MIKEE MACALALAD
ART. 26 – FAMILY CODE
(DIGESTS)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ORBECIDO III
FACTS:
• Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M.
Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City, on May 24,
1981. They were blessed with a with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and
Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
• Lady Myros left for the United States bringing
along their son Kristoffer in 1986. After few years,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen.
• Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had
obtained a divorce decree sometime in 2000 and
then married a certain Innocent Stanley and lived
in California.
• He then filed with the trial court a petition for
authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was
filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court
granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was
denied. Orbecido filed a petition for review of
certiorari on the Decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
• W/N respondent Orbecido can remarry under Art.
26 of the Family Code.
HELD:
• YES.
• The Court’s unanimous decision in holding Article
26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code be interpreted
as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been
divorced by a spouse who had acquired a
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under
Philippine law.
• The article should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens,
but later on, one of them became naturalized as
a foreign citizen and obtained a divorce decree.
• The instant case was one where at the time the
marriage was solemnized, the parties were two
Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was
naturalized as an American citizen and
subsequently obtained a divorce granting her
capacity to remarry, and indeed, she remarried
an American citizen while residing in the US. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at
the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
• However, considering that in the present petition
there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on
record, the Court is unable to declare, based on
respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who
was naturalized as an American citizen, had
obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an
American, that respondent is now capacitated to
remarry. Such declaration could only be made
properly upon respondent’s submission of the
aforecited evidence in his favor. Hence, he was
still barred from remarrying.
CORPUZ V. STO. TOMAS
FACTS:
• Petitioner Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino
citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
married respondent Daisilyn Sto. Tomas, a
Filipina, in Pasig City. Gerbert left for Canada
soon after the wedding. When he returned to the
Philippines and discovered that his wife was
having an affair with another man.
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• Hurt and disappointed, he filed a petition for
divorce before the Superior Court of Justice,
Windsor, Ontario, Canada which granted the
petition for divorce.
• Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved
on and found another Filipina to love. He went to
the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered
the Canadian divorce decree.
• Gerbert also filed a petition for judicial recognition
of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage
as dissolved with the RTC. Daisylyn did not file
any responsive pleading and offered no
opposition to the petition.
• The RTC denied the petition. The RTC concluded
that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute
the action for judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian
citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can
avail of the remedy
• Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC
is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that
filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a
determination of his rights under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
Taking into account the rationale behind the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, he contends that the provision applies as
well to the benefit of the alien spouse.
ISSUE:
• W/N the 2nd paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family
Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court
of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree.
HELD:
• NO.
• The alien spouse can claim no right under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code as the substantive right it establishes is in
favor of the Filipino spouse.
• Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
• As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was
included in the law “to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse.”
• The legislative intent is for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital
status, settling the doubts created by the divorce
decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino
spouse a substantive right to have his or her
marriage to the alien spouse considered as
dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.
• Given the rationale and intent behind the
enactment, and the purpose of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the
RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the
provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In
other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under
this provision.
VDA. DE CATALAN V. CATALAN-LEE
FACTS:
• Orlando B. Catalan, a naturalized American
citizen, allegedly obtained a divorce in the United
States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor. He then
contracted a second marriage with petitioner,
Merope Enriquez De Catalan.
• When Orlando died intestate in the Philippines,
petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for the
issuance of letters of administration for her
appointment as administratrix of the intestate
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estate. While the case was pending, respondent
Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of
Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar
petition with the RTC. The two cases were
consolidated.
• Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition
filed by the respondent on the ground of litis
pendentia. Respondent alleged that petitioner
was not considered an interested person qualified
to file the petition. Respondent further alleged
that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against
petitioner by Felicitas Amor contending that
petitioner contracted a second marriage to
Orlando despite having been married to one
Eusebio Bristol.
• However, the RTC acquitted petitioner of bigamy
and ruled that since the deceased was a divorced
American citizen, and that divorce was not
recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the
marriage between him and petitioner was not
valid. The RTC took note of the action for
declaration of nullity then pending filed by
Felicitas Amor against the deceased and
petitioner. It considered the pending action to be
a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of
petitioner for the crime of bigamy. The RTC also
found that petitioner had never been married to
Bristol.
• The RTC subsequently dismissed the Petition for
the issuance of letters of administration filed by
petitioner and granted that of private respondent.
Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A,
the RTC held that the marriage between
petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and
subsisting when she married Orlando. The RTC
held that petitioner was not an interested party
who may file said petition. The CA affirmed the
decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
• W/N the divorce obtained abroad by Orlando may
be recognized under Philippine jurisdiction.
HELD:
• YES.
• Under the principles of comity, Philippine
jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by
a spouse of foreign nationality. Aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. Nonetheless, the fact of divorce
must still first be proven by the divorce decree
itself. The best evidence of a judgment is the
judgment itself. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept
in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office.
• Moreover, the burden of proof lies with the “party
who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an
action.” In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden
of proving the material allegations of the
complaint when those are denied by the answer;
and defendants have the burden of proving the
material allegations in their answer when they
introduce new matters. It is well-settled in our
jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they
must be alleged and proved.
• It appears that the trial court no longer required
petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s
divorce under the laws of the United States and
 MIKEE MACALALAD
the marriage between petitioner and the
deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the
proceedings to the trial court for further reception
of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.
FUJIKI VS. MARINAY
FACTS:
• Fujiki was a Japanese national who married
respondent in the Philippines.
• The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s
parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to
Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost
contact with each other.
• Marinay met another Japanese, Maekara.
Without the 1st marriage being dissolved,
Marinay and Maekara were married in Quezon
City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to
Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered
physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara
and started to contact Fujiki.
• Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were
able to reestablish their relationship.
• Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a
family court in Japan which declared the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void on the
ground of bigamy.
• Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage).” Fujiki prayed
(among others) for the RTC to direct the Local
Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the
Japanese Family Court judgment on the
Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and
Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the
Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar
General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
• The RTC dismissed the petition. It based its
dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with
any of the preceding requirements may be a
ground for immediate dismissal of the petition."
Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the
husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara
or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their
marriage void, and not Fujiki.
• Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He
argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated
ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and
annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of
foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which
"seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular
fact," and not a civil action which is "for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong."
• Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court is applicable. Section 2 of Rule
108 provides that entries in the civil registry
relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments
of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning" are subject to
cancellation or correction. The petition in the RTC
sought (among others) to annotate the judgment
of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
ISSUE:
• W/N a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file
a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or
her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy.
HELD:
• YES.
• Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only
requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
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establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."
Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a
person’s life which are recorded by the State
pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No.
3753. These are facts of public consequence
such as birth, death or marriage, which the State
has an interest in recording.
• Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person
interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning thecivil status of persons which has
been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction
of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.
• Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to
recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to
Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to
cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of
the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
• A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an
action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for
Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a
foreign judgment, which presupposes a case
which was already tried and decided under
foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 (Family
Courts Act of 1997) define the jurisdiction of the
foreign court.
MEDINA V. KOIKE
FACTS:
• Medina was married to Koike on on June 14,
2005 in Quezon City, Philippines. Their union
bore two children.
• On June 14, 2012, Medina and Michiyuki,
pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for divorce
before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City, Aichi
Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced on even
date as appearing in the Divorce Certificate and
the same was duly recorded in the Official Family
Register of Michiyuki Koike.
• Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate
annotated on her Certificate of Marriage on file
with the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City,
Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce and
declaration of capacity to remarry.
• At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the
petition. On the other hand, Medina presented
several foreign documents, namely, "Certificate
of Receiving/Certificate of Acceptance of
Divorce" and "Family Register of Michiyuki
Koike" etc.
• RTC denied Medina's petition, ruling that the
foreign divorce decree and the national law of the
alien recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a
divorce must be proven in accordance with
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence.
• The RTC ruled that while the divorce documents
presented were successfully proven to be public
or official records of Japan, she nonetheless fell
short of proving the national law of her husband,
particularly the existence of the law on divorce.
Medina’s testimony was insufficient since she
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was not presented a qualified expert witness nor

was shown to have.

ISSUE:
• Whether or not the RTC erred in denying the
petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce.
HELD:
• NO.
• At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law
does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our
courts cannot grant it. Considering that the
validity of the divorce decree between Medina
and Michiyuki, as well as the existence of
pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are
essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation of
the evidence presented before the RTC.
• The resolution of factual issues is the function of
the lower courts, whose findings on these matters
are received with respect and are in fact binding
subject to certain exceptions. In this regard, it is
settled that appeals taken from judgments or final
orders rendered by RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction raising questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law should be
brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) in
accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.