Environment Law Assignment

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
ASSIGNMENT
NAME: ANNA A. OOMMEN
TOPIC: 1) THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

2) GREEN COURTS
3) FEATURES OF INDIAN FOREST ACT, 1927
4) FEATURES OF WILDLIFE PROTECTION ACT, 1972
5) OFFENCES AND PENALTIES UNDER WILDLIFE PROTECTION ACT
ROLL NO.: 33
CLASS: TY B.B.A. LLB.
COLLEGE: UNIVERSITY OF MUMBAI LAW ACADEMY
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The public trust doctrine is the principle that the sovereign holds in trust for public use some resources such as
shoreline between the high and low tide lines, regardless of private property ownership.
ORIGINS
The ancient laws of the Byzantine Emperor Justinian held that the sea, the shores of the sea, the air and running
water was common to everyone. The seashore, later defined as waters affected by the ebb and flow of the tides
could not be appropriated for private use and was open to all. This principle became the law in England as well.
Centuries later, the Magna Carta further strengthened public rights. At the insistence of English nobles, fishing
weirs which obstructed free navigation were to be removed from rivers. These rights were further strengthened
by later laws in England and subsequently became part of the common law of the United States as recognized in
Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). In that case the Illinois Legislature had granted an
enormous portion of the Chicago harbor to the Illinois Central Railroad. A subsequent legislature sought to
revoke the grant, claiming that original grant should not have been permitted in the first place. The court held
that common law public trust doctrine prevented the government from alienating the public right to the lands
under navigable waters (except in the case of very small portions of land which would have no effect on free
access or navigation).
The public trust applies to both waters influenced by the tides and waters that are navigable in fact. The public
trust also applies to the natural resources (mineral or animal) contained in the soil and water over those public
trust lands.
APPLICATION
This doctrine has been primarily significant in two areas: land access and use, and natural resource law Access
to oceans and ponds.
The doctrine is most often invoked in connection with access to the seashore. In the United States, the law
differs among the fifty states but in general limits the rights of ocean front property owners to exclude the
public below the mean high tide line.
Massachusetts and Maine (which share a common legal heritage) recognize private property ownership to the
mean low tide line—but allow public access to the seashore between the low and high tide lines for "fishing,
fowling and navigation," traditional rights going back to the Colonial Ordinance of 1647.Maine's Supreme
Court in 2011 expanded the public trust doctrine by concluding fishing fowling and navigation are not an
exclusive list; the court allowed the general public to cross private shoreline for scuba diving.
The public trust doctrine also finds expression in the Great Pond law, traditional right codified in case law and
statutes in Massachusetts, Maine, and New Hampshire. The state is said to own the land below the low water
mark under great ponds (ponds over ten acres), and the public retains in effect an access easement over
unimproved private property for uses such as fishing, cutting ice, and hunting.
In Oregon, a 1967 “Beach Bill” affirmed the state's public trust doctrine, and the right of the public to have
access to the seashore virtually everywhere between the low and high tide marks. In California the situation is
more complicated: private landowners often try to block traditional public beach access, which can result in
protracted litigation. Freshwater use rights have also been subject to litigation in California, under the public
trust doctrine.
Natural resources
The doctrine has also been used to provide public access across and provide for continued public interest in
those areas where land beneath tidally influenced waters has been filled. In some cases, the uses of that land
have been limited (to transportation, for instance) and in others, there has been provision for public access
across them.
The doctrine has been employed to assert public interest in oil resources discovered on tidally influenced lands
(Mississippi, California) and has also been used to prevent the private ownership of fish stocks and crustacean
beds. In most states in the United States, lakes and navigable-in-fact streams are maintained for drinking and
recreation purposes under a public-trust doctrine
Case law
M. C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath 1997 (1) SCC 388 was a landmark case in Indian environmental law. In the case,
the Supreme Court of India held that the public trust doctrine applied in India.
Facts of the case
The Indian express published an article reporting that Span Motels Private Limited, which owns Span Resorts,
had floated another ambitious venture, Span Club. The family of Indian politician Kamal Nath has direct links
with this company. The club was built after encroaching upon 27.12 bighas of land, including substantial
forestland, in 1990. The land was later regularised and leased out to the company on 11 April, 1994.
The regularisation was done when Nath was Minister of environment and forest. This encroachment led to the
swelling of the Bease river, and the swollen river changed its course and engulfed the Span Club and the
adjoining lawns, washing it away. For almost five months now, the Span Resorts management has been moving
bulldozers and earth movers to turn the course of the Beas for a second time.
A worrying thought was that of the river eating into the mountains, leading to landslides which were an
occasional occurrence in that area. In September, these caused floods in the Beas and property estimated to be
worth Rs. 105 crore was destroyed. The Government of India, Ministry of Environment and Forests by the letter
dated 24.11.1993, addressed to the Secretary, Forest, Government of Himachal Pradesh, Shimla conveyed its
prior approval in terms of Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 for leasing to the Motel 27 bighas
and 12 biswas of forest land adjoining to the land already on lease with the Motel. An expert committee formed
to assess the situation of the area arrived at the following conclusion; "The river is presently in a highly unstable
regime after the extraordinary floods of 1995, and it is difficult to predict its behaviour if another high flood
occur in the near future. A long-term planning for flood control in the Kullu Valley needs to be taken up
immediately with the advice of an organisation having expertise in the field, and permanent measures shall be
taken to protect the area so that recurrence of such a heavy flood is mitigated permanently".
Arguments for the defendants

Whatever construction activity was done by the motel on the land under its possession and on the area around, if
any, was done with a view to protect the lease-hold land from floods.
Divisional Forest Officer permitted the motel to carry out the necessary works subject to the conditions that the
department would not be liable to pay any amount incurred for the said purpose by the motel.
However, it could be easily ascertained from the facts that the Motel had made various constructions on the
surrounding area and on the banks of the river.
Judgment of the court
The forest lands which have been given on lease to the Motel by the State Governments are situated at the bank
of the river Beas. Beas is a young and dynamic river. The river is fast-flowing, carrying large boulders, at the
time of flood. When water velocity is not sufficient to carry the boulders, these are deposited in the channel
often blocking the flow of water. Under such circumstances the river stream changes its course, remaining
within the valley but swinging from one bank to the other. The right bank of the river Beas where the motel is
located mostly comes under forest, the left bank consists of plateaus, having steep banks facing the river, where
fruit orchards and cereal cultivation are predominant. The area being ecologically fragile and full of scenic
beauty should not have been permitted to be converted into private ownership and for commercial gains.
Lake Mono Case
Supreme Court of California said in the Mono Lake case, “….the public trust is more than an affirmation of
state power to use public property for public purposes. It is an affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the
people's common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, surrendering that right of protection only
in rare cases when the abandonment of that right is consistent with the purposes of the trust...." Our legal
system-based on English Common Law - includes the public trust doctrine as part of its jurisprudence. The
State is the trustee of all natural resources which are by nature meant for public use and enjoyment. The State as
a trustee is under a legal duty to protect the natural resources. These resources meant for public use cannot be
converted into private ownership.
The esthetic use and the pristine glory of the natural resources, the environment and the eco-systems of our
country cannot be permitted to be eroded for private, commercial or any other use unless the courts find it
necessary in good faith, for the public good and in public interest to encroach upon the said resources.
The Court said that they had no hesitation in holding that the Himachal Pradesh Government committed patent
breach of public trust by leasing the ecologically fragile land to the Motel management. Both the lease -
transactions are in patent breach of the trust held by the State Government. The second lease granted in the year
1994 was virtually of the land which is a part of riverbed. Even the board in its report has recommended
deleasing of the said area.
Orders of the Court
The public trust doctrine, as discussed by the Court in this judgment was a part of the law of the land. The prior
approval granted by the Government of India, Ministry of Environment and Forest and the lease-deed dated
11.04.1994 in favour of the Motel were quashed. The lease granted to the Motel by the said lease-deed in
respect of 27 bighas and 12 biswas of area, is cancelled and set aside. The Himachal Pradesh Government shall
take over the area and restore it to its original-natural conditions. The Motel shall pay compensation by way of
cost for the restitution of the environment and ecology of the area. The pollution caused by various constitutions
made by the Motel in the riverbed and the banks on the river Beas have to be removed and reversed.
The Doctrine of Public Trust In India
The Public Trust Doctrine has its origins in Roman Law. It has been extended in recent years, placing a duty on
the state to hold environmental resources in trust for the benefit of the public. At its widest, it could be used by
the courts as a tool to protect the environment from many kinds of degradation. In some countries, the doctrine
has formed the basis of environmental policy legislation, allowing private rights of action by citizens for
violations by the state (directly or indirectly) of the public trust.
The Rule of Law runs close to the rule of life and the Indian Constitution, in its humanist vision, has made
environmental-ecological preservation a fundamental value. The higher jurisprudence of Article 21 of the
Constitution (right to life) embraces the protection and preservation of nature's gift without which life ceases to
be viable and human rights become a simulacrum. In other words, this right to life under article 21 has been
extended to include the right to a healthy environment and the right to livelihood. The third aspect of the right to
life is the application of public trust doctrine to protect and preserve the public land. When the Indian courts
have applied the public trust doctrine, they have considered it not only as an international law concept, but one,
which is well established in their national legal system.
Accepting public trust doctrine as a part of common law, the Indian courts have applied this explicitly in three
recent cases, the first one in 1997 and two cases in 1999 , including the case under consideration. Articles 48A
and 51A of the Constitution also furnish the principles of jurisprudence, which are fundamental to our
governance under the Rule of Law.
Case law
M.I Builders v. Radhey Shyam Sahu
The appeal was directed against the judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.
By a common judgment in three writ petitions, High Court speaking through Shobha Dixit, J. held that the
decision of the Lucknow Nagar Mahapalika ('Mahapalika' for short), also now called Nagar Nigam or
Corporation, permitting M.I. Builders Pvt. Ltd. (the appellant herein) to construct underground shopping
complex in the Jhandewala Park situated, Lucknow, was illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional. Writ of
mandamus was issued to the Mahapalika to restore back the park in its original position within a period of three
months from the date of the judgment and till that was done, to take adequate safety measures and to provide
necessary safeguard and protection to the public, users of the park. High Court had noticed that the fact that the
park was of historical importance was not denied by the Mahapalika and also the fact that perseverance or
maintenance of the park was necessary from the environmental angle and that the only reason advanced by the
Mahapalika for construction of the underground commercial complex was to ease the congestion in area. On
taking notice of the ground situations the court said that the public purpose, which is alleged to be served by
construction of the underground commercial complex, seemed totally illusory. On Appeal the court held that the
facts and circumstances when examined point to only one conclusion that the purpose of constructing the
underground shopping complex was a mere pretext and the dominant purpose was to favour the M.I. Builders to
earn huge profits. In depriving the citizens of Lucknow of their amenity of an old historical park in the
congested area on the spacious plea of decongesting the area Mahapalika and its officers forgot their duty
towards the citizens and acted in a most brazen manner. By allowing the construction Mahapalika had deprived
its residents as also others of the quality of life to which they were entitled to under the Constitution and the
Act. The agreement smacks of arbitrariness, unfairness and favourtism. The agreement was opposed to public
policy. It was not in public interest. Whole process of law was subverted to benefit the builder.
DOCTRINE OF PUBLIC TRUST IN VARIOUS STATES IN INDIA
Kerala
In Kerala Plachimada Panchayat has issued orders refusing permission to extract ground water due to
environmental problems in the nearby areas. Following the principles of Public Trust Doctrine court has upheld
the steps taken by the Panchayat. The State and its instrumentalities should act as trustees of this great wealth
.State has got a duty to protect ground water against excessive exploitation and the inaction of the State in this
regard will tantamount to infringement of the right to life of the people guaranteed under Art 21 of the
Constitution. Coca Cola Company has no right to extract much of national wealth and the extraction of ground
water is illegal, the Court held. Kerala State Government has framed legislation for protecting the fragile forest
land following the said principle of public trust doctrine. Kerala Forest (Vesting and Management of
Ecologically Fragile Lands) Act, 2002 was framed following the above principles.
Andhra Pradesh
Andhra Pradesh State Government has issued notification prohibiting conversion of agricultural land for
another purpose namely for irrigation or for some other purpose whatsoever by the State/Board of Revenue.
Andhra Pradesh HC[25]has held that, the same cannot be said to be bad in law. Deep underground water
belongs to the State in the sense that doctrine of public trust extends thereto. A person who holds land for
agricultural purpose may, subject to reasonable restriction that may be made by the State may have the right to
use water for irrigational purposes and for the said purpose he may also excavate a tank. But under no
circumstances, he can be permitted to restrict the flow of water to the neighboring lands or discharge the
effluents in such a manner so as to affect the right of his neighbor to use water for his own purposes.
Tamil Nadu
Reiterating the principles of "Public Trust" sand mining was stopped. Madras HC directed to take appropriate
action against the officers of the Government who permitted the illegal removal of the sand and causing damage
to the river.
Rajasthan
Steps taken to acquire land which is the bed of a village. The same was challenged before the Rajasthan HC in a
PIL.HC found that there is no necessity to invoke the urgency provisions and the principles of Public Trust has
been highlighted.
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court issued its landmark opinion in Illinois P.R Co case on the nature of a state's
title to its tide and submerged lands nearly 110 years ago, and although courts have reviewed tidelands trust
issues many times since then, the basic premise of the trust remains fundamentally unchanged. The Court said
then that a state's title to its tide and submerged lands is different from that to the lands it holds for sale. “It is a
title held in trust for the people of the State that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce
over them, and have liberty of fishing” free from obstruction or interference from private parties.
In India M.C Mehta v. Kamal Nath was the landmark judgment as far as the doctrine of public trust was
concerned. In that case Span motel, owned by the family members of Shri Kamal Nath, Minister for
Environment and Forests, Govt. of India diverted the Course of river Beas to beautify the motel and also
encroached upon some forest land. The apex court ordered the management of the Span motel to hand over
forest land to the Government of Himachal Pradesh.
The Court delivered a land mark judgment and established principle of exemplary damages for the first time in
India. The Court said that polluter must pay to reverse the damage caused by his act and imposed a fine of Rs
Ten Lakhs on the Span motel as exemplary damages. The Supreme Court of India recognized Polluter Pays
Principle and Public Trust Doctrine.
Various High Courts have evidently adopted the judgment as it is evidenced by the decisions from across the
country which has already been discussed in the last chapter. The decision of the Kerala High Court in the
Plachimada case also is significant as the same has gained worldwide attention.
GREEN COURTS
The Indian judiciary is set to turn ‘green’ with the Law Commission of India (hereafter ‘LCI’) recommending,
in its 186th Report, the constitution of specialised Environmental Courts to strengthen and revitalise
environmental governance.
1 The proposal has its roots in the call that emanated from the corridors of the apex Constitutional Court, that is,
the Supreme Court of India, in numerous significant cases
2 The Law Ministry has formulated the required draft legislation which awaits legislative sanction.
3 The Supreme Court has elevated the ‘right to healthy environment’ to the status of a fundamental human right
under Article 214 of the Constitution in the process of progressive enrichment of the environmental
jurisprudence with principles like sustainable development, polluter pays, public trust doctrine, precautionary
principle and intergenerational equity. This extension of constitutional umbrella over environmental issues
through dynamic judicial activism has augured well for environmental governance in India. The constitution of
a ‘green’ branch of judiciary to adjudicate environmental matters will be a further significant step towards
improving the quality of environment at a time when India has been caught in a tussle between developmental
and sustainability issues. Improvement in institutional arrangements to provide easily accessible environmental
justice to people is a part of the international agenda highlighted in instruments like Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, 1992 and the Aarhus Convention, 1998. Such institutional changes carry a
greater significance in case of emerging market economies like India where trade and development issues are
set to clash with environmental imperatives.
Keeping the development of environmental jurisprudence in India as the background, this article highlights the
problems afflicting the Indian judicial system which have led to a call for a specialised judiciary. I propose to
showcase the LCI’s significant recommendations regarding various dimensions of the ‘green’ court project in
light of the international experience concerning such courts in Australia and New Zealand. In light of this
appraisal, I argue that the Law Commission Report (hereafter ‘186th LCR’), though exhaustive and
comprehensive on familiar dimensions of the issue, fails to comprehend and explore the relatively obscure
anomalies that plague the idea of having Environmental Courts in the recommended form - a lacuna which
renders the proposed institutional arrangements myopic and status quoist. This article highlights that the
constitution of a new court system may not be such a ‘green’ plan after all, unless it is made capable of
adjudicating in an atmosphere independent of dominating political interests plaguing such specialised courts
and thus, as an alternative, it advocates for the establishment of specialist divisions within the existing Indian
High Courts.
The theoretical foundations of the advocacy for Environmental Courts can be traced in the arguments proposed
by the proponents of specialized courts in the renowned generalist versus specialised courts debate. Specialised
forums, it is contended, are able to evolve superior procedural norms and develop better quality of jurisprudence
through expert judges who have greater exposure to a homogeneous legal policy regime. They bring uniformity,
consistency and predictability in decision making which enhances public confidence and helps in development
of a rich body of jurisprudence. Incidental benefits include time and cost savings as the requirement of massive
documentation for understanding technical points of law in the special field is averted and streamlined
procedures make litigation easier and quicker.64 Though there are pitfalls like tunnel vision65 and capture by
interest groups,66 yet, in view of the practical necessity, specialisation appears to be an inevitable phenomenon
and the field of environmental law has produced two excellent examples of successful forums in Australia and
New Zealand.
The practical need for a ‘Green’ Court has been best articulated by Lord Woolf, in his Garner lecture to United
Kingdom Environmental Law Association, on the theme ‘Are the Judiciary Environmentally Myopic?’,67 based
on the extreme inadequacy of the general courts to deal with increasing specialisation in environmental law68
and the need to move beyond their traditional role of detached Wednesbury review. Thus, he proposed a
‘multifaceted, multi-skilled body which would combine the services’ provided by existing forums in the
environmental field to act as ‘one stop shop’ for faster, cheaper and more effective resolution of environmental
disputes because scientifically unsound or delayed decisions may wreak havoc in terms of irreversible
environmental damage and irreparable economic loss.
The objective of securing ‘environmental justice’ through adoption of flexible and people oriented procedures
offers another justification for such forums. Internationally, the concept of easy access to a fair, equitable,
timely and inexpensive justice system has been recognised as an important facet of environmental
governance.69 In the Indian context, the Constitution guarantees the right to speedy access to justice;70 a facet
of which is necessarily related with environmental rights.71 The most
Law, Environment and Development Journal
significant facets of environmental justice are ‘equal justice’ and ‘social inclusion’,72 that is, simplification of
structures and procedures for potential claimants in order to improve access to justice to those who are socially
excluded due to the labyrinthine complexity of the present system. Article 39A73 mandates the Indian State to
secure a legal system which is socially inclusive and equally accessible to all people and the jurisprudence of
PIL stems from this recognition of the rights of the deprived, illiterate and the poor.74 The constitution of
environmental courts is thus a sacred constitutional obligation upon the Indian State.
Furthermore, it has also been argued that environmental law has grown as a specialised area of law requiring
separate adjudication due to certain unique features75 viz. (1) existence of complex technical/scientific
questions; (2) overlapping of civil and criminal remedies as well as public and private interests in any
environmental and development of fundamental environmental principles such as the precautionary approach,
polluter-pays, sustainable development, prevention at source, and procedural transparency.
However, the present efforts in India have been triggered by the call from the Supreme Court to constitute such
courts. The practical necessity stems from (1) lack of expertise with the courts, including the Constitutional
Courts, to judge merits of an environmental issue plagued with scientific uncertainty;76 and (2) labyrinthine
routes provided for review and appeals under the statutes to nonexpert bureaucrats leading to delay in
adjudication. The Supreme Court has, at least in three landmark cases, expressed the difficulties arising out of
lack of expertise with the judges,77 which is best expressed in the following words:
The cases involve the correctness of opinions on technological aspects expressed by the Pollution Control
Boards or other bodies whose opinions are placed before the Courts. In such a situation, considerable difficulty
is experienced by this Court or the High Courts in adjudicating upon the correctness of the technological and
scientific opinions presented to the Courts or in regard to the efficacy of the technology proposed to be adopted
by the industry or in regard to the need for alternative technology or modifications as suggested by the Pollution
Control Board or other bodies; (3) rapid evolution of a substantial body of international environmental
instruments spanning across a gamut of issues like trade in endangered species, ocean and marine pollution ,
transnational shipments of hazardous wastes and global climate change nature of remedies under the current
dispensation which provides for multiple appeal routes under different statutes.85 The proposed Environmental
Courts would act as ‘one stop shop’ or single window for all environmental adjudication. Rationalisation of
such fragmented and diversified jurisdictions of a number of authorities has been an important aim of such
courts in New South Wales, Australia and New Zealand. In the United Kingdom, the idea has been toyed with
mainly because the system has grown ‘too complex, unintelligible to the general public, lacking any underlying
coherence and thus failing to reflect contemporary developments in environmental law’.86 Moreover, the
existing authorities, in the Indian context, lack the combination of judicial and technical expertise, for example,
the qualifications of the persons to be appointed as appellate authorities under section 28 of the Water
(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, section 31 of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution)
Act, 1981 and under Rule 12 of the Hazardous Wastes (Management and Handling) Rules, 1989, are not clearly
spelt out. The Supreme Court has noted regional disparities created by such open provisions viz. while the
appellate authority under section 28 in the State of Andhra Pradesh as per the notification of the Andhra Pradesh
Government is a retired High Court Judge with no expert to help him in technical matters and the same
authority as per the notification in State of Delhi is the Financial Commissioner who is neither a regular judicial
member nor a technical expert.87 Going further, under the National Environmental Tribunal Act, 1995, the
Tribunal may either have a Judge/ retired Judge of the Supreme or High Court or a Secretary to Government or
Additional Secretary who has been a Vice-Chairman for two years as Chairman of the Tribunal. This
involvement of executive authorities deprives the process of procedural fairness due to lack of public hearings,
restricted procedural rights and lack of transparency and consequently, such a system fails to contribute to the
development of a body of legal principleswhich is indispensable for the development of efficient environmental
governance system.
To crown it all, the Constitutional Courts are faced with the Sisyphean task of clearing a burgeoning docket of
cases reaching them through multifarious appellate routes under the Constitution and other statutes. The 124th
Report of the LCI describes the pendency of cases in the High Courts as ‘catastrophic, crisis ridden, almost
unmanageable, imposing an immeasurable burden on the system’.89 Thus, they are not able to devote requisite
time and attention to pressing issues of environmental concern in the face of a manifold rise and high visibility
of environmental litigation. Lastly, the presence of a specialist court will also increase public, government and
industry awareness of environmental issues as witnessed in New South Wales.90 From a holistic perspective,
the rational for a ‘green’ court can be best articulated in the following words:
The costs and administrative changes involved in setting up such a Tribunal to handle the majority of existing
appeals would be modest compared to the policy gains to be made. Such a Tribunal would bring a greater
consistency of approach to the application and interpretation of environmental law and policy. The
improvements in authority and specialist knowledge would also foster increased confidence in those subject to
environmental regulation, the regulatory authorities, and the general public. The Environmental Tribunal would
lead to the better application of current environmental law and policy, a more secure basis for addressing future
challenges, increased public confidence in how we handle environmental regulation, and the improved
environmental outcomes which should follow.
Background
Most conservationists would have heard of the National Green Tribunal (NGT), and some may have already
filed applications before it. This short primer explains how, when and where to approach the NGT, and looks at
the fundamental difference between courts and tribunals, and the structure and jurisdiction of the NGT.
The NGT was established on October 18, 2010 under the National Green Tribunal Act 2010, passed by the
Central Government. The stated objective of the Central Government was to provide a specialized forum for
effective and speedy disposal of cases pertaining to environment protection, conservation of forests and for
seeking compensation for damages caused to people or property due to violation of environmental laws or
conditions specified while granting permissions.
Structure
Following the enactment of the said law, the Principal Bench of the NGT has been established in the National
Capital – New Delhi, with regional benches in Pune (Western Zone Bench), Bhopal (Central Zone Bench),
Chennai (Southern Bench) and Kolkata (Eastern Bench). Each Bench has a specified geographical jurisdiction
covering several States in a region. There is also a mechanism for circuit benches. For example, the Southern
Zone bench, which is based in Chennai, can decide to have sittings in other places like Bangalore or Hyderabad.
The Chairperson of the NGT is a retired Judge of the Supreme Court, Head Quartered in Delhi. Other Judicial
members are retired Judges of High Courts. Each bench of the NGT will comprise of at least one Judicial
Member and one Expert Member. Expert members should have a professional qualification and a minimum of
15 years experience in the field of environment/forest conservation and related subjects.
Powers
The NGT has the power to hear all civil cases relating to environmental issues and questions that are linked to
the implementation of laws listed in Schedule I of the NGT Act. These include the following:
The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974;
The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977;
The Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980;
The Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981;
The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986;
The Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991;
The Biological Diversity Act, 2002.
This means that any violations pertaining only to these laws, or any order / decision taken by the Government
under these laws can be challenged before the NGT. Importantly, the NGT has not been vested with powers to
hear any matter relating to the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, the Indian Forest Act, 1927 and various laws
enacted by States relating to forests, tree preservation etc. Therefore, specific and substantial issues related to
these laws cannot be raised before the NGT. You will have to approach the State High Court or the Supreme
Court through a Writ Petition (PIL) or file an Original Suit before an appropriate Civil Judge of the taluk where
the project that you intend to challenge is located.
Procedure for filing an Application or Appeal
The NGT follows a very simple procedure to file an application seeking compensation for environmental
damage or an appeal against an order or decision of the Government. The official language of the NGT is
English.
For every application / appeal where no claim for compensation is involved, a fee of Rs. 1000/- is to be paid. In
case where compensation is being claimed, the fee will be one percent of the amount of compensation subject to
a minimum of Rs. 1000/-.
A claim for Compensation can be made for:
Relief/compensation to the victims of pollution and other environmental damage including accidents involving
hazardous substances;
Restitution of property damaged;
Restitution of the environment for such areas as determined by the NGT.
No application for grant of any compensation or relief or restitution of property or environment shall be
entertained unless it is made within a period of five years from the date on which the cause for such
compensation or relief first arose.
Principles of Justice adopted by NGT
The NGT is not bound by the procedure laid down under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, but shall be guided
by principles of natural justice. Further, NGT is also not bound by the rules of evidence as enshrined in the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Thus, it will be relatively easier (as opposed to approaching a court) for
conservation groups to present facts and issues before the NGT, including pointing out technical flaws in a
project, or proposing alternatives that could minimize environmental damage but which have not been
considered.
While passing Orders/decisions/awards, the NGT will apply the principles of sustainable development, the
precautionary principle and the polluter pays principles.
However, it must be noted that if the NGT holds that a claim is false, it can impose costs including lost benefits
due to any interim injunction.
Review and Appeal
Under Rule 22 of the NGT Rules, there is a provision for seeking a Review of a decision or Order of the NGT.
If this fails, an NGT Order can be challenged before the Supreme Court within ninety days.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
1. What is the difference between a Court and a Tribunal?
The Supreme Court has answered this question by holding that “Every Court may be a tribunal but every
tribunal necessarily may not be a court”. A High court for instance, where a PIL would be filed, may have wide
ranging powers covering all enacted laws (including the power of contempt) but the NGT has only been vested
with powers under the seven laws related to the Environment.
2. We are trying to protect a National Park/Sanctuary from various pressures including a dam proposal and
widening of a highway. Should we approach the NGT?
No. As explained above, the NGT is not empowered to hear matters pertaining to issues coming under the ambit
of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, which is applicable in case of National Parks, Sanctuaries and Tiger
Reserves. It would be appropriate to approach either the High Court in your State or the Supreme Court. Please
consult a competent lawyer for advice.
3. Can I personally argue a matter before the NGT or do I need a lawyer?
Yes. You can argue the matter yourself provided you are well acquainted with the facts and are reasonably
knowledgeable about the law and procedures. The language of the NGT is English, and some guidelines related
to dress apply. However, it would be best if a lawyer represents you since (s)he will be better equipped to argue
and handle all procedural aspects.
4. What is the penalty for non-compliance of an NGT Order?
If a project proponent or any authority does not comply with the directions contained in an NGT order, the
penalty can be imprisonment for three years or fine extending to 10 crores or both. Continued failure will attract
a fine of twenty five thousand rupees per day.
5. Is there a bar on civil courts to hear /take up cases under the seven specified laws in Schedule I of the NGT
Act?
Yes. With the enactment of the NGT Act, Civil courts cannot hear matters related to Environmental issues
under the seven laws which the NGT is empowered to deal with.
The Supreme Court of India has stayed its own order by which it had transferred all environmental cases from
high courts in the country to the National Green Tribunal (NGT) in August 2012 . The recent order, dated
March 10, was given on a petition filed by the Adarsh Cooperative Housing Society, which has built the
controversial 31 storey Adarsh residential building in south Mumbai on land meant for war widows.
The Union Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) had ordered the demolition of the housing society in
January 2011, citing violations of the Coastal Regulation Zone Notification of 1991. Adarsh housing society
filed an appeal against this order in the high court of Mumbai. In January 2013, the company filed an appeal to
the high court, requesting transfer of the still pending case to NGT, citing the August 2012 order of the Supreme
Court. In July last year, the high court rejected the appeal, following which the company approached the apex
court, challenging the high court order against transfer of the case to NGT.
The apex court has upheld the high court order for now and has added that the order transferring cases needs
reconsideration. The Supreme Court order also states that till the matter is decided, no case will be transferred to
NGT. The next hearing is on April 21.
The August 2012 order of the apex court was given in a case connected with the Bhopal gas tragedy. The idea
behind the order was to avoid “likelihood of conflicts of orders between high courts and NGT” with a view to
expedite the process of providing justice. All matters that fell under the purview of the NGT Act, 2010,
Schedule I, were to be transferred. Interestingly, justice Swatanter Kumar, the present chairperson of NGT, was
on the bench that passed the August 2012 order.
Question of NGT’s jurisdiction
The NGT Act states that all cases where a “substantial question” relating to the environment is involved, it is
the NGT’s jurisdiction. This “substantial question” has been defined under the Act to include instances of direct
violation of a statutory environmental obligation leading to a direct or indirect impact on community or an
individual or where the gravity of damage to the environment or property is substantial. The NGT website
clarifies that such substantial questions of environment are those arising out of implementation of the
enactments mentioned in Schedule I of the Act.
Schedule I mentions seven environment and forest laws in the country, such as the Water (Prevention and
Control of Pollution) Act 1974, Forest (Conservation) Act 1980, Environment (Protection) Act 1986, and Air
(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act 1981. Thus any matter related to these Acts form part of the NGT
jurisdiction. Keeping these principles in mind and taking into consideration the Supreme Court order of August
2012, the Adarsh case relating to violation of CRZ Notification does seem to fall under the purview of NGT.
What about environment cases?
“It is clear that all matters related to Acts mentioned under Schedule I of the NGT Act are under its purview but
what about matters of ‘environment plus’?” asks Sanjay Upadhyay, a Supreme Court lawyer who also argues
cases before NGT. By “environment plus” he means other Acts that may well be involved under an
environmental matter filed at NGT but not mentioned under Schedule I. For instance, if a case of CRZ violation
is filed in NGT, it may also involve looking at the town planning Act or SEZ regulations. This is a grey area
that needs to be clarified, especially since most environmental concerns today tend to involve more than just the
seven Acts mentioned under Schedule I. “This is just one case but now across the countries many such cases are
there in the high court which even though they involve a pressing environmental issue are not being transferred
to NGT due to them being environment plus,” informs Upadhyay.
Lately, there have been some tensions over jurisdiction of high courts vis-à-vis NGT. For instance, in January
this year the Chennai High Court passed an order stating that the Southern bench of NGT has no authority to
take up sou moto cases as it is not a part of the NGT Act.
The cases transferred from high courts to NGT for which the rulings have been given revolve around a number
of environmental issues. There have been cases of NGT sending the cases back to the high courts, saying they
are out of the purview of NGT. A case in point is one relating to the Great Indian Bustard Sanctuary. NGT in its
judgement dated March 25 has sent the case back to high court, stating the Wildlife Protection Act does not fall
under Schedule I and is hence out of its jurisdiction.
There is a need for greater clarity on what entails substantial questions relating to the environment and whether
it is only limited to the seven Acts mentioned under Schedule I of the NGT Act. It is also important to
understand how and who will deal with some of the “environment plus” cases and if there is a need for these
cases to go to a special court or not. Are not all environmental cases actually “environment plus”?
NGT was formed with a clear aim to expedite environmental cases in a special court. Is that purpose being met?
Most would say yes. Article 226 of the Indian Constitution lays down the jurisdiction of the high courts in the
country. The August 2012 order of the apex court was an attempt to ensure there is no overlap of jurisdiction of
high courts and NGT. However, to keep the NGT jurisdiction restricted to matters related to the seven Acts in
Schedule I of the NGT Act might not serve the very purpose of having NGT. For many environmental cases
might not fall under the purview of only those Acts or might involve more regulations not mentioned in
Schedule I.
It is imperative that the substantial question related to environment is considered to include a wider meaning of
the phrase. Then only the intent of the law (NGT Act) will be met.
THE INDIAN FOREST ACT, 1927
The Indian Forest Act, 1927 was largely based on previous Indian Forest Acts implemented under the British.
The most famous one was the Indian Forest Act of 1878. Both the 1878 act and the 1927 one sought to
consolidate and reserve the areas having forest cover, or significant wildlife, to regulate movement and transit
of forest produce, and duty leviable on timber and other forest produce. It also defines the procedure to be
followed for declaring an area to be a Reserved Forest, a Protected Forest or a Village Forest. It defines what is
a forest offence, what are the acts prohibited inside a Reserved Forest, and penalties leviable on violation of the
provisions of the Act.
Indian Forest Act, 1927:
• This Act recognizes forest dwellers’ rights and makes conservation more accountable.
• The Act basically does two things:
1 Grants legal recognition to the rights of traditional forest dwelling communities, partially
correcting the injustice caused by the forest laws, and
2 Makes a beginning towards giving communities and the public a voice in forest and wildlife
conservation.
• The law recognises three types of rights:
1 Land Rights: Land rights are given to people, who have been cultivating land prior to December,
13, 2005.
2 Use Rights: The law provides for rights to use and/or collect the minor forest produce things like
tendu patta, herbs, medicinal plants etc “that has been traditionally collected, use of grazing grounds and water
bodies and use of traditional areas by nomadic or pastoralist communities i.e. communities that move with their
herds, as opposed to practicing settled agriculture.
3 Right to Protect and Conserve: The law gives rights to protect and manage the forests to people
of village communities.
• The Act also categorizes forests into three categories:

1 Reserve forest: These forests are the most restricted forests and may be constituted by the State
Government on any forest land or waste land which is the property of the Government or on which the
Government has proprietary rights. In reserved forests, most uses by local people are prohibited, unless
specifically allowed by a Forest Officer in the course of settlement.
2 Protected forest: The State Government is empowered to constitute any land other than reserved
forests as protected forests over which the Government has proprietary rights. Under ‘Protected Forests’, the
Government retains the power to issue rules regarding the use of such forests and retains the power to reserve
the specific tree species in the protected forests. This power has been used to establish State control over trees,
whose timber, fruit or other non-wood products have revenue-raising potential.
3 Village forest: ‘Village forests’ are the one in which the State Government may assign to ‘any
village community the rights of Government to or over any land which has been constituted a reserved forest’.
The Indian Forest Act, 1927 was an act to consolidate the then existing laws relating to forest, the transit of
forest products and duties that can be levied on “Forest Product” as defined in Section 2 (iv) (a) and (b) of the
act. The act deals with reserved forest, village forest, protected forest, control over forests and lands not being
property of government, the duty on timber and other forest produce, regulation transit of forest products,
collection of timber, penalties and procedures, cattle – trespass, forest officers and other miscellaneous
provisions.
This act does not lay down a specific definition for forests. The act establishes three categories of forests,
reserve forest, protected forest and village forest. The reserved forests (section 3 to 27 of the Act of 1927) can
be notified by the State Government on any forest land or waste land to which the government has ownership or
right. To be categorized as a reserved forest, the land must be forest land or waste land in the absence of which
the notification could be quashed. Section 26 of the Indian Forest Act 1927 prohibits a number of activities
including making fresh clearings, tree felling, lopping, burning, grazing, quarrying, manufacturing activities,
hunting, shooting, etc. in the forest. Violation of provisions of Section 26 specifically with regards to creating
fire, felling, girdling, lopping, etc. of trees, quarrying and manufacturing operations or clearing breaking up of
any land for cultivation is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or with fine
which may extend to Rs. 20,000 but which shall not be less than Rs. 5,000.
For other offenses under Section 26 an imprisonment for a term which may extend to 6 months or with fine
which may extend to Rs. 1,000 or with both and on the second and every subsequent conviction for the same
offense, with imprisonment which may extend to 6 months or with fine which may extend to Rs. 2,000 or with
both is prescribed. It also provides for adjudication of forest rights, uses by local people as allowed by forest
officer, appeals and denotification. Section 25 specifically empowers the forest officer to stop any public or
private way or water coarse in reserved forest. The act also provides for issuing notification regarding
appointment of forest settlement officer to adjudicate rights and granting permissions for activities and claims.
Section 28 provides for assigning rights of reserved forests or protected forests or any forest belonging to the
state government to any village community and provisions relating to reserved forest, protected forest or forest
belonging to the government shall apply. Such forests are called village forests.
Section 29 provides for the notification of protected forests. Protected forests are also notified on forest land or
waste land. The state government under provision of Section 30 may declare any tree or class of trees in a
protected forest to be reserved, it can also declare any portion of a protected forest as closed for a term not
exceeding 30 ears during which the rights of private persons shall be suspended provided that alternate rights
are available in the remainder of the forest. It can also prohibit specified activities within the area Violation of
prohibited activities in protected areas as prescribed in Section 30 and 32 are punishable offences liable to be
punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 2 years or with a fine which may extend to Rs.
5,000 or with both and on the second and every subsequent conviction for the same offence, with imprisonment
for a term which may extend to 2 years and with fine which may extend to Rs. 10,000.
The state government also has the powers to regulate or prohibit activities in any forest or waste land not being
the property of the government after providing suitable opportunity to the owner of such forest or land.
Some of the other acts related with forestry and tree plantation are as follows:
Central Acts:
1 The Forest Conservation Act 1980.
2 The Wildlife Protection Act 1972.
3 The Environment Protection Act 1986.
4 The Biodiversity Protection Act 2003.
More effective and unambiguous provisions with regards to the implementation of the Polluter Pays Principle
would be beneficial in the longer run.
FEATURES OF THE WILDLIFE PROTECTION ACT,1972
India is a land with a rich heritage of wild life. India is home to many big animals and smaller species in large
numbers. The Indian jungles are famous and immortalized by Rudyard Kipling in his Mowgli books. Elephants,
Rhinoceroses, tigers and lions are all at home in the Indian jungles. To get a magnitude of the wild life in India
one has only to examine the numbers of these animals as they existed throughout history. Reports indicate that
the elephant population number over 500,000 and the lion roamed all over India. The tiger population was over
100,000. But indiscriminate poaching and hunting by Maharajahs and their ilk, depleted the wild life
dangerously. The British who for a long period ruled India were not concerned about Indian wild life and over
the years the Lion almost became extinct and the number of tigers dwindled dangerously. There were also only
5 wild life parks available when India became free in 1947.
With a dwindling population of wild life in India with mass scale hunting and poaching and deforestation ,
which destroyed the natural habitat of the Indian species the government of India with pressure from wild life
enthusiasts thought it fit to pass a stringent law to curb such practices and also give statutory recognition to
game parks and animal reserves. Thus the Indian Wild Life Protection Act 1972 was enacted by the Indian
parliament. The law was made applicable to the entire India state except Jammu and Kashmir which enacted its
own wild life act.
The law for the first time regulated the setting up and control of game parks to be referred to as National Parks
and declared many species as protected animals and also provided for stringent punishments for poachers or
other persons who killed wild animals. Effectively the act banned hunting for pleasure or sport.
The act has six schedules which cover the entire gamut of wild life.
a) Schedule I and II are the most potent sections of the act. This section covers animals which are in the
category of endangered species. The sections in this schedule give absolute protection to certain species and
these cannot be infringed on any account. The value of these sections can bee seen from the fact that the famous
actor Salman Khan was sentenced to 5 years rigorous imprisonment for shooting a black buck in Rajasthan. The
case is under appeal in the high court. In addition 16 persons have been convicted and sentenced to various
terms of prison up to 7 years for killing a tiger.
b) Schedule III and IV. These also have roughly the same provisions of Section I and II, but cover animals
that are not in danger of becoming extinct. The penalties under this section are also less than Schedule I and II.
c) Schedule V delineates animals that can be hunted like ducks and deer’s. For this purpose the hunter has to
apply for a license to the District Forest Officer who will allow a hunter to shoot during a specific season and
restricted area. Any infringement can lead to cancellation of the hunting license.
d) Schedule VI concerns cultivation and plant life and gives teeth to setting up more protected animal parks.
The Indian Wild life protection act is a god send for wild life conservation in India and gives sweeping powers
to law enforcement authorities to punish anybody guilty under the act.
Soon after the Stockholm convention on Environment, the Indian government responded positively by passing
an act for the protection of India’s wildlife (both terrestrial and aquatic) and their habitats. Ever visited a
Wildlife Sanctuary or a National Park? Taken a safari to enjoy the animals in the wild? Well, all that was
possible only after the enactment of this Act.
WHY WAS THIS ACT NEEDED?
A previous law, called the Wild Birds and Animals Protection Act 1935, had become completely obsolete. The
jurisdiction of forests and wildlife came under the State governments, and each state government had a different
policy in dealing with this subject. Furthermore, due to uncentralized regulation, huge exploitation of forests as
well as the wild animals was going on for various economic needs. The numbers of different wild species of
animals, including the cheetah, tiger, black buck fell sharply, and so did the total forest cover of the country.
The Act was enacted to check this rampant disregard for the animals and birds of the country.
OBJECTIVES
The underlying objective of this Act is to protect the animals and birds of the country.
SALIENT FEATURES
The Act has 7 Chapters, 66 Sections and 6 Schedules as of today.
Any amendment to this act can be done on the recommendation of an expert committee, that has been put
together by the Indian Board of Wildlife. The Act has been amended in 1982, 1986, 1991 and 1993.
The 6 Schedules of the Act specify the level of protection for different species. Schedule I and II are for
endangered species, that deserve rigorous protection and the breach of these rules results in serious punishment.
A famous case where this was applied was when Salman Khan was sentenced to 5 years in prison for hunting a
black buck.
Schedule III and IV is for species that are not endangered, but the protection and punishments are equally
rigorous.
Schedule V delineates the animal species that can be hunted, like deer or ducks, and the rules pertaining to their
hunting.
Schedule VI covers the protection and trade of medicinal plants as well as agricultural species of plants.
Chapter IV of this act spells out the rules for the different types of protected areas that will be marked out for
the protection of wildlife.
Chapter V concerns with the trade and commerce involving wild animals, as well as prohibition of the hunting
of trophy animals. It states that every wild animal is the property of the Indian Government. A license is
maintained by the government for the regulation of hunting as well as possession of wildlife parts.
Chapter VI spells out the punishments for different offences.
PROTECTED AREAS
The Act talks about the setting up of three types of Protected Areas for the protection of wildlife. These are-
Wildlife Sanctuaries- A state government can declare any area as a wildlife sanctuary if it feels that the area has
the necessary ecological importance. The setting up of the sanctuary is then taken up by the concerned District
Collector. This includes the resettlement of people, if required, and the land acquisition process. Once the
sanctuary is functional, the Chief Wildlife Warden is the highest authority for the sanctuary. He/She can provide
permits for people to enter and utilize the resources within the sanctuary. It is not strictly off-limits.
National Parks- The state governments are again responsible for taking initiative in declaring a site as National
Park. National Parks are more strictly regulated than Wildlife Sanctuaries, with absolutely no other activity
taking place within it’s premises. The boundary of a National Park is fixed and clearly specified, unlike a
sanctuary. If this boundary needs to be changed for any purpose, a motion has to be passed in favor of it in the
Legislative Assembly of the state.
Closed Areas- These are areas that are temporarily off limits for a particular duration of time. Oftentimes, this
for regulation of hunting of animals.
Zoos- Under Chapter IV-A, the Central Zoo Authority has been set up to regulate the zoos of the country. Zoos
help in ex-situ conservation, when protection in-situ is not possible or impractical.
PUNISHMENTS FOR OFFENSES
This has been described in Chapter VI of the Act. All offenses under this Act are considered non-bailable and
cognizable; meaning no search warrant is required by the authority if they think a person/party is guilty of
breaking any rules of this act, particularly the trade of animal parts. If a person is found guilty of breaching this
Act (unless provisions are stated), it can lead to an imprisonment of a minimum of three years and a fine of
minimum of 25,000 rupees.
If a company commits a crime against this Act, all persons in-charge of the company/project in question, as well
as the company itself, will be the liable party.
This was a landmark Act in the environmental movement of India. It was soon after this that various other
legislation like Water Act, Air Act and Environment Protection Act came into force.
Definitions under the Act (Section 2)
"animal" includes amphibians, birds, mammals, and reptiles, and their young ones, and also includes, in the
cases of birds and reptiles, their eggs.
"animal article" means an article made from any captive or wild animal, other than vermin, and includes an
article or object in which the whole or any part of such animal has been used and an article made therefrom.
"hunting" includes
(a) capturing, killing, poisoning, snaring, or trapping any wild animal, and every attempt to do so
(b) driving any wild animal for any of the purposes specified in sub clause
(c) injuring, destroying or taking any body part of any such animal, or in the case of wild birds or reptiles,
disturbing or damaging the eggs or nests of such birds or reptiles.
"taxidermy" means the curing, preparation or preservation of trophies.
"trophy" means the whole or any part of any captive or wild animal (other than vermin) which has been kept or
preserved by any means, whether artificial or natural. This includes:
(a) rugs, skins, and specimens of such animals mounted in whole or in part through a process of taxidermy
(b) antler, horn, rhinoceros horn, feather, nail, tooth, musk, eggs, and nests and shells.
"uncured trophy" means the whole or any part of any captive animal (other than vermin) which has not
undergone a process of taxidermy. This includes a freshly killed wild animal, ambergris, musk and other animal
products.
"vermin" means any wild animal specified in Schedule V.
"wildlife" includes any animal, bees, butterflies, crustacean, fish and moths; and aquatic or land vegetation
which forms part of any habitat.
Summary of Wildlife Protection Act (1972) of India!
The Wildlife Act was passed in 1972 to protect the wildlife and their habitats. The habitat destruction due to
agriculture, industries, urbanisation and other human activities had led to the erosion of the country’s wildlife.
The major activities and provisions in the act can be summed up as follows:
1. It defines the wildlife related terminology.
2. Enactment of an All India Wildlife Protection Act (1972).
3. It provides for the appointment of wildlife advisory Board, Wildlife warden, their powers, duties etc.
4. Becoming a party to the Convention of International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora
(CITES, 1976).
5. Launching a “national component of UNESCO’s ‘Man and Biosphere Programme’ (1971).
6. Under the Act, comprehensive listing of endangered wildlife species was done for the first time and
prohibition of hunting of the endangered species was mentioned.
7. Protection to some endangered plants.
8. The Act provides for setting up of National Parks, Wildlife Sanctuaries etc.
9. The Act provides for the constitution of Central Zoo Authority.
10. There is provision for trade and commerce in some wildlife species with license for sale, possession,
transfer etc.
11. The act imposes a ban on the trade or commerce in scheduled animals.
12. It provides for legal powers to officers and punishment to offenders.

It provides for captive breeding programme for endangered species. Several Conservation Projects for
individual endangered species like Lion (1972), Tiger (1973), Crocodile (1974) and Brown antlered Deer
(1981) were stated under this Act. The Act is adopted by all states in India except J & K, which has its own Act.
Some of the major drawbacks of the Act include mild penalty to offenders, illegal wildlife trade in J & K,
personal ownership certificate for animal articles like tiger and leopard skins, no coverage of foreign
endangered wildlife, pitiable condition of wildlife in mobile zoos and little emphasis on protection of plant
genetic resources.
Steps for the wild life conservation
(i) To survey and collect all the information about wildlife, especially, their number and growth.
(ii) To protect habitat by protecting forests.
(iii) To delimit the areas of their natural habitat.
(iv) To protect wildlife from pollution and from natural hazards.
(v) To impose complete restriction on hunting and capturing of wildlife.
(vi) To impose restrictions on export and import of wildlife products and severe punishment to be given to those
who indulge in this activity.
(vii) To develop game sanctuaries for specific wild animals or for general wildlife.
(viii) To make special arrangements to protect those species whose number is very limited.
(ix) To develop general awareness at national and international level regarding protection of wildlife
The number of cases reported under Wildlife Protection Act in India was 829 during the year 2015. The top 10
States/UTs in terms of the number of cases reported under Wildlife Protection Act were: Rajasthan, Uttar
Pradesh, Assam, Karnataka, West Bengal, Jharkhand, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Uttarakhand and Chhattisgarh
during the year 2015.
The number of cases reported under Wildlife Protection Act in Rajasthan was 239 during the year 2015. It
accounted for 28.83% of the number of cases reported under Wildlife Protection Act in India during the year
2015.
The number of cases reported under Wildlife Protection Act in Uttar Pradesh was 234 during the year 2015. It
2015. The number of cases reported under Wildlife Protection Act in Assam was 74 during the year 2015. It
2015.
The number of cases reported under Wildlife Protection Act in Karnataka was 74 during the year 2015. It
2015. The number of cases reported under Wildlife Protection Act in West Bengal was 50 during the year 2015.
It accounted for 6.03% of the number of cases reported under Wildlife Protection Act in India during the year
2015.
OFFENCES AND PENALTIES UNDER WILDLIFE PROTECTION ACT
Section 51 in The Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972
51. Penalties.—
(1) Any person who 1[contravenes any provision of this Act 2[(except Chapter VA and section 38J)] or any rule
or order made thereunder or who commits a breach of any of the conditions of any licence or permit granted
under this Act, shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall, on conviction, be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to 3[three years] or with fine which may extend to 4[twenty-five
thousand rupees] or with both: 5[Provided that where the offence committed is in relation to any animal
specified in Schedule I or Part II of Schedule II or meat of any such animal or animal article, trophy or uncured
trophy derived from such animal or where the offence relates to hunting in a sanctuary or a National Park or
altering the boundaries of a sanctuary or a National Park, such offence shall be punishable with imprisonment
for a term which shall not be less than three years but may extend to seven years and also with fine which shall
not be less than ten thousand rupees: Provided further that in the case of a second or subsequent offence of the
nature mentioned in this sub-section, the term of imprisonment shall not be less than three years but may extend
to seven years and also with fine which shall not be less than twenty-five thousand rupees.] 6[(1A) Any person
who contravenes any provisions of Chapter VA, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall
not be less than 7[three years] but which may extend to seven years and also with fine which shall not be less
than 8[ten thousand rupees].] 9[(1B) Any person who contravenes the provisions of section 38J shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to
two thousand rupees, or with both: Provided that in the case of a second or subsequent offence the term of
imprisonment may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees.] 10[(1C) Any
person, who commits an offence in relation to the core area of a tiger reserve or where the offence relate to
hunting in the tiger reserve or altering the boundaries of the tiger reserve, such offence shall be punishable on
first conviction with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but may extend to seven
years, and also with fine which shall not be less than fifty thousand rupees but may extend to two lakh rupees;
and in the event of a second or subsequent conviction with imprisonment for a term of not less than seven years
and also with fine which shall not be less than five lakh rupees but may extend to fifty lakh rupees.
(1D) Whoever abets any offence punishable under sub-section (1C) shall, if the act abetted is committed in
consequence of the abetment, be punishable with the punishment provided for that offence.]
(2) When any person is convicted of an offence against this Act, the court trying the offence may order that any
captive animal, wild animal, animal article, trophy, 11[uncured trophy, meat, ivory imported into India or an
article made from such ivory, any specified plant, or part or derivative thereof] in respect of which the offence
has been committed, and any trap, tool, vehicle, vessel or weapon, used in the commission of the said offence
be forfeited to the State Government and that any licence or permit, held by such person under the provisions of
this Act, be cancelled.
(3) Such cancellation of licence or permit or such forfeiture shall be in addition to any other punishment that
may be awarded for such offence.
(4) Where any person is convicted of an offence against this Act, the court may direct that the licence, if any,
granted to such person under the Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1954), for possession of any arm with which an offence
against this Act has been committed, shall be cancelled and that such person shall not be eligible for a licence
under the Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), for a period of five years from the date of conviction. 12[(5) Nothing
contained in section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or in the Probation of Offenders
Act, 1958 (20 of 1958) shall apply to a person convicted of an offence with respect to hunting in a sanctuary or
a National Park or of an offence against any provision of Chapter VA unless such person is under eighteen
years of age.]
Definitions
The definitions section of the Act plays a part in setting out its scope in terms of the articles to which it applies.
The Act’s protection extends to wild animals and captive animals, both of which are defined as animals
belonging to a species which is listed in Schedules I-IV of the
Act.6
The Act’s provisions on trade, possession and transport of protected species relate not just to captive and wild
animals, but also to the uncured trophies, trophies, animals articles, and meat derived from such animals.
In Cottage Industries Exposition Limited and Another v. Union of India and Others 2007 (143) DLT 477, the
Delhi High Court was dealing with a writ petition by a company carrying on a business in shahtoosh wool,
which is made from the hair of the Tibetan antelope, a protected species listed in Schedule I of the Act. The
petitioner argued that a shahtoosh shawl would not fall within the definition of “animal article” since the
definition did not specifically include the word ‘hair.’ The court refused to accept this contention. After quoting
a series of judgments that a statute must be construed so as to avoid absurdity and mischief, the court held that:
“In fact, the acceptance of the plea of the petitioner to the effect that the definition of
'animal article' would exclude 'hair' merely because of the definition of 'trophy' including
'hair' within its sweep would lead to an absurd result proscribed by the above judgments
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court…… In our view, the definitions of 'uncured trophy', 'trophy'
and 'Scheduled animal article' are not separate, distinct and exclusive compartments but
are complementary to one another. Any other construction would defeat the object of the
Act and the intention of the Legislature.”
Accordingly, any and all parts of a captive or wild animal will either fall within the definitions of meat, uncured
trophy (if it has not undergone a process of taxidermy or preservation), trophy (if it has undergone a process of
preservation), or animal article (when it has undergone further processing to become an article, such as a
shatoosh shawl).
In State of Tamil Nadu and Another v. Messrs Kaypee Industrial Chemicals Private Limited and Others 2005
AIR (Mad) 304, the Madras High Court allowed the collection of coral for commercial use in lime manufacture.
It held that dead pieces or the outer skeleton of a protected marine living organism would not fall within the
definition of animal article or wild animal and that therefore its collection was not banned. This judgment is
contrary to the Delhi High Courts view in Cottage Industries Exposition Limited (Supra) since as per that view,
the dead coral would fall within the definitions of trophy or uncured trophy and would therefore be protected.
The judgment was appealed by the State to the Supreme Court where a stay was granted on such collection.
Owing to the stay, the Madras High Court declined to allow collection of coral in C. Rathinavel v. State of
Tamil Nadu and Others 2008 INDLAW MAD 1875. Offences
For offences relating to wild animals (or their parts and products) included in schedule-I or part II of Schedule-
II and those relating to hunting or altering the boundaries of a sanctuary or national park the punishment and
penalty have been enhanced, the minimum imprisonment prescribed is three years which may extend to seven
years, with a minimum fine of Rs. 10,000/-. For a subsequent offence of this nature, the term of imprisonment
shall not be less than three years but may extend to seven years with a minimum fine of saanvi Rs. 25,000. Also
a new section (51 - A) has been inserted in the Act, making certain conditions applicable while granting bail:
'When any person accused of the commission of any offence relating to Schedule I or Part II of Schedule II or
offences relating to hunting inside the boundaries of National Park or Wildlife Sanctuary or altering the
boundaries of such parks and sanctuaries, is arrested under the provisions of the Act, then not withstanding
anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, no such person who had been previously
convicted of an offence under this Act shall be released on bail unless -[4]
(a) The Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of opposing the release on bail; and -[4] (b) Where the
Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that he is not guilty of such offences and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail".
In order to improve the intelligence gathering in wildlife crime, the existing provision for rewarding the
informers has been increased from 20% of the fine and composition money respectively to 50% in each case. In
addition to this, a reward up to Rs. 10,000/- is also proposed to be given to the informants and others who
provide assistance in detection of crime and apprehension of the offender.
At present, persons having ownership certificate in respect of Schedule I and Part II animals, can sell or gift
such articles. This has been amended with a view to curb illegal trade, and thus no person can now acquire
Schedule I or Part II of Schedule II animals, articles or trophies except by way of inheritance (except live
elephants).
Stringent measures have also been proposed to forfeit the properties of hardcore criminals who have already
been convicted in the past for heinous wildlife crimes. These provisions are similar to the provisions of
'Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985'. Provisions have also been made empowering officials
to evict encroachments from Protected Areas.
Offences not pertaining to hunting of endangered species
Offences related to trade and commerce in trophies, animals articles etc. derived from certain animals
(exception: chapter V A and section 38J) attracts a term of imprisonment up to three years and/or a fine up to
Rs. 25,000/-.
his judgment will dispose of the four appeals in all of which the same question arises for consideration. The
question is whether a vehicle or vessel etc. seized under Section 50(1)(c) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act,
1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ) is put beyond the power of the Magistrate to direct its release during
the pendency of trial in exercise of powers under Section 451 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(hereinafter referred to as the Code ). On behalf of the appellant, the State of Madhya Pradesh, it is strongly
contended that the answer to the question would be only in the affirmative. The contention appears to us to be
ex facie untenable but in order to examine the stand of the State Government it would be necessary to state the
facts and circumstances in which the question arises and to take note of the relevant provisions of law in light of
which it is to be answered.
The facts of the case are taken from Civil Appeal No.5199 of 2001, the State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Madhukar
Rao, which was the leading case before the High Court. On March 12, 1997 at about 3.30 a.m., in course of
checking a Sub-Inspector of Excise found a Tata Sumo vehicle, bearing Registration No.MH.31-H/6919,
carrying 206 kgs. of antlers.
The vehicle was owned by Madhukar Rao, the respondent, but he was not in it at the time of checking. The
Excise Sub-Inspector informed the officers of the Forest Department who registered a case being Offence
No.6527/97 under Sections 39, 42, 43, 44, 49(Kha) and 51(Kha) of the Act. The four persons occupying the
vehicle were arrested and the vehicle and the antlers were seized under Section 50(1)(c) of the Act. The Judicial
Magistrate, Raipur, was duly informed about the institution of the case on March 13, 1997.
The respondent, being the owner of the vehicle, moved the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Raipur on May 12,
1997 for its release on Supurdnama. On behalf of the respondent it was stated that he was not an accused in the
case and he had no concern with the commission of any offences. It was further stated that his neighbour Shri
Lohiya, one of the accused in the case, had borrowed the vehicle on the pretext of going to see his ailing father.
The Magistrate allowed the petition and directed for release of the vehicle on Supurdnama by order, dated May
12, 1997.
Against the order of the Magistrate, the State Government filed a revision before the Sessions Judge, Raipur. In
the revision, it was stated that the Magistrate had erred in allowing the release of the vehicle in disregard of
Section 39(d) of the Act in terms of which the seized vehicle became the property of the Government and
hence, the court had no power to release it on Supurdnama. It was further contended that the power of release
under Section 451 of the Code could be exercised only in respect of vehicles seized by a police officer. The
Sessions Judge by order, dated June 5, 1997 allowed the revision, relying upon a Bench decision of the Gwalior
Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in L.P.A.No.152 of 1996. (Here it is stated on behalf of the State that the
S.L.P. filed against the order in the L.P.A. was dismissed by this Court in limine). After the revision was
allowed and the order of release passed by the Magistrate was set aside, the Wild Life Warden and Divisional
Forest Officer, Raipur passed an order on June
16, 1997 declaring the seized vehicle as Government property in terms of Section 39(d) of the Act. The
respondent then went to the High Court at Jabalpur, in Writ Petition No.4421 of 1997, challenging the decision
of the Sessions Judge and seeking a direction for release of the vehicle on Supurdnama as ordered by the
Magistrate. The case of the present respondent along with three other cases (giving rise to the three other
appeals in this batch) was finally heard by a full bench. Dharmadhikari,J. (as His Lordship then was) who
authored the full bench judgment held and found that the Magistrate s power to release a vehicle during the
pendency of trial was not, in any way, affected by the legislative changes in the Act relied upon by the State and
in appropriate cases it was fully open to the Magistrate to pass an order of interim release of a seized vehicle.
The three other cases were also disposed of following the Full Bench decision in Madhukar s case. The State is
in appeal against the order passed by the High Court.
On behalf of the State, it is contended that after the amendments made in Section 50 and Section 39(1)(d) of the
Act w.e.f. October 2, 1991 by Act 44 of 1991 there was no way a vehicle seized for violation of the Act could
be released. The amendments in Section 50 took away the power from the Assistant Director of Wild Life
Preservation or Wild Life Warden (or an officer superior to them) and the Magistrate under the Code, in any
event, had no such power. Moreover, the amendment of Section 39(1)(d) of the Act made any interim release of
the vehicle further impossible.
In order to appreciate the submissions made on behalf of the State it would be necessary to examine the relevant
provisions of law. Chapter VI of the Act contains provisions dealing with the prevention and detection of
offences.
The chapter begins with Section 50 that gives to the specificied officers the powers of entry, search, arrest and
detention. It is a long section having as many as nine sub-sections. Sub-section (1) which is sub-divided into
three clauses is as follows :50. Power of entry, search, arrest and detention - (1) Notwithstanding anything
contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Director or any other officer authorized by him in this
behalf or the Chief Wild Warden or the authorised officer or any Forest Officer or any Police Officer not below
the rank of a sub-inspector, may, if he has reasonable grounds for believing that any person has committed an
offence against this Act
(a) require any such person to produce for inspection any captive animal, wild animal, animal article, meat,
[trophy, uncured trophy, specified plant or part or derivative thereof] in his control, custody or possession, or
any licence, permit or other document granted to him or required to be kept by him under the provisions of this
Act;
(b) stop any vehicle or vessel in order to conduct search or inquiry or enter upon and search any premises, land,
vehicle or vessel, in the occupation of such person, and open and search any baggage or other things in the
possession;
(c) seize any captive animal, wild animal, animal article, meat, trophy or uncured trophy, or any specified plant
or part or derivative thereof, in respect of which an offence against this Act appears to have been committed, in
the possession of any person together with any trap, tool, vehicle, vessel or weapon used for committing any
such offence and, unless he is satisfied that such person will appear and answer any charge which may be
preferred against him, arrest him without warrant, and detain him.
Provided that where a fisherman, residing within ten kilometers of a sanctuary or National Park, inadvertently
enters on a boat, not used for commercial fishing, in the territorial waters in that sanctuary or National Park, a
fishing tackle or net on such boat shall not be seized.
Before the Act was subjected to a large number of amendments with effect from October 2, 1991, Section 50
had sub-section
(2) which was as follows :
(2) Any officer of rank not inferior to that of an Assistant Director of Wild Life preservation or Wild Life
Warden, who, or whose subordinate has seized any trap, tool, vehicle, vessel or weapon under clause (c) of sub-
section (1), may release the same on the execution by the owner thereof of bond for the production of the
property so released, if and when so required, before the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the offence on
account of which the seizure has been made.
The Amendment Act 44 of 1991 deleted sub-section (2) and inserted in its place sub-section (3-A) which is as
follows :
(3-A). Any officer of a rank not inferior to that of an Assistant Director of Wild Life Preservation of [as
Assistant Conservator of Forests], who, or whose subordinate, has seized any captive animal or wild animal
under clause (c) of sub-section (1) may give the same for custody on the execution by any person of a bond for
the production of such animal if and when so required, before the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the
offence on account of which the seizure has been made.
At the same time, amendments were made in Section 39(1)(d) after which it reads as follows :
39. Wild animals, etc., to be Government
property (1) Every

(a) xxx xxx xxx xxx
(b) xxx xxx xxx xxx
(c) xxx xxx xxx xxx
(d) vehicle, vessel, weapon, trap or tool that has been used for committing an offence and has been seized under
the provisions of this Act, shall be the property of the State Government, and, where such animal is hunted in a
sanctuary or National Park declared by the Central Government, such animal or any animal article, trophy,
uncured trophy or meat [derived from such animal, or any vehicle, vessel, weapon, trap or tool used in such
hunting] shall be the property of the Central Government.
Ms.Vibha Datta Makhija, learned counsel appearing for the State of Madhya Pradesh referred in detail to
various sub-sections of Section 50. She also referred to Section 51 laying down the penalties for offences
committed under the Act, Section 53 dealing with the punishment for wrongful seizure and Section 54 dealing
with the power to compound offences. Learned counsel submitted that prior to October 2, 1991, while sub-
section (2) of Section 50 was in existence, the specified officers were empowered to release any trap, tool,
vehicle, vessel or weapon seized under clause (c) of sub-section (1) in connection with any offence under the
Act. But the provision was deleted and was substituted by sub-section (3-A) that limited the power of release
only in regard to any captive animal or wild animal. The legislative intent was thus clear that no release was
permissible of any article other than a captive animal or wild animal that could be given in the custody of any
person on execution of a bond.
Learned counsel submitted that Section 50 of the Act provided a complete and comprehensive scheme in
matters of entry, search, arrest and detention for prevention and detection of offence under the Act and excluded
the application of any other Act, including the Code, in the matter. She maintained that at no time it was open to
the Magistrate to direct for interim release of a vehicle seized under Section 50(1)(c) of the Act. Previously
officers of certain higher ranks had the power to release the seized vehicle but after deletion of sub-section (2)
the power was taken away from the departmental officers as well and hence, a vehicle seized for commission of
an offence under the Act could no longer be released on interim basis.
In support of the submission that Section 50 provided a complete Code she also referred to Sections 51 and 53
of the Act. She submitted that the punishment for wrongful seizure too was provided under the Act itself and
hence, the seizure would not attract the provisions of any other law, including the Code. In support of the
submission she relied upon the decision of this Court in State of Karnataka vs. K.A.Kunchindammed [2002 (9)
SCC 90]. She particularly relied upon paragraph 23 of the decision.
We are unable to accept the submissions. To contend that the use of a vehicle in the commission of an offence
under the Act, without anything else would bar its interim release appears to us to be quite unreasonable. There
may be a case where a vehicle was undeniably used for commission of an offence under the Act but the vehicle
s owner is in a position to show that it was used for committing the offence only after it was stolen from his
possession. In that situation, we are unable to see why the vehicle should not be released in the owners favour
during the pendency of the trial.
We are also unable to accept the submission that Section 50 and the other provisions in Chapter VI of the Act
exclude the application of any provisions of the Code. It is indeed true that Section 50 of the Act has several
provisions especially aimed at prevention and detection of offences under the Act. For example, it confers
powers of entry, search, arrest and detention on Wild Life and Forest Officers besides police officers who are
normally entrusted with the responsibility of investigation and detection of offences; further sub-section (4) of
Section 51 expressly excludes application of Section 360 of the Code and the provisions of Probation of
Offenders Act to persons eighteen years or above in age. But it does not mean that Section 50 in itself or taken
along with the other provisions under Chapter VI constitutes a self-contained mechanism so as to exclude every
other provision of the Code. This position becomes further clear from sub-section (4) of Section 50 that requires
that any person detained, or things seized should forthwith be taken before a Magistrate. Sub-section (4) of
Section 50 reads as follows :
50(4). Any person detained, or things seized under the foregoing power, shall forthwith be taken before a
Magistrate to be dealt with according to law [under intimation to the Chief Wild Life Warden or the officer
authorized by him in this regard].
It has to be noted here that the expression used in the sub-section is according to law and not according to the
provisions of the Act . The expression according to law undoubtedly widens the scope and plainly indicates the
application of the provisions of the Code. We find that the full bench of the High Court has correctly taken the
view that the deletion of sub-section (2) and its replacement by sub-section (3-A) in Section 50 of the Act had
no effect on the powers of the Magistrate to release the seized vehicle during the pendency of trial under the
provisions of the Code.
The effect of deletion of sub-section (2) and its replacement by sub-section (3-A) may be summed up thus: as
long as, sub-section (2) of Section 50 was on the Statute Book the Magistrate would not entertain a prayer for
interim release of a seized vehicle etc. until an application for release was made before the departmental
authorities as provided in that sub-section. Further, in case the prayer for interim release was rejected by the
departmental authority the findings or observations made in his order would receive due consideration and
would carry a lot of weight before the Magistrate while considering the prayer for interim release of the vehicle.
But now that sub-section (2) of Section 50 stands deleted, an aggrieved person has no option but to approach the
Magistrate directly for interim release of the seized vehicle. We are also of the view that the decision in
Kunchindammed is of no help to the State in the present appeals. Paragraph 23 of the decision apparently seems
to support the appellant s contention but we find it difficult to apply it in the facts of the present case. The
decision in Kunchindammed was rendered on the provisions of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963. In that case, an
order of confiscation of the vehicle was passed by the competent authority and the confiscation order had
attained finality. The present case arises under the Wild Life Protection Act and the facts are materially
different.
The decision of this Court closer to the issue under consideration may be found in Moti Lal vs. Central Bureau
of Investigation & Anr. [2002 (4) SCC 713]. In that case an offence committed under the Act was handed over
for investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation and the action was assailed exactly on the plea that the
Wild Life Act was a special law and it contained comprehensive provisions for investigation, inquiry, search,
seizure, trial and imposition of punishment and, therefore, the police force establishment under the Delhi
Special Police Establishment Act was not empowered to investigate the case. This Court rejected the contention
and after examining in detail the various provisions of the Act particularly the provisions of Section 50 came to
find and hold as follows :
The scheme of Section 50 of the Wild Life Act makes it abundantly clear that a police officer is also
empowered to investigate the offences and search and seize the offending articles. For trial of offences, the
Code of Criminal Procedure is required to be followed and for that there is no other specific provision to the
contrary. The special procedure prescribed is limited for taking cognizance of the offence as well as powers are
given to other officers mentioned in Section 50 for inspection, arrest, search and seizure as well as of recording
statement. The power to compound offences is also conferred under section 54. Section 51 provides for
penalties which would indicate that certain offences are cognizable offences meaning thereby a police officer
can arrest without warrant. Sub-section (5) of Section 51 provides that nothing contained in Section 360 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure or in the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 shall apply to a person convicted of an
offence with respect to hunting in a sanctuary or a national park or of an offence against any provision of
Chapter 5-A unless such person is under 18 years of age. The aforesaid specific provisions are contrary to the
provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure and that would prevail during the trial. However, from
this, it cannot be said that operation of rest of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are excluded.
In this view of the matter, there is no substance in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant
that Section 50 of the Wild Life Act is a complete code and, therefore, CBI would have no jurisdiction to
investigate the offences under the said Act. Hence, it cannot be said that the judgment and order passed by the
High Court rejecting the petition filed by the appellant is in any way illegal or erroneous.
We have, therefore, no doubt that the provisions of Section 50 of the Act and the amendments made thereunder
do not in any way affect the Magistrate s power to make an order of interim release of the vehicle under Section
451 of the Code. Learned counsel submitted that Section 39(1)(d) of the Act made the articles seized under
Section 50(1)(c) of the Act as government property and, therefore, there was no question of their release. The
submission was carefully considered by the Full Bench of the High Court and on an examination of the various
provisions of the Act it was held that the provision of Section 39(1)(d) would come into play only after a court
of competent jurisdiction found the accusation and the allegations made against the accused as true and
recorded the finding that the seized article was, as a matter of fact, used in the commission of offence. Any
attempt to operationalise Article 39(1)(d) of the Act merely on the basis of seizure and accusations/allegations
leveled by the departmental authorities would bring it into conflict with the constitutional provisions and would
render it unconstitutional and invalid. In our opinion, the High Court has taken a perfectly correct view and the
provisions of Section 39(1)(d) cannot be used against exercise of the Magisterial power to release the vehicle
during pendency of the trial.
We thus find no merit in any of the submission made on behalf of the appellants. The High Court has taken a
correct view that warrants no interference by this Court. Accordingly, all the appeals and special leave petitions
are dismissed.

Environment Law Assignment

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Environment Law Assignment

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

NAME: ANNA A. OOMMEN

TOPIC: 1) THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

Facts of the case

Arguments for the defendants

Judgment of the court

Lake Mono Case

Orders of the Court

M.I Builders v. Radhey Shyam Sahu

Law, Environment and Development Journal

The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974;

The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977;

The Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980;

The Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981;

The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986;

The Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991;

The Biological Diversity Act, 2002.

A claim for Compensation can be made for:

Restitution of property damaged;

Restitution of the environment for such areas as determined by the NGT.

Principles of Justice adopted by NGT

Review and Appeal

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

1. What is the difference between a Court and a Tribunal?

3. Can I personally argue a matter before the NGT or do I need a lawyer?

4. What is the penalty for non-compliance of an NGT Order?

What about environment cases?

Indian Forest Act, 1927:

• The Act basically does two things:

• The law recognises three types of rights:

• The Act also categorizes forests into three categories:

1 The Forest Conservation Act 1980.

2 The Wildlife Protection Act 1972.

3 The Environment Protection Act 1986.

4 The Biodiversity Protection Act 2003.

WHY WAS THIS ACT NEEDED?

The Act has 7 Chapters, 66 Sections and 6 Schedules as of today.

Chapter VI spells out the punishments for different offences.

PUNISHMENTS FOR OFFENSES

Definitions under the Act (Section 2)

"taxidermy" means the curing, preparation or preservation of trophies.

"vermin" means any wild animal specified in Schedule V.

Summary of Wildlife Protection Act (1972) of India!

1. It defines the wildlife related terminology.

2. Enactment of an All India Wildlife Protection Act (1972).

5. Launching a “national component of UNESCO’s ‘Man and Biosphere Programme’ (1971).

7. Protection to some endangered plants.

9. The Act provides for the constitution of Central Zoo Authority.

12. It provides for legal powers to officers and punishment to offenders.

Steps for the wild life conservation

(ii) To protect habitat by protecting forests.

(iii) To delimit the areas of their natural habitat.

(iv) To protect wildlife from pollution and from natural hazards.

(v) To impose complete restriction on hunting and capturing of wildlife.

Section 51 in The Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972

Act and the intention of the Legislature.”

(2) which was as follows :

39. Wild animals, etc., to be Government

property (1) Every

(b) xxx xxx xxx xxx

(c) xxx xxx xxx xxx

You might also like