Art 9 Two-Party System - Jou - 2010

PA RT Y P O L I T I C S V O L 1 6 . N o . 3 pp.
370–393
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TOWARD A TWO-PARTY SYSTEM OR

TWO PARTY SYSTEMS?
Patterns of Competition in Japan’s Single-Member
Districts, 1996–2005
Willy Jou
ABSTRACT
This article examines whether electoral reform in Japan replacing a single

non-transferable vote (SNTV) system with a parallel mixed system has
led to two-party competition in single-member districts (SMDs) in House
of Representative elections from 1996 to 2005. While nationwide figures
suggest declining numbers of effective candidates and losers, distin-
guishing SMDs by levels of urbanization reveals that this trend is largely
limited to urban areas. Instead of converging toward a two-party system
as many proponents of electoral reforms had anticipated, elections under
the SMD portion of the new system have witnessed the emergence and
continuation of two distinct patterns of competition: urban constitu-
encies featuring contests between two major parties, and rural con-
stituencies dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The
persistence of the latter pattern diminishes the prospect of power alter-
nation.
KEY WORDS bipolar competition electoral reform Japan single-member

districts urban-rural differences
Introduction
According to Pempel (1990): ‘The ability of citizens to change their govern-

ment is taken as a major hallmark of democracy. But when governments seem
not to change, how genuine is a country’s democracy?’ One of the main objec-
tives of electoral reform in Japan was to facilitate this outcome through the
creation of two parties capable of alternating in government. Four elections1
later, analyses and debates on progress toward this goal (or the lack thereof)
continue to command the attention of scholars and practitioners alike. Why
1354-0688[DOI: 10.1177/1354068809342991]
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J O U : T W O - PA RT Y S Y S T E M O R T W O PA RT Y S Y S T E M S ?
has the expected causal relationship leading from electoral reform to a two-
party system, and in turn to power alternation, not materialized? This
article examines patterns of competition in single-member districts (SMDs)
where election outcomes are determined, and finds that while the patterns
in urban districts have consistently moved toward the anticipated equilib-
rium, the absence of similar movement in rural districts constitutes a major
obstacle to any alternation of power.2 These diverging developments
between urban and rural areas underscore the limits of altering electoral rules
to fashion party system change, and call for additional explanations of
continuing single-party dominance.
The article begins with a literature review on the expected consequences
of Japan’s electoral reform, specifically its effects on the number of parties.
Section two investigates whether two-party competition in SMDs is becoming
the norm nationally under the new electoral system, while section three
applies the same measures separately to rural, mixed and urban districts.
The national perspective appears to indicate movement toward a two-party
system, but a closer view of districts classified according to levels of urban-
ization raises reservations about such a conclusion. Section four explores
reasons for Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) dominance in rural areas and
competitiveness in urban districts, and probes factors such as malappor-
tionment as explanations for the party’s longevity in power. The concluding
section offers some comments on prospects of government alternation and
the comparability between elections for upper and lower chambers of
parliament.
Electoral Reform
Japan used a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system for parliamentary

elections from 1947 to 1993, under which voters cast one vote in districts
represented by two to six Diet members.3 Parties seeking a majority must
nominate multiple candidates in each district, leading to intra-party compe-
tition as candidates unable to campaign on party labels resorted to cultivat-
ing a personal vote (Carey and Shugart, 1995), mainly through constituency
service and the establishment of personal support organizations (koenkai)
(Curtis, 1971; Thayer, 1969). The electoral system was widely blamed for
fostering ‘issue-free elections, political corruption, and one-party dominance’
(Reed, 2005: 279).
After a series of corruption scandals involving top-ranking politicians in
the LDP – which held the reins of government from its formation in 1955
until 1993 – some members of the party seized on widespread demands for
political reform and defected (Cox and Rosenbluth, 1995; Otake, 1996;
Wolfe, 1995), establishing two new parties4 which, after the 1993 election,
joined all other opposition parties bar the Communists to form the first non-
LDP government in 38 years under Hosokawa Morihiro. With few goals in
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common except excluding the LDP from power, this seven-party coalition
fell within a year – but not before enacting far-reaching reforms of the elec-
toral system after reaching a compromise with the LDP5 (see Christensen,
1994; Kawato, 2000; Shiratori, 1995).
The new parallel mixed electoral system6 consists of 300 SMDs and 200
(later reduced to 180) seats allocated through proportional representation
(PR).7 Parties may nominate candidates to both tiers simultaneously, and these
‘dual candidates’ may be ranked equally on the PR list. If they lose in their
SMD races, the position of an equally ranked candidate on the PR list is deter-
mined by the ratio of her SMD vote to the SMD winners’ vote (sekihairitsu).
In other words, equally ranked dual candidates who come closest to winning
their SMDs have a better chance of gaining seats through the PR tier.
Anticipated Consequences of Electoral Reform
According to Duverger (1954), ‘the simple-majority single-ballot system

favors the two party system’, adding that this proposition ‘approaches most
nearly perhaps to a true sociological law’. However, according to Herron
and Nishikawa (2001), the juxtaposition of SMD and PR seats means that
this causal relationship would be mitigated because its mechanical effect
would be ‘less punishing to marginal parties than the mechanical effect in
standard SMD systems with a plurality rule’. The linkage between the two
tiers of the electoral system alters the incentive of small parties so that they
may continue to run in SMDs regardless of their chances of winning, because
they can gain more PR votes in districts where they field SMD candidates
(Mizusaki and Mori, 1998).8
Reed and Thies (2001) point out that these dual candidacies ‘work against
the psychological factor in Duverger’s Law’, since voters who support small
parties retain an incentive to vote sincerely rather than strategically to
make their preferred candidates ‘better losers’. Cox and Schoppa (2002) cite
examples from the 2000 election as evidence that, by encouraging small
parties to put up dual candidates, this provision has the effect of raising the
equilibrium for the number of parties per district above two.9 However,
weighing small parties’ conflicting incentives, Reed (2002) predicts that
‘the PR tier will not be able to rescue many, if any, small parties from the
powerful incentives toward two-candidate competition in the single-member
districts’.10
Taking these complexities into consideration, would one expect the emer-
gence of two-party competition, pitting the government against a united
opposition, as a result of electoral reform? Herron and Nishikawa (2001)
argue that ‘we would not expect the number of parties in the mixed system
to approach two due to contamination effects’, and Shiratori (1995) predicts
that while SMDs would accelerate bipolar competition, the influence of the
PR tier could create a moderate multiparty system. Thies (2002a) concurs
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with this assessment, adding that ‘the system should continue to produce
two large parties and a few small ones’. Similarly, Kohno (1997) predicts
that ‘Duverger’s law is not going to work and a two-party system is unlikely
to emerge’ due to voters’ ability to split their votes, and that future govern-
ments are likely to be coalitions with small parties playing crucial roles in
forming parliamentary majorities. McKean and Scheiner (2000) specifically
forecast ‘three conservative-to-centrist parties’ as well as the continued
viability of the Japan Communist Party (JCP).
An alternative view is exemplified by Curtis’s (1999) caveat that electoral
reform may not lead to much change at all: ‘it is conceivable that the new
electoral system will reinforce the unity and the electoral strength of the
LDP while leaving its opposition weak and divided’. In other words, insti-
tutional changes would either leave the fundamentals of a dominant party
system unaltered, or even generate incentives unforeseen by, and operating
contrary to the intentions of, advocates of electoral reform. Analysis below
of LDP vote and seat distributions will show whether a dominant party
system persists in both electoral and parliamentary dimensions.
Turning to the narrower question of whether two-party competition would
be the norm at least in SMDs, there is still little consensus. Presenting data
from Germany, Cox and Schoppa (2002) demonstrate that the effective
number of parties in SMDs remains relatively stable over time instead of
decreasing as Duverger’s law would predict, because ‘under mixed rules,
Duverger’s incentives do not operate strongly enough to move ENEP
numbers below the mid-2.0 range’.11 Wada (1996: 26) advances the same
forecast in more pessimistic terms: ‘Japan will never have a two-party system
even in the single-member district with plurality part’ because small parties
do not withdraw from SMDs, resulting in ‘a terribly distorted multi-party
system’. Thies (2002a) asserts that the prospects of opposition parties co-
ordinating SMD candidacies are low due to the JCP’s insistence on fielding
candidates in all districts, and to the aforementioned PR incentive. In
contrast, Reed (2005: 283–4) reports both a decline in the effective number
of candidates per district and ‘a clear trend toward districts featuring bi-
polar competition between one representative of the governing coalition and
one representative of the opposition’, although ‘movement towards a two-
party system at the national level has been halting at best’, largely because
the main opposition party has difficulty presenting itself as a credible alter-
native to the LDP.12
Elections 1996–2005
Before assessing the extent of Japan’s progress (or the lack thereof) toward
a nationwide two-party system, it is helpful to quickly summarize the four
elections which have taken place since the adoption of the new system (see
Table 1 for SMD results). In the 1996 election, the LDP gained seats (albeit
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Table 1. Single-member district seats and vote-shares for the two largest parties
LDP NFP/DPJ
Seats* Votes Seats Votes
1996 169 38.63% 96 27.97%
2000 177 40.97% 80 27.62%
2003 168 43.85% 105 36.66%
2005 219 48.49% 52 36.99%
* Out of 300
falling short of a parliamentary majority), while the main opposition New

Frontier Party (NFP) stagnated, giving rise to the unfamiliar result of what
Reed (1997) labels ‘a confusing hybrid of a minority and a coalition govern-
ment’. Significantly, he points out that ‘the NFP failed to establish itself as
the alternative government’, and that ‘few SMDs experienced bipolar com-
petition’.13
The NFP subsequently imploded, and another opposition party, the Demo-
cratic Party of Japan (DPJ), assumed the mettle of LDP’s main challenger in
2000. Analysing this election, Thies (2002b) describes a decline in the effec-
tive number of parties in SMDs, as Duverger’s law would predict, but small
parties continued to run candidates in hopeless SMD races. He also observes
that LDP ‘was the only party in a position to contest the election across the
country’. In other words, while two-party competition was becoming the
norm at the district level, ‘the opposition has so far failed to consolidate
or coordinate sufficiently to really challenge the LDP for Diet supremacy’
(Thies, 2002a).
The 2003 election saw further movement towards a nationwide two-party
system. Schaap (2005) finds evidence for this in the DPJ’s success in securing
anti-LDP votes while smaller opposition parties declined, consequently
reducing LDP’s seat bonus in SMDs, and also cites a significant increase in
the combined share of votes for the largest two parties as further proof of
a consolidating two-party system.14 Similarly, Kabashima (2004) notes that
DPJ’s merger with the Liberal Party ahead of the 2003 election ‘narrowed
the field of non-LDP candidates, giving voters a clearer idea of which oppo-
sition aspirant had the strongest chance of winning’. One may attribute this
merger to the mechanical effect of Duverger’s law.
Yet the prospect of validating Schaap’s (2005) forecast that ‘two-party
competition is more genuine now than at any time in the post-war era,
suggesting that alternance is a realistic prospect’ was postponed, if not
reversed, by the 2005 election, in which the LDP scored a landslide victory.
By expelling LDP Diet members who defied the official party line to vote
against a postal privatization bill, the prime minister successfully assumed
the mettle of reform and cast both these LDP rebels and the DPJ as anti-
reformers. Despite suffering a crushing defeat, however, Maeda (2006) claims
that the DPJ’s loss was not as devastating as its greatly reduced seat share
374

suggests. Since many districts were lost as a result of only a small swing,
the DPJ still has a chance to win the next election as long as it remains the
main opposition to the LDP (Reed, 2007).
The Urban–Rural Distinction
According to Reed and Scheiner (2003), ‘the urban/rural distinction tends

to be the sharpest feature dividing electoral districts’ in Japan, one that has
persisted over many decades. Richardson (1973) attributes this difference
to divergent patterns of political socialization, due to higher educational
levels and media exposure in urban areas in contrast to the ‘high density of
both informal social interaction and group activities’, hence greater organ-
ized group membership and participation, in rural sectors. Furthermore, he
observes that ‘urban voters cast their vote more in terms of responses to
comparatively diffuse symbolic objects (party label or candidate reputation),
whereas rural voters make their choice on more pragmatic and personally
immediate grounds’ (Richardson, 1974: 175). It follows that urban districts
(or intermediate districts containing important regional cities) ‘seem to have
a much higher proportion of persons who are swing voters’ (Christensen,
2006) who hold less particularistic preferences and are prone to change their
vote (or abstain) from one election to the next.
This urban/rural divide, already notable under SNTV (Stockwin, 1998),15
became even more pronounced under the new system. Writing after the
1996 election, Jain and Todhunter (1997) note that ‘the LDP has fortified
its rural stronghold as the party of farmers and business interests in the
provincial urban centres’, while ‘the DPJ and NFP present themselves as
principally parties for urban dwellers’. In the 2000 election, Thies (2002b)
observes that while the LDP ‘did very well in rural districts and was compet-
itive in semi-urban ones, it was almost shut out in metropolitan districts’.
Similarly, Schaap (2005) mentions that in 2003 ‘the LDP’s lock on rural
seats remains strong’, winning these districts by larger margins than in
urban and metropolitan districts, and further comments that ‘how and
whether the DPJ will be able to make inroads into the LDP’s rural domin-
ance remains unknown’.16 This pattern did not continue in 2005, but only
because ‘the LDP led the DPJ by a greater margin in the most urban districts
than in the most rural districts. The LDP has reclaimed metropolitan Japan’
while reaffirming its rural bastion (Reed, 2007).17
Toward a Two-Party System? A National View
One basic measure of the strength of a two-party system is simply the sum
of the two largest parties’ vote-shares. This figure stood at 66.6 percent in
1996, 68.6 percent in 2000, 80.5 percent in 2003 and 85.6 percent in 2005.
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Furthermore, Reed (2007) observes an increasing number of districts that

witnessed competition between one government and one main opposition
candidate. While these trends imply a marginalization of small parties and
independent candidates, it reveals nothing about the strength of the two
largest parties relative to each other. To measure the effective number of
parties, the most commonly used indicator is the index developed by Laakso
and Taagepera (1979). Also, Molinar (1991) proposes an alternative index,
standardized around the largest party. Following Reed’s (2001) study on the
impact of electoral system change in Italy, subtracting 1 from Molinar’s
index indicates the ‘effective number of losers’. If Duverger’s law operates
perfectly, the effective number of parties should approach 2, while the effec-
tive number of losers should converge toward 1, in all SMDs. Furthermore,
one expects the number of seats won by independents to decline even more
than those won by small party candidates, since independents come under
the polarizing pressure of SMDs without the possibility of resurrection
through PR.
Looking at the total number of SMD candidates in the four elections
conducted under current electoral rules, Table 2 shows a clear and consist-
ent downward movement, the average per district declining from 4.2 in
1996 to 3.3 in 2005. More importantly, the effective number of candidates,
as calculated by the Laakso–Taagepera index, went down from nearly 3 in
1996 to around 2.4 in the 2003 and 2005 elections. This is evidence that,
in accordance with Duverger’s law, parties and candidates made strategic
decisions to withdraw or coordinate with others, and some voters also made
strategic decisions to cast their ballots for candidates with a chance to win,
even if this meant abandoning their most preferred choice. However, whereas
in both 2000 and 2003 the effective number of candidates decreased from
the previous election, this trend did not continue in 2005. It is plausible that
the effective number of SMD candidates may not decrease all the way to
two, but would remain in the range observed in the two most recent elec-
tions due to both smaller parties’ PR incentive and fielding of Communist
candidates in all districts.18
The logic of Duverger’s law predicts that the effective number of losers,
calculated by Molinar’s index minus 1, would converge toward 1 in both
over-competitive and under-competitive districts. There has indeed been such
a movement. The figures for 2003 and 2005 show that there was slightly
Table 2. Single-member district number of candidates and losers

Average no. Effective no. Effective no.
of candidates of candidates of losers
1996 4.20 2.95 1.31
2000 4.00 2.77 1.11
2003 3.42 2.41 0.92
2005 3.30 2.40 0.92
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less than one effective loser in all SMDs, suggesting either dominance of the
winning candidates or a fragmentation of votes among losers. Considering
the decreasing number of effective candidates seen in the middle column of
Table 2, the latter explanation is unlikely. One may attribute the low effec-
tive number of losers in 2005 to the LDP landslide, as many LDP winners
increased their margin of victory. However, this figure did not change at all
from 2003, when the difference between LDP and DPJ was much narrower
in terms of both SMD votes and seats. Thus, again assuming that most votes
were cast for the top two finishers, one may infer that some winners from
both LDP and DPJ enjoyed comfortable margins of victory.
Turning to the issue of cross-district linkage, an obvious way to address
this question is simply by counting the number of districts where the top
two candidates represented the two largest parties nationwide. In 1996,
candidates nominated by LDP and NFP finished in the top two positions in
182 districts; this rose to 196, 234 and 251 districts in 2000, 2003 and
2005, respectively.19 These figures underestimate the true extent to which
SMD races featured one government and one opposition candidate, since
the LDP refrained from putting up candidates in a number of districts to
allow its coalition partners20 a clear run. The consistent trends toward
nationalization of the two largest parties at the expense of smaller parties
and the government versus opposition pattern of district-level competition
both suggest that, at least in the SMD tier, Japan is indeed moving toward
a two-party (or at least a two-camp) system.
A tally of independent candidates who won SMD races, however, raises
questions about the validity of such a conclusion. The creation of SMDs
was meant to strengthen the role of parties by making party nomination a
more valuable resource, yet candidates running without any party endorse-
ment were still able to capture 9 seats in 1996, 20 in 2000, 12 in 2003 and
18 in 2005. The fact that many of these winners joined a party soon after
their election and ran for re-election under their new party labels may signal
recognition of the value of party endorsements, yet this does not shed light
on how so many candidates could defy the pressure toward two-party
competition.21 Strictly speaking, successful independents do not contradict
Duverger’s law, which only predicts convergence toward two viable candi-
dates in SMDs without stipulating that either or both represent parties.
However, the persistence of this trend does highlight problems of linkage
that impede movement toward nationwide two-party competition.
Toward a Two-Party System? Comparing Urban and

Rural Districts
Developments described in the previous section assume that all SMDs are
similar, and conceal variations among different types of districts. Dividing
the 300 SMDs into an equal number of rural, mixed and urban districts,
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Reed (2002) cites data from the 1996 and 2000 elections to demonstrate that
‘the number of non-competitive districts22 is higher in rural districts in both
years and falls monotonically with the level of urbanization’. He further
notes that districts which became non-competitive actually outnumber those
which became competitive in all three categories, although ‘the phenomenon
of non-competition is primarily a rural one’. Covering elections up to 2003
and using the same classification scheme, Scheiner (2006, ch. 8) shows that
the LDP enjoyed a commanding lead over the main opposition party in rural
districts in terms of votes, which translated into an even more overwhelming
advantage in terms of seats. This means that ‘despite the fact that rural
SMDs constitute only about 20 percent of all seats, rural SMD victories
provide the LDP with nearly one third of all the seats it needs to win a
majority. To win a majority, the LDP needs to take only around 40 percent
of the remaining seats’. In short, opposition weakness in rural SMDs repre-
sents a major barrier to an alternation of government.
Table 3 lists the effective number of candidates for each of the three sectors.
One notes a striking contrast between urban and rural districts: whereas the
effective number of candidates decreased by more than 1.0 in the former
sector, this indicator hardly changed at all in the latter. In other words, the
nationwide decline in the effective number of candidates per district
discussed earlier is shown as a primarily urban phenomenon. In one sense
this is only natural, since the effective number of candidates in rural districts
was already low from the very first election conducted under the new
system. However, this does not mean that a two-party system is more firmly
established in rural areas; quite the contrary, in fact.
Breaking down the effective number of losers by level of urbanization,
Table 4 again reveals conspicuously different trends in urban and rural
Table 3. Single-member district effective number of candidates by level of

urbanization
Rural Mixed Urban
1996 2.38 2.86 3.62
2000 2.35 2.73 3.22
2003 2.22 2.38 2.62
2005 2.36 2.34 2.50
Table 4. Single-member district effective number of losers by level of urbanization

Rural Mixed Urban
1996 0.79 1.21 1.93
2000 0.72 1.09 1.54
2003 0.69 0.94 1.12
2005 0.85 0.92 0.98
378

districts. The effective number of losing candidates declined from 2 to 1 in

urban SMDs, exactly as forecast by Duverger’s law. On the other hand,
figures for rural SMDs scarcely changed at all – and showed no upward
movement toward 1. In fact they became less competitive from 1996 to
2003, only reversing this trend in 2005. This means that either the margins
of victory in rural SMDs are particularly wide, or that votes in these dis-
tricts are highly fragmented among losing candidates. The low effective
number of candidates in rural areas, as shown in Table 3, rules out the latter
explanation. Thus, whereas over-competitive urban districts have lived up
to the expectations of those who enacted electoral reform to bring about a
two-party system, their hopes so far seem dashed by what has happened
(more accurately, what has failed to happen) in under-competitive rural
districts.
Lack of genuine competition in SMDs does not necessarily benefit one
particular party, since it is conceivable that two parties could each win a
share of seats by wide margins. Yet, as described above, rural areas consti-
tute the LDP’s power base. Table 5, listing the vote- and seat-shares in rural,
mixed and urban districts, shows clearly that while the main opposition
party was evenly matched with the LDP in urban seats, it has always lagged
far behind the LDP in rural areas. One must note that the vote-shares under-
estimate the true level of opposition support, since the main opposition
party did not always present a full slate of candidates, as shown in Table 6.
The LDP also did not nominate candidates in several districts, but whereas
the reason for the absence of an LDP candidate was frequently to allow its
coalition partners a clear run – particularly in urban but also in mixed
Table 5. Single-member district seats and votes of the two largest parties by level
of urbanization
LDP NFP/DPJ
Seats Votes Seats Votes
1996 Rural 75 47.38% 15 25.71%
Mixed 57 39.23% 35 29.59%
Urban 37 29.93% 46 28.51%
2000 Rural 77 51.63% 8 19.16%
Mixed 66 42.25% 23 30.50%
Urban 34 30.06% 49 32.53%
2003 Rural 79 51.33% 10 27.04%
Mixed 58 43.49% 35 39.75%
Urban 31 37.43% 60 42.42%
2005 Rural 74 48.92% 10 31.92%
Mixed 71 49.97% 26 40.31%
Urban 74 45.25% 16 37.07%
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Table 6. Single-member districts without nominated

candidates by level of urbanization
LDP NFP/DPJ
1996 Rural 6 33
Mixed 4 21
Urban 2 11
2000 Rural 4 (2) 38
Mixed 7 (1) 11
Urban 18 (0) 9
2003 Rural 5 (3) 24
Mixed 7 (1) 8
Urban 11 (1) 1
2005 Rural 1 8
Mixed 0 2
Urban 9 (0) 1
Values in parentheses indicate seats not contested by either the
LDP or its coalition partners.
districts23 – the absence of a main opposition nominee was likely an indi-

cator of the party’s weakness in terms of organization and the pool of qual-
ified candidates.
Another characteristic of rural seats is the relatively higher – indeed,
increasing – number of SMDs won by independent candidates. One may
argue that the high number of independent victories in 2005 is attributable
to events preceding and during the campaign, when LDP party headquarters
not only refused to endorse candidates who voted against the government’s
postal privatization bill but also sent so-called ‘assassins’ to run against these
‘rebels’, and that this unique set of circumstances is unlikely to be repeated.
Even so, the fact remains that some of the ‘rebels’ were able to defy the
trend toward two-party competition and defeat candidates who received
party endorsements.24 Keeping in mind earlier discussions on the salience
of personal ties and clientelism in rural areas, it is no coincidence that most
independent SMD winners are found in rural districts.
The preceding paragraphs lay out in detail what Scheiner (2006) identifies
as ‘two parallel party systems: a one-party dominant system in rural areas
and a competitive system in urban areas’. Ironically, at least when looking
at the number of seats, the 2005 election results could be interpreted as a
convergence of the two party systems – toward a one-party dominant form.
One can examine whether this is indeed the case by comparing not only
vote-shares for the LDP and DPJ, but also the margins by which SMDs are
won, i.e. the degree to which each seat is vulnerable to a nationwide swing.
This is important because ‘whereas the old electoral system tended to muffle
the swing, SMD tends to magnify the swing’ (Reed, 2002).
380

Dividing all SMDs into the three categories of marginal, intermediate and
safe seats – won by margins of below 5 percent, between 5 and 15 percent
and above 15 percent, respectively – Table 7 lays out the distribution of
seats for the LDP and the largest opposition party in the past four elections.
About one-half of all LDP seats fall into the ‘safe’ category, while (except
in 1996) only less than one-fifth are classified as marginal. In contrast, the
largest opposition party always has a much lower share of safe districts –
which represent very few actual seats, since it has never won nearly as many
SMDs as the LDP. The implication is that a modest swing in favour of the
DPJ would not seriously threaten a majority of LDP seats, while a similarly
small swing in the opposite direction would devastate the DPJ – as indeed
happened in 2005.
Table 7. Single-member district margin of victory

LDP NFP/DPJ
Seats % total Seats % total
1996 Safe 73 43.2% 19 19.8%
Intermediate 47 27.8% 41 42.7%
Marginal 49 29.0% 36 37.5%
2000 Safe 108 61.0% 16 20.0%
Marginal 26 14.7% 35 43.8%
2003 Safe 83 49.4% 23 21.9%
Marginal 26 15.5% 34 32.4%
2005 Safe 109 49.8% 6 11.5%
Marginal 27 12.3% 27 51.9%
One may plausibly attribute the LDP’s advantage not to any inherent
strength of the party or the calibre of its candidates, but to the simple fact
that many of its SMD winners are incumbents who have the opportunity
to build up personal reputations and support groups, and thus have an edge
over relatively unknown and untested opposition challengers.25 If one sub-
scribes to this view, once the LDP incumbents lose or retire, many of the
seats the party wins by wide margins will no longer be ‘safe’, since new
candidates nominated by the LDP start on the same basis as new DPJ candi-
dates. To test this hypothesis, Table 8 lists the average margins of victory for
both incumbent and non-incumbent SMD winners.26 This shows that there
is indeed an incumbency advantage. More importantly, the average LDP
incumbent who won his SMD did so with considerably greater margins than
the average DPJ incumbent, and to a lesser extent the same is true when
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Table 8. Single-member district average margin of victory by incumbency

LDP NFP/DPJ
Margin Seats Margin Seats
1996 Incumbent 19.77% 126 10.06% 70
Non-incumbent 10.00% 43 7.52% 26
2000 Incumbent 23.10% 155 11.30% 49
Non-incumbent 17.41% 22 4.73% 31
2003 Incumbent 21.52% 141 10.05% 28
Non-incumbent 9.71% 27 11.29% 77
2005 Incumbent 19.00% 174 7.92% 50
Non-incumbent 7.03% 45 1.84% 2
comparing non-incumbent winners from the two parties, with the exception
of 2003. Thus, marginality of seats is not determined by incumbency alone.
As in the case of vote and seat shares, the distribution of marginal and
safe seats is not uniform in all districts. A cross-tabulation of SMDs by
marginality and level of urbanization, as shown in Table 9, illustrates the
two party systems argument. Whereas at least a third of urban districts are
marginal (except in 2005, when the LDP was able to win many metropol-
itan SMDs by significant margins), this is true for only less than a sixth of
rural SMDs. More than half of rural districts are won by such wide margins
that they are unlikely to change hands anytime soon – and an overwhelming
percentage of these seats are held by the LDP. With a relatively small swing
in its favour, the DPJ may easily capture more seats than the LDP in urban
areas, but such a swing would translate into few seat gains in rural areas.
Table 9. Single-member district margin of victory by level of urbanization

Safe Intermediate Marginal
1996 Rural 56 26 18
Mixed 35 36 29
Urban 14 38 48
2000 Rural 68 17 15
Mixed 41 33 26
Urban 27 37 36
2003 Rural 63 25 12
Mixed 27 47 26
Urban 23 43 34
2005 Rural 55 33 12
Mixed 31 47 22
Urban 36 38 26
382

It is also notable that, at all levels of urbanization, the number of marginal

seats has not increased since the introduction of SMDs.
The observation above does not challenge Duverger’s law, which makes
no predictions about convergence toward a pattern of competition charac-
terized by two parties/candidates of approximately equal strength in SMDs.
Indeed, many parties in countries using the first-past-the-post system boast
of bastions of regional dominance similar to the LDP’s stranglehold in rural
areas. The difference, however, is that the DPJ can boast of few similarly
unassailable electoral redoubts of its own.27 While the LDP may lose its
parliamentary majority in subsequent elections, a DPJ majority in SMDs
would require a swing considerably greater than in the first four elections
held under the current system.
Explaining the Urban–Rural Divergence
Three questions – one theoretical, the other two empirical – must be addressed
to explain why the prospect of government alternation has remained elusive.
First, why do contests in some SMDs feature one-party dominance rather than
two-party competition? In discussing the psychological effect of Duverger’s
law leading to two strong parties at the district level, Cox enumerates the
following conditions where this equilibrium does not obtain (1997: 79):
1) the presence of voters who are not short-term instrumentally rational;

2) lack of public information about voter preferences and vote intentions
(hence about which candidates are likely to be ‘out of the running’); 3)
public belief that a particular candidate will win with certainty; or 4)
the presence of many voters who care intensely about their first choice
and are nearly indifferent between their second and lower choices.
While the relevance of conditions 1 and 4 can only be probed through

survey data, one can surmise the extent to which the other two conditions
operate by examining aggregate level results. Condition 2 applies if three
(or more) candidates have an equal chance of winning an SMD, making
third parties less willing to refrain from nominating candidates and forming
alliances, and the electorate less capable of strategic voting by distinguishing
who the top two candidates are. Condition 3 applies if one candidate enters
an SMD contest as an overwhelming favourite, in which case other parties
and candidates have no incentive to coordinate, since cooperation could not
lead to victory. Instead, all parties may run on their own, not in order to win
but rather to boost their PR vote-share or achieve non-instrumental goals.
As Table 2 shows, the steady decline in the effective number of candi-
dates per district implies that three-cornered contests are becoming increas-
ingly rare. While smaller parties, especially the Communists, continue to
nominate SMD candidates, they have little realistic prospect of winning more
than a handful of districts, and in most cases garner vote-shares far below
383

PA RT Y P O L I T I C S 1 6 ( 3 )
those of the two leading parties. Hence condition 2 does not pertain in most
cases. In contrast, Table 5 demonstrates the LDP’s near monopoly in rural
SMDs, and Tables 7 and 9 imply that the ruling party holds many of these
seats by wide margins. It is therefore safe to assume that both parties and
voters in these districts are well aware of the results even before a single
ballot is cast. Thus, the inapplicability of the Duvergerian logic toward two-
party competition in rural SMDs is attributable to condition 3 above.
This leads to the second question: what explains the LDP’s continued dom-
inance in rural areas? Here it is pertinent to mention that another objective
proponents of electoral reform hoped to achieve, namely policy-centred elec-
tions, has also not materialized. Instead, the importance of both candidate-
centred campaigns and personal support organizations persist under the
current electoral rules (Christensen, 1998; Krauss and Pekkanen, 2004). In
view of differences between the urban and rural areas in terms of both social-
ization processes and expectations of system outputs, politics centred around
personalities and patronage is especially prominent in the latter sector.
Indeed, one may speculate that for many voters, particularly in rural areas
where clientelism is more common (see below), the object of support is less
the LDP itself than local candidates who happen to run under LDP labels.28
Scheiner (2006) cites survey evidence showing more prevalent patronage-
oriented behaviour in rural areas, explaining that ‘it is easier to target specific,
geographically concentrated groups and claim credit for spending because
a larger proportion of beneficiaries live and vote in the area’, and also that
higher group membership and denser community ties enable easier mobil-
ization at election time.29 Moreover, Kabashima stresses that whereas urban
voters consider multiple objectives in deciding how to vote, elections in rural
areas foster ‘an exciting mood of rivalry that first draws in local notables
and then ordinary voters’ (1988: 154) and that in some cases this involves
the provision of money and goods. As the party in power, the LDP is natur-
ally in the best position to meet these expectations. Indeed, Scheiner (2006)
points to a self-reinforcing cycle comprising politicians joining the ruling
party bandwagon to be in a position to distribute largesse, voters continuing
to support the LDP on account of these targeted benefits, and the opposition
finding itself unable either to meet the electorate’s clientelistic expectation
or to recruit qualified candidates in rural districts.
One must also consider the complementary question on the other side of
the urban–rural divide: what explains the LDP’s viability in metropolitan
areas? Absent patronage ties and clientelistic expectations, Table 5 shows that
the LDP still performs adequately in urban districts, consistently winning at
least 30 percent of votes and seats even in elections remembered for signi-
ficant opposition advances. These figures in fact underestimate LDP strength
in large cities; as Table 6 suggests, the LDP regularly refrains from endors-
ing candidates in some SMDs to allow its urban-based coalition partner
Komeito a free run. The growing closeness, even mutual dependence,
between the LDP and Komeito during elections (Reed, 2007) effectively
384

makes the two coalition partners a single bloc when discussing the question
of government alternation. Despite certain differences in policy outlooks,30
neither party is likely to seek a divorce. Maintenance of the coalition ensures
the LDP a sizeable and reliable source of urban support from highly discip-
lined Komeito voters.
Another notable fact in urban SMDs is the respectable vote-shares garnered
by Communist candidates relative to other types of districts (not shown). The
JCP has nominated standard-bearers in all SMDs despite the improbability
of winning. Considering the JCP’s ideological stance, its well-organized vote
is unlikely to benefit the LDP if the party decides not to put up SMD candi-
dates. Kabashima (2004) conjectures that ‘the only route to a decisive DPJ
victory over the LDP (and a change of government) entails a decision by the
JCP not to field candidates in closely contested single-seat districts’, and JCP
withdrawals are most likely to make a difference in urban districts where
its support is concentrated. At the same time, while the DPJ has sought
electoral and legislative accommodation with other opposition parties, it
has never made overtures to the JCP. So history does not offer any guide
to cooperation between these two parties, and it is far from certain that
Communist voters would automatically support the DPJ against the LDP
(rather than abstain).
Another frequently discussed issue related to the LDP’s electoral domin-
ance is malapportionment. Both academic and journalistic accounts have
focused on the role of urban under-representation in giving the LDP extra
seats under SNTV.31 Comparing both the ratio of the maximum over the
minimum number of seats per capita and the Loosemore–Hanby index of
disproportionality before and after electoral reform, Horiuchi and Saito find
that ‘reapportionment associated with the electoral reform in 1994 led to a
major reduction in inequality in representation’ (2003: 672).32 Furthermore,
Christensen illustrates that ‘in many instances the [DPJ] actually would win
more seats than the LDP at identical vote share levels’ (2004: 269–70). Thus,
while malapportionment may still favour the LDP by over-representing
districts where it performs well, the main explanation for its continued
dominance must be sought elsewhere.
Discussion and Conclusion
Since elections are much more likely to be determined by results in SMDs

than in the PR tier under Japan’s parallel mixed system,33 the preceding
analysis demonstrates that the existence of different party systems in rural
and urban areas is a major reason why the long-awaited change of govern-
ment has not taken place. The nationwide movement toward a two-party
system obscures a gaping disparity between patterns of competition at differ-
ent levels of urbanization: while urban areas have been progressing toward
a two-party system, rural areas have not. In metropolitan areas, the average
385

PA RT Y P O L I T I C S 1 6 ( 3 )
number of candidates and losers has moved toward two and one, respec-
tively, at successive elections under the new electoral system, while similar
movement has been conspicuous by its absence in the countryside. Incidences
of independent candidates winning SMDs are very rare in urban areas, but
much more common in rural areas. This series of evidence leads to the
conclusion that, electorally speaking, Japan has developed two party systems
instead of moving toward a two-party system. The persistence of candidate-
centred campaigns and clientelistic expectations buttresses the continuation
of a one-party dominant system in rural areas, where a plurality system in
SMDs inflates already substantial electoral dominance into even greater
parliamentary dominance.
This is by no means the sole explanation for sustaining LDP rule. Reed
(2007) cites two other important reasons: the ruling party’s alliance with
Komeito, and its incredible feat of running against itself. As discussed in the
previous section, the importance of the coalition prompts Reed’s prediction
that ‘when the first alternation in power occurs, it will not be because
Koumei changed coalition partners. It will be because the DPJ defeated the
LDP–Koumei coalition’ (2007: 104). As for the LDP’s two landslide victories
in recent years, namely in the 2001 upper house and 2005 lower house elec-
tions, the party triumphed by fighting against its own old guard.34 Dramatic
and effective as this strategy proved, similar tactics are hardly open to fre-
quent repetition. In short, the second factor is context-specific and probably
not liable to replication, while the first reinforces the already considerable
barrier to alternation of power illustrated in this article.
Scholars and practitioners who express optimism about the likelihood
of government alternation may point to results from the 2007 House of
Councillors election, in which the DPJ (in alliance with smaller opposition
parties) won by a large margin,35 as a precursor to similar electoral tides in
the next House of Representatives election, due by 2009. One should not
forget, however, that opposition parties have registered significant advances
in upper house elections in the past,36 without seizing the reins of govern-
ment in subsequent lower house elections. The explanation lies in different
rules governing elections to the two chambers. Upper house districts, which
correspond with prefectural boundaries, cover a larger territory than lower
house SMDs, rendering targeted distribution of clientelistic largess more
difficult. Fewer upper house districts alleviate the opposition’s problem of
recruiting qualified candidates. Finally, while dates for upper house elec-
tions are fixed, the cabinet can (and often does) select politically opportune
moments to dissolve the lower house and call new elections.37 These differ-
ences caution against forecasting the outcome of lower house polls based
on upper house election results.
It may still be too early to answer definitively whether the creation of
SMDs in Japan would lead to a nationwide two-party system and enhance
the likelihood of government alternation. What is known is that a single
member plurality system may as easily lead to one-party domination as a
386

two-party system. The analysis above suggests that so long as the LDP retains
a firm grip on its rural base and sustains an adequate level of support in
urban areas, the former outcome is at least as probable as the latter.38 The
absence of a similar stronghold for the DPJ further underpins this forecast.39
Even if the DPJ manages to consolidate an urban base, Scheiner’s (2006)
observation that ‘without greater success in the uncompetitive rural system,
the opposition was not able to channel its victories in the competitive urban
system into control of the national parliament’ in recent elections still apply.
While it is true that ‘the rural areas and organized voters are stable and
reliable but do not produce enough seats to win a majority’ for the LDP
(Reed, 2007), they may constitute a sufficient barrier to a DPJ majority. In
other words, while rural voters alone do not determine government compo-
sition, their preferences tip the scales heavily in favour of the LDP. The un-
likely scenarios of a DPJ–Komeito coalition or a massive flow of Communist
SMD votes to DPJ candidates may bestow to the main opposition party urban
strongholds nearly as impregnable as the LDP’s fortresses across Japan’s
countryside, and could well deprive the LDP of its parliamentary majority.
But such realignments seem improbable in the near future.
Returning to the question posed in the Introduction on why the antici-
pated causal chain between electoral reform, a two-party system and alter-
nation of government has not operated as expected, the preceding pages have
shown that while incentives deriving from electoral reform have induced
movement toward two large parties, what have also emerged are two distinct
party systems. The existence of two divergent patterns of competition, with
a two-party system in urban SMDs juxtaposed with a dominant party system
in rural areas, impedes the prospect of power alternation. These developments
illustrate both the successes and the limitations of institutional reform.
Barring major changes in the party system, it appears that an alterna-
tion of government that proponents of electoral reform so enthusiastically
envisioned remains unlikely in the near future. Reflecting on whether such
expectations were misplaced, it is appropriate to refer to Rae’s distinction
between proximal and distal effects of electoral law. While the former consists
of a direct link between vote share and seat distribution, the latter involves
factors beyond electoral rules that mediate this link. Therefore:
[W]hen distal effects are considered, the redistributive bias of electoral

systems becomes only one of an infinite array of competing factors –
social, psychological, economic, even accidental – and it is not easy to
decide how important the effects of the electoral law itself have been in
producing the observed patterns of party competition. (Rae, 1971: 134)
While changing incentives of both parties and voters in the immediate after-
math of drastic electoral reform render conclusions drawn from one or two
initial elections premature, after more than a decade under the new system
one may speak of a more settled party space. That the reconfiguration of
party competition has not achieved one of the main objectives that motivated
387

PA RT Y P O L I T I C S 1 6 ( 3 )
electoral reform offers a precautionary note on the limits of seeking alter-

ations in political attitudes and behaviours through institutional change.
Notes
1 These refer to elections for the House of Representatives (lower house) only.
Elections for the House of Councillors (upper house) are not discussed here
because the power to determine government composition rests with the lower
house.
2 After the House of Councillors election in July 2007, the opposition Democra-
tic Party of Japan (DPJ) replaced the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
as the largest bloc in the upper house, but an LDP-led coalition remains in power
due to its majority in the House of Representatives. Previous opposition victories
in upper house elections were not replicated in subsequent lower house elections,
as discussed in the final section.
3 With the exception of the Amami Islands, which elected one Diet member.
4 Shinseito (Japan Renewal Party) and Sakigake (New Party Harbinger)
5 According to Thies (2002a): ‘LDP obtained concessions that made the new system
much more majoritarian than the Hosokawa government had originally intended.’
6 Also referred to as a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system, or mixed
superposition system.
7 There are 11 regional PR blocs containing 7 to 33 seats.
8 This logic lies behind Cox and Schoppa’s (2002) finding that ‘every mixed system
has produced a larger number of parties than the average ENEP [effective
number of elective parties] for pure SMD systems’.
9 Cox and Schoppa (2002) add that the LDP could have been deprived of its
majority had the opposition parties cooperated rather than ran their own SMD
candidates.
10 Gallagher (1998) points out that the lack of coordination among small parties
can be attributed to strained relations among them, as well as uncertainty about
party strengths in SMDs ahead of the initial election under the new system.
11 The authors of course note the difference in seat allocation rules between the
mixed systems used in Germany and Japan. SMD and PR tiers are linked in
Germany when determining the number of seats, but are separate in Japan.
12 Just because competition in SMDs primarily takes places between candidates
from two parties does not necessarily imply that the same two parties compete
across the country, a process Cox labels cross-district linkage. As the analysis in
this section shows, such linkage has developed in Japan.
13 In contrast, Gallagher (1998) notes that ‘many of the smaller parties did not
contest many SMDs’, contrary to expectations derived from the aforementioned
contamination effect.
14 Or at least a two-bloc system: LDP coordinated with its smaller coalition partner,
Komeito (affiliated with the Buddhist sect Soka Gakkai), refraining from running
in 10 SMDs where Komeito put up candidates. Komeito supporters in other
SMDs were instructed to vote for LDP candidates, while some LDP supporters
were told to vote for Komeito in the PR tier.
15 Many academic and media accounts also emphasize malapportionment as a factor
388

that exaggerates the LDP’s parliamentary strength relative to its vote-shares, a

topic that is addressed in more detail in a later section.
16 Kabashima (2004) notes that the DPJ succeeded in ‘making particularly large
inroads in the intermediate districts once dominated by the LDP, and gained a
small but significant foothold in rural districts as well’ in the 2003 election as a
result of merging with the Liberal Party.
17 This also holds true for the PR tier: whereas in 2003 the LDP gained its largest
share of votes in rural blocs (Chugoku, Shikoku, Hokuriku), in 2005 the party’s
best performance was in Tokyo and its vicinity (Christensen, 2006).
18 The JCP is considering drastically reducing the number of SMD candidates, since
candidates garnering less than 10 percent of SMD votes lose their deposit.
Instead, the JCP will concentrate its campaign on the PR tier (Asahi Shimbun
electronic edition, 9 September 2007).
19 The scoreboard for these SMD races reads as follows: 1996 – LDP 109, NFP
76; 2000 – LDP 125, DPJ 71; 2003 – LDP 137, DPJ 97; 2005 – LDP 201, DPJ
50. These numbers do not include independent SMD winners who joined either
party after the elections.
20 Komeito and the Conservative Party in 2000 and 2003; Komeito in 2005. The
number of districts where a government coalition candidate and a DPJ nominee
finished in the top two was 211 in 2000, 249 in 2003 and 259 in 2005.
21 In a few cases, the LDP allowed more than one candidate to run in a district
without giving any official endorsement, with the understanding that whoever
won would receive the party nomination next time. This tactic carries the risk
of splitting the LDP vote to the benefit of an opposition candidate, however, and
is very rarely employed.
22 Defined as districts where the effective number of losers falls below 0.6.
23 Komeito, LDP’s main coalition partner, is a largely urban-based party. It has not
put up any candidates in rural SMDs since the current electoral system came into
force. The Conservative Party did win several rural SMDs where there were no
LDP nominees, but this small coalition partner was absorbed by the LDP after
the 2003 election.
24 Almost all of the ‘rebels’ who won re-election were re-admitted into the LDP,
despite an earlier pledge from the LDP leadership not to allow their return.
25 Krauss and Pekkanen (2004) even point out that some LDP representatives rely
on candidate support organizations (koenkai) containing members who support
the individual MP but detest the party she belongs to.
26 Incumbents here include both SMD and PR winners from the previous election.
27 For example, the British Conservatives in the southeast of England, the Canadian
Conservatives in the Prairie provinces, and the US Republicans in the South and
Mountain West states all enjoy electoral dominance, but British Labour, Canadian
Liberals and US Democrats can rely on strongholds in other regions.
28 Opposition candidates’ victories in rural prefectures in the 2007 House of Coun-
cillors election provide indirect evidence that voters in the countryside may not be
as firmly attached to the LDP as results from House of Representatives elections
suggest.
29 Scheiner (2006) cites data showing that rural voters express greater agreement
with clientelistic positions. For example, more than twice as many rural voters’
top criteria in assessing candidates is their ability to bring home subsidies com-
pared with voters in metropolitan districts, according to the JEDS survey.
389

PA RT Y P O L I T I C S 1 6 ( 3 )
30 For example, the LDP supports constitutional revision and the dispatch of troops
abroad, while Komeito has voiced reservations on both issues.
31 Hrebenar (1977), Hickman and Kim (1992) and others cite malapportionment
as a key contributor to the LDP’s monopoly of power under the old system, but
Christensen and Johnson (1995) and Curtis (1988) find that while malappor-
tionment did help the LDP, this was by no means decisive for keeping the party
in government.
32 Calculating from data reported in Horiuchi and Saito (2003), the average
Loosemore–Hanby (LH) index in the 13 elections the LDP contested under SNTV
is 0.127, compared with 0.078 and 0.081 in the first two elections under the new
system (SMD seats only). Using district data from the Japanese Ministry of
Internal Affairs and Communications (Somusho) for 2003 and 2005, I find the
LH index for the two most recent elections to be 0.078 and 0.080. This confirms
that malapportionment has been reduced considerably under the new system.
33 Small swings would change few PR seats, but are likely to decide the outcome
in many marginal SMDs. Also, more seats are allocated by plurality in SMDs
than by PR.
34 When the LDP campaigned against the DPJ rather than anti-reformers within its
own ranks, as in the 2003 lower house and 2004 upper house elections, its
performance was considerably more lacklustre (Reed, 2007).
35 Out of 121 seats contested, the DPJ secured 60 (13 other seats were won by
smaller opposition parties), the LDP only 37 (plus 9 seats for Komeito and 1 for
a pro-government independent).
36 Japan Socialist Party (JSP) in 1989, New Frontier Party (NFP) in 1995, DPJ in
1998 and 2004.
37 I am grateful to Ethan Scheiner for pointing out these insightful contrasts
between upper and lower house elections.
38 This refers not just to the LDP itself, but also to the LDP–Komeito coalition.
39 This is evidenced by urban voters who supported the DPJ in previous elections
showing their lack of firm partisan attachment by flocking to the LDP in 2005.
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392

WILLY JOU is a doctoral candidate at the University of California, Irvine. His

current research focuses on political cleavages in new democracies in eastern Europe
and east Asia.
ADDRESS: School of Social Science, University of California, Irvine, 3151 Social
Science Plaza, Irvine, CA 92697–5100, USA. [email: jouw@uci.edu]
Paper submitted 10 November 2007; accepted for publication 30 June 2008.
393

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PA RT Y P O L I T I C S V O L 1 6 . N o . 3 pp.

Copyright © 2010 SAGE Publications Los Angeles London New Delhi

TOWARD A TWO-PARTY SYSTEM OR

This article examines whether electoral reform in Japan replacing a single

KEY WORDS bipolar competition electoral reform Japan single-member

According to Pempel (1990): ‘The ability of citizens to change their govern-

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Japan used a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system for parliamentary

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Anticipated Consequences of Electoral Reform

According to Duverger (1954), ‘the simple-majority single-ballot system

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falling short of a parliamentary majority), while the main opposition New

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The Urban–Rural Distinction

According to Reed and Scheiner (2003), ‘the urban/rural distinction tends

Toward a Two-Party System? A National View

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Furthermore, Reed (2007) observes an increasing number of districts that

Table 2. Single-member district number of candidates and losers

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Toward a Two-Party System? Comparing Urban and

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Table 3. Single-member district effective number of candidates by level of

Table 4. Single-member district effective number of losers by level of urbanization

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districts. The effective number of losing candidates declined from 2 to 1 in

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Table 6. Single-member districts without nominated

districts23 – the absence of a main opposition nominee was likely an indi-

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Table 7. Single-member district margin of victory

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Table 8. Single-member district average margin of victory by incumbency

Table 9. Single-member district margin of victory by level of urbanization

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It is also notable that, at all levels of urbanization, the number of marginal

Explaining the Urban–Rural Divergence

1) the presence of voters who are not short-term instrumentally rational;

While the relevance of conditions 1 and 4 can only be probed through

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Discussion and Conclusion

Since elections are much more likely to be determined by results in SMDs

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[W]hen distal effects are considered, the redistributive bias of electoral

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electoral reform offers a precautionary note on the limits of seeking alter-

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that exaggerates the LDP’s parliamentary strength relative to its vote-shares, a

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Carey, John M. and Matthew Soberg Shugart (1995) ‘Incentives to Cultivate a

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at Univ. Duisburg-Essen on August 27, 2016

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at Univ. Duisburg-Essen on August 27, 2016

Pempel, T. J. (1990) ‘Introduction. Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dom-

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at Univ. Duisburg-Essen on August 27, 2016

WILLY JOU is a doctoral candidate at the University of California, Irvine. His

Paper submitted 10 November 2007; accepted for publication 30 June 2008.

Downloaded from ppq.sagepub.com at Univ. Duisburg-Essen on August 27, 2016

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