Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Political Solutions
Metaphysical Problems,
Political Solutions
Self, State, and Nation in
Hobbes and Locke
Asaf Z. Sokolowski
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to a kindred spirit
ZORACH GILMOVSKY
(1891–1979)
Contents
Acknowledgements ix
Introduction 1
Bibliography 175
Index 183
vii
Acknowledgements
ix
Introduction
1
2 Introduction
ty. 2 While the dogmatic reputation of theology and metaphysics has cast a
shadow over the entirety of this corpus, the resultant occlusion has deprived
us of intriguing ontological discussion that might have served as a vital
theoretical backdrop to the prescription of particular forms of political order.
This is because metaphysical identity concerns are, at least to my mind,
deeply implicated by the various measures that liberal political theorists have
proposed as remedies against the collapse of cultured social conduct and the
prevention of the emergence of a state of unrest.
In the pages that follow I will unpack this claim by revealing striking
correlations between metaphysical problems or tensions, on the one hand,
and the seemingly unrelated political solutions of key liberal thinkers on the
other. I will achieve this by way of a study of the tension that can be dis-
cerned between such pairs of ideas as friction and harmony, change and
immutability, freedom and restriction, fragmentation and unison, and chaos
and order; a tension that is addressed not only in the metaphysical and politi-
cal contributions of authors like Hobbes and Locke, but also in the ways in
which these concepts relate to the scientific and theological thought of these
liberal authors. This holistic approach will generate three distinctive and—
contrary to standard interpretations—competing strands of liberal thought.
Moreover, by uncovering the fundamental differences between these strands
it will be possible to revisit, and indeed to revise, the prevailing opinion that
the very idea of the modern liberal state provides the foundation of an un-
bound cosmopolitan perspective and, as such, is incompatible with a national
perspective.
pertain to the social contract tradition and to its product: the modern liberal
State.
Both in science and in politics, “rule making” is an attempt to unleash
ourselves, by means of autonomous rationality, from the tyranny of the un-
known and the unpredictable. In the formulation of rules, we take particular
experiences and extend them to other occurrences by generalizing them into
other-referring statements. If we accept the assumption that rationality in
itself, rather than its worldly manifestation, is not derived from experience,
then rationality should be liberated from worldly constraints. However, if we
are subject to inherent material constraints, would these not inhibit us from
living out the liberty of an unbounded rationality? The rationalist tradition,
which I will trace back to Hobbes in the following chapters, attempts to
achieve an impossible feat: namely, to artificially eliminate human con-
straints by magnifying human rationality into perfect Godly proportions.
From this rationalist perspective the limits of the natural human individual
can be overcome by means of the ambitious social “rule making” projects of
the social contract and the artificial State. Rationality is allowed to run ram-
pant, unchecked by the confines of the corporeal world. It steps beyond
human boundaries, thereby engaging in the self-deception of likening the
human condition to the incorporeal condition of God. It utilizes unbound
perspectives in time and space in order to form a social structure that is
theoretically sound, yet unbefitting of the actuality of bound existence. The
aspiration of the rationalist tradition is, in this sense, unreal.
This criticism differs from that of the Humean conventionalist, as well as
from the somewhat related communitarian critique of contractarianism. Hu-
means charge contractarianism with being unreal on empirical grounds: it is
accused of being a “folly of the mind” that does not match empirical facts. 3
Communitarians criticize contractarianism on sociological grounds, for ab-
stracting itself out of reality, conjuring up an imaginary solitary position that
no one could ever occupy in a real existence. 4 There is however another
claim of unreality, one that is neither empirical nor sociological but, rather,
metaphysical. All three critiques highlight the detachment of contractarian-
ism from the real world: the empiricist complains of detachment from histor-
ical fact, the communitarian of detachment from the formative impact of
actual social surroundings. By contrast, the corporealist position, defended
here, highlights the detachment of contractarianism from the metaphysical
constraints that define us as human, namely the finitude of our existence as
projected in time and space. Moreover, while the conventionalist (i.e., empir-
icist) and communitarian critiques reject contractarianism altogether, my
metaphysical critique divides contractarianism into a rationalist, Hobbesean
strand, that grows distant from materialism, and a Lockean strand that rec-
tifies the Hobbesean drift away from physical constraints.
4 Introduction
Political order, much like any other type of order, is entrenched in metaphys-
ical dispositions. A metaphysical conception of a created order has certain
political consequences, while that of an evolving order, which emerges from
interaction between individuals, will have others. Moreover, within the camp
of those who conceive of order as created there is a further divergence
between those who hold to an ultimate, singular order instilled by the perfect
creator: “the best of possible worlds,” and those who believe in a contingent
order enacted by an imperfect human creator. The discord over the source of
order extends into a discord over the origin of the individual and the role of
individuation within that order. Again, the individual could be a product of
creation, or a product of market-like interaction. Individualism could be natu-
rally occurring, or man-made; it could be an integral part of order, or a
hindrance to order that must be addressed by means of social reengineering.
The following chapters will challenge the assumption that a cosmopolitan
political order is rooted in liberal individualism, and more specifically in the
thought of John Locke. 5 A match between cosmopolitanism and Hobbesean-
ism will be proposed and the argument made that at the crux of the Hobbes-
ean system of ideas stands the indispensability of a holistic overlap between
the scientific, the theological and the political. It follows that Hobbesean
cosmopolitanism is the political aspect of a yearning to restore the original
unitary order of creation, part and parcel of a scientific quest for truth and the
Introduction 5
OVERVIEW
My use of political theory texts follows the method that Charles Tarlton, in
an essay examining scholarly approaches to the analysis of Hobbes’s Levia-
than, discredits under the label “rewriting Hobbes.” I have no qualms with
the label chosen by Tarlton; I do however object to his discrediting it. The
label is a true representation of an approach that is not seeking to expose the
truth about the author or the text, but is rather seeking truth within the
authored text. This is much in line with David Gauthier’s assertion regarding
the study of Hobbes: “The underlying rationale of our study . . . is that
Hobbes has something of value for us, confronted with moral and political
problems, even if what is of most value is not what he intended.” 9 In such
research, then, authorial intentions and formative historical context are side-
lined in favor of a theoretical modeling and logical argumentation that is
assumed “intelligible in its own terms as some kind of classical expression
independent of both time and space.” 10 Moreover, we may derive from this
logical argumentation insights as to contemporary political conditions; or as
Jean Hampton observes, “the principal reason for studying Hobbes’s work is
that doing so will improve our understanding social contract theories general-
ly.” 11
Tarlton criticizes contrived rehabilitation readings that turn a blind eye to
Hobbes’s inherent despotism. He seems intent on forcing commentators to
take a “political” stance. One must either sanctify the text as a whole, thereby
implicitly condoning anything it might spawn, or vilify and dismiss it. His
position implies that once sealed by the author’s intentions and context, the
text is “parceled” and offered to us in its entirety, either to reject or accept.
On this view, the text is not a logical framework worthy of intellectual
dissection; it is a social agenda-promoting platform. The Frankfurt school’s
“theory as praxis” approach that no doubt informs this position is evident in
Tarlton’s disapproving remark that, “we should not be surprised, however,
that when the main question has become the ‘truth’ of the political theory
[with which Hobbesian contractarians are presumed to be engaged], then the
idea of theory as a political act, as a provocation to action in a particular kind
of situation gets lost.” 12 Seeking the theoretical “truth” in the logic of the
words is denounced, since it eclipses the potential praxis that the words hold.
Moreover, the authenticity of the text (i.e. the intent to promote a social
stance) cannot be “messed with,” or borrowing Max Weber’s comment, “it is
not a hired cab which one may stop at will and climb into or out of as one
sees fit.” 13
By contrast, the approach I have taken is close to the one set out by
Gregory Kavka in Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory: “This book is less
concerned with what Hobbes said for its own sake than with what may be
10 Introduction
learned from what he said,” and “the ultimate goal of this process is to
explicate and defend a plausible system of moral and political hypotheses
suggested and inspired by Hobbes.” 14 The method I employ is to examine the
thought expressed in the writings of early modern thinkers from the holistic
vantage point that Hobbes himself advocates:
It is not the bare words, but the scope of the writer that giveth the true light by which
any writing is to be interpreted; and they that insist upon single texts, without
considering main designe, can derive no thing from them cleerly. 15
Though words be the signs we have of one another’s opinions and intentions: be-
cause the equivocation of them is so frequent, according to the diversity of contex-
ture, and of the company wherewith they go . . . it must be extreme hard to find the
opinions and meanings of those men that are gone from us long ago, and have left us
no other signification thereof but their books; which cannot possibly be understood
without history enough to discover those aforementioned circumstances. 16
perhaps should, have held in the name of logical consistency within their
systems of thought.
NOTES
1. Ross Harrison, ed., Rational Action: Studies in Philosophy and Social Science (Cam-
bridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
2. See Jean Hampton, “Should Political Philosophy Be Done without Metaphysics?” in
John Rawls: Critical Assessment of Leading Political Philosophers, ed. Chandran Kukathas
(New York: Routledge, 2003).
3. David Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” in Political Essays, ed. Knud Haakonssen
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1994 [1748]), 188.
4. Bernard Yack, The Problems of a Political Animal: Community, Justice, and Conflict in
Aristotelian Political Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 47–48.
5. I make use of the term “cosmopolitanism” primarily in the delimited sense of “cosmo-
politan about culture and self” as defined by Samuel Scheffler; namely, an approach that “is
opposed to any suggestion that individuals’ well-being or their identity or their capacity for
effective human agency normally depends on their membership in a determinate cultural group
whose boundaries are reasonably clear and whose stability and cohesion are reasonably se-
cure.” See Samuel Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University
Press, 2002), 112.
6. Friction, a futile exertion of force, produces nothing but waste in the worlds described
by both physics and politics.
7. The consolidation of Smithean and Humean thought into a single Smith-Humean school
reflects a sense that the Smithean social idea of the market is related to Humean metaphysical
and political perceptions of individuation.
8. See also Russell Hardin, David Hume: Moral and Political Theorist (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2009), 119 and 213.
9. David Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan: The Moral and Political Theory of Thomas
Hobbes (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2000 [1969]), 133.
10. Charles Tarlton, “The Despotical Doctrine of Hobbes, Part I: The Liberalization of
Leviathan,” History of Political Thought 22, no. 4 (2001): 607.
11. Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition (New York: Cambridge,
1986), 3.
12. Wolf Heydebrand and Beverly Burris, “The Limits of Praxis in Critical Theory,” in
Foundations of the Frankfurt School of Social Research, ed. Judith Marcus and Zoltán Tar
(New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1988), 401–2; Tarlton, “Despotical Doctrine, Part I,” 601.
13. Max Weber, in Weber: Political Writings, ed. Peter Lassman (Cambridge, U.K.: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1994), 358.
14. Gregory S. Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University, 1986), xiv., and Ibid., 3.
15. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. R. Tuck (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University
Press, 1991 [1651]), 415.
16. Thomas Hobbes, Human Nature and De Corpore Politico, ed. J. C. A. Gaskin (Oxford,
U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1999 [1650]), 76–77.
17. Aloysius P. Martinich, The Two Gods of Leviathan (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2002), 12.
18. Ibid., 10.
Chapter One
Both Hobbes and Locke, then, are generally assumed to be solely con-
cerned with what is essentially a security problem, the degree of threat they
identify generating mere nuances in the same strand of liberal thought. A
“metaphysically conscious” understanding of the relation between Locke and
Hobbes, by contrast, understands Locke to be replying to and, moreover,
divorcing himself from Hobbes. 10 The former wishes to manage an immut-
able state of metaphysical fragmentation, whereas the latter attempts to coun-
ter this same threatening—yet contingent—state by submitting to the rule of
unison under a single master. 11 Moreover, a metaphysically saturated reading
rejects the reduction of the social problem addressed by both thinkers to a
clash of interests alone. The framing of the conflict as a security problem, a
concern for the harm of one’s person and possessions, is eclipsed by the
fundamental insecurity problem that potentially confronts all rational crea-
tures: an anxiety as to our inability to identify regular rules that correlate
attributes, including possessions, with persons. Undeniably, physical survival
is the primal necessary condition for the continual existence of any living
creature; however, it is by no means a sufficient condition for a rational
existence. For rationality a further condition is necessary, namely, an ability
to rely upon continuous identity. If personal identity, and by extension enti-
tlement to possessions, cannot be preserved over time, rational future-orien-
tated considerations in interpersonal interactions are made redundant. The
future, having not been secured, cannot be trusted to form a “continuum” by
connecting with the past and present.
Despite being aware of the insecurity aspect of the social interaction
problem, one might still mistake Locke for a Hobbesean since they both
submit that in the absence of a medium for the artificial generation of a stable
continuum social interaction would degenerate, albeit to different degrees.
However, in the context of the metaphysics underlying their politics, it be-
comes apparent that they diverge in their views regarding the extent of the
control that political solutions can hope to exert over the metaphysical
sources of this social problem, namely a prevailing irregularity and unfore-
seen changes in spatio-temporal existence. Hobbes’s position allows for the
undoing of the causes of anxiety concerning the future by the artificial gener-
ation, indeed creation, of an immutable environment detached from the fluc-
tuations inherent to a mode of existence rooted in time and space. He endeav-
ors to form a political body of such immense power as to enable it to virtually
grind time, and by extension change, to a halt. The Hobbesean state thus
inhibits the ghastly condition of constant revolution. Although Hobbes re-
jects Thomas Aquinas’s idea of eternity as “nunc stans, an ever-abiding
now,” the absolute stability provided by his sovereign generates a virtual
recurrence of the “now” under Hobbes’s own definition of eternity: “ever-
lasting succession.” 12 The historical progression from past to present to fu-
ture, the “account of time” in Hobbesean terms, is preserved, while the fluc-
16 Chapter 1
tuations between these temporal states are capped. 13 By contrast, Locke does
not foresee an absolute remedy for these fluctuations; moreover, he dismisses
the prospect of unbinding humankind from its spatio-temporal constraints,
since he perceives that these are definitive of individuality itself.
Locke’s position is a reaction to Hobbes’s demand for the complete sur-
render of individual particularity in exchange for an immutable state of per-
fect stability. Although the Lockean stance appreciates the requirement of
stability for generating future-oriented interest in individuals, it exhibits a
more humble approach to the human capacity to rule its own existence. The
unbounded autonomy that Hobbes bestows upon humanity in order to allow
it to take charge of reality and infuse social interaction with certainty, Locke
replaces with a constrained ability to administer a secure existence within the
corporeal confines of time and space. Locke thus motivates individuals to
invest themselves in the future by establishing a state that provides institu-
tional guarantees for the vessel of their corporeal preservation, namely their
property. 14
Yet, if these spatio-temporal constraints are indeed according to Locke
inherent to humankind, then they conflict with the boundary-free assump-
tions of cosmopolitanism. By contrast, despite the contention of the realist
school in international relations theory, Hobbes’s radical argument for free-
ing humankind from spatio-temporal constraints serves as a platform for a
cosmopolitan outlook, albeit a highly authoritarian one. 15 An alternative,
non-authoritarian platform is to be found in Hayek’s adaptation of the
“Smith-Humean” market model. However, as the following chapters demon-
strate, despite similarity in terminology the Lockean market should be distin-
guished from conceptions of the market that claim their origin in Smith and
Hume, namely Hayek’s supposedly liberal model and Nozick’s libertarian
one. For both Hayek and Nozick the individual is, in effect, generated by the
market, hence preserving the market necessarily preserves particularity. By
contrast, for Locke individuality is a condition for the market, not its product.
Therefore for Locke protecting individuality from encroachment requires
recognition of its primality and its conceptual separation from the market.
Thus, while the Smith-Humean model is essentially compatible with cosmo-
politanism, it is at odds with Locke’s brand of liberal individualism.
Time and space are woven together; however, they are not one and the same,
nor are they symmetrical. Consider the mundane fact that we can visit a
single point in space at different points in time, but we cannot be present
simultaneously at two distinct points in space. Still, time and space are inter-
Politics, Metaphysically Speaking 17
NOTES
This chapter reads Hobbes’s political theory in the logical context of his
metaphysical, eschatological and theological pursuit of the truth. This ap-
proach, developed in full in the following two chapters, may be branded
holistic insofar as it regards Hobbes’s political stance as an integral part of
his general scientific quest for the attainment of an indisputable truth that
spans the entirety of human knowledge-seeking enterprises. Underlying
Hobbes’s effort is the monotheistic metaphysical idea that the singularity of
truth is rooted in the singularity of creation. Moreover, this monotheistic
influence is evident in a link that is drawn between the rational order iden-
tified with the creator and the rational capacity that humankind exhibits. The
gift of rationality allows humankind to seek out the original lost order, and
reestablish its rule. Unfortunately, due to an interruption in the natural course
of creation, human society has lost touch with, if not distanced itself from,
this original rational order. The pervasiveness of mayhem, constantly verging
toward a social collapse into the abyss of war, is the empirical evidence of
social disorder. The remedy for this precarious condition is the reunification
of humanity with rationality, and thereby with God. Once the puzzle of the
truth is scientifically deciphered, once all the pieces that compose it are in
place, the order of creation will be restored to its perfect original state.
Moreover, the indisputability of the reign of truth will ensure that this is the
most secure of existences. In this artificially recreated state, everything will
unfold according to a predetermined plan; the world will permanently come
to the standstill of perfect equilibrium.
The first section of this chapter unravels the theological underpinnings of
Hobbes’s vision of rational political order. On the face of it, this act of
disentanglement might be construed as a reiteration of Sharon Lloyd’s non-
25
26 Chapter 2
Lloyd concedes that within this standard bent interpretation may vary consid-
erably; nevertheless, she contends one can still demarcate commentators into
three camps: protagonists, complete antagonists, and substantial antagonists.
Variants of the camp of protagonists among the standard philosophical inter-
pretation can be found, in her view, in the writings of authors such as Gauthi-
er, Watkins, Macpherson, Nagel, Plamenatz, Skinner, Kavka, and Hampton. 4
Interpretations “deeply at odds” with the standard view are attributed to
Taylor, Warrender, and Hood, whilst positions that require “rejection of sub-
stantial portions” of the standard position are to be found in Barry, Oake-
shott, and Johnston. 5 Although one might query Lloyd’s positioning of par-
ticular authors, what is important for us is that the overall sketch of the
traditional understanding of Hobbes, against which she measures them, is
accurate. 6
In Lloyd’s view, the difference between the standard interpretations of
Hobbes and the one that she proposes stems from opposing views taken on
the relationship between Hobbes’s politics and his theology, and also from a
related dispute as to the prescriptive moral stance, if any, held by Hobbes.
She finds that Hobbes’s theology provides an insight into the (usually unrec-
ognized) significance in Hobbes’s thought of “passionate beliefs” as a
counterbalance to rationality. Her concern is that standard interpretations
overemphasize the role of might, thereby distorting the indispensable contri-
bution of faith to the political system that Hobbes devises. She claims that by
28 Chapter 2
The international sphere, certainly in Hobbes’s day and arguably in ours, has lacked
a “common power.” It is however important to distinguish between uncertainty and
chaos or “anarchy” in the popular sense of the word. It does not follow from the
absence of a common power that no mutually beneficial action is possible. But it is
liable to prove unstable: there is no reasonable expectation that conditions of coop-
eration will persist. It is this radical uncertainty which marks, in Hobbes’s view, the
relation between sovereign states. 10
view of Hobbes that literally equates international relations with the inter-
individual state of nature. 14 Intent on demonstrating that Hobbes occupies
“the marshland” between realism and rationalism, with one “keeping check
on the enthusiasm of the other,” he explores and discounts accounts of Hob-
bes’s theory that rely on standalone versions of Wight’s rationalist and revo-
lutionary patterns of thought.
The rationalist account maintains that although Hobbes uses the same
name—state of nature—for both a theoretical pre-political condition and the
actual interaction between states, there are in fact several crucial differences
between the two situations. First, states are more resilient and self-sufficient
than individuals, especially at withstanding conflict, and even at times bene-
fit from it economically. Second, states, more so than individuals, are com-
pelled to “bandwagon” with the few mighty superpowers, and the latter are
inclined to negotiate amongst themselves and curtail the actions of their
respective proxy states. Third, states are not inclined to involve themselves in
situations that would be life threatening to their inhabitants, since that would
undermine the very legitimacy of their existence. By contrast, the revolution-
ary account of Hobbes, like the realist account, contends that the term state of
nature is used consistently in both descriptions of the pre-political and inter-
state interaction. Where it differs from the realist vision is in the contention
that not only does the logic of the Hobbesean inter-individual argument
impel a theoretical spillover of its peace-seeking rationale beyond the state
level, but that nothing bars the actual realization of such a spillover and the
world-governing cosmopolitan order it entails. 15
Vincent, invoking the arguments of Hedley Bull, Charles Brewin and
Murray Forsyth, asserts that Hobbes most probably rejected the spillover
rationale for any one or more of the following reasons:
a. He projected the self-preservation of the individual onto a state that
could not surrender its independence.
b. His patriotism would not allow him to forsake Englishness.
c. The state was no less a product of external threat than of internal strife;
in other words, external demons sustain the legitimacy of the state.
Vincent, having in his mind ruled out the revolutionary proposition, but
still left with two strong contenders, seizes the middle-of-the-road position
developed by Murray Forsyth. 16 In the latter’s somewhat Lockean adaptation
of the Hobbesean state of nature, a differentiation is made between a “raw”
brutish state of nature, “a deliberately fabricated ‘not-world,’” and the viable,
albeit unpleasant, Leviathan-conducive social condition. Employing this bi-
focal approach, Forsyth achieves the merging of the realist and rationalist
positions. This split of inter-individual and inter-state interactions into
matching bifocal manifestations of the state of nature, one theoretical and the
other actual, retains the realist insistence on a strict parallel between the
inter-individual and inter-state account, as well as the rationalist demand for
30 Chapter 2
last obstacle is well addressed by Nozick in the transition that his security
agency model envisages from a plurality of competing protection agencies to
an ultimate one. 19
Although Nozick presumably develops this model in the context of a
plurality of states, there is no reason why it should not be extended further,
much like the Hobbesean political project, to the international sphere.
Hobbes himself comments only briefly on the difference between the actual
inter-sovereign state of nature and the potential inter-individual state of na-
ture. He states, somewhat cryptically, that, “because they [sovereigns] up-
hold thereby [by intimidating one another], the Industry of their Subjects;
there does not follow from it [inter-sovereign intimidation], that misery,
which accompanies the Liberty of particular men [in a state of war].” 20
Hobbes appears to presume that, at the national level, a balance is struck
between the “added value” provided to the subjects and the external threat
that subsists. However, he never clarifies why the balance is struck at the
national level and not, for example, at the level of the band, the village or the
city. Indeed, by stopping his argument at the national level he is effectually
regressing his argument for cooperation back to the lowest sustainable level
of cooperation.
Finally, it is worth revisiting the definition of the “revolutionist” category
as originated by Wight and inspired by Christopher Dawson’s Religion and
the Rise of Western Culture:
[Revolutionists are] those who believe passionately in the moral unity of the society
of states or international society . . . and experience an overriding obligation to give
effect to it, as the first aim of the international policies. For them the whole of
international society transcends its parts; they are cosmopolitan rather than interna-
tionalist, and their international theory and policy has a missionary character. 21
Unless one takes “first aim” in a literal ordinal sense, rather than as a syno-
nym of primality, the “revolutionist” understanding as drafted by Wight reaf-
firms the metaphysical unison interpretation of Hobbesean theory as present-
ed here.
The state, whether national or global, is expected to subdue the war of all
against all. However, assuming that the underling conflict survives then,
should the sovereign’s hold weaken, the fragile balance of power would be
interrupted. Although this reinforces justification for totalitarian rule, the
resolution offered by such a harsh regime is far from final; it is a contingent
rule, potentially overruled by a competing one. The reasonably stable cease
of hostilities leaves the threat of mutiny lurking in the shadows. Sovereignty
that is upheld by power can also be overturned by a claim to higher power.
The restraint under the common power that Hobbes yearns for, since “men’s
natural Disposition is such that if they are not restrained by fear of a common
32 Chapter 2
power, they will distrust and fear each other,” provides deterrence, not mere-
ly due to its sheer force, but precisely because it is commonly acknowl-
edged. 22
Lloyd, seeking this commonality, identifies the maintenance of the singu-
larity of truth as key to Hobbes’s argument for stability and peace. The
incontestability of truth guarantees that we are all “on the same page,” and so
quashes all disagreement. For Lloyd, Hobbesean theology, or rather, relig-
ious belief infuses the Hobbesean stance with a uniquely passionate hold on
the rational truth. It provides a social and ethical element that balances the
egoistic tendencies of individualism and instrumental rationalism. I, too, con-
sider the establishment of truth as key to political stability in the Hobbesean
system; however, my political conclusions are drawn from the logical impli-
cation of the metaphysical aspect Hobbes’s eschatology, whereas Lloyd
draws hers from the logical application of the religious idea of faith to social
interaction. The difficulty that Hobbes contends with is that “the doctrine of
Wright and Wrong is perpetually disputed by both the Pen and Sword”; the
resolution is found in “the doctrine of Lines and Figures . . . because men
care not, in that subject what be truth.” 23 The quest for a single dictated truth
that would end all forms of sedition requires the integration of Hobbes’s
theology and his politics into a single form of science inspired by geome-
try. 24 Related to his fascination with geometry, Hobbes’s holistic understand-
ing of order is derived from the monotheistic idea of a single indisputable
design, ordained by God in his capacity as the creator. As Timothy Beal
notes:
The logical importance of the idea of a single creator for Hobbes’s under-
standing of the singularity of order and his perception of political rule has
been largely overlooked. Hobbes’s earthly sovereign, the single creator of
meaning in the political context, replicates the original monotheistic creator
of meaning, namely God: “The Pacts and Covenants, by which the parts of
this Body Politique were first made, set together, and united, resemble that
Fiat, or the Let us make man, pronounced by God in the Creation.” 26 This
interpretation should not however be confused with Eric Brandon’s argument
that the coherence of Leviathan crucially depends on reading its civil and
religious parts within the context of Hobbes’s metaphysical monism, namely
his materialism. 27 For Brandon, Hobbes’s eschatology is founded on his
materialism, as indeed also is his idea of the self. 28 By contrast, I am arguing
that the foundation for Hobbes’s materialism, or more precisely his corpo-
Hobbes: A Holistic Reading of His Politics 33
To this warre of every man against every man . . . Where there is no common
Power . . . there be no Propriety, no Dominion, no Mine and Thine distinct; but
onely that to be every mans, that he can get; and for as long, as he can keep it. And
thus much for the ill condition, which man by meer Nature is actually placed in;
though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in Passions, partly in
Reason. 32
34 Chapter 2
The strong version claims that Hobbes envisaged a single, continuous chain of
derivation leading from physics, via psychology, to politics. . . . The weak version,
on the other hand, claims only that Hobbes applied the method of physical science to
the science of politics, so that political theory resembles or parallels the physics
without necessarily being derived from it. 36
and hewing one another, and desire with their hearts, to conforme themselves
into one firme and lasting edifice.” 41 Hobbes is not a positivist whose politi-
cal prescription is defined by an immutable observable real politique. In-
stead, he should be understood as a reactionary thinker endeavoring to take
control of a reality that indisputable empirical indications suggest has gone
mad. Moreover, the features and motivations that he identifies in this mad
existence need to be extracted from it, if sanity is to be restored. This pro-
gression from the real to the ideal can be read into Hobbes’s retrospective
account of the order and the purpose served by the chapters leading up to
chapter twenty in The Elements of Law:
That part of this treatise which is already past, hath been wholly spent, in the
consideration of the natural power, and natural estate of man; namely of his cogni-
tion and passions in the first eleven chapters; and how from thence proceed his
actions in the twelfth; how men know one another’s minds in the thirteenth; in what
estate men’s passions set them in the fourteenth, what estate they are directed unto
by the dictates of reason, that is to say, what be the principal articles of the law of
nature, in the fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, and lastly how a multi-
tude of persons natural are united by covenants into one person civil or body poli-
tic. 42
The system of Hobbes’s philosophy lies in his conception of the nature of philo-
sophical knowledge, and not in a doctrine about the world. And the inspiration for
his philosophy is the intention to be guided by reason and reject all other guides: this
is the thread, the hidden thought, that gives it coherence, distinguishing it from
Faith, “Science,” and Experience. It remains to guard against all possible error. 47
The lineage of Hobbes’s rationalism lies, not (like that of Spinoza or even Des-
cartes) in the great Platonic-Christian tradition, but in the sceptical, late scholastic
tradition. He does not normally speak of Reason, the divine illumination of the mind
that unites man with God; he speaks of reasoning. 48
For though in all places of the world, men should lay the foundation of their houses
on the sand, it could not thence be inferred, that so it ought to be. The skill of
making, and maintaining Common-wealths, consisteth in certain Rules, as doth
Arithmetique and Geometry. 50
Therefore the Hobbesean aim is to reshape our existence into a single coher-
ent reality along the holistic lines ascribed by Watkins.
Hobbes draws on the parallel between the detachment of both God and
reasoning from the corporeal in order to form a system in which (contra
40 Chapter 2
Neverthelesse, we are not to renounce our Senses and Experience; nor (that which is
the undoubted word of God), our naturall Reason. For they are the talents which he
hath put into our hands to negotiate, till the coming again of our blessed Saviour;
and therefore not to be folded up in the Napkin of an Implicite Faith, but employed
in the purchase of Justice, Peace, and true Religion. For though there be many things
in Gods Word above Reason; that is to say, which cannot by naturall reason be
either demonstrated, or confuted; yet there is nothing contrary to it; but when it
seemeth so, the fault is either in our unskillful Interpretation, or erroneous Ratioci-
nation. 51
Hobbes is attempting to achieve the harmony of the unison of the “two book”
doctrine, according to which God has spoken to us in two great books: the
book of nature, in which created things speak to us directly, and the book of
revelation, where God himself reveals to us his own inner nature and his free
gifts and special plans for humanity. As Norris Clarke notes, according to
this doctrine:
These two books, both written by the same Author, cannot contradict each other; if
there is an apparent contradiction, either one side or the other, natural reason or
theological interpretation of the revelation, has made an error, and each possibility
must be reexamined more carefully. 52
Against this Empusa I think there cannot be invented a better exorcism, than to
distinguish between the rules of religion, that is, the rules of honouring God, which
we have from the laws, and the rules of philosophy, that is, the opinions of private
men; and to yield what is due to religion to the Holy Scripture, and what is due to
philosophy to natural reason. 55
And:
The greatest, and main abuse of Scripture, and to which almost all the rest are either
consequent, or subservient, is the wresting of it, to prove that the Kingdom of God,
mentioned so often in the Scripture, is the present Church, or multitude of Christian
men now living, or that being dead, are to rise again at the last day. 56
Yet, contrary to the spirit of Hull’s argument, Hobbes does not disengage
with theology and eschatology altogether; indeed, they are an integral part of
Leviathan wherein they are discussed extensively in relation to their political
context. Instead of eliminating theology, he takes steps to split theological
discourse into an otherworldly strand and a worldly one. It is a division
between the marginalized prerogative of the church to speculate on the after-
life, and the privilege of the civil sovereign to administrate a worldly theolo-
gy. The church is free to engage in “invisible” theological matters, as long as
these are restricted to the realm of faith and therefore have no temporal
public consequences: “For internall Faith is in its own nature invisible, and
consequently exempted from all human jurisdiction; whereas the words, and
actions that proceed from it, as breaches of our Civill obedience, are injustice
both before God and Man.” 57
Hull, however, has no choice but to concede that Hobbes went to great
lengths to demonstrate that the age of prophecy is over. Indeed, Hobbes
states this claim unequivocally:
Seeing therefore Miracles now cease, we have no sign left, whereby to acknowledge
the pretended Revelations, or Inspirations of any private man. 58
And:
To say he hath spoken to him in a Dream, is no more than to say he hath dreamt that
God spake to him; which is not of force to win beleef from any man . . . and such
42 Chapter 2
dreams as that, from selfe conceit, and foolish arrogance, and false opinion of a
mans own godlinesse, or other vertue, by which he thinks he hath merited the favour
of extraordinary Revelation. 59
Moreover, Hobbes clarifies that prophecy was the sole privilege of the an-
cient Jews:
One must consider therefore that the Hobbesean stance may be a variant on
the position Benzion Netanyahu attributes to St. Augustine:
Augustine’s City of God was not an established power, as was the Church of medie-
val times, but a utopia which was once achieved by man, then lost, and which should
be the final goal of all humanity’s efforts. The City of Man was not accepted by
Augustine as a legitimate phenomenon, as the temporal power was by the Church.
The purpose of history, as he understood it, was constantly to minimize and narrow
the limits of the City of Man and broaden those of the City of God. These two
domains were antagonistic to each other and their conflict was beyond compromise.
The full materialization of one ideal meant the total ruin of the other, and the
purpose of history was, indeed, completely to eliminate the City of Man and to
establish the sole reign of the City of God. 61
Hobbes believes he has figured out the formula for artificially hastening the
Augustinian progress of history, a perfectionist theory that will finally allow
for the vanquishing of the empirically observed City of Man. The difference
between Augustine and Hobbes is that the latter’s messianic vision pertains
to the present, and is to be administered politically. 62 In a similar vein, J. G.
A. Pocock argues that Hobbes’s “politics have taken on a messianic dimen-
sion, just as the messianism they entail is almost brutally political,” while
“his ‘world to come’ so closely replicates this world that the distinction
between the worlds tends to disappear.” 63
Hobbes, as Hull argues, is troubled by the presumptuousness of assuming
knowledge of the will of God and applying it correctly to the interpretation of
concrete political situations. 64 He expresses this concern explicitly: “But
commonly they that call for right reason, to decide any controversy, do mean
their own.” 65 But it is important to appreciate that, contrary to the positions
of Hull and Oakeshott, the difficulty that Hobbes identifies here is not a
consequence of a mismatch between two distinct types of knowledge, bibli-
cal and scientific, but rather a difficulty that arises from the multitude of
Hobbes: A Holistic Reading of His Politics 43
opinions. 66 Social tension does not arise from lack of proper demarcation
between biblical and scientifically acquired knowledge, since these are not
inherently in conflict: “Is it because such opinions [that years are determined
by the motions of the earth] are contrary to true Religion? that cannot be, if
they be true.” 67 Tension must therefore arise out of individual differences of
opinion as to the implementation of knowledge acquired from different, but
equally legitimate, sources. Since in the post-biblical era one must assume
that God no longer speaks to individuals, be they commoners, or nobles, or
clergy, in the interest of public order differences must be decided by the civil
authority that speaks for Godly order in the context of this world:
It follows that the human hubris that Hobbes is concerned with is derived
from individual self-conviction and pride, as opposed to the aforementioned
collective hubris of the rational ambitions of humankind, against which Mai-
monides and Aquinas were arguing.
Hobbes does not separate contemplation of the divine from contemplation
of the political; or as Jürgen Overhoff’s puts it:
Hobbes does not so much desire to divorce biblical and political forms of
contemplation, as to detach the act of contemplation from the individual and
relegate it to the sovereign. 70 The individual is barred from acting in God’s
name, while the sovereign is entrusted with “deciding for God”:
There is not amongst men a universal reason agreed upon in any nation, besides the
reason of him that hath sovereign power. Yet though his reason be but the reason of
one man, yet it is set up to supply the place of that universal reason, which is
expounded by our saviour in the Gospel. 71
The reason the church cannot undermine the ruler’s absolute monopoly over
contemplation, or for that matter rule itself, is because engagement in eccle-
siastical matters of the afterlife is irreconcilable with administration of the
temporal. “Internal” beliefs and “external” reason are incommensurable. 72
44 Chapter 2
Yet, even given this interpretation, Hobbes’s position is not necessarily ag-
nostic, it merely diverts from the standard Christian views of his day. 75
Hobbes is certainly unconventional in replacing God’s direct supervision
with a surrogate human-manufactured one; nevertheless, if he does not con-
sider the man-made version of law as having been created anew he does not
necessarily cross the secular line of doubting God. He is not displacing God;
he is rather engaged in the revival of natural law, or earthly Godliness, by
synthetic political means. The Hobbesean position artificially pursues the
restoration of an original, perfectly created and peaceful condition. There-
fore, its employment of God does not require a belief in God’s authority to
command us (on which point Watkins challenges Warrender), but merely
demands the acknowledgement of the immutability of the order of creation. 76
Moreover, the “creationist” reading of Hobbes actually sits very well with
the crux of Watkins’s own argument, that is, the unification of Hobbes’s
ideas into a singular cohesive system. What Watkins fails to appreciate,
however, is that on a philosophical monotheistic understanding, the abstract
conception of God is that of the unity of ideas, which, as indeed he himself
claims, is precisely Hobbes’s aspiration. Furthermore, the holistic interpreta-
tion of Hobbes that Watkins endorses is not only modeled upon staunch
monotheism, it is, including its absolutist penchant, positively derived from
it.
I am not denying that Hobbeseanism is essentially reformist; however, it
is not modernist in the revolutionary sense that is often attributed to it.
Hobbeseanism does not consider itself as ushering in something alien, but
rather something familiar. It is intriguing that Watkins chose the term “alien”
in relation to the reception of Hobbesean ideas among the religious author-
ities of his time, in light of the fact the he goes to great lengths to show that
Hobbes’s scientific method came under the influence of the Platonist meta-
physics of remembrance. 77 According to this doctrine, while the language
and laws of humankind appear to be fabricated, insofar as they are effective
Hobbes: A Holistic Reading of His Politics 45
they are reconstructed in the mold of the original natural law as instilled in
humankind by creation.
Time is nothing else but the successive Motion or Operation of Creatures; which
Motion or Operation, if it should cease, Time would also cease, and the Creatures
themselves would cease with Time: Wherefore such is the Nature of every Creature,
that is in Motion, or hath certain Motion, by means of which it advances forward,
and grows to a farther perfection. And seeing in God there is no successive Motion
or Operation to a farther perfection; because he is most absolutely perfect. Hence
there are no Times in God or his Eternity. And moreover, because there are no Parts
in God, there are no Times in him; for all Times have their Parts, and are indeed
infinitely divisible, as before was said. 81
ers of Hobbes, Conway included, confuse his description with his prescrip-
tion. Hobbes is a reformist, rather than the revolutionary he is often made out
to be. Although his description of the is seems to submerge God into corpo-
reality, his prescription of the ought is its contrasting mirror image. His
perfectionism aspires to lift humankind into virtual incorporeality; to make
its conduct Godlike. The empowerment of humankind is thus achieved, not
by lessening the eminence of God, but by the raising of its own stature to
meet that of God.
Despite her stated reservations, Peter Loptson claims that Conway and
Hobbes would appear to share a remarkably similar account of substance and
essence. 82 This position may be further reaffirmed by arguing that the foun-
dations for their respective arguments can be understood as essentially identi-
cal, save the crucial element of the sourcing of motion, and the consequent
implications with regard to our attitude toward it. Consider that Conway and
Hobbes share an understanding of God as the epitome of perfection, as well
as an identification of perfection with an effortless stationary point, devoid of
time and motion. Consider further that they also share the idea of God as the
creator, and additionally that both observe the corporeal world that human-
kind inhabits to be in motion rather than at a standstill. Finally, consider that
both share the common purpose of bringing more Godly conduct into corpo-
real life. Where they diverge, however, is on the role of motion and conse-
quently on the extent to which humankind can pursue Godliness.
Conway sources motion in God and therefore views it as an instrument of
perfection, a positive force that is fuelled by creation to assist corporeal
beings in changing and thereby nearing perfection. Yet, as much as they
might aspire to perfection, these corporeal beings are barred from reaching it.
Hobbes, by contrast, divorces motion from God. On the Hobbesean under-
standing, creation could not have originally created anything short of a per-
fect and by extension motionless world. The observable motion in the corpo-
real world is an indication of imperfection, it is a departure from the moment
of creation, and must therefore have an alternative source: a human one. In
other words, in Hobbes’s view creation is not responsible for the friction-rife
state of nature that threatens our prosperity: it created the Edenic blissful
paradise that logically precedes it, while humankind, by its own hand, by its
own carelessness, brings the threat of the state of nature upon itself.
Observation of the “disorders of the present time” suggests to Hobbes that
the continuity of the original harmonious creation was somehow impaired. 83
Still in awe of a perfect creator, Hobbes’s analysis cannot presume the crea-
tion of a faulty world, and is therefore drawn to the conclusion that the
worrying condition of humankind is self-inflicted. It is the consequence of a
departure from, or a rebellion against, the original order of creation. Human-
kind’s rebelliousness interrupted the orderly unfolding of creation. This iden-
tification of human action as the root of social conflict, combined with great
Hobbes: A Holistic Reading of His Politics 47
this cannot be, as Martinich contends, what separates “law” from “dictate.” 88
It is our wretched state of corporeality that defines our inability to live by
dictate, and forces us to subject ourselves to corporeal law enforcement. The
indispensability of a body that imposes the law is reinforced by the biblical
consent God gives to the degrading shift in the rule of the ancient Hebrews:
from the blissful, but untenable, reason of the prophet Samuel, to the harsh
control of a King. 89 The request for submission to artificial control implicitly
concedes the human failure to guide itself autonomously by internalized
natural reason:
For the Worship which the Sovereign commandeth to bee done unto himself by the
terrour of his Laws, is not a sign that he that obeyeth him, does inwardly honour him
as a God, but that he is desirous to save himself from death, or from a miserable
life. 90
immense infinite system, which must and ought to be disposed of, according
to the conveniency of the whole.” 100 For Hobbes, even more than for the
Stoic, the atoms must be fused back together. A fusion into singular perfec-
tion in which motion has ceased—that is, the “everlasting succession” deliv-
ers a continuous immutable state, and by extension time virtually, albeit not
actually, stops. For a visual expression of such a situation, recall the familiar
scene from the grand heist genre of films, in which the thieves loop the video
signal of the surveillance cameras, creating the impression of stillness. The
artificial generation of the virtual world of peace requires human intervention
in the real world of mayhem.
In her own style, and arguably more lucidly than Hobbes himself does,
Margaret Cavendish, Hobbes’s would-be disciple, voices the troubling impli-
cation the atomist stance has for political interaction: 101
For if Every and Each Atome were of a Living Substance, and had Equal Power,
Life and Knowledge, and Consequently, a Free-will and Liberty, and so Each and
Every one were as Absolute as any other, they would hardly Agree in one Govern-
ment, and as unlikely as Several Kings would Agree in one Kingdom, or rather as
Men, if every one should have an Equal Power, would make a Good Government;
and if it should Rest upon Consent and Agreement, like Human Governments, there
would be as many Alterations and Confusions of Worlds, as in Human States and
Governments. 102
Hence the ruler that Hobbeseans seek is an instrument for the provision of an
immutable existence, lest we find ourselves spiraling by the force of unfore-
seen change into increasing social friction. Although well aware of “some
striking similarities between Hobbes’s and Cavendish’s views,” Deborah
Boyle identifies an original contribution to ethics and politics in Cavendish’s
work that differentiates her from Hobbes. For Boyle, what distinguishes
Cavendish from Hobbes is the motivation for the pursuit of public order. 103
Boyle states that Hobbes relies on an innate desire for self-preservation,
whereas Cavendish builds upon an inwrought ambition for fame. 104 Yet in so
demarcating the two, Boyle is assuming the reading of Hobbes as concerned
primarily, if not solely, with corporal preservation. My own employment of
Cavendish is as a “Hobbes interpreter,” who by reiterating Hobbes in her
own style often offers an extra lucidity to his arguments. Moreover, and as
shall become apparent in what follows, the “future outlook” approach that
Hobbes’s rationality wishes to teach “the fool” relies upon instilling in the
latter a posterity motivation similar to Cavendish’s fame.
The social parallel for the unforeseen atoms are free-roaming individual
madmen, or to use Hobbes’s own term, fools. There is an underlying tension
between the chaos that arises from individual indeterminate motion on the
one hand, and the collective determinism required for the resurrection of
rational action on the other. Faced with the threat of social madness, a war of
Hobbes: A Holistic Reading of His Politics 51
NOTES
1. S. A. Lloyd, Ideals as Interests in Hobbes’s Leviathan : The Power of Mind over Matter
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
2. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 21, 145.
3. Lloyd, Ideals as Interests, 7, 14.
4. Ibid., 7; Gauthier, Logic of Leviathan (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1969); J.
W. N. Watkins, Hobbes’s System of Ideas: A Study in the Political Significance of Philosophi-
cal Theories (London: Hutchinson, 1965); C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Posses-
sive Individualism; Hobbes to Locke (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press, 1962); Thomas Nagel,
“Hobbes’s Concept of Obligation,” Philosophical Review 68 (1959); John Plamenatz, “Mr.
Warrender’s Hobbes,” in Hobbes Studies, ed. K. C. Brown (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1965); Quentin Skinner, “The Ideological Context of Hobbes’s Political
Thought,” Historical Journal 9 (1966); Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory; Hamp-
ton, Hobbes.
5. A. E. Taylor, “The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes,” in Hobbes Studies, ed. K. C. Brown
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965); Howard Warrender, “A Reply to Mr.
Plamenatz,” in Hobbes Studies, ed. K. C. Brown (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1957); Francis C. Hood, The Divine Politics of Thomas Hobbes (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon
Press, 1964); Brian Barry, “Warrender and His Critics,” Philosophy 42, no. 164 (1968); Mi-
chael Oakeshott, Introduction to Hobbes’s Leviathan (Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell, 1957).
6. Although Lloyd does not explain the somewhat odd grouping of Skinner in a list of
“non-contexualist” commentators, she might be relying on the view, expressed by Avner De-
Shalit, that while Skinner is highly critical of “textualism” he is not strictly a “contextualist,”
since his position is that context provides an explanation but not necessarily understanding.
Avner De-Shalit, Power to the People: Teaching Political Philosophy in Skeptical Times (Lan-
ham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2006), 161.
7. See also Deborah Baumgold, Hobbes’s Political Theory (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge
University Press, 1988), 5–10.
8. Lloyd, Ideals as Interests, 43.
9. Martinich, Two Gods; Brandon, The Coherence of Hobbes’s Leviathan; Richard Tuck,
“The Civil Religion of Thomas Hobbes,” in Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain, ed.
Nicholas Phillipson and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press,
1993).
10. Glen Newey, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Hobbes and Leviathan (New York:
Routledge, 2008), 161.
11. Ibid., 162.
12. Ibid., 160.
13. R. John Vincent, “The Hobbesian Tradition in Twentieth Century International
Thought,”Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10, no. 2 (1981): 96.
52 Chapter 2
14. Murray Forsyth, “Thomas Hobbes and the External Relations of States,”British Journal
of International Studies 5 (1979): 196.
15. Vincent, “Hobbesian Tradition,” 95.
16. Forsyth, “External Relations.”
17. Hanson, “Highway to Peace.”
18. David Boucher, “Inter-Community and International Relations in the Political Philoso-
phy of Hobbes,” Polity 23, no. 2 (1990): 213.
19. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 53.
20. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 13, 90.
21. Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions (London: Leicester Univer-
sity Press, 1994), 8.
22. Thomas Hobbes, R. Tuck, and M. Silverthrone. (eds.), On the Citizen (Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge University Press, 1998 [1642]), 10.
23. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 11, 74.
24. Ibid., ch. 20, 145.
25. Timothy K. Beal, Religion and Its Monsters (London: Routledge, 2002), 99.
26. Hobbes, Leviathan, 9–10.
27. Brandon, The Coherence of Hobbes’s Leviathan, 11, 62, 119.
28. Ibid., 73.
29. See Baumgold, Hobbes’s Political Theory, 8–9.
30. This understanding blurs the difference between Hobbes’s prescription and that of
Locke into mere nuance.
31. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 17, 120.
32. Ibid., ch. 12, 90.
33. Ibid., ch. 13, 96.
34. Thomas Hobbes, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, vol. II, ed. Sir William Moles-
worth (London: John Bohn, 1840), 77; Thomas Hobbes, Man and Citizen (De Homine and De
Cive), ed. B. Gert (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998 [1656, 1642]), 178; De Cive, VI, 9.
35. Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political
Thought (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), 252–56.
36. Noel Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2002), 146.
37. John Gowdya and Irmi Seidl, “Economic Man and Selfish Genes: The Implications of
Group Selection for Economic Valuation and Policy,” Journal of Socio-Economics 33 (2004):
345.
38. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch.2, 71.
39. Jacob Neusner, Judaism and Christianity in the Age of Constantine: History, Messiah,
Israel, and the Initial Confrontation (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2008), 76.
40. Hobbes, Human Nature and De Corpore Politico, 146.
41. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 29, 221.
42. Hobbes, Human Nature and De Corpore Politico, 109.
43. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 12, 76.
44. Watkins, Hobbes’s System.
45. Michael Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc.,
1975).
46. Ibid., 20.
47. Ibid., 27.
48. Ibid.
49. Benzion Netanyahu, Don Isaac Abravanel Statesman and Philosopher (Philadelphia:
The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1982), 113.
50. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 20, 145.
51. Ibid., ch. 32, 256–56.
52. W. Norris Clarke, The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics
(Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 2001), 7.
53. Martinich, Two Gods, 134.
54. Gordon Hull, “Against this Empusa: Hobbes’s Leviathan and the Book of Job,” British
Journal of the History of Philosophy 10, no. 1 (2002).
Hobbes: A Holistic Reading of His Politics 53
55. Hobbes, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, vol. I., x–xi.
56. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 44, 419.
57. Ibid., ch. 42, 360. See also Richard Tuck’s comment that “an important and surprising
feature of Hobbes’s argument [in Elements of Law as well as Critique of Write] . . . was to
protect theology from philosophy—more or less the opposite of what is conventionally sup-
posed to have been his intention.” Tuck, “The Civil Religion of Thomas Hobbes,” 126.
58. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 32, 259.
59. Ibid., ch. 32, 257.
60. Ibid., ch. 31, 246, emphasis original.
61. Netanyahu, Don Isaac Abravanel, 190.
62. See also Richard Tuck (ed.) “Introduction,” Leviathan, xliii.
63. J. G. A. Pocock, Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History
(London: Methuen, 1972), 173–74.
64. Hull, “Against this Empusa,” 19.
65. Hobbes, Human Nature and De Corpore Politico, 181.
66. Hull, “Against this Empusa,” 24.
67. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 46, 474.
68. Ibid.
69. Jürgen Overhoff, “The Theology of Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan,” Journal of Eccesias-
tical History 51, no. 3 (2000): 534.
70. See also James R. Martel, “Strong Sovereign, Weak Messiah: Thomas Hobbes on Scrip-
tural Interpretation, Rhetoric and the Holy Spirit,” Theory and Event 7, no. 4 (2004): 3.
71. Hobbes, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, vol. VI., 22.
72. See also Martinich, Two Gods, 280–82, 98.
73. Overhoff, “The Theology of Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan,” 543.
74. Watkins, Hobbes’s System, 9–10.
75. Martinich, Two Gods, 2–5.
76. Watkins, Hobbes’s System, 87. Martinich, Two Gods, 273–74.
77. Watkins, Hobbes’s System, 9–10, 61–63.
78. On a biographical note, it is worth mentioning that Conway suffered from chronic
headaches, and that her physician was none other than Hobbes’s close friend William Harvey.
See Peter Loptson, in Conway, The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, ed.
Peter Lopston (The Hague: Marinus Nijhoff, 1982 [1692]), 4.
79. Ibid., 13, 57.
80. Probably referring to such accounts as found in Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 34, 269 and ch.
45, 463.
81. Conway, Principles, 155.
82. Ibid., 57.
83. Hobbes, “A Review, and Conclusion,” Leviathan, 491.
84. Mark Larrimore, ed. The Problem of Evil: A Reader (Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell, 2003),
174. See also Loptson: “[Conway’s] idea [of essence] is that we can conceive of an individual
substance, whatever its biological or chemical classification, gradually undergoing transforma-
tion or metamorphosis, like a caterpillar turning into a moth—yet remaining the same individu-
al.” Conway, Principles, 47.
85. Larrimore, The Problem of Evil: A Reader, 149.
86. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 21, 145.
87. Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1973), 130.
88. Martinich, Two Gods, 125.
89. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 20, 143.
90. Ibid., ch. 45, 449.
91. Martinich, Two Gods, 290.
92. Hobbes, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, vol. IV, 298; vol. V, 328; vol. IV, 299
(my italics).
93. Conway, Principles, 155; Martinich, Two Gods, 248.
94. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 34, 270 (my italics).
54 Chapter 2
95. It is perhaps the projection of Conway’s own conjecture as to the relation between the
real and the ideational onto Hobbes, which leads her to consider him a materialist essentialist
and moral subjectivist.
96. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of
Man, and the Origin of Evil, ed. Austin Marsden Farrer (LaSalle: Open Court, 1985 [1710]),
128.
97. For a detailed account of the resemblance between the Neostoicism popularised by the
Flemish philologist Justus Lipsius and Hobbes’s social, political and theological ideas, see
David Burchell, “The Disciplined Citizen: Thomas Hobbes, Neostoicism and the Critique of
Classical Citizenship,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 45, no. 4 (1999): 521.
98. Conway, Principles, 47.
99. Catherine Packham, “The Physiology of Political Economy: Vitalism and Adam Smith’s
Wealth of the Nations,” Journal of the History of Ideas 63, no. 3 (2002): 477.
100. Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge University Press, 2002 [1759]), 325.
101. Anna Battigelli refers to Margaret Cavendish as Hobbes’s “would-be disciple” in Anna
Battigelli, Margaret Cavendish and the Exiles of the Mind, Studies in the English Renaissance
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1998), 65.
102. Margaret Cavendish, Philosophical and Physical Opinions (London, 1663), sig.
C2r–C2v.
103. Deborah Boyle, “Fame, Virtue, and Government: Margaret Cavendish on Ethics and
Politics,” Journal of the History of Ideas 67, no. 2 (2006): 256.
104. Ibid., 259.
105. See also Wolin, Politics and Vision, 243.
Chapter Three
This chapter pieces together the Hobbesean truth: the ultimate order that is
the foundation for everything. It argues that the objective of Hobbes’s system
of thought is to achieve the unison of the arts that will render all physical and
social interaction scientifically predictable, and thus restore the world to the
perfection of the moment of creation. Once the reengineering of our exis-
tence is complete, once the ultimate order is restored, we will enter a state of
perfect equilibrium, one of rest and peace.
The first section of the chapter discusses Hobbes’s strive for the ultimate
equilibrium of peace. Key to the emancipation of humankind from chaos is
the revealing of the common thread that runs through creation: the single
godly order that rules all corporeal existence. In his attempt to artificially
generate God’s order, Hobbes builds upon the rational thread that links the
creator and the human that was created in his image. However, in his attempt
to artificially mimic godly order, Hobbes unwittingly elevates humankind to
the rank of the creator.
The second section argues that although Hobbes seemingly empowers the
individual, he is wrongly understood to be supporting individualism. Individ-
ualism is a subject matter that he studies, but does not endorse. It is not his
political prescription, but a descriptive effort ultimately aimed at restoring a
condition of original unity that has degenerated into an empirically perceived
fragmentation. Hobbes borrows the rationalist method of René Descartes for
whom, in Hayek’s interpretation, individualism is a means to achieving a
liberating unity, but not an end in itself.
The third section argues against the perception that Hobbes was a mod-
ernist thinker whose defense of rationalism is a revolutionary departure from
earlier political thought. Drawing upon the previous two sections, I claim
that his conception of rationalism accords with a model in which equilibrium
55
56 Chapter 3
PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM
lose. The entire re-education process is conducted within the artificial sanctu-
ary of the state, a reservation in which order is fixed and can therefore thrive.
Hobbes does not only portray the absence of a state as a grim condition of
chaos, but also as an expression of foolishness. The volatility of the state of
nature and its sporadic coalitions motivate the Hobbessian rational individual
to seek a more permanent haven. 6 The Hobbesean “fool” is introduced as one
who “hath said in his heart, there is no such thing as justice,” with the clear
implication being that the fool cannot conceive a state which would dispense
justice. 7 The fool has a “reasoning disability”: he is incapable of calculating
the costs and benefits of his interactions with others far enough into the
future to realize the benefits he may individually reap from conducting him-
self in a social manner. His inability to elevate himself beyond current events
and practices leads him to deny the long-term benefits of an orderly state:
“The cause whereof is, That the object of mans desire, is not to enjoy once
onely, and for one instant of time; but to assure for ever, the way of his future
desire.” 8 The Hobbesean attempt to rationalize justice is further highlighted
by identifying the substitutions Hobbes chose to make while paraphrasing the
original biblical text: “the scoundrel said in his heart, there is no God.” 9
Hobbes replaces God with justice and the original ethical term “scoundrel”
with the fool. The implications of this parallel are far reaching. Hobbes
attempts to reconcile faith and reason by portraying them as analogous ef-
forts. Both are rational rule-following enterprises that must ultimately con-
verge on a “one and only” truly viable order. They are not posited as factions
that compete for the title of the truth, but rather as its two champions.
The quest for “the truth,” an uninterrupted and unchallenged order, de-
pends upon the integration of these two knowledge-seeking enterprises. The
resolution of the potential conflict between the two proceeds from that fact
that underlying these activities is a single method instilled in existence by
creation. The structure of this existence resembles in its construction the
layered manufacture of a Russian doll. The classic Russian doll, known also
as a nested doll or stacking doll, is a collection of hollow figurines crafted
with precision as incrementally larger sized replications of an original solid
doll that is nested at the core. Due to the precision with which the doll-layers
are made to mimic one another’s features, albeit increasing in size, the multi-
plicity of layers stack together to form a singular unity. Similarly, in the
proposed model of creation the harmony of nature, or coexistence without
friction, is sustained since each layer of “creation” has been fashioned to
echo its predecessor; stretching back to the original mould of creation—
authentic God. By extension, a social state of peaceful coexistence is to be
achieved by submission to an artificial order emulating a natural one that has
unfortunately been lost. For social order to function—that is, to remove
friction from social interaction—each social layer needs to echo a preceding
Hobbes: One for All 59
layer. An ordered society is one whose components echo the original source
of order.
In the corporeal existence of humankind, the reverence with which idea-
tional God is held as the original source of creation needs to be transposed
onto the reverence with which the corporeal state is regarded, and more
particularly onto the reverence of the corporeal ruler. 10 Hobbes perceives the
ailing society as lacking in direction, since both individual and collective
actions exhibited in it are erratic. The medium of the state allows for rational-
ity and stability, the conceptual components of godliness, to manifest them-
selves in the otherwise chaotic corporeal existence. The method and the
objective of the infusion of order into corporeality are the same: echoing the
rules. A society in which all rigorously abide by the rules is one of complete
subordination. It is a reality in which permanent order prevails, thereby re-
lieving its inhabitants from concerns about what the future might hold.
The level of security that Hobbes promises requires the virtual dislodge-
ment of humankind from its corporeality and the uncertainty that goes with
it. Admittedly, by placing governance into the hands of a corporeal sove-
reign, Hobbes acknowledges the barrier to direct godly rule and seemingly
reinforces the division between the corporeal and the incorporeal. However,
he also realizes that the indisputability of rule to which he strives is that of a
perfect order, a godly one. Anything short of perfection risks receding into
the anxiety of indeterminate social conduct, igniting a cycle of distrust. He
therefore proposes to overcome the difficulty in synthesizing the corporeal
and incorporeal by picking up on the echo of the original order and reproduc-
ing it. A chain of imitation is established: the sovereign mimics God and the
public mimics the sovereign, thus vicariously the public follows God. 11
Yet the godlikeness which Hobbes aspires to achieve by means of the
Russian doll model soon slips from “emulation of God,” which regards God
as a role model, to assuming the position of “native God.” From frail foolish
beings who are incapable of managing their interaction with each other, it is
presumed that we undergo a transformation into perfect rational citizens;
humankind is elevated to the rank of God. Thus Hobbes tries to improve
upon the sorry human condition in the state of nature by “surgically remov-
ing” the source of the problem, namely the psychologically debilitating ef-
fects of corporeality. There is, however, a flaw in this argument. Even if it
were possible to suspend one’s corporeality through a process of rationaliza-
tion, the advantage of a friction-free existence comes at the cost of individual
particularity: being at one with the Godly comes at the expense of purging
what defines us as particular selves.
60 Chapter 3
Both Watkins and Kavka cite a passage from the English translation of De
Cive (The Citizen), from which they derive conclusions as to Hobbes’s dis-
section-based scientific method as well as his attitude toward individual-
ism: 12
For as in a watch, or some such small engine, the matter, figure, and motion of the
wheels, cannot be well known, except it be taken insunder, and viewed in parts; so
to make a more curious search into the rights of states and duties of subjects, it is
necessary, I say, not to take them insunder, but yet that they be so considered as if
they were dissolved; that is, that we rightly understand what the quality of human
nature is . . . and how men must be agreed among themselves that intend to grow up
into a well-grounded state. 13
Watkins argues that the adoption of the dissection method implies empower-
ing the lowest level of deconstruction as the source of the construction itself,
which in the political context he translates into the liberal empowerment of
the individual level. By contrast, Kavka concludes that the primary function
of the proposed dissection method is to determine “what the proper function
of the state is,” and “what undesirable conditions or features of the state of
nature it serves to ameliorate.” 14
Let’s take Kavka’s position to the extreme, arguably further than he ever
intended, and propose that Hobbes disassembles society into individuals
merely for the purpose of reconstructing them in the “correct” order. He sets
out, that is, to solve the puzzle of reconstructing them into a single coherent
rational body. By contrast with Watkins’s assertion, dissection only implies
reductionism if one presumes that the outer layers of the dissected matter are
sheltering an explanatory primary component that is found at its core. The
liberal conclusion is only warranted if one considers dissection as a process
of peeling away distracting derivative layers, thereby revealing an essential-
ity.
The method of treating the perceived world “as if it were dissolved” can
be understood in at least two fashions. One, practiced by Watkins, assumes
that the dissolution reveals the essential components of society and its driv-
ing forces (i.e., individuals). The other regards the dissolution of society as a
thought experiment that reveals the social reconstruction of the components
that could prevent its collapse into conflicting fragments. The decomposition
of society, the ongoing “rotting away” of the social corpus, is the focus of
such a study. Contrary to Watkins’s proposition, Hobbes does not employ
dissection as a means toward understanding the primary building blocks that
generate reality. Instead, he is studying the ultimate product of decomposi-
tion (i.e., the individual) as a means toward the end of understanding the
Hobbes: One for All 61
In Genesis 3, even after Adam and Eve are banished from the Garden, order is not
lost, but is continually sought after, promised, and re-established through successive
covenants. The covenants in the Hebrew Bible signify the re-establisment of order.
Similarly, in Hobbes, a high value is placed on establishing order, but in his case
that order is the escape from the original state [of nature]. 20
Adam and Eve’s descendants may rejoin the “great link” of perfect harmony
by employing their rationality to artificially rebuild the original godly unison
of creation. In doing so humankind will dissolve the tension that arises from
physical corporeality, it will cure itself completely of the evils of fragmenta-
tion.
It is the hubris of this rationalist approach, the assumption that perfection
is attainable through the flexing of our faculties, which threatens Hayek’s
sense of individuality. The idea of perfection, a perfect equilibrium, would
leave no scope for contention, no room for competition, no space for alterna-
tive individual positions. 21 It would be a world as stagnant and dead as it is
complete, an inhuman motionless state, devoid of the definitive aspect of
humanity: the capacity to rebel. By contrast, an aversion to the tendency
toward dissent seems to have served as the impetus for the Hobbesean enter-
prise. Although Hayek never refers to Hobbes directly in his lecture “Individ-
ualism: True or False,” and explicitly reflects mostly on a Rousseau-Kantian
authoritarian tradition, I am inclined to agree with Norman Barry that the
lecture is just as much an indictment of Hobbes:
If this indictment of Hobbes holds, then he is neither the skeptic nor the
proponent of individualism that Oakeshott deems him to be. 23
Hobbes: One for All 63
And first we find that Adam was created in such a condition of life, as had he not
broken the commandment of God, he had enjoyed it in the Paradise of Eden Ever-
lastingly. For there was the Tree of Life; whereof he was so long allowed to eat, as
he should forbear to eat of the tree of Knowledge of Good and Evill; which was not
allowed him. And therefore as soon as he had eaten of it, God thrust him out of
Paradise. 26
It is, however, much in line with the position Pacchi attributes to Klaus
Michael Kodalle:
Seen in this light, the painful march of humankind from the natural state to the social
contract is interpreted as a movement of reconciliation of man with God after the sin
of Adam, the restoration of an alliance which evolved gradually through a succes-
sion of covenants—Abraham, Moses the coming of Christ—culminating in the es-
chatological vision of the final establishment of the Reign of God on Earth. 28
Men, vehemently in love with their own new opinions, (though never so absurd,)
and obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those their opinions also that reverenced
name of Conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawfull, to change or speak
against them; and so pretend to know they are true, when they know at most, but that
they think so. 30
pronounces them untrustworthy and therefore ill fitted for restoring faith
among the socially disillusioned.
The rationality that the Hobbesean state introduces into the lives of frag-
mented individuals should be familiar to them both in content and in method
of administration. It is merely a reproduction of the original order embedded
in them by the creator. The citizens take their place in a chain of emulations
of order: the ruler emulates the order as set by the creator, and the subjects
emulate the order as set by the ruler, consequently achieving a conduct
matching that of original creation. In this respect, rather than being a break
with tradition, the Hobbesean position adopts the scholastic method of edu-
cation by apprenticeship. It is a practice that lives on in contemporary school-
ing, at least in the plastic arts in which as part of their training students
literally reproduce masterpieces. It is also a tradition that is supported by the
original creative act as described in scripture, in which man is created in
God’s image, or, in other words, as a scaled down replica of God. Indeed, if
all of creation were to organize itself in a chain of emulation that reached
back to God, the puzzle would be solved and the original harmony of crea-
tion would reign again.
Hobbesean empirical observation of humankind reveals that the original
harmonic order was disrupted. Explanation of the disruption is identified
analytically by tracing the phenomena of insubordination and the associated
fragmentation effect back to its original occurrence, namely, the dispersal of
Edenic human collectivity, symbolized in the shift from the singular appear-
ance of only one Adam and subsequently only one Eve, into a plurality of
individuated human beings. This plurality, contrasting with the singularity of
God, threatens to place the world in a state of disorder due to the lack of
common ground between the fragmented individuals. The conventional an-
swer to this difficulty, which went under the title divine right theory, was to
establish a privileged lineage that connected a sovereign to ancient father
figures, working back to direct knowledge of the original order. Suspicious
of the demonstrability of divine lineage, Hobbes provides an alternative route
to the original common ground. 31
The mission that Hobbes takes up is to prevent anarchy, the unwelcome
outcome of individuation. His ambition is to overcome the barrier between
the necessary singularity of common rule, and the effective plurality of frag-
mented individuals: “But one and the first which disposeth them to sedition,
is this, that the knowledge of good and evil belongs to each single man.” 32
The instrument for achieving the objective of reintegration is the ruler. The
method applied is that of replication, more specifically, the artificial recrea-
tion of a worthy, master-like, corporeal figure, who acts as a surrogate source
of the original lost order. In a similar vein, Martinich argues:
66 Chapter 3
The civil state imitates God in three crucial respects. First, the civil state has over-
whelming power to control its citizens. Second, it has no obligations to its citizens,
even though they have obligation to it. Third, the civil state saves people from the
imminent death lurking in the state of nature, just as God supposedly saves people
from the death of sin. 33
Hobbes’s work is an attempt to mend a broken society that has lost touch
with the original order, by cloning it in the image of a model with proven
credentials. Much like a broken vase, humanity has been reduced to frag-
ments and rendered dysfunctional. Since the fragments can no longer hold
themselves together, and since God’s “hands” cannot be soiled in corporeal-
ity, the sovereign’s hands must actively hold the pieces together.
The sovereign is acting for God; she is his angel or messenger in the
biblical sense. 34 The role is essentially that of a coordinator who holds her
subjects in their place vis-à-vis each other, and, in as far as she is merely a
conduit for the Godly to enter this world, she is not strictly speaking “running
the show.” That is not to say that “the show” runs itself, or self-replicates.
The sought after coordination is not that of Smith or Hume—a coordination
that is achieved by means of a correlating “invisible hand” that relies on the
exchange of signals between individuals. 35 The sovereign does not teach
individuals to properly communicate with each other, nor does she provide
them with a method to recognize each other’s signals. Such efforts would be
futile, since direct communication would only reiterate their irreconcilable
differences. The subjects must be entirely alienated from each other, acting
only in accordance with prescribed standardized guidelines. Only if they all
follow the sovereign’s order to the letter will they become synchronized into
unison:
In the state of nature, where every man is his own judge, and differeth from other
concerning the names and appellations of things, and from those differences arise
quarrels, and breach of peace; it was necessary there should be a common measure
of all things that might fall in controversy. . . . This common measure, some say, is
right reason: with whom I should consent, if there were anything to be found or
known in rerum naturâ. But commonly they that call for right reason, to decide any
controversy, do mean their own. But this is certain, seeing right reason is nonexis-
tent, the reason of some man, or men [that have the sovereign power] . . . must
supply the place thereof. 36
Moreover, due to her corollary relation of obedience with God, the sovereign
ineluctably acts as the role model for obedience. She too works within the
strict guidelines that she subsequently projects upon her own prescriptions.
The trickling down of rationality follows the aforementioned Russian doll
model; however, unlike the solid version in which each doll is prefabricated
to fit perfectly into its larger facsimile, in the living version the perfect match
between the components requires that every level shape itself in the image of
Hobbes: One for All 67
the previous level, forming a chain of replications. This chain goes back to
the original master copy, reminiscent of the description in Scripture of man’s
creation in God’s image.
The question arises whether the end-product of this chain of replications
achieves endurance or perdurance? David Lewis argues that endurance is
persistence through time in a complete form. 37 In each and every moment
nothing is lost and nothing is gained. The object persists through time as a
replication of itself; its facsimile keeps surfacing again and again. The source
of its recurrence is either something inherent to it, or is achieved by an
external “fax machine” that keeps recreating it. In certain accounts such an
external source would be named God. By contrast, perdurance is persistence
that is stretched through a set of time frames, just as a road might stretch
spatially. It allows for both losses and gains to the object, thereby drawing
the essence of its existence from a deeper layer of existence or from an
exterior source; again, perhaps, God. 38
Hobbesean godliness appears to be characterized by endurance rather
than perdurance. The act of creation seeds within existence a permanent
order that can be rationally decoded, and thus potentially regenerated. There
is textual evidence that Hobbes himself detested the term potential, and
would therefore probably have found the wording “the power to regenerate
itself” more agreeable. 39 Nevertheless, despite Hobbes’s reservations, the
initial term conveys the tension, identified by Strauss, between the power of
Hobbesean reason in theory and its inability, unassisted by the motivation of
the passions, to exercise its power in practice. 40 The sovereign is therefore an
artificial replication of God who is charged with realizing the potential of
order to artificially replicate itself. Moreover, the sovereign’s role as the
earthly replicator of godly order assists the Hobbesean argument by contend-
ing with the difficulty of a potential conflict between the ruler’s bidding and
God’s bidding, recognized in chapter forty-two of Leviathan. 41 The sove-
reign is required to replicate our existence, thereby instilling a sense of
familiarity that breeds security. We, in turn, are expected to take part in the
replication process by replicating the method of replication—that is, employ-
ing rationality in our consideration of the reign of the sovereign. Any attempt
on our part to break the chain of replication would therefore be both irration-
al and ungodly.
Although something of the traditional hierarchy between God, sovereign,
and “the flock” survives here, in Hobbes’s version the flock are godly-like
creatures and therefore have a heightened aspiration toward order that legiti-
mates the sovereign as its provider. In sufficiently large groups, due to sparse
interaction, natural replication of order by imitation becomes unviable. If we
rarely meet naturally, we might need to meet artificially. 42 It is such artificial
mediation that is provided by the sovereign. The state is a rational node, an
artificial mechanism that duplicates a process at the macro level, with which
68 Chapter 3
we are intimately familiar, and occurs naturally at the micro level of the
family or the village. 43 Once again we are merely expected to reacquaint
ourselves with an inwrought order; to reestablish contact with the root of our
creation.
Following the Church Fathers, the Hobbesean text observes in Scripture the
description of an original sin-related fall, from the pinnacle of an innocent,
seamlessly peaceful social unison in the Garden of Eden to the dire straits of
individuated social hostility. 44 For Hobbes, contrary to the pessimism often
associated with his approach, all hope is not lost. 45 Humankind can still hope
to salvage itself, not only in death, but also in life. The evidence for this is to
be found in the biblical account of the rise of ancient Hebraic society. 46
Hobbes views the replication of the course of law-abiding society charted in
scripture as the pattern for reunification with the one and only sustainable
order. Life need not be wasted in a miserable solitary wait for reunification in
death, breeding superstitious worldly beliefs in the meantime. Instead, union
can be achieved here and now by employing the instrument of reason to
clone the original order. We can pick up the pieces of the human state of
nature, and rationally work out the puzzle of putting them back together in
just the right sequence needed in order to reform the godly state of nature: an
order of perfect equilibrium that once achieved will have an indefinite hold.
In a similar vein, Hampton observes that, “as Hobbes might say (DC, EW ii,
pref. xiv), the social contract theorist figuratively takes the state apart and
(rationally) puts it back together again in order to explain the structure of any
existing state and to determine whether or not it is justified.” 47
According to David Johnston, the Hobbesean rational engagement with
worldly matters, as opposed to the superstitious (or perhaps more precisely,
awe-struck) attitudes that riddled pre-Hobbesean Christian theology,
amounts to no less than a “transformation of the human psyche that would
prepare men and women to be assembled . . . into a truly lasting political
community.” 48 This divergence from the standard Christian thinking of his
contemporaries is related to Hobbes’s adoption of the Mortalist or “soul
sleeping” heresy. 49 J. F. Maclear correctly traces these differences within the
Christian faithful to the “tension between the Hellenic concept of psychic
immortality and the Hebraic emphasis on the Last Judgment.” 50 In the for-
mer, the waiting is an attribute of corporeal life, with death announcing the
end of the queue and heralding a transmutation into a sublime psychic form
that spends the afterlife in either an immaterial heaven or hell. 51 In the latter,
death has no liberating connotations; on the contrary, in death one is co-
Hobbes: One for All 69
And it is beside evident in reason, that since Death and Misery, were the punish-
ments of Sin, the discharge of Sinne, must also be a discharge of Death and Mis-
ery. 58
And:
But where it is said, In the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die, it must
needs bee meant of his Mortality, and certitude of death. Seeing then Eternall life
was lost by Adams forfeiture, in committing sin, he that should cancel that forfeiture
was to recover thereby, that Life again. 59
Of all these Formes of Government, the matter being mortall, so that not only
Monarchs, but also whole Assemblies dy, it is necessary for the conservation of the
peace of men, that as there were order taken from an Artificiall man, so there be
order taken from an Artificiall Eternity of life. 61
The logic here is that what does not change is forever left uninterrupted, even
by death. In a world guided by consistent rules, nothing changes and nothing
dies. In such a world everything is predictable and therefore nothing is to be
feared. Thus the removal of death from the equation willy-nilly removes
irrational fear as well.
The aforementioned division between the afterlife as God’s business and
life (of “embodied minds”) as our business lends itself to being misconstrued
as capitulation to agnosticism. 62 For example, Fania Oz-Salzberger claims
that thinkers like Hobbes and John Selden followed a modern implementa-
tion of a Hebraic model that originally “achieved the breakthrough of remov-
ing civil society from its divine cradle,” thus paving “the way for the secular-
ization of modern European politics.” 63 Although Hobbesean texts may have
been an inspiration for such secularization in the thought of later thinkers,
Hobbesean theory loses much of its robustness without its theological meta-
physical grounding. 64 While one can make a good case for the secularization
of Hobbes, such a metaphysics-free analysis relies on the subjugation, if not
collapse, of his ought to, or into, his is. 65
Once the Hobbesean rationalist ought is identified and separated from the
empiricist is, one appreciates that the Hobbesean acknowledgement of a
division between the profane and the holy is not meant as an endorsement,
but rather a description of the malady of society, of which individuation is a
symptom. Far from advocating individuality, Hobbes seeks to annihilate it by
reestablishing the long lost orderly unison that has been preserved in the
words of Scripture. The proper use of words, their use according to infallible
rules of logic, holds the key to an everlasting perfect order of peaceful exis-
tence. Once such perfection is reached, nothing will be wanting, since the
world will have come to a state of rest. There can, however, be only one
order that remains in perfect equilibrium: a monist godly order. Moreover,
the existence of multiple equilibria, a plurality of peaceful arrangements of
the world, implies polytheism. There is but a single workable peaceful order
that applies to the corporeal human existence. The same scientific approach
that is applied to physics should therefore be successfully applied to poli-
tics—indeed, the same rules should apply in all orderly engagements. As
Netanyahu notes:
The prevalent opinion [across monotheistic theology of the middle ages, from Mai-
monides and Al-Ghazali through Averroes to Roger Bacon] was that it [Scripture]
contained not only “wonders of wisdom,” but all the truths concerning all the prob-
lems which baffle the human mind. It is only through Revelation, through God’s
Hobbes: One for All 71
word to the Hebrew prophets, that man learned what he knew, and it is therefore on
the foundations of revealed knowledge that all sciences rest. 66
Nevertheless, this does not entail that revelation is superior to reason. In-
stead, reason and revelation, both being derivatives of infallible logic, should
be regarded as two sides of the same coin. 67 Netanyahu provides an explana-
tion for such a relationship in the context of the theology of the middle ages:
There seemed to be no question, then, that one must look to Holy Writ as the source
of all truth. But the question was how to understand or interpret Holy Writ. Here
human reason, seemingly suppressed and relegated to secondary importance, began
to manifest its strength. Instead of guiding and controlling Reason in accordance
with what they found in Scripture, people began to interpret Scripture in accordance
with the directives of Reason. 68
For Hobbes, the absence of a clear and authoritative divine voice, far from being the
cause of our woes, enables and even requires the possibility of human agency. Our
reason is a gift from God, a “talent” given to us in order to negotiate a world marked
by God’s (relative) absence. Rather than despair, we must endeavour to become
aware of our own power to discover and produce truths in God’s name. 78
Preventing natural law from being relegated to a dead letter makes the
ruler an agent of God, not in the divine right sense, but as an instrument that
enables individuals to act in accordance with the laws of nature, or in other
words in a godly manner. The Hobbesean position is wrongly understood to
have discarded God, completely replacing him with a mortal God. It is true
that the Hobbesean stance may have cut the umbilical cord between God and
sovereign; nevertheless, the Hobbesean sovereign still facilitates the pursuit
of God in a corporeal existence. She ceases to be God on earth in the divine
right sense—she is not a vessel through which God speaks; she is, instead, a
vehicle for the pursuit of godly reason. Moreover, and as noted above, our
relationship with God is perceived by Hobbes to be a unilateral one. Conse-
quently, God’s direction will not pursue us; we must pursue it.
The secularization of Hobbesean thought fails to generate a legitimacy of
authority that could, conclusively, put to rest the Hobbesean social nightmare
of mutiny. Understood in a secularized fashion, apart from reducing human
interaction to a material struggle over the source of social motion (i.e., mate-
rial power), the Hobbesean position does nothing to finalize the struggle for
power; it may even perpetuate it. It is on the grounds of ineffectiveness in
advancing social peace, the foremost goal of the Hobbesean endeavor, that
the secular interpretation must be rejected. Without the appeal to the singu-
larity of a one and only ordained order, so perfect that no one could reason-
ably object to it, and no one in their right mind hope to unseat it, the entire
project collapses.
WORD WORSHIP
Galileo; Galileo thought that geometry was the key to celestial mechanics . . . once it
was spelled out, [truth] was a matter of necessity. 90
reached the height of their natural development, there is nothing that they
can yet learn, whereas humans still have untapped artificial social poten-
tial. 95
Setting us apart from the beasts, and by contrast with Aristotle’s notion of
society, the Hobbesean argument views rationality and sociability as inter-
changeable. Primates, although not addressed within the Hobbesean text,
would probably have been described as possessing a modicum of rationality.
Zenon Bankowski, in an attempt to illustrate rationality, makes use of a
nature program on television depicting monkey behavior:
The monkey displays rationality when it universalises and transcends the particular
experience. When it sees that what happened is not something that stands alone. It
sees the event as something that can be connected with past and future experiences
and it so connects them. . . . It is a refusal to see the world as a chaotic universe of
particular instances which have no connection. 96
From the Hobbesean perspective, the human advantage over the primates’
“modicum rationality” is derived from our ability to build upon a legacy of
accumulated rational discoveries:
Whereas there is no Felicity of Beasts, but the enjoying of their quotidian Food,
Ease, and Lusts; as having little, or no foresight of the time to come, for want of
observation, and memory of the order, consequence, and dependance on things they
see; Man observeth how one Event hath been produced by another; and rememberth
in them Antecedence and Consequence. 97
The human employment of oral language and the written word emulates God
in two ways: it emulates the aforementioned action of creation, since “the
first author of Speech was God himself,” and it emulates God’s immortality
by allowing us to transcend the fleeting moment, “to Register, what by cogi-
tation, wee find to be the cause of any thing, present or past; and what we
78 Chapter 3
Hobbes, as opposed to Hume, clearly does not believe that nature has
blessed us with enough innate “lubrication.” Moreover, he implies, by allud-
ing to the banishment of Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden, that we
brought ruin upon ourselves. 101 Still, does this amount to the advocating of a
bionic society? Is the solidity of the new form of authority he aspires to the
product of mastering a chemical recipe, thereby producing the political
equivalent of super-reinforced concrete? In a section of Hobbes and the
Social Contract Tradition entitled “Hobbes’s Materialist Psychology,”
Hampton argues for the standard view of Hobbes as a strong physical reduc-
tionist who builds upon the emerging natural philosophy of his day in order
to establish a physics of the body politic. She here relies on exerts from De
Corpore to arrive at the conclusion that, not only does Hobbes insist that “the
explanation of human behavior is to be found in the study of physics,” but
also that he adopts the view that the behavioral functions of humans can be
reduced to “the (deterministic) natural laws of motion that the ultimate [ato-
mistic] particles always obey.” Moreover, Hampton deduces from “the tone
of [Hobbes’s] discussion in chapter six of Leviathan . . . the more controver-
sial thesis that there was a unique reduction of a psychological state to a
physical state.” 102 The breadth and depth of her textual evidence notwith-
standing, accepting this radically reductionist portrayal of the Hobbesean
stance supports the conclusion that his is a bionic project. On this under-
standing, Hobbes proposes to reconstruct faulty fools by manipulating the
physical occurrences that induce their social motivations. However, should
this construction be anything short of perfect it would eventually suffer from
the same physical ailments, and by extension also social ones, that it was
established to eradicate in the first place. Consequently, either the eradication
is left incomplete, or it relies on a perpetuum mobile device. Yet, the latter
would either be inapplicable outside the vacuum of theory, or in practice it
would defy the very laws of physics.
It is tempting to answer this dilemma by projecting Kavka’s argument as
to the idealized sense in which Hobbes conjures up a state of nature populat-
ed by idealized individuals, onto its negative in the photographic sense: the
state. 103 On Kavka’s account, in the context of the counterfactual state of
nature, the hypothetical idealized individual serves a heuristic purpose.
Therefore, could the idealized individual not serve in the factual world as a
model, an ideal type to be aspired to, if never fulfilled. Coherence considera-
tions would suggest otherwise. It would be difficult to detach Hobbeseanism
from its absolutist, all or nothing, tenets. Hobbesean theory places individu-
als on a slippery slope: they are either rational agents, or fools; either there is
an absolute captain at the helm, or the social vessel goes completely out of
control: “For the sovereign is absolute . . . or else there is no Sovereignty at
all.” 104 There is no room for partial allegiance; those who comply are friends
80 Chapter 3
and those who do not are foes. The citizenry either complies absolutely, or it
does not comply at all.
The Hobbesean project is not about controlling the fire within, but rather
about extinguishing it. It is a final act of contracting apprehension of the
other out of existence. 105 Distrust is like a bonfire, if one does not put it out,
it will spontaneously reignite. Insofar as we are presented with a choice at all,
it is an all or nothing choice between gaining the security that goes hand in
hand with submission to the sovereign, or facing the insecurity of incompli-
ance; the latter choice being in reality a hypothetical deterrent that no one in
their right mind would choose over the former. As Kavka contends, it serves
as motivation for making the grade, for stopping the fall into the state of
nature. 106 However, just as much as the state of nature remains an actual
impossibility, so, too, the photographic negative image of a perfect state
populated by rational citizens must be real. It must be achievable in its
entirety, or not at all. It cannot be hypothetical, not even in part. Once the
puzzle has been pieced together, it is solved conclusively. It is the attainabil-
ity of the truth through the tool of rationality that puts all discord to rest. It is
a single truth that spans all of creation.
NOTES
Hayek: “Hayek was attempting to draw economists away from their tendency to characterise
the competitive order as an equilibrium state, arguing that because equilibrium ‘presupposes
that the facts have already all been discovered and competition therefore ceased’ (NS 184),
such a concept was of limited theoretical use.” Chandran Kukathas, Hayek and Modern Liber-
alism (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon, 1989), 96.
22. Norman Barry, “The Tradition of Spontaneous Order,” Literature of Liberty 5, no. 2
(1982): 9. Barry reiterates this contention by positing Sir Matthew Hale’s reply to Hobbes’s
Dialogue of Common Laws, as an argument against rationalism, in the tradition of Adam
Smith, Edmund Burke and in the present day, Friedrich Hayek; ibid., 15.
23. Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association, 60–62.
24. John Bramhall, Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, 36.
25. Arrigo Pacchi, “Hobbes and Biblical Philology in the Service of the State,” Topoi 7
(1988): 234.
26. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 38, 307.
27. Garrath Williams, “Normatively Demanding Creatures: Hobbes, the Fall and Individual
Responsinility,” Res Publica 6 (2000): 309.
28. Pacchi, “Hobbes and Biblical Philology in the Service of the State,” 236.
29. See also Tom Sorell, “Hobbes’s Moral Philosophy,” in The Cambridge Companion to
Hobbes’s Leviathan, ed. Patricia Springborg (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press,
2007), 146.
30. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 7, 48.
31. See also Martinich, Two Gods, 47.
32. Hobbes, Man and Citizen, 244; De Cive, XII, 1.
33. Martinich, Two Gods, 336.
34. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 34, 277.
35. Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, ed. Kathryn Sutherland (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1998), 292.
36. Hobbes, Human Nature and De Corpore Politico, 180–81.
37. David K. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell, 1986), 202–4.
38. Christopher H. Conn, Locke on Essence and Identity (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluw-
er Academic, 2003), 95.
39. Hobbes, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, vol. IV, 299.
40. Strauss, Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 130.
41. Hobbes, Leviathan, 388.
42. So-called netizens have taken this idea to its extreme, claiming that the ease and fre-
quency of virtual interaction could replace sovereignty altogether. Roger Hurwitz, “Who Needs
Politics? Who Needs People? The Ironies of Democracy in Cyberspace,” Contemporary Soci-
ology 28, no. 6 (1999): 655.
43. I use “node” here in the sense of a central intersection of information exchange.
44. See also Wolin, Politics and Vision, 237.
45. Garrath Williams, “Normatively Demanding Creatures: Hobbes, the Fall and Individual
Responsibility,” Res Publica 6 (2000): 312.
46. Martinich, Two Gods, 272; Adam Sutcliffe, Judaism and Enlightenment (Cambridge,
U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 49–50.
47. Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, 269; emphasis in original.
48. David Johnston, “Hobbes’s Mortalism,” History of Political Thought 10, no. 4 (1989):
130.
49. See reference 2 in J. F. Maclear, “Anne Hutchinson and the Mortalist Heresy,” New
England Quarterly 54, no. 1 (1981): 75; Pocock, Politics, Language and Time, 175; Martinich,
Two Gods, 262–63.
50. Maclear, “Anne Hutchinson and the Mortalist Heresy,” 78.
51. Martinich, Two Gods, 257–66.
52. Maclear, “Anne Hutchinson and the Mortalist Heresy,” 76.
53. Pocock, Politics, Language and Time, 193–94, 200; also, Brandon, The Coherence of
Hobbes’s Leviathan, 62.
54. Ezekiel 37:1–14; Daniel 12:13.
82 Chapter 3
91. Andrew Lister, “Scepticism and Pluralism in Hobbes’s Political Thought,” History of
Political Thought 19, no. 1 (1998).
92. See also Richard Tuck’s comments in his introduction to Leviathan, xlii.
93. Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association, 24.
94. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 17, 119–20.
95. Understood in this fashion, Hobbeseanism feeds into Marxism.
96. Zenon Bankowski, Living Lawfully (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 2001), 24.
97. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 12, 76.
98. Ibid., ch. 4, 24, 25.
99. Ibid., ch. 13, 96.
100. Louis K. Dupré, The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism (New York: Harcourt,
1966), 288.
101. Hobbes, Leviathan, 307, 407.
102. Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, 12, 13.
103. Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory, 84.
104. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 20, 142.
105. Apprehension and not all out war; since, as Gregory Kavka argues, in the Hobbesean
state of war the “parties need not actually be fighting each other. . . . All that is required is a
known willingness.” Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory, 90.
106. Ibid., 84.
Chapter Four
85
86 Chapter 4
Private Duels are, and alwayes will be Honourable, though unlawful, till such time
as there shall be Honour ordained for them that refuse, and Ignominy for them that
make the Challenge. For Duels also are many times effects of Courage; and the
ground of Courage is alwayes Strength or Skill, which are Power; though for the
most part they be effects of rash speaking, and of the fear of Dishonour, in one, or
both the Combatants; who engaged by rashnesse, are driven into the Lists to avoyd
disgrace. 5
Hobbes thinks immediately of such large societies as his own, in which one may
interact with new people almost daily. . . . To resolve problems of a large society,
Hobbes supposes we require the imposition of a powerful sovereign so that our
relationships with thousands of others are regulated by dyadic relationships with the
sovereign. 16
which the transgressor either actually steals my cows and sells them to a
slaughterhouse, or is merely perceived as a continual threat to their well-
being. This state of economic uncertainty ensues a domino-effect-collapse of
trade networks, moreover the lack of recourse risks degenerating personal
commercial enterprise altogether. It thereby reaffirms the Hobbesean insis-
tence that, ideally, no one should remain outside the bounds of the contract.
Those who retain the ability to threaten our contracted stability, identify
themselves as the foe of our efforts to achieve a peaceful commonwealth.
In a similar vein, Kavka finds a disparity between the Hobbesean defini-
tion of the state of nature as a condition of war, on the one hand, and its
portrayal as an unpleasant, yet manageable, state of affairs on the other.
Kavka summarizes the characteristics of the Hobbesean state of war in three
points:
a. A relational concept that may exclude or include others parties.
b. A known willingness to fight that does not necessarily pronounce itself
in actual violence at any given moment.
c. A disposition to fight unless assurances are provided.
Bearing these characteristics in mind, he observes that actual occurrences of
“violence, and the injury, death, and the fear that it engenders,” would not be
prevalent. 19 He therefore concludes that it is the alternative threat of an
“absence of the fruits of social cooperation and of the incentive to labor
productively” that makes remaining in the state of nature so unattractive.
Yet Kavka might be selling the Hobbesean argument short. The “fear of
death and injury” can also be understood in a much less literal manner. The
Hobbesean argument identifies corporeal existence as primary, and conse-
quently its demise as detrimental to any social, cultural or commercial activ-
ity. Nevertheless, the survival of the body must be matched within the Hob-
besean framework with a survival of identity: a name, an address, a deed to
property. Without the preservation of such attributes the rational differentia-
tion between man and beast that Hobbes cultivates is left meaningless. On a
broader interpretation, fear of death involves an insecurity of identity over a
time-continuum that might be secondary to corporal insecurity, but is a nec-
essary condition for the employment of rationality. Such an interpretation is
complementary to my earlier identification of the fundamental Hobbesean
problem of distrust as one that occurs among strangers. It also accounts for
an extremely bleak portrayal of the state of nature, matching the Hobbesean
proclamation that, “in such condition, there is no place for Industry; because
the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no
Navigation . . . no Society; and which is worst of all, continual feare, and
danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish,
and short.” 20 Without identity there can be no consistency, and without con-
sistency there can be neither commerce nor science.
Hobbes: Rationality as Recurrence 91
If [there be] no safety [there be] no propriety, neither of goods, wives, children nor
lives, and if there be no propriety there will be no husbandry and the lands will lie
unmanured; also there will be neither trade nor traffic, all which will cause famine,
war, and ruin, and such a confusion as the kingdom will be like a chaos, which the
gods keep us from. 21
The lack of propriety that worries both Hobbes and Cavendish is intrinsically
connected to a concern about continuous identity. This is exemplified in the
above illustration of commercial exchange. If I am offering you an exchange
of my cows’ milk for your cider, as much as we should mutually be con-
cerned about the physical availability of the product and the well-being of its
producer, we should equally be concerned about the consistency of each
other’s identity. Am I who I present myself to be, and how can you be
assured that I will continue to represent myself in the same fashion. If I do
live up to my responsibilities, I will have generated a consistency of credit;
however, this welcome condition cannot be established on goodwill alone, it
requires a ruling body to provide longstanding reliable assurances.
In comes the ruler to administrate our identity, to steer us in the godly
persistent way of language and law, and if necessary to utilize force to keep
order within and transgressors of our established identity at bay. The state
apparatus can be regarded as an extension of the ruler, acting as the ruler’s
stability management firm. Since insecurity is the mother of all ills, causing
the future to collapse and individuals to react in an irrational ungodly fash-
ion, the enterprise aspires to reach a state of stability that can no longer be
disrupted. It seeks to provide a perfect equilibrium—it aspires to godliness.
Yet, this uncovers tension within the Hobbesean system. If the state and the
ruler are roughly, as I have argued, one and the same and the ruler is not
godly by divine right, then the aspiration to perfection is unattainable and the
construction is ultimately ineffective, since it is not free of the risk of col-
lapse. Alternatively, if the perfect equilibrium is within reach, then the ruler
and by extension the ruled have inexplicably transcended emulation of godli-
ness and entered into a state of “native God.” The created find themselves
elevated to the rank of the creator.
But we have seen that prisoner’s dilemmas do not underlie the institution of the state
in Hobbes’s or Locke’s theory. Although they are the sort of problem precipitating
conflict for which the state is supposed to be a solution, they are not the problem
which must be solved to create that solution. Another more easily solved problem
underlies the state’s creation—i.e., the conflict-ridden coordination game. 33
Like Russell Hardin, Hampton reiterates the Humean stance that promissori-
al agreement is neither fruitful nor necessary. 34 In their view social tension,
according to Hobbes, does not resolve itself through recurrence (be it the
theoretical recurrence of hypothetical rational calculation of a Rawlsean
thought experiment, or by the actual reiteration of Gauthierean prisoner’s
dilemma situations), rather it is resolved by the introduction of the powerful
coordinating ruler, as the original Hobbesean text suggests. 35 Moreover, Har-
din reaffirms Hampton’s differentiation between Gauthier and Hobbes,
maintaining that:
The resolution of our disputes demands that they be taken out of our hands,
placing ourselves in a state of alienation. Any resolution in which we are
actively involved is bound to regress into a problematic original promise-
making scenario.
While Gauthier casts Hobbes as a liberal rational-choice contract theorist,
with essentially no role for the forceful ruler, Hampton wishes to resurrect
Hobbes’s insistence on the need for the creation of a powerful Leviathan.
The sheer extent of the power of the Leviathan is her solution to our natural
mistrust (prisoner’s dilemma). Where she thinks Hobbes went wrong is in his
explanation of the creation of the Leviathan. On her account, the Leviathan
Hobbes: Rationality as Recurrence 95
cannot rely on promises, and in this it makes no difference if the looked for
ground is a grand-promise (the third law of nature) or an aggregation of
minor promise situations (reiterated prisoner’s dilemma). The Leviathan, the
first form of cooperation, can be preceded by coordination alone. 37
Gauthier returns matters to our own hands. He empowers individuals by
enhancing the original Hobbesean, future-oriented, rational outlook. Individ-
uals are no longer weaklings, susceptible to an inherently “foolish” human
frailty of the mind. Society is no longer an arena of measured civilized
competition, but rather a platform for the exercise of rationality-enhancing
cooperative interaction. Both God and the coercive sovereign that emulates
Him are rendered obsolete. Or, as Hampton puts it:
Gauthier is, I believe, trying to make the following point. If people have decided to
enter into a world in which their interactions are cooperative rather than coercive,
then coercive power and the goods that this power has amassed no longer define the
parties’ bargaining positions. 38
which strangers casually enter into trade, rely on the provider of the service
acting as a data banker, compiling an openly accessible yet secure database
of user profiles containing voluntary reciprocal comments on the users’ past
conduct. The fraudsters that are attracted to these communities notwithstand-
ing, the risk of losing one’s untarnished reputation to retaliatory defamation
might also deter reputable agents from voicing grievances. 45 Indeed, a recent
report on a change in eBay feedback policy reported that “eBay officials say
the feedback change was necessary to counter a growing trend of sellers
leaving retaliatory ratings for buyers who give them negative ratings.” 46 In
the micro-cosmos of the online trading community, padding of reputations
goes no further than artificially inflating the general sense of confidence. But
if, as Gauthier claims, this is the conduct of the rational self-interested indi-
vidual at large, one must ask oneself whether, under this populist regime,
demand would not outstrip, or “overload” supply? 47
One could still argue that contemporary research into online trading pro-
vides a degree of corroboration for Gauthier’s view that self-interested reci-
procity is sufficient to generate trust among strangers. Gauthier’s position is
reinforced by the reliance of the virtual community on a reciprocal ranking
system. Moreover, disputes are primarily referred to mutually accepted medi-
ation that holds, at most, only limited coercive power. However, in the par-
ticular case of the exemplar online trading service eBay, a further purchase
protection program with increased insurance is offered to buyers, provided
that the purchaser uses eBay’s own proxy payment service PayPal. Although
the effect of buyer protection on electronic trade has yet to be thoroughly
studied, it should be noted that in practice self-interest and reciprocity do not
necessarily emerge spontaneously. 48 The contribution of both actual insu-
rance provision, as well as trust in the brand name under which the trading
activity is being conducted, should not be overlooked. While coercion might
play a minuscule role in these commercial exchanges, it is submission to an
external authority, and not to an internal, rational and autonomous one,
which generates the observed orderly conduct.
Since it is a market of limited trust, eBay is perhaps not the best of
illustrations. That it is such a market is indicated by David Lucking-Reiley’s
finding that although collectables accounted for some eighty-five percent of
listings, “high priced collectibles (valuable art and antiques) have remained
the purview of brick-and-mortar auction houses such as Sotheby’s and Chris-
tie’s.” 49 Lucking-Reiley does observe that this real-world exclusivity may be
in the process of disappearing due to the acquisition of traditional auction
houses by their online counterparts. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that high-
profile artwork will truly follow the anonymous carefree process by which
less valuable items are exchanged. Equally, although vehicle sales are not
uncommon on eBay, the completion of the deal involves the transfer of
registration “the old fashioned way.” Moreover, even the most imaginative
98 Chapter 4
mind would find it difficult to envisage the sale of real estate solely by means
of eBay, that is, without the verification of identity and legal transfer of
ownership traditionally provided by conventional state institutions.
The reciprocal verification of identity has been, and continues to be, the
task of the state. The state serves its citizens as the technical guarantor of the
singular and continued identity of strangers who come upon one another on a
first or occasional basis. Thus it extends our trust and opens the door to
dealings outside the intimate circles of our family, our clan, and our village,
to those whom we have just met. The sovereign is the guardian of our
integrity. As far as our interaction with strangers is concerned, without her
each and every one of us could wake up every day, quite literally as a
different person. Those who find this assertion farfetched should consider the
difficulties with which immigration authorities are confronted when attempt-
ing to identify individuals from “disorderedly” states in which records are
frequently abused. The lack of reliable record keeping allows citizens of
theses states to reinvent themselves when interacting with foreign authorities.
Indeed, one could argue that a lack of trustworthy authoritative record keep-
ing undermines the entire claim to statehood. Without the sovereign, the
keeper of records, spontaneous orderly conduct would only occur, as Taylor
correctly observes, in a size-restricted closely knit community. 50 While some
forms of social conduct among strangers may not require coercion, they
ultimately rely on a much more substantial role of sovereign authority than
Gauthier allows for, if they are to occur on a grand scale. Furthermore,
although the registrar of the state serves to extend the boundaries of our
sociability, it does so at the expense of binding its citizenry to a particular
identity.
Given that the task of the state is to generate our particular identity, and
hence to facilitate peaceful interaction among strangers, would a universal
registrar not deliver the utmost in this regard? Although the logical validity
of the universalist stance cannot be questioned, its ability to contend with the
actuality of a human existence restricted to time and space, can. The theoreti-
cal formula which universalists employ defies these restrictions. Individuals
are assumed in their models to interact with each other on an entirely de-
tached dimensional plane. This cannot be faulted on the formulaic level and
must therefore be conceded as a theoretical truth; nevertheless, it is in disso-
nance with our most basic perception of ourselves. Unfortunately we cannot
be both at the dentist’s and at a relative’s funeral at the same time, nor can we
deny the finality of our relative’s death. Experience convinces us that we
must resign ourselves to being in one place at any particular time. In the
Gautherian version of the Hobbesean formula time is at a virtual standstill, as
our future is considered a reiteration of our past, and spatial restriction is of
no consideration. 51 In this chapter I have pointed out both ethical and practi-
cal difficulties that arise as a result of embracing a past reputation-based
Hobbes: Rationality as Recurrence 99
NOTES
1. Niccolò Machiavelli, Machiavelli: The Prince, ed. Quentin Skinner (Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge University Press, 1988).
2. See also Martinich, Two Gods, 44–45.
3. See also Dietrich Ritschl, “Can Ethical Maxims Be Derived from Theological Concepts
of Human Dignity?,” in The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse, ed. Eckart
Klein and David Kretzmer (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), 96: “both Hobbes
and Locke operate with the presupposition that the destiny of the human race is not destruction
or extinction (this too, is a parallel to the biblical concept of covenant).”
4. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 27, 206.
5. Ibid., ch. 10, 67.
6. Sivert Langholm, “Violent Conflict Resolution and the Loser’s Reaction: A Case Study
from 1547,” Journal of Peace Research 2, no. 4 (1965): 324.
7. Vickie L. Ziegler, Trial by Fire and Battle in Medieval German Literature (Rochester,
N.Y.: Camden House, 2004), 118.
8. The imagery of unruly children is borrowed from Jean Hampton, Political Philosophy
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1997), 63.
9. See also Theodore Waldman, “Hobbes on the Generation of a Public Person,” in Thom-
as Hobbes in His Time, ed. Ralph Ross, Herbert W. Schneider, and Theodore Waldman (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974), 70.
10. Watkins, Hobbes’s System, 115–16. See also David Luban, Legal Modernism (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 294.
11. The expression “opening the future” is borrowed from Roberto Bernasconi, “‘Opening
the Future’—The Paradox of Promising in the Hobbessian Social Contract,” Philosophy Today
41, no. 1–4 (1997); Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 27, 206.
12. Ibid., ch. 14, 90.
13. It is worth noting that, drawing upon Eve’s role in the Edenic narrative, monotheistic
thought came to associate temptation with women, perhaps originating the alignment of pas-
sions with femininity, and rationality with masculinity and, in an extreme version, women with
the devil and men with God. See Avraham Grossman, Pious and Rebellious: Jewish Women in
Medieval Europe (Lebanon, N.H.: Brandeis University Press, 2004), 13–15. Moreover, once
such a division is accepted and the project of the state is understood as a project of pure
rationalization, the exclusion of women from statesmanship is ideologically explained.
14. Note that this problem is avoided in a divine right based theory, since strictly speaking
all humans are kin, going back to the original forefathers of humanity. Authoritative figures are
understood to have gained their stature by a mythical direct line to the truth, originally handed
to their ancient ancestors by God himself.
15. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 14, 90.
16. Russell Hardin, “From Power to Order, from Hobbes to Hume,” Journal of Political
Philosophy 1, no. 1 (1993): 70.
17. For a discussion of the condition of sovereignty by conquest, as well as other circum-
stances that may result from acquisition by force, see Hobbes, “A Review, and Conclusion,”
Leviathan, 485–86.
18. See also Gregory Kavka’s discussion of the influence of even a scarce amount of
“dominators” on the conduct of “moderates” within society: Hobbesian Moral and Political
Theory, 104–7.
19. Ibid., 90.
20. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 13, 89.
100 Chapter 4
21. Margaret Cavendish Newcastle (Duchess of), Political Writings, ed. Susan James (Cam-
bridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 167.
22. Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory, 4.
23. Hobbes, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury: Elements of Philosophy,
vol. II, iv.
24. Jody S. Kraus, The Limits of Hobbesian Contractarianism (Cambridge, U.K.: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1993), 254–59.
25. Samuel Freeman, “Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views,” Philosophy and
Public Affairs 19 (1990): 134.
26. David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon, 1986), 328.
27. Ibid., 315.
28. See ibid., 181, 188. The conclusion in the main text holds provided that the proportion of
CMs in the population is not below a critical threshold.
29. “Reiterated prisoner’s dilemma” refers to the game-theory mathematical model of a
situation in which suboptimal outcomes, stemming from the inability to trust one’s partner in
an initial stand-alone interaction, are commonly understood to be avoided by presuming a
recurrence of the interaction. See Norman Schofield, “Modeling Political Order in Representa-
tive Democracies,” in Political Order Nomos xxxviii, ed. Ian Shapiro and Russell Hardin (New
York: New York University Press, 1996), 94.
30. Micahel Taylor, “Rationality and Revolution Collective Action,” in Rationality and
Revolution, ed. Michael Taylor (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University, 1988).
31. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (London: Penguin, 1990).
32. Anatol Rapoport, Game Theory as a Theory of Conflict Resolution (Dordrecht, the
Netherlands: Reidel, 1974), 27.
33. Jean Hampton, “The Contractarian Explanation of the State,” Midwest Studies in Philos-
ophy 15 (1990): 351.
34. Hardin, “From Power to Order, from Hobbes to Hume,” 71–72; Hardin, David Hume:
Moral and Political Theorist, 217.
35. Ibid., 214.
36. Russell Hardin, “Hobbessian Political Order,” Political Theory 19, no. 2 (1991): 164.
37. Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, 134.
38. Jean Hampton, “Two Faces of Contractarian Thought,” in Contractarianism and Ration-
al Choice: Essays on David Gauthier’s Morals by Agreement, ed. Vallentyne, Peter (Cam-
bridge, U.K.: Cambridge, 1991), 43.
39. Robert Sugden, “Spontaneous Order,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, no. 4
(1989).
40. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, 327.
41. Hampton, “Two Faces of Contractarian Thought,” 47–48.
42. Ibid., 50.
43. Council tax is a UK local tax that serves to fund some of the services provided to
residents of that particular locale.
44. Yannis Bakos and Chrysanthos Dellarocas, “Cooperation without Enforcement? A
Comparative Analysis of Litigation and Online Reputation as Quality Assurance Mechanisms,”
(DSpace@MIT [working paper database], 2002; http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/1850).
45. Werner Güth, Friederike Mengel, and Axel Ockenfels, “The Dynamics of Trust and
Trustworthiness on eBay,” (IDEAS Research Papers in Economics, 2006), 2.
46. Brandi Stewart, “Ebay Feedback Cutoff Kicks in Monday,” CNNMoney.com, money.
cnn.com/2008/05/14/smbusiness/ebay_feedback.fsb/index.htm (accessed August 1, 2010).
47. The term “overload” is associated with Anthony King and related to the governability
discussion in the 1970s that included contributors such as Samuel Brittan, Giovanni Sartori,
Samuel Huntington. See, Wayne Parsons, “Politics without Promises: The Crisis Of ‘Overload’
and Governability,” Parliamentary Affairs 35, no. 4 (1982).
48. Güth, Mengel, and Ockenfels, “The Dynamics of Trust and Trustworthiness on eBay,”
2.
49. David Lucking-Reiley, “Auctions on the Internet: What’s Being Auctioned and How?,”
Journal of Industrial Economics 58, no. 3 (2000): 232–33.
Hobbes: Rationality as Recurrence 101
103
104 Chapter 5
reality of disorderliness. The new order that Hobbes proposes would substi-
tute the observed motion in the world with the peace of virtual stillness.
Locke, by contrast, devises a system of administration that allows humans to
contend with the inevitability of imperfection. This system stipulates the
inescapability of the motion driven change that we are subject to, and ac-
knowledges the inherent constraints of humanity, i.e., time and space.
Locke’s attempts to incorporate the constraints of “the real” into “the idea-
tional” pursue the recognition that the bound human mortal cannot hope to
emulate the unbound deity. He places property on a pedestal, thereby align-
ing his political stance with his metaphysical understanding of individuation
as rooted in corporeality. His is therefore a demand for the erection of an
earthly power to match the individuated earthly manifestation of property, as
opposed to the Hobbesean demand for the unitary perfection of heaven on
earth. By contrast with Hobbes, then, Locke is not seeking a political system
that would annihilate individuation, but one that would reconcile it with a
productive life.
The third section distinguishes Locke’s defense of individuation from that
provided by theories of convention, and more specifically from Hayek’s
interpretation of Smith’s idea of the relation between individuation and the
market. While in this vein of libertarian thought individuation is guaranteed
by the market, for Locke, individuation, and by extension ideas of property
and self, must have justification that is independent of the market. Otherwise,
the market can potentially redefine the components of individuation.
The final section distances Locke’s position from the Nozickean variant
of Libertarian thought. It maintains that, contrary to Nozick’s self-professed
affiliations, the foundation for his position is neither Lockean nor Smith-
Humean, but rather is related to Gauthier’s evolutionary interpretation of
Hobbes.
IS LOCKE A HOBBESEAN?
Hobbes assigns the sovereign the grandiose role of awakening the dormant
human reasoning potential. The power of the sovereign kickstarts reason by
quenching the human aspiration for immutable stability. This newly found,
or rather newly rediscovered stability is destined to dominate and therefore
motivates the fool to become the citizen. The stability that generates civil
conduct is achieved, however, at the expense of individuality. Autonomous
actions, which have not been orchestrated or choreographed by the sove-
reign, risk the friction of interference. Therefore the ideal sovereign is a
totalitarian one, who controls all the properties of our corporeal existence. 2
By contrast, Locke’s sovereign does not presume to take control of existence,
Locke: Removing the Misconceptions 105
but rather to manage it. While Hobbes’s ruler is a reformist educator who
decrees reason in this world, Locke’s sovereign merely keeps track of prop-
erty within it. At the core of the former’s notion of a secure, and therefore
prosperous social existence is the principle of an enduring rational predict-
ability; whereas the latter relies on the preservation of property to achieve the
minimal degree of stability that is conducive to carefree economic exchange.
Hobbes defeats interpersonal apprehension in his social enterprise by con-
structing a mechanism of rule that he believes can redirect the human psyche,
from corporeal fixation on the particular to incorporeal considerations of the
general. It is a shift from the traitorous waters of the chaos of unforeseen
conduct, to the tranquility of predetermined orderly engagement. I have
argued in previous chapters that he anchors this political construct in a meta-
physical idea of perfection, a moment of creation, in which allegedly the
corporeal and incorporeal were fused together. His political apparatus is
designed to emulate the conditions of this moment and thereby revive it.
Locke, too, strives to remove peril from social interaction. Yet Locke
metaphysically rejects the idea that humankind can be perfected, as this
would involve a disembodiment that becomes a possibility only in death.
Locke does not deny that this illusionary state of “calm” can be induced by
duress, but he objects to its portrayal as natural and Godly. Moreover, from a
Lockean perspective the radical measures taken by Hobbes are unnecessary
for the achievement of his objective.
For Locke, the difficulty presented by the multitude of opinion, or person-
al autonomy, does not require the refashioning of all in the single mold of an
original indisputable truth. Moreover, the corporeality of human beings, even
if it is a repercussion of humankind’s doing—original sin, is not reversible in
life. We cannot politically reinvent the condition of corporeality, we do not
have the power to overthrow our corporeality and recreate ourselves. Our
redemption and recreation is in the hands of God. The logic behind this
position is the reversal of the famous “he giveth and he taketh away.” Locke
reserves the ultimate control, the creationist control, for God. He who placed
us into the hardships of corporeality will, at his own discretion, relieve us of
them. Meanwhile, we must find corporeal measures that make the best of the
condition we are in; we must find the means to prosper.
As I have argued in previous chapters, Hobbes stipulates rationality as an
aspect of human behavior that is Godlike. Acting rationally is therefore act-
ing in accordance with the laws of nature, or, in other words, attempting to
mimic God:
Or imitate the creation: if you will be a philosopher in earnest, let your reason move
upon the deep of your own cogitations and experience; those things that lie in
confusion must be set asunder, distinguished, and every one stamped with its own
name set in order; that is to say your method must follow that of creation. 3
106 Chapter 5
We are attempting to escape the misery of the natural human condition (the
state of nature) by entering into a condition that is artificial for man but
natural for God. 4 Although Hobbes seems aware of the inability of corporeal
humans to reach perfection (“For if God should require perfect Innocence,
there could no flesh be saved”), his rationalist inclination places his theory on
a slippery slope, gradually diminishing the ungodly (corporeal) dimensions
of humanity in an attempt, under the supervision of the sovereign, to achieve
a metamorphosis of the fool into the rationalized demigod of the citizen. 5
Locke drops Hobbes’s bleak portrayal of the state of nature. He does so
on metaphysical grounds, and not because of some discord with Hobbes as to
the psychological nature of humankind. Locke’s state of nature is not to be
escaped, precisely because it is identical to the state of corporeality. The
state of nature can and should be reorganized to “best fit” prosperity; it is not,
however, within human capacity to depart from it by overhauling it. For
Locke, and in contrast to Hobbes, the corporeal perspective is not a matter of
choice, but a matter of fact. It is not a degenerated form of the incorporeal
perspective, to be restored to an original unison through proper guidance. For
Locke the barrier between the corporeal and the incorporeal is permanent.
The function of the sovereign is not to instruct us in escaping the state of
nature; rather, it is to assist us in administrating it.
Locke identifies the state of nature as God’s property in His capacity as
its creator. His discussion of the human acquisition of property by means of
labor is a reflection of the metaphysical and political distinction he makes
between the bound material human condition and unbound creationist capac-
ity of godliness. This division not only denounces the projecting of God’s
creative abilities onto human capacities, but also rejects any projecting of
unbound perception onto a bound existence. We cannot envision the unison
of creation, because we are the created, not the creator. True to empiricism,
we are engaged in discovery, not in creation. Trapped within the sandpit that
has been constructed for us, we are merely mixing and matching a prefabri-
cated world. Humans must settle, both epistemologically and politically, for
the mere manipulation of creation, while paying due respect to the founding
principle of creation: making the most of what has been given.
From the Lockean perspective, the idea of creation is logically inesca-
pable and by extension the idea of collective property is inescapable:
All the fruits [the earth] naturally produces, and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind in
common, as they are produced by the spontaneous hand of nature; and no body has
originally a private dominion, exclusive of the rest of mankind, in any of them, as
they are thus in their natural state. 6
Being given for the use of men, there must of necessity be a means to appropriate
them some way or other, before they can be of any use, or at all beneficial to any
particular man. The fruit, or venison, which nourishes the wild Indian, who knows
no inclosure, and is still a tenant in common, must be his, and so his, i.e., a part of
him, that another can no longer have any right to it, before it can do him any good
for the support of his life. 7
The implication is that the “use of men” can only be achieved in the particu-
lar individuated form. In other words, humans do not occupy the generality
of a world of ideas, but rather the concrete world of particularities.
This essentially political position exhibits a blend of the political and the
metaphysical, derived itself from Locke’s metaphysical contributions. In An
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke expressly states that “all
things that exist are only particulars.” 8 Although he makes this assertion in
an epistemological rather than an ontological context, the ontological argu-
ment, with the exception of God, is implied. Having been born into a created,
material individuated existence, we are now confronted by the political req-
uisite of administering individual property so as to address the moral con-
cerns it raises: “private possessions and labour, which now [post original sin]
the curse on earth made necessary, by degrees made a distinction of condi-
tions, it gave room for covetousness, pride, and ambition, which by fashion
and example spread the corruption which has so prevailed over mankind.” 9
Enter the Lockean acquisition of property through the mixing of labor argu-
ment. 10 We cannot resist the logic of adherence to natural law, Locke argues,
since we cannot resist the logic of creation and the collective property it
entails. Equally, we cannot escape the individuation of property that is prede-
termined by the corporeality of our existence. In a strictly godly (noncorpo-
real) existence property takes on a collective and secure form: God and
God’s property are interchangeable terms. In a human (corporeal) existence,
by contrast, the generality is broken. Moreover, corporeal individuation
places a logical divide between God and God’s property such that God can
no longer be expected to guarantee the integrity of property. The state can
thus be understood as an artificial substitute, in the corporeal individuated
existence, for the perdurance of property that is naturally provided by God in
an incorporeal unison. Indeed, such is precisely the end that Locke ascribes
to government: “The great and chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into
commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preserva-
tion of their property.” 11
By metaphysically and politically distancing Locke from Hobbes, the
above account avoids difficulties in Locke’s interpretation that have led com-
mentators to reduce the value of his contribution to political theory. The strict
division between the corporeal and the incorporeal and the understanding of
the cultivation of prosperity as the corporeal aspect of creation, makes sense
108 Chapter 5
The second law of nature is not a golden rule commanding that we treat charitably
our fellow human being; nor is it even, in any serious way, a restrictive injunction
ordering that we hold back from gratuitous harm. What purpose the second law of
nature mainly serves is to supply man in nature with a license to kill, and to explain
how political authority comes by the right to inflict punishment on its subjects. 15
Thus Coby reiterates his position that Locke is essentially a Hobbesean, and
in doing so severely diminishes Locke’s original contribution to political
theory.
Likewise, Jeremy Waldron worries about an apparent tension between
Locke’s discussion of political morality and rights under the title of the
Locke: Removing the Misconceptions 109
The contrast between the two stories could hardly be greater. On the first account,
government is explicitly conventional: its institution is the deliberate act of free and
equal individuals acting consciously and rationally together in pursuit of their goals.
On the other account, the growth of government is largely unconscious—it develops
by what Locke calls “an insensible change” (II 76). 16
Treating the social contract as a purely normative model is one way of responding to
its evident implausibility as an historical hypothesis. . . . I shall argue that the
political theory of John Locke provides an example of a somewhat different ap-
proach to the issue of historicity. 20
LOCKE’S ORIGINALITY
Self love will make men partial to themselves and their friends: and on the other
side, that ill nature, passion and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others;
and hence nothing but confusion and disorder will follow, and that therefore God
hath certainly appointed government to restrain the partiality and violence of men. 22
That those Philosophers, who sayd the World, or the Soule of the World was God,
spake unworthily of him; and denyed his Existence: For by God, is understood thee
cause of the World; and to say the World is God, is to say there is no cause of it, that
is, no God. 24
Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas: and ideas become
general, by separating from them the circumstances of time and place, and any other
ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence. By this way of
abstraction they are made capable of representing more individuals than one. 25
Our ability to live out the ontology of these general words is suspect, accord-
ing to Locke. In the absence of the particularizing circumstances of time and
space, we would share with God the physical attributes accorded to him by
112 Chapter 5
product of the rationalization of the material: while they are highly related to
the material, it is questionable whether they are material in themselves. I
myself have a further minor quibble with the distinction between events and
substances. 30 I am not entirely sure that substances could not be reduced to
events, and I suspect that they have not been because of what Conn acknowl-
edges as a hierarchal bias toward substances, to which we subordinate other
spatio-temporal phenomena. 31 This difference notwithstanding, the general
implication of the position Conn attributes to Locke, i.e., that as humans we
capture the world as it relates to us and not as it is in itself, is plausible. This
position should not, however, be confused with a constructivist one. Con-
structivists question the reality of extra-mental conditioning occurrences,
whereas Locke’s intention is merely to identify the importance of a hard-
wired perspective.
This insistence on “earthing” one’s perspective is Locke’s response to the
Hobbesean “rationalist drift.” As such, his response is not only indicative of
their distinctive conceptions of the control that the human “ratio” can exert
over time and space, but also influences their contrasting holist and pluralist
positions. Although Hobbes, strictly speaking, holds onto a division between
reason and the passions, between mind and matter, he loses this distinction
once he pronounces reason to be the caretaker. In subordinating the contin-
gent particular to the constant and general, and thereby reiterating the parallel
with God as the warden of all His creation, he is anticipating both Rousseau
and Kant: stipulating that the contingency of human materiality tends to lead
us astray, whereas constant Godly reason sets us right. Ideally, the condition
in which all men would live, if they could only afford to do so, would be one
that subjugates passions to reason to the point of their complete suppression.
Note the similarity, as observed by Noel Malcolm, in the terms employed
by Hobbes and Spinoza:
In part IV of the Ethics Spinoza explains that, while passions are individual and
particularizing, reason is universal and harmonizing. “Men can be opposed to each
other in so far as they are afflicted with emotions which are passions”; “men neces-
sarily agree with one another in so far as they live according to the dictates of
reason.” This “agreement” is a real harmonizing and converging of minds, not just
an attitude of liberal non-interference; as Spinoza wrote in his early Short Treatise,
if I teach knowledge and the love of God to my neighbours, “it brings forth the same
desire in them that there is in me, so that their will and mine become one and the
same, constituting one and the same nature, always agreeing about everything.” 32
Locke maintained the same set of propositions in both the Essay and the Two
Treatises. 38
Yet her subsequent explication of this statement seems hostile to the gist of
the material individuation versus Godly unity argument advanced in the
present work:
That there is natural law that is reasonable; that God has equipped men with natural
faculties suited to the task of discovering its contents; and that men are obligated to
follow its dictates as they are the workmanship of the Supreme Being whose will it
expresses. 39
Such a position seems incompatible with the idea that the Godly cannot be
duplicated and demands a distinctly human, corporeally individuated ver-
sion. On the face of it, Grant’s version of Locke, much like the position I
have associated with Hobbes, appears to maintain that the godly ideational
realm can be reproduced in the real realm by means of the gift of rationality,
virtually without need of amendment. However, reading Grant more closely
one appreciates that this initial impression may be false. Although she does
not juxtapose Locke with Hobbes, she does label Locke as a cautious liberal
and infers that he is a cautious rationalist:
Locke’s attitude toward the political is the same as his attitude toward the problem
of human understanding. Men cannot know everything, but they can know enough
to govern their conduct rationally. Action need not be arbitrary; it can be guided by
rational principles of conduct. But the application of those principles to practice will
always involve an element of judgment and uncertainty. 40
Furthermore, this position is reinforced by Kim Ian Parker, who enlists the
similar conclusions of both Ashcraft and D. G. James, arguing that Locke
was skeptical about the capacity of reason. 41
It is the magnification of this element of caution that prompts classifica-
tion of the end of Locke’s pursuit as one of imperfect authority, as opposed to
the Hobbesean ambition to attain a perfect one. Both Hobbes and Locke
agree that “what Adam fell from . . . was the state of perfect Obedience”;
however, while Hobbes attempts to recapture the original state of perfection
by employing reason, Locke considers this ambition unattainable. 42 As Park-
er notes, for Locke, “even though humans can be taught to be reasonable,
they still fall short of the standard that God sets.” 43 Moreover, there is textual
support in The Reasonableness of Christianity for Parker’s claim that the
116 Chapter 5
limit Locke places on reason is intended to reserve for Christ the restoration
of what was lost by Adam’s fall:
Adam being the son of God . . . was immortal. But Adam transgressing the com-
mand given him by his heavenly Father, incurred the Penalty, forfeited that state of
Immortality, and became mortal . . . God nevertheless, out of his infinite Mercy,
willing to bestow Eternal Life on mortal men, sends Jesus Christ into this world;
who being conceived . . . by the immediate Power of God, was properly the Son of
God. 44
Let us return to the dualism Locke imports from the Essay to the Second
Treatise. In the Essay he argues that:
If Matter were the eternal first cogitative Being, there would not be one eternal
infinite cogitative Being, but an infinite number of finite cogitative Beings indepen-
dent one of another, of limited force, and distinct thoughts, which could never
produce that order, harmony, and beauty, which is to be found in Nature. Since,
therefore, whatsoever is the first, eternal Being must necessarily be cogitative. . . . It
necessarily follows, that the eternal, first Being cannot be Matter. 45
Locke makes the metaphysical claim that a unified order cannot be expected
to emerge from the fragmentation and disorder inherent to all that is corpo-
real. The political implication seems to be that artificially reproducing the
“order, harmony, and beauty” of nature in the social context would require
the institution of an artificial political God. Indeed, I have claimed this is the
conclusion that Hobbes reached. However, for Locke playing the role of God
would amount to both contradiction and blasphemy. It would involve the
mortal and contingent disguising itself as the eternal truth, and not long
thereafter deluding itself to be the bearer of the truth. This is precisely his
grievance against the wrongdoing of so called great men, who while engaged
in lawmaking presume to be speaking in truth’s name:
But laws are not concerned with truth of opinions, but for the safety and security of
the commonwealth and of every particular man’s goods. Clearly this is no cause for
regret. For the truth certainly would do well enough if she were once left to shift for
herself. She has not received and never will receive much assistance from the power
of great men, who do not always recognize or welcome her. 46
work; and he finds it ironic that these notions later rebounded into the social
sciences in a distorted and inappropriate form. In an attempt to draw a dis-
tinction between the application of these ideas in biology and their applica-
tion in the social sciences, he writes: “in social evolution the decisive factor
is not the selection of the physical and inheritable properties of individuals
but the selection by imitation of successful institutions and habits.” 48 The
former is determined by physiological inheritance, the latter is socially ac-
quired; biological evolution would seem to be conditioned by nature, where-
as social evolution appears to be dependent on nurture. The following model
may be helpful in elucidating this difference.
In biology we witness random mutations, these mutations must contend
with two reciprocally interacting variables and one constant:
Individuals play a much more substantial role in the analysis of the social
sciences, as they not only inform the actions of other individuals and affect
the balance of resources, but also take part in the amendment of the social
pattern database, which in turn instructs their own actions by way of educa-
tion and imitation. By contrast, in biology the constraints of physics are set:
individuals preside over the interactions but are themselves immune to
change. 49 There is another striking difference at the model level: in contrast
to social evolution, Darwinian evolution has a starting point. Evolution, as
we know it, started with the Big Bang. Before the existence of the laws of
physics evolution seems difficult to fathom, since there is nothing held con-
stant for the evolutionary factor to act upon. Yet this is exactly what Hayek
wishes us to envisage when it comes to social evolution. Society does not
have a starting point, there is no “contractual moment,” just an endless trail
of convention, followed by convention.
For Hayek, in the political context this trail of conventions composes the
market. Supposedly containing no fixed content and therefore no predeter-
mined personal bias, this value-free intangible instrument of communication
is said to combine the ultimate in personal liberation with noncoercive social
Locke: Removing the Misconceptions 119
not to act in a delusional manner and attempt to address it. However, there is
more at stake for Hayek than a fancy version of the commonsense dictum “if
it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” Hayek views the mechanism as an instrument of
liberty. A market society is one in which, by virtue of the humble presump-
tion of human ignorance as to the rationale behind social phenomena, no
individual or group can legitimately monopolize the ultimate truth. On this
account the divide between political liberalism and economic liberalism col-
lapses to form a single, capital-L Liberalism. 53 Once the distinction collapses
it also becomes less and less clear whether selves and property allow for the
market, or the market allows for property and selves.
Hayek appears to portray the relationship between the market and the self
as logically circular, in the sense that neither precedes the other. Yet this
picture is difficult to accept. Consider that while Hayek’s market system
supposedly functions merely as an indicator of prices, nevertheless, if there is
to be any consequence to these prices then they must be attached to actual
goods, which in turn are attached to actual individuals. Hayek must concede
that the exchange that the market facilitates is not merely that of information,
but eventually also an exchange of ownership. He must also allow that the
stability of property is a condition of the market system, since in the absence
of mutual recognition of ownership trade could never be initiated. Moreover,
having been initiated, should the foundations of property become unstable,
commerce would experience breakdown and the market would cease to oper-
ate. Furthermore, the stability of property, to which Hayek’s and any other
market system are compelled to commit themselves, presupposes the consis-
tency of selves. The reciprocal acknowledgement of selfness, as demanded
by G. W. F. Hegel in the master-slave dialectic, acts as a precursor to the
establishment of property, since without individuation, property could not be
attached and therefore could not be exchanged under the market. 54 Yet for
Hayek individuation, and by extension property and selves, do not precede
the market, rather they are a market effect.
If we follow Hayek, and do not anchor the market with nonevolving
concepts of self and property, then there is no reason to think that it will not
drift to the point where it no longer coincides with liberty. Without securing
the self and property, as Locke does, the market itself may evolve and mutate
undesirably. Some market economists have attempted to remedy this prob-
lem by extending the invisible hand from its initial classification as an unin-
tentional ordering factor to that of a self-balancing natural organizer that
draws us toward a dominant economic equilibrium. Kukathas, in his discus-
sion of the role of competition in Hayek’s theory, argues convincingly that
this contradicts the epistemological boundaries set by Hayek: “Hayek was
attempting to draw economists away from their tendency to characterise the
competitive order as an equilibrium state, arguing that because equilibrium
‘presupposes that the facts have already all been discovered and competition
Locke: Removing the Misconceptions 121
therefore has ceased,’ such a concept was of limited theoretical use.” 55 Yet if
Kukathas is correct, then Hayek cannot rely on the self-preservation of the
market through its attraction to equilibrium, and therefore it must be ac-
counted for outside the market system. The only remaining option is that the
concept of the self and its adjoined property be codified constitutionally
outside the mutability of evolution. This Lockean proposition does not sit
well with Hayek’s theory, since it would effectively create a prescribed truth.
Nevertheless, in the absence of a special standing for the self and property,
Hayek’s theory quickly morphs into postmodernism, a theory that begins
with a genuine concern for liberty and ends in a confused drift that is unable
to hold onto liberty at all.
The previous section argued that Locke does not share the Hayekean confi-
dence in the market’s ability to sustain liberty. However, there is another
version of libertarianism that is often associated with Locke, namely that of
Nozick, whose development of the idea of the minimalist role of the state is
allegedly based on the model of Locke’s night watchman state. 56 Despite this
conventional association, however, a careful consideration of Nozick’s refer-
ences to Locke in Anarchy, State, and Utopia reveals their differences, and
arguably his closer affinity with Hobbes. Alternatively, one could argue that
Nozick follows the trend of reading Hobbes into Locke, blurring the differ-
ences between the two.
Nozick himself links his political thought not only with Locke, but also
with evolutionary and spontaneous order ideas, supposedly drawing upon the
same sources that Hayek calls upon in his attempt to revive this school of
thought. 57 Nozick and Hayek both hold in high regard the rules and patterns
that emerge from the market, celebrating their freedom from bias and looking
to them as perhaps the only epistemologically available measures for the
administration of social interaction. But this shared regard has more often
than not led to the conceptual subsumption of their theoretical positions
under the libertarian umbrella. However, Hayek appears to reject the extreme
version of the minimalist state that is at the crux of Nozick’s libertarian
argument in Anarchy, State, and Utopia:
al authority power to make the inhabitants contribute to a common fund from which
such services could be financed. 58
might apply; they simply avoid clashes by keeping attune to each others’
advertised intentions.
Which of the two positions does Nozick embrace? Nozick claims to use
Locke’s description of the state of nature as a backdrop for the development
of his idea that a dominant security provider emerges from a conflict between
competing protection agencies. 65 According to Nozick, individuals turn to
such agencies in the first place because natural law proves inefficient as a
governing method. Like Locke, he worries that although such a system
would resolve social problems to a certain extent, it would ultimately be
incomplete. Not only would it allow personal bias to infiltrate in the form of
disproportionate reactions, it would also lack a recognized finality of due
process, thereby risking an endless sequence of retaliatory actions. The pro-
tection agency addresses both difficulties: it is emotionally detached from the
cases it deals with, and the eventual prominence of a single agency as the
sole and final legitimate recourse produces a sense of closure that prevents
endless feuding.
Strikingly, a very similar argument can be made on Hobbesean grounds.
Hobbes does not rule out defensive associations in his state of nature: “in a
condtion of Warre . . . there is no man can hope by his own strength, or wit,
to defend himselfe from destruction, without the help of Confederates.” 66 It
is simply the sporadic nature of these coalitions and their vulnerability to the
whims of “the passions” that motivates individuals to seek a more permanent
haven: “getting themselves out from that miserable condition of Warre,
which is necessarily consequent (as has been shewn) to the naturall Passions
of men, when there is no visible Power to keep them in awe.” 67 Moreover, it
is difficult to accept Nozick’s contention that his dominant protective agency
differs from the state, when he himself ascribes the dominant agency with the
role of providing closure. After all, if the competition between protection
agencies does not generate a sense of finality of discord, the entire evolution-
ary rationale of these protection agencies becomes questionable. The only
difference I can discern between a Gautherian interpretation of Hobbes, as
discussed in chapter 4, section 2 above, and Nozick’s evolutionary under-
standing of social relations, is that the latter stresses the positive outcome of
conflict in “knocking some sense” into subscribers to the competing agen-
cies, invariably resulting in a treaty or consolidation emerging out of a condi-
tion of anarchy. 68 Gauthier’s Hobbes appears to merely qualify Nozick’s
position, employing rationality so that we may skip the educational conflict
phase and enter directly into a state of consolidated sovereignty, coinciding
with Hobbes’s statement that, “since it no less, nay, it much more conduceth
to peace, to prevent brawls from arising than to appease them being risen.” 69
Although Nozick speaks against the explicit compact between individuals
that Hobbes subscribes to, and claims that his dominant protection associa-
tion does not share the state’s monopoly over violence, if one reads Hobbes
Locke: Removing the Misconceptions 125
along the invisible-hand lines, as Gauthier does, the distinction between the
two dissipates. 70 Hampton goes further and argues that Nozick is mistaken in
thinking that his framing of the social question as one of coordination rules
out a social contract solution:
NOTES
1. Save the ‘common view’ that holds his contribution to human rights theory in high
regard. Michael Freeman, Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Cambridge, U.K.:
Polity Press, 2002), 22.
2. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 20, 142.
3. Hobbes, English Works, vol. I, xiii.
4. Although Hobbes’s approach to morality, as Jean Hampton states, ‘is not an approach
that assumes there is a naturally good object in the world,' his stance does not prohibit the
existence of a naturally good object beyond the actual world. Hampton, “Two Faces of
Contractarian Thought,” 33.
5. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 43, 404.
6. Locke, Second Treatise of Government 18–19 (ch. 5, §26).
7. Ibid.
8. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Pauline Phemister (Ox-
ford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2008 [1689]), 261.
9. John Locke, “Homo Ant Et Post Lapsum (Man before and after the Fall),” in Locke:
Political Essays, ed. M. Goldie (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997 [1693]),
321. Note that for the purposes of this argument, the theological debate over whether we were
directly created into the material, or “materialized” as the result of “the fall,” is inconsequen-
tial.
10. Locke, Second Treatise of Government, 19 (ch. 5, §27).
11. Ibid., 66 (ch. 9, §124).
12. Patrick Coby, “The Law of Nature in Locke’s Second Treatise: Is Locke a Hobbesian?,”
Review of Politics 49, no. 1 (1987): 16–17. “Hobbes-light” is my own wording.
13. Ibid., 23.
14. Ibid., 7, 10.
15. Ibid., 10–11.
16. Jeremy Waldron, “John Locke: Social Contract Versus Political Anthropology,” Review
of Politics 51, no. 1 (1989): 7.
17. Ibid., 10.
18. Ibid., 11–14, 17–18.
19. Coby, “The Law of Nature in Locke’s Second Treatise: Is Locke a Hobbesian?,” 17.
20. See Waldron, “John Locke: Social Contract versus Political Anthropology,” 11–14, 17,
17–18.
21. Netanyahu, Don Isaac Abravanel, 155.
22. Locke, Second Treatise of Government, 12 (ch. 2, § 13).
23. Stewart Duncan discusses at length Hobbes’s struggle with outright materialism and its
implications, observing an inconsistent shift in his views; in Stewart Duncan, “Hobbes’s Mate-
rialism in the Early 1640s,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13, no. 3 (2005).
Watkins comments that “Hobbes goes far but Spinoza goes the whole way.” J. W. N. Watkins,
“The Posthumous Career of Thomas Hobbes,” Review of Politics 19, no. 3 (1957).
24. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 31, 250.
25. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 261.
26. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 12, 77.
27. Jim Wilson, “Executing Schrödinger’s Cat,” Popular Mechanics, October 1997, 34.
28. Max Jammer, Concepts of Simultaneity: From Antiquity to Einstein and Beyond (Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 239.
29. Conn, Locke on Essence and Identity, 4.
30. Ibid., 94–95.
31. Ibid., 5.
32. Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes, 51–52.
33. Martinich, Two Gods, 47.
34. Although allegedly speaking of monarchy by divine right, King James VI of Scotland
seems to have considered himself a God by his own right. This opinion is expressed in his
Locke: Removing the Misconceptions 127
speech before parliament: “For Kings are not onely GODS Lieutenants vpon earth, and sit vpon
GODS throne, but euen by GOD himselfe they are called Gods.” King James VI and I, King
James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. J. P. Sommerville (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1994), 181.
35. The overtness of this dissonance may have led to notions of hereditary right of succes-
sion that, as I noted earlier, Hobbes appears to have shared for stability considerations. Hobbes,
Leviathan, ch 19, 135.
36. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (London: Oxford,
1973).
37. Hampton, Political Philosophy, 77–78.
38. Ruth W. Grant, John Locke’s Liberalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987),
26.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., 203–4.
41. Kim Ian Parker, The Biblical Politics of John Locke, Editions Sr; V.29. (Waterloo, Ont.:
Published for the Canadian Corp. for Studies in Religion/Corporation canadienne des Sciences
religeuses by Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2004), 39.
42. John Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, ed. Ian T. Ramsey (Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 1958 [1695]), 25.
43. Parker, The Biblical Politics of John Locke, 61.
44. John Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, ed. J. C. Higgins-Biddle (Oxford,
U.K.: Oxford University, 1999 [1695]), 113; Parker, The Biblical Politics of John Locke, 61.
45. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 400.
46. John Locke, Epistola De Tolerantia: A Letter on Toleration, ed. R. Klibansky and J. W.
Gough (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press, 1968 [1686]), 123.
47. More specifically: Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order, Hayek, “Freedom, Rea-
son, and Tradition,” Ethics 68, no. 4 (1958), and Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982).
48. Hayek, “Freedom, Reason, and Tradition,” 233.
49. Interestingly a legalistic Kantian interpretation, which understands Kant to be attempt-
ing to convert contingent social patterns into moral rules, would reduce the social sciences into
Darwinian biology.
50. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, 37.
51. Kukathas, Hayek and Modern Liberalism, 51.
52. See also Hayek, “Freedom, Reason, and Tradition,” 231.
53. See also Russell Hardin, Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy (Oxford, U.K.:
Oxford University Press, 1999), 59.
54. G. W. F. Hegel, J. N. Findlay (contributor), and A. V. Miller (translator), Phenomenolo-
gy of Spirit (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1979), 520.
55. Kukathas, Hayek and Modern Liberalism, 96, citing Friedrich A. Hayek, New Studies in
Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas (London: Routledge, 1978), 184.
56. A. R. Lacey, Robert Nozick (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), 58.
57. Robert Nozick, “Invisible-Hand Explanations,” American Economic Review 84, no. 2
(1994). Barry, “The Tradition of Spontaneous Order,” 7.
58. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, 41.
59. David K. Lewis, Convention: A Philosophical Study (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard,
1969), 118–21.
60. Ibid., 84–85.
61. Ibid., 120.
62. Ibid., 78.
63. Ibid., 118–21.
64. Arguably it is a combination of mannerism, preference copying, trust and partial condi-
tioning, yet even so it remains a convention lookalike.
65. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 9–12.
66. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 15, 102.
67. Ibid., ch. 17, 117.
128 Chapter 5
129
130 Chapter 6
The first section of this chapter explores the definition of the self within
the Lockean argument and examines its relationship to property. It argues
that the Lockean attraction to the preservation of property has its roots in a
joint metaphysical and political attitude toward coping with individuation. In
other words, it is established on logical grounds, and as such stands well
beyond reduction to the context of an apologetic defense of the bourgeoisie. 2
Rather, Locke’s defense of property is intended to defuse social difficulties
that arise out of the condition of individuation. Contrary to the Hobbesean
stance that seeks to escape the “cancer” of individuation by its surgical
elimination, Locke merely prescribes “medication” for the condition. For
Hobbes, individuation is a terminal condition, which, if left untreated, will
drag society back into the “social death” that is the unproductive war of all
against all. By contrast, for Locke we must make the most of the condition of
individuation, precisely because we escape it only in death.
In the third section the role of the state as a vessel of memory is explored.
It is maintained that the state acts to counter the inherent temporality of the
self and the property attached to this self. Locke’s metaphysical discussion of
identity and personal continuity serves as the foundation for the argument
that the state safeguards the collapse of the rational individual into a momen-
tary, discontinuous being, that cannot hope to hold onto property and is thus
stripped of selfhood. The state, quite literally, assures the integrity of individ-
uals, thereby enabling their own trust in strangers. Again, Locke’s position is
contrasted with Hobbes’s, with the latter portrayed as a political expression
of Berkeley’s solution to the continuous identity debate. I appreciate that this
last statement is extremely controversial. After all, Berkeley was a staunch
immaterialist, whereas Hobbes is widely identified with materialism. Never-
theless, and as I have stressed continually, the monist position that Hobbes
embraces cannot help but upset his materialism. Moreover, what is advanced
is not that Berkeley and Hobbes actually had a shared metaphysical outlook,
but rather that there are similarities in the role of God as the guarantor of both
infinity and continuity in their reasoning.
The divergence between Locke and Hobbes lies in their respective reme-
dies for the troublesome human relationship with the time continuum, and
the numbing effect that frequent erratic changes may have on rational indi-
viduals. Hobbes proposes to virtually stop the flow of time by means of an
all-powerful consistent form of rule that emulates the ever-present, all-know-
ing God, whereas Locke offers to manage time by institutional continuity.
The institutional function of the state as a registrar for undisputed informa-
tion is further explored in this section, identifying it not only as a stepping-
stone for the conservation of stability and perhaps the source for the imple-
mentation of fairness, but also potentially as a means toward the assurance of
heritage. The state is a medium that vicariously allows rational individuals to
take part, and therefore to take an interest, in happenings beyond their life-
Locke: The Property of Continuous Identity 131
times. Hence the state is not only a provider of a secure stable environment in
which to live and form property relations, it also acts to repress considera-
tions of our eventual demise, preventing them from “eating away” at our
motivation to contribute our property offerings to the world.
The fourth section is a prelude to the following chapter, which itself is
concerned with the perdurance of elements of human activity that appear to
be irreducible to “cold currency.” The difficulty is introduced in this chapter
by way of an examination of the issue of land ownership and the implications
of the commodification of land. It is here argued that sustaining the perdu-
rance of land by means of its commodification would effectively acknowl-
edge a right to secession, thereby undermining the entire construct of the
state.
For this Organisation, being at any one instant in any one Collection of Matter, is in
that particular concrete distinguished from all other, and is that individual Life,
which existing constantly from that moment both forwards and backwards, in the
same continuity of insensibly succeeding Parts united to the living Body of the
Plant, it has that Identity which makes the same Plant, and all the parts of it, parts of
132 Chapter 6
the same plant, during all the time that they exist united in that continued Organisa-
tion, which is fit to convey that Common Life to all the Parts so united. 7
For the most part we “connect the spatio-temporal dots” collected by our
sensory faculties and deposited in our memory, either causally or by means
of probability. We stretch these events and organisms across a temporal
continuance, thereby achieving their perdurance. 8 As noted earlier (chapter
3, section 3), Lewis introduced the term “perdurance” into the persistence
discussion in order to denote persistence that has a stretched temporal dimen-
sion. Neveretheless, as Garth Kemerling observes: “So long as our knowl-
edge of bodies is derived from the observable qualities of bodies, in ignor-
ance of their internal features and operations, we can have no certain univer-
sal knowledge of the material world.” 9 It would appear that if we come close
to universal knowledge of anything at all, we do so introspectively, since in
this special case we would conceivably be jointly aware of the self and its
bodily manifestation.
As far as existence in this world (as opposed to the afterlife) is concerned,
Locke subscribes to a dualist position that entertains a difference between
bodies and souls or selves. Nevertheless, he also holds that body and soul
cannot be entirely divorced until death. Bodies and souls are not one and the
same, and yet they appear to be interrelated, as if the body was a material
extension of the self, or perhaps it would be better to say, a shadow of it. 10
Locke may very well have been trying to make the inference that our corpo-
real existence and actions shadow our incorporeal intentions, and we must
therefore take responsibility for them. 11 He is concerned with discounting
magical accounts or ones that lend themselves to placing a wedge between
the corporeal and the incorporeal. As Kemerling notes:
Locke took great pains in showing the Cartesian account of human nature, as an
immaterial thinking substance existing in uneasy alliance with a differentiated por-
tion of material universe, is inadequate for the allocation of just punishment to the
same moral agent who commits an immoral act. Several of Locke’s notorious “puz-
zle cases” are intended precisely to undermine any attempt at a Cartesian explana-
tion of moral accountability. 12
The reason why men enter into society, is the preservation of their property; and the
end why they chuse and authorise a legislative, is, that there may be laws made, and
rules set, as guards and fences to properties of all the members of the society, to
limit the power, and moderate the dominion, of every part and member of the
society: for it may never be supposed to be the will of society, that the legislative
should have the power to destroy that which every one designs to secure, by entering
into society. 14
I claimed earlier that Hobbes’s argument for the state cannot be reduced to
removing the physical threat of death, in the literal sense, but is rather a
remedy for the metaphorical death that manifests itself in lack of prosperity.
For Hobbes, the state of nature was a sorry, but not an impossible condition
in which to exist. The question that arises is whether the Hobbesean and
Lockean theories converge on the rationale for the establishment of the state.
There is in fact a strong parallel between the proposed rationale for the
Hobbesean state and the one that is supported by the above interpretation of
Locke. Both enact the state in order to address the problem of continuous
identity. They both require a solution to the problem of the “fleeting integ-
rity” of individuated beings. Indeed, and as I will reiterate shortly, once
individuated beings have the autonomy to assert themselves, they may very
well reinvent themselves, thereby causing havoc in interpersonal relations.
The state is the provider of the integrity that would otherwise be absent from
these interpersonal engagements. Nevertheless, there is a crucial difference
between the preservation offered by Hobbes’s state and the one offered by
Locke’s.
Recall the difference between perdurance and endurance as offered by
Lewis and implemented here (chapter 3). Briefly, endurance allows for pres-
ervation by setting the characteristics of a body in stone, whereas perdurance
admits changes in characteristics just so long as there is an external observer
that can guarantee the original identity. Hobbes offers preservation of the
integrity of individuated beings through a mechanism that provides endu-
rance. The Hobbesean state is one in which all motion, and by extension all
134 Chapter 6
change, has been brought to a virtual halt. It freezes a “shot” of the world and
establishes an infinite loop wherein that very same frame is continuously fed
back into individuals’ perception. It creates the ultimate in conservative sce-
narios, thereby generating a degree of predictability that eliminates the stress
associated with the unknown. As long as the subjects obey the sovereign they
can remain at peace, as the future is guaranteed to unfold in a predetermined
fashion. By contrast, Locke offers preservation of individuated beings by
means of perdurance. Their identity and by extension their integrity is held in
check, as opposed to being held constant, by the institution of the state. The
individuals submit to this new external body’s “observation” in order to
referee problems that might occur in interpersonal exchange. Locke’s state is
an honest broker that works according to procedures that are laid out in the
open.
There is therefore some other mind wherein they [sensible things] exist, during the
intervals between the times of my perceiving them: as likewise they did before my
birth and would do after my supposed annihilation. And as the same is true with
regard to all other finite created spirits, it necessarily follows, there is an omnipres-
ent, external Mind, which knows and comprehends all things, and exhibits them to
our view in such a manner, and according to such rules as he himself has ordained,
and are by us termed the laws of nature. 15
tracted. As a result he loses touch with time, he is trapped in the “here and
now” of the moment:
But you’re different. You’re more perfect. Time is three things for most people, but
for you, for us, just one. A singularity. One moment. This moment. Like you’re the
center of the clock, the axis on which the hands turn. Time moves about you but
never moves you. It has lost its ability to affect you. What is it they say? That time is
theft? But not for you. Close your eyes and you can start all over again. Conjure up
that necessary emotion, fresh as roses. 17
Nolan is not strictly speaking “out of time,” for his protagonist is not dead;
nevertheless, his autonomous existence is in jeopardy. By laying a physical
trail of documented evidence in the form of Polaroids, tattoos and notes, he
hopes to artificially secure the continuity of his identity. However, he soon
realizes that these “facts” are untrustworthy, his condition having left him
prey to the manipulation of the “strangers” he encounters every time his
mind is “reset.” He is essentially being programmed by others; his indepen-
dent existence has been placed in question.
Gabriella Slomp argues convincingly that Hobbes’s political thought is an
attempt to solve an identity problem similar to that with which Nolan con-
fronts his protagonist:
In the Hobbesean state of nature, a person’s identity is endangered in two ways: (i)
in a crude and drastic sense: physical life is threatened; (ii) in a more sophisticated
sense the ability of the mind to detach itself from the present and to plan the future is
wasted. For Hobbes the state of nature is a state of uncertainty, where one cannot
trust anybody and least of all one’s experiences of the past. . . . In other words in the
state of nature people are victim of the present; the time of the mind is forced to
coincide with the time of nature, which for Hobbes is the present. 18
Let us suppose that the ability of the mind to store images of what we have per-
ceived through our senses were to disappear. In other words let’s suppose that we
had no imagination and thus when the object is removed, so is our consciousness of
it. If we were conscious of external objects only at the very moment when they “act
upon us” (i.e., if we had no memory), then each moment would be spent (and
wasted) in making ourselves conscious of the elementary objects around us. It is
because what we have perceived has become knowledge that we can proceed to
learn new things. Without memory, it would be as if we were reborn again at each
moment. 19
Put together, Nolan and Slomp’s accounts of identity difficulty call to mind a
scenario in which we all suffer from this odd amnesia condition. This would
136 Chapter 6
The last section argued that depositing one’s property for safekeeping with
the state allows for its perdurance. However, Hampton has identified an
inconsistency in the Lockean attitude toward property, which I have yet to
address. She asserts that, on the one hand Locke undoubtedly argues that
property rights precede the state, and consequently that the state lacks any
claim of possession over land, yet on the other hand the Lockean stance
places land under direct governmental jurisdiction by denying individuals,
even ones who have merely given their tacit consent to its establishment, the
right to take parcels of land with them if they choose to leave the state. 32
Locke: The Property of Continuous Identity 141
Moreover, there are strong reasons for holding that Locke believed that the
right to land belonged to God and not to man. 35 George Gale proposes that,
for Locke, land falls under a complex category of multilayered ownership. At
the least, land is owned dually by individuals and government, although
ultimately it is subject to God. Locke, relying heavily on scripture throughout
the Treatise, never expressly states that God gave up his right to the land.
Rather, it may be inferred that Locke holds that God, out of his benevolence,
allowed man to benefit from the land after his banishment from the Garden
of Eden and into the hardships of the state of nature. 36
This position is reiterated in Menachem Lorberbaum’s comments on the
idea of the holiness of the land in Leviticus, 25:12, 23:
That fiftieth year shall be a jubilee for you. . . . It shall be holly to you. . . . But the
land must not be sold without reclaim, for the land is Mine; you are but strangers
[gerim] resident [toshavim] with Me.
carries over to express consenters and for the reasons there mentioned the
path to dissolving the state and a return to the state of nature has been
laid.
2. Free Market: The land assets held by tacit consenters are free of con-
straints. It follows that such assets may have higher value than those held
by express consenters. The added value may attract the buyout of the
express consenters by tacit consenters , thereby literally undermining the
state.
3. Restricted Market: Only express consenters are allocated land rights. This
scenario effectively drains tacit consenters of any constituency. Even if
tacit consenters are left the right to benefit from the land, they become
subordinate to the lands’ owners, so there is good reason to believe they
will be coerced into express consent. A similar argument works for chil-
dren (the natural constituency of “tacit consenters” as they have yet to
develop the rational capacity that would allow them to give their express
consent). Under a restricted market, fortunate children can only inherit
their fathers’ land through express consent. Less fortunate children would
only inherit their fathers’ subordinated right to benefit from the land.
Although this scenario leaves the state in tact, it makes a mockery of
consent, and moreover of liberty itself.
NOTES
1. Granted the main twentieth century thinker of this school, Friedrich Hayek, does consid-
er limiting the market so it will not infringe upon fair-play or offer products that are unsafe, but
144 Chapter 6
these limitations are in line with Nozick’s ultra-minimalist state, and moreover apply just as
well to a world-state. See Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, 62.
2. The conception of Locke as a trumpet for bourgeoisie rhetoric can, according to Jeffery
Isaac, be traced back to Karl Marx’s interpretation and is forcefully reiterated in C. B. Mac-
pherson’s work. Jeffery Isaac, “Was John Locke a Bourgeois Theorist? A Critical Appraisal of
Macpherson and Tully,” Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory 11, no. 3 (1987):
107.
3. Dan Kaufman, “Locke on Individuation and the Corpuscular Basis of Kinds,” Philoso-
phy and Phenomenological Research 75, no. 3 (2007): 499.
4. E. J. Lowe, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Locke on Human Understanding, (Lon-
don: Routledge, 1995), 102.
5. Max Milam, “The Epistemological Basis of Locke’s Idea of Property,” in John Locke
Critical Assessments, ed. Richard Ashcraft (London: Routledge, 1991 [1967]).
6. It is worth noting that Locke’s dualist position allows for the differentiation between the
animate and the inanimate, a distinction that is impossible for Hobbes. It is perhaps this
implication of his monistic unity that has led to the latter’s strong association with materialism;
an association which is in question in this book.
7. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 206.
8. For a thorough discussion of why organisms and events in Locke perdure whereas atoms
and masses are perdurance or endurance neutral, see Conn, Locke on Essence and Identity, ch.
5.
9. Garth Kemerling, “A Guide to John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding,”
www.philosophypages.com/locke/g0.htm (August 1, 2010).
10. See also, “Here we have a most unequivocal expression of the idea that the personality is
extended to encompass physical objects.” Karl Olivecrona, “Apropriation in the State of Na-
ture: Locke on the Origin of Property,” in John Locke Critical Assessments, ed. Richard
Ashcraft (London: Routledge, 1991 [1974]), 319.
11. On a light-hearted note, James Matthew Barrie may have hinted at this demand for
responsibility when he depicted Wendy sewing Peter’s shadow onto him in his famous Peter
Pan tale. James Mathew Barrie, Peter Pan (Fairford, U.K.: Echo Library, 2009), 35.
12. Kemerling, “A Guide to John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” “Mo-
ral Agents,” referring to §10–14 in the aforementioned “Of Identity and Diversity” chapter.
13. The term “Rashomon Effect” was popularized following Akira Kurosawa’s film Rasho-
mon. In the film, Kurosawa questions the existence of a single truth by posing four equally
plausible, yet conflicting, testimonies to a criminal event, including: a raped woman, the al-
leged perpetrator, an onlooker, and even the woman’s murdered spouse (by means of a me-
dium).
14. Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ch. 19, 111, §222.
15. George Berkeley, The Works of George Berkeley Part One, trans. G. N. Wright (Kes-
singer Publishing, 2004 [1713]), 201.
16. Jeffery L. Johnson, “Personal Survival and the Closest-Continuer Theory,” International
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 41, no. 1 (1997): 10.
17. Jonathan Nolan, “Memento Mori,” Esquire, March 1, 2001.
18. Gabriella Slomp, Thomas Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory (New York:
Macmillan, 2000), 20.
19. Ibid., 18.
20. Ibid., 20. Borris Henning, “No Identity without Agency,” www.borishennig.de/texte/
2005/id.pdf (August 1, 2010).
21. This “death-rebirth cycle” is not unlike the Buddhist state of Samsara; see Theodore
Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana (with Sanskrit Text of Madhyamaka-Kari-
ka) (Delhi: Blue Dove Press, 1996), 98.
22. Slomp, Thomas Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory, 20.
23. Henning, “No Identity without Agency,” 7, referring to §20 in the “Of Identity and
Diversity” chapter.
24. Robert Filmer, Patriarcha and Other Writings, ed. J. P. Sommerville (Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge University Press, 1991).
Locke: The Property of Continuous Identity 145
While Locke’s position has been allied with the cosmopolitan camp, never-
theless the legal scholar Jeremy Rabkin textually and conceptually demon-
strates that Locke’s epistemological “nurture” approach lends itself to a cul-
tural nationalist position. Rabkin claims that Locke’s idea of cultural diffe-
rentiation between societies carries over to his moral theory. 1 In addition, he
draws attention to Locke’s statement:
The people who are the descendants of, or claim under those who were forced to
submit to the yoke of a government by constraint, have always a right to shake it off
and free themselves from usurpation or tyranny which the sword hath brought upon
them.
Rabkin argues from this passage that Locke’s statements on property, and
especially his contentions as to the right of the conquered to reclaim their
property under their own “banner,” could be construed as an outright
endorsement of “national rights.” 2 Although he concedes that Locke’s theory
offers aliens legal safeguards, and that conquerors would not necessarily
abuse the strictly legal aspect of property ownership, he maintains that it is
implied in Locke’s position that property under a consented sovereignty
holds added value.
Rabkin makes much of “a striking parallel” that he identifies between
property and nationhood, and controversially associates Locke’s perception
of “society” with the idea of a nation. 3 From these findings he arrives at the
conclusion that Locke’s government is an instrument for the effective admin-
istration of, and increased efficiency in, the trade of naturally occurring prop-
erty, as well as the sophistication of the semi-natural “pre-political agreement
to band together.” His confidence in this conclusion is reinforced by the
coherence between his position and the one that emerges from Nathan Tar-
147
148 Chapter 7
cov’s study of the fence metaphor that, when invoked by Locke, indicates a
propensity toward division and borders, thereby uniting—again—concepts of
property and nationality. 4
Rabkin appreciates the difficulties that arise from his position. He recog-
nizes that stressing the familial descent aspect of nationalism weakens the
Lockean argument for rule by consent, playing into the hands of Filmer’s
Patriarcha. He is equally aware that strongly insisting on “the pre-existing
cultural unity” invites troubling questions as to its original source. Neverthe-
less, he remains convinced that, “it is not political constitution that makes a
nation, in Locke’s account, but the prior existence of a nation that makes it
possible to have a liberal constitution.” 5 However, apart from a few commu-
nitarian hints, his allusion to the “added value” of property under a govern-
ment with which one is affiliated is not sufficiently theoretically grounded. 6
Moreover, the importance of his identification of a relation between property
and nationality notwithstanding, I think he exaggerates the parallel between
the two.
Rabkin struggles to demonstrate that the strong theoretical grounds on
which one may claim that for Locke property is pre-political, carry over to
nationality. Had the parallel between property and nationality been as strong
as he proposes, one would expect the state to take on a similar role in both
respects. Yet the administrative efficiency-enhancing role of the state in rela-
tion to property does not have a clear-cut parallel in nationality. The “care-
free” trade between individuals provided by the state-mediation of their inter-
action does not replicate itself in the form of comparable advantage in na-
tionality, unless, of course, one reduces nationality to an atomist form of the
kind expressed by Nozick. 7 Moreover, Rabkin struggles to explain the emer-
gence of a multiplicity of particular nationalities out of a potential joint
global national pool that, itself, corresponds to a seemingly global Lockean
society. Although Locke may very well have had a national division in mind,
the theoretical foundation for it needs to be uncovered; it cannot be assumed
to be self-evident.
That said, Rabkin makes a good case for the view that Locke has been
misclassified as a precursor to cosmopolitanism. Such misclassification is
itself probably a consequence of Locke’s focus upon the seemingly universal
application of natural law that has been relabeled as “human rights” in con-
temporary discourse. Locke’s contribution to the development of the concept
of human rights is well recognized. Nevertheless, one cannot look to Lock-
ean theory as the basis for the human rights that govern a cosmopolitan
political body, since his metaphysical stance is incompatible with such a
form of governance.
In an effort to distance Locke from the proto-cosmopolitan outlook that
he has been associated with, this chapter examines the limits of the solution
offered to “future anxious individuals” by the Lockean state. This examina-
Locke: Heritage and Nationality 149
tion reveals that the state can only preserve the past and present of individu-
als by converting these temporal states into currency and commodifying
them. The unique advantage of currency is its inherent artificiality. Currency,
or money, does not succumb to the forces of natural degradation that face
mortal beings. It might be susceptible to artificial loss in its valuation, but
this can be compensated for by the artificial manipulation of interest rates.
By transcending the effects of time, effectively achieving immortality, cur-
rency becomes an instrument of vicarious perdurance. This invaluable trait
facilitates carefree interpersonal exchange, as well as cross-generational in-
heritance. By opening the future, currency makes sense of investing in the
present.
Nevertheless, this chapter also argues that the currency-perdurance utility
provided by the state does not satisfy the full extent of human preservation
requirements. It explores forms of property that individuals strive to pre-
serve, despite their inconvertibility into currency. Subsequently, these forms
of property are linked to the human restriction to a single space in time.
Unlike the constriction regarding time, however, the constriction with respect
to space does not seem to be either controllable (Hobbes), or manageable
(Locke); it is in fact beyond the administrative capacity of the state. The
capacity to “bank” incorporeal legacy must therefore lie elsewhere. Other
associations, which have been historically entrusted with the preservation of
noncommodities, are identified; nevertheless, the nation emerges as domi-
nate because it forms the perfect match, in terms of size and counterbalance,
to the state. Moreover, with the exception of certain historical contingencies,
the most notable of which is the United States of America, resetting national
heritage might act as a “spoiler” to social contribution on the part of the
human rational individual, since it would at least partially rob us of the
pursuit of continuum. 8
largely unchanged, thus giving credence to the Hobbesean notion of the state
as an antirevolutionary, if not counter-revolutionary, measure. 9
This tempered stability establishes the minimal requirements for trust
among strangers, thereby providing the perfect backdrop for future-oriented
trade relationships. Devoid of state regulation, both individual identities and
their association with goods would be in a state of constant flux: a state of
revolution. Even staunch libertarians should concede that such is the situa-
tion not only in failed states, challenged by widespread corruption and in
which one can reinvent one’s identity for a negligible amount of cash, but
also in the common practice within successful states of untrustworthy indi-
viduals who disguise their dubious past business performance under the guise
of a formally “new” commercial entity. Perhaps this is why Hobbes, intent
on providing the utmost in trust, was so adamant about discouraging any kind
of reform beyond an original “once and for all” constitutional moment. I
have ventured so far as to say that he envisages a sovereign so powerful as to
make even the changes incurred by the passage of time irrelevant. His ideal,
super-rational ruler freezes time, and his ideal citizen acts accordingly in
order to reinforce this welcomed condition in which planning is made worth-
while. Therefore, acting against an established lineage of stability is pro-
nounced irrational.
I have argued that the impetus for Lockean social theory may have been a
fear that Hobbes had positioned himself on a slippery slope of rationality that
would inevitably lend itself to idealism. Hobbes’s striving for perfection
would result in unreal expectations from mere mortals and would ultimately
lead to an imposition of the manufactured super-rationality of the sovereign
on the natural, moderately rational, individual. The Lockean alternative is a
ruler who is potentially fallible, yet also attainable. It is a position that shifts
the attention from perfect uninterrupted lineage as a source of stability, to the
tradition of a ruling institution that embodies timelessness. On the latter
account our real sense of time is not being negated, rather it is being man-
aged. Through institutionalization we harness time to our advantage, we
make it productive by accumulating our actions and “banking” them into a
shared artificial currency that we can exchange under the rules set by the
state arbitrator.
The state does not act as a rational distillery, in the style of Rawls, nor is
its sole purpose, as proposed by Nozick, the mere provision of corporal
security. Rather, it performs the necessary function of a material banker. In
the hope of defeating our individual inconsequentiality, we commit ourselves
(including lives, liberties and estates) to the state for the purpose of safekeep-
ing. 10 As a “banking” institution, in addition to sheltering our property from
the natural elements and the harmful intentions of others, it offers a horizon
for our individual contributions to this world. The state administers its bank-
ing by way of conversion into currency; it provides security by assuring us
Locke: Heritage and Nationality 151
Recall that the rationale offered earlier for the social grouping of self-cen-
tered individuals was to open the future and escape the destructive logic of
the momentary. The argument was that this is achieved by the stability of
institutions that are able to account for the past and present, thereby manufac-
turing a future. One is tempted to continue along this line of argument and
seek out the ideal dimensions of the assurance-provider, or “banker.” 14 In a
contrived theoretical exercise of this sort, size would have a gravitational
effect. Strength being in numbers, seekers of security and stability for their
worldly achievements would gravitate toward assurance providers with en-
during large constituencies, thereby reaffirming the provider’s perceived
power. The ideal size for both state and national affiliations is, as can be read
into Hobbes, one in which we all “bank” with one cosmopolitan entity,
putting an end to conflict and replacing it with legal exchange. Indeed, it
would be most fortunate if we shared a single banking currency; lacking one,
154 Chapter 7
Nationality, one might say, is the appropriate form of solidarity for societies that are
mobile—so that clan and village can no longer serve as the primary forms of com-
munity—and egalitarian—so that people are no longer bound together by vertical
ties to overlords and dependants. 19
Consequent to this Errour, that the present Church is Christ’s Kingdome, there ought
to be some one Man, or Assembly, by whose mouth our Saviour (now in heaven)
speaketh . . . power Regal under Christ, being challenged, universally by the Pope,
and in particular Common-wealth by Assemblies of the Pastor of the place, (when
the Scripture gives it none but Civill Sovereigns,) . . . that they see not who it is to
whom they have engaged their obedience. 30
Locke: Heritage and Nationality 157
A Czech Republic becomes a Czech Republic not by virtue of being Czech but by
virtue of consciously adopting republican goals. Thus far it is no more Czech than
Slovak or American. Founding its statehood on universal principles rather than local
158 Chapter 7
claims means that the local claims no longer determine membership. Hence, the
republic’s Czechness is an accident, morally speaking, rather than a necessity. This
accident occurs for sufficient reason—the Aristotelian reason—that every essence
appears (becomes phenomenal) via agencies whose accidental qualities condition
being-in-the-world. Thus, universal principles are made manifest only in particular
forms. 34
Allen’s argument is that universal principles in the modern age are offered by
default to inconsequential, pre-packaged historical groups. These affiliations
survive only as administrative labels, empty convenient receptacles for uni-
versal content. They are therefore particular and exclusive in name only. Yet
Allen seems to be missing the defining features of local historical “baggage.”
He seems to be begging the question of universalism by downplaying the
role of national identity.
This perhaps explains the prominence, if not fascination within the American
psyche, with legal matters in general and the Supreme Court in particular.
Thus it should come as no surprise that the phrase “sue me” originated in the
land of opportunity. For many, immigration was an escape not only from
stratification, but also from corruption. America was conceived as a level
playing field, with legal institutions in place to counteract unfair advantage.
What constitutes fair opportunity is a matter well worth discussing else-
where, but without going into intricate details it can readily be stated that the
minimal requirement is the curtailment of the influence wielded by any one
body, whether by institutional checks and balances, or by anti-trust laws. The
land of opportunity has in return demanded a civic allegiance, most pro-
nounced in its naturalization procedures, as well as allegiance ceremonies
incorporated into the education system. The strictly civic or statist nature of
these demands would seem to challenge the assertion I made earlier as to the
symbiotic connection between state and nation.
As a matter of fact, I suspect that much of the cosmopolitan argument
relies on the prototype of the United States as an exemplar of a “nationless
state.” The cosmopolitan view finds great appeal in starting the world anew,
a clean slate, free of past national baggage. Contrast this with Miller:
The majority of people [in the world] are too deeply attached to their inherited
national identities to make their obliteration an intelligible goal. People value the
rich cultural inheritance that membership of a nation can bring them; and they want
to see continuity between their own lives and the lives of their ancestors. 38
well view the current attempts to unite Europe, as a tactical step toward the
goal of world unification. 41 Europhiles who would object to this claim, are
not truly in the cosmopolitan camp; they should be labeled Euro-nationalists.
The American model cannot, however, be revived in the current era, since
the conditions of “the original experiment” cannot be replicated. Europe is a
case in point; unlike its American cousin, the EU does not yield to reorgan-
ization because it already contains multiple legacies of order. The preserva-
tion of these legacies is not merely a matter of conservative policy, but is an
indispensable part of the individual’s future-oriented contribution to a social
corpus. Much as in the case of the state, without assurances that one’s efforts
to leave a mark on the social culture will survive beyond one’s singular
corporeal existence, the motivation to create for an audience beyond oneself
regresses to nil. Although civic nationalism is seemingly accommodating,
recognizing the potential clash of cultural legacies, it requires those who seek
to join established nation-states to either leave their national baggage at the
door or conceive a formula of converting the old into the new.
If all the participants in a cosmopolitan enterprise were neutral “history-
free” states, the consolidation of law and order would be a difficult yet
manageable task. Yet it is doubtful whether the inhabitants of history-encum-
bered states would accept an imposed “amnesia.” Having served for some
time as the historical continuum platform for their respective majorities, such
nation-states will have accumulated content. These political bodies will have
come to embody cultural memory banks of non-currency that make it ration-
al for individuals to contribute something of themselves. If such endeavors
are at risk by “cultural revolution” they offer no more security to individuals
than they may find in their own individuated temporally limited existence.
Consequently individuals would recede back into their solitary shells.
Recall that the rational individuals we have been discussing suffer from
“the human fault,” the handicap of the spatio-temporal. Some relief from the
detrimental effect that time has on our capacity to aggregate property is
provided by the institutionalization of an authority that is perpetual for all
goods and purposes, and yet earthly in the sense that it is rationally compre-
hensible and indisputable. Its perpetuity is achieved either, as Hobbes pro-
posed, by “freezing” conditions, or as Locke suggests, by introducing a con-
servative counter-revolutionary framework of civil society. This is an earthly
and comprehensible authority because of its human, rather than godly, origin.
Finally, the authority is indisputable because it relies on consent, either of the
Hobbesean variety that submits to an ultimate rationality, or of Lockean
renewable consent by rational consideration. By virtually suspending time,
Hobbes kills two birds with one stone. Although time does not stop, due to
the introduction of the repetitiveness of the “everlasting succession” of
events, time becomes inconsequential. By halting the effects of time, both
time and space are eliminated from the equation of our existence. I have
Locke: Heritage and Nationality 161
already shown the difficulties in performing this “trick,” yet it must be con-
ceded that it is an elegant one.
The Lockean version is not as elegant as the Hobbesean one. It decreases
the unwanted effects of time, but does not take it out of the equation. As a
result, space remains a human constraint that one needs to contend with. Yet
our perception of space remains at odds with our perception of time. The
artificial extension of ourselves through time to form the future, even be it
perhaps an illusion, does not seem to have a corollary in space. Our percep-
tion of space is captured in the singular, whereas our perception of time is
potentially continuous. Our voluminous manifestation suggests that we are
not singular in the same sense as a point in space is singular. Nevertheless,
although we are extended in space, we do not extend through it in the same
sense that we think of ourselves as extending through time. Moments in time
seem to connect to one another to form a time continuum, whereas moments
in space merely connect serially to each other.
This intuitive notion that, although time and space are intrinsically con-
nected they are not cut from the same cloth, is further strengthened by the
established fact that one is unable to be simultaneously in two places, yet one
can easily be in one place at two different moments of time. Our extension in
space, as opposed to our contrived extension through time, is defined by our
confinement to clear physical boundaries. In other words we can artificially
extend ourselves through time, whereas we cannot do so through space.
Whether we consider ourselves, metaphysically, to be “substances” or
“events” makes little difference. 42 In either case we would take up an exclu-
sive delineated volume in space. As a “substance” we could not share our
exact position with other “substances”; alternatively, as an “event” we would
need to be scheduled at a “venue” such that our appearance does not conflict
with others scheduled for the same “venue.”
Since we cannot overcome these spatial constraints, neither physically
nor mentally, we must submit to them. Moreover, these are not obstacles, but
defining features of our existence as “property-ridden” individuals. If we
could, by some technological wonder, relieve ourselves of the singularity of
spatial existence, our effective omnipresence would relieve us of time restric-
tions as well. This would return us to the Hobbesean model of perfection,
wherein my property would be indiscernible from your property. Indeed, our
whole notion of selves would collapse into a singular collective self. Related
notions may be found in the monistic Hindu aspiration to Moksha (liberation)
by uniting Atman (self) with Brahman (transpersonal, universal), as well as
in the annihilation of the illusion of the self offered by Buddhist Nirvana as
the resolution to the misery of the perpetuation of its illusion Samsara (rein-
carnation). 43
While we appear to be able to resist time by artificial means, we cannot
and quite possibly should not resist our “hardwired” spatiality, since it may
162 Chapter 7
There is nothing in Nozick’s argument to rule out protective agencies competing for
clients on a non-territorial basis. So there are no jurisdictional boundaries in a
Nozickian world, except in the sense that one may pass from a region where most
people have signed up with agency A to a region where most people have signed up
with agency B. The only firm boundaries are those that demarcate individuals’
holdings of property. 45
surrounding mine would not leave me access to “passage” of the same qual-
ity and extent as you have appropriated for yourself. 47 Nozick does not
concern himself with the possibility that these islands might become safe
havens for criminals originating in the surrounding territories, or alternative-
ly that they might utilize their seclusion to free-ride on the defensive ring
provided by circumfusing territories. However, these issues might be moot,
as ultimately he seems to be implying that an ultra-minimalist state would
gradually evolve into a minimalist one, in which sovereignty is monopolized.
Moreover, there is nothing to bar the consolidation trend from reaching glo-
bal proportions.
Surprisingly, although hardly an advocate of Nozick’s social conclusions,
recent commentary by Lynn Dobson on supranational citizenship in the con-
text of the emerging European Union suggests a convergence of her view
with his on the function of the traditional nation-state. There would be no
reason for Nozick to reject Dobson’s redefinition of citizenship:
Citizenship is not about being, but about doing . . . citizenship defines the space and
the possibilities for certain kinds of action within highly structured, impersonal,
multitudinous and multisystem worlds, where each of us engages in hundreds or
thousands of interactions with others—mostly unseen and unsuspected others—
every day; and where each of us is socialised into networks of rules and roles and
codes structuring our behaviour and our expectations, most of which we do not even
notice. 48
For both Nozick and Dobson the nation-state is a contingent, perhaps even
anachronistic, yet effective administrative zone. But if nation-states are re-
duced to convenient administrative zip codes, nationalities in themselves are
rendered defunct altogether, as they serve no purpose save perhaps a folklor-
istic one. As far as the nation survives within the nation-state it survives in a
“civic nationalism” form. Both Nozick and Dobson would also champion
boundary-free governance under complete laissez passer immigration. They
would differ only on the degree of such governance, or on the extent of
laissez faire. For Nozick, governance would be restricted to the provision of
global corporal security, whereas for Dobson it would extend into the provi-
sion of global social security, thereby curtailing laissez faire.
Following Nozick and Dobson, consider now the possibility that I am
wrong: consider, that is to say, that individuals might not be easily converted
to global human nationality, but nevertheless are convertible all the same.
Such a perception of the individual might generate two major strands of
“world government” policies: a planned egalitarian strand, and a free-market
strand. In what remains of this chapter, I develop simulations of these poli-
cies aimed at demonstrating that even if the demographics of the world could
be completely reshuffled, the attraction of corporeally constrained beings to
164 Chapter 7
A global government would devise a grand central plan for the even distribu-
tion of humankind across the globe. Such a plan would take into account
resource distribution in order to assure that choice is not curtailed by our
access to goods. However, since the resources may become depleted over
time, or their value may change as a result of technological development, the
government must reserve the right to redistribute the world population to
accommodate its speculation as to what the future foretells. This would be
attaching individual fate to the collective fate of humankind at large.
This would not come without a cost. We could count on very little stabil-
ity. Our investments, as well as our attachments—to anything from skylines
to relationships—would become extremely limited in their scope. Figurative-
ly, much like the traveling salesperson, we would be living in a hotel room
without there being much point in unpacking our suitcase. Furthermore, once
we left one place for another, there would be nothing to secure the existence
of the former place in the form we recalled it. For some this may seem too
extreme a scenario, describing an exaggerated rate of change. They would
perhaps hold that governmental wisdom would curtail the rate of change by
applying relocation programs only every so often. In this more moderate
account, we would be able to live a more stable life and would form attach-
ments to people and places. After a while we would develop local traits and
quirks and would become attached to those as well. We might even develop
regional traditions.
For the sake of the argument, assume that the tradition we have developed
is one of sports and exercise. We take these so seriously that we elevate them
to the degree of body worship, and as we are not shy about it, our tradition is
to conduct sports exhibitions in the nude. Now, a generation or two have
come to pass and the central government has decided that redistribution of
the populace can no longer be avoided. However, the newcomers who are
being transported to our community do not approve of our cherished practice,
in fact they consider it vile and immoral. In fear of this increasingly vocal
influx of immigrants we demand our own sovereignty so as to protect our
cherished practices. We wish to demarcate our borders and exclude these
“others,” so as to preserve our invested interests.
Free Market
as long as we like. It is thought that market values of supply and demand will
coordinate our migration so as to best accommodate the occurring changes,
be they technologically influenced, resources related, or what have you.
Again, individual fate is attached to the fate of humankind, albeit in a differ-
ent manner.
This policy seems to lend itself, even more easily than the centrally con-
trolled one, to a volatile existence with no stability whatsoever. Once more
this can be challenged as an extreme scenario. Still, if humans are indeed
stability and prosperity seeking beings, as reflected in the preceding discus-
sion of the aspiration for the establishment of the state in Hobbes and Locke,
they will challenge the “fleeting reality” that they encounter. They will attach
themselves to a spatial location, rather than become drifters and wanderers.
Now, a generation or two would come to pass and our community might
have developed a tradition of “boozing.” Our successful society might attract
an influx of immigrants that think that drinking is a vile habit. We soon
realize that these immigrants could come to threaten our culture and therefore
wish to enact our own sovereignty in order to protect it.
NOTES
1. Jeremy A. Rabkin, “Grotius, Vattel, and Locke: An Older View of Liberalism and
Nationality,” Review of Politics 59, no. 2 (1997): 308.
2. Locke, Second Treatise of Government, 98, §192. Rabkin, “Grotius, Vattel, and Locke,”
312.
166 Chapter 7
35. Benedict Anderson, “Introduction,” in Mapping the Nation, ed. Gopal Balakrishnan
(London: Verso, 1996), 1.
36. Taras Kuzio, “The Myth of the Civic State: A Critical Survey of Hans Kohn’s Frame-
work for Understanding Nationalism,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 21, no. 1 (2002): 21.
37. Chaim Gans, The Limits of Nationalism (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press,
2003), 11.
38. Miller, On Nationality, 184.
39. Israel Zangwill, The Principle of Nationalities (London 1917), 54; Hans Kohn, Nation-
alism: Its Meaning and History (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1955), 29.
40. Gans, The Limits of Nationalism, 15.
41. Daniele Archibugi, “Re-Imagining Political Community,” in Studies in Cosmopolitan
Democracy,” ed. David Held (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), 219.
42. Recall the earlier reflection on the difference between the two with reference to Christo-
pher Hughes Conn.
43. Satguru Sivaya Subramuniyaswami, Dancing with Siva: Hinduism’s Contemporary Cat-
echism (Kapaa, Hawaii: Himalayan Academy Publications, 1997), 87, 352, 581, 299, 822.
Unfortunately lying outside the scope of this work, the suggested crude parallel between Hob-
bes’s position toward the individual and the Hindu and Buddhist attitude toward Atman, is
worthy of thorough examination elsewhere.
44. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 16.
45. David Miller, “Liberalism and Boundaries: A Response to Allen Buchanan,” in States,
Nations, and Borders, ed. Allen Buchanan (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press,
2003), 264.
46. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 54.
47. A. John Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1992), 293–94.
48. Lynn Dobson, Supranational Citizenship, Europe in Change (Manchester, U.K.: Man-
chester University Press, 2006), 171.
49. Granted, there could also be combined strains of world governance; however, this would
not necessarily affect my argument.
Chapter Eight
A Breakdown of Cosmopolitanism
It has been a key objective of this book to metaphysically reform the under-
standing of Locke’s liberalism. The cruel implication of this reformation, to
which this final chapter draws attention, is the erosion of the widely held
belief that the relationship between nationalism and liberalism is necessarily
antithetical. From Ernst Renan onwards, nationalism has been portrayed as a
communal defining factor of human consciousness and, as such, illiberal. 1
Rabkin identifies the source of the conventional conceptual rift between
liberalism and nationalism with the post-World War II legal attempt to shel-
ter private individuals, under the umbrella of international law, from gross
misconduct by their own governments. 2 Moreover, he contends that we are
witnessing a contemporary departure from the original liberal tradition as
characterized by the work of Swiss legal theorist Emerich de Vatell and the
political thought of John Locke, which was highly committed to nationalism.
While supportive of the general gist of Rabkin’s argument, I find that his
understanding of nationality relies too heavily on communitarian argumenta-
tion.
Related to both its antagonism toward the abstraction of cosmopolitan-
ism, and to the historical lack of substantial theoretical discussion of nation-
alism, communitarianism is often considered as the missing theoretical foun-
dation for nationalism. In the contemporary debate between cosmopolitans
and communitarians each side is seen as aligned with a corresponding philo-
sophical enlightenment tradition. The cosmopolitan position is commonly
understood to draw upon the liberal tradition, with the historical American
experiment as its “case study” of an unencumbered individualist rational
existence. 3 The communitarian position probably has more “flavors”; its
spectrum spanning from rationalist to anti-rationalist depictions of the human
psyche. The foundations of all these variants are traced back to the Aristote-
169
170 Chapter 8
The cosmopolitan may live all his life in one city and maintain the same citizenship
throughout. But he refuses to think of himself as defined by his location or his
ancestry or his citizenship or his language. Though he may live in San Francisco and
be of Irish ancestry, he does not take his identity to be compromised when he learns
Spanish, eats Chinese, wears clothes made in Korea, listens to arias by Verdi sung
172 Chapter 8
NOTES
1. See, Judith Lichtenberg, “How Liberal Can Nationalism Be?,” Philosophical Forum 28
(1996–1997).
2. Rabkin, “Grotius, Vattel, and Locke.”
3. Patrick Hayden, “Cosmopolitanism Past and Present,” in The Ashgate Research Com-
panion to Ethics and International Relations, ed. Patrick Hayden (Farnham, U.K.: Ashgate,
2009), 49.
4. Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, 1993).
174 Chapter 8
5. Yael Tamir, “In Response to the New Old Nationalism,” New York Review of Books 41,
no. 12 (1994).
6. Rational human individual, as opposed to the ideal rational individual.
7. Margaret Moore, “Liberalism, Communitarianism, and the Politics of Identity,” in Con-
temporary Debates in Political Philosophy, ed. Thomas Christiano and John Philip Christman
(Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell, 2009), 323.
8. John S. Partington, “H. G. Wells and the World State: A Liberal Cosmopolitan in a
Totalitarian Age,” International Relations 17, no. 2 (2003).
9. Jeremy Waldron, “Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative,” in The Rights
of Minority Cultures, ed. Will Kymllicka (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1995), 95.
10. Lichtenberg, “How Liberal Can Nationalism Be?,” 63.
11. The sixth book of the series: Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince.
12. It is worth mentioning the fearsome dispute that erupted within the Zionist movement in
the early twentieth century when, under the title “the Uganda scheme,” it was suggested that a
Jewish homeland might be realized in East Africa. See Ehud Luz, “Zion and Judenstaat: The
Significance of The ‘Uganda’ Controversy,” in Essays in Modern Jewish History: A Tribute to
Ben Halpern, ed. Phyllis Cohen Albert and Frances Malino (Cranbury, N.J.: Associated Uni-
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Index
afterlife 17, 41, 43, 68, 70, 132, 136 Boyle, Deborah 50
alienation 21, 66, 78, 94, 151, 152 boundedness. See binds and boundaries
Allen, William B. 157–158 Bramhall, Bishop 48
Althusius, Johannes 157 Brandon, Eric 32
Anscome, G. E. M. 114 Brewin, Charles 29
Aquinas, Thomas 15, 40, 43 Buchanan, Allen 162
Aristotle 43, 76, 77, 92, 169 Bull, Hedley 29
Ashcraft, Richard 109, 115 Burke, Edmund 139
atomism 26, 44, 49, 50, 79, 148
autonomy 1, 3, 13, 16, 25, 26, 36, 45, 46, Cavendish, Margaret 50, 54n101, 91
47, 50, 55, 56, 57, 72, 76, 91, 104, 105, change. See motion
108, 111, 119, 133 Christianity 17, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 68,
Augustine 42, 82n62 110, 115, 116, 156
Averroes 70 Clarke, Norris 40
Axelrod, Robert 93 Clive, Megan 44
closest continuer 125, 139, 140
Bacon, Francis 73 Coby, Patrick 108, 109
Bacon, Roger 70 common power. See sovereign
Bankowski, Zenon 77 communitarianism 3, 13, 148, 166n6,
Barry, Norman 62 169–170, 171
Battigelli, Anna 54n101 conflict, social. See friction
Beal, Timothy 32 constraint, metaphysical. See binds and
Bell, David 155 boundaries
Berkeley, George 130, 134, 136, 166n9 cosmopolitanism 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11n5, 13–14,
binds and boundaries 11n5, 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 16, 22, 23n2, 28, 29, 30, 31, 98, 129,
17, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21–22, 71, 78, 143n1, 147, 148, 152, 153, 156, 157,
98, 103, 106, 129, 140, 149, 155, 161, 158, 159, 160, 163, 164–165, 167n49,
163, 164, 165, 171 169, 170, 171–172
Black, Anthony 157 contractrianism. See social contract
Bodin, Jean 157 Conway, Anne 6, 26, 45, 45–46, 47,
Boucher, David 30 48–49, 53n78, 56, 57, 129
183
184 Index
corporeality 2, 5, 6, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, freedom, complete. See unboundedness
32, 39, 45, 46, 47, 49, 55, 56, 59, 62, friction 2, 5, 6, 11n6, 19, 33, 34, 35, 36, 40,
65, 66, 68, 70, 71, 72, 74, 76, 77, 78, 46, 50, 57, 58, 59, 60, 72, 78, 86, 87,
82n56, 86, 90, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 88, 94, 104, 110, 111, 124, 140, 149
110, 111, 111–112, 113–114, 115, 125, Freeman, Samuel 92
132, 137, 151, 160, 165, 171
covenant. See social contract Gahzali, Abu Hamid 70
creation, the 4, 5, 21, 40, 47, 49, 55, 58, 62, Gale, George 141
80, 91, 106, 107, 108, 113, 156; See Galileo, Galilee 75
also God, the creator Gans, Chaim 158, 159
currency 7, 103, 131, 148, 149, 150, 151, Gauthier, David 9, 27, 86, 91–98, 101n51,
152, 153, 155, 157, 160 104, 114, 122, 123, 124–125
geometry 32, 39, 92
Darwin, Charles 117, 118, 127n49 Gewirth, Alan 94
DaVinci, Leonardo 75 God (nature): attributes of 2, 3, 8, 17–18,
Dawson, Christopher 31 35, 39, 40, 45–46, 48, 65, 66, 69, 77,
Descartes, René 39, 55, 61, 96, 132 86, 87, 91, 95, 103, 105, 106, 107, 110,
De-Shalit, Avner 51n6 111, 115, 116, 130, 134, 136, 145n35,
Dobson, Lynn 163, 163 173; commandment of 26, 44, 47, 63,
dualism 5, 6, 21, 22, 114, 116, 131, 132, 74, 116; the creator 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 18, 19,
144n6 21, 25, 26, 32, 35, 44, 46–47, 49, 50,
55, 56, 58, 59, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66–67,
echo. See replication 72, 91, 105, 106, 107, 108, 110, 111,
egoism 27, 32, 35, 36 113, 115, 116; perfection 3, 4, 6, 35, 36,
Einstein, Albert 112 39, 45, 46, 48, 49, 55, 59, 78, 86, 91,
Elshtain, Jean Bethke 82n62 103, 105, 106, 115, 137, 150, 161; the
eschatology 8, 25, 32, 41, 64 power 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 58,
everlasting succession 15, 49, 63 59, 61, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 71–72, 74,
evolution 4, 6, 117, 118, 122, 124, 125 87, 88, 91, 95, 105, 108, 110, 110–111,
equilibrium 6 113, 114, 115, 116, 125, 130, 134, 136,
equilibrium, perfect 4, 18, 16, 25, 36, 46, 141, 142, 155, 160, 99n14, 126n34,
48, 49, 55, 56, 58, 62, 64, 64–65, 68, 166n9; rationality of 18, 20, 21, 25, 39,
70, 80n21, 91, 120 40, 47, 55, 55–56, 59, 61, 63, 64, 66,
67, 70, 71, 73, 74, 77, 82n56, 86, 91,
fall of humankind 8, 36, 47, 56, 61, 63, 69, 99n13, 105–106, 111, 113, 115, 156;
72, 77, 80, 105, 107, 115, 126n9 reason. See rationality; word of;
fear: of death 17, 27, 35, 37, 48, 76, 85, 88, rationality of
90, 133, 139; of the future 15, 37, 59, Gooch, G. P. 157
76, 85, 88, 137, 148; of the other 4, 6, government. See sovereign
19, 21, 31, 34, 37, 56, 57, 73, 76, 80, Grant, Ruth W. 114–115
91, 105, 153; of the unknown 8, 70, 76, Grotius, Hugo 28, 157
85
Filmer, Robert 136, 148 Habermas, Jürgen 158
fool, the 50, 58, 60, 74, 77, 79, 85, 86, 88, Hampsher-Monk, Iain 44
93, 95, 104, 106, 135, 137 Hampton, Jean 9, 27, 68, 79, 94, 94–95,
foolish. See fool, the 96, 114, 124, 125, 126n4, 140, 141, 143
force. See power Hanson, John R. 30
Forsyth, Murray 29, 30 Hardin, Russell 89, 94, 123
fragmentation. See individuation Harrison, Ross 125
Index 185
121, 143, 152, 162, 163, 164, 165 order : rational 4, 25, 32, 35, 36, 42, 44, 46,
Martel, James 72, 73 50, 55, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66,
Martinich, Aloysius 10, 40, 47, 48, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 74, 105, 116, 134;
71 metaphysical 2, 4, 25, 32, 55, 56, 57,
Marx, Karl 61, 78, 83n95, 144n2, 152, 155, 58–59, 60, 61, 63, 65, 67, 68, 70, 75,
156, 169 77, 116, 119, 122, 151; political. See
materialism 2, 17, 21, 22, 27, 32, 35, 45, order, social; social 1, 4, 25, 29, 34, 37,
110, 126n23, 130, 144n6 27, 30, 32, 33, 42, 50, 57, 58, 63, 87,
memory 21, 77, 112, 130, 132, 134, 135, 89, 91, 92, 103, 105, 110, 117, 118,
136, 138, 139, 154, 157, 160, 164 121, 129, 136, 138, 151; spontaneous 6,
might. See power 22, 34, 62, 98, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121,
Milam, Max 131 122, 123
Miller, David 23n2, 154–155, 159, Overhoff, Jürgen 43, 44
161–162, 171 Oz-Salzberger, Fania 70
Mill, John Stuart 61
Milton, John 63 Pacchi, Arrigo 63, 64
modernism 5, 25, 36, 44, 45, 55, 155 Parker, Kim Ian 115
Moloney, Patrick 72, 73 particularity. See individualism
Molyneaux, William 131 peacefulness. See rest
monism 5, 21, 32, 61, 70, 110, 130, 144n6 Plato 39, 44
monotheism 25, 26, 32, 35, 44, 70, 99n13, Pocock, J. G. A. 42
111 Popper, Karl 61, 75
mortality 2, 17–18, 19, 21, 69, 70, 77, 116 power 15, 27, 28, 31, 35, 47, 50, 56, 57, 63,
motion 2, 5, 6, 7, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 26, 45, 74, 85, 87, 89, 91, 94, 95, 99n17, 108,
46–47, 48, 49, 50, 56, 57, 62, 69, 74, 116, 137
79, 85, 103, 119, 129, 130, 133, 137, prisoner’s dilemma 23n11, 27, 93, 94,
140, 156 100n29, 123
property 6, 21, 22, 15, 16, 19, 20, 33–34,
nation. See nationhood 87, 88, 90, 91, 98, 103, 104, 106, 107,
nation-state 8, 153, 157, 158, 159, 160, 163 107–108, 109, 110, 116, 117, 119–120,
nationalism. See nationhood 125, 129–130, 131, 133, 138, 139, 140,
nationhood 1, 4, 6, 13, 14, 23n2, 143, 147, 141, 142, 143, 144n10, 145n35,
147–148, 149, 150, 152, 153, 154–155, 147–148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 155,
157, 158–160, 163, 164–165, 166n20, 157, 160, 161–162, 166n11
169–170, 171, 172 prudence 27, 36, 37
natural law. See laws of nature Pufendorf, Samuel 157
Netanyahu, Benzion 42, 70–71, 110
Newey, Glen 28 Rabkin, Jeremy 147, 148, 166n6, 169, 170,
Newton, Isaac 75 171
Nolan, Jonathan 134–135, 136, 139, 151 Rapaport, Anatol 93
Nozick, Robert 7, 16, 30, 31, 104, 121, rational action 1, 50, 55, 56, 59, 60, 61, 63,
124–125, 139, 143n1, 148, 150, 161, 85, 88, 89, 91, 91–98, 115, 123
162–163 rational conduct. See rational action
rationality 3, 5, 6, 8, 15, 18, 20, 21, 27, 30,
Oakeshott, Michael 26, 27, 38, 39, 40, 42, 33–34, 35–37, 38, 40, 41, 43, 46, 50,
57, 62, 76 55–58, 59, 60, 62, 65, 66, 67, 68, 71,
obedience 5, 21, 26, 27, 30, 33, 35, 41, 48, 72, 73, 75, 76–77, 80, 85, 86, 87, 88,
64, 55, 56, 59, 63, 64, 65, 66, 85, 92, 90, 91, 92, 94, 95, 96, 99n13, 104, 105,
97, 103, 115, 133, 156 111, 112, 113, 115, 116, 123, 124, 129,
Index 187
130, 136, 143, 149, 150, 152, 153, 156, social contract 2, 3, 9, 18, 19, 21, 34, 61,
158, 160, 170 62, 64, 68, 92, 94, 99n3, 108–109, 122,
rationalism 3, 6, 8, 19, 21, 25, 33, 39, 55, 124, 125, 138, 139, 157
59, 61, 62, 67, 68, 70, 74, 92, 95, 106, sovereign 14, 15, 20–21, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33,
113, 114, 115, 116, 169, 171; in 33–34, 35, 36, 37, 41, 43, 43, 46, 47,
international relations 32 48, 50, 57, 59, 61, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69,
Rawls, John 94, 114, 138, 139, 150, 170 70, 71, 73, 74, 79, 80, 81n42, 85, 86,
reason. See rationality 87, 89, 91, 92, 94, 95, 98, 99n17, 104,
recurrence 15, 34, 37, 63, 67, 85, 93, 94, 106, 107, 108, 110, 112, 113–114, 121,
98, 100n29, 133 123, 124, 125, 133, 136, 136–137, 137,
religion 27, 32, 37, 41, 42, 61, 71, 152, 140, 141, 142, 147, 150, 151, 156, 157,
155, 156, 157 162, 164, 165
Renan, Ernst 169 spatio-temporality 2, 5, 7, 8, 15–16, 17, 18,
replication 34, 55, 58–59, 63, 64, 65, 66, 19, 21, 45, 46, 48, 49, 57, 98, 103,
67, 68, 98, 133 111–113, 114, 130, 131, 132, 139, 140,
reputation 93, 96–97, 98 152, 156, 160, 160–161, 149, 171, 172,
rest 5, 6, 16, 18, 25, 27, 32, 34, 44, 45, 47, 173
48, 49, 55, 56–57, 58, 59, 66, 70, 71, Spinoza, Baruch 39, 110, 113, 126n23
74, 76, 85, 86, 87, 88–89, 98, 103, stability, complete. See rest
104–105, 124, 140 standstill. See rest
right reason (objective reason) 42, 66 state 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 15, 16, 20, 28, 29,
Rowling, J. K. 172 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 43, 47, 49,
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 61, 62, 92, 113, 50, 57, 58, 59, 60, 63, 65, 67, 68, 69,
169, 166n20 71, 77, 79, 80, 91, 97–98, 103, 107,
ruler. See sovereign 110, 111, 117, 121, 124, 125, 130–131,
Ryan, Alan 75, 141 133, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 142, 143,
148, 149, 149–150, 151, 152, 152–154,
Scheffler, Samuel 11n5, 13 155, 156, 157, 158–159, 160, 162, 170
science 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 25, 26, 29, 30, 32, 33, state of nature 14, 18, 27, 28–29, 31, 33,
34–35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 55, 34, 35, 36, 46, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63,
60, 61, 70, 75–76, 92 64, 66, 68, 72, 77, 79, 80, 85, 90,
scripture 26, 40–41, 42, 43, 44, 48, 56, 62, 90–91, 106, 108, 110, 117, 124, 133,
64, 65, 68, 70, 71, 141, 142, 156, 157 135, 141, 142, 162
Seabright, Paul 154 Strauss, Leo 14, 47, 67
security, personal 1, 8, 15, 21, 86–87, 88, Sugden, Robert 95
89, 90, 108, 150, 151, 163
Selden, John 70 Tamir, Yael 170, 23n7
self 1, 21, 22, 28, 32, 92, 95, 120, 130, Tarcov, Nathan 147
131–133, 136, 139, 161, 167n43, 171, Tarlton, Charles 9
172 Taylor, Michael 93, 98, 154
self-preservation 29, 35, 37, 40, 50 theology 1–2, 4, 5, 8, 25, 26, 27, 28, 32, 35,
sin, original. See fall of humankind 39, 40, 41, 53n57, 56, 57, 63, 64, 68,
singularity. See unison 69, 70, 71, 110, 126n9
Skinner, Quentin 51n6 trust 19, 21, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 59, 64, 73,
Slomp, Gabriella 135–136 76, 77, 80, 85, 89, 90, 94, 97–98,
Smith, Adam 5, 6–7, 11n7, 16, 49, 61, 66, 100n29, 123, 127n64, 130, 135, 136,
76, 95, 96, 104, 116, 117, 118, 122, 137, 138, 150, 153, 154
123, 125, 129 truth 4, 8, 18, 25, 26, 27, 32, 35, 36, 37, 39,
40, 42, 55, 56, 58, 64, 70, 71, 73, 75,
188 Index
76, 80, 105, 116, 119, 120, 136 Waldron, Jeremy 108–109, 171, 173
war. See unrest
unboundedness 2, 2–3, 4, 8, 13, 16, 17, 18, war of all against all. See unrest
19, 22, 47, 61, 71, 77, 87, 103, 106 Watkins, J. W. N. 26, 27, 38, 39, 44, 60,
unison 2, 4, 6, 15, 18, 25, 31, 32, 35, 37, 60, 88
39, 40, 44, 49, 55, 56, 61, 62, 65, 66, Warrender, Howard 27, 44
68, 70, 74, 106, 107, 111, 113, 114, Weber, Max 9
116, 134 Wells, H. G. 171
unrest 14, 25, 31, 33, 34, 49, 50, 56, Wight, Martin 28, 29, 31
83n105, 86, 89, 90, 111, 117, 124, 130, Wright, Joanne H. 61
132, 142, 158
Zangwill, Israel 159
Vattel, Emmerich 169 Zemach, Eddy 112
Vincent, Andrew 152, 153 Zuckert, Michael 14
Vincent, John 28, 29, 29–30