to the

TRAINING
on
DESIGN FAILURE MODE & EFFECT ANALYSIS

DFMEA
20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 1
ORIGIN
US-Space program and defense safety system in 1960’s.

COMMON DEFINITIONS
FUNCTION :
Function of the item being analyzed to meet the Design intent.
Includes information regarding the environment in which this system
operates.
POTENTIAL – DESIGN FMEA:
Potential Means ‘Anticipated’ It is an analytical technique to assure that
potential failure mode and their associated causes have been considered
and addressed.
FAILURE MODE:
A ‘Failure mode’ is the manner in which a component, assembly or
system could potentially fail to meet the design intent. Typical
failure may include, not limited to :
Yield; Fatigue; Material Instability; creep; wear; corrosion; Cracked
Deformed; Leaking.
20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 2
WHAT IS FMEA?
FMEA is a systemized group of activities to:
1. recognize and evaluate the potential failure of a product /
process and its effects

2. identify actions which could eliminate or reduce the chance

of potential failure occurring

3. Document the process

WHY FMEA ?
1. For a company policy where continual improvement is
emphasized for its product, process

2. FMEA is a living document

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 3

WHO SHOULD DO FMEA?
1. Multidisciplinary Team Effort – with a leader
2. Team of knowledgeable individuals Ex. Expertise in
Design, Mfg., Assembly., Quality., etc.
3. Team should include representatives of out source
and/or customers

WHEN FMEA SHOULD BE DONE ?

1. Essence is timeliness
2. Pro-Active rather than reactive
3. Before failure mode occurs (before-the-event)

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 4

ADVANTAGES OF FMEA
Avoids late change crisis.
Reduces or eliminates chance of implementing
corrective change.
Excellent technique for preventive action.
Interactive process which is never ending.

TYPES OF FMEA
1. System FMEA – Power transmission system
2. Design FMEA – Axle shaft
3. Process FMEA – Heat treatment
20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 5
TS 16949-2009 REQUIREMENTS
FMEA shall consider Customer Complaints
FMEA shall consider special characteristics
FMEA shall consider Repeated NCs
Aiming defect prevention rather than defect detection
Use FMEA manual & MDT approach

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 6

Design FMEA supports the Design process in reducing the risk of failures by :

• Aiding in the objective evaluation of design requirements and design alternatives

• Aiding in the initial design for manufacturing and assembly requirements
• Increasing the probability that potential failure modes and their effects on system
and vehicle operation have been considered in the design/ development process.
• Providing additional information to aid in the planning of thorough and efficient
design test and development programs
• Developing a list of potential failure modes ranked according to their effect on the
"customer", thus establishing a priority system for design improvements and
development testing
• Providing format for recommending and tracking risk reducing actions.
• Providing future reference to aid in analysing field concerns, evaluating design
changes and developing advanced designs.

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 7

 Summary of changes in the 4th edition FMEA Reference Manual

1.Changes in the FMEA format to make it more user friendly.

2.Improvements in Severity, Occurrence and Detection ranking tables so
that they more meaningful.
3.Use of thresholds on RPN or pre-defined RPN limit is clarified as a
practice that is not recommended.
4.More thrust on responsibility and ownership for development and
maintenance of FMEAs (focus on training).
5.Linked with initial risk assessment.
6.Use of boundary diagram and P diagram.
7.Top Down Approach (System – Subsystem – Component )
8.Clarity on “Customer” (Next customer, Subsequent customer, external
customer, end customer).
9.Linkage with other tools like DVP, etc.
20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 8
 BOUNDARY DIAGRAM
• It is a robust tool used in the creation of FMEA. It divides the boundary
between the system under consideration called the design system and the
system surrounding the design system called the mating system.
• It helps in capturing the elements outside the boundary, which may become
a potential causes/ Effects of failure.
• Also included are the Sub systems/ Components that need clearance from
the system under consideration.
• Boundary diagram is also helpful in identifying the factors that need to be
addressed in the FMEA.
To create a boundary diagram, you need to have a team of experts for the
system under design consideration as well as the external system with which
it has interfaces. First you create the boundary to include the system. The
dashed line is boundary to your design system under consideration. This
helps us in specifying where to draw a line for consideration. If this is not
clearly specified, we end up in a big puddle focusing at systems which does
not warrant consideration.

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 9

Here if we are looking at a Transmission, we are looking at Transmission as
well as a Torque converter. We have to ask the design about the interface
between the transmission and torque converter, if that is linked together or
mounted separately and connected though a different system. Now say we
consider Transmission and Torque converter as one system. Now we have to
break open the transmission and torque converter to the next level, which in
this case will be the Clutch group, oil system, Electronics/ Software ,Housing
System/ Breather, PTO Pump drive Gear set system.
Outside the boundary will be interacting systems or the mating systems to
which the design system will have to interact in order to give desired outputs. In
this case the transmission will interact with the external components such as
Engine, battery, operator, frame, oil cooler and drive shaft.
We have completed the first part in completing the Boundary, which consists of
identifying the design system and the mating system. Here the design system is
the Transmission and the mating systems are Engine, operator, Battery etc
The most important part of the boundary diagram is the interface matrix. This
is mostly the reason DFMEAs become more robust. There are two ways of
creating interface matrices

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 10

 WHY DO WE NEED BOUNDARY DIAGRAM?
Boundary diagram is an excellent tool which not only captures failures from the
functionality of the product, but also failures likely to be caused due to
improper/ undesired functioning of the surrounding/ mating components.
This also called as the interface matrix, captures the failure modes arising
due to the failures passed from the failed mating component to the
operating/ design component. When doing the DFMEA, we can ensure that
the mating component to the design component does not cause the failure/
interference in the cordial functioning of the Intended component.
PARAMETER DIAGRAM (P-DIAGRAM)
• It is a useful tool in brainstorming and documenting
– Noise factors
– Control factors
– Error states, or failure modes
WHY DO WE NEED A P-DIAGRAM?
• When completed, you have the ground work for Design Changes and
Testing Optimization. FMEA’s also benefit from these inputs.

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 11

 DESIGN FMEA - BLOCK DIAGRAM
( PRODUCT STRUCTURE TREE)
Helps to analyze the inter-relationship between various parts/
subsystems within each subsystem/ system.

Example :
SWITCH COMPONENTS
ON/OFF
C A. HOUSING
B. BATTERIES (2 D CELL)
C. ON/OFF SWITCH
2 D. BULB ASSEMBLY
E. PLATE
BULB HOUSING F. SPRING
ASSEMBLY
3 A
D ASSEMBLY METHOD

1. SKIP FIT
4 1 4 2. RIVETS
3. THREAD
4. SNAP FIT
PLATE BATTERIES SPRING COMPRESSIVE FIT
E B F
+ 5 5

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 12

 System Level Sub system level Component level

Bicycle Frame Upper frame

DESIGN OBJECTIVE FUNCTION

1 Minimum 3000 hr. of riding without
need for maintenance & 10,000 hr.
of riding for design life
2 Accommodates mate audits
comfortably to the 99.5 th percentile
etc.
1 provide stable attachment for seat FUNCTION
support 1 provide structural support
POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE ( S ) POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE ( S )
1 Structural failure of seat support 1 Structural failure
2 Excessive defection of seat support 2 Excessive defection
FUNCTIONS : FUNCTIONS :

POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE :
1 Difficult to steer
2 difficult to pedal
FUNCTION
1 provide reliable transportation
POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE ( S )
Provide pleasing appearance Provide dimensional control for correct
finishing frame geometry
POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE ( S )
POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE ( S )
1 Finish deteriorates
2 Paint chips 1 Length of frame mounting points too
long
2 Length of frame mounting points are too
Handle bar Assembly

Lower front Tube

1 Chain break frequency Front wheel Assembly
2 Tires require frequency
Lower Rear Tube
FUNCTIONS : Rear wheel Assembly

Sprocket Assembly Sprocket Tube

Item, Function and Failures

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 13

 Example Boundary Diagram
Engine Mounting System
Engine Lubrication System Electrical System Evaporative Emissions
Cle
a ra -breather System

ing
nc
e

nd
Carburetor

ou
Ca External Shift Linkage

Gr
li bra
tio
n
Vehicle Frame Primary Drive System
System
Exhaust System & Mounts
(All Subsystems)
Crank Case
(Big Twin) Secondary Drive System
(All Subsystems)
Starter System
Instrumentation
nce (Speedometer & Sensor)
Rear Brake Cleara
Line Lubrication System
ics -Dyna/FLT; physical interface Engine Management
o nom System
E rg -Buell; material exchange
Rider Interface (ECM)
(Foot Pegs) Transmission/Gearing Shift Mechanism
DFMEA
Transmission Case/Covers/Gaskets Shifter Cam Assembly Boundary
Main shaft Bearings/Bushings/Seals Shifter Forks/Rails/Drums Interfaces
Main shaft Gears Synchronizers
Physical
Countershaft/Bearings/Bushings/Seals Shifter Controls/Shafts/Links/Pedals
Countershaft Gears Shift Mechanism Accessories Energy

Transmission/Gearing Accessories Data

Crank Case System (Mid Weight)
Materials

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 14

 P - Diagram

NOISE FACTOR
1.Piece-to-Piece Variation 2. Other systems 3.Customer usage / duty cycle
Halshafts splines Improper part lock capable adjustments Park actuator wear
Park mechanism actuator Contactor box feedback Poor service practices
Mounting points (PCU) Improper voltage from high voltage battery
Mounting points (motor gear box) Improper voltage from low voltage battery
Improper AC voltage 5. Environment
Improper coolant flow rate Heat / Humidity
Improper sub frame / body frame mounting criteria Salt
Vibration Common chemicals
Signal noise Water, dust, B4 (noise)
4. Deterioration / degeneration over time
Wire insulator wears

Ideal function (musts)

Input Provide torque to Halshafts
Accelerator inputs ENGINE INTERFACE SYSTEM Lock Halshafts in park
DC voltage Change high voltage battery
Contactor box Provide 12 volt power
AC voltage Provide all necessary signals to Cluster
MCP master cylinder pressure Provide mounting points
Gear selector Control factors
Specifications Provide energy to battery
DCM Provide all necessary vehicle controls
EPO Corporate standard (WCR)
Design validation testing Provide all NOs. Vehicle communications /
Ignition switch CAN (SCP)
CAN / SCP Government reqs
IEC Provide diagnostic capability
Wake up signal from DCM
FMVSS / CMVSS
FCC
UL
Supplier documentation Error status
Quality operating systems Incorrect torque supply
Incorrect Halt hat lock
High voltage battery incorrectly charged
Incorrect power supply 12 volt
Incorrect signal supplied to cluster
Incorrect mounting points

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 15

 Example P-Diagram

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 16

 Example Interface Matrix

High voltage power leads (negative)

High voltage power leads (positive)
Park Mechanism Acuation

Shield Motor Power leads

Power Conversion Unit

Mounting sub frame #1

Mounting sub frame #2

Mounting sub frame #3

PCU Signal Connector

Motor / Gear Box

Halfshafts (2)
2 2 2 2 2
P o w e r C o n v e r s io n U n it
2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
M o to r / G e a r B o x

2 2
P a r k M e c h a n is m A c u a t io n

2 2
H a lf s h a fts ( 2 )

2 2
M o u n t in g s u b f r a m e # 1

2 2
M o u n t in g s u b f r a m e # 2

2 2
M o u n t in g s u b f r a m e # 3

2 2
P C U S ig n a l C o n n e c t o r
2
2
S h ie ld M o t o r P o w e r le a d s

2 2 -2
H ig h v o lt a g e p o w e r le a d s ( p o s it iv e )

-2
H ig h v o lt a g e p o w e r le a d s ( n e g a t iv e )

P E P : P h y s ic a lly to u c h in g E : E n e rg y tra n s fe r
I M I: In fo r m a tio n e x c h a n g e M : M a te r ia l e x c h a n g e

R e q u ir e d 2 N e c e s s a r y fo r fu n c tio n
D e s ir e d 1 B e n e fic ia l, b u t n o t a b s o lu te ly n e c e s s a r y fo r fu n c tio n a lity
In d iffe r e n t D o e s n o t a ffe c t fu n c tio n a lity
U n d e s ir e d -1 C a u s e s n e g a tiv e e ffe c ts b u t d o e s n o t p r e v e n t fu n c tio n a lity
D e tr im e n ta l -2 M u s t b e p r e v e n te d to a c h ie v e fu n c tio n a lity

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 17

 DFMEA Structure
All requirements of DFMEA are arranged in a typical structure

General requirements (Under rows)

Technical requirements (Under columns)

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 18

 POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (DESIGN FMEA)
--System—Sub System—Component Design Responsibility…………. FMEA Number……………………..
Model…………………………………. Key Date…………… Page …… of …….
Core Team……………………………… FMEA Date (Orig) (Rev) Prepared by…………………………
Item Requirem Potential Potential S C Potential Cause(s) / Current Design D RPN Recommended Responsibilit Action Results
ents Failure Effect(s) E l mechanism (s) of Control O Controls E Action y & Target
Mode of Failure V a Failure Prevention C Detection T Completion
s Date S O D R
C Actions Taken
s E C E P
Completion date
Function V C T N

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 19

 EXAMPLES OF FAILURE MODE
CORROSION INGRESS DELAMINATION
RACTURE VIBRATIONS EROSION
MATERIAL YIELD WHIRL THERMAL SHOCK
ELECTRIC SHORT SAGGING THERMAL RELAXATION
OPEN CIRCUIT CRACKING BONDING FAILURE
BUCKLING STALL STARVED FOR LUBRICATION
RESONANCE CREEP STAINING
FATIGUE THERMAL EXPANSION INEFFICIENT
DEFLECTIONS OXIDATION FRETTING
SEIZURE UV DETERIORATION THERMAL FATIGUE
BURNING ACOUSTIC NOISE STICKING
MISALIGNMENT SCRATCHING & HARDNESS INTERMITENT SYSTEM OPERATION
STRIPPING UNSTABLE EGRESS
EMBRITTLEMENT RINGING LOOSENING
WEAR LOOSE FITTINGS SURGE
LOOSE SCORING LEAKING
RADIATION DAMAGE DEFORMATION YIELD
MATERIAL INSTABILITY CORROSION CRACKED
BINDING UNBALANCED OVER SHOOTING (CONTROL)
20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 20
 ITEM REQUIREMENTS POTENTIAL POTENTIAL
FAILURE EFFECT(S)
FUNCTION MODE OF FAILURE

Specify the Occupant protection

description & from weather, noise
Function of the & side Impact.
Item
Support anchorage
EXAMPLE for door hardware.
ITEM
Door RH/LH

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 21

 POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE POTENTIAL SEV
EFFECT(S) OF
FAILURE
Review of past things like things gone wrong,
concern reports, & group brain storming is
required to be done.

List the failure modes those are possible to

occur against the requirements specified in
the previous column.

Apart from Engineering Specification, what

would a customer consider objectionable
CUSTOMER is - Next operation - Subsequent
operation - End user.

EXAMPLE
Cracked, Deformed, Loosened, Oxidized &
Leaking etc.,

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 22

 Example of Potential Failure Modes:
Item Function Requirement Failure Mode
Disk Brake System Stop Vehicle Vehicle does not stop at all
on demand
Vehicle stops but not within
(Considering Stop vehicle travelling
the specified distance (i.e.
environmental on wet asphalt
distance in excess to the
conditions pavement within
specified distance)
such as wet, specified distance,
dry etc.) within specified g’s of Vehicle stops within the
force specified distance but with
more than xx g’s of force

Activates with no demand,

vehicle movement is partially
Allow unimpeded affected
vehicle movement on
no system demand Activates with no demand,
vehicle does not move
Brake Rotor Allows transfer Insufficient torque resistance
of force from delivered
Must deliver specified
brake pads to
torque resistance to
axle
axle

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 23

 POTENTIAL EFFECT(S) OF FAILURE SEV CLASS
List the effect of failure mode on the function as
perceived by customer

Describe the effects using the terminology

specified in Severity Rating table.

For each failure mode, more than one effect can

be listed.

EXAMPLE

Noise, Erratic operation, Poor appearance,

unstable, intermittent operation, Rough,
Inoperative
20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 24
 Example of Potential effects

Item Failure Mode Effect

Disk Brake System Vehicle does not stop at all Vehicle control impaired, Regulatory
non-compliance

Vehicle stops but not within the
specified distance (i.e. distance in
excess to the specified distance)
Vehicle stops within the specified
distance but with more than xx g’s of
force
Activates with no demand, vehicle
movement is partially affected
Vehicle control impaired, Regulatory
non-compliance
Regulatory non-compliance
Decreased pad life, diminished vehicle
control

Activates with no demand, vehicle Customer cannot drive the vehicle,

does not move Functional non-compliance

Brake Rotor Insufficient torque resistance delivered Vehicle control impaired, Regulatory
non-compliance

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 25

 POTENTIAL
SEVERITY CLAS CAUSE(S) /
S MECHANISM (S)
OF FAILURE
Assess the seriousness of the effect
in a 1-10 scale

This rating applies to EFFECT only

(i.e. previous column)

Safety related effects should be rated

in Nos.9 or 10

SEV RANKING

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 26

 POTENTIAL CURR
CLASSIFICATION CAUSE(S) / ENT
MECHANISM (S) CONT
OF FAILURE ROLS

Classify special product

characteristics (e.g. critical,
key, major)

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 27

 POTENTIAL CAUSE(S) / CURRENT DESIGN
MECHANISM (S) OF FAILURE
CONTROL O CONTROL
PREVENTION C DETECTION
C
Indication of Design weakness, the consequence of
which is failure mode.
Describe the causes in such a way that can be
eliminated or controlled.

Typical cause may include but not limited to:

1 Incorrect material specification.
2 Inadequate design life assumption.
3 Over stressing.
4 Insufficient lubrication capability.
5 Inadequate/improper Maintenance
Instruction
6 Improper software specification/ surface finish
specification/ travel specification.
7 Excessive heat
8 Incorrect algorithm
9 improper tolerance specified
20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 28
 Example of Potential Causes / Mechanisms of Failure:

Failure Mode Mechanisms Causes

Vehicle does not stop at all
Vehicle stops but not within the
specified distance (i.e. yy distance in
excess to the specified distance)
Vehicle stops within the specified
distance but with more than xx g’s of
force
Activates with no demand, vehicle
movement is partially affected
Activates with no demand, vehicle does Hydraulic pressure does not
not move
No transfer of force from pedal
to pads
Reduced transfer of force from Mechanical linkage joints corroded due to inadequate
pedal to pads
Excessive/ Rapid transfer of
force from pedal to pads
Pads do not release
release
Mechanical linkage break due to inadequate protection
against corrosion
Master cylinder vacuum lock due t seal design
Loss of hydraulic fluid from loose hydraulic line due
to incorrect connector torque specification
Loss of hydraulic fluid due to hydraulic lines crimped/
compressed, inappropriate tube material specified
Mechanical linkage joints stiff due to inappropriate
lubrication specification
protection against corrosion
Partial loss of hydraulic fluid due to hydraulic lines
crimped, inappropriate tube material specified
Cumulative pressure build up in master cylinder due to
seal design
Corrosion or deposit build up on rails or pad ears due
to surface finish not promoting adequate self cleaning
and correction protection
Master cylinder lock due to seal design

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 29

 CURRENT DESIGN DE RP
T N
CONTROL PREVENTION OCC CONTROL
DETECTION
TYPE OF CONTROLS

LEVEL TYPE EXAMPLES

P- Prevention of causes Design features/
Prevention Design change
D- Detection Detection of causes & leading to Simulation, Model testing
corrective actions, Detection of & Design Verification/
defect validation

List the existing controls, which can detect the causes or failure mode

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 30

 Example of Prevention and Detection Design controls:
Failure Mode Causes Prevention Controls Detection Controls
Vehicle does not stop at Mechanical linkage Designed as per Material Environmental stress
all break due to inadequate Standard M-845 test 03-9963
protection against
corrosion

Master cylinder vacuum Carry over design with Pressure variability

lock due t seal design same duty cycle testing – At system
requirement level
Loss of hydraulic fluid Designed as per torque Vibration step test 18-
from loose hydraulic requirement 3993 1950
line due to incorrect
connector torque
specification
Loss of hydraulic fluid Designed as per Material Design of Experiment –
due to hydraulic lines Standard MS-1178 Tube resiliency
crimped/ compressed,
inappropriate tube
material specified

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 31

 CURRENT DESIGN
CONTROL OCCURRENCE CONTROL
PREVENTION DETECTION
Estimate the probability of occurrence on a 1-
10 scale.
Rate against each cause.
Use past data as a basis (rejection%) for
ranking.
Document the basis of occurrence ranking.
For a new design, if there is no previous
experience, use team judgment
Don’t consider failure-detecting measures
while giving ranking (Prototype testing.)

OCC RANKING

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 32

Estimate the likelihood of occurrence of potential failure cause / mechanism on 1
to 10 scale. In determining this estimate, questions such as following should be
considered.
1 What is the service history / field experience with similar components , sub
system , or systems ?
2 Is component a carryover or similar to previous level component ,
subsystem or systems ?
3 How significant are changes from previous level component, subsystem or
systems ?
4 Is component is radically different from previous level component,
subsystem or systems?
5 Is component is completely new ?
6 Has the component application changed ?
7 What are the environmental changes?
8 Has an engineering analysis been used to estimate the expected comparable
occurrence rate for the application ?
9 Have preventive Controls been put in place ?

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 33

 DETECTION RPN RECOMMENDED
ACTION
Assess the probability of controls listed
in the previous column, which will
detect the cause or failure mode.

While giving ranking, assume the

failure is occurred.
Don’t assume ranking is low because
the occurrence is low.

Random controls should not influence

detection ranking.
One detection ranking can be assigned
to multiple controls.
DET RANKING

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 34

 RPN RECOMMENDED RESPONSIBILITY
ACTION & TARGET
COMPLETION
DATE
Risk Priority Number
is the multiplication
or the Product
= (Severity x Occurrence
x Detection)

While calculating RPN,

consider only highest
severity rating of each
failure mode

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 35

 RECOMMENDED ACTION RESPONSIBILITY &
TARGET ACTION
COMPLETION DATE RESULT
Policy for RPN to take action
consider only high priority no.
for take action and review
Periodically.
As a first priority, take action
- On Severity of 9/10 by change in
Design of Product for elimination of
failure mode as severity can only be
eliminated.
Action such as, be not limited to
should be considered
-Review design geometry & / or
tolerance
-Revised material specification
-DOE Or other problem solving method
-Revised test plan
20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 36
 RECOMMENDED ACTION RESPONSIBILITY & ACTION
TARGET RESULT
COMPLETION DATE

-On causes to reduce

occurrence ranking
-The next priority is to
Consider action on controls to
Reduce detection ranking

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 37

 Example of Causes, controls, recommended actions:
Failure Causes Prevention Detection Controls Recommended
Mode Controls Actions
Vehicle Mechanical linkage break Designed as per Environmental stress test Change Material to
does not due to inadequate Material Standard 03-9963 Stainless Steel
stop at all protection against M-845
corrosion

Master cylinder vacuum Carry over design Pressure variability Use Carry Over Seal
lock due t seal design with same duty testing – At system level Design
cycle requirement

Loss of hydraulic fluid Designed as per Vibration step test 18- Modify Connector from
from loose hydraulic line torque 1950 Bolt-Style to Quick-
due to incorrect connector requirement 3993 Connect
torque specification

Loss of hydraulic fluid due Designed as per Design of Experiment – Modify Hose Design
to hydraulic lines crimped/ Material Standard Tube resiliency from MS-1178 to
compressed, inappropriate MS-1178 MS-2025 to increase
tube material specified strength

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 38

RESPONSIBILITY & TARGET ACTION SEV OCC DET RPN
COMPLETION DATE TAKEN

Specify the
responsibility and
target completion date
for every action
identified.

During APQP, the FMEA

completion date should
be prior to design
release.

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 39

 ACTION RESULTS
ACTION TAKEN SEV OCC DET RPN
COMPLETION DATE
Describe the verification
results Where effectiveness
Measure is required, specify
the target date accordingly
After the assessment of the
actions taken, re-assess the
values of severity,
occurrence, detection and
RPN

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 40

 Alternatives to RPN

RPN = (S) x (O) x (D)

The table below, however, illustrates how different SEV (S), OCC (O) & DET (D)
scenarios result in equal RPN values.

# SEV OCC DET RPN

01 8 9 5 360
02 8 5 9 360
03 6 10 6 360
04 6 6 10 360
05 4 10 9 360

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 41

 Alternatives to RPN
Alternative: SO (S x O)

• primarily focus on SEV & OCC.

• focus on how to reduce by reducing “O” through preventive actions.

Alternative: SOD , SD

• one of the prioritization tool.

• non-arithmetic combination of the SEV, OCC & DET rankings
e.g. For (SOD) - SEV – 7, OCC – 3, DET – 5, the resulting SOD is 735.
e.g. For (SD) - SEV – 7, DET – 5, the resulting SD is 75.

The SOD, when sorted in numerical, descending order, will prioritize the
scenarios first by SEV, second by OCC and lastly by DET.

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 42

 Alternatives to RPN

Contrast among RPN, SOD and SD

S O D RPN SOD SD
7 7 3 147 773 73
7 3 7 147 737 77
3 7 7 147 377 37

There will be some limitations for SOD also. E.g. a failure mode with a SOD
of 711 would be ranked higher (i.e. have to be considered before) a failure mode
with 599. So the decisions can be taken based on team judgments.

In short all these methods provide different paths. We need to decide which path will
lead us to improve.

20/07/2010 DESIGN FMEA NNCPL 43

 FOLLOW UP ACTIONS

The Design engineer concerned is responsible for ensuring that

all actions recommended have been implemented or
adequately addressed.
FMEA is a living document and should always reflect the
latest design level as well as the latest relevant actions.
The responsible engineer has several means of ensuring that
concerns are identified and that recommended actions are
implemented . They includes but not limited to followings :
1 Ensuring design requirements are achieved
2 Reviewing engineering drawings & specifications
3 Conforming incorporation in assembly /
manufacturing documentation
4 Reviewing Design FMEA & Control plans

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 DESIGN FMEA QUALITY OBJECTIVES

1 DESIGN IMPROVEMENTS: The FMEA drives design

improvement as primary objective. With an emphasis on
Error / Mistake proofing solutions
2 HIGH RISK FAILURE MODES: The FMEA address all
high-risk failure modes as identified by FMEA team, with
executable action plans. All other failure modes are
considered.
3 CONTROL PLANS: The prototype Control Plan consider
the failure modes from the design FMEA.
4 A/D/V/ or DVP & R Plans: The Analysis/ Development/
Validation & or Design validation plan & Report are consider
the failure mode
5 LESSONS LEARNED: The FMEA considered all major “
lessons learned “ as input to failure mode identification

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 PROCESS FMEA QUALITY OBJECTIVES

6 SPECIAL OR KEY CHARACTERISTICS: the FMEA

identifies appropriate key characteristics candidates as
input to the key characteristics selection process , if
applicable due to company policy.
7 TIMING: The FMEA is completed during the “ Window of
opportunity “ where it could most efficiently impact the
product design.
8 TEAM: The right people participate as part of the FMEA
team through out the analysis and are adequately trained in
FMEA methods
9 DOCUMENTATION: the FMEA is completely filled out “
by the book ” including “ action plan ” and new RPN
values.
10 TIME USAGE: Time spent by FMEA team as early as
possible is an effective & efficient use of time, with a value –
added result. This assumes recommended actions are
identified as required and the actions are implemented.

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 DESIGN FMEA CHECK LIST
USE THE CHECKLIST BELOW TO HELP ASSURE THE DESIGN FMEA IS COMPLETE. ALL ANSWERS TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS SHOULD BE YES

Preliminaries Are the part functions Listed? Has a MDT been formed? Is there evidence Background information has been
checked?

Header Information Are all applicable entries in the header completed?

Purpose/Function Is the design and Intent or Purpose clear? Are functions clearly (Verb – noun) format?

Failure Modes Do the failure modes relate to the part functions?

Failure effects Are effects on safe vehicle operation and government regulation considered?

Failure Causes/ Mechanisms Are root caused identified? Are Design deficiencies considered that may induce manufacturing/ assembly variation?
Are Mfg/assembly causes excluded (But addressed in Process FMEA)? Are Causes described in terms of a part
characteristic, where appropriate?

Design Controls Can Design controls listed detect the cause(s) of failure modes before engineering release? Are mfg/ assembly
detection methods excluded?
(Prevention & Detection)
Severity Rating Are ratings based upon most serious consequence of the failure mode?

Occurrence rating Are ratings based on the occurrence of the first level cause?

Detection rating Are ratings based on the likelihood of detecting the failure mode prior to engineering release?

Classification Do Potential Critical Characteristics correspond to a part characteristic?

Were potential Critical Characteristic communicated to the Process FMEA team?

RPN Are the Risk Priority Numbers (RPN) ranked from high to low?

Recommended Actions Do actions address potential Critical Characteristics? Are remedial actions Listed that reduce the RPN for the
highest ranked failure modes? Are responsibility and timing for Recommended actions listed? Are Preventive,
instead of detection, actions listed where appropriate? Are actions aimed at making the design more robust? Are the
actions listed design actions, not mfg/assembly controls?

Follow Up Was the FMEA updated after recommended actions were implemented? Did the Process FMEA team determine
whether normal and customary or special controls were required for the identified potential Critical characteristics?

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 DESIGN FMEA TRAINING

ANY QUESTIONS ?

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