REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,
G. R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboaga del Sur, Branch 23, granting
respondent’s petition for authority to remarry invoking par. 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were
married in Lam-an, Ozamis City and were blessed with a son and a daughter.
In 1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S. bringing along their son and after a few
years she was naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son – who was
living with his wife in the States – that his wife had remarried after obtaining
her divorce decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to remarry with
the trial court invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code.
Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Sur granted the petition of the respondent and allowed him to
remarry.
The Solicitor General’s motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of
that, petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court. Herein petitioner raised the issue of the applicability of
Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant case.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER THE
ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Held:
Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit competent
evidence showing his allegations that his naturalized American wife had
obtained a divorce decree and had remarried. Therefore, the Petition of the
Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of
the RTC Br. 32 of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur is hereby SET ASIDE.
“Art. 26 (2) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under the Philippine laws.”
Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was
naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce
granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American
citizen while residing in the U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does
not apply to the instant case.
However, the legislative intent must be taken into consideration and rule of
reason must be applied. The Supreme Court ruled that par. 2 of Art. 26 should
be construed and interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the
time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one
of then becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.
The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party
were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be sanction absurdity and injustice. Were the interpretation
of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous
results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be
construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary
the letter of the law. A stature may therefore be extended to case not within
the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirits or
intent.
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAN
LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS
alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
FACTS:
FACTS:
During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage
was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six
children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On
August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with
whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an
American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of
the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which
issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent
Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr.
William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard,
Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived
with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on
December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she
filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of
Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of
improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the
petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of
Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He
further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of
his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: denied the motion to dismiss, ruled that respondent, as widow
of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue
was properly laid. Mila filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Tensuan on
November 16, 1994. Thus, a new trial ensued.
(2) Trial Court (new): dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It
held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor
and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been
filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It found that the decree of
absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid
in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It
also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s
legitimate children.
(3) CA: reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court
ISSUES:
(1) Whether venue was properly laid, and
(2) Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly
remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to
Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took
effect on August 3, 1988.
(3) Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters
of administration.
RULING:
(1) Yes, the venue was proper. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the
petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed
in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of
his death."
For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a
person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or
place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. While petitioners
established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent
proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982
up to the time of his death. From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a
resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate.
(2) Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree
validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine
law. As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation
where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the
enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our
lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent.
The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed
Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality
to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the
records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the
divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in
California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and
the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly
show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated
in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as
they must be alleged and proved.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to
the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained
by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
(3) Yes. Respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or
as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the
Family Code.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in
1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the
subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-
owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their
joint efforts during their cohabitation.
PEREZ-FERRARIS vs. FERRARIS G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Psychological Incapacity, Article 36 of the
Civil Code
OCTOBER 20, 2017
FACTS:
The RTC rendered a Decision denying the petition for declaration of nullity of
petitioner’s marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial court noted that suffering
from epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Civil Code and the evidence on record were insufficient to prove
infidelity. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied where the trial
court reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent is mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that he could not have known the obligations
he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof.
Petitioner appealed to the CA which affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial
court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of petitioner and respondent is void ab initioon
the ground of respondent’s psychological incapacity.
RULING:
It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, save for the most
compelling and cogent reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court
go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties
to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a
misappreciation of facts, which are unavailing in the instant case.
The term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for the nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated
characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
“psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for
its understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully
explained, which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.
Indeed, the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent
was suffering from psychological incapacity. There is absolutely no showing
that his “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage, or that
those are incurable.
We find respondent’s alleged mixed personality disorder, the “leaving-the-
house” attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during
epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support,
and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are
not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, where therein respondent preferred to spend
more time with his friends than his family on whom he squandered his money,
depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was dishonest to his wife
regarding his finances, the Court held that the psychological defects spoken of
were more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the
performance of some marital obligations and that a mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute
psychological incapacity; it is not enough to prove that the parties failed to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that
they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological,
not physical, illness.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. No less
than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the
family; it decrees marriage as legally “inviolable” and protects it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
“protected” by the state.
579 SCRA 193 – Civil Law – Family Code – Article 36: Psychological
Incapacity – Molina Case Merely a Guideline
Every case involving psychological incapacity must be resolved on a case-to-
case basis
Note: This case relaxed the application of the Molina Guidelines
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te met Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu at a Filipino-Chinese
gathering at a school campus. They did not have interest with each other at first
but they developed a certain degree of closeness due to the fact that they share
the same angst with their families. In 1996, while still in college, Rowena
proposed to Kenneth that they should elope. Kenneth initially refused on the
ground that he was still young and jobless. But due to Rowena’s persistence
Kenneth complied bringing with him P80K. The money soon after disappeared
and they found themselves forced to return to their respective home.
Subsequently, Rowena’s uncle brought the two before a court and had had them
be married. After marriage, Kenneth and Rowena stayed with her uncle’s house
where Kenneth was treated like a prisoner.
Meanwhile, Kenneth was advised by his dad to come home otherwise he will
be disinherited. One month later, Kenneth was able to escape and he was hidden
from Rowena’s family. Kenneth later contacted Rowena urging her to live
with his parents instead. Rowena however suggested that he should get his
inheritance instead so that they could live together separately or just stay with
her uncle.
Kenneth however was already disinherited. Upon knowing this, Rowena said
that it is better if they live separate lives from then on. Four years later, Kenneth
filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Rowena. Rowena did not file
an answer. The City Prosecutor, after investigation, submitted that he cannot
determine if there is collusion between the two parties. Eventually, the case was
tried. The opinion of an expert was sought wherein the psychologist
subsequently ruled that both parties are psychologically incapacitated. The said
relationship between Kenneth and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the
wreck and weakly-founded. The break-up was caused by both parties’
unreadiness to commitment and their young age. Kenneth was still in the state
of finding his fate and fighting boredom, while Rowena was still egocentrically
involved with herself. The trial court ruled that the marriage is void upon the
findings of the expert psychologist. The Solicitor General (OSG) appealed and
the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the OSG. The OSG claimed that the
psychological incapacity of both parties was not shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable (Molina case). The clinical psychologist did
not personally examine Rowena, and relied only on the information provided
by Kenneth. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended
by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. All these were requirements
set forth in the Molina case to be followed as guidelines.
ISSUE: Whether or not the expert opinion of the psychologist should be
admitted in lieu of the guidelines established in the landmark case of Molina.
HELD: Yes, such is possible. The Supreme Court ruled that admittedly, the SC
may have inappropriately imposed a set of rigid rules in ascertaining
Psychological Incapacity in the Molina case. So much so that the subsequent
cases after Molina were ruled accordingly to the doctrine set therein. And that
there is not much regard for the law’s clear intention that each case is to be
treated differently, as “courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.” The SC
however is not abandoning the Molina guidelines, the SC merely reemphasized
that there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern
the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36 such as in
the case at bar. The principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis
of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on
a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
The SC then ruled that the marriage of Kenneth and Rowena is null and void
due to both parties’ psychological disorder as evidenced by the finding of the
expert psychologist. Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and
incurable psychological incapacity. Kenneth cannot assume the essential
marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and
rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without
advice from others. He is too dependent on others. Rowena cannot perform the
essential marital obligations as well due to her intolerance and impulsiveness.
MANSION BISCUIT CORPORATION, respresented by its president,
ANG CHO HONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, TY TECK
SUAN substituted by his heirs, ROSENDA TY, ELIZABETH TY KOH,
EDWARD TY, EDMUND TY, EDGAR TY, EVELYN T. LIM, EDWIN
TY and EDISON TY, and SIY GUI, respondents.
G.R. No. 94713 November 23, 1995
FACTS: Sometime in 1981, Ty Teck Suan, as president of Edward Ty Brothers
Corporation, ordered numerous canons of nutria-wafer biscuits from Mansion
Biscuit Corporation, before the delivery of the goods on November 12, 1981,
Ty Teck Suan issued to Ang Cho Hong, president of Mansion Biscuit Corp.,
four postdated checks totaling P404,980.00 as payment for the nutria-wafer
biscuits. Four other postdated checks in the amount of P100,000.00 each were
issued by Ty Teck Suan with Siy Gui as Co-signor in December of the same
year. Accordingly, Mansion Biscuit Corp. delivered the goods. When the first
four checks were deposited, they were all dishonored due to insufficiency of
funds. Ang Cho Hong informed Ty Teck Suan of the dishonor and requested
him to replace the checks with good cash or good checks. Ty Teck Suan failed
to heed said request. Subsequently, Ty Teck Suan delivered a total of 1,150
sacks of Australian flour to Mansion Biscuits plus cash advance by Suan and
the amount paid was applied as payment for the first postdated check. Hong
sent Suan a formal demand letter requesting the latter to make good the value
of the remaining dishonored checks within five days from the receipt thereof.
Thereafter, the second batch of checks were issued by Suan and Gui but were
all dishonored again. Mansion Biscuit Corporation filed a case against Suan and
Gui for violation of Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law)
ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of Ty Teck Suan that the subject checks
were issued merely to guarantee or secure fulfillment of the agreement with the
complaint.
HELD: The court concludes of the above-mentioned checks by the accused
subject to these two criminal cases, and their subsequent dishonor, cannot be
considered in violation of the Batasang Pambansa Blg.22 because one important
element of the offense is missing: that the check is made or drawn and issued
to apply on account or for value and because these were issued to guarantee the
fulfillment of an agreement to deliver biscuits by complaint when accused Suan
would place orders. Accused are hereby declared not guilty of the offense
charged.
G.R. No. L-18193 - BERNALDES, SR vs. Bohol Land Transportaion Inc.
FACTS:
Appellant, Jovito Bernaldes and his brother, Nicasio, boarded one
of appellee's passenger trucks(B.L.T. Co. No. 322 with plate No. 1470) in the
town of Guindulman, Bohol, on the way to Tagbilaran, thebus fell off a deep
precipice in barrio Balitbiton, municipality of Garcia-Hernandez, resulting in
the death of Nicasio and in serious physical injuries to Jovito. A complaint for
damges against apellee, Bohol LandTransportation Co. was filed. Defendant
moved for the dismissal of the complaint on two grounds,namely, that the
cause of action alleged therein was barred by a prior judgment, and that it did
not state acause of action. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, it
was established that in Criminal Case No. 2775 of thesame court, the driver of
the bus involved in the accident, was charged with double homicide
thrureckless imprudence but was acquitted on the ground that his guilt had not
been established beyondreasonable doubt, and that appellees, through their
attorneys, intervened in the prosecution of said caseand did not reserve the
right to file a separate action for damages. The lower court sustained the
motionon the ground of bar by prior judgment, and dismissed the case. Hence,
this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON a civil action for damages against the owner of a public vehicle, based
on breach of contract of carriage, may be filed after the criminal action
instituted against the driver has been disposedof, if the aggrieved party did not
reserve his right to enforce civil liability in a separate action.WON whether
the intervention of the aggrieved party, through private prosecutors, in
theprosecution of the criminal case against the driver
—
who was acquitted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
—
will bar him from suing the latter's employer for damages for breach of
contract, in anindependent and separate action.
HELD: YES.
Article 31 of the New Civil Code expressly provides that when the civil
action is based uponan obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceedindependently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. This
provisionevidently refers to a civil action based, not on the act or omission
charged as a felony in a criminal case,but to one based on an obligation arising
from other sources, such as law or contract. Upon the other hand it is clear that
a civil action based on contractual liability of a common carrier is distinct
from thecriminal action instituted against the carrier or its employee based on
the latter's criminal negligence. Thefirst is governed by the provisions of the
Civil Code, and not by those of the Revised Penal Code, and itbeing entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, the same may be instituted and
prosecutedindependently of, and regardless of the result of the latter.In the
case at bar, the civil action instituted against appellee is based on alleged
culpacontractual
incurred by it due to its failure to carry safely the late Nicasio Bernaldes and
his brother Jovitoto their place of destination, whereas the criminal action
instituted against appellee's driver involvedexclusively the criminal and civil
liability of the latter arising from his criminal negligence. In other
words,appellant's action concerned the civil liability of appellee as a common
carrier, regardless of the liabilitiesof its driver who was charged in the
criminal case. The failure, on the part of the appellants, to reservetheir right to
recover civil indemnity against the carrier can not in any way be deemed as a
waiver, on their part, to institute a separate action against the latter based on
its contractual liability, or on
culpa aquiliana
,under Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
452 SCRA 532 – Civil Law – Human Relations – Abuse of Rights – Volenti
Non Fit Injuria
One evening in October 1994, an exclusive party was being held at the Nikko
Hotel Manila Garden. The party was being held for a prominent Japanese
national. The person in charge at the party was Ruby Lim who was also the
executive secretary of the hotel. Later during the party, she noticed Robert
Reyes (popularly known as Amay Bisaya). Reyes was not on the list of
exclusive guests. Lim first tried to find out who invited Reyes to the party.
When she ascertained that the host celebrant did not invite Reyes, Lim
approached Reyes and told the latter, in a discreet voice, to finish his food and
leave the party. Reyes however made a scene and began shouting at Lim. Later,
a policeman was called to escort Reyes out of the party.
Reyes then sued Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden for damages. In his
version, he said that he was invited by another party guest, Dr. Violeta Filart.
He said that while he was queuing to get his food, Lim approached him and
ordered him in a loud voice to leave the party immediately. He told Lim he was
invited by Dr. Filart however when he was calling for Dr. Filart the latter
ignored him. Later, he was escorted out of the party like a common criminal.
The trial court ruled in favor of Lim and Nikko Hotel. However, the Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of Reyes as it ruled that Lim abused her right and that
Reyes deserved to be treated humanely and fairly. It is true that Lim had the
right to ask Reyes to leave the party but she should have done it respectfully.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lim acted with abuse of rights.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court found the version of Lim more credible. She
has been employed by the hotel for more than 20 years at that time. Her job
requires her to be polite at all times. It is very unlikely for her to make a scene
in the party she was managing. That would only make her look bad.
Reyes based his complaint on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Art. 19
which provides:
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.
was not violated by Lim as it appears that even Reyes testified in court that
when Lim told him to leave, Lim did so very close to him – so close that they
could almost kiss. This only proves that Lim intended that only Reyes shall hear
whatever is it that she’s going to tell Reyes and exclude other guests from
hearing.
Article 21 on the other hand is commonly known as contra bonus mores:
Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.
This article is likewise not violated. Lim, as proven by evidence on record, did
not demean Reyes. They do not know each other personally. She has no reason
to treat him wrongfully especially so that Reyes himself is a prominent person.
On the other hand, Reyes brought whatever damage he incurred upon himself.
Under the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, by coming to the party uninvited,
Reyes opens himself to the risk of being turned away, and thus being
embarrassed. The injury he incurred is thus self-inflicted. Evidence even shows
that Dr. Filart herself denied inviting Reyes into the party and that Reyes simply
gate-crashed. Reyes did not even present any supporting evidence to support
any of his claims. Since he brought injury upon himself, neither Lim nor Nikko
Hotel can be held liable for damages.
Castillo v. Republic G.R. No. 214064 February 6, 2017 Psychological
Incapacity, Art. 36, FC
JUNE 20, 2018
FACTS:
Mirasol and Felipe started as friends then, eventually, became sweethearts.
During their courtship, Mirasol discovered that Felipe sustained his affair with
his former girlfriend. The couple’s relationship turned tumultuous after the
revelation. With the intervention of their parents, they reconciled. They got
married and were blessed with two childåren.
However, after thirteen years of marriage, Felipe resumed philandering.
Tired of her husband’s infidelity, she left the conjugal dwelling and stopped
any communication with him. Felipe’s irresponsible acts like cohabiting with
another woman, not communicating with her, and not supporting their
children for a period of not less than ten years without any reason, constitute a
severe psychological disorder.
Mirasol filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage which
was granted by the trial court.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of evidence presented warrants, as the RTC
determined, the declaration of nullity of the marriage of Mirasol and Felipe on
the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
RULING:
Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be
due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations
of marriage.
In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity,
the respondent’s unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of
a disordered personality, completely preventing the respondent from
discharging the essential obligations of the marital state; there must be
proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated
him from complying with the obligation to be faithful to his spouse.
It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological
disorder itself.
As discussed, the findings on Felipe’s personality profile did not emanate
from a personal interview with the subject himself. Apart from the
psychologist’s opinion and petitioner’s allegations, no other reliable evidence
was cited to prove that Felipe’s sexual infidelity was a manifestation of his
alleged personality disorder, which is grave, deeply rooted, and incurable.
The Court is not persuaded that the natal or supervening disabling factor
which effectively incapacitated him from complying with his obligation to be
faithful to his wife was medically or clinically established.
Basic is the rule that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not
equivalent to proof, i.e., mere allegations are not evidence.
The petition for review was denied.
GLENN VIÑAS, vs. MARY GRACE PAREL-VIÑASG.R. No. 208790,
January 21, 2015
Psychological incapacity; Testimony of Expert Witness
FACTS:
Glenn filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary
Grace. Glenn sought professional guidance and submitted himself to a psychol
ogical evaluation by Clinical Psychologist. The doctor found him as “amply a
ware of his marital roles” and “capable of maintaining a mature and healthy he
terosexual relationship.” On the other hand, Mary Grace’s personality was ass
essed through the data gathered from Glenn and his cousin and diagnosed her t
o be suffering from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-
social traits. The doctor then concluded that Mary Grace and Glenn’s relations
hip is not founded on mutual love, trust, respect, commitment and fidelity to e
ach other. Hence, Dr. Tayag recommended the propriety of declaring the nullit
y of the couple’s marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lack of personal examination or assessment of a psycholog
ist or psychiatrist is fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage.
RULING:
No. The lack of personal examination or assessment of the respondent by a ps
ychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the declaratio
n of nullity of marriage. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to susta
in a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of th
e person concerned need not be resorted to. In the case of Mary Grace, howev
er, the documentary evidence offered do not sufficiently prove the root cause,
gravity, incurability of Mary Grace’s condition and that it existed at the incept
ion of marriage.
Moreover, while the various tests administered on the petitioner could have be
en used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same st
atement cannot be made with respect to the respondent’s condition. To make c
onclusions and generalizations on the respondent’s psychological condition ba
sed on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from
admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such
evidence.
GARCIA vs. RECIO G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, VS.
RODERICK A. RECIO,
respondent
October 2, 2001
FACTS:
The respondent, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian
citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia.
In 1989, the Australian family court issued a decree of divorce supposedly
dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australian citizenship.
In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan
City. In their application for marriage license, respondent was declared as
“single” and “Filipino”. Since October 1995, they lived separately; and in
1996 while in Autralia, their conjugal assets were divided. In 1998, petitioner
filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of
bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondent’s former marriage only in
November. On the other hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his
prior marriage in 1993, before they were married. Respondent also contended
that his first marriage was dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia
in 1989 and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The
trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the ground of the
divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence,
this petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was
proven.
2. Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia.
RULING:
The Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts
cannot grant it. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner,
Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry”. A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens,
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their
respective laws. Therefore, before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce,
the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to
be authentic, issued by an Australian family court. Although, appearance is
not sufficient; and compliance with the rules on evidence regarding alleged
foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decree was admitted on account of
petitioner’s failure to object properly because he objected to the fact that it
was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its
admissibility.
Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly
admitted as evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under
Australian law. However, there are two types of divorce, absolute divorce
terminating the marriage and limited divorce merely suspending the marriage.
In this case, it is not known which type of divorce the respondent procured.
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign
statutes, still restrict remarriage. Under the Australian divorce decree “a party
to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute commits
the offense of bigamy”. This shows that the divorce obtained by the
respondent might have been restricted. Respondent also failed to produce
sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his status. Together
with other evidences submitted, they don’t absolutely establish his legal
capacity to remarry according to the alleged foreign law.
Case remanded to the court a quo. The marriage between the petitioner and
respondent can not be declared null and void based on lack of evidence
conclusively showing the respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner.
With the lack of such evidence, the court a quo may declare nullity of the
parties’ marriage based on two existing marriage certificates.
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Facts:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love
decided to get married on September 4, 1954. Wassmer made the necessary
preparations for the wedding including making and sending wedding
invitations, buying of wedding dress and other apparels, and other wedding
necessities.
On Sept. 2, 1954, Velez left this note for his bride-to-be advising her that he
will not be able to attend the wedding because his mom was opposed to said
wedding.
And one day before the wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer advising
her that nothing has changed and that he will be returning soon. Therefore,
Velez did not appear and was not heard from again.
Wassmer sued Velez for damages and he failed to answer and was declared in
default. On April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay
plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages; P2,500.00 as attorney’s fees; and the costs.
On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was
because of fortuitous events. He further argued that he cannot be held civilly
liable for breaching his promise to marry Wassmer because there is no law upon
which such an action may be grounded. He also contested the award of
exemplary and moral damages against him.
Issue:
Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this case.
Held:
This is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach
of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding
and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 which provides in
part “any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.”
And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to
receive an award for moral damages as properly awarded by the lower court in
this case. Further, the award of exemplary damages is also proper. Here, the
circumstances of this case show that Velez, in breaching his promise to
Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and oppressive manner – this warrants the
imposition of exemplary damages against him.