Petitioner PDF

2nd NIU National Moot Court Competition - 2019
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BEFORE THE HON’BLE
SUPREME COURT OF SENTARA
ORIGINAL WRIT JURISDICTION
PUBLIC INTEREST LETIGATION
W.P. (CIVIL) NO. OF 2019
UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF SENTARA
In the matter of Articles 14, 15, 17,

25 and 26 of Constitution of Sentara
SHRADDHA AND ORS.........................................................................................................PETITIONER

v.
UNION OF SENTARA AND ANR........................................................................................RESPONDENTS
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS COMPANION

JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF SENTARA
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

TABLE OF CONTENTS
S. No. HEADING Page No.

1. TABLE OF CONTENTS
2. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
3. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
4. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
5. STATEMENT OF FACTS
6. ISSUE RAISED
7. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
8. ARGUMENT ADVANCED
Whether the exclusionary practice which is based upon a biological

factor exclusive to the female gender amounts to "discrimination"
8.1
and thereby violates the very core and Fundamental rights of the
Constitution?
Whether Rule 3 of “The ABC Places of Worship (Authorisation of

Entry Act) permits 'religious denomination' to exclude such women
8.2 between the ages of 10 to 50 years and if so, would it not contempt to
Articles 14, 15(3) and 21 of the Constitution by restricting entry of
women on the ground of sex?
Whether the practice of excluding such women constitutes an

"essential religious practice" under Article 25 and can a religious
8.3
institution assert a claim it in regard under right to manage its own
affairs in the matters of religion?
Whether Temple of Saripura has a denominational character and,

if so, is it permissible on the part of a 'religious denomination'
8.4
managed by a statutory board and financed under Art. 290 A out
of the consolidated fund of Keripula to indulge in such practices?
9. THE PRAYER

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AIR All India Reporter
& And
Hon’ble Honorable
Art. Article
Sec. Section
COI Constitution of India
Cal Calcutta
Ed. Edition
v. Verses
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SC Supreme Court
u/a Under Article
Ors. Others
I.P.C Indian Penal Code
C.P.C Civil Procedure Code
Anr. Another
Crl. A. Criminal Appeal
PIL Public Interest Litigation
I.L.R Indian Law Reporter
SCJ Supreme Court Journal
Govt. Government
UDHR United Nations Declaration on human rights

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

BOOKS
LEGAL DATABASES
1. Manupatra
2. SCC Online
3. West Law
4. Hein Online
LEGISLATIONS
1. The Constitution of India, 1950
2. The Indian Penal Code, 1869
CONVENTIONS
1. United Nation Declaration of Human Rights, 1948

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Sentara has the jurisdiction in this matter under Article 32 of
the Constitution of Rambo which reads as follows:
32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part-
(1.) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the
enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
(2.) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs,
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo
warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any
of the rights conferred by this Part.”

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Background:
Sentara is a country located in subcontinent of Asia with a glorious and rich heritage and where
multifarious religious group co-exist. The country of Sentara consists of 29 states and 9 union
territories in which Keripula is one of the states. Sentara also recognize the Right to equality &
non- discrimination as its Fundamental Rights.
Historical Background of Temple:
The Temple of Saripura is a temple complex located at Keripula. The temple is dedicated to
the Hindu celibate deity A, who according to belief is the son of Shiva and Mohini, (the
feminine incarnation of Vishnu). The temple is situated on a hilltop between eighteen hills at
an altitude of 480 m (1574 ft.) above sea level, and is surrounded by mountains and dense
forests. The Pilgrims has to trek the hill top of Neel to reach the holy place which has 18 sacred
steps, to worship lord “A” after undergoing strict religious vows for 48 days.
The temple’s beauty and rituals are spoken of highly & it is regarded as one of the strictest
temples when it comes to abstinence & fasting. It is a male only temple and women between
the ages of 10 to 50 years, that is those who are in menstruating age, are barred from entering
the temple. However the women between 10 to 50 years are not prohibited to worship lord A
in any other temple, their entry is prohibited only in the temple of Sripura.
The exclusion of (a class of) women from the Temple is justified on the basis of ancient custom,
which was sanctioned by rule 3(b) framed by the Government under the authority of a certain
Act namely “The ABC Places of Worship (Authorization of Entry Act). Rule 3(b), however,
provided for the exclusion of “women at such time during which they are not by the custom
and usage allowed to enter a place of public worship.”
The board which maintains the temple has also expressed that the ban was in accordance with
centuries- old tradition. Further argument put forth by the temple authorities is that it is not
possible for women to put up with the physical hardship, austerity and days of celibacy like
men.

Events relevant to the root of dilemma:
In the year 1991, in response to PIL filled before the Hon’ble Court of Keripula, the Hon’ble
High Court confirmed the practice and judged that the restriction of entry of women ages 10-
50 to the temple was in accordance with the usage prevalent from time immemorial and it
directed the Board to uphold the customary traditions of the temple.
Subsequent responses:
Shraddha along with her other women lawyers approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court seeking
a direction to allow entry of women into the temple without any age restrictions. Their petition
contended that discrimination in matters of entry into temples was neither ritual nor ceremony
associated with Hindu religion. The religious denomination could only restrict entry into
sanctum sanctorum and could not ban entry into temple, making discrimination on the basis of
sex.
The matter being of public interest, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Sentara granted leave and
admitted the matters and considering the importance of the questions raised by petitioners,
Chief Justice of Supreme Court of Sentara has posted them before a bench for final disposal
on 13th September 2019.
Though court generally do not interferes in the traditions and practices followed in religious
places, it has also never failed to uphold equality whenever discrimination was reported.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE I:
Whether the exclusionary practice which is based upon a biological factor exclusive
to the female gender amounts to "discrimination" and thereby violates the very core
and Fundamental rights of the Constitution?
ISSUE II:
Whether Rule 3 of “The ABC Places of Worship (Authorisation of Entry Act) permits
'religious denomination' to exclude such women between the ages of 10 to 50 years
and if so, would it not contempt to Articles 14, 15(3) and 21 of the Constitution by
restricting entry of women on the ground of sex?
ISSUE III:
Whether the practice of excluding such women constitutes an "essential religious

practice" under Article 25 and can a religious institution assert a claim it in regard
under right to manage its own affairs in the matters of religion?
ISSUE IV:
Whether Temple of Saripura has a denominational character and, if so, is it permissible

on the part of a 'religious denomination' managed by a statutory board and financed
under Art. 290 A out of the consolidated fund of Keripula to indulge in such practices?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Issue I .....................Whether the exclusionary practice which is based upon a biological
factor exclusive to the female gender amounts to discrimination and thereby violates the
very core and fundamental rights of the Constitution?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that there has been gross violation of Article
14, 15, 17, 25 and 26 of the Constitution which extensively leads to gross violation of natural
justice & human rights as well. Further the exclusionary practice on biological factor is
unconstitutional and punishable under Sec. 153-A and 295-A of I.P.C.
Issue II ...................Whether Rule 3 of “The ABC Places of Worship (Authorisation of

Entry Act) permits 'religious denomination' to exclude such women between the ages of
10 to 50 years and if so, would it not contempt to Articles 14, 15(3) and 21 of the
Constitution by restricting entry of women on the ground of sex?
It is most humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the said Act doesn’t permits
exclusion of women on the ground of age and it also does not constitute to the condition to
form it as a religious denomination. Further the rights given under Part III of the constitution
can’t be amended as these rights are absolute and unalterable.
Issue III ..................Whether the practice of excluding such women constitutes an

"essential religious practice" under Article 25 and can a religious institution assert a
claim it in regard under right to manage its own affairs in the matters of religion?
It is most humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the exclusionary practise doesn’t
constitute to “essential and integral” religious practice and this practice is unconstitutional as
well. Further the rights under Art. 25 is guided with reasonable restrictions with subject to
public order, morality and health.
Issue IV ..................Whether Temple of Saripura has a denominational character and,

if so, is it permissible on the part of a 'religious denomination' managed by a statutory
board and financed under Art. 290 A out of the consolidated fund of Keripula to indulge
in such practices?
It is most humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the temple exclusionary practise
cannot attain a distinct identity of a separate religious denomination as religious denomination
is to have a strong bondage among the members. Further the temple is partly funded by the
state under Art. 290-A and cannot be granted as a religious denomination.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1. Whether the exclusionary practice which is based upon a biological factor exclusive
to the female gender amounts to "discrimination" and thereby violates the very core
and Fundamental rights of the Constitution?
It is most humbly contended before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Sentara that, in the present
case exclusionary practice on biological factor is irrelevant and unconstitutional. Further this
practice of excluding female based on biological factor amounts to grave violation of soul pillar
of the constitution with respect to the fundamental rights [1.1] Secondly, this exclusionary
practice extensively leads to gross violation of natural justice & human rights as well [1.2] and
lastly, the adoption of gender disparity is punishable in I.P.C. under Sec. 153 A and 295 A as
well [2.3].
[1.1] Grave violation of Fundamental Rights
It is further contended before the hon’ble Supreme Court that in this present case there is
tremendous violation of basic vitality of the constitution as mentioned under the Articles 141,
152, 173, 254, and 265 which is constantly remarking under the impugned lights of customs and
traditions.
[1.1.1] Violation of right to equality before law under Art. 14 of constitution
It is humbly submitted before the court that Article 14 is one of the basic and foremost
sacrosanct pillar of the Constitution of Sentara that embodies the general principles of equality
before law and prohibits unreasonable discrimination between persons, but in this present case
the exclusionary practice of preventing women between the age of 10 to 50 years based on
physiological factors and gender found exclusively to be in violation of Article 14. The
classification made on gender inequality can be seen here as arbitrary, artificial and evasive as
well and have no reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the legislation
through such a classification. Further there is already an existence of classification between
men and women as separate classes, and there cannot be any further sub-classification among
women on the basis of physiological factors such as menstruation by which women below 10
years and above 50 years are allowed.
1
Art. 14 – Equality before law
2
Art. 15 – Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.
3
Art. 17 – Abolition of untouchability.
4
Art. 25 - Freedom of conscience and free profession, practise and propagation of religion.
5
Art. 26 – Freedom to manage religious affairs.

Further it is humbly contended that in this present case there is a reasonable ground basis for
the classification that declares it to be discriminatory and many a time the court itself has
incorporated that the classification created under Art. 14 having no rational relation and nexus
to the principles of the statute is void ab initio and also proves it to be discriminatory as well.
Further the classic nexus test for a reasonable classification under Art. 14 was enunciated by
S.R. Das, J. in Anwar Ali Sarkar6 case where this hounrable court itself has made a remarked
judgment that: "In order to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be
fulfilled viz. (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which
distinguishes those that are grouped together from others left out of the group, and (ii) that the
differentia must have a rational relation to the objects sought to be achieved by the Act. The
differentia which is the basis of the classification and the object of the Act are distinct and what
is necessary is that there must be nexus between them."
Hereafter the dynamic concept of equality with confined aspects to traditional and doctrinaire
necessities was well incorporated by Bhagwati, J. in Maneka Gandhi case7 that: "It is indeed
the pillar on which rests securely the foundation of our democratic republic. And therefore, it
must not be subject to a narrow, pedantic or lexicographic approach. No attempt should be
made to truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning, for, to do so would be to violate its
activist magnitude.... Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it
cannot be imprisoned within traditional and doctrinaire limits.... Article 14 strikes at
arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The principle of
reasonableness, which legally and philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-
arbitrariness, pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence.'' Further this was again
reiterated by the Supreme Court in the International Airport Authority case8 also.
Similarly in this present case there is no rational nexus which can be deciphered between the
classification created and the underlying objective of the Act, so as it does not satisfy the test
of reasonableness, and thus it violates Article 14 of the Indian Constitution.
[1.1.2] Discrimination on the ground of sex and religion as under Art. 15 of constitution
It is most humbly contended before the court that the exclusionary practice per se violates
Article 15(1) of the Constitution which amounts to discrimination on the basis of sex as the
physiological feature of menstruation is exclusive to females alone. Further the incorporation
of this article has affirmatively placed assurance in the judgments of this Court under the case
6
The State Of West Bengal v. Anwar All Sarkar; 1952 AIR 75
7
Maneka Gandhi v. Union Of India; 1978 AIR 597
8
Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India & Ors.; 1979 AIR 1628

of Anuj Garg & others v. Hotel Association of India & others9 and hereafter in the case of
Charu Khurana & others v. Union of India & others,10 where the Hon’ble Supreme Court
itself has emphasized that gender bias in any form is opposed to constitutional norms.
It is further submitted before the court that this exclusionary practice also violates Article 15(3)
which says that “No laws can be against the women” and the term law means not only
parliament made laws but also all laws enshrined in Art. 13 includes rules, regulation,
ordinance, customs, and usage, therefore this practice stand towards in complete contrary to
the Article 15(3). The questions on the incorporation of this article was well answered by
Calcutta High Court in the case of Mahadeb Jiew v. B.B. Sen11, where P.B. Mukherjee, J.
observed that: The words women and children used in Article 15(3) means making special
provision in favour of women and children and not against them.
Hereafter in the case of Dattatreya Motiram v. State of Bombay,12 honourable Chief Justice
Chagla held that:
As a result of the joint operation of Article 15(1) and Article 15(3) the state could discriminate
in favour of women against men, but it could not discriminate in favour of men against women.
Hence the above mentioned arguments clearly reflect that use of present exclusionary practice
is complete infringement of Articles 15 of the Constitution.
[1.1.3] Practise of Untouchability as a violation of Article 17 of the constitution
It is humbly contended before the court that this exclusionary practice has a great and
devastating impact of casting a stigma on women of menstruating age for it considers them
polluted and thereby has a huge psychological impact on them which resultantly leads to the
violation of Art. 17 as the expression “in any form” in under this article includes untouchability
based on social factors and is wide enough to cover menstrual discrimination against women.
It is further submitted to the Hon’ble Supreme Court that Article 17 applies to both State and
non-State actors and has been made operative through a Central legislation in the form of
Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955. Further the application of this article draws its support
from the decisions of this Hon’ble Court itself in the case of National Legal Services
Authority v. Union of India & others13 where the Hon’ble Court has held that:
“The purpose of law is the establishment of the welfare of society “and a society whose
members enjoy welfare and happiness may be described as a just society. It is a negation of
9
CIVIL APPEAL NO.5657 OF 2007; Decided On, 06 December 2007
10
2014 SCC Online SC 900
11
AIR 1951 Cal 563
12
AIR 1953 Bom 311
13
WP (Civil) No 604 of 2013

justice to say that some members, some groups, some minorities, and some individuals do not
have welfare: on the other hand they suffer from ill-fare. So it is axiomatic that law, if it is to
fulfil itself, must produce a contented, dynamic society which is at once meting out justice to
its members.”
Hence on the base of above arguments there is a clear reflection that the exclusionary practice
is complete infringement of Articles 17 of the Constitution.
[1.1.4] Imposes restriction on freedom of religion enshrined under Art. 25 & 26.
It has humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the exclusionary practice violates the
rights of Hindu women under Art. 25 and 26 of the Constitution as they have the right to enter
Hindu temples dedicated to the public. Further the court itself has delivered a group of
judgments wherein the rights of entry into temples of all castes have been upheld on the premise
that they are Hindus and similarly, and in this present case also the women who assert the right
to enter the temple also belongs to the same religion and community. It is humbly contended
before the court the court that, this court itself has made a remarkable judicial incorporation of
this article in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Shri Sajjan lal Panjawat & others,14 where
the hon’ble Court has contended that:
“No such appointment can be made which contravenes the fundamental rights guaranteed
under articles 25 of the constitution, and if any such appointment is made, those who have a
right to challenge it can do so and have the appointment struck down. In this view to regulate
and to make better provisions for the administration of public religious and charitable trusts
of articles 25 or any other article of the constitution.”
Further it is humbly submitted that by referring to Sections 3 and 4 of the ABC Place of Public
Worship (Authorization of Entry) Act, 1965 and Rule 3 (b) framed thereunder, the petitioners
have submitted that the expression at any such time occurring in Rule 3(b) doesn’t lead to
complete exclusion or prohibition of any woman. In other words, if at such time during which,
by any custom or usage, any woman was not allowed, then the said custom or usage shall
continue and to substantiate this claim, however, it does not permit complete prohibition on
entry of women. Further, it is humbly submitted that any other interpretation of Rule 3(b) would
render the said rule open to challenge as it would be violative of the ABC Places of Public
Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules, 1965 but also of Article 25(2)(b)15 of the Constitution.
14
1975 AIR 706
15
Providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public
character to all classes and sections of Hindus.

It is humbly submitted before the Court that the Section 4 of the ABC Places of Public Worship
(Authorization of Entry) Act, 1965 and Rule 3(b) which disentitles certain categories of people
from entering any place of public worship and this includes women who, by custom or usage,
are not allowed to enter a place of public worship. It has further submitted that the Rule 3(b) is
of ultra vires in nature and the Act itself is unconstitutional as it contravenes and violates
Articles 14, 15, 17, 25 and 26 of the Constitution in so far as it prohibits women from entering
a public temple. Rule 3(b), is not an essential practice protected under Article 26 of the
Constitution for it is not a part of religion as the devotees of Lord A are just Hindus and they
do not constitute a separate religious denomination under Article 26 of the Constitution as they
do not have a common faith or a distinct name.
Hence, it is humbly submitted as on the basis of light of arguments there is a clear image that
Art. 25 mandates that subject to public order, morality and health, all persons enjoy the freedom
of conscience and have the right to entertain any religious belief and to propagate it.
[1.2] Gross violation of the principles of Natural justice & human rights
Gender equality and neutrality is considered as the heart of human rights and values. The
fundamental principle of UDHR was adopted by world leaders in 1945 as "equal rights of men
and women", and protecting and promoting women's human rights16 is the responsibility of all
States for the attainment of equality between women and men, and the elimination of all forms
of discrimination against women are fundamental human rights and values. But in the present
case before the Hon’ble Court there is a clear mark of gross inequality between men and women
which is a complete violation of the principles of UDHR.
In a Constitution Bench decision of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in Shri Admar Mutt case17, while
giving the judgment Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud referred to Broom‘s Legal Maxims as
follows : “Ces-sante Ratione Legis Cessat Ipsa Lex” which speaks that:-
Reason is the soul of the law, and when the reason of any particular law ceases, so does the
Law itself.
The objective of this rights in achieving equality between women and men requires a
comprehensive understanding of the ways in which women experience discrimination and are
denied equality. The principles adopted to set out the goal “to reaffirm faith in fundamental
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, and in the equal rights of men and
16
Article 2 & 7 of UDHR
17
Shri Swamiji of Shri Admar Mutt etc. etc. v. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable
Endowments Dept. and Ors., AIR 1980 SC 1

women”. Since women’s equal rights have been included amongst the most fundamental
guarantees of human rights.
However, in this present case, intersecting forms of discrimination, combining factors such as
sex, religion, and other grounds, have also acted a particular impact on women, which is to be
factored into responses.
[1.3] Adoption of gender disparity is punishable under Sec. 153-A and 295-A of I.P.C.
It is humbly contended before the court that Sections 153-A (1)(a) state that any person who
promotes hatred, enmity, disharmony or ill-will between different linguistic, religious, regional
groups or racial, communities or castes, by verbal or written expression is punishable for
disrupting public order. Further, Section 295A of the Code states that writings, signs or
speeches with a preconceived intention to cause insult to a religion or religious belief18 is
punishable and could lead to 3 years of imprisonment. Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955
prescribes severe punishment to who-ever practices untouchability, includes provisions
penalizing hate speeches19.
It is humbly contended that Section 153A makes it an offense if any person attempts to promote
or promotes, by usage of written or spoken words or by signs or any other obvious
representations of hatred, enmity, disharmony or feelings of ill will between different religious,
lingual, racial, or religious groups or communities or castes which can hold the offender liable
for punishment with imprisonment for up to three years or with a fine or with both20.
Moreover the provision of Section 295A criminalizes the acts of a person who with malicious
and deliberate intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of citizens of India,
attempts to insult or insults the religious beliefs or the religion itself of a particular class by
signs, spoken or written words or by any other perceptible representations. This section too
confers a punishment of fine and imprisonment up to three years or both on the offender21.
Hence on the basic of above mentioned facts and arguments it is humbly contended before the
Hon’ble Court that as the matter involved in this case is in extent of Fundamental Rights of
women related to specific ages as in the form of biological exclusion and also as a grave
violation of women’s human rights and natural justice as well. So, it is humbly plead before
the Hon’ble court to provide relief to victims by striking down the special rules for religious
denominations as unconstitutional.
18
Ramji Lal Modi v. State of UP; 1957 AIR 620
19
Balwant Singh and another vs. State of Punjab; 1995 3 SCC 214
20
Babu Rao Patel v. State of Delhi; AIR 1980 SC 763
21
Sunilakhya Chowdhury v. H.M. Jadwet and another; AIR 1968 Calcutta 266

2. Whether Rule 3 of “The ABC Places of Worship (Authorisation of Entry Act) permits
'religious denomination' to exclude such women between the ages of 10 to 50 years
and if so, would it not contempt to Articles 14, 15(3) and 21 of the Constitution by
restricting entry of women on the ground of sex?
It is most humbly contended before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that, the Rule 3 of “The ABC
Places of Worship (Authorisation of Entry Act) doesn’t permits exclusion of women on the
ground of ages. Further the temple of Sripura does not constitute to the conditions that are
essential to form it as a religious denomination [2.1] secondly, the rights given under Part III
of the constitution can’t be amended as these rights are absolute and the inclusion of 9th
schedule effectively removed such a law which are consider or held to be in contravention of
the basic structure doctrine [2.2].
[2.1] Absence of elements that essentially constitute it as religious denomination.
It is most humbly contended before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the constitution does not
define ‘religious denomination’. Religion is not consider as an identity but it has a direct
implications on the life of peoples. The religious conceptions in this country are so vast that
they cover every aspect of life, from birth to death. Under Articles 25 & 26, Part III of the
constitution it distinctly grants the fundamental freedom to religion. This right is established in
two respects: first, the right of an individual to practice, profess and propagate religion,
second, the right of the denomination or sections.
Article 26 also includes the word “section” making it inclusive of a sect or sub-sect of a
religion22. Further it is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the term religious
denomination in Article 26 is different from that found in Article 30 which includes religious
and lingual minorities. The Supreme Court itself has largely relied on a rigid formula provided
in its own previous decision in Shirur Mutt case23 on the questions of religious denomination.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shirur Mutt, has strictly commented that, there must
be presence of these following three conditions that are essential for a religious denomination:
first, it must be a collection of individuals who have a system of beliefs or doctrines which they
regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being, that is, common faith; second, common
organisation; and third, designation by a distinctive name.
22
Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagdishwarananda Avadhuta AIR 2004 SC 2984
23
The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swaminar of Sri
Shirur Mutt ; 954 AIR 282

But surprisingly in this present case there is an ambit of conclusive evidences where these
essential ingredients has been dislodged by this Act to be a religious denomination. Firstly,
there is nothing on record that show the devotees of Lord A, have any common religious tenets
peculiar to themselves, which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being, other than
those which are common to their religion. Further holding on this present case secondly, there
is no such an identified group relatively called as devotees of Lord A or as Naishtika
Brahmmchari.
Hereafter it is humbly submitted before the court that, this court itself in its judgement on Sri
Adi Visheshwara24 case, where Justice Nariman refers to held that the Hindu believers of
Lord Shiva form of worship are part of the Hindu form of worship and are not denominational
worshippers. It did not deal with case where believers from different religions can’t worship
other religion as well.
From the Judgement of Sri Adi Visheshwara, it was also clear that Hindus of all kinds,
Muslims, Christians etc., all visit the temple as worshippers, without, in any manner, ceasing
to be Hindus, Christians or Muslims. Therefore can they be regarded, as special identity
devotee who worship the idol of Lord A as according to the rituals and customs but not as
denominational worshippers. Further holding on the Act, the believers and devotees from
different religions with a common identifiable faith can form a religious denomination as well.
Further entrusting upon the Freedom of Religion as a fundamental rights it is generally
considered that adherence to a ‘common faith’ would entail that a common set of beliefs have
been followed since the conception of the particular sect or denomination. Moreover,
pilgrimage provides an equal footing that people of all religions participate in the pilgrimage.
A member of any religion can be a part of the collective of individuals who worship Lord A as
religion is not the basis of the collective of individuals who worship the deity. Therefore, bereft
towards a religious identity or the collective cannot claim to be regarded as a ‘religious
denomination’.
The believers from different religions with a common identifiable faith have constitutional
protection on the interpretation of Article 26 of the Constitution which deals with the phrase
“religious denomination” assumes significance in the context of Article 26 because it gives
them special rights which includes right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. But,
it is equally pertinent to note that neither the Constitution nor the General Clauses Act, 1897
24
Sri Adi Visheshwara v. State Of U.P. & Others; Appeal (civil) 1013 - 1015 of 1987

defines the overruling of basic rights nor fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution
by interpreting the term of any such said act as well.
[2.2] Absoluteness of Fundamental Rights that cannot be contravened by other Acts

It is humbly submitted before the court that the Fundamental rights are identified as basic
structure of the Constitution, which in any way cannot be amended by any act of the Parliament
or state as well25. Absolute rights in words itself states, ‘without restrictions’ i.e. the state
cannot impose reasonable restrictions on its implementation on any grounds possible. While
the Fundamental Rights are an integral part of the Constitution, it would be incorrect to term
them as unconditional. These rights, by the Constitution itself, are restricted by conditions
which aim to balance the individual freedom and rights to the necessity of public good and
welfare.
Further it is humbly contended before the court that the exercise of The ABC Places of Worship
(Authorization of Entry Act) in itself is violative of Fundamental Rights implanted under Part
III of constitution and the performance of rule 3(b) of the said Act is ultra vires to the principles
of Natural Justice as well, which itself attracts Art. 32 of the Constitution i.e. Right to
Constitutional Remedies which empowers the Hon’ble Supreme Court to safeguard the major
rights especially the Articles from 12 – 35 enshrined as Fundamental Rights.
Moreover in this present case present before the Hon’ble Court the perpetuation of exclusionary
practise as according to the said acts and rule, which ab initio conflicts with the rights of the
worshippers and also the fundamental right guaranteed by Articles 25, and 26 of the
Constitution. Further this exclusionary practise has no reasonable evidence under any of the
religious texts and the indication of the celibate nature of Lord A do not establish a connection
between the Lord’s nature and exclusion of women.
Later in the Ajmer Durgah Committee case26 Justice Gajendragadkar clearly held that:
“similarly, even practices, though religious, may have sprung from merely superstitious beliefs
and may in that sense be extraneous and unessential accretions to religion itself… In other
words, the protection under Article 26 must be confined to such religious practices as are an
essential and an integral part of it and no other.”
Contemporarily now a days the Court has started to make a distinction between religious
practices and superstitious beliefs. Mere superstitious beliefs should not be given constitutional
25
Kesavnanda Bharti v. State of Kerala; (1973) 4 SCC 225
26
Durgah Committee, Ajmer & others v. Syed Hussain Ali & others; 1961 AIR 1402

protection in the garb of religious belief or practice. Hereafter in another case, where the
religious head of the Dawoodi Bohra community27 challenged the constitutional validity of
the Bombay Prevention of Excommunication Act, 1949 the majority of the Judges struck down
the Act as violating Article 25 and 26 where Chief Justice Sinha beautifully articulated that:
“… It is noteworthy that the right guaranteed by Art. 25 is an individual right as distinguished
from the right of an organised body like a religious denomination or any section thereof, dealt
with by Art. 26. Hence, every member of the community has the right, so long as he does not
in any way interfere with the corresponding rights of others, to profess, practice and propagate
his religion, and everyone is guaranteed his freedom of conscience. ………
The Constitution has left every person free in the matter of his relation to his Creator, if he
believes in one. It is, thus, clear that a person is left completely free to worship God according
to the dictates of his conscience, and that his right to worship as he pleased is unfettered so
long as it does not come into conflict with any restraints, as aforesaid, imposed by the State in
the interest of public order, etc. A person is not liable to answer for the verity of his religious
views, and he cannot be questioned as to his religious beliefs, by the State or by any other
person. Thus, though his religious beliefs are entirely his own and his freedom to hold those
beliefs is absolute, he has not the absolute right to act in any way he pleased in exercise of his
religious beliefs. He has been guaranteed the right to practice and propagate his religion,
subject to the limitations aforesaid. His right to practice his religion must also be subject to
the criminal laws of the country, validly passed with reference to actions which the legislature
has declared to be of a penal character. Laws made by a competent legislature in the interest
of public order and the like, restricting religious practices, would come within the regulating
power of the State. For example, there may be religious practices of sacrifice of human beings,
or sacrifice of animals in a way deleterious to the wellbeing of the community at large. It is
open to the State to intervene, by legislation, to restrict or to regulate to the extent of completely
stopping such deleterious practices. It must, therefore, be held that though the freedom of
conscience is guaranteed to every individual so that he may hold any beliefs he likes, his actions
in pursuance of those beliefs may be liable to restrictions in the interest of the community at
large, as may be determined by common consent, that is to say, by a competent legislature. It
was on such humanitarian grounds, and for the purpose of social reform, that so called
religious practices like immolating a widow at the pyre of her deceased husband, or of
dedicating a virgin girl of tender years to a God to function as a devadasi, or of ostracizing a
27
Sardar Syedna Taher Saifudeen Sahib v. State of Bombay, (1962) Supp (2) SCR 496

person from all social contacts and religious communion on account of his having eaten
forbidden food or taboo, were stopped by legislation.”
Later in a case of Travancore Devaswom Board28 the Court has clearly held that:
“Any custom or usage irrespective of even any proof of their existence in pre-constitutional
days cannot be countenanced as a source of law to claim any rights when it is found to violate
human rights, dignity, social equality and the specific mandate of the Constitution and law
made by Parliament. No usage which is found to be pernicious and considered to be in
derogation of the law of the land or opposed to public policy or social decency can be accepted
or upheld by courts in the country.”
Further in the modern world Dignity as a facet of Article 21 is firmly entrenched in the
Constitution after the decision Justice Puttaswamy’s case29 and in Munn v. Illions30, where
the Hon’ble made a remarkable statement that “the life of humans are considered more than it
meant to a mere animal existence”.
It is humbly contended that such practices which legitimise menstrual taboos due to notions of
purity and pollution, limit the ability of menstruating women to attain the freedom of
movement, the right to education, and the right of entry to places of worship and eventually
their access to the public sphere. Women have a right to control their own bodies. The
menstrual status of a woman is an attribute of her privacy and person. Women have a
constitutional entitlement that their biological processes must be free from social and religious
practices that enforce segregation and exclusion. These practices result in humiliation and a
violation of dignity.
Hence it is humbly submitted to the Hon’ble Court in the light of above mentioned facts and
arguments that, the Act don’t permits 'religious denomination' and it also violates Articles 14,
15(3) and 21 of the Constitution by this exclusionary practise.
28
N.Adithayan vs. Travancore Devaswom Board, (2002) 8 SCC 106
29
Justice K.S.Puttaswamy & anr vs. Union of India & others, (2017) 10 SCC 1
30
94 U.S. 113(1876)

3. Whether the practice of excluding such women constitutes an "essential religious

practice" under Article 25 and can a religious institution assert a claim it in regard
under right to manage its own affairs in the matters of religion?
It is most humbly contended before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that, the exclusionary practise
of specific women belonging to menstrual age doesn’t constitute to “essential and integral”
religious practices under Art. 25. Further this essential religious practice of excluding women
of specific ages to enter into the temple is unconstitutional, as this practise is completely biased
[3.1]. Secondly, the right to manage its own its own affairs in the matters of religion is a
freedom provided to religious denomination with reasonable restrictions until the exercise of
the right is subject to public order, morality and health [3.2].
[3.1] Excluding women through any religious practise is bigotry and unconstitutional
It is most humbly contended before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the practice of excluding
such women belonging to menstrual ages doesn’t constitutes an "essential religious practice"
under Art. 25, as it places a barricade of age to a specific class of people which in fact pretends
to discrimination on grounds of sex and is unconstitutional as it contravenes with the prominent
articles of fundamental rights as well.
The doctrine of essential religious practise under Art. 25 has originated from the judgment of
Supreme Court itself in Shirur Matt case31 where the Hon’ble court has stated that what
constitutes the essential part of a religion with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself.
The Hon’ble court has upheld that:
“…what constitutes the essential part of a religion is primarily to be ascertained with reference
to the doctrines of that religion itself. If the tenets of any religious sect of the Hindus prescribe
that offerings of food should be given to the idol at particular hours of the day, that periodical
ceremonies should be performed in a certain way at certain periods of the year or that there
should be daily recital of sacred texts or ablations to the sacred fire, all these would be
regarded as parts of religion and the mere fact that would not make them secular activities
partaking of a commercial or economic character; all of them are religious practices and
should be regarded as matters of religion within the meaning of article 25.”
Hereinafter the test of essential religious practices is engaged with constitutional values. In the
present case the religious denominates and the temple have completely lacked to establish the
31
The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swaminar of Sri
Shirur Mutt ; 954 AIR 282

exclusion of women is either an obligatory part of religion, or has been consistently practiced
over the years. The presence of evidence that demonstrates that Lord A was of celibate nature
does not establish that exclusion of women is part of essential reasonable practise.
The test of essentiality is infused with necessary limitations but the assumption of the temple
authorities claim that the presence of women would might cause deviation of their followers
from the celibacy and austerity, and such an opinion cannot be sustained as a necessary
limitation. The assumptions of the temple authorities has just impose the burden of a man’s
celibacy on the woman and construct her as a cause for deviation from celibacy. The Act which
deny access of women pretends to be unconstitutional as it refuses to maintain social equality
which literally these women were entitled to as a human beings.
Further, in the judgement of AS Narayana Deeshitulu v. State of A.P,32 where the honourable
Court has confirmed that:
“The essential or integral part of a religion must be determined from the doctrines of that
religion according to its tenets, historical backgrounds and change in evolved process and the
core of religion is the belief of the devotees on which the base of any religion is founded upon”
However it is not new that the Supreme Court has already held that customs33 are also a subject
to fundamental rights. Custom, usages and personal law have a significant impact on the civil
status of individuals. Later in the judgement of Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of
Mysore,34 the Hon’ble Court laid down a crucial precedent which marked a shift in judicial
approach wherein the Court’s role became determinative in determining whether a practice
qualified as essential.
“Whether the temple is of private or public institution, it purely attracts a matter of legal
inference to be drawn, and that could be allowed to be raised as a pure question of law where
the question is of harmonizing the equality and justice.”
To immunize them from constitutional scrutiny, is to deny the primacy of the Constitution, and
since untouchability and discrimination on the ground of sex are prohibited under the
Constitution, the customs of the Temple barring on the entry of women of a certain age group
could also fall foul of constitutional ethos or could be termed unconstitutional.
In this present case the proscription of entry of women of said ages, restricts freedom and
dignity of a larger group of people and therefore, should be judicially invalidated. The practise
of exclusion in a social and religious institution that is characterised by hierarchy,
32
(1996 (9) S.C.C 548),
33
Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar; 1996 AIR 186
34
1958 AIR 255

subordination, and exclusion may be called as patriarchy. Moreover if the practice of custom
and tradition is biased, like barring a certain group from entering the temple then the legislature
is empowered by the Constitution itself, to enact a law and open the temple to everyone to meet
the people with social equality and social justice as well.
[3.2] Religious denomination are also subject to reasonable restrictions
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that every religious institution in Sentara can
enjoy freedom of religious affair guaranteed under Article 26 of Sentaran constitution. This
Article provides freedom to manage affairs of religious institutions under the light of
reasonable and justified restriction. So there are many activities associated with religion which
are left for the discretion of these religious institutions such as appointment of priest, donations
by the devotees, property of institution etc.
Article 26(b) of the constitution reads: “Subject to public order, morality and health, every
religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right to manage its own affairs in
matters of religion”. The high court erred grievously in interpreting the limitations on the
exercise of Article 26(b). For the custom of disallowing menstruating women to pass
constitutional muster, it must have satisfied two tests. First, the custom should have formed
part of ‘essential religious practice’, and then examined on the touchstone of ‘public order,
health and morality’, and second, the test notwithstanding, the denominational right to manage
internal affairs can’t be wide enough to totally abrogate the individual right of religion for
women.
Further in the landmark judgments of Naz Foundation and Shreya Singhal case35, ‘morality’
has been interpreted as ‘constitutional morality’ and not popular or individual morality.
Constitutional morality may be understood as the core framework of values and principles like
equality, non-discrimination, dignity, rule of law etc. that characterises and justifies the
constitution. In this present case also there is a very strong presumption that the controversial
custom of restricting women offends the value of ‘non-discrimination’ which is the central
pillar of that constitutional morality.
The religious denomination or organisation enjoys complete autonomy in the matter of
deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are essential according to the tenets of the religion
and no outside authority has any jurisdiction to interfere with the decision of such religious
denomination. Article 26(b) gives complete freedom to the religious denomination to manage
35
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India; WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.167 OF 2012

its own affairs36 in matters of religion.37 But the only restriction imposed by that article is that
the exercise of the right is subject to public order, morality and health.
In the landmark judgement of Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan,38
“The Nathwada Rajasthan Act 1959” was challenged before High Court of Rajasthan held
that: “the term affairs of religion is very wide phrase and state can regulate affairs of religious
institution and can perform secular activities of the religion. This view of High court was struck
down by the Supreme Court of India and held hat it only covers only secular activities until the
activities are concerned with subject to public order, morality and health of the state and
devotees respectively. The right of denomination to administer the property cannot be taken
away, though the state can regulate the administration of property but shall take away the right
of denomination but state can impose restrictions and regulations as it think fit in the social
sphere of equality, morality and public order.”
Since Sentara is democratic country and is rich in heritage which guarantees that all persons
are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and have moral right to freely profess, practice
and propagate religion. This means that rights of a woman to pray is not dependent39 on a
legislation, it is the constitutional right that has been provided to her directly by the constitution
itself.
Hence it is humbly contended before the Hon’ble Court in the light of above mentioned facts
and arguments that, the practice of excluding such women doesn’t constitutes an "essential
religious practice" under Article 25 and any religious institution cannot assert a claim on it in
regard under right to manage its own affairs in the matters of religion.
36
Bira kishor Deb Hereditary Superintendent of Jagannath Temple Puri v. State of Orissa AIR 1964 SC 1501
37
Indian Young Lawyers Association v. The State Of Kerala; WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 373 OF 2006
38
AIR 1963 SC 1638
39
Manavedan & Ors. v. The State Of Kerala & Ors.; 14 July, 1972

4. Whether Temple of Saripura has a denominational character and, if so, is it

permissible on the part of a 'religious denomination' managed by a statutory
board and financed under Art. 290 A out of the consolidated fund of Keripula to
indulge in such practices?
It is most humbly contended before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that, the temple of Saripura
has a denominational character but the violative exclusionary practise cannot attain a distinct
identity of a separate religious denomination. Further the purpose of constituting a religious
denomination is to have a strong bondage among the members, but such distinct rituals,
practices, usages must also have their properties in accordance with law [3.1]. Secondly, the
Saripura temple does not grant itself as a religious denomination, as it doesn’t fulfil the
conditions to be a religious denomination [3.2] and lastly the temple is dedicated to the public
and is partly funded by the state under Art. 290-A so in any manner it does not take away the
Fundamental Rights under Part III of the constitution [3.3].
[3.1] Rituals and traditions of these religious denomination must be accordance with law
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that in legal and constitutional argot, the
purpose of constituting a religious denomination is to have a strong bondage among the
members of its persuasion. Such denomination must be clearly distinct following a particular
set of rituals, practices, usages and customs having their own religious institutions including
managing their properties must be in accordance to law.
Further, it is emphasized that the religious denomination which closely binds its members with
certain rituals, customs must also be owning some property with continued succession which
is recognised under the Article 26 of the Constitution and accordingly religious denominations
have been conferred four rights under clauses (a) to (d) of Article 26. These rights, it is
submitted, are not disjunctive and exclusive in nature but are collectively conferred to establish
their identity.
Moreover in the judgement of Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay40,
Raja Bira Kishore Deb v. State of Orissa,41 Shastri Yagnapurushadiji & others v. Muldas
Bhundardas Vaishya & another42 and S.P. Mittal v. Union of India & others43 wherein the
concept of religious denomination was discussed by the Hon’ble Court where it was strictly
40
1962 AIR 853
41
1964 AIR 1501
42
1966 AIR 1119
43
1983 AIR, 1

held that some mere difference in practices carried out at Hindu Temples cannot accord to them
the status of separate religious denominations.
It is most humbly contended before the Court that the Saripura Temple is not a separate
religious denomination, for the religious practises performed in the temple and are akin to any
other Hindu Temple. Further the same objective was laid down in the judgement of Durgah
Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali,44 wherein Gajendragadkar, J. clarified that:
“in matters of religious affairs, it is observed that the same is also not sacrosanct as there may
be many ill-practices like superstitions which may, in due course of time, become mere
accretions to the basic theme of that religious denomination, and it shall not be protected under
Article 26(b) if it is so abhorring and is against the basic concept of our Constitution.”
Further it is humbly contended that, this Hon’ble Court itself in Shirur Mutt made a remarkable
criterion while giving freedom under clauses (a) and (b) of Article 26, made it clear that: what
is protected is only the ‘essential part’ of religion or, in other words, the essence of ‘practise’
practised by a religious denomination. Therefore, it is humbly submitted that before any
religious practice is examined on the touchstone of constitutional principles, it has to be
ascertained positively whether the said practice is, in pith and substance, really the ‘essence’
of the said religion.
Thus, the purpose of constituting a religion is to have a strong bondage among the members,
but such distinct rituals, practices, usages must also have their properties in accordance with
law.
[3.2] The temple of Saripura is not recognized as a religious denomination
It is humbly submitted before the Court that Article 26 of the Constitution which guarantees to
every religious denomination the right (a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious
and charitable purposes; (b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion; (c) to own and
acquire movable and immovable property; and (d) to administer such property in accordance
with law. However, these rights are subject to public order, morality and health.
But in the present case the important question that emerges is as to whether the temple of
Saripura constitutes a religious denomination or not which has been subject matter of several
decisions of this Court. Further in the decision of Shirur Mutt Case45 wherein the Court
observed that:
44
1961 AIR 1402
45
The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur
Mutt; 1954 AIR 282

“the word denomination has been defined in the Oxford Dictionary to mean 'a collection of
individuals classed together under the same name: a religious sect or body having a common
faith and Organisation and designated by a distinctive name. As article 26 contemplates not
merely a religious denomination but also a section thereof, the spiritual fraternity represented
by it can legitimately come within the purview of this article.”
Coming to the first and the most important condition for a religious denomination, i.e., the
collection of individuals ought to have a system of beliefs or doctrines which they regard as
conducive to their spiritual well-being. There is nothing on record to show that the devotees of
Lord A have any common religious tenets peculiar to themselves, which they regard as
conducive to their spiritual well-being, other than those which are common to the Hindu
religion. Therefore, the devotees of Lord A are just Hindus and do not constitute a separate
religious denomination.
Moreover there is no identified group called devotees of Lord A as every Hindu devotee can
go to the temple. There are other temples for Lord A also and there is no such prohibition.
Therefore, there is no identified sect that we hold, without any hesitation, as the temple is a
public religious endowment and there are no exclusive identified followers of the cult.
Later in the case of Nallor Marthandam Vellalar and others v. Commissioner, Hindu
Religious and Charitable Endowment and others46, where it was observed that special
religious practices and beliefs which are integral part of their religion and that the front
mandappam of the sanctorium is open to access only to the members of their community and
no one else and outsiders can offer worship from the outer compound. The Court held that:
“the temple at Nellor owned by the Vellala Community of Marthandam did not constitute a
religious denomination as there was no evidence to prove that the members of the Vellala
Community had common religious tenets peculiar to themselves other than those which are
common to the entire Hindu community.”
[3.3] The temple is dedicated to public and is partly funded by state under Art. 290-A
It has been submitted by the petitioners that after the 1950 Act, no individual temple of
Travancore Board can act differently both in matters of religion and administration as they
have lost their distinct character and temple Saripura, no more remained a temple of any
religious denomination after the take-over of its management.
As far as the funding aspect is considered, it is humbly contended that prior to the adoption of
the Constitution, both the Travancore and Devaswom Boards were funded by the State but after
46
Appeal (civil) 175 of 1997

six years of the adoption of the Constitution, the Parliament, in the exercise of its constituent
power inserted Article 290-A, to be charged upon the Consolidated Fund of the State of
Keripula which is paid to the Travancore Devaswom Board. Further after the insertion of
Article 290-A in the Constitution and the consequent State funding, no individual ill-practice
could be carried on in any temple associated with the statutory Devaswom Board even in case
of Hindu temple as this constitutional amendment has been made on the premise that no ill-
practice shall be carried on in any temple which is against the constitutional principles.
It is further contended that Article 290-A of the constitution itself provides that a sum of money
shall be charged on, and paid out of, the Consolidated Fund of the State of Keripula every year
to the Travancore Devaswom Board and a sum of money is paid out of the Consolidated Fund
every year to the Devaswom Fund established in that state for the “maintenance of Hindu
temples” which squarely fall within the ambit of “other authorities” in Article 12, and is duty
bound to give effect to the Fundamental Rights. The right of a woman to enter the Temple as
a devotee is an essential aspect of her right to worship, and is a necessary concomitant of the
right to equality guaranteed by Articles 15. The exclusion of women cannot be classified as an
essential religious practise in the absence of any scriptural evidence. Placing reliance on the
impact test47 enunciated by this Court itself. The justification for Rule 3 cannot flow from the
proviso to Sec. 3, since the proviso can only be interpreted in line with the decision of this
Court in Sri Venkataramana Devaru & Ors. v. State of Mysore & Ors.48 So it is humbly
urged that since all Hindu Temples are bound to follow the basic tenets of Hindu religion,
individual ill-practice of any temple contrary to the basic tenets of Hindu religion is
impermissible, after it being taken over by statutory board
Thus, on the above contentions it can be clearly seen that the Saripura temple is incapable to
fulfil the conditions to be recognized and protected under a religious denomination.
47
Bennett Coleman & Co. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.; 1973 AIR 106
48
1958 AIR 255

PRAYER
In the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, may this Hon’ble
Court be pleased to:
1. Hold the Union of Sentara & others liable for violation of fundamental rights of
the Indigenous people.
2. Hold the exclusionary practise unconstitutional and allow the women devotee to
enter into the temple.
3. Order and direct the government to implement adequate laws for the
reestablishment of religious spirit with coercive measures.
4. Award compensatory damages to be paid from Temple fund to the mental and
physical suffers of this discriminating act.
AND/OR
Pass any other order that it deems fit in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience.
And for this, the Petitioner as in duty bound, shall humbly pray.
COUNSELS FOR THEPETITIONER

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2nd NIU National Moot Court Competition - 2019

2nd NIU National Moot Court Competition - 2019

BEFORE THE HON’BLE

SUPREME COURT OF SENTARA

ORIGINAL WRIT JURISDICTION

PUBLIC INTEREST LETIGATION

W.P. (CIVIL) NO. OF 2019

UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF SENTARA

In the matter of Articles 14, 15, 17,

SHRADDHA AND ORS.........................................................................................................PETITIONER

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS COMPANION

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

S. No. HEADING Page No.

Whether the exclusionary practice which is based upon a biological

Whether Rule 3 of “The ABC Places of Worship (Authorisation of

Whether the practice of excluding such women constitutes an

Whether Temple of Saripura has a denominational character and,

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

AIR All India Reporter

COI Constitution of India

SCC Supreme Court Cases

u/a Under Article

I.P.C Indian Penal Code

C.P.C Civil Procedure Code

Crl. A. Criminal Appeal

PIL Public Interest Litigation

I.L.R Indian Law Reporter

SCJ Supreme Court Journal

UDHR United Nations Declaration on human rights

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

1. The Constitution of India, 1950

2. The Indian Penal Code, 1869

1. United Nation Declaration of Human Rights, 1948

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part-

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

Historical Background of Temple:

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

Events relevant to the root of dilemma:

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

Whether the practice of excluding such women constitutes an "essential religious

Whether Temple of Saripura has a denominational character and, if so, is it permissible

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

Issue II ...................Whether Rule 3 of “The ABC Places of Worship (Authorisation of

Issue III ..................Whether the practice of excluding such women constitutes an

Issue IV ..................Whether Temple of Saripura has a denominational character and,

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

[2.2] Absoluteness of Fundamental Rights that cannot be contravened by other Acts

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

3. Whether the practice of excluding such women constitutes an "essential religious

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER