Question No.

1
UNLIKE THE BJE IN THE DEFUNCT
MOA-AD, BANGSAMORO UNDER
THE FAB IS NOT A “STATE IN ALL BUT
NAME.” INSTEAD, BANGSAMORO IS
MERELY AN AUTONOMOUS REGION
THAT REPLACES THE AUTONOMOUS
REGION OF MUSLIM MINDANAO
(ARMM) IN A MANNER CONSISTENT
WITH AND TRUE TO THE SPIRIT OF
THE CONSTITUTION.

Petitioners assert that the creation of the Bangsamoro Entity is

an affront to the Constitution as it allegedly implies the creation of a
new political entity that is not contemplated by the Constitution, to wit:

“The Constitution provides in Article X, Section 1 that

“the territorial and the political subdivisions of the
Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays. There shall be
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.” Section 15 of the
same Article further states that “There shall be created
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other
relevant characteristics within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.”

Nowhere is there any mention of the creation of a

“Bangsamoro” or a Bangsamoro New Political Entity
(NPE) x x x.”1

Moreover, the Petitioners allege that the establishment of the

Bangsamoro Entity would necessarily require an amendment of the
Constitution.2

Petitioner Paras stretched these allegations even further by

claiming that calling the ARMM as Bangsamoro territory is
tantamount to considering it as a separate part of the Philippines,

1 Petition (Aquino, et al.), p. 5.

2 Petition (PHILCONSA), p. 12.
although under the latter’s jurisdiction.3

These arguments are clearly misguided, inaccurate and

erroneous.

Bangsamoro Entity is not a

separate state. It is an
autonomous region.

The Montevideo Convention provides four (4) indispensable

requirements in order for an entity to be recognized as a state:

(a) a permanent population;

(b) a defined territory;
(c) government; and
(d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.4

Otherwise stated, a state is “a community of persons more or less

numerous, permanently occupying a definite portion of territory,
independent of external control, and possessing an organized
government to which a great body of inhabitants render habitual
obedience.”5

It must be recalled that in North Cotabato, the Honorable Supreme

Court held that the BJE, created through the MOA-AD, is a “state in
all but name as it meets the criterion provided for by the Montevideo
Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a
government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.”6

The same, however, cannot be said of the Bangsamoro Entity. A

closer perusal of the FAB would reveal that it does not intend to imbue
the Bangsamoro with statehood:

One, to say that, “to define the Bangsamoro territory is to

consider it as a separate part of the Philippines,” is utterly misplaced.
Following such logic would necessarily lead to an absurd conclusion
that each political subdivision, which has a clearly defined territory, is
separate from the Philippines. Clearly, as correctly put by Dean
Agabin and Atty. Tan, “defining a territory does not put a political

3 Petition (Paras), p. 20
4 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, art.1, 1934, 165 L.N.T.S.19
[“Montevideo”].
5 JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A

COMMENTARY, 38 (2009).
6 North Cotabato, G.R. No. 183591.
subdivision into a separate state, and the MOA-AD Decision certainly
did not make this conclusion.”7

Two, the Bangsamoro Identity defined in the FAB does not, and
should not, exclude the Bangsamoro people from the rest of the
Filipinos. At the most, it is only an affirmation of identity, and not a
definition of citizenship in the Bangsamoro Entity.8

Three, the Bangsamoro Entity lacks the capacity to conduct

international relations, which is an important aspect of sovereignty.
Although the FAB provides for certain powers that would allow
Bangsamoro to enter into relations with foreign states, these are not
the relations that would qualify it as a state:

“…the foreign relationships the Bangsamoro Entity

is empowered to enter into are not the diplomatic
relationships that make a state a state. Provinces,
cities and municipalities are separate corporate entities
and may thus enter into legal relationships, such as
raising debt and borrowing money. So long as it is
clear that the President remains the Philippines’ sole
voice in foreign affairs as contemplated in
constitutional law and that the President as
Commander-in-Chief remains solely responsible for
external defense, nothing prevents a political
subdivision such as the Bangsamoro Entity from
entering into these other legal relationships, especially
not ones that capitalize on the entity’s unique
demographic such as certain relationships with
Muslim countries and their political subdivisions that
could well simulate investment in Mindanao.”9
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Notably, Section 2, Article III of the FAB provides:

“III. POWERS

xxx

1. The Central Government shall have powers on:

a. Defense and external security
b. Foreign policy
c. Common market and global trade, provided
that the power to enter into economic

7 Pacifico Agabin & Oscar Franklin Tan, “A Liberal Interpretation of the Bangsamoro Basic Law”, 4 THE
IBP JOURNAL 1, 17 (2015).
8 Id.
9 Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, Joint GPH-MILF Draft Framework

Agreement on the Bangsamoro, art. III §2 (2012).

 agreements already allowed under Republic
Act No. 9054 shall be transferred to the
Bangsamoro
d. Coinage and Monetary policy
e. Citizenship and Naturalization
f. Postal Service”
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that Congress, in

discussing, debating and further refining the provisions of the draft
BBL, has now renamed the measure the Basic Law on the Bangsamoro
Autonomous Region. This is an acknowledgment that there is no intent
to create a separate state, but merely replace the ARMM with the
Bangsamoro Entity while still retaining its autonomous region status.

The Bangsamoro Entity is a

mere replacement of the
ARMM.

The objection of the Petitioners on the constitutionality of the

Bangsamoro Entity on the ground that it is not an autonomous region
contemplated and allowed by the Constitution is difficult to
understand. The observation of Dean Agabin and Atty. Tan is
enlightening:

“This objection is difficult to understand because all

the Constitution broadly states is that ‘There shall be
created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
in the Cordilleras…’ The Constitution provides only
very broad requirements for such autonomous
regions, such as their remaining subject to the
President’s general power of supervision over local
governments. The Constitution provides that an
autonomous region’s organic act must provide for
legislative power over an enumerated list of fields, but
this is flexible because the legislature may add, ‘Such
other matters as may be authorized by law for the
promotion of the general welfare of the people of the
region.’

The current ARMM is not specified in the Constitution.

Rather it is a statutory creation within the above
constitutional framework that may be altered and
expanded by statute. So long as the Bangsamoro
Entity does not transgress any of the broad
constitutional guidelines for autonomous regions, it
must be a valid replacement of the ARMM that is
 within the Congress’ power to create.”10 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied.)

Petitioner PHILCONSA would like to make an impression that

the creation of the Bangsamoro Entity would require constitutional
amendment by citing the exchanges between Commissioners Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, S.J. (“Fr. Bernas”) and Jose N. Nolledo during the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission:

“FR. BERNAS. Before we vote, may I ask one

clarificatory question.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Bernas may

proceed.

FR. BERNAS. Is it then the sense of the Committee that

besides recognizing the Cordilleras and Muslim
Mindanao as autonomous regions. Congress is
prohibited from creating other autonomous regions?

MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. I said that we

are adopting the Rodrigo observation during that
caucus that if there should be other regions aside
from Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras which
would like to create themselves into autonomous
regions, they should seek a constitutional
amendment.

FR. BERNAS. They should seek a constitutional

amendment?

MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President.”11

The creation, however, of a new autonomous region, apart from

the two (2) provided in the Constitution, is not being sought in this case.
Section 1, Article 1 of the FAB is very explicit:

“The Parties agree that the status quo is unacceptable

and that the Bangsamoro shall be established to
replace the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM). The Bangsamoro is the new
autonomous political entity (NPE) referred to in the
Decision Points of Principles as of April 2012.”
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

10 Agabin & Tan, supra note 52, at 20-21.

11 1986 Constitutional Commission Records, Volume 3 (1986).
 Since what is being sought here is the replacement by the
Bangsamoro Entity of the ARMM, which is an autonomous region that
is not created not by the Constitution but by an Organic Act that is the
Organic Act of 1989 (“Organic Act of ARMM”), what is required is only
the amendment of the Organic Act of ARMM and not the
Constitution. A law that will implement the provisions of the FAB
should be viewed merely as an amendment or repeal of the Organic
Act of ARMM and not an unlawful amendment of the Constitution.

With regard to the amendment of the Organic Act of ARMM, Fr.

Bernas explains, by citing the case of Pandi v. Court of Appeals,12 that
organic acts, such as the Organic Act of ARMM, may only be amended
through a plebiscite called for the purpose. This explanation is further
bolstered by Section 3 of Article XVIII of the Organic Act of ARMM
which states:

“Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act

shall become effective only when approved by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the
purpose, which shall be held not earlier than sixty (60)
days or later than ninety (90) days after the approval of
such amendment or revision.”13

The requirement of a popular ratification of the proposed

amendment to the Organic Act of ARMM has been complied with in
Section 2, Article V of the FAB:

“2. The Parties shall work together in order to ensure

the widest acceptability of the Bangsamoro Basic Law
as drafted by the Transitory Commission and the core
areas mentioned in the previous paragraph, through a
process of popular ratification among all the
Bangsamoro within the areas for their adoption. An
international third party monitoring team shall be
present to ensure that the process is free, fair, credible,
legitimate and in conformity with international
standards.” (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

The replacement of the

ARMM beyond the First
Congress elected under the
1987 Constitution is
sanctioned by the
Constitution.

12 BERNAS, S.J., supra note 50, at 1142 (citing Pandi v Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116850 (2002).
13 Id.
 Petitioner PHILCONSA would like to interpret Section 19, Article
X of the Constitution to mean that the mandate for Congress to create
the ARMM through the enactment of its organic law is vested only in
the First Congress elected under the Constitution, and should be
exercised within eighteen (18) months from the time of the
organization of both Houses.14

This distorted interpretation runs contrary to the nature of

legislative power. Section 19, Article X of the Constitution must be
interpreted within the framework of the nature and attributes of
legislative power. “Legislative power is the authority to make laws
and to alter and repeal them.”15 One corollary to the plenary grant of
legislative power is that Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws. This
was explained by Judge Cooley in the following manner:

“To say that the legislature may pass irrepealable laws,

is to say that it may alter the very constitution from
which it derives its authority; since, in so far as one
legislature could bind a subsequent one by its
enactments, it could in the same degree reduce the
legislative power of its successors; and the process
might be repeated, until, one by one, the subject of
legislation would be excluded altogether from their
control, and the constitutional provision that the
legislative power shall be vested in two houses would
be to a greater or less degree rendered ineffectual.”16

Since Congress’ powers are plenary, and limited only by the

Constitution, any attempt to limit the powers of future Congresses
through an irrepealable law is not allowed. Kida v. Senate, citing Duarte
v. Dade, is instructive on this point, to wit:

“The power of the legislature to make laws includes

the power to amend and repeal these laws. Where the
legislature, by its own act, attempts to limit its power
to amend or repeal laws, the Court has the duty to
strike down such act for interfering with the plenary
powers of Congress. As we explained in Duarte v. Dade:

‘A state legislature has a plenary law-

making power over all subjects, whether
pertaining to persons or things, within its
territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce

14 Petition (PHILCONSA), pp. 12-14.

15 BERNAS, S.J., supra note 50, at 676
16 Id., at 677
 new laws or repeal the old, unless
prohibited expressly or by implication by
the federal constitution or limited or
restrained by its own. It cannot bind
itself or its successors by enacting
irrepealable laws except when so
restrained. Every legislative body may
modify or abolish the acts passed by
itself or its predecessors. This power of
repeal may be exercised at the same
session at which the original act was
passed; and even while a bill is in its
progress and before it becomes a law.
This legislature cannot bind a future
legislature to a particular mode of
repeal. It cannot declare in advance the
intent of subsequent legislatures or the
effect of subsequent legislation upon
existing statutes.’”17 (Emphasis and
underscoring provided.)

The FAB is premised on the Parties’ agreement that “the status

quo is unacceptable and that the Bangsamoro shall be established to
replace the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).”18 It
must be noted that the negotiations on the FAB and the CAB constitute
the third attempt at devolution. It is a continuing process of
recognizing the Bangsamoro people and their “aspiration to chart their
political future through a democratic process that will secure their
identity and posterity and allow for meaningful self-governance.” The
GPH Peace Panel, in negotiating the FAB and the CAB, considered the
spirit of the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions by
consulting with the concerned stakeholders on how the historical
injustice and the resulting social, economic and political inequities in
Mindanao may most effectively be corrected and reduced.

BANGSAMORO’S MINISTERIAL FORM

OF GOVERNMENT UNDER THE FAB
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
CONSTITUTION.

The Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Paragraph 2, Section

1 of FAB, which provides that “The government of Bangsamoro shall
have a ministerial form.” Citing Section 18, Article X of the Constitution,

17Kida v. Senate, G.R. No. 196271, 18 October 2011

18Section 1, Title I on the Establishment of the Bangsamoro, Framework Agreement on the
Bangsamoro.
Petitioner Paras argues that “the Constitution contemplates a structure
of government that is anything except a parliamentary government.”19

A parliamentary government is a government structure that

combines its executive and legislative departments. A presidential
government, on the other hand, mandates the creation of three (3)
branches of government with three (3) different functions. These
branches are the executive, the legislative and the judiciary.

While it is admitted that the Constitution prescribes a presidential

type of government at the national level, and the creation of co-equal
branches, it did not require that such type of government be mirrored
in the autonomous regions and local government units.20

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states:

“Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act

for each autonomous region with the assistance and
participation of the regional consultative commission
composed of representatives appointed by the
President from a list of nominees from multi-sectoral
bodies. The organic act shall define the basic
structure of government for the region consisting of
the executive department and legislative assembly,
both of which shall be elective and representative of
the constituent political units. The organic acts shall
likewise provide for special courts with personal,
family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with
the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.

The creation of the autonomous region shall be

effective when approved by majority of the votes cast
by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the
purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and
geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite
shall be included in the autonomous region.”21
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Note that the only requirement of the Constitution as to the

government structure of an autonomous region is that it should consist
of “the executive department and legislative assembly, both of which
shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units.”
The Constitution did not provide that both departments be completely
independent of each other. The use of the word ‘and’ means that two

19 Petition (Paras), p. 21.

20 Candelaria, supra note 2, at 21.
21 PHIL. CONST. art. X, §18.
separate departments shall be created but as to the allocation of the
powers, it is the Congress which should ultimately decide on the
matter. This is supported by Section 17, Article X of the Constitution:

“Section 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities

not granted by this Constitution or by law to the
autonomous regions shall be vested in the National
Government.”22 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)

Thus, a parliamentary type of government, in compliance with this

requirement, is absolutely free from constitutional defect.

It is also worth noting that the Constitution, in using the word

elective, made no other qualifications as to who should vote. Hence, so
long as power or right is vested through a process of voting, it passes
the qualification of being an elective.

Corollary to this issue is the manner of the election of the Chief

Minister of the Bangsamoro Parliamentary Government. Paragraph 5,
Part 2 of the Annex on Transitional Arrangements and Modalities
provides:

“The Bangsamoro Cabinet shall be composed of the

Chief Minister, a Deputy Chief Minister, and such
other ministers necessary to perform the functions of
the government. The Chief Minister shall be elected
by majority from among the members of the
assembly and shall exercise executive authority on its
behalf. The Chief Minister shall appoint the Deputy
Chief Minister from among the elected members of the
assembly and the rest of ministers, majority of whom
shall also come from among the members of the
assembly.” (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Issue is being made on the fact that the Chief Minister shall be
elected by the members of the assembly, and not by the people.
Petitioners would have us believe that this violates the principle of
democratic representation enshrined in our Constitution.

No less than former Chief Justice Hilario Davide declared that

although the Chief Minister of the Bangsamoro Government is elected
by the Bangsamoro Parliament and not directly by the electorate, the
constitutional requirement, that the Executive Department be elected

22 PHIL. CONST. art. X, §17.

and representative of the constituent political units, is still met.23 Chief
Justice Davide explained that the Constitution does not require that the
autonomous region's chief executive should be directly elected by the
electorate.24

Further, the people remain to have a hand in the installation of

the Chief Minister. It is important to note that what the Annex on
Transitional Arrangements and Modalities provides is that the Chief
Minister shall be elected “from among the members of the assembly,”
thus, the Chief Minister will not be an outsider from the exercise of the
direct vote of the people. He or she will have come from the same set
of assembly members directly elected by the people, in accordance
with the democratic principles set forth by the Constitution.

Furthermore, it is in their capacity as representatives of the

people who elected them that the members of the assembly will decide
who the Chief Minister will be. This likewise upholds the democratic
principles of the Constitution.

In summary, it is within the power of Congress to create an

autonomous region and its discretion to prescribe its type of
government as long as it is within the bounds of the Constitution.
Therefore, if Congress deems it proper to establish a parliamentary
government to satisfy the constitutional requirement of having a more
responsive and accountable local government structure, the
Honorable Supreme Court cannot question its wisdom.

Question No. 2
THE ASSIGNMENT OF THE
FUNCTIONS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND
ORDER TO THE BANGSAMORO
POLICE FORCE IS CONSISTENT WITH
THE CONSTITUTION.

Petitioner PHILCONSA alleges that the transfer of law

enforcement functions from the Armed Forces of the Philippines

23 Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Retired Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Re: Report of Cluster 1
(Constitutionality, Form and Powers of Government and Plebiscite, Report on the study made on
the BBL).
24 Id.
(“AFP”) to the police force for the Bangsamoro is unconstitutional,
without explaining why.25

Petitioner Paras likewise submits that the Annex on Normalization

is unconstitutional for providing the functions of the police force for
the Bangsamoro, the creation of an Independent Commission on
Policing, and the elimination of the AFP, to be replaced by the
Bangsamoro police force. He likewise alleges that the Bangsamoro
police force will conflict with the functions of the Philippine National
Police (“PNP”) and the AFP.26

On the other hand, Petitioner Pamatong claims that the creation

of a Bangsamoro police force is an attribute of a fully sovereign
government.27

There is nothing unconstitutional about the creation of the police

force for the Bangsamoro. There is no intent to supplant the
overarching authority of a central PNP, but merely to create a local
police force that can better address peace and order within the context
of an autonomous region.

There is a clear recognition of the accountability of the police

force for the Bangsamoro to the Central Government in the Annex on
Normalization:

“The police force for the Bangsamoro shall be

professional, civilian in character, effective and
efficient in law enforcement, fair and impartial, and
accountable under the law for its actions. It shall be
responsible both to the Central Government and the
Bangsamoro Government, and to the communities it
serves.”28

Furthermore, Section 21, Article X of the Constitution provides:

“The preservation of peace and order within the

regions shall be the responsibility of the local police
agencies which shall be organized, maintained,
supervised and utilized in accordance with
applicable laws. The defense and security of the
regions shall be the responsibility of the National
Government.” (Emphasis and underscoring
provided.)

25 Petition (PHILCONSA), p. 7.
26 Petition (Paras), p. 28.
27 Petition (Pamatong), p. 12.
28
 Fr. Bernas explains the distinction between internal peace and
order, on the one hand, and national defense and security, on the other,
in the following manner:

“Section 21 makes a distinction between the problem

of internal peace and order and the problem of national
defense and security. The former, understood as the
problem of ordinary criminality which should
normally be the concern of police authorities, is the
responsibility of the local police agencies. However,
the organization, maintenance, and supervision of
police agencies may in certain circumstances be
beyond the capabilities of local governments. In such
instances, the President, as Commander-in-Chief may
order the armed forces into the autonomous region to
perform whatever may be necessary. As to national
defense and security, that is, as to dealing with threats
to the stability, integrity, and survival of the nation,
this clearly is the primary responsibility of the national
government.”29

This must be read within the broader context of normalization in

a peace process. The distinction between the role of the PNP in
addressing internal peace and order or ordinary criminality, and the
role of the AFP in national defense and security is well-defined by the
Constitution. However, there lie exceptions where the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, may call upon the armed forces into the
autonomous region. One such exception is the cessation of insurgent
group hostilities.

Normalization is “the process through which communities

affected by the decades-long armed conflict in Mindanao can return to
a peaceful life and pursue sustainable livelihoods free from fear of
violence and crime. It involved the transition of the MILF’s
Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces to a peaceful civilian life, which
includes putting their weapons beyond use. It also involves the redress
of unresolved legitimate grievances and the rehabilitation of conflict-
affected areas.”30

Normalization, which is the process of returning to a peaceful

life, necessarily includes the turn-over of peacekeeping functions from
the AFP (which may only be called upon during the exceptional

29BERNAS, supra note 50, at 1147.

30Frequently Asked Questions on the Annex on Normalization, Office of the Presidential Adviser
on the Peace Process, available in http://www.opapp.gov.ph/milf/news/frequently-asked-
questions-annex-normalization (last accessed 5 August 2015).
circumstances, including the cessation of insurgent group hostilities,
in this case) to the police force (mandated by the Constitution to
maintain peace and order).

In any case, Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the “DILG
Act of 1990,”unmistakeably sanctions the creation of a regional police
force in the autonomous regions:

“Section 25. Organization.- x x x

The PNP shall be composed of a national office,

regional offices, provincial offices, district offices, city
or municipal stations.

xxx

At the regional level, the PNP shall have regional

offices, including that of the National Capital Region,
which may be divided into two (2) separate regions
without prejudice to the pertinent provisions of the
Organic Act for the Autonomous Regions of the
Cordilleras and Muslim Mindanao relative to the
creation of a regional police force in the area of
autonomy. Each of these regional offices shall be
headed by a regional director for peace and order. xxx”
(Emphasis and underscoring provided.

Question No. 3
THE FAB’S PROVISION ON REVENUE
GENERATION AND WEALTH AND
POWER SHARING BETWEEN THE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND
BANGSAMORO ARE CONSISTENT
WITH THE CONSTITUTION.

Petitioners decry the FAB’s provisions on revenue generation

and wealth-sharing for allegedly violating the Constitution.

The pertinent provisions of the FAB relating to revenue

generation and wealth-sharing are as follows:

1. The parties agree that wealth creation (or

revenue generation and sourcing) is important for the
operation and Bangsamoro.
 2. Consistent with the Bangsamoro Basic Law, the
Bangsamoro will have the power to create its own
sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and
charges, subject to limitations as may be mutually
agreed upon by the Parties. This power shall include
the power to determine tax bases and tax rates, guided
by the principles of devolution of power, equalization,
equity, accountability, administrative simplicity,
harmonization, economic efficiency, and fiscal
autonomy.

3. The Bangsamoro will have the authority to

receive grants and donations from domestic and
foreign sources, and block grants and subsidies from
the Central Government. Subject to acceptable credit
worthiness, it shall also have the authority to contract
loans from domestic and foreign lending institutions,
except foreign and domestic loans requiring sovereign
guaranty, whether explicit or implicit, which would
require the approval of the Central Government.

4. The Bangsamoro shall have a just and equitable

share in the revenues generated through the
exploration, development or utilization of natural
resources obtaining in all the areas/territories, land or
water, covered by and within the jurisdiction of the
Bangsamoro, in accordance with the formulas agreed
upon by the Parties.

5. The Bangsamoro may create its own auditing

body and procedures for accountability over revenues
and other funds generated within or by the region
from external sources. This shall be without prejudice
to the power, authority and duty of the national
Commission on Audit to examine, audit and settle all
accounts pertaining to the revenues and the use of the
funds and property owned and held in trust by any
government instrumentality, including GOCCs.

6. The details of revenue and wealth sharing

arrangements between the Central Government and
the Bangsamoro Government shall be agreed upon by
the Parties. The Annex on Wealth Sharing shall form
part of this Agreement.

7. There shall be an intergovernmental fiscal

policy board composed of representatives of the
Bangsamoro and the Central Government in order to
address revenue imbalances and fluctuations in
regional financial needs and revenue-raising capacity.
The Board shall meet at least once in six (6) months to
determine the necessary fiscal policy adjustments,
 subject to the principles of intergovernmental relations
mutually agreed upon by both Parties. Once full fiscal
autonomy has been achieved by the Bangsamoro then
it may no longer be necessary to have a representative
from the Central Government to sit in the Board. Fiscal
autonomy shall mean generation and budgeting of the
Bangsamoro’s own sources of revenue, its share of the
internal revenue taxes and block grants and subsidies
remitted to it by the central government or any donor.

8. The parties agree that sustainable development

is crucial in protecting and improving the quality of life
of the Bangsamoro people. To this end, the
Bangsamoro shall develop a comprehensive
framework for sustainable development through the
proper conservation, utilization and development of
natural resources. For efficient coordination and
assistance, the Bangsamoro legislative body shall
create, by law, an intergovernmental body composed
of representatives of the Bangsamoro and the Central
Government, which shall ensure the harmonization of
environmental and developmental plans, as well as
formulate common environmental objectives.”31

The provision empowering the Bangsamoro Entity to raise its

own revenues and levy its own taxes is consistent with Section 20,
Article X of the Constitution. It provides:

“Section 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and

subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions
shall provide for legislative powers over:

1. Administrative organization;
2. Creation of sources of revenues;
3. Ancestral domain and natural resources;
4. Personal, family, and property relations;
5. Regional urban and rural planning
development;
6. Economic, social and tourism development;
7. Educational policies;
8. Preservation and development of the cultural
heritage; and
9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law
for the promotion of general welfare of the
people of the region.” 32

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

31
32 PHIL. CONST. art. X, §20.
 More, such power is explicitly granted to local government units
in Section 5, Article X of the Constitution, to wit:

“Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the

power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy
taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and
limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent
with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes,
fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
governments.”33

The details of revenue and wealth sharing arrangements

between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro Government as
stated in the Annexes on Power and Wealth Sharing, likewise, comply
with the mandate of the Constitution.

Section 2, Part 4 of the Annex on Power Sharing states that “the

Bangsamoro Government shall have authority and jurisdiction over
the exploration, development and utilization of mines and minerals in
the territory.” This provision clearly finds its justification in Section 20,
Article X of the Constitution:

“Section 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and

subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions
shall provide for legislative powers over:

xxx

3. Ancestral domain and natural resources;

x x x” 34
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

This constitutional mandate is reflected in Section 8, Article III of

the Organic Act of ARMM,

“Section 8. Regional Government Authority Over Natural

Resources. – Subject to the provisions of the
Constitution and this Organic Act, the Regional
Government shall have the authority, power and right
to explore, develop and utilize the natural resources
including surface and sub-surface rights, in-land and
coastal waters, and renewable and non-renewable

33 PHIL. CONST. art. X, §5.

34 PHIL. CONST. art. X, §20.
 resources in the autonomous region. Muslims and the
other indigenous cultural communities shall, however,
have priority rights to explore, develop and utilize the
said resources in the areas designated as parts of their
respective ancestral domains.”35

Furthermore, in Section 57 of the IPRA:

“Section 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.

– The ICCs/IPs shall have the priority rights in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of
any natural resources within the ancestral domains. A
non-member of the ICCs/IPs concerned may be
allowed to take part in the development and utilization
of the natural resources for a period not exceeding
twenty-five (25) years for not more than twenty-five
years: Provided, that a formal and written agreement
is entered into with the ICCs/IPs concerned or that
community, pursuant to its own decision making
process, has agreed to allow such operation: Provided,
finally, that all the extractions shall be used to facilitate
the development and improvement of the ancestral
domains.” 36

Clearly, the power granted to the Bangsamoro Entity is a power

that has been previously granted to the local government units and to
the Indigenous Peoples under the IPRA. As a legitimate political
subdivision, the Bangsamoro Entity is similarly authorized to develop
the resources within its territory.

As regards the sharing between the Central Government and the

Bangsamoro Government on the revenues generated from taxes and
levies, it is well to note that there is no provision in the Constitution
which restricts sharing of tax revenue with an autonomous region or
local government unit.

With regard to the provisions on sharing of revenues generated

from the exploitation of natural resources within Bangsamoro, such
does not translate to a cession by the Philippine State of ownership
over such resources to the Bangsamoro, and thus, remains to be
consistent with the principle of jura regalia.37

35 R.A. No. 6734, art. III, §8.

36 INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997, §57.
37 Candelaria, supra note 2, at 73.