India’s Strategy to

Counter Terrorism

SUBMITTED TO:
RACHNA YADAV

SUBMITTED BY:
MANISH BHATIA
2K17/ME/132


INDIA’S STRATEGY TO COUNTER TERRORISM 1

 INDEX
S.NO CONTENTS PAGE NO.

1 CERTIFICATE 3

2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 4

3 ABSTRACT 5

4 ISLAMIST TERRORISM IN INDIA 6

5 CAUSES OF TERRORISM 8

6 INDIA’S COUNTERTERRORISM SETUP 9

7 INSURGENCY IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR 11

8 EVOLUTION OF COUNTER TERRORISM IN INDIA 14

9 COUNTER TERRORISM TECHNIQUES FOLLOWED BY INDIA 18

10 MODUS OPERANDI/CONCEPTS OF RELIGIOUS AND NON RELIGIOUS 22
TERRORIST GROUPS

11 CONCLUSION 25

12 BILIOGRAPHY 25

INDIA’S STRATEGY TO COUNTER TERRORISM 2

 Certificate

This is to Certify that the content of this project

entitled “India’s Strategy to Counter Terrorism” by
Manish Bhatia is the Bonafide work of him submitted
to Mrs. Rachna Yadav for consideration in partial
fulfilment of the requirement of the Technical
Communication Project, for the fulfilment of credits.

____________________
RACHNA YADAV

INDIA’S STRATEGY TO COUNTER TERRORISM 3

 Acknowledgement

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my

teacher Mrs. Rachna Yadav for providing her
invaluable guidance, comments and suggestions
throughout the course of this project without which,
completing this project would not have been an event
of existence. Lastly, I would like to thank my parents
and friends for motivating me to keep working hard in
the right direction to achieve this result!

________________________

MANISH BHATIA
2K17/ME/132

INDIA’S STRATEGY TO COUNTER TERRORISM 4

Abstract

India has been under the major effect of islamist extremism in the form of insurgency and
terrorism since India’s Independence in 1947 in different parts of the country. Terrorism has
been taken as an armed violent movement directed against the government as well as non-
government targets, involving pre-meditated attacks with arms, ammunition and explosives
against civilians, and resorting to intimidation tactics such as hostage-taking and hijacking, but
not seeking territorial control.

India exclusively has faced terrorist movements in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir Bordering
Pakistan, and part insurgent movements in the northeast, bordering Myanmar and Bangladesh;
in Bihar, bordering Nepal; and in certain interior states like Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh
and Orissa that do not have international borders.

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, India’s previously lonely struggle against terrorism has taken
place against the background of the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT). This report tells us
how India has has evolved its counterterrorism strategy in response to various attacks over the
years.

The GWOT has influenced Indian counterterrorism in important ways, although influence has
been subtle and enhanced rather than transformative. The GWOT has enhanced Indo-American
counterterrorism cooperation, shaped India’s terror environment by launching the war in
Afghanistan and enriched Indian Counterterrorism with the American Experience. Just as
important, it has also had an impact on India’s debate on counterterrorism, civil liberties and
human rights.

This report will provide an overview of the terrorism challenges that India faces. Subsequently,
it would examine the evolution of Indian counterterrorism and its institutional setup. This
report would not engage the complex but often unproductive discussion on how to define
terrorism and counterterrorism. A notoriously difficult and controversial task, the search for a
definition of terrorism has produced numerous bud widely divergent definitions, with the
historian Walter Lacquer coating more than one hundred definitions by 1999. Hence, for
practical purposes, we will define terrorism as violence perpetrated, threatened, or promoted by
non-state actors to attain political objectives, while counterterrorism is defined as the political,
intelligence or military activities designed to prevent terrorism or limit its destructive impact.

INDIA’S STRATEGY TO COUNTER TERRORISM 5

Islamist Terrorism in India

Islamist terrorism has posed a serious and increasingly multifaceted threat to India for the last
three decades. This threat first emerged in the late 1980s, when a Pakistan-supported
insurgency erupted in Kashmir. While this insurgency was partially motivated by local
grievances, it was soon over- taken by Pakistan-supported Islamist groups, manned by veterans
from the Afghan war, which infiltrated Kashmir and turned it into the main battle- ground
between Islamist terrorism and the Indian state.

In the meantime, in the early 1990s, India saw the emergence of a home- grown Islamist
terrorist threat outside Kashmir. At the backdrop of communal tensions between Hindus and
Muslims following the 1992 destruction of the Ayodhya mosque, Dawood Ibrahim, the Muslim
don of the D-Company mafia syndicate, organised the 1993 Mumbai blasts, with the likely
support of Pakistan.

India during the last three decades has faced various Islamist terrorist organisations, which can
be broadly divided into three large categories: Pakistan-based terrorist groups, homegrown
terrorist groups, and international terrorist organisations.

Pakistan-based terrorist groups have been the oldest and most lethal Islamist terror threat to
India. Based in Pakistan and benefitting from substantial ISI support, these groups aim to
overthrow Indian rule in Kashmir and unify it with Pakistan, although some also pursue a
broader Islamist agenda. However, with the improvement of India’s counterinsurgent
operations in Kashmir and the diminishing strategic returns of supporting the insurgency,
groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) have expanded their
operational zone beyond Kashmir to unleash terror in India’s heartland. The Jammu and
Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) was the first major Pakistan-based terror group, although due
to its support for Kashmir independence and nominally secular orientation ISI soon sidelined it
to make way for Islamist groups such as Hizbul- Mujahideen (HM).A highly centralised
organisation based in Pakistan but primarily staffed by Kashmiris, HM has run training camps
in Pakistan- administered Kashmir (PAK) and has boasted a large force under its command, as
many as 10 000 militants in the early 1990s. Arguably, the leading driver of violence in Jammu
and Kashmir since 1990, the group has recently attracted a following among radicalised
Kashmiri youths due to the efforts of its charismatic commander Burhan Wani, whose
assassination by Indian forces in 2016 provoked massive unrest in Kashmir.

In comparison to the Kashmir-focused HM, LeT and JeM operate on Indian territory both
inside and outside Kashmir. Founded in 1986 as an Islamist educational outfit involved in the
Afghanistan war, Lashkar-e-Taiba is a multifaceted Islamist organisation which has combined
jihad against India and the West with rigorous educational and charitable activities.

INDIA’S STRATEGY TO COUNTER TERRORISM 6

Often regarded as the most trusted of ISI’s terrorist proxies, LeT under its long-time leader
Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, operates a number of training facilities for militants and is believed to
be involved in the 2001 Indian Parliament attack (with JeM) and the 2008 Mumbai attacks
(with IM). A player on both the Indian and the global jihadi stage, LeT has close contacts with
a number of militant organisations, including al-Qaeda, the Haqqani network and the Indian
Mujahideen with which it has extensively cooperated. Jaish- e-Mohammad is yet another
Pakistan-based group which was founded, under ISI orders, by militants from an older Kashmir
Islamist group, Harkat ul-Mujahideen (HuM), freed after an Indian Airlines plane hijacking in
1999. Active in Kashmir, the Indian heartland, Afghanistan and even Pakistan itself, JeM is
known to cooperate closely with al-Qaeda, IM and LeT. It has been suspected of carrying a
number of attacks, including the 2001 Indian Parliament attacks (together with LeT), the Indian
consulate bombing in Mazar-e-Sahrif (2016), the Pathankot attack (2016) and the Uri attack
(2016), the last two likely aimed at blocking any potential improvement in Indo-Pakistani
relations.

Homegrown terrorist groups are the second type of terrorist organisation which threaten India’s
security. Usually motivated by grievance against the Indian state and India’s Hindus, these
groups threaten India with the rise of a potentially massive domestic jihadi movement. While
indigenously formed, such Islamist groups have received support, training and shelter both
from Pakistan’s ISIS and from Pakistani-based terrorist groups, such as LeT and JeM.The first
such group was the D-Company which orchestrated the 1993 Mumbai attacks and, after
moving to Pakistan, enabled its ISI backers to use its criminal network to recruit terrorists.The
Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) is another homegrown group which began as a
legitimate Muslim student organisation in Uttar Pradesh but gradually become radicalised and
turned to terrorism. A key recruitment source for the LeT, which had supported it since the
mid-1990s, SIMI has been massively reduced in recent years due to police action. An offshoot
of SIMI, Indian Mujahideen (IM) is viewed as the most dangerous domestic terrorist group in
India, at present. It has established a wide network across much of India and has benefitted
from extensive training by ISI and close contacts with the Bangladesh-based Harkat-ul-Jihad-
al-Islami (HUJI-Bangladesh), its parent organisation SIMI and with LeT, turning it into the key
domestic Indian terrorist organisation through which LeT and ISI have operated in India.IM has
been involved in the 2008 Jaipur bombing, the 2008 Ahmedabad bombing, the 2011 Mumbai
serial blasts and potentially the 2013 Hyderabad attack, among others.

The unprecedented variety, lethality and persistence of these groups testifies to the fact that
India faces a massive terrorist threat. In response, India has been evolving a specific approach
to counterterrorism and a complex institutional set-up to implement it.

INDIA’S STRATEGY TO COUNTER TERRORISM 7

Causes of Terrorism

The causes for the various insurgent/terrorist movements include Political, Economic, Ethnic
causes and last but not the least Religious causes. The maximum number of terrorist
incidents and deaths of innocent civilians have occurred due to religious terrorism. The local
terrorists or the foreign or foreign trained terrorists who infiltrate are generally involved in
the indiscriminate use of sophisticated Improvised Explosive Devices, suicide bombers, the
killing of civilians with hand-held weapons and resorting to methods such as hijacking,
hostage-taking, blowing up of aircraft through IEDs, etc. Religious as well as non-religious
terrorist groups draw moral support and material sustenance from the overseas Diaspora in
terms of Funding and safe Sanctuaries.

Funding

The main sources of funding for terrorist and insurgent groups are clandestine contributions
from Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, contributions from, fundamentalist jihadi
organisations in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, trans-national mafia groups, extortions and ransom
payments for releasing hostages, collections -- voluntary or forced -- from the people living
in the area where they operate and Narcotics smuggling.

Sanctuaries

Religious terrorist organisations have their main external sanctuaries in Pakistan and
Bangladesh, while non-religious terrorist organisations look to Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar.
Some northeast non-religious terrorist groups also operate from Bangladesh, while certain
religious groups get sanctuary in Nepal. Since 1956, Pakistan has been using its sponsorship
of and support to different terrorist groups operating in India as a strategic weapon to keep
India preoccupied with internal security problems.

INDIA’S STRATEGY TO COUNTER TERRORISM 8

India’s Counterterrorism Set-Up

Institutionally, India’s approach to counterterrorism has been embodied in a large but highly
fragmented institutional set-up which includes a number of central and state institutions with
overlapping responsibilities. As a result, India has many tools to fight terror but its
counterterrorism efforts have suffered from poor coordination, institutional rivalry, unclear
division of labour and inability to concentrate resources, resulting in the underfunding and
understaffing of institutions. The fits and starts evolution of Indian counterterrorism described
above is one major culprit for this situation. India’s federal constitution is another, as it
postulates that the maintenance of law and order, including terrorism, is the responsibility of
states. Hence, counterterrorism in India has been divided between national and state agencies.

India's counter-terrorism set-up consists of the following:

The State Police and its Intelligence Set-up: Under India's federal Constitution, the
responsibility for policing and maintenance of law and order is that of the individual states.
The central government only gives them advice, financial help, training and other assistance
to strengthen their professional capabilities and share with them the intelligence collected by
it.

The National Intelligence Community: This consists of the internal intelligence agency
(the ministry of home affairs' Intelligence Bureau), the external intelligence agency (the
Cabinet secretariat's Research and Analysis Wing), the Defence Intelligence Agency under
the intelligence directorates general of the armed forces.
The IB collects terrorism-related intelligence inside the country and RAW does it outside.
The DIA and the intelligence directorates general of the armed forces essentially collect
tactical intelligence during their counter-terrorism operations in areas.

Physical Security Agencies: These include the Central Industrial Security Force, responsible
for physical security at airports and sensitive establishments; the National Security Guards, a
specially trained intervention force to terminate terrorist situations such as hijacking,
hostage-taking, etc; and the Special Protection Group, responsible for the security of the
prime minister and former prime ministers.

INDIA’S STRATEGY TO COUNTER TERRORISM 9

Paramilitary Forces: These include the Central Reserve Police Force and the Border
Security Force, which assist the police in counter-terrorism operations when called upon to
do so.

The Army: Their assistance is sought as a last resort when the police and paramilitary forces
are not able to cope with a terrorist situation. But in view of Pakistan's large-scale infiltration
in Jammu and Kashmir, the army has a more active, permanent and leadership role in
counter-terrorism operations here.

Multi-disciplinary Centre: Headed by a senior IB officer, within the IB, is expected to be

patterned on the CIA's counter-terrorism centre. Officers of various agencies responsible for
intelligence collection and counter-terrorism operations work under a common umbrella and
be responsible for joint analysis of the intelligence flowing in from different agencies and
coordinated follow-up action.

Counter-terrorism Division: This is in the ministry of external affairs, likely to be patterned

after the counter-terrorism division of the US state department. It is responsible for co-
ordinating the diplomatic aspects of counter-terrorism, such as briefing other countries on
Pakistan's sponsorship of terrorism against India, processing requests for extradition and
mutual legal assistance, servicing the work of various joint working groups on counter-
terrorism which India has set up with a number of countries, etc.

Four major causes of India’s counterterrorism failures:

1) Lack of political consistency, which produces frequent ad hoc changes in counter-terror

measures.

2) Lack of political consensus in fighting terror, due to domestic or international resistance.

3) Lack of operational capacity as a result of insufficient funding and manpower.

4) Lack of operational coordination between the different state and national security services.

INDIA’S STRATEGY TO COUNTER TERRORISM 10

Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir

What Exactly Happened in 1947?

Jammu & Kashmir in the year 1947 was an independent country for all practical purposes.
The Maharaja who ruled the State had signed agreements with both Pakistan and India to
remain neutral and not be part of either country. India honoured that agreement but Pakistan
did not. Pakistani raiders and soldiers attacked the state in 1947 forcing the Maharaja to flee
to India. The Maharaja asked India to help his people who were being killed and looted by
the Pakistani raiders. He also agreed to make Jammu & Kashmir part of India. The Indian
ruler at that time was Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. He accepted Jammu & Kashmir's
accession to India and agreed to rescue his people from the Pakistani attackers. Indian troops
were flown into the Kashmir Valley and they managed to drive away most of the Pakistani
raiders from the state. But a large area of the state remained under the control of Pakistani
soldiers. These areas were difficult to reach because they were surrounded by tall mountain
ranges. Also, India wanted to stop the fighting. The fighting ended with Pakistan retaining
control of a large area of the state but India keeping a larger part.

How did the Fighting End?

The fighting ended in the beginning of 1949 because India did not want the war to drag on.
India felt that other influential countries like the US and Britain would ask Pakistan to stop
fighting and withdraw its soldiers from a State that had legally become part of India. India
therefore went to the world body called the United Nations, or UN for short. India said that
Pakistan had attacked a neutral State and that State had now become part of India. Therefore,
Pakistan should withdraw its soldiers from the State.

The United Nations agreed with the Indian demand and asked Pakistan to withdraw its forces
from Jammu & Kashmir. It also told India to ask the people of Jammu & Kashmir whether
they wanted to be part of India or part of Pakistan. This was because some people in the State
wanted to join Pakistan while others wanted to stay with India. The Prime Minister of India
agreed to ask the people what they wanted through a process known as a referendum or
plebiscite. Pakistan did not agree and refused to vacate the areas of Jammu & Kashmir it had
forcibly grabbed. Because of this a plebiscite could not be held. Powerful countries like the
US and Britain did not force Pakistan to withdraw its troops from Kashmir. They simply
termed the entire State as a ‘Disputed Territory’.

INDIA’S STRATEGY TO COUNTER TERRORISM 11

Why is Jammu and Kashmir termed “Disputed Territory”?
This was done essentially because both India and Pakistan claimed the state of Jammu &
Kashmir. The big powers, like the US and Britain, did not want to take sides and might have
felt that it would be best if the problem of the state could be settled between India and
Pakistan. India wants to settle the problems once and for all. But Pakistan will only accept a
solution under which it can keep the Kashmir Valley to itself. India cannot allow this.
Therefore, the so-called "dispute" continues to this day.

Legal Position of Kashmir

Legally, Jammu & Kashmir is an integral and inseparable part of India. The British had ruled
India as one undivided country made up of many provinces and princely states. When they
left, India was partitioned into two separate countries. The new country, as mentioned earlier,
was called Pakistan. The British as well as the leaders of both India and Pakistan had agreed
to one basic principle - every inch of land must go either to India or to Pakistan. In other
words, people living in India before the partition of 1947, had only two options: they could
either join Pakistan or they could join India. They could not remain independent. 

Jammu & Kashmir was actually an exception. The Maharaja of the State had wanted time to
decide whether he should join Pakistan or join India. But the rulers of Pakistan did not want
to give him the opportunity to decide and instead attacked his state, killing hundreds of
people and causing extensive damage to property. The Pakistani action forced the Maharaja
to join India.

Was the Maharaja’s Decision Legal?

It was absolutely legal. According to the agreement on which the partition of India was
based, the rulers of princely states, like Jammu & Kashmir, had the absolute right to decide
whether they wanted to join Pakistan or India. There was never any question of holding a
referendum or a plebiscite. All the same, the then Prime Minister of India, Pundit Jawaharlal
Nehru, agreed to hold a plebiscite because he was a democrat and wanted to find out what
the people of the state of Jammu & Kashmir wanted.

Why was the plebiscite not held?

The plebiscite was not held because Pakistan refused to vacate the large parts of Jammu &
Kashmir that had been occupied by its soldiers. The plebiscite was meant for all the people
of the state of Jammu & Kashmir and not just for those who lived in the Kashmir Valley. But
the Pakistanis felt that the parts of the state they had captured was theirs and would not part
with it. Pakistan defied the agreement reached by the world body called the United Nations
and refused to vacate its troops. The powerful countries of the world did nothing to ensure

INDIA’S STRATEGY TO COUNTER TERRORISM 12

that Pakistan honoured the UN Resolutions on Jammu & Kashmir. India could not therefore
hold a plebiscite.

Why is Kashmir in Turmoil?

This is because a section of leaders belonging to the Kashmir Valley want to break away
from India. Some of them want to form a separate country while others want to join Pakistan.
Making such demands is against the law. The Indian government has been forced to arrest
some of these leaders and put them in prison. Most of them have later been released.

Some of them, however, decided to become terrorists and started to kill people in the
Kashmir Valley and in other parts of the state. To protect the lives of people and to counter
these terrorists, the Indian government posted soldiers in the Kashmir Valley. The terrorists
then started killing these soldiers as well. The soldiers started fighting back and for all
practical purposes, the Kashmir Valley became a battlefield. Indian soldiers have killed many
terrorists but some remain to this day and continue to frighten the people of Jammu &
Kashmir.

How do Kashmiri terrorists dare take on Indian Soldiers?

Kashmiris are basically a proud people. The younger generation also showed that they are a
brave people. When their elders and intellectual leaders told them about the glorious victories
of Islam and how India had reneged on its promise for a plebiscite, the Kashmiri youth felt
they had to take up the gun against the Indian security forces.

This happened because some leaders in the Kashmiri Valley, who were unhappy about the
fact that they could not rule, decided that they would force the Indian government to leave
the Valley. These leaders knew they could not fight the Indian government by themselves. So
they went to Pakistan. There, the Pakistani leaders assured them all help because the
Pakistanis felt that if India was forced to give up the Kashmir Valley, then they would grab it
for themselves. They decided to help the Kashmiri leaders who wanted to separate from
India.

The Pakistanis trained Kashmiri youth to fight, set off bombs and carry out assassinations.
They also gave them money and weapons of all kinds. These Kashmiri youth went back to
the Valley and started a reign of terror in 1989. They became known freedom fighters as first
and then later as terrorists. Now most Kashmiri youths are disillusioned and have stopped
fighting but are still called terrorists, when actually those fighting are mainly from Pakistan
Occupied Kashmir, Pakistan and Afghanistan. These people are also looting Kashmiris and
indulging in forced adulterous relations with many Kashmiri women.

INDIA’S STRATEGY TO COUNTER TERRORISM 13

Evolution of Counter Terrorism in India

India’s response to the threat of terrorism in the last 30 years has been regularly criticised as
reactive, piecemeal and poorly organised. Indeed, New Delhi has often hastily adopted
counterterrorism polices in reaction to major attacks only to see them gradually wither away.
Also, as described in the previous section, the diversity of the Islamist terrorist groups India has
faced has made it very difficult to develop a unified counterterrorism approach. Nevertheless,
in response to a series of spectacular attacks, particularly the 2001 Indian Parliament attack and
the 2008 Mumbai attacks (also known as 26/11), India has gradually developed a more
comprehensive approach to counterterrorism, more as a product of evolution than of any
thought-through strategy. The resulting approach, albeit still slowly evolving in response to
events and underdeveloped, can be described as relatively localised (i.e., limited primarily to
India’s borders), law enforcement counter- terrorism strategy which emphasises defence. As
the following overview demonstrates, the evolution of this approach has been primarily driven
by the Indian response to terrorist attacks and not by the GWOT. Nevertheless, as this paper
elaborates later, the GWOT has influenced the evolution of Indian counterterrorism in indirect
but important ways.

In the 1990s, India faced divergent terrorist threats in Punjab, the Northeast, Kashmir, and
Mumbai, which inevitably produced counterterrorist strategies tailor-made to counter each of
them and, hence, prevented the emergence of a unified Indian approach to counterterrorism.
Hence, Indian counterterrorism in the 1990s was poorly coordinated and often piecemeal, with
the major exception of Kashmir.

In Kashmir the thinking about terrorism was dominated by a dual approach based on
counterinsurgency and political process. The counter- insurgent element of this strategy relied,
on one hand, on overwhelming military domination of the affected areas which aimed to stop
infiltration and eliminate insurgents and, one the other, on a “hearts and mind” policy which
sought to win the support of the local population through operations such as “Op Sadhbhavana”
and through lavish government spending.

However, as India’s prevailing thinking on counterinsurgency held that the military cannot
address the insurgent threat without a political solution, Delhi sought to offer a political process
in Kashmir which would allow the Muslim population to express its political concerns. In this
spirit, Delhi promised maximum autonomy to Kashmir, a promise which enabled assembly
elections in the restive state in 1996. The Indian government also negotiated with some
insurgents on ceasefire terms and on conducting peace talks, and even sought to engage with
Pakistan in 1999 and 2001.

INDIA’S STRATEGY TO COUNTER TERRORISM 1

Outside Kashmir in the 1990s, India did not formulate a clear counter- terrorism strategy but
responded with haphazard measures which mostly emphasised law enforcement. This approach
reflected the fact that the terrorism India faced at the time was sporadic and often reflected
communal tensions between Hindus and Muslims which could not be addressed by
counterterrorism. The 1993 Mumbai bombings proved to be a key event for Indian
counterterrorism in the 1990s. The attacks prompted measures such as joint coastal patrols by
Maharashtra and Gujarat to prevent arms smuggling by the D-Company, attempts to organise a
coastal security system and efforts to stop infiltration through India’s borders. The attacks also
led to a drive to improve information sharing between intelligence services and state police
forces and to a massive crackdown on ISI agents and militants which yielded valuable
intelligence that India used to prevent pre-planned attacks. Just as important, India sought the
assistance of foreign intelligence and security agencies in identifying the Pakistani connection
in the attack, in the hope of putting international pressure on Islamabad, with little success.

Nevertheless, as there was little institutional or doctrinal change, the post- 1993
counterterrorism drive soon lost its momentum. For the rest of the 1990s, India primarily relied
on local law enforcement forces in its fight against terrorism and did not fundamentally change
its counterterrorism approach in spite of terrorist incidents such the 1998 Coimbatore bombings
and the 1999 Indian Airlines hijacking.

The year 2001 marked the beginning of a new period in the evolution of Indian
counterterrorism. The 2001 Indian Parliament attack profoundly shook India and inaugurated a
series of massive assaults on India’s heartland, such as the 2005 Delhi attacks, the 2006
Mumbai train bombings and the 2008 Mumbai attacks. The 9/11 terrorist attacks also shocked
India and seriously affected its fight against terror, a topic discussed later. This massive
upsurge in terrorism prompted Delhi to initiate major reforms in all aspects of its
counterterrorism. The only major exception was Kashmir, where the existing
counterinsurgency strategy largely continued with an added emphasis on wining the support of
the local population, emphasis codified in official doctrine in 2004 and 2006.

The shocking 2001 Indian Parliament attack convinced India that it needs to reform its
counterterrorism apparatus. The result was the adoption of the Prevention of Terrorism Act
(POTA), a relatively tough terrorism law which was repealed in 2004, as well as a renewed but
unsuccessful push to found a Multi-Agency Centre to combat terrorism. Delhi also hastened to
implement many of the intelligence recommendations made after the Kargil War (1999),
including the establishment of a Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) which gathers intelligence
on Kashmir insurgents, among other tasks. Even more important, following the 2001/2002
Indo-Pakistani standoff prompted by the Parliament attack, India became better aware of the
limits of its ability to coerce Pakistan militarily in response to terrorist attacks and the risks and
costs of conflict with its nuclear-armed rival. These lessons have constrained India’s response

INDIA’S STRATEGY TO COUNTER TERRORISM 15

to terrorism ever since and have shaped Delhi’s adoption of a law-and-order approach to
counterterrorism instead of a military one. Similarly, Delhi’s discovery of the limits of US
pressure on Pakistan, Washington forced Islamabad to ban JeM and LeT but was unable to
force their dismantling, convinced India again that a diplomatic, international strategy of
addressing terrorism is unfeasible.

The 26/11attacks, a series of “comprehensive failures from the point of view of India’s security
establishment,” which had clues about the impeding attack but did not act on them, had even
deeper impact on Indian counter- terrorism. The attacks and the shambolic response of the
authorities spectacularly revealed the intelligence, coordination and operational weaknesses of
Indian counterterrorism and prompted a series of reforms. Institutionally, Delhi decided to
establish a National Investigation Agency (NIA) to investigate terrorism, a National Counter
Terrorism Center (NCTC) to lead its counterterrorism efforts, and a National Intelligence Grid
to coordinate intelligence sharing, although of these three only NIA has materialised at the time
of this writing. Legislatively, India added a special terrorism amendment to the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), which incorporated the tougher elements of the repealed
POTA, and passed the Central Industrial Security Force (Amendment) Bill 2008, which
enabled the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) to provide security to private industrial
establishments. Operationally, Delhi set up four regional special forces hubs, in Kolkata,
Hyderabad, Chennai, and Mumbai, in order to respond faster to terrorist attacks.

India made plans to expand its coastal security infrastructure and improve its surveillance
capabilities in cities and on key sites, plans that were implemented slowly and partially.
Whereas the effort to improve Indian counterterrorism after 26/11 initially gained momentum,
it gradually petered out and reforms stalled. Since 2009, there has been little change in India’s
approach to counterterrorism, although Delhi’s response to the Uri attack in 2016 and hints that
the NCTC might be revived suggest that changes might be under way.

The key conclusion from the aforementioned overview is that India’s approach to
counterterrorism has emerged in response to large terrorist attacks and, crucially, the GWOT
has played little role in its development.

The war model and reconciliatory models do not fit well with Indian counterterrorism. The war
model, adopted by the US in the GWOT, clearly does not apply to Indian counterterrorism, as
Delhi does not fight terrorists militarily outside the Kashmir and has refrained from carrying
even surgical strikes against them, with the recent exception of the strikes that followed the Uri
attacks. India has not adopted the war model for three reasons. First, Delhi still lacks the
military and surveillance capabilities to use military force to effectively fight terrorism, as the
American superpower does. Second, as Pakistan hosts many of the terrorist groups which target
India, the use of military force against terrorists on Pakistani territory can easily escalate into a

INDIA’S STRATEGY TO COUNTER TERRORISM 16

larger war that might involve nuclear tensions. Finally, as much of Indian terrorism is domestic,
military action against terrorists might easily lead to large civilian casualties and domestic
political tensions. Similarly, the reconciliatory model hardly describes Indian counterterrorism.
Whereas India has negotiated with insurgents in Kashmir and in the Northeast and struck a deal
with Islamist hijackers in 1999, it has refrained from renouncing its struggle with Islamist
terrorists and switching to a policy of reconciliation with them. The main reason is that Islamist
terrorists either have unacceptable demands, such as Kashmir’s secession from India, or are
motivated by the sheer desire to harm India, often at Pakistan’s behest.

In short, New Delhi’s approach to fighting terror can be generally described as defensive, law-
and-order based and localised, that is, limited to India’s homeland. The last point is self-
evident, as Delhi has not regularly engaged in counterterrorism beyond its borders, as the US
has systemically done.

INDIA’S STRATEGY TO COUNTER TERRORISM 17

Counter-Terrorism Techniques Followed By India

The following techniques are being stressed upon by India:

Good Grievances Detection, Monitoring and Redressal Machinery: This is important so

that the build-up of grievances in any community is detected in time and the political
leadership alerted and advised to take prompt action to redress them. The intelligence
agencies have an important role to play as the eyes and ears of the government in different
communities to detect feelings of anger and alienation which need immediate attention.
Good, Preventive Human intelligence: This is easier said than done because of the
difficulties in penetrating terrorist organisations, particularly of the religious kind.
Timely Technical Intelligence: This is generally more precise than human intelligence.

Objective and Balanced Analysis: To avoid over-assessing the strength and capabilities of the
terrorists, which could lead to over-reaction by counter-terrorism agencies, thereby aggravating
the feeling of alienation within the affected community, driving more people into the arms of
terrorists, such analysis is particularly difficult in the case of human intelligence.

Prompt and Coordinated Follow-up Action: It assumes importance on well-assessed

intelligence from all agencies, without allowing inter-agency jealousies and rivalries to come
in the way.
Effective Physical Security: Measures are taken so that even if intelligence fails, security

agencies are able to prevent acts of terrorism.

Effective Crisis Management Apparatus: If both intelligence and physical security
measures fail, one is able to deal effectively with the resulting crisis or disaster.
Good Investigative Machinery: Individuals specially trained to investigate terrorism-related
cases.

Not Over-Projecting the Personality and Capabilities of Terrorist Leaders: This is to

ensure that terrorists do not become objects of idolisation in their community.
Constantly Underlining to the Public: Just because some people of a particular community
or religion have taken to terrorism, the entire community or religion should not be looked
upon with suspicion.

INDIA’S STRATEGY TO COUNTER TERRORISM 18

Highlighting the Positive Aspects of the Affected Community or religion: This is to
prevent the build-up of a negative image of the community or religion in the eyes of the
public.

Active Interaction with the Media: To ensure that press does not not make terrorist leaders
appear like heroes or prejudice the minds of the public about the affected community or
religion or create problems for effective counter-terrorism operations.

Well-Designed Psychological War Operations: To project the terrorists for what they are -
irrational killers and make aware the people of their nefarious designs so that they do not
support the so called ‘cause’ for which terrorists boast about.

Observing Human Rights: This is importance to avoid alienation of the public against the
security agencies during counter-terrorism operations.
Training: The importance of periodic refresher training of all those involved in counter-
terrorism operations through special classes, seminars, opportunities for interaction with
those who have distinguished themselves in counter-terrorism operations, can not be
overemphasised.

Intelligence-sharing with other countries:

Even before 9/11, arrangements for intelligence-sharing on terrorism amongst the agencies of
different countries existed. 9/11 brought the realisation that terrorism is an absolute evil
whatever be the cause and that unless the intelligence agencies of the world network
themselves as effectively as the terrorist organisations, they might not be able to eradicate
this menace. This has improved intelligence-sharing.
India's success in bringing Sikh terrorism in Punjab under control before 9/11 might not have
been possible but for the valuable intelligence inputs received from agencies of many
countries. Some of the significant successes in different countries against Al Qaeda were
apparently possible due to increased intelligence-sharing without reservations.
While this is welcome, one has to remember that political considerations peculiar to each
country influence their perceptions of terrorism and this is bound to have an effect on
intelligence-sharing. Hence, while continuing to benefit from increased intelligence-sharing,
the important task of strengthening one's national intelligence collection capability should
not be neglected.
Regional cooperation in South Asia:
Regional cooperation in the battle against terrorism has not been as successful in south Asia
as it has been in the southeast Asian region. This is largely because of Pakistan's policy of

INDIA’S STRATEGY TO COUNTER TERRORISM 19

using terrorism as a weapon to keep the Indian security forces bleeding and pre-occupied
with internal security duties and Bangladesh's tolerance of the activities of terrorists from its
territory. Unless these two countries realise the folly of their policies and actions, which have
made their own territories playgrounds for terrorist groups of different hues and
irrationalities, there is very little scope for any meaningful co-operation.
India has been facing the problem of Pakistani state-sponsored terrorism for over 40 years
and nearly 40,000 civilians and 3,500 members of the various security forces have been
killed. This has not prevented India from becoming self-sufficient in agriculture, emerging as
a major manufacturing country, developing educational, particularly technological,
institutions of excellence the like of which no other Asian country can boast of, becoming the
leading information technology software power of the region, and building up a foreign
exchange reserve of US $72 billion, which, at this rate, should cross the US $100 billion
mark in a couple of years.
India can continue to fight Pakistan-sponsored terrorism for another 40 years and yet move
forward on its path of development as a major power in the region. Pakistan, on the other
hand, has not had the required funds for educational and social development and for the
economic advancement of its people because of its obsessive urge to keep India bleeding
through terrorism. In its attempt to lift a big boulder and throw it at India, it is dropping it on
its own feet.

What are the results already achieved by India through its counter-terrorism policies
and techniques?
There is peace in Nagaland with a duly elected government promoting the economic
development of the state. Only a small group of Nagas from the bordering areas of Manipur
has not yet given up arms, but it is observing a ceasefire and negotiating with the
government.
There has been peace in Mizoram for nearly 20 years now.
There has been peace in Punjab since 1995. However, Pakistan has not yet given up its
efforts to re-kindle terrorism in Punjab through some terrorist leaders and hijackers given
sanctuary in its territory.
The Ananda Marg has been dormant since 1995.
As the economic and social development of the states affected by Maoist terrorism moves
forward, these groups are bound to wither away.
In J&K, the opposition has come to power after last September's election and is trying to
reduce the alienation of the people and deal effectively with the Pakistani jihadis.

INDIA’S STRATEGY TO COUNTER TERRORISM 20

The Indian Muslim community, despite feeling hurt because of the large-scale anti-Muslim
violence in Gujarat last year, has remained fiercely loyal, law-abiding and forward-looking.
It has kept its distance from Al Qaeda and the IIF and repulsed the approaches of Pakistani
jihadi organisations aligned with Al Qaeda.
Southeast Asian countries have been increasingly affected by pan-Islamic jihadi terrorism
spawned in madrasas and training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Cadres of the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front and Abu Sayaaf of the southern Philippines had fought along with
Pakistani jihadi and Afghan mujahideen groups against Soviet troops in Afghanistan in the
1980s. The links built then have been sustained.
Pakistan's HuM, which is a member of Osama bin Laden's IIF, has been training the Abu
Sayaaf group and providing it with arms and ammunition. HuM leaders claim that many of
its cadres fought against Filipino security forces along with Abu Sayaaf, achieved
'martyrdom' and are buried there. In 1998, Abu Sayaaf became a member of bin Laden's IIF.
The Jemmah Islamiyah, which has been co-ordinating pan-Islamic jihadi activities in
southeast Asia, is sought to be patterned after the IIF. It is believed to have many cadres of
Afghan jihad vintage in its ranks and leadership.
Last year, the total number of students from southeast Asia studying in Pakistan's pan-
Islamic madrasas was estimated at 400. Some of them had gone to Afghanistan and fought
against American troops in order to get jihadi experience.
The Pakistan branch of the Tablighi Jamaat is very active in southeast Asia. It ostensibly
teaches the Muslims of the region to be better Muslims, but actually acts as the front
organisation for IIF jihadi members for recruiting local volunteers for training and funnelling
financial and other assistance.
India has a good database on these organisations and their activities and valuable experience
in dealing with them. Close interaction between the counter-terrorism agencies of India and
countries of the southeast Asian region would, therefore, be of mutual benefit.

INDIA’S STRATEGY TO COUNTER TERRORISM 21

Modus Operandi/ Concepts Of Religious And Non-
Religious Terrorist Groups

Suicide Terrorism
Non-religious terrorist groups in India do not believe in suicide terrorism, but the LTTE
does. Of the religious terrorist groups, the Sikhs did not believe in suicide terrorism. The
indigenous terrorist groups in J&K do not believe in suicide terrorism either; it is a unique
characteristic of Pakistan's pan-Islamic jihadi groups operating in J&K and other parts of
India. They too did not believe in suicide terrorism before 1998; in fact, there was no suicide
terrorism in J&K before 1999. They started resorting to it only after they joined Osama bin
Laden's International Islamic Front in 1998. Since then, there have been 46 incidents of
suicide terrorism, of which 44 were carried out by bin Laden's Pakistani supporters
belonging to these organisations.

Hijacking and Blowing up of Aircraft

Non-religious terrorist groups in India have not resorted to hijacking and blowing up of
aircraft. Of the religious terrorists, the Sikh groups were responsible for five hijackings, the
indigenous JKLF for one and the Pakistani jihadi group, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (which is
a member of the IIF), for one. The Babbar Khalsa, a Sikh terrorist group, blew up Air India's
Kanishka aircraft off the Irish coast on June 23, 1985, killing nearly 200 passengers and
made an unsuccessful attempt the same day to blow up another Air India plane at Tokyo. The
IED there exploded prematurely on the ground. The Kashmiri and the Pakistani jihadi groups
have not tried to blow up any passenger plane while on flight. However, the JKLF had blown
up an Indian Airlines aircraft, which it had hijacked to Lahore in 1971, after asking the
passengers and crew to disembark.

Kidnapping /Hostages
All terrorist groups -- religious as well as non-religious -- have resorted to kidnapping
hostages for ransom and for achieving other demands. The non-religious terrorist groups
have targeted only Indians, whereas the religious terrorist groups target Indians as well as
foreigners. The Khalistan Commando Force, a Sikh terrorist group, kidnapped a Romanian
diplomat in New Delhi in 1991. The JKLF kidnapped some Israeli tourists in J&K in 1992.
HUM, under the name Al Faran, kidnapped five Western tourists in 1995 and is believed to
have killed four of them. An American managed to escape. Sheikh Omar, presently on trial
for the kidnap and murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl in Karachi in January last

INDIA’S STRATEGY TO COUNTER TERRORISM 22

year, had earlier kidnapped some Western tourists near Delhi. They were subsequently freed
by the police.

Terrorism Outside Indian Territory

Non-religious terrorist groups in India have not carried out any act of terrorism outside
Indian territory. Of the religious terrorist groups, a Sikh organisation blew up an Air India
plane off the Irish coast and unsuccessfully tried to blow up another plane at Tokyo the same
day, plotted to kill then prime minister Rajiv Gandhi during his visit to the US in June 1985
(the plot was foiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation), attacked the Indian ambassador
in Bucharest, Romania, in October 1991, and carried out a number of attacks on pro-
government members of the Sikh diaspora abroad. The JKLF kidnapped and killed an Indian
diplomat in Birmingham, England, in 1984.

Use Of Weapons Of Mass Destruction

None of the non-religious terrorist groups advocate the acquisition and use of Weapons of
Mass Destruction. Of the religious groups, the Sikh and the indigenous Kashmiri terrorist
groups did/do not advocate the acquisition and use of WMD. However, the Pakistani pan-
Islamic groups, which are members of the IIF and which operate in J&K, support bin Laden's
advocacy of the right and religious obligation of Muslims to acquire and use WMD to protect
their religion, if necessary.

Holy Book as Justification

The Sikh terrorist groups did not cite their holy book as justification for their acts of
terrorism, but the indigenous Kashmiri groups as well as the Pakistani jihadi groups
operating in India cite the holy Koran as justification for their jihad against the government
of India and the Hindus.

Scope of Objective
The Sikh and the indigenous Kashmiri groups projected/project their objective as confined to
their respective state, but the Pakistani pan-Islamic terrorist groups project their aim as
extending to the whole of South Asia -- namely the ‘liberation' of Muslims in India and the
ultimate formation of an Islamic Caliphate consisting of the ‘Muslim homelands' of India and
Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

INDIA’S STRATEGY TO COUNTER TERRORISM 2

Grounds for Independent State
The Sikh terrorist groups demanded an independent nation on the ground that Sikhs
constituted a separate community and could not progress as fast as they wanted to in a
Hindu-dominated country. They did not deride Hinduism and other non-Sikh religions. Nor
did they call for the eradication of Hindu influences from their religion. The indigenous
Kashmiri organisations, too, follow a similar policy. But the Pakistani pan-Islamic jihadi
organisations ridicule and condemn Hinduism and other religions and call for the eradication
of what they describe as the corrupting influence of Hinduism on Islam as practised in South
Asia.

Belief in Parliamentary Democracy

The Sikh and indigenous Kashmiri terrorist organisations believed/believe in Western-style
parliamentary democracy. The Pakistani jihadi organisations project Western-style
parliamentary democracy as anti-Islam since it believes sovereignty vests in people and not
in God.

External Links
Religious as well as non-religious terrorist groups have external links with like-minded
terrorist groups in other countries. Examples: The link between the Marxist groups of India
with Maoist groups of Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh; the link between the indigenous
Kashmiri organisations with the religious, fundamentalist and jihadi organisations of
Pakistan; the link between organisations such as the Students Islamic Movement of India
with jihadi elements in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia; and the link between the Pakistani pan-
Islamic jihadi organisations operating in India with bin Laden's Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

INDIA’S STRATEGY TO COUNTER TERRORISM 24

Conclusion

Terrorists and states sponsoring them have long understood, though, that even limited levels
of violence can transform the world. Terrorism, Islamist or otherwise, can usefully be
understood as a form of theatre, a performance staged for those who watch the spectacle
unfold. To see low-level acts of terrorism in Bangalore, Hyderabad or New Delhi as trivial
acts of violence is to miss their point. It may prove to be in Lashker’s views, the decisive
moment when the jehad is transformed into a general communal war that will tear India
apart. No great imagination is needed to see that this is no fantasy and corrective stringent
timely actions need to be taken to save India from the clutches of these prolonged bleeding
actions by the adversaries.

Bibliography

• www.google.com
• www.wikipedia.org
• usembassy.gov
• www.tandfonline.com
• researchgate.com
• doi.org
• ADGPI Indian Army

INDIA’S STRATEGY TO COUNTER TERRORISM 25