Descartes: Meditation Four

1. There are three issues that Descartes discusses in Meditation Four. The first is confirmation
of his Criterion of Truth, proposed at the beginning of Meditation Three, by noting that the
perfect being (i.e., God), whose existence he has just proved, cannot deceive him because
deception is an imperfection. The second is to explain how human error is possible at all,
given that God will not allow us to be subject to systematic deception/error. The third is to
explain how to avoid error (the third point will be explained in my notes on Meditation Six).

Criterion of Truth

2. The Criterion of Truth, which Descartes proposes at the beginning of Meditation Three, is
that “everything I very clearly and distinctly perceive is true” (p.24). Then Descartes
reminds himself that he can be systematically deceived even about the things he clearly and
distinctly perceives, such as “2 + 2 = 4”. This is why Descartes, in that Meditation, sets out
to prove the existence of God as a perfect being who cannot deceive him. For if it can be
proved that such a perfect being exists in place of the evil genius, Descartes would have
eliminated the possibility of systematic deception, and would have secured the Criterion of
Truth from all doubt.

3. So at the beginning of Meditation Four, Descartes draws out the consequences of the proof of
God’s existence. It not only proves the existence of a perfect being, it also establishes its
nature as a non-deceiving being, since deception involves evil intent which is incompatible
with perfect goodness. Such a being provides guarantee that whatever appears systematically
true to us will be true. In other words, the Criterion of Truth (“everything I very clearly and
distinctly perceive is true”) is now safe from the now refuted Evil Genius Hypothesis.

4. Of course, there is the problem known as the Cartesian Circle (already explained in #3 of my
notes on Meditation Three). In his proof of the existence of perfect being, Descartes uses a
clear and distinct idea of perfect being, and uses the proof to establish that all of our clear
and distinct ideas are true. But if the truth of our clear and distinct ideas are in doubt, how
could Descartes use a clear and distinct idea to remove the doubt? Descartes’s strategy for
removing the possibility of systematic deception seems circular, and Descartes does not
satisfactorily address this issue.

The Problem of Error

5. But Descartes does address a second problem which arises from his position that God as a
perfect being cannot deceive us. If God is a non-deceiver, how is it possible that we ever
make any mistakes at all? Let’s call this the Problem of Error.

6. Descartes has a beautiful solution to this problem, which consists of two parts. First, he
notes that error derives from the joint operation of two mental faculties, the faculty of

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 understanding and the faculty of will/choice. Through the first faculty we know what ideas
we have (e.g., the idea of a bent straw in the glass of water) and we cannot be mistaken about
the presence of this or that idea in our consciousness, and whether the idea is clear and
distinct, or obscure and confused. On the other hand, the faculty of will in us is perfect, and
we can choose to believe or act upon whatever we please (though we may not succeed
because our power is limited). Secondly, we make mistakes only when we rashly exercise
our free will in making decisions about the contents of our consciousness (which we know
infallibly). It is only when we decide to believe, on the basis of an obscure and confused
idea, that there is something external to our minds corresponding to the idea, (e.g., that the
straw in the glass of water is really bent) that we make mistakes. So, God is not to blame for
the mistakes we make, since he has guaranteed us infallible access to the ideas in our minds
and perfectly free will; we ourselves are to blame for the rash exercise of our own free will,
and if we are careful enough we can avoid mistakes.

7. What’s interesting to note about the Problem of Error is that it is analogous to the well-
known Problem of Evil. Here is a comparison:
PROBLEM OF EVIL PROBLEM OF ERROR
(1) God exists. (1) God exists.
(2) God is perfectly wise, good, & powerful. (2) God is perfectly wise, good, & powerful.
(3) Yet there is evil. (3) Yet we make mistakes.
The problem in both cases is that it looks as though we cannot consistently hold (1), (2) and
(3). To explain why there is evil or why we make mistakes, it looks as though we have to
give up (1)—God’s existence—or modify (2)—possibly saying that God is not as powerful
or wise as we thought, or not completely good.

8. Descartes’s solution to the Problem of Error is analogous to St. Augustine’s (354~430 CE)
solution to the Problem of Evil. These solutions try to show that (1), (2) and (3) are
compatible, despite appearances to the contrary.1 Let’s first look at St. Augustine’s solution
to the Problem of Evil and then compare Descartes’s solution to the Problem Error with it.

9. Here are the four basic elements of St. Augustine’s solution to the Problem of Evil:
(a) Evil is absence of goodness. Evil exists, but only in the same sense as darkness
exists. Just as darkness is absence of light, evil is absence of good (evil is something
missing, not something present).2 So God cannot be the direct author of evil, just as
light cannot directly produce darkness.
(b) Free will is an important good. Free choice is so great a good that God saw fit to
give it to humans, despite the possibility of humans committing sin (= moral evil):
the goodness of free will outweighs moral evil.

1
Such a solution, which defends God’s existence and His perfect nature even while allowing room for evil or error,
is known as theodicy.
2
This is the view shared by St. Augustine and later medieval philosophers, as well as Descartes, that degrees of
perfection correlate with degrees of reality: the higher the degree of perfection, the fuller the existence. So, on this
view, e.g., greater goodness enjoys fuller existence than something less good, and greater evil is more deficient in
reality than something less evil. This view is associated with the Great Chain of Being, with God at the top, angels
below, humans in the middle, animals and vegetables even lower and dirt and stones near the bottom.

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 (c) The whole creation is perfect, though any part of the creation isolated from the whole
may seem imperfect. Whereas (b) explains why there are moral evils which are the
products of our free will, (c) explains why there are natural evils such as earthquakes,
diseases, etc., which are not the consequences of human choice. Earthquakes seem
bad to us, but is a necessary part of the perfect cosmos. Point (c) also explains why
there are different degrees of perfection in the universe (such as humans who are
imperfect compared to God). There being different degrees of perfection contributes
to the rich diversity and harmony of the universe. Moreover, some higher-order
goods are not possible without lower-order goods. For example, the virtue of
sympathy is impossible without pain, and the virtues of justice and forgiveness are
impossible without wrongdoing.
(d) We are imperfect in understanding, and cannot comprehend God’s perfectly wise and
benevolent plan. Just as an ignorant child observing a doctor performing surgery on a
patient might think that the doctor is doing something bad, we might think that God is
doing something bad when he allows natural disasters, plane crashes, plagues, etc.
This is because we are imperfect in knowledge, and even if we cannot explain how
these apparent evils contribute to the good of the universe as a whole, these mysteries
are due to our own shortcomings and not God’s.

10. Descartes relies on all these elements in his solution to the Problem of Error:
(a) Error is absence of truth. Error exists, but only in the same sense as darkness exists.
Just as darkness is absence of light, error is absence of truth and ignorance absence of
knowledge.
(b) Free will is an important good. Free choice is so great a good that God saw fit to
give it to us, despite the possibility that we might use it to affirm or deny things which
we imperfectly understand, thus committing errors in judgment.
(c) The whole creation is perfect, though any part of the creation isolated from the whole
may seem imperfect. See (d).
(d) We are imperfect in understanding, and cannot comprehend God’s perfectly wise and
benevolent plan. Descartes uses (c) and (d) to explain why God gave us only a
limited understanding, i.e., why many of our ideas are obscure and confused, even
while he gave us unlimited free choice, more specifically, unlimited freedom to make
judgments, even about things we understand obscurely and confusedly.

11. Here is one problem for Descartes’s solution. If we are indeed imperfect in understanding,
and God’s perfectly wise and benevolent plan must remain mysterious, then how do we know
that systematically deceiving Descartes or you or I is not part of that plan? Such systematic
deception may be a small piece in an intricate puzzle (along with plagues and natural
disasters) which, when all the pieces are in place and the puzzle is finally solved to reveal the
cosmic plan, will be shown to have been all for the best. (E.g., perhaps God has placed us in
virtual reality, so that even though everyone is exercising free will, no one’s actually getting
hurt. But this would involve systematic deception, such as making us believe we are not
living in virtual reality.) If this is so, then Descartes, by his own lights, cannot be certain that
proving the existence of God removes the possibility of systematic deception.