWER: NO. The denial of the motion of the Governor for formal investigation is erroneous. His right to
formal investigation is spelled out in Administrative Order No. 23. He has the right to appear and defend
himself in person or by counsel, the right to confront the witnesses and the right to compulsory attendance
of witness and the production of documentary evidence. The right of the Governor to formal investigation
was not satisfied when the complaint was decided on the basis of position papers. (Joson vs. Torres, 290
SCRA 279)

20. An administrative complaint was filed against MDA before the Office of the
Ombudsman. She requested for a formal investigation as provided for in the Administrative
Code but it was denied. She now claims she was deprived of her right to due process. Is her
contention legally tenable?
ANSWER: NO. The provision in the Administrative Code cited by the petitioner in support of her theory that
she is entitled to a formal investigation apply only to cases filed before the Civil Service Commission. The
administrative complaint against petitioner was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, suggesting that
a different rules of procedure govern. Administrative Order No. 7, as amended by AO 17, particularly
governs the procedure in administrative proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman. The denial of
petitioner’s request for a formal investigation is not tantamount to a denial of her right to due process.
Petitioner was required to file a counter-affidavit and position paper and later on, was given a chance to file
two motions for reconsideration of the decision of the deputy ombudsman. (Medina vs. COA, 543 SCRA
684)
21. Who is vested with the power to remove or dismiss erring local elective officials? What
is the effect of the imposition of the penalty of dismissal in an administrative case?
ANSWER: The Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials since such power is
exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of Section 60 of the
Local Government Code. (Salalima vs. Guingona, 257 SCRA 55) Likewise, in Pablico vs. Villapando, 385
SCRA 601, it was held that the power to remove erring elective local officials from service is lodged
exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the rules and regulations implementing the
Local Government Code insofar as it vests power on the “disciplining authority” to remove from office
erring elective local officials, is void for being repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local
Government. Such grant to the “disciplining authority” of the power to remove elective local officials is
clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight Committee that prepared the rules and regulations. No such
regulation may alter, amend or contravene a provision of law, such as the Local Government Code.
The law on suspension and removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and
applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with
utmost good faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people
through the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be put to naught by the
caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority. When the disciplining authority is given only the power
to suspend and not the power to remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the
power to remove. (Ibid.) The penalty of removal from office as a result of an administrative investigation
shall be considered a bar to the candidacy of the respondent for any elective position. (Section 66 c, LGC)
22. May a Deputy Ombudsman be subjected to the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the
President?
ANSWER: NO. The framers of the Constitution intended that independent bodies be insulated from

Page 6 of 15
political pressure to the extent that the absence of independence would result in the impairment of their
core functions., Hence, RA No. 6770 vesting authority in the President over the Deputy Ombudsman
violates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman and thus unconstitutional. (Gonzales III. Office
of the President of the Philippines, GR No. 196231, January 28, 2014)
(5)
Preventive Suspension vs. Suspension as a Penalty
23. Distinguish preventive suspension from suspension as a penalty. Can service of the
former be credited as service for the latter?
ANSWERS: Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in administrative
investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and
the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which
may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. If after such investigation, the charge is
established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his suspension or removal, then
he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. Unlike in criminal law in case of preventive
imprisonment, the period within which one is under preventive suspension, not being a penalty, is not
considered of the actual penalty of suspension – service of the preventive suspension cannot be credited
as service of the penalty. (Quimbo vs. Gervacio, 466 SCRA 277)
24. What are the periods of preventive suspension?
ANSWER: For administrative cases: a) under CS Law, 90 days b) under the LGC, 60 or 90 days for
elective officials, and 90 days for appointive officials c) under Ombudsman Act, 6 months.
For criminal cases, under RA 3019, 90 days by analogy.

25. Differentiate preventive suspension pending investigation from preventive suspension

pending appeal.
ANSWER: PSPI is not a penalty but only a means of enabling the disciplinary authority an unhampered
investigation while PSPA is punitive is character. In PSPI, the officer shall be automatically
reinstated after the lapse of the period of preventive suspension while in PSPA, if officer is
exonerated, he shall be reinstated with full pay for the period of suspension. In PSPI, the
officer is not entitled to payment of salaries during such period of suspension even if
subsequently exonerated, except local elective officials, while in PSPA, his penalty of
suspension shall be treated as PSPA upon appeal but if exonerated or the penalty is
reprimand, he is entitled to back salary corresponding to the period of suspension.
Preventive suspension and Backwages
26. Should a civil servant is preventively suspended and subsequently reinstated, is the
payment of backwages proper during the period of his preventive suspension?
ANSWER: YES. The payment of backwages during the period of preventive suspension of a civil servant
who is subsequently reinstated is proper if: (1) he is found innocent of the charges, and (2) the
suspension is unjustified. Where the two circumstances are absent, the payment of backwages is
improper. (Brugada vs. Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, 450 SCRA 225)
Appeals from Administrative Decisions
27. Can a complainant appeal a decision exonerating or absolving a civil service
employee?
ANSWER: NO. The Civil Service Law does not allow a complainant to appeal a decision exonerating or
absolving a civil service employee. This doctrine, however, may have been modified to allow the Civil
Service Commission, as a party adversely affected by the decision, to appeal decisions exonerating an
employee. Nonetheless, excepting the privilege of appeal granted to the CSC, the law does not
contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers and employees from administrative charges. (CSC
vs. Dacoycoy, 306 SCRA 425 and Floria vs. Sunga, 368 SCRA 551)
In National Appellate Board of the NAPOLCOM vs. Mamauag, 466 SCRA 624, it was also held
that a private complainant is not one of “either party” who can appeal under Section 43 and 45 of RA 6975
– she has no legal personality to appeal the dismissal of the charges against members of the PNP. The
government party that can appeal is not the disciplinary authority or tribunal which previously held the
case and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service – it must be one that is
prosecuting the administrative case.

Page 7 of 15
 In Civil Service Commission v. Clave, GR No. 194645 and 194665, 667 SCRA 556, both the
GSIS and the CSC were given standing to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals. In GSIS v. Chua,
GR No. 202914, 682 SCRA 118, the GSIS was then allowed to bring an appeal of the modification of the
penalty with this Court. Thus, we now hold that the parties adversely affected by a decision in an
administrative case who may appeal shall include the disciplining authority whose decision dismissing the
employee was either overturned or modified by the Civil Service Commission. (LRTA v. Salvana , GR No.
192074, June 10, 2014)
Impeachable Officers
28. Who are the impeachable officers? Can they be prosecuted for criminal offenses?
ANSWER: As enumerated in Section 2 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, only the following are
impeachable officers: the President, the Vice President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members
of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman. The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be
criminally prosecuted for the same offense which constitutes grounds for impeachment presupposes his
continuance in office. Hence, the moment he is no longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or
permanent disability, there can be no bar to his criminal prosecution in the courts.
(6)
Initiation of Impeachment
29. When is an impeachment complaint deemed initiated under Section 3(5) of Article XI of
the Constitution?
ANSWER: Initiation of impeachment proceedings takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the
same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. Considering that
the first impeachment complaint was filed by former President Estrada against the Chief Justice, along
with seven other justices of the Supreme Court, on June 2, 2003, and referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Reps. Teodoro and Fuentebella
against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003, violates the constitutional prohibition against initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period. (Francisco vs.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol, GR No. 160261, November 10, 2003)
30. Before the 15 th Congress opened its first session, Ombudsman MMG faced an
impeachment complaint filed by RHB. A day after the opening of the 15 th Congress, the
Secretary General of the House of Representatives transmitted the impeachment complaint to
the House Speaker who directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the order of
Business. On the same day, RR filed another
impeachment complaint against Ombudsman MMG. On even date the House of representatives
provisionally adopted the Rules of procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 14 th Congress.
The Secretary General RR’s complaint to the Speaker who also directed the Committee on
Rules to include it in the Order of Business. During the plenary session, the House of
Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to the Committee. After hearing, the
Committee, by Resolution, found the two complaints sufficient in form. By a second Resolution,
the Committee found the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance. Ombudsman MMG avers that
1) she was denied of due process when the impeachment rules were published only after the
Committee has ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints and 2) two impeachment
proceedings were initiated against her when two impeachment complaints were filed against her
in the same year. Decide.
ANSWERS:
1) Unlike the rules of procedures on inquiries in aid of legislation, the Constitution did not intend to have
the Impeachment Rules published. In the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific
rules, the Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Congress
relative thereto. Under the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, courts may not intervene in the internal
affairs of the legislature.
2) The one year bar rule under the Constitution was not violated. The term “initiate” means to file the
complaint and take initial action on it. The initial action taken by the House of Representatives on the

Page 8 of 15
 complaint is referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice. Contrary to Ombudsman MMG
emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the Constitution mentions is impeachment proceedings.
(Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, GR No. 193459, February 15, 2011)
31. A verified impeachment complaint was filed by 208 members of the House of
Representatives against Chief Justice Crown. The complaint was immediately
transmitted to the Senate for trial. Chief Justice Crown challenges such immediate
transmittal to the Senate because the verified complaint was 1) not included in the
order of business of the House, 2) was not referred to the House Committee on Justice
for hearing and consideration for sufficiency in form and substance, and 3) was not
submitted to the House Plenary for consideration as enumerated in Paragraph (2),
Section 3, Article XI of the Philippine Constitution. Decide with reasons whether the
initiation of impeachment is valid.
ANSWER: Since the verified complaint was filed by 208 Members of the House of Representatives and
they constituted at least one-third of its Members, it need not undergo the procedure in
Paragraph 2, Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution. The verified complaint constitutes the
Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate should proceed forthwith. (Section 3(4),
Article 11 of the Constitution.)
Command Responsibility
32. Can a public officer be dismissed from service on administrative charge for gross
neglect of duty without substantial evidence to support the findings of gross neglect of
duty because the duty to monitor and inspect the project was not vested in the public
officer?
ANSWER: NO. Administrative liability could not be based on the fact that a public officer was the one who
signed and approved the Environmental Compliance Certificate, without proof of actual act or
omission constituting neglect of duty. In the absence of substantial evidence of gross neglect of the
public officer, administrative liability could not be based on the principle of command responsibility. The
negligence of a public officer’s subordinates is not tantamount to his own negligence. It was not
within the mandated
responsibility of the public officer to conduct actual monitoring of projects. The principle governing
public
(7)
officers under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 clearly provides that a head of a department or a
superior officer shall not be civilly liable for the wrongful acts, omissions of duty, negligence or misfeasance
of his subordinates unless he has actually authorized by written order the specific act or misconduct
complained of. (Principe vs. Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau, office of the Ombudsman, 374 SCRA
460).
33. Does the Doctrine of Command Responsibility apply to high ranking officers of the
central monetary authority?
ANSWER: NO. The principle of command responsibility itself which is an accepted notion in military or
police structural dynamics or its counter part respondeat superior in the law on quasi-delicts is not relevant
to a case involving the actual performance in the office of petitioner public officials and given the fact that
they are high ranking officers of the country’s central monetary authority. Petitioners in this case owing to
their high ranks cannot be expected to monitor the activities of their subalterns and to acquaint themselves
which such minutae as the flow of files and documents which leave their desks. Myriad details such as
those, by office practice, left to subalterns and minor employees. Delegation of function is part of sound
management practice. (Reyes vs. Rural Bank of San Miguel, 424 SCRA135)
34. Can the doctrine of command responsibility be used in amparo and habeas cases data?
Can the President, as commander-in-chief of the military be held responsible for
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances?

Page 9 of 15
ANSWERS: YES. The development in the use of command responsibility in civil proceedings shows that
the application of this doctrine has been liberally extended even to cases not criminal in nature.
Thus, command responsibility may likewise find application in proceedings seeking the privilege
of the writ of amparo to ascertain responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances. The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine
whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address a person’s abduction in
order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights.
YES. The President, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses
control over the military that qualifies him as superior within the purview of the command responsibility. On
the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals apply strict standard of
knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may nonetheless be established through circumstantial evidence.
In the Philippines, a more liberal view is adopted and superiors may be charged with constructive
knowledge. Under EO 226, a government official may be held liable for neglect of duty under the doctrine
of command responsibility if he has knowledge that a crime or offense shall be committed, is being
committed, or has been committed by his subordinates, or by others within his area of responsibility and,
despite such knowledge, he did not take preventive or corrective action either before, during, or
immediately after its commission. As to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that
as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the President has the power to effectively command,
control and discipline the military. (in the Matter of petition for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data in
Favor of Noriel Rodriguez v. GM Arroyo, et al. GR No. 191805 and 193160, November 15, 2011)
Ombudsman
35. What is the scope and limitations of the power of the Ombudsman?
ANSWER: Scope of power: The Supreme Court upheld the authority of the Ombudsman over acts of
public officers related or not related to official duty. (Lastimosa vs. Vasquez, GR No. 116801, April 6, 1995)
The
power to investigate and prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified – it
pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. (Uy vs. Sandiganbayan, 354 SCRA 651) It has the power to
prosecute not only graft cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by
the regular courts. (Office of the Ombudsman vs. Enoc, 374 SCRA 691)
The Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from government service an
erring public official, other than impeachable officials, and members of Congress and the Judiciary. (Office
of the Ombudsman vs. CA, GR No. 168079, July 17, 2007) RA 6770 expressly grants the power to
preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges to the Ombudsman and
his deputies. (Office of the Ombudsman vs. CA, 491 SCRA 92) Section 25 of RA 6770 gave the Office of
the Ombudsman the power to impose penalties in administrative cases.
Under RA 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Office of the Ombudsman has disciplinary
authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies including members of the cabinet, local governments, government -
owned and controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except those who may be removed only by
impeachment. On the other hand, RA 7160, the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panlungsod
and Sangguniang Bayan have disciplinary authority over elective barangay official. Thus, the Office of the
Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with the local government units over administrative cases against
elective local officials. (Laxina vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 471 SCRA 542)
Power to Impose Preventive Suspension. RA 6770 empowers the Ombudsman to impose a
preventive suspension of a longer period of not more than six (6) months.
(8)
Limitations. The office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to investigate employees of
government-owned or controlled corporations organized under the Corporation Code. (Khan vs. Office of
the Ombudsman, 495 SCRA 452).The Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to entertain criminal charges filed
against a judge of the Regional Trial Court relative to his handling cases before the court. The
determination of whether a judge has maliciously delayed the disposition of the case is exclusively a
judicial function. (De Vera vs. Hon. Pelayo, GR No. 137354, July 6, 2000) The Ombudsman must indorse
the case to the Supreme Court for appropriate action. (Judge Fuentes vs. Office of the Ombudsman -
Mindanao, GR No. 124295, October 23, 2001)
Effectivity and Finality of Decisions, Appeal
Page 10 of 15
36. What decisions of the Ombudsman are considered final and unappeallable?
ANSWER: Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman was further amended which
provides that decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately executory even pending appeal and in case
the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins the appeal, he shall be considered as
having been
under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not
receive by reason of the suspension or removal, which provision is similar to Section 47 of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Section 7 now reads:
Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. – Where the respondent is absolved of the
charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision
shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to
the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions set
forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the written Notice
of Decision or Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
Decisions Considered Final and Unappeallable. There are two instances where a decision,
resolution or order of the Ombudsman arising from an administrative case becomes final and
unappealable: (1) where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and (2) in case of conviction, where the
penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine
equivalent to one month salary. (Dagan v. Office of the Ombudsman, GR No. 184083, November 19,
2013)
All appeals from the decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases may be
taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Where the decisions of
certain administrative bodies are appealable to the Court of Appeals, these adjudicative bodies are co-
equal with the Regional Trial Courts in terms of rank and stature; their actions are logically beyond the
control of the RTC, a co-equal body. A such, the RTC has no jurisdiction to interfere with or to restrain the
execution of the Ombudsman’s decisions in disciplinary cases. (DILG v. Gatuz, GR No. 191176, October
14, 2015)
37. Are the decisions of the Office of the President under the Local Government Code final
and executory?
ANSWER: YES. The decision of the Office of the President under the Local Government Code are
immediately executory even pending appeal because the pertinent laws under which the
decisions are rendered mandated them to be so. No motion for reconsideration is allowed by
law but the parties may appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals. The appeal, however, does
not stay the execution of the decision. Thus the DILG Secretary may validly move for its
immediate execution. (Calingin vs. CA, 434 SCRA 173)
38. What is the three-fold responsibility of a public officer?
ANSWER: It is a basic principle of the law on public officers that a public official or employee is under a
three-fold responsibility for violation of a duty or for a wrongful act or omission. This simply means that a
public officer may be held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful doing. Thus, if such
violation or wrongful act results in damages to an individual, the public officer may be held civilly liable to
reimburse the injured party. If the law violated attaches a penal sanction, the erring officer may be
punished criminally. Finally, such violation may also lead to suspension, removal from office, or other
administrative sanctions. This administrative liability is separate and distinct from the penal and civil
liabilities. (Apolinario vs. Flores, GR No.152780, January 22, 2007)
Preventive Suspension by the Sandiganbayan
39. Can the Sandiganbayan impose preventive suspension upon members of Congress
facing charges for violation of RA 3019 –the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
without violating the doctrine of separation of powers?
ANSWER: YES. The Doctrine of Separation of Powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively
excluded members of Congress from RA 3019 nor from its sanctions. The question in the case at bar does
not pertain to an affair internal to either Congress or the Executive where the Court substituted its own
judgment over that of any other two branches of government, and therefore there is no infringement of any
specific Constitutional proscription, no impairment or a clear disregard of a specific constitutional precept
Page 11 of 15
or provision that can unbolt the steel door for judicial intervention. The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Law does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan
did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension. (Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, 256 SCRA
636)
(9)
41. How may a public office be created and abolished? Distinguish abolition of an office
and its related positions from removal of an incumbent from office. Explain the test of good faith
in the abolition of a public office.
ANSWER: A public office is created by the Constitution or by law or by an officer or tribunal to which the
power to create has been delegated by the legislature. The power to create an office carries with it the
power to abolish. Abolition and removal are mutually exclusive concepts. From a legal standpoint, there is
no occupant in an abolished office. Where there is no occupant, there is no tenure to speak of. Thus,
impairment of tenure does not arise in the abolition of office. On the other hand, removal implies that the
office and its related positions subsist and the occupants are merely separated from their positions. A valid
order of abolition must not only come from a legitimate body, it must also be made in good faith. An
abolition is made in good faith when it is not made for political or personal reasons, or when it does not
circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees. Abolition of office may be
brought about by reasons of economy, or remove redundancy of functions, or a clear explicit constitutional
mandate for such termination of employment. Where one office is abolished and replaced with another
office vested with similar functions, the abolition if a legal nullity. The overlap in the functions of the
abolished Energy regulatory Board (ERB) and of the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) does not
mean that there is no valid abolition because the latter has new and expanded functions which are
intended to meet specific needs of a deregulated power industry. (Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy
Regulatory Board vs. Barin, 526 SCRA 1)
42. The Executive Secretary issued a Memorandum directing all non-career officials to
vacate their positions. Pursuant to the Memorandum, ANDOK resigned from the DOF. More than
a year later he was charged before the Ombudsman due to the illegal transfer of Tax Credit
Certificates. Can the Ombudsman still institute an administrative case after a public official’s
resignation from office.
ANSWER: NO. While resignation of a public servant does not preclude the finding of administrative liability
to which he or she is still answerable if the purpose is either to prevent the continuation of a case already
filed or to pre-empt the imminent filing of one. ANDOK’s resignation was neither his choice nor his own
doing; he was forced to resign. His forced resignation negates that he tried to prevent the filing of the
administrative case. Although the Ombudsman Law does not preclude the Ombudsman from conducting
the investigation, the Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case against ANDOK because
the latter was not a public officer at the time the case was filed. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Andutan, GR
No. 164679, July 27, 2011)
Multiple Positions, Additional Compensation
43. Are the following public officers allowed to hold multiple positions? If so, are they
entitled to double compensation? 1) Chairman of the Civil Service Commission as ex-officio
Member of the Board of Trustees of the GSIS 2) Secretary of Finance as ex-officio Member
of the Monetary Board
ANSWERS: 1) NO. It is a clear violation of the special provision of Section 2 of Article IX-A of the
Constitution, which strictly provides that he shall,, during his tenure, not hold any other office or
employment. Such provision foes not make any distinction among the offices he may not hold, or as to
whether or not the functions attached to said offices would be primarily related to his duties as Chairman of
the CSC and therefore may be held in an ex-officio capacity. His designation as ex-officio member also
impairs the independence of the CSC since the President exercises control over all government offices in
the Executive branch. Since he is not allowed to hold any other position in the government service even in
an ex-officio capacity, it follows that he is not entitled to receive any form of additional compensation.
(Funa v. Chairman, CSC, GR No.191672,, November 25, 2014)

Page 12 of 15
2) YES. The prohibition against the holding of multiple positions by Cabinet Members in Section
13, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to positions occupied in an ex-officio
capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office.
However, he cannot receive any additional compensation for his service in that position
are already paid for by the compensation attached to his principal office. (Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317)
44. What is the principle of hold-over? Who among the elective officials may hold-over?
ANSWER: In the absence of any express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the
contrary, the public officer is entitled to hold his office until his successor shall have
been duly chosen and shall have qualified. The purpose of hold-over principle is to
prevent hiatus in public service. The hold-over principle may apply to barangay officials as
their term is fixed by a statute, RA 9164. An amendatory law may be passed by Congress for
this purpose. All other elective officials are not covered by the principle because their terms are
fixed by the Constitution. Likewise, constitutional officers whose terms are fixed by the
Constitution have no right to hold-over their positions.
45. What are the requisites for the effective operation of the “Rotational Scheme” for
Constitutional Commissions?
ANSWER: The first Commissioner should start on a common date and any vacancy before the
expiration of tem should be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term.

(10)

46. What are the rights of illegally dismissed civil service employees?
ANSWER: An employee of the civil service has the right to be protected min the possession and exercise
of his or her office. He or she cannot be removed from his or her employment save for causes allowed by
law. A necessary consequence of the importance given to security of tenure is the rule that an employee
invalidly dismissed from service is entitled to reinstatement. An employee of the civil service who is
ordered reinstated is also entitled to the full payment of his or her backwages during the entire period of
the time that he or she was wrongfully prevented from performing the duties of his or her position and from
enjoying its benefits. This is necessarily so because, in the eyes of the law, the employee never left the
office. The right to receive backwages means exactly this – that it corresponds to his salary at the time of
his dismissal until reinstatement. Any income he may have obtained during the litigation of the case shall
not be deducted from this amount. This is consistent with our ruling that an employee illegally dismissed
has the right to live and to find employment elsewhere during the pendency of the case. (Campol v. Balao-
as, GR No. 197634, November 28, 2016, 810 SCRA 501)
Three consecutive terms limit
46. What are the two conditions for the application of the disqualification by reason of the three
consecutive terms limit for local elective officials?
ANSWERS: (1) The two conditions for the application of the disqualification by reason of the three
consecutive terms limit are: (1) the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. (Lonzanida vs.
COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602; Latasa vs. COMELEC, 417 SCRA 574; Ong vs. Alegre, 479 SCRA 473 and
Abundo vs. COMELEC, GR No.201716, January 8, 2013))
47. ONG was declared by the Board of Canvassers as winner for a mayoralty position in
the 1992 elections. He assumed office but was ordered unseated six months later by virtue of a
successful election protest filed by ALEGRE. He ran again in 1995 and 1998 for the same
position and won and served his terms. (1) Is he eligible to run again for mayor in the
2001 elections? (2) Would your answer be the same if during the 1992 elections, the order
unseating him was issued after the expiration of his term?
(1) YES. Though proclaimed as winner by the Board of Canvassers, he is not considered duly
elected for that particular term because he was unseated. Voluntary renunciation of a term of office
does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from the office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an

Page 13 of 15
interruption of continuity of service. (Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602)
(2) NO. In Ong vs. Alegre, 479 SCRA 473, the Supreme Court held that Ong’s assumption as mayor
of San Vicente, Camarines Sur from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, constitutes “service of full term” and
should be counted as full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the
Constitution. While Ong’s opponent “won” in an election protest in the 1998 mayoralty race, and therefore
was the legally elected mayor, that disposition was without practical and legal use and values, having
been promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired. Ong’s contention that he was only a
presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him
less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as duly elected
mayor in 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the
functions thereof from the start to finish of the term, should be legally be taken as service for a full term in
contemplation of the three-term rule.
In Rivera vs. COMELEC, GR 167591ans GR 170577, May 9, 2007, since respondent Morales
was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, and assumed the position and served as mayor
until June 30 2001, the Supreme Court ruled that he was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the
Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him as mayor. Such
circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term. Whether as “caretaker” or “de
facto” officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the office which enables him “to stay
on indefinitely.”
48. CONDE was elected Mayor of the Municipality of La Trinidad in the elections of 1995,
1998 and 2001. He fully served his first two terms, and during his third term, the
municipality was converted into a component City if La Trinidad. The city charter
provided for a hold-over and so without interregnum CONDE went on the serve as the
Mayor of the City of La Trinidad. Is CONDE eligible again to run for City Mayor in the
2004 elections?
ANSWER: NO. While a new component city which was converted from a municipality acquires a new
corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality, this does not mean however, that
for the purpose of applying the constitutional provision on term limits, the office of the municipal mayor
would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. Where
a person has been elected for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor and prior to the end or
termination of such three-year term the municipality has been converted by law into a city, without the city
charter interrupting his term until the end of the three-year term, the prohibition applies to prevent him from
running for the fourth time as city mayor thereof, there being no break in the continuity of the term.
Accordingly, the municipal mayor is barred from running for city mayor under the three-term limit rule.
(Latasa vs. COMELEC, 417 SCRA 574)
(11)
This prohibition also applies to the office of a punong barangay of a municipality merged with
another municipality to create a city as a new political unit. The territorial jurisdiction of such barangay is
the same as before conversion and the inhabitants of the barangay are the same. The voters who voted
for the punong barangay are the same group of voters. The prohibition applies to prevent him from running
as punong barangay for the fourth time, there being no break in the continuity of the terms. (Laceda vs.
Limena, GR No. 182867. November25, 2008)
49. Distinguish voluntary renunciation from office from involuntary severance from office.
ANSWER: No severance From Office. Where an elective official was elected for 3-consecutive terms but
was the subject of a preventive suspension by the Ombudsman for several months during one of his
terms, such suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer’s continued stay and
entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred from
exercising the functions of his office during this period. (Aldovino v. COMELEC, December 23, 2009)
Voluntary Renunciation From Office. A Punong Barangay who had already completed two
consecutive terms of office and ran for a third term in the Barangay elections of 2002, and while serving his
third term as Punong Barangay, he subsequently ran and won and assumed the position of a Sangguniang
Bayan member, has effectively abandoned the position of a Punong Barangay and he intended to forego
of it. Abandonment, like resignation, is voluntary. When he voluntarily relinquished his office as a Punong
Barangay, there is voluntary renunciation of said office. (Bolos vs. COMELEC, GR No. 184082, March 17,
2009))
Page 14 of 15
 Involuntary Severance From Office. SFP was elected and served three consecutive term as
municipal councilor. During his second term, he succeeded as vice-mayor due to the retirement of the
incumbent vice-mayor. His assumption as vice-mayor was considered an involuntary severance from his
office as municipal councilor resulting an interruption in his second term of service. It was held that it could
not be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of law,
hence qualified to run again as municipal councillor. (Montebon vs. COMELEC, 551 SCRA 50)

50. EDWARD was elected City Mayor of Puerto Princesa in the elections of 1992, 1995 and
1998, where he fully served all the three consecutive terms. In the 2001 elections he
ran for governor of Palawan but he lost in such electoral race. A year after, a recall
election for City Mayor of Puerto Princesa was called by the COMELEC. Is EDWARD
eligible to run for City Mayor without violating the constitutional provision on term limit?
ANSWER: YES. After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-election
for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the
end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by
the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election is no longer an immediate re-election after
three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the
continuity of service. (Socrates vs. COMELEC, 2002, 391 SCRA 457)
51. What is the effect of interruption of service on the three-term limit rule?
ANSWER: In Abundo v. COMELEC, GR No. 291716, January 8, 2013, the Court held that the two-year
period during which Abundo’s opponent was serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption,
which effectively removed Abundo’s case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule. Pending the favorable
resolution of his election protest, Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary constituent since his
opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the mayoralty seat. For two years,
Abundo was a private citizen warming his heels while awaiting the outcome of his protest. An
elected official who was belatedly declared as winner and assumed office for only a short period of term
is declared eligible by the Court, because he was deprived of his right and opportunity to serve his
constituents and that an injustice may be committed against the people of Viga by depriving them of their
right to choose their leaders.
--ooOoo—

(12)

Page 15 of 15