(Sagip Kalikasan) Dagudag vs Paderanga

Facts:
Sometime in 2005, forest products were confiscated by the representatives of PNPRMG, DENR and the Philippine Coast
Guard for non-compliance of pertinent documents, and since no one claimed ownership of the said items for a reasonable
time, it was confiscated in favor of the government. Respondent-judge, in a case for issuance of writ of replevin, instituted by
plaintiff Edma, issued and decided in favor of the plaintiff, for the return of the undocumented forest products. DENR, CENRO
and herein petitioner filed a motion to quash the writ of replevin but was thereafter denied by herein respondent. The DENR
counsel was also lambasted in the courtroom by herein respondent.

Issue(s):
1) Whether or not relevin is a proper remedy where the confiscated items were undocumented forest products under the
custody of the DENR.
2) Whether or not the acts of herein respondent constitutes gross ignorance of the law and unbecoming of a judge.

Ruling:
1) No, The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. That since the case is for violation of Section
68 of PD 705 as amended by EO 277 is under the jurisdiction of DENR. That respondent should have dismissed the replevin
suit outright for three reasons, to wit:

That courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies, under the doctrine of administrative
exhaustion;

That also, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction courts cannot take cognizance of the cases pending before administrative
agencies of special competence. That since the undocumented forest products are in the custody of the DENR, an
administrative proceeding may have already been commenced; and,
That the forest products are already in custody of law and thus cannot be the subject of replevin.

2) Yes, respondent, in taking cognizance of the replevin suit and thereafter issuing the said writ constitute gross ignorance of
the law. Respondent also is liable for using inappropriate language in court, and repeated interruption of the lawyers and
refusal to consider the motion to quash are undignified and very unbecoming of a judge. Considering also that this is his third
offense.
Carlos T. Go Sr. vs Luis T. Ramos

FACTS
These three cases are petitions for review on certiorari. G.R. Nos.167569 and 167570 are regarding the preparation
and filing of deportation charges against Jimmy T. Go. On the other hand G.R. No. seeks to set aside the decision and
resolution of the Appellate Court . Considering that all cases arose from the same factual milieu, the Court resolved to
consolidate G.R. Nos. 167570 and 167569 with G.R. No. 171946 per Resolution dated February 26, 2007.

It all started when Luis Ramos initiated a petition against petitioner Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and
undesirable alien and not a Filipino citizen. Ramos alleged that Go represents himself as a Filipino citizen when in fact Go’s
personal circumstances and other records indicate that he is Chinese.

Go denies the allegation and insisted that he is a natural-born Filipino. Jimmy alleged that his father Carlos, who
was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with Article IV, Section 1,
paragraph 4 of the 1935 Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 625.

The the complaint for deportation against Jimmy was dismissed however the Board of Commissioners (Board)
reversed said dismissal, holding that Carlos election of Philippine citizenship was made out of time. Finding Jimmys claim to Philippine
citizenship in serious doubt by reason of his fathers questionable election thereof, the Board directed the preparation and filing of the
appropriate deportation charges against Jimmy.

Petitioners father and son filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for injunctive reliefs before the
RTC seeking to annul and set aside the Resolution of the Board of Commissioners, the Charge Sheet, and the proceedings
had therein. They challenged the jurisdiction of the Board to continue with the deportation proceedings.
Go filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC and reiterated their application for injunctive
reliefs. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction pending litigation on the main issue, enjoining the
Bureau from enforcing the Decision. However, RTC dissolved the writ and dismissed the decision.
Following the dismissal of the petition the Board issued a warrant of deportation which led to his apprehension and
Jimmy’s detention at the Bureau of immigration. Go commenced a petition for habeas corpus, but was dismissed by reason
of his provisional release on bail. A petition for certiorari before the CA was filed imputing grave abuse of discretion by the
RTC for passing upon their citizenship, claiming that what they asked for in their petition was merely the nullification of the
Resolution and the charge sheet. The CA dismissed the petition.

ISSUES
1) Whether or not the cause of action of the Bureau against petitioner had prescribed;
2) Whether or not the deportation proceedings are null and void for failure to implead Carlos as an
indispensable party therein;
3) Whether or not the evidence adduced by the petitioners to prove their claim of Philippine citizenship
is substantial and sufficient to oust the Board of its jurisdiction from continuing with the deportation
proceedings in order to give way to a formal judicial action to pass upon the issue of alienage;
4) Whether or not due process was properly observed in the proceedings before the Board; and
5) Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed.

RULINGS:

1) Deportation may be effected any time after entry, but shall not be effected under any other clause unless the
arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause of deportation arises. The court a
quo is correct when it ruled that the 5-year period should be counted only from the time when Luis filed his complaint
for deportation. It is the legal possibility of bringing the action which determines the starting point for the computation
of the period of prescription. A prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings
for its investigation and punishment. The counting could not logically start when his passport was issued because
the government was unaware that he was not a Filipino citizen, otherwise his application would have been denied.

2) To be indispensable, a person must first be a real party in interest, that is, one who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. In this case, Carlos clearly is not an
indispensable party as he does not stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit. What is sought is the
deportation of Jimmy on the ground that he is an alien.

3) No. Citizenship proceedings are a class of its own. Unlike other cases, res judicata does not obtain as a
matter of course. Every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative
case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to suchcitizenship is generally
not considered as res judicata. Res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship only if the following concur: a) a
person'scitizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party; b) the Solicitor
General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and c) the finding or citizenship is
affirmed by the Court.
The doctrine of jus soli only benefited those who were individually declared to be citizens of the Philippines by
a final court decision on the mistaken application of jus soli. The 3-year period for electing Philippine citizenship may
be extended as when the person has always regarded himself as a Filipino. In this case, there was no sufficiency to
show merit the extension of the 3-year period. The exercise of Carlos’ right of suffrage were done after he elected
Philippine citizenship. His registration as a voter indicates his desire to exercise a right appertaining exclusively to
Filipino citizens but does not alter his real citizenship which is determined by blood (jus sanguinis). The exercise of
the rights and privileges granted only to Filipinos is not conclusive proof of citizenship, because a person may
misrepresent himself to be a Filipino and thus enjoy the rights and privileges of citizens of this country. It is incumbent
upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No
presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship and any doubt regarding citizenship
must be resolved in favor of the state.

4) No. Deportation proceedings are administrative in character, summary in nature, and need not be conducted
strictly in accordance with the rules of ordinary court proceedings. The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met.

5) No. A writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or
lawful. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person's detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application
for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening
events, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Once a person detained is duly charged in
court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. When an
alien is detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the Deportation
Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings
because there is no law authorizing it. The petition for habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic.

Petitions Denied.
FELICITAS M. MACHADO vs. RICARDO L. GATDULA, COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS

Facts: On February 2, 1999, Gatdula wrote a letter 4 to the COSLAP requesting assistance because the Machados allegedly
blocked the right of way to his private property by constructing a two-door apartment on their property
The Machados contested these reports in their position paper dated August 26, 1999. They alleged that Gatdula had no right
of action since they did not violate Gatdula’s rights.5 They further assailed the jurisdiction of the COSLAP, stating that the
proper forum for the present case was the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna.

The COSLAP Ruling

On October 25, 1999, the COSLAP issued a resolution directing the Machados to reopen the right of way in favor of Gatdula.
In so ruling, the COSLAP relied on the verification survey made by Engr. Arellano, which established that the Machados had
encroached on the existing alley in Gatdula’s property.

The COSLAP declared the Machados estopped from questioning its jurisdiction to decide the case, since they actively
participated in the mediation conferences and the verification surveys without raising any jurisdictional objection. It ruled that
its jurisdiction does not depend on the convenience of the Machados.

Issue: WON COSLAP has jurisdiction over the case?

Held: NO.
The COSLAP’s forerunner, the PACLAP, was created on July 31, 1970 pursuant to Executive Order No. 251. As
originally conceived, the committee was tasked to expedite and coordinate the investigation and resolution of land disputes,
streamline and shorten administrative procedures, adopt bold and decisive measures to solve land problems, and/or
recommend other solutions.

The PACLAP was abolished by EO 561 effective on September 21, 1979, and was replaced by the COSLAP. Unlike the
former laws, EO 561 specifically enumerated the instances when the COSLAP can exercise its adjudicatory functions:

Section 3. Powers and Functions. – The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:

(2.) Refer and follow up for immediate action by the agency having appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or dispute referred
to the Commission: Provided, That the Commission may, in the following cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems
or disputes which are critical and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large number of the parties involved, the
presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action:

(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber concessionaires;

(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees;

(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants;

(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of the public domain; and

(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude.

Under these terms, the COSLAP has two different rules in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, e.g., COSLAP
can assume jurisdiction only if the matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of the law. Otherwise, it should
refer the case to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement or resolution.21 In resolving whether to assume
jurisdiction over a case or to refer it to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP considers: (a) the nature or classification
of the land involved; (b) the parties to the case; (c) the nature of the questions raised; and (d) the need for immediate and
urgent action thereon to prevent injury to persons and damage or destruction to property.

The terms of the law clearly do not vest on the COSLAP the general power to assume jurisdiction over any land dispute
or problem. Thus, under EO 561, the instances when the COSLAP may resolve land disputes are limited only to those
involving public lands or those covered by a specific license from the government, such as pasture lease agreements, timber
concessions, or reservation grants.

Undisputably, the properties involved in the present dispute are private lands owned by private parties, none of whom is a
squatter, a patent lease agreement holder, a government reservation grantee, a public land claimant or a member of any
cultural minority.

Moreover, the dispute between the parties can hardly be classified as critical or explosive in nature that would generate social
tension or unrest, or a critical situation that would require immediate and urgent action. The issues raised in the present case
primarily involve the application of the Civil Code provisions on Property and the Easement of Right of Way.
UST v Sanchez
G.R. No. 165569
July 29, 2010

Facts: A Complaint for Damages filed by respondent Danes B. Sanchez (respondent) against the University of Santo Tomas
(UST) and its Board of Directors, the Dean and the Assistant Dean of the UST College of Nursing, and the University Registrar
for their alleged unjustified refusal to release the respondent’s Transcript of Records (ToR).

Instead of filing an Answer, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss where they claimed that they refused to release respondent’s
ToR because he was not a registered student, since he had not been enrolled in the university for the last three semesters.
After the parties filed their responsive pleadings, petitioners filed a Supplement to their Motion to Dismiss, alleging that
respondent sought administrative recourse before the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) through a letter-complaint
dated January 21, 2003. Thus, petitioners claimed that the CHED had primary jurisdiction to resolve matters pertaining to
school controversies, and the filing of the instant case was premature.

Issue: WON Rule on Primary Jurisdiction applies in this case

Held: NO.

The rule on primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions.
Thus, an essential requisite for this doctrine to apply is the actual existence of quasi-judicial power. However, petitioners have
not shown that the CHED possesses any such power to “investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings,
weigh evidence, and draw conclusions. Indeed, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7722 otherwise known as the Higher Education
Act of 1994, certainly does not contain any express grant to the CHED of judicial or quasi-judicial power.
C.T. TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROMEO J. HIBIONADA
G.R. No. 80916 November 9, 1990

Facts: The petitioner as agent of private respondent Pleasantville Development Corporation sold a subdivision lot on
installment to private respondent Efren Diongon. The installment payments having been completed, Diongon demanded the
delivery of the certificate of title to the subject land. When neither the petitioner nor Pleasantville complied, he filed a complaint
against them for specific performance and damages in the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental.

C.T. Torres Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the competent body to hear and decide
the case was the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board.

Issue: WON HLURB acquires jurisdiction

Held: YES.
P.D. No. 1344, which was promulgated April 2, 1978, and empowered the National Housing Authority to issue writs of
execution in the enforcement of its decisions under P.D. No. 957, specified the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the agency as
follows:

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers
provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases of the following nature:

A. Unsound real estate business practices;

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project
owner developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and

C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision
lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
Under E.O. No. 648 dated February 7, 1981, the regulatory functions conferred on the National Housing Authority under P.D.
Nos. 957,1344 and other related laws were transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, which was
renamed Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board by E.O. No. 90 dated December 17, 1986.

It is clear from Section 1(c) of the above quoted PD No. 1344 that the complaint for specific performance with damages filed
by Diongon with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental comes under the jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board. Diongon is a buyer of a subdivision lot seeking specific performance of the seller's obligation to deliver to
him the corresponding certificate of title.
HLC CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND HENRY LOPEZ CHUA, petitioners, vs. EMILY
HOMES SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION (EHSHA)
[G.R. No. 139360. September 23, 2003]

Facts: Respondents Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners Association (EHSHA) and the 150 individual members thereof
filed on October 21, 1998 a civil action for breach of contract, damages and attorney’s fees with the Regional Trial Court of
Davao del Sur, Branch 19, against petitioners, the developers of low-cost housing units like Emily Homes Subdivision.
Respondents alleged that petitioners used substandard materials in the construction of their houses, like coco lumber and
termite-infested door jambs. Petitioners furthermore allegedly did not adhere to the house plan specifications because the
ceiling lines were sagging and there were “deviations from the plumb line of the mullions, door jams (sic) and concrete
columns.”[3] Respondents asked petitioners to repair their defective housing units but petitioners failed to do so. Respondents
had to repair their defective housing units using their own funds. Hence, they prayed for actual and moral damages arising
from petitioners’ breach of the contract plus exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

On December 11, 1998, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, claiming that it was the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) and not the trial court which had jurisdiction over the case.

Issue: WON HLURB has jurisdiction

Held: YES.
In this case, respondents’ complaint was for the reimbursement of expenses incurred in repairing their defective housing units
constructed by petitioners. Clearly, the HLURB had jurisdiction to hear it. In the case of Arranza vs. B.F Homes, Inc. this
Court ruled that:

xxx the HLURB has jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the subdivision developer and the lot buyer or
those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations to make the
subdivision a better place to live in.

The fact that the subject matter of the complaint involved defective housing units did not remove the complaint from the
HLURB’s jurisdiction. The delivery of habitable houses was petitioners’ responsibility under their contract with respondents.
The trial court should have granted the motion to dismiss filed by petitioners so that the issues therein could be expeditiously
heard and resolved by the HLURB.
SPS. LEONARDO AND MILAGROS CHUA,
v.
HON. JACINTO G. ANG
G.R. No. 156164

Facts: On February 11, 1999, the petitioners (as buyers) and Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI, as developers) executed a
Contract To Sel a condominium unit. Despite the lapse of three (3) years, FEPI failed to construct and deliver the contracted
condominium unit to the petitioners.

As a result, the petitioners filed a Complaint-Affidavitbefore the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City accusing the
private respondents of violating P.D. No. 957, specifically its Sections 17 and 20, in relation with Section 39.

The petitioners alleged that the private respondents did not construct and failed to deliver the contracted condominium unit to
them and did not register the Contract to Sell with the Register of Deeds.

Of the seven (7) private respondents, only private respondent Alice Odchique-Bondoc filed a Counter-Affidavit. She
countered that the City Prosecutor has no jurisdiction over the case since it falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).

On November 4, 2002, Assistant City Prosecutor Dennis R. Pastrana and Pasig City Prosecutor Jacinto G. Ang (public
respondents), respectively issued and approved the Resolution dismissing the complaint for being premature. The Resolution
held that it is the HLURB that has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving real estate business and practices.

Issue: WON HLURB has authority to impose criminal penalties

Held: NO
HLURB’s jurisdiction over contractual rights and obligations of parties under subdivision and condominium contracts comes
out very clearly. But hand in hand with this definition and grant of authority is the provision on criminal penalties for violations
of the Decree, provided under the Decree’s Section 39, heretofore quoted. Significantly, nothing in P.D. No. 957 vests the
HLURB with jurisdiction to impose the Section 39 criminal penalties. What the Decree provides is the authority of the HLURB
to impose administrative fines under Section 38, as implemented by the Rules Implementing the Subdivision and
Condominium Buyer’s Protective Decree. This Section of the Decree provides:

Sec. 38. Administrative Fines. – The Authority may prescribe and impose fines not exceeding ten thousand pesos for violations
of the provisions of this Decree or of any rule or regulation thereunder. Fines shall be payable to the Authority and enforceable
through writs of execution in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court.

The Implementing Rules clarify that “The implementation and payment of administrative fines shall not preclude criminal
prosecution of the offender under Section 39 of the Decree.”

Thus, the implementing rules themselves expressly acknowledge that two separate remedies with differing consequences
may be sought under the Decree, specifically, the administrative remedy and criminal prosecution.

Unless the contrary appears under other provisions of law (and in this case no such provision applies), the determination of
the criminal liability lies within the realm of criminal procedure as embodied in the Rules of Court. Section 2, Rule 112 of these
Rules provide that the prerogative to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause lies with the persons duly
authorized by law.
HOME BANKERS SAVINGS VS CA ET AL, G.R. 128354, April 26, 2005

In case of banking institutions…..

While the cases cited by petitioner held that the mortgagee is not under obligation to look beyond the certificate of title when
on its face, it was free from lien or encumbrances, the mortgagees therein were considered in good faith as they were totally
innocent and free from negligence or wrongdoing in the transaction. In this case, petitioner knew that the loan it was extending
to Garcia/TransAmerican was for the purpose of the development of the eight-unit townhouses. Petitioner’s insistence that
prior to the approval of the loan, it undertook a thorough check on the property and found the titles free from liens and
encumbrances would not suffice. It was incumbent upon petitioner to inquire into the status of the lots which includes
verification on whether Garcia had secured the authority from the HLURB to mortgage the subject lots. Petitioner failed to do
so. We likewise find petitioner negligent in failing to even ascertain from Garcia if there are buyers of the lots who turned out
to be private respondents. Petitioner’s want of knowledge due to its negligence takes the place of registration, thus it is
presumed to know the rights of respondents over the lot. The conversion of the status of petitioner from mortgagee to buyer-
owner will not lessen the importance of such knowledge. Neither will the conversion set aside the consequence of its
negligence as a mortgagee.

Judicial notice can be taken of the uniform practice of banks to investigate, examine and assess the real estate offered
as security for the application of a loan. We cannot overemphasize the fact that the Bank cannot barefacedly argue that simply
because the title or titles offered as security were clean of any encumbrances or lien, that it was thereby relieved of taking any
other step to verify the over-reaching implications should the subdivision be auctioned on foreclosure. (Homebankers Saving
& Trust Co. vs. CA, G.R. No. 128354, 2005)

HOME BANKERS SAVINGS & TRUST CO., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PABLO N. AREVALO,
FRANCISCO A. UY, SPOUSES LEANDRO A. SORIANO, JR. and LILIAN SORIANO, ALFREDO LIM and FELISA CHI
LIM/ALFREDO LIM, respondents.

FACTS:

Each of private respondents entered into separate contracts to sell with TransAmerican Sales and Exposition (TransAmerican)
through the latter’s Owner/General Manager, Engr. Jesus Garcia, involving certain portions of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 19155, located at No. 45 Gen. Lim Street, Heroes Hill, Quezon City, together with one unit three-
storey townhouse to be built on each portion.

On May 30, 1989, Engr. Garcia and his wife Lorelie Garcia obtained from petitioner Home Bankers Savings and Trust
Company (formerly Home Savings Bank and Trust Company) a loan in the amount of P4,000,000.00 and without the prior
approval of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), the spouses mortgaged eight lots covered by TCT Nos.
3349 to 3356 as collateral. Petitioner registered its mortgage on these titles without any other encumbrance or lien annotated
therein. The proceeds of the loan were intended for the development of the lots into an eight-unit townhouse project. However,
five out of these eight titles turned out to be private respondents’ townhouses subject of the contracts to sell with
Garcia/TransAmerican.

Petitioner filed its Answer contending that private respondents have no cause of action against it; that at the time of the loan
application and execution of the promissory note and real estate mortgage by Garcia, there were no known individual buyers
of the subject land nor annotation of any contracts, liens or encumbrances of third persons on the titles of the subject lots; that
the loan was granted and released without notifying HLURB as it was not necessary.

Petitioner filed its Answer contending that private respondents have no cause of action against it; that at the time of the loan
application and execution of the promissory note and real estate mortgage by Garcia, there were no known individual buyers
of the subject land nor annotation of any contracts, liens or encumbrances of third persons on the titles of the subject lots; that
the loan was granted and released without notifying HLURB as it was not necessary.

Private respondents filed their Reply and a motion for the judgment on the pleadings. Petitioner did not file a rejoinder. The
case against Garcia/TransAmerican was archived for failure to serve summons on him/it despite efforts to locate his
whereabouts or its office. The case was then considered submitted for decision.

On August 16, 1991, OAALA rendered its Decision in favour of the petitioner . Petitioner filed an appeal with the Board of
Commissioners of the HLURB which dismissed the same in a decision dated June 15, 1992. Petitioner then elevated the case
to the Office of the President which rendered a decision dated June 30, 1995 dismissing the appeal and affirming the June
15, 1992 decision of the HLURB. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied in a Resolution dated May 7, 1996.

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA which, in the herein assailed decision dated November 28, 1996, denied the
petition and affirmed the decision of the Office of the President.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the President erred in ruling that HLURB has jurisdiction to nullify or declare
unenforceable the real estate mortgage validly constituted by the owner.

HELD:
Petitioner cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith. Indeed it was negligent, as found by the Office
of the President and by the CA. Petitioner should not have relied only on the representation of the mortgagor that the latter
had secured all requisite permits and licenses from the government agencies concerned. The former should have required
the submission of certified true copies of those documents and verified their authenticity through its own independent effort.

Petitioner’s admission that it granted and released the loan without notifying the HLURB because of its belief that it was not
necessary to do so, is fatal to petitioner’s defense. As a consequence thereof, the mortgage constituted in favor of petitioner
can be declared invalid as against private respondents even without the presence of Garcia/TransAmerican. This petition was
DISMISSED.
TOPIC: JURISDICTION, HLURB
CADIMAS V. CARRION
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 180394 September 29,
2008
TINGA, J.:
POINT OF THE CASE: Regular courts have
jurisdiction over a complaint filed by an ordinary seller
of property (emphasis supplied).
The complaint must sufficiently describe the lot as a
subdivision lot and sold by the defendant in his
capacity as a subdivision developer to fall within the
purview of P.D. No. 957 and P.D. No. 1344 and thus
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB
(emphasis supplied).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------The HLURB, has jurisdiction
over complaints aimed at compelling the subdivision
developer to comply with its contractual and statutory
obligations.
Meaning: If buyer is complaining against a seller for
unsound real estate practices, it is the HLURB which
has jurisdiction.
If seller is complaining, it is the RTC which holds
jurisdiction (such as in this case).
FACTS:
Petitioner Cadimas, through her attorney-in-fact,
Rosales, filed the complaint for accion reivindicatoria and
damages against respondents Carrion and Hugo.
In the complaint, petitioner averred that she and
respondent Carrion were parties to a Contract to sell,
wherein petitioner sold to respondent Carrion a town
house to be paid in instalments. According to petitioner,
Carrion had violated said contract when she transferred
ownership of the property to respondent Hugo under the
guise of a special power of attorney, which authorized the
latter to manage and administer the property for and in
behalf of respondent Carrion. Allegedly, petitioner asked
respondent Carrion in writing to explain the alleged
violation but the latter ignored petitioner’s letter, prompting
petitioner to demand in writing that Carrion and Hugo
vacate the property and to cancel the contract.
Then, petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Defendant
Carrion In Default, alleging that despite the service of
summons and a copy of the complaint, Carrion failed to
file a responsive pleading within the reglementary period.
Respondent Hugo filed a Motion to Dismiss on her behalf
and on behalf of respondent Carrion, citing the grounds of
lack of jurisdiction to hear the case on the part of the RTC
and estoppel and/or laches on the part of petitioner.
Respondent Hugo argued that the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) has jurisdiction over the
complaint because ultimately, the sole issue to be
resolved was whether petitioner, as the owner and
developer of the subdivision on which the subject property
stood, was guilty of committing unsound real estate
business practices.
RTC: issued an Omnibus Order, which denied the motion
to dismiss. The RTC held that the court’s jurisdiction is not
determined by the defenses set up in the answer or the
motion to dismiss.
Respondent Hugo sought a reconsideration of the
omnibus order.
The RTC issued an order, upholding its jurisdiction over
petitioner’s complaint.
The RTC set the pre-trial conference of the case.
***However, respondents elevated the matter to the Court
of Appeals via a special civil action for certiorari, praying
that the Omnibus Order be reversed and set aside and
that the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-04-53581 be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
CA: set aside the assailed orders of the RTC and ordered
the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. Also, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over petitioner’s
complaint.
HELD: Yes. The RTC has jurisdiction over petitioner’s
complaint.
RATIO:
The nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal
are determined by the material allegations of the complaint
and the law at the time the action was commenced.
Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject matter or
nature of an action is conferred only by law and not by the
consent or waiver upon a court which, otherwise, would
have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an
action.
Reading Section 1 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1344
which enumerates the regulatory functions of the HLURB
together with its preamble shows that the NHA or the
HLURB has jurisdiction over complaints arising from
contracts between the subdivision developer and the lot
buyer or those aimed at compelling the subdivision
developer to comply with its contractual and statutory
obligations to make the subdivision a better place to live
in.
Nothing in the complaint or in the contract to sell suggests
that petitioner is the proper party to invoke the jurisdiction
of the HLURB. There is nothing in the allegations in the
complaint or in the terms and conditions of the contract to
sell that would suggest that the nature of the controversy
calls for the application of either P.D. No. 957 or P.D. No.
1344 insofar as the extent of the powers and duties of the
HLURB is concerned.
Note particularly paragraphs (b) and (c) of Sec. 1, P.D. No.
1344 as worded, where the HLURB’s jurisdiction concerns
cases commenced by subdivision lot or condominium unit
buyers. As to paragraph (a), concerning "unsound real
estate practices," the logical complainants would be the
buyers and customers against the sellers (subdivision
owners and developers or condominium builders and
realtors), and not vice versa.
The complaint does not allege that petitioner is a
subdivision lot buyer. The contract to sell does not contain
clauses which would indicate that petitioner has
obligations in the capacity of a subdivision lot developer,
owner or broker or salesman or a person engaged in real
estate business. From the face of the complaint and the
contract to sell, petitioner is an ordinary seller of an
interest in the subject property who is seeking redress for
the alleged violation of the terms of the contract to sell.
Petitioner’s complaint alleged that a contract to sell over a
townhouse was entered into by and between petitioner
and respondent Carrion and that the latter breached the
contract when Carrion transferred the same to respondent
Hugo without petitioner’s consent. Thus, petitioner sought
the cancellation of the contract and the recovery of
possession and ownership of the town house. Clearly, the
complaint is well within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
On Respondent’s contention:
Respondents claim that the resolution of the case
ultimately calls for the interpretation of the contract to sell
and the determination of whether petitioner is guilty of
committing unsound real estate business practices, thus,
the proper forum to hear and decide the matter is the
HLURB. The argument does not impress.
It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction
of the court over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether or not
the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the
jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon
the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to
dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would
almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What
determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the
action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the
complaint. The averments in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought are the matters to be
consulted. Thus, the allegations in respondents’ motion to
dismiss on the unsound real estate business practices
allegedly committed by petitioner, even if proved to be
true, cannot serve to oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over
actions for breach of contract and damages which has
been conferred to it by law.
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate
the real estate trade and business and in addition to its
powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957,
the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other
claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project
owner, developer, dealer, broker, or
salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of
contractual and statutory obligations filed by
buyers of subdivision lot or condominium
unit against the owner, developer, dealer or
salesman.
[G.R. No. 131683. June 19, 2000]

ARRANZA vs BF HOMES

RECEIVERSHIP

FACTS:

Respondent BF Homes, Inc. (BFHI), is a domestic corporation engaged in developing subdivisions and selling residential lots.
One of the subdivisions that respondent developed was the BF Homes Paranaque Subdivision, the place of the petitioners.

When the Central Bank ordered the closure of Banco Filipino, which had substantial investments in respondent BFHI,
respondent filed with the SEC a petition for rehabilitation and a declaration that it was in a state of suspension of payments.

SEC appointed Atty Orendain as a Receiver. He created United BF Homeowners Associations (UBFHAI) which was task by
the respondents have control and administration of the subdivisions basic needs.

Thenafter, Atty Orendain was relieved by the SEC as a Receiver and appointed the eleven Board of directors of the respondent
as receiver. The new receivers revoke the authority given to Orendain which resulted to dissolution of UBFHAI the one task
for the control and administration of the subdivision. Consequently, they created BF Paranaque Homeowners Association Inc
(BFPHAI) as the representative of all homeowners in the subdivision. (They did not do a good job)

Resulted to petitioners filed with HLURB a class suit in behalf of all homeowners for enforcement of their rights as purchasers
of lots such as the basic needs of the homeowners: rights~of~way; water; open spaces; road and perimeter wall repairs;
security; and the interlocking corporations etc.

ISSUES:

Which body has jurisdiction over petitioners claims, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) or the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)?"

Assuming that the HLURB has jurisdiction, may the proceedings therein be suspended pending the outcome of the
receivership before the SEC?

CA Contention:

CA contended in the main that the HLURB acted "completely without jurisdiction" in issuing the Order granting the writ of
preliminary injunction considering that inasmuch as respondent is under receivership, the "subject matter of the case is one
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the SEC."

Moreover, It ruled that private respondents action may properly be regarded as a "claim" within the contemplation of PD No.
902~A which should be placed on equal footing with those of petitioners other creditor or creditors and which should be filed
with the Committee of Receivers.

SC Contention:

Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause the right to act in a case. It is conferred by law and not by mere
administrative policy of any court or tribunal. Presidential Decree No. 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers
Protective Decree) is the law conferring HLURB the jurisdiction.

In the case at bar, petitioners complaint is for specific performance to enforce their rights as purchasers of subdivision lots as
regards rights of way, water, open spaces, road and perimeter wall repairs, and security. Indisputably then, the HLURB has
jurisdiction over the complaint.

The fact that respondent is under receivership does not divest the HLURB of that jurisdiction.

RECEIVERSHIP:
A receiver is a person appointed by the court, or in this instance, by a quasi~judicial administrative agency, in behalf
of all the parties for the purpose of preserving and conserving the property and preventing its possible destruction
or dissipation, if it were left in the possession of any of the parties. It is the duty of the receiver to administer the assets
of the receivership estate; and in the management and disposition of the property committed to his possession, he acts in a
fiduciary capacity and with impartiality towards all interested persons. The appointment of a receiver does not dissolve
a corporation, nor does it interfere with the exercise of its corporate rights. [21]

In this case where there appears to be no restraints imposed upon respondent as it undergoes rehabilitation
receivership,[22] respondent continues to exist as a corporation and hence, continues or should continue to perform its
contractual and statutory responsibilities to petitioners as homeowners.

Receivership is aimed at the preservation of, and at making more secure, existing rights; it cannot be used as an
instrument for the destruction of those rights.[23]

What petitioners seek to enforce are respondents obligations as a subdivision developer. Such claims are basically not
pecuniary in nature although it could incidentally involve monetary considerations. All that petitioners claims entail is
the exercise of proper subdivision management on the part of the SEC~appointed Board of Receivers towards the end that
homeowners shall enjoy the ideal community living that respondent portrayed they would have when they bought real estate
from it.

Neither may petitioners be considered as having "claims" against respondent within the context of the following proviso
of Section 6 (c) of P.D. No. 902~A, as amended by P.D. Nos. 1653, 1758 and 1799.

Claims under Receivership:

Claims refers to debts or demands of a pecuniary nature. It means "the assertion of a right to have money paid. It is
used in special proceedings like those before administrative court, on insolvency.

Hence, the HLURB should take jurisdiction over petitioners complaint because it pertains to matters within the
HLURBs competence and expertise.

WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This case is
REMANDED to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board for continuation of proceedings with dispatch as the Securities
and Exchange Commission proceeds with the rehabilitation of respondent BF Homes, Inc., through the Board of Receivers.
Thereafter, any and all monetary claims duly established before the HLURB shall be referred to the Board of Receivers for
proper disposition and thereafter, to the SEC, if necessary. No costs.
Marina Properties Corporation vs Court of Appeals and H.L. Carlos Construction

Facts: