VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO to exercise control over conjugal assets.
FACTS: In 1972, Alice Reyes, a Filipina,
and Richard Upton, an American,
married in Hong Kong. However, in 1982,
Upton obtained a divorce decree in
Nevada, USA.
Later, Reyes married Theodore Van
Dorn.
In 1983, Upton filed a civil case against
Reyes in Pasay City. Upton was
petitioning that he be granted
management rights over a property in
Manila (The Galleon). It was his
contention that the divorce decree they
obtained abroad do not apply to
properties in the Philippines, hence,
despite the divorce, Reyes’s property in
the Philippines remained conjugal with
Upton. Judge Manuel Romillo, Jr. agreed
with Upton. The judge ruled that the
divorce decree issued by the Nevada
court, a foreign court, cannot prevail over
the declared national policy of the
Philippines which prohibits divorce.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Romillo,
Jr. is correct.
HELD: No. Under Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality (nationality principle). Aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may
be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in
Nevada Upton from the marriage from
the standards of American Law, under
which divorce dissolves the
marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national
law, Upton is no longer the husband of
Reyes. He would have no standing to sue
as Reyes’s husband as he is not entitled
He is bound by the decision of his own
country’s court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by
his own representation before said court
from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.
Further, the SC declared, Alice Reyes
van Dorn should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served.
QUITA VS. CA
Facts:
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both
Filipinos, were married in the Philippines
on May 18, 1941. No children were born
out of their marriage. On July 23, 1954,
petitioner obtained a final judgment of
divorce in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A. On April 16, 1972, Arturo died
leaving no will. On August 31, 1972, Lino
Javier Inciong filed a petition with the
RTC for issuance of letters of
administration concerning the estate of
Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust
Company. Respondent Blandina
Dandan, claiming to be the surviving
spouse of Arturo Dandan and the
surviving children, all surnamed Padlan,
opposed the petition. The RTC
expressed that the marriage between
Antonio and petitioner subsisted until the
death of Arturo in 1972, that the marriage
existed between private respondent and
Arturo was clearly void since it was
celebrated during the existence of his
previous marriage to petitioner. The
Court of Appeals remanded the case to
the trial court for further proceedings.
Issues:
1. Should the case be remanded to the
lower court?
2. Who between the petitioner and
private respondent is the proper heir of
the decedent?
Held:
If there is a controversy before the court
as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive
shares to which each person is entitled
under the law, the controversy shall be
heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No dispute exists as to the right of the six
Padlan children to inherit from the
decedent because there are proofs that
they have been duly acknowledged by
him and petitioner herself even
recognizes them as heirs of Arturo
Padlan, nor as to their respective
hereditary shares.
Private respondent is not a surviving
spouse that can inherit from him as this
status presupposes a legitimate
relationship. Her marriage to Arturo being
a bigamous marriage considered void ab
inito under Articles 80 and 83 of the Civil
Code renders her not a surviving spouse.
The decision of the Court of Appeals
ordering the remand of the case is
affirmed.
REPUBLIC VS. ORBECIDO III
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari
of the decision and resolution of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave,
Zamboaga del Sur, Branch 23, granting
respondent’s petition for authority to
remarry invoking par. 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III
and Lady Myros Villanueva were married
in Lam-an, Ozamis City and were
blessed with a son and a daughter. In
1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S.
bringing along their son and after a few
years she was naturalized as an
American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido
learned from his son – who was living
with his wife in the States – that his wife
had remarried after obtaining her divorce
decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for
authority to remarry with the trial court
invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family
Code.
Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002,
the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga
del Sur granted the petition of the
respondent and allowed him to remarry.
The Solicitor General’s motion for
reconsideration was denied. In view of
that, petitioner filed this petition for review
on certiorari of the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court. Herein petitioner
raised the issue of the applicability of Art.
26 par. 2 to the instant case.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT
CAN REMARRY UNDER THE ARTICLE
26 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
Held: Respondent Orbecido who has the
burden of proof, failed to submit
competent evidence showing his
allegations that his naturalized American
wife had obtained a divorce decree and
had remarried. Therefore, the Petition of
the Republic of the Philippines is
GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution
of the RTC Br. 32 of Molave, Zamboanga
del Sur is hereby SET ASIDE.
“Art. 26 (2) Where a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under the Philippine
laws.”
Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only
applies to case where at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties
are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The
instant case is one where at the time the
marriage was solemnized, the parties
were two Filipino citizens, but later on,
the wife was naturalized as an American
citizen and subsequently obtained a
divorce granting her capacity to remarry,
and indeed she remarried an American
citizen while residing in the U. S. A.
Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does
not apply to the instant case.
However, the legislative intent must be
taken into consideration and rule of
reason must be applied. The Supreme
Court ruled that par. 2 of Art. 26 should
be construed and interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time
of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of then
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen
and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party
were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be sanction absurdity
and injustice. Were the interpretation of a
statute according to its exact and literal
import would lead to mischievous results
or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the
letter of the law. A stature may therefore
be extended to case not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they
come within its spirits or intent.
CORPUZ VS. STO. TOMAS
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz is a
naturalized Canadian citizen who
married respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto.
Tomas but subsequently left
for Canada due to work and other
professional commitments. When he
returned to the Philippines, he
discovered that Sto. Tomas was already
romantically involved with another man.
This brought about the filing of a petition
for divorce by Corpuz in Canada which
was eventually granted by the Court
Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A
month later, the divorce decree
took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has
fallen in love with another Filipina and
wished to marry her. He went to Civil
Registry Office of Pasig City
to register the Canadian divorce decree
on his marriage certificate with Sto.
Tomas. However, despite the
registration, an official of National
Statistics Office informed Corpuz that the
former marriage still subsists under the
Philippine law until there has been a
judicial recognition of the Canadian
divorce decree by a competent judicial
court in view of NSO Circular No. 4,
series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a
petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and/or declaration
of dissolution of marriage with the RTC.
However, the RTC denied the petition
reasoning out that Corpuz cannot
institute the action for judicial recognition
of the foreign divorce decree because he
is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was
provided further that Sto. Tomas was the
proper party who can institute an action
under the principle of Article 26 of the
Family Code which capacitates
a Filipino citizen to remarry in case
the alien spouse obtains a foreign
divorce decree. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code grants alienslike
Corpuz the right to institute a petition for
judicial recognition of a foreign divorce
decree?
HELD: Petition GRANTED.
RTC Decision REVERSED.
The Supreme Court qualifies the above
conclusion – i.e., that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code bestows no rights in favor
of aliens -with the complementary
statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s
petition before the RTC. In other
words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code to aliensdoes not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest
to petition the RTC for the recognition of
his foreign divorce decree.
The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the
alien’s national law have been duly
proven according to our rules of
evidence, serves as a presumptive
evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which provides for the
effect of foreign judgments. A remand, at
the same time, will allow other interested
parties to oppose the foreign judgment
and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive
evidence of aright by proving want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to a
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact. Needless to state, every
precaution must be taken
to ensure conformity with our laws before
a recognition is made, as the foreign
judgment, once recognized, shall have
the effect of res judicata between the
parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court.
GARCIA VS. RECIO
FACTS:
Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married
to Editha Samson an Australian citizen,
on March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989 a
decree of divorce dissolving the marriage
was issued by the Australian Family
Court. On June 26, 1992, Recio became
an Australian citizen. Subsequently,
Recio entered into marriage with Grace
Garcia, a Filipina, on January 12, 1994.
Starting October 22, 1995, Recio and
Garcia lived separately without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage. On
March 3, 1998, Garcia filed a complaint
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on
the ground of bigamy. Recio contended
that his prior marriage had been validly
dissolved by a decree of divorce obtained
in Australia thus he is legally capacitated
to marry Garcia. The trial court rendered
the decision declaring the marriage
between Garcia and Recio dissolved and
both parties can now remarry. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce
obtained by Recio in Australia ipso
facto capacitated him to remarry.
HELD: The SC remanded the case to the
court a quo to receive evidence. Based
on the records, the court cannot conclude
that Recio who was then a naturalized
Australian citizen was legally capacitated
to marry Garcia. Neither can the court
grant Garcia’s prayer to declare her
marriage null and void on the ground of
bigamy. After all it may turn out that
under Australian law he was really
capacitated to marry Garcia as result of
the divorce decree. The SC laid down the
following basic legal principles; a
marriage between two Filipino cannot be
dissolved even by a divorce decree
obtained abroad because of Articles 15
and 17 of the Civil Code.
AZNAR VS GARCIA
FACTS: Edward Christensen was born in
New York but he migrated to California
where he resided for a period of 9 years.
In 1913, he came to the Philippines
where he became a domiciliary until his
death. In his will, he instituted an
acknowledged natural daughter, Maria
Lucy Christensen (legitimate), as his only
heir, but left a legacy sum of money in
favor of Helen Christensen Garcia
(illegitimate). Adolfo Aznar was the
executor of the estate. Counsel for Helen
claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2
of the Civil Code, California law should
be applied; that under California law, the
matter is referred back to the law of the
domicile. On the other hand, counsel for
Maria, averred that the national law of the
deceased must apply, illegitimate
children not being entitled to anything
under California law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law
of the deceased should be applied in
determining the successional rights of his
heirs.
HELD: The Supreme Court deciding to
grant more successional rights to Helen
said in effect that there are two rules in
California on the matter; the internal law
which applies to Californians domiciled in
California and the conflict rule for
Californians domiciled outside of
California. Christensen being domiciled
in the Philippines, the law of his domicile
must be followed. The case was
remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings – the determination of the
successional rights under Philippine law
only.
PIMENTEL VS. PIMENTEL
FACTS:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y
Lacap(private respondent) filed an action
for frustrated parricide against Joselito
Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City.
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received
summons to appear before the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo City for the pre-trial
and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v.
Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an
urgent motion to suspend the
proceedings before the RTC Quezon City
on the ground of the existence of a
prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted
that since the relationship between
the offender and the victim is a key
element in parricide, the outcome of the
civil case would have a bearing in the
criminal case filed against him before the
RTC Quezon City.
The RTC Quezon City held that the
pendency of the case before the RTC
Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that
warrants the suspension of the criminal
case before it.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
with application for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order before the Court
of Appeals. However, The Court
of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage
between petitioner and respondent
would be declared void, it would be
immaterial to the criminal case because
prior to the declaration of nullity, the
alleged acts constituting the crime of
frustrated parricide had already been
committed.
ISSUE:
Whether the resolution of the action for
annulment of marriage is a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of
the criminal case for frustrated parricide
against petitioner.
HELD:
No.
RATIO:
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides that
elements of a prejudicial question are: (a)
the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.
In the case at bar, the civil case for
annulment was filed after the filing of the
criminal case for frustrated parricide. As
such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule
111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure was not met since the civil
action was filed subsequent to the filing
of the criminal action.
The relationship between the offender
and the victim is a key element in the
crime of parricide, which punishes any
person “who shall kill his father, mother,
or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
or any of
his ascendants or descendants, or his
spouse.” However, the issue in the
annulment of marriage is not similar or
intimately related to the issue in the
criminal case for parricide. Further, the
relationship between the offender and
the victim is not determinative of the guilt
or innocence of the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations.
The issue in parricide is whether the
accused killed the victim. In this case,
since petitioner was charged with
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether
he performed all the acts of execution
which would have killed respondent as a
consequence but which, nevertheless,
did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of petitioner’s will.
At the time of the commission of the
alleged crime, petitioner and respondent
were married. The
subsequent dissolution of their marriage
will have no effect on the alleged crime
that was committed at the time of the
subsistence of the marriage. In short,
even if the marriage
between petitioner and respondent is
annulled, petitioner could still be held
criminally liable since at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, he was
still married to respondent.
We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals that “the
judicial declaration of the nullity of a
marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date of
the celebration of the
marriage insofar as the vinculum
between the spouses is concerned x x x.”
First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of
the judicial declaration of nullity of a
second or subsequent marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity on a
criminal liability for bigamy. There was no
issue of prejudicial question in that case.
Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that
“[t]here is x x x a recognition written into
the law itself that such a marriage,
although void ab initio, may still produce
legal consequences.” In fact, the Court
declared in that case that “a declaration
of the nullity of the second marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity is
of absolutely no moment insofar as the
State’s penal laws are concerned.”
CAPILI VS. PEOPLE
FACTS: In September 1999, James
Capili married Karla Medina. But then,
just three months later in December
1999, he married another woman named
Shirley Tismo.
In 2004, Karla Medina filed an action for
declaration of nullity of the second
marriage between Capili and Tismo. In
June 2004, Tismo filed a bigamy case
against Capili.
Before a decision can be had in the
bigamy case, the action filed by Karla
Medina was granted and Capili’s
marriage with Tismo was declared void
by reason of the subsisting marriage
between Medina and Capili. Thereafter,
Capili filed a motion to dismiss in the
bigamy case. He alleged that since the
second marriage was already declared
void ab initio that marriage never took
place and that therefore, there is no
bigamy to speak of.
The trial court agreed with Capili and it
dismissed the bigamy case. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals reversed the
dismissal and remanded the case to the
trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not a declaration of
nullity of the second marriage avoids a
prosecution for bigamy.
HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally
married;
2. That the first marriage has not been
legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity.
When Capili married Tismo, all the above
elements are present. The crime of
bigamy was already consummated. It is
already immaterial if the second (or first
marriage, see Mercado vs Tan) was
subsequently declared void. The
outcome of the civil case filed by Karla
Medina had no bearing to the
determination of Capili’s guilt or
innocence in the bigamy case because
all that is required for the charge of
bigamy to prosper is that the first
marriage be subsisting at the time the
second marriage is contracted. He who
contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.
The Supreme Court also notes that even
if a party has reason to believe that his
first marriage is void, he cannot simply
contract a second marriage without
having such first marriage be judicially
declared as void. The parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment
of competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can
it be held as void, and so long as there is
no such declaration the presumption is
that the marriage exists.
MERCADO VS. TAN
FACTS: In April 1976, Dr. Vincent
Mercado married Ma. Thelma Oliva. But
in June 1991, Mercado married a second
time. He married a certain Consuelo Tan.
In October 1992, Tan filed a bigamy case
against Mercado.
In November 1992, Mercado filed an
action to have his first marriage with
Oliva be declared void ab initio under
Article 36 of the Family Code
(psychological incapacity).
In January 1993, the prosecutor filed a
criminal information for bigamy against
Mercado.
In May 1993, Mercado’s marriage with
Oliva was declared void ab initio.
Mercado now sought the dismissal of the
bigamy case filed against him. He
contended that since his first marriage
was declared void ab initio, there was no
first marriage to speak of, hence, his
“second” marriage with Tan was actually
his first marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mercado is
correct.
HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are
as follows:
1. That the offender has been legally
married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet
be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code;
3. That he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity
All the elements are present when
Mercado married Tan. When he married
Tan, his first marriage was still subsisting
and was not declared void. In fact,
Mercado only filed an action to declare
his first marriage void after Tan filed the
bigamy case. By then, the crime of
bigamy had already been consummated.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, a
judicial declaration of nullity of a void
previous marriage must be obtained
before a person can marry for a
subsequent time. Absent that declaration
a person who marries a second time shall
be guilty of bigamy.
ARLEGUI VS. CA
Facts:
The object of a controversy is a
residential apartment unit which was
formerly owned by Serafia Real Estate
Inc. and leased to spouses Genguyon.
Thereafter the spouses were informed
that Serafia and its assets had been
assigned to A. B. Barreto enterprises,
which was subsequently sold to Mateo
Tan Lu. Spouses Genguyon continued to
make payments for the rental of the
aforementioned apartment. Before the
sale to Mateo Tan Lu and to Arlegui, the
Genguyon Spouses expressed their
desire to purchase the said apartment
unit from A. B. Barreto Enterprises; offers
for this was made through Barreto
Apartments Tenant Association, with
Mateo Tan Lu and Arlegui made officer s
in this association. The sale of the
property was done after Arlegui and Tan
Lu were made officers in the
aforementioned association.
Issue:
Whether or no Mateo Tan Lu and
Josue Arlegui cannot be considered
innocent purchasers for value for
violating the trust reposed upon them by
the spouses Genguyon when they
surreptitiously purchased the object
property.
Held:
Yes. It can be gainsaid that
Arlegui violated the constructive trust that
was created when Tan Lu and the
Petitioner appropriated for themselves
the property for which they were
negotiating for in behalf of the
Association. There is the presence of
abuse of confidence. Petitioner avers
that there was no constructive trust
created; however, constructive trusts do
not only arise from fraud or duress, but
also by abuse of confidence, in order to
satisfy the demands of justice. There is
ample documentary and testimonial
evidence to establish the existence of a
fiduciary relationship between them, and
those subsequent acts of the petitioner
betrayed the trust and confidence
reposed on him. Petitioner cannot argue
that the spouses Genguyon should and
could have negotiated directly with the
Barretos after he had already accepted
the responsibility and authority to
negotiate in their behalf. American
jurisprudence provides precedent rulings
that a constructive trust is an appropriate
remedy against unjust enrichment; it is
raised by equity in respect of property,
although acquired originally without
fraud, it is against equity that it should be
retained by the person holding it.
An action for reconveyance of
registered land on an implied trust
prescribes in 10 years even if the decree
of registration is no longer open to
review.
AMONOY VS. GUTIERREZ
Facts:
Amonoy was the counsel of the
successors of the
deceased Julio Cantolos for the
settlement of the latter’s estate. On
January 1965, the lots were adjudicated
to Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso
Formilda. On January 20, 1965,
Pasamba and Formilda executed a deed
of real estate mortgage on the said two
lots adjudicated to them, in favor of
Amonoy to secure the payment of his
attorney’s fees. But on August 6, 1969,
after the taxes had been paid, the claims
settled and the properties adjudicated,
the estate was declared closed and
terminated. When Pasamba and
Formilda passed away, Formilda was
succeeded by the spouses Gutierrez. On
January 21, 1970, Amonoy filed for the
closure of the two lots alleging the non-
payment of attorney’s fees. The herein
respondents denied the allegation, but
judgment was rendered in favor of
Amonoy.
Still for failure to pay attorney’s fees, the
lots were foreclosed. Amonoy was able
to buy the lots by auction where
the house of the spouses Gutierrez was
situated. On Amonoy’s motion of April 24,
1986, orders were implemented for
the demolition of structures in the said
lot, including herein respondents’ house.
On September 27, 1985, David Formilda
petitioned to the Supreme Court for a
TRO for the suspension of
the demolition, which was granted, but
the houses have already been
demolished. A complaint for damages
was filed by respondents, which was
denied by RTC but granted by CA, thus
this case.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that
Amonoy was liable for damages to
respondents.
Ruling:
Petitioner invokes that it is well-settled
that the maxim of damage resulting from
the legitimate exercise of a person’s
rights is a loss without injury — damnum
absque injuria — for which the law gives
no remedy, saying he is not liable for
damages. The precept of Damnum
Absque Injuria has no application is this
case. Petitioner did not heed the TRO
suspending the demolition of structures.
Although the acts of petitioner may have
been legally justified at the outset, their
continuation after the issuance of the
TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of
his right. Indubitably, his actions were
tainted with bad faith.
Article 19, known to contain what is
commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, sets certain standards
which may be observed not only in the
exercise of one’s rights but also in the
performance of one’s duties. These
standards are the following: to act with
justice; to give everyone his due; and to
observe honesty and good faith. This
must be observed. Clearly then,
the demolition of respondents’ house by
petitioner, despite his receipt of the TRO,
was not only an abuse but also an
unlawful exercise of such right. The
petition is denied. The decision of CA is
affirmed.
BUNAG VS. CA
FACTS:
On the afternoon of September 8, 1973,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. brought
plaintiff-appellant to a motel or hotel
where they had sexual intercourse. Later
that evening, said defendant-appellant
brought plaintiff-appellant to the house of
his grandmother Juana de Leon in
Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila,
where they lived together as husband
and wife for 21 days, or until September
29, 1973. On September 10, 1973,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and
plaintiff-appellant filed their respective
applications for a marriage license with
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Bacoor, Cavite. On October 1, 1973,
after leaving plaintiff-appellant,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an
affidavit withdrawing his application for a
marriage license.
Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the
afternoon of September 8, 1973,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., together
with an unidentified male companion,
abducted her in the vicinity of the San
Juan de Dios Hospital in Pasay City and
brought her to a motel where she was
raped.
ISSUE:
Whether, since action involves a breach
of promise to marry, the trial court erred
in awarding damages.
RULING:
It is true that in this jurisdiction, we
adhere to the time-honored rule that an
action for breach of promise to marry has
no standing in the civil law, apart from the
right to recover money or property
advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of
such promise. 8 Generally, therefore, a
breach of promise to marry per se is not
actionable, except where the plaintiff has
actually incurred expenses for the
wedding and the necessary incidents
thereof.
However, the award of moral damages is
allowed in cases specified in or
analogous to those provided in Article
2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively,
under Article 21 of said Code, in relation
to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any
person who wilfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for moral
damages. 9 Article 21 was adopted to
remedy the countless gaps in the
statutes which leave so many victims of
moral wrongs helpless even though they
have actually suffered material and moral
injury, and is intended to vouchsafe
adequate legal remedy for that untold
number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to
specifically provide for in the statutes. 10
Under the circumstances obtaining in the
case at bar, the acts of petitioner in
forcibly abducting private respondent
and having carnal knowledge with her
against her will, and thereafter promising
to marry her in order to escape criminal
liability, only to thereafter renege on such
promise after cohabiting with her for
twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute
acts contrary to morals and good
customs. These are grossly insensate
and reprehensible transgressions which
indisputably warrant and abundantly
justify the award of moral and exemplary
damages, pursuant to Article 21 in
relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article
2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil
Code.
Petitioner would, however, belabor the
fact that said damages were awarded by
the trial court on the basis of a finding that
he is guilty of forcible abduction with
rape, despite the prior dismissal of the
complaint therefor filed by private
respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's
Office.
Generally, the basis of civil liability from
crime is the fundamental postulate of our
law that every person criminally liable for
a felony is also civilly liable. In other
words, criminal liability will give rise to
civil liability ex delicto only if the same
felonious act or omission results in
damage or injury to another and is the
direct and proximate cause
thereof. 11 Hence, extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction
of civil liability unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist. 12
In the instant case, the dismissal of the
complaint for forcible abduction with rape
was by mere resolution of the fiscal at the
preliminary investigation stage. There is
no declaration in a final judgment that the
fact from which the civil case might arise
did not exist. Consequently, the dismissal
did not in any way affect the right of
herein private respondent to institute a
civil action arising from the offense
because such preliminary dismissal of
the penal action did not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action.
The reason most often given for this
holding is that the two proceedings
involved are not between the same
parties. Furthermore, it has long been
emphasized, with continuing validity up
to now, that there are different rules as to
the competency of witnesses and the
quantum of evidence in criminal and civil
proceedings. In a criminal action, the
State must prove its case by evidence
which shows the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil
action it is sufficient for the plaintiff to
sustain his cause by preponderance of
evidence only. 13 Thus, in Rillon, et al.
vs. Rillon, 14 we stressed that it is not
now necessary that a criminal
prosecution for rape be first instituted and
prosecuted to final judgment before a
civil action based on said offense in favor
of the offended woman can likewise be
instituted and prosecuted to final
judgment.
WASSMER VS. VELEZ
In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz
Wassmer planned their marriage. They
decided to schedule it on September 4,
1954. And so Wassmer made
preparations such as: making and
sending wedding invitations, bought her
wedding dress and other apparels, and
other wedding necessities. But 2 days
before the scheduled day of wedding,
Velez sent a letter to Wassmer advising
her that he will not be able to attend the
wedding because his mom was opposed
to said wedding. And one day before the
wedding, he sent another message to
Wassmer advising her that nothing has
changed and that he will be returning
soon. However, he never returned.
This prompted Wassmer to file a civil
case against Velez. Velez never filed an
answer and eventually judgment was
made in favor of Wassmer. The court
awarded exemplary and moral damages
in favor of Wassmer.
On appeal, Velez argued that his failure
to attend the scheduled wedding was
because of fortuitous events. He further
argued that he cannot be held civilly
liable for breaching his promise to marry
Wassmer because there is no law upon
which such an action may be grounded.
He also contested the award of
exemplary and moral damages against
him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of
damages is proper.
HELD: Yes. The defense of fortuitous
events raised by Velez is not tenable and
also unsubstantiated. It is true that a
breach of promise to marry per se is not
an actionable wrong. However, in this
case, it was not a simple breach of
promise to marry. because of such
promise, Wassmer made preparations
for the wedding. Velez’s unreasonable
withdrawal from the wedding is
contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy. Wassmer’s cause of action
is supported under Article 21 of the Civil
Code which provides in part “any person
who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the
damage.”
And under the law, any violation of Article
21 entitles the injured party to receive an
award for moral damages as properly
awarded by the lower court in this case.
Further, the award of exemplary
damages is also proper. Here, the
circumstances of this case show that
Velez, in breaching his promise to
Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and
oppressive manner – this warrants the
imposition of exemplary damages
against him.

LIANG VS PEOPLE, JAN. 28
FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with
the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering
defamatory words against fellow ADB
worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged
before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City
with two counts of oral defamation.
Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a
warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing
petitioner’s bail, the MeTC released him
to the custody of the Security Officer of
ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge
received an “office of protocol” from the
DFA stating that petitioner is covered by
immunity from legal process under
section 45 of the Agreement between the
ADB and the Philippine Government
regarding the Headquarters of the ADB
in the country. Based on the said protocol
communication that petitioner is immune
from suit, the MeTC judge without notice
to the prosecution dismissed the criminal
cases. The latter filed a motion for
reconsideration which was opposed by
the DFA. When its motion was denied,
the prosecution filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with the RTC of
Pasig City which set aside the MeTC
rulings and ordered the latter court to
enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier
issued. After the motion for
reconsideration was denied, the
petitioner elevated the case to the SC via
a petition for review arguing that he is
covered by immunity under the
Agreement and that no preliminary
investigation was held before the criminal
case.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner’s case
is covered with immunity from legal
process with regard to Section 45 of the
Agreement between the ADB and the
Philippine Gov’t.
(2) Whether or not the conduct of
preliminary investigation was imperative.
HELD:
(1) NO. The petitioner’s case is not
covered by the immunity. Courts cannot
blindly adhere to the communication from
the DFA that the petitioner is covered by
any immunity. It has no binding effect in
courts. The court needs to protect the
right to due process not only of the
accused but also of the prosecution.
Secondly, the immunity under Section 45
of the Agreement is not absolute, but
subject to the exception that the acts
must be done in “official capacity”.
Hence, slandering a person could not
possibly be covered by the immunity
agreement because our laws do not
allow the commission of a crime, such as
defamation, in the name of official duty.
(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not
a matter of right in cases cognizable by
the MeTC such as this case. Being purely
a statutory right, preliminary investigation
may be invoked only when specifically
granted by law. The rule on criminal
procedure is clear that no preliminary
investigation is required in cases falling
within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
Hence, SC denied the petition.
CORPUZ VS PEOPLE
FACTS:
Accused Corpuz received from
complainant Tangcoy pieces of jewelry
with an obligation to sell the same and
remit the proceeds of the sale or to return
the same if not sold, after the expiration
of 30 days.
The period expired without Corpuz
remitting anything to Tangcoy.
When Corpuz and Tangcoy met, Corpuz
promised that he will pay, but to no avail.
Tangcoy filed a case for estafa with
abuse of confidence against Corpuz.
Corpuz argued as follows:
a. The proof submitted by Tangcoy
(receipt) is inadmissible for being a mere
photocopy.
b. The information was defective
because the date when the jewelry
should be returned and the date when
crime occurred is different from the one
testified to by Tangcoy.
c. Fourth element of estafa or demand is
not proved.
d. Sole testimony of Tangcoy is not
sufficient for conviction
ISSUES and RULING
Can the court admit as evidence a
photocopy of document without violating
the best evidence rule (only original
documents, as a general rule, is
admissible as evidence)?
Yes. The established doctrine is that
when a party failed to interpose a timely
objection to evidence at the time they
were offered in evidence, such objection
shall be considered as waived.
Here, Corpuz never objected to the
admissibility of the said evidence at the
time it was identified, marked and
testified upon in court by Tangcoy.
Corpuz also failed to raise an objection in
his Comment to the prosecution’s formal
offer of evidence and even admitted
having signed the said receipt.
Is the date of occurrence of time material
in estafa cases with abuse of
confidence?
No. It is true that the gravamen of the
crime of estafa with abuse of confidence
under Article 315, paragraph 1,
subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the
appropriation or conversion of money or
property received to the prejudice of the
owner and that the time of occurrence is
not a material ingredient of the crime.
Hence, the exclusion of the period and
the wrong date of the occurrence of the
crime, as reflected in the Information, do
not make the latter fatally defective.
Further, the following satisfies the
sufficiency of information:
1. The designation of the offense by the
statute;
2. The acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense;
3. The name of the offended party; and
4. The approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the place
wherein the offense was committed.
The 4th element is satisfied. Even though
the information indicates that the time of
offense was committed “on or about the
5th of July 1991,” such is not fatal to the
prosecution’s cause considering that
Section 11 of the same Rule requires a
statement of the precise time only when
the same is a material ingredient of the
offense.
What is the form of demand required in
estafa with abuse of confidence?
Note first that the elements of estafa with
abuse of confidence are as follows:
(a) that money, goods or other personal
property is received by the offender in
trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make number of witnesses, but by the quality of
delivery of, or to return the same; their testimonies, for in determining the
(b) that there be misappropriation or value and credibility of evidence, the
conversion of such money or property by witnesses are to be weighed not
the offender or denial on his part of such numbered.
receipt;
(c) that such misappropriation or
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and
(d) that there is a demand made by the
offended party on the offender.
No specific type of proof is required to
show that there was demand. Demand
need not even be formal; it may be
verbal. The specific word “demand” need
not even be used to show that it has
indeed been made upon the person
charged, since even a mere query as to
the whereabouts of the money [in this
case, property], would be tantamount to
a demand.
In Tubb v. People, where the
complainant merely verbally inquired
about the money entrusted to the
accused, the query was tantamount to a
demand.
May a sole witness be considered
credible?
Yes. Note first that settled is the rule that
in assessing the credibility of witnesses,
SC gives great respect to the evaluation
of the trial court for it had the unique
opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses and their deportment on the
witness stand, an opportunity denied the
appellate courts, which merely rely on the
records of the case.
The assessment by the trial court is even
conclusive and binding if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence,
especially when such finding is affirmed
by the CA. Truth is established not by the