The climate change regime

Prehistory
• In the 1980s, working through international scientific meetings, the World
Meteorological Organization and UN Environment Program, scientists
pushed to get climate change on the agenda at national and international
level.
• UNEP and the WMO set up the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) in 1988 with a UN mandate to asses the current state of
climate change science and to present a consensus view.
• First assessment report in 1990 predicted 0.3 degrees C increase per
decade along business as usual path.
• The first agreement on climate change was part of a package of measures
at the Rio Earth Summit (UNCED) in 1992, where the North’s
environmental concerns and the South’s development concerns were
linked through the idea of sustainable development.
•
 The Framework Convention on Climate
Change 1992

• Following the precedent of ozone and long-range transboundary air pollution,

reporting and regular meeting of the parties established, with potential for
tightening up by adding protocols. This led to the Kyoto Protocol to the FCCC.
• Recognized the need to move towards stabilization of climate change.
• At the insistence of developing countries it enshrined the principle of ‘common but
differentiated responsibility’ – interpreted by developing countries as developed
countries should act as they were largely responsible for past emissions.
• At US insistence targets and timetables wanted by EU and some vulnerable
developing countries like the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) were dropped,
though a form of words recognizing the desirability of rich countries stabilizing at
1990 emission levels by 2000 was inserted.
• Poorer countries failed to get the new funding mechanism they sought, albeit they
got minor concessions on funding reporting.

• Positions of major players have shifted little since 1992!

 Kyoto Protocol 1997: the deal.
• The negotiations went right up to the brink of no agreement being
signed, which would have been severely embarrassing to the EU,
Japan and the US Clinton administration.
• The EU accepted flexibility mechanisms allowing the US to do little.
It got relatively minor cuts on 1990 emissions in developed
countries and 'bubbling‘ (burden sharing across the EU).
• The US-led coalition accepted cuts and gave in on developing
countries taking on commitments; but it got flexibility mechanisms,
differential targets, and a comprehensive approach.
• The Group of Seventy-Seven (G-77) developing countries got
maintenance of principle of differentiated responsibility and zero
commitments for them, plus potentially some additional aid.
 Binding emission reduction targets.

• Legally binding for Annex 1 (developed and former Eastern block) countries.
• No binding targets for non-Annex 1, ‘developing’ countries (including NICs like
China and India and rich countries like Saudi Arabia), excused commitments under
the principle of differentiated responsibility.
• Equivalent to cuts of 5.2% on average from baseline levels, for the time window
2008-2012.
• Baseline 1990 for most countries, but can be 1995 for CFC replacements.
• Targets vary: EU 8%; US 7%; Japan 6%; some countries got increases (e.g. Australia,
which didn’t ratify until 2007). 'Bubbling' for EU, whereby some member states
picked up part of the reduction burden of others, allowing Spain, Portugal and
Greece to increase emissions.
• Controversy:
I. Too little (greens and European critics)!
II. ‘Top down’ approach too inflexible and costly (US critics).
III. Institutionalizes rigid North/South distinction despite growth in South’s
emissions and ‘common’ responsibility (Northern critics).
 Coverage.

• Covers all significant greenhouse gasses. Specifically carbon

dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons
(HFCs), perfluorocarbons, and sulphur hexafluoride.
• Controversy:
I. ‘Comprehensive approach’ at the insistence of the US.
II. Others saw the scientific case, but thought it allowed the
US to evade the C02 issue by making other reductions.
III. Difficulties with eliminating HFCs and other CFC (ozone
depleting) substitutes concerned some countries.
 Inclusion of sinks.

• Enhancement of some sinks to be counted as reduction of

emissions, e.g. planting new forest.
• Controversy:
I. Scientific case not clear.
II. Verification problems.
III. Led to some countries claiming that maintenance of
existing sinks should count.
IV. From the green NGO perspective, another 'loophole',
pushed by the US, to evade C02 reductions.
V. Details of implementation so controversial that they were
simply postponed at Kyoto for future meetings.
 'Flexibility mechanisms' and ‘Joint
Implementation’.
• Principle: make cuts in emissions where it can be done at lowest cost; if not in your
country, then in some other country that has a 'surplus' of emissions to trade for
money, or where 'cheap' projects you fund can lead to large reductions.
• Trading between companies and between companies and governments is implied.
• Agreed at Kyoto in outline:
I. Target-based emissions trading among the developed countries where one
country has 'surplus target' to sell, although this must be 'supplemental to
domestic action';
II. Project-based emissions trading between developed countries that are
compliant with treaty obligations, including the former Soviet block countries,
under which projects funded by government or private enterprise in another
country can be counted towards meeting national targets – so called ‘joint
implementation’.
III. Clean development mechanism, whereby rich countries can fund projects in
developing countries, offsetting some proportion of reductions against their
targets so long as some share of proceeds are used to fund sustainable
development in particularly vulnerable countries.
 Controversy over flexibility and markets
• US refused to sign any deal that did not allow trading; EU disliked this
'loophole’.
• Collapse of heavy industry in Russia and the Ukraine left large reductions
on 1990 emissions to trade, but this 'hot air’, i.e. emissions that would not
have happened anyway, independent of the regime.
• The G. 77 with EU support got a clause about 'supplemental to domestic
action' inserted, but this is hard to judge.
• The G-77 was concerned that clean development might buy the easy cuts
to be made in the South cheaply, but was not opposed to technology
transfer on favourable terms.
• Considerable problems with verification, measurement, and setting up the
carbon market. Critics suspicious of additionality on many credits gained
through clean development deals with China and other developing
countries, i.e. investments reduce emissions but would have happened
anyway for other reasons like input-price changes.
 Compliance and sanctions.
• Kyoto targets are legally binding, but in the 1997 negotiations the
contentious question of sanctions was sidelined.
• Under the Marrakesh Accords negotiated at the COP in 2001, countries
that exceed their targets for the first commitment period 2008-2012
would have to take on an extra 30% over and above any binding
commitments for the second period.
• This was very weak both because it was far from certain there would be a
second period (for most countries there will not be – see below) and
because a country subject to sanctions can merely demand lower targets
for the second period or drop out completely.
• Also non-compliant countries would not be allowed to trade permits in
the second period, but it is implausible that such a country would have
any to sell or that it would actually want to comply in the second period.
• If climate change requires sanctions, these need to be credible (those
applying them have an incentive to do so) and sufficient (enough to
make a difference to behaviour). Those under Kyoto satisfy neither
requirement!
 Bringing the protocol into force, 2000-2005.

• After the March 2000 election of George W. Bush instead of the more
environment friendly Democratic candidate Al Gore, the US formally
announced it would pull out of the Kyoto Protocol (though not from the
FCCC), citing the economic impact of the Kyoto measures and the
uncertainty of the science.
• As the US produced around 25% of global emissions at the time, this made
it very uncertain whether the necessary ratifications to bring the Protocol
into force could be marshalled (55 parties to the convention including
annex 1 countries producing at least 55% of emissions). With Japan’s
agreement to ratify (diplomatic concerns?) the key became whether
Russia would do so.
• Late in 2004 Russia finally agreed to ratify, bringing the Kyoto Protocol in
to force in February 2005. One calculation was that Russia stood to
benefit, perhaps to the tune of $20 bn annually from emission trading, if
the treaty came into force, but there it was concerned that its boom based
on growing fossil fuel production would be slowed.
Kyoto: Little effect on climate, but potentially important
because of institutional ‘path dependence’.
• Because of the collapse of the former Soviet-bloc economies and modest
reductions in some European Union (EU) countries largely due to the
other pressures, emissions of greenhouse gasses from the developed
world were some 6% lower by the mid 1990s than they were in 1990.
• The collective commitment of the developed world at Kyoto amounts to
stabilizing these reductions over the window 2008-2012, i.e. to putting
into international law what would have anyway. In these terms the
agreement is completely ineffective as it has no causal impact.
• Even if fully implemented, the impact of the Kyoto agreement is tiny –
perhaps 0.10o C on global temperatures by 2050.
• But the impact of Kyoto on the future of climate change politics is critical
because of the institutional architecture it generated, with possible ‘path
dependence’. Will Kyoto 2 include binding targets + flexibility? Some see
this as very counter-productive, others as see it as indispensible.
Global trends in CO2 emissions (EU Commission
2011)
 Interpretation of trends

• Annex 1 parties will probably meet commitments over 2008-2012 window (we
won’t know for sure until late this year).
• But the 37 countries in Annex 1 that have ratified the treaty only emit around 25%
of total carbon emissions.
• Globally, there has been an increase of around 40% in CO2 emissions since 1990,
largely due to increased total emissions from developing countries, particularly
China and India.
• Even among Annex 1 parties, if we exclude EIT (former Soviet block) parties,
emissions have actually increased slightly (as they also have done in the US).
• Some parties will meet commitments only by buying ‘hot air’ from EIT parties, by
using joint implementation and clean development, or using land-use flexibilities.
• Some countries will definitely not meet commitments, e.g. Canada will not, and
has withdrawn.
• The EU is on-target, but much of this is due to de-industrialization/globalization
and shift from coal to gas.
 Copenhagen December 2009: A ‘Discordant Accord’ .

• Despite some optimism occasioned by incoming Obama administration’s apparent

position on climate change, little real shift from the US. At Copenhagen it was
conditionally willing to offer a domestic climate bill, but this had little chance of
getting through Congress.
• Chaotic process due to poor Danish control of agenda and negotiating text,
procedural wrangles orchestrated by China(?), and mismanagement of NGO and
media involvement.
• The major sticking point for many poorer developing countries was funding, where
they were looking for additional aid flows of $100bn dollars a year by 2020, which
some Northern leaders saw as politically unrealistic. (Danish negotiating text,
developed behind the backs of the G77, offered as little as $10bn dollars per
annum.)
• Another major sticking point was US insistence on independent verification of
emissions reductions, resisted by China and India on grounds of sovereignty.
• Final deal largely hammered out in final hours in a meeting between Obama
(personally) and leaders of China, India, Brazil and South Africa, diplomatically
sidelining the EU. This occurred outside the FCCC process.
 The main points of the Copenhagen Accord.

• Recognition of less than 2oC change as a long goal and the need for
deep cuts in emissions to achieve it, plus adaptation and action on
forests.
• No binding emission targets for the period after 2012. ‘Bottom up’
approach replaces Kyoto’s ‘top down’ approach.
• Countries to lodge ‘mitigation plans’ related to the accord with the
UNFCC secretariat by the February 2010 deadline.
• Verification of pledges to involve country reporting, not
independent inspection.
• Developed countries to provide finance and technology with target
of $100bn per annum by 2020, but no commitment to definite and
additional aid flows from public sources. ‘Significant portion’ to flow
through new Copenhagen Green Fund.
• Recognition of carbon trading, among other mechanisms.
 The aftermath of Copenhagen.

• A critical part of the deal is that India and China for the first time pledged
action at an international forum. The Chinese position was softening
because of the leadership’s growing concerns that the domestic impact of
climate change and associated pollution, but India retained a tough
stance.
• If the upper end of pledges were actually achieved, we might even be
close to stabilizing temperature increases at 2oC; but at the lower end
there is no chance of stabilizing climate change given the implied 3%
global average cuts on 1990 baseline (European Climate Foundation).
• In any case pledges are non-binding.
• After Copenhagen, with the world economy in recession, it was generally
thought that there was little hope of reviving the Kyoto architecture, but it
turned out at Cancun (December 2010) and Durban (December 2011) that
rumours of the death of Kyoto were premature.
 Durban December 2011 and Doha December
2012.

• After the fiasco of Copenhagen and the failure to make significant progress at
Cancun in December 2010, most observers thought the Kyoto process and its key
idea of binding reductions targets and timetables + flexibility was dead. However,
resurrection may be a possibility.
• By 2011 developing countries as defined under Kyoto were responsible for 58% of
global greenhouse-gas emissions, albeit typically with low emissions per-capita.
Most rich countries wanted China and India, in particular, to be legally bound by a
new successor treaty to Kyoto.
• While some rapidly developing countries including Brazil were willing to take on
legally binding commitments (as opposed to pledges under Copenhagen), China
and particularly India were loath to do so.
• Developing countries feared that when Kyoto expired, no developed country
would have binding commitments, despite their historical responsibility.
• But to exert leadership the EU became willing to trade a process leading to a new
treaty where the rigid distinction between developed and developing countries
was dissolved against a unilateral pledge to keep Kyoto going in the interim after
2012.
 The ‘Durban Platform’ for negotiating
‘Kyoto 2’
i. By 2015 negotiation of a successor to Kyoto to come into force in 2020.
ii. Such a protocol would make no distinction between annex 1 and other
states; so developing countries could take on reduction commitments.
Critically China’s position may have moved towards doing so, but India
remains more reluctant.
iii. Between 2013 and 2020 some annex 1 states under Kyoto 1 legally commit
to reductions of 18% on 1990 emission levels. But only the EU, Norway,
Australia and a few smaller countries generating 15% of global emissions are
so committed.
iv. After 2020 ‘Green Climate Fund’ of $100bn per annum from North to South.
v. Subsequently negotiated at Doha 2012 compensation fund for ‘loss or
damage’ to nations due to climate change agreed in principle, but wording
might allow this to be linked to Green Climate Fund.
• All the hard negotiating is to come! We don’t know how much of the rest of
Kyoto1 architecture will carry over, particularly on flexibility.
 Some possible futures
• Kyoto 2 process ‘succeeds’. But the major stumbling blocks are whether the US
administration would get the deal through Congress, whether India and China will
commit, whether the North would actually make funding available, and whether
commitments will be deep enough to make a real difference.
• Regional action. Kyoto 2 fails but the EU carries on with unilateral regional action
and some other countries join in. EU emissions trading links to growing carbon
markets and voluntary schemes, giving significant economic incentives for some
corporate players. Major problems are that regional action not including the US
and China would not make much difference.
• Patchwork of action at different levels. Interstate process partially bypassed
(though this future could include EU action and some states having national goals),
with change driven by voluntary action at city, inter-corporate and community
level partly driven by energy cost, energy security and ‘green jobs’ concerns. Some
of this will happen anyway, but the major problem is that without interstate
agreement it may not be deep enough and coordinated enough and to stabilize
climate change. Autonomous city/community processes are plausible only in rich
democratic societies.
 Conclusion: collective action failure.
• Although some sort of political momentum was
maintained at Copenhagen and Durban, because of the
growth in emissions in NICs we are further away than
ever from being able to stabilize climate change.
• It is now highly unlikely that we can limit temperature
increases to 2oC above pre-industrial and even 4oC will
become very difficult if considerably more is not done
in the next 2 decades.
• Given the ratio of benefits to costs for acting, this
represents a massive collective action failure, as well as
being a major injustice given the distribution of the
costs of not acting.
 Failure of international relations
theory.
• In overview, the outlines of the political coalitions and their positions have changed little since
1992: the EU attempts to lead; the US is committed to doing little or nothing; the NICs will act only
if the US does and the North pays; and poorer developing countries call in largely in vain for more
action and more funding.
• Gridlock cannot be unlocked by the use of geopolitical power: the EU does not have the power; the
US does not have the will to use its power; and US power may be insufficient given its growing
economic weakness and the irrelevance of military might.
• While realist theory rightly points to scepticism about action, it fails to identify the roots of this in
domestic politics, which makes it very difficult to envisage action by the US, despite some positive
developments.
• On the other hand climate change represents the major failure of the liberal-institutionalist view
that global environmental governance can be built through relatively institutionalized regimes.
• Given the prevalence of hardnosed calculation of national economic interest, perspectives based on
knowledge and identity also fare very poorly in this case.
• It is possible to derive some optimism from the growth of carbon markets. Some would go further
to argue that the way forward is to bypass the inter-state level through action led by global and
domestic civil society.