Case Title Ponente Held

Art. 2-3 – Essential/Formal Requisites

Republic vs. CA PUNO, J. Absence of a marriage license renders the marriage void ab initio.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized
without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio.

The certification of “due search and inability to find” issued by the civil registrar enjoys probative value and sufficiently proves that his office did not issue a particular
marriage license.

Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz:

“Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record.—A written statement signed by an officer having custody of an official record or by his deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry of a
specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such
record or entry.”

The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified
tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they
are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. The
certification of “due search and inability to find” issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of “due search
and inability to find” sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.

“Secret marriage” is a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either
or both of the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to
corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city
court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a “secret marriage”—a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the
knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the
parents of the former.
Sy vs. CA QUISUMBING, J. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio.
Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for annulment of marriage before the trial court that the incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and the
celebration of the marriage itself would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to Fernando was void from the beginning, she points out that these critical dates were contained in the
documents she submitted before the court. The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate, September 17, 1974, is contained in their marriage contract which was
attached as Annex “A” in her petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibit “A” in the course of the trial. The date of
celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private respondent, as stated in paragraph three of
petitioner’s petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and private respondent’s answer admitting it. This fact was also affirmed by petitioner, in open
court, on January 22, 1993, during her direct examination.

November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the parents in both their son’s and daughter’s birth certificates, which are also attached as Annexes “B” and “C” in the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibits “B” and “C” in the course of the trial. These pieces of evidence on record
plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage
void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever
resided in Carmona.

Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that indeed petitioner did not expressly state in her petition before the trial court that there was incongruity
between the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of the issuance of their marriage license. From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued
on September 17, 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a
marriage license. Nowhere do we find private respondent denying these dates on record. Article 80 of the Civil Code31 is clearly applicable in this case. There being no claim of an
exceptional character, the purported marriage between petitioner and private respondent could not be classified among those enumerated in Articles 72-7932 of the Civil Code. We
thus conclude that under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning.
Sevilla vs. CHICO- The certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found
Cardenas NAZARIO, J. in the register despite diligent search.
The certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register
despite diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.
Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that “hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem.” It could be easily implied
from the said statement that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its
“loaded work.” Likewise, both certifications failed to state with absolute certainty whether or not such license was issued.

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 This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the
logbook due to the fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of the said person was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on
record that the former custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony could not be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove
the material contents therein, had been exerted.

Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered,
the presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted. According to Section 3(m), Rule 131 of
the Rules of Court, the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed is among the disputable presumptions. The presumption of regularity of official acts may be
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome by other
evidence as in the case at bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the first and second certifications.

Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the
logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence
or falsity of entries therein. Sevilla vs. Cardenas, 497 SCRA 428, G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006

The rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds; Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
The rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts look upon this presumption with
great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several years producing two offsprings,26 now adults themselves. It took Jaime several years
before he filed the petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual sometime in 1991.27 We are not ready to reward petitioner by declaring the nullity of his
marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.

Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested.
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social
institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral
fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members alone.

Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested; Every intendment
of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony.
“The basis of human society through­out the civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony
are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the
parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil
Procedure is ‘that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.’ Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always
presume marriage.”
Silverio vs. CORONA, J. A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations—it is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status; There is no such special law in the
Republic Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects.
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 413: All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.

But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.

To grant the changes in name and sex sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations—it will allow the union
of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s
first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman. One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-
operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the
Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation
to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
Art. 4 – Effect Regarding Absence, Defect or Irregularity Thereof
Cosca vs. PER CURIAM While an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the same shall be civilly, criminally and
Palaypayon administratively liable.
The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts or certificates of those marriages he solemnized without a marriage license, there were no dates placed in the
marriage contracts to show when they were solemnized, the contracting parties were not furnished their marriage contracts and the Local Civil Registrar was not being sent any copy of
the marriage contract, will not absolve him from liability. By solemnizing alone a marriage without a marriage license he as the solemnizing officer is the one responsible for the

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 irregularity in not complying (with) the formal requ(i)sites of marriage and under Article 4(3) of the Family Code of the Philippines, he shall be civilly, criminally and administratively
liable.

On the charge regarding illegal marriages, the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an
irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

The present proceedings pertain only to the administrative liability of the respondent judge and clerk of court, all without prejudice to their criminal liability.
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriages, and what we are providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of
respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides that “(p)riests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities
who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law.” This is of course, within the province of the
prosecutorial agencies of the Government.

With respect to the charge of illegal solemnization of marriages, it does appear that the respondent judge had not taken to heart, but actually trifled with, the law’s concern
for the institution of marriage and the legal effects flowing from civil status.
The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to be imposed on respondent judge should, therefore, be modified. For one, with respect to the charge of illegal
solemnization of marriages, it does appear that he had not taken to heart, but actually trifled with, the law’s concern for the institution of marriage and the legal effects flowing from civil
status. This, and his undeniable participation in the other offenses charged as hereinbefore narrated in detail, approximate such serious degree of misconduct and of gross negligence
in the performance of judicial duties as to ineludibly require a higher penalty.
Aranes vs. PUNO, J. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage.
Occiano Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara, we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of
the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is
the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of
petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
Morigo vs. People QUISUMBING, J. Declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio retroacts to the date of the celebration of the first marriage.
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the
marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 42 of the Family
Code. There was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the
date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married. The records
show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory.

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete.
Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married “from the beginning.” The contract
of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage
with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be
sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
Alcantara vs. CHICO- A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in
Alcantara NAZARIO, J. relation to Article 58 of the same Code.
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code
which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage
void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the same Code.

To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage
contract or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.
From these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be
apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the
marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite.
The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further
validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.

Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the
marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business.
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business.
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by
no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of
the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness. Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by
counsel, admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.

Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of
publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage; An irregularity in
any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

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 Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that
there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent’s marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties,
and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect
the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly,
criminally and administratively liable.

The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary.
The issue raised by petitioner—that they appeared before a “fixer” who arranged everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a
Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel—will not strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be
presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary. Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and
regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the
issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.

Presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage.

Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage
bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
Nollora, Jr. vs. CARPIO, J. The elements of the crime of bigamy are: 1. That the offender has been legally married. 2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
People absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code. 3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage. 4. That the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: 1. That the offender has been legally married. 2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code. 3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage. 4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all
the essential requisites for validity. The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally married to Pinat; (2) Nollora and Pinat’s marriage has
not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the existence of his second marriage to Geraldino; and (4) Nollora and Geraldino’s marriage
has all the essential requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage.

Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that “[i]n case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law
or this Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply.”
Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that “[i]n case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code,
the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply.” Nollora’s religious affiliation is not an issue here. Neither is the
claim that Nollora’s marriages were solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime of
bigamy.
Republic vs. MENDOZA, J. In the United States, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as “limited purpose”
Albios marriages. A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child. Another is for immigration purposes.
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United
States, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as “limited purpose” marriages. A common limited
purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child. Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually
concerned with the intention of the couple at the time of their marriage, and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.

A “marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married.”
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, established the principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled
that a “marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married.” This standard was modified with the passage of the
Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not “entered into for the purpose of evading the
immigration laws of the United States.” The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining the intention of evading immigration laws. It
must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage
void ab initio. Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A “freely given” consent requires that the
contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under
Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of
intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act. Their understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or
hypnotism.

Marriages in Jest; A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and
with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound; Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete
absence of consent.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but
entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not
followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation. It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever,
hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no
genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.

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 A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law; There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes
other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship; Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by
law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no
real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature,
consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by
law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.

Marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites, are equally valid.
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their
lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages
in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes,
limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.

No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading
immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may
constitute fraud, namely, (1) nondisclosure of a previous conviction involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually
transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul
a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the
ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham
marriage.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State; The Supreme
Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. It must, therefore, be
safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the
parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.
Abbas vs. Abbas VELASCO, JR., Marriages; Formal Requisites of Marriage.
J. As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions
that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows: Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are: (1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; (2) A valid
marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and (3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. Art. 4. The absence of any
of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable as provided in Article 45. An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable. Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: x x x x (3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the
preceding Chapter.

Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the
contrary; The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary.
We held, “The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.” No such affirmative evidence was shown that
the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having
been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed
does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.

The certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license.
In the case of Cariño v. Cariño, following the case of Republic, it was held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was
adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the
burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured. Gloria has failed to discharge that burden,
and the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage license that would not
affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.

35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under
Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage
license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, “The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 5

 35(2).” Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under
Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code. Abbas vs. Abbas, 689 SCRA 646, G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013
Go-Bangayan vs. CARPIO, J. The certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys
Bangayan probative value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage
license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only Marriage License Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage License No. N-
07568 did not match the series issued for the month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and
Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys
probative value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally
entered into a marriage contract, the marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license.

Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, “shall be void from the
beginning.”
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a
marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, “shall be void from the beginning.” In this case, the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the
marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 which made their marriage
void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts
which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are “inexistent and void from the beginning.” Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.

For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage.
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage. In this case, there was really no
subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar
and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and represented themselves as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage.

Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally
which were given by Benjamin’s father to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before the trial court even admitted that “Benjamin’s late father himself
conveyed a number of properties to his children and their respective spouses which included Sally.

The words “married to” preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. Such words do not prove co-ownership.
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is more in accord with the evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No.
61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses. The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin with the descriptive title
“married to Sally.” The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally with the descriptive title “married to Benjamin” while the properties under
TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words “married to” preceding the name of a spouse are merely
descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-
ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.
Kho vs. Republic PERALTA, J. Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where
and Kho either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.
Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting
party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75. Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional
character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. These marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war; (2)
marriages in remote places; (3) consular marriages; (4) ratification of marital cohabitation; (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage; (6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages; and (7)
mixed marriages. Petitioner’s and respondent’s marriage does not fall under any of these exceptions.

The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the
proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate
consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that
it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage. Stated differently, the
requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested.

Petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar “has no record nor
copy of any marriage license ever issued in favor of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and Veronica M. Borata [respondent] whose marriage was celebrated on June 1, 1972.” Thus, on the
basis of such Certification, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent has been overcome and it becomes the burden of respondent to prove that their marriage
is valid as it is she who alleges such validity. As found by the RTC, respondent was not able to discharge that burden.

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 To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence or such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage
contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.
To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the
very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show that a
wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. As cited above, Article 80(3) of the Civil Code
clearly provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except marriages of exceptional character under Articles 72 to 79 of the same Code. As earlier
stated, petitioner’s and respondent’s marriage cannot be characterized as among the exceptions.
Art. 7 and 10 – Solemnizing Officers
Aranes vs. PUNO, J. The authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.
Occiano Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their
territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in
Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the
marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.

Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside the court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not
affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
“A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate
court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with.
However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.”
Tilar vs. Tilar PERALTA, J. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Our Constitution clearly gives value to the sanctity of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which
the public is deeply interested. Thus, the State is mandated to protect marriage, being the foundation of the family, which in turn is the foundation of the nation. The State has
surrounded marriage with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The security and stability of the State are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest of each and
every member of the community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction.

As marriage is a special contract, their terms and conditions are not merely subject to the stipulations of the contracting parties but are governed by law.
As marriage is a special contract, their terms and conditions are not merely subject to the stipulations of the contracting parties but are governed by law. The Family Code provides for
the essential as well as formal requisites for the validity of marriage. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35(2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear
personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall
be contained in the marriage certificate which shall be signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer. A marriage license shall be issued
by the local civil registrar of the city or municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, except in marriages where no license is required. The rationale for the compulsory
character of a marriage license is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract
marriage.

The proceedings for church annulment which is in accordance with the norms of Canon Law is not binding upon the State as the couple is still considered married to each
other in the eyes of the civil law.
The marriage of petitioner and respondent which was solemnized by a Catholic priest and was held in a church was in accordance with the above quoted provisions. Although,
marriage is considered a sacrament in the Catholic church, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed by the Family Code. As petitioner correctly pointed out, the instant
petition only seeks to nullify the marriage contract between the parties as postulated in the Family Code of the Philippines; and the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage in the
religious and ecclesiastical aspect is another matter. Notably, the proceedings for church annulment which is in accordance with the norms of Canon Law is not binding upon the State
as the couple is still considered married to each other in the eyes of the civil law. Thus, the principle of separation of the church and state finds no application in this case.

As marriage is a lifetime commitment which the parties cannot just dissolve at whim, the Family Code has provided for the grounds for the termination of marriage.
As marriage is a lifetime commitment which the parties cannot just dissolve at whim, the Family Code has provided for the grounds for the termination of marriage. These grounds may
be invoked and proved in a petition for annulment of voidable marriage or in a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, which can be decided upon only by the court exercising
jurisdiction over the matter. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 provides:

Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxxx
(15) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations.

Hence, a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, which petitioner filed before the RTC of Baybay City, falls within its exclusive jurisdiction; thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the
petition for lack of jurisdiction.
Art. 21 – One or Both Parties is/are Foreigner/s

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 7

Recio vs. Recio PANGANIBAN, J. Certificate of Legal Capacity; The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned; The certificate of legal capacity mentioned
in Article 21 of the Family Code is sufficient to establish the legal capacity of a foreign national—a duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of
legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her,
its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry. We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party
concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.

The absence of a certificate of legal capacity is merely an irregularity in complying with the formal requirements for procuring a marriage license, an irregularity which will
not affect the validity of a marriage celebrated on the basis of a marriage license issued without that certificate.
In passing, we note that the absence of the said certificate is merely an irregularity in complying with the formal requirement for procuring a marriage license. Under Article 4 of the
Family Code, an irregularity will not affect the validity of a marriage celebrated on the basis of a marriage license issued without that certificate. (Vitug, Compendium, pp. 120-126;
Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, 1997 reprint, p. 17; Rufus Rodriguez, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1990 ed., p. 42; Melencio Sta.
Maria, Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law, 1999 ed., p. 146.).

A divorce decree does not ipso facto clothed a divorcee with the legal capacity to remarry—he must still adduce sufficient evidence to show the foreign State’s personal
law governing his status, or at the very least, he should still prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We
agree with petitioner’s contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to
adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.

The Court may not declare the second marriage of a divorcee null and void on the ground of bigamy where there is a possibility that, under the foreign law, the divorcee
was really capacitated to remarry as a result of the divorce decree—the most judicious course is to remand the case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which
show the divorcee’s legal capacity to remarry.
Neither can we grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really
capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if
any, which show petitioner’s legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties’ marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being
already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan
City dated January 12, 1994.
Art. 26 (2) – Marriages Between a Filipino and a Foreigner
Republic vs. Iyoy CHICO-NAZARIO Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, by its plain and literal interpretation, cannot be applied to the case of a Filipino couple where one spouse obtained a divorce
while still a Filipino citizen.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the married couple is a foreigner who divorces his or her Filipino spouse. By its plain and literal
interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen.
Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for
the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she
filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws
on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce
between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
Republic vs. QUISUMBING, J. The Supreme Court holds that paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Orbecido III Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and
remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a
private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial
determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage. x x x We hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should
be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To
rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene
the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended
to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.

The Supreme Court is unanimous in holding that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a
Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.
We are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who
has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
We state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 8

 as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a
valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced” Filipino
spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
Corpuz vs. Santo BRION, J Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Executive Order No. (EO) 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v.
Tomas Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 (1985), and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 (1989).
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the
Freedom Constitution, enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows: “Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.” Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 (1985), and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 (1989). In
both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus,
recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses.

Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law “to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.” The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the
divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce,
whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not
recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated
in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution
of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

An action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree—if the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage.
An action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the
alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar
declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.

Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code—the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the
provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no
right under this provision.

The unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip such aliens of legal interest to petition the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree—direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the
requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment.
We qualify our above conclusion—i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens—with the complementary statement that this
conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. * * * To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign
judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have
declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws—the
foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself.
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera
explained that, as a rule, “no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.” This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The
recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.

In the instant case where the foreigner seeking recognition of the foreign divorce decree attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required
certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the foreign law on divorce, the Court deems it more appropriate to remand the case to the trial court to
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the foreign divorce law, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s obvious conformity
with the petition.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 9

 custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. The records show that Gerbert attached
to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation,
we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law. We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will
be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and
overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every
precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the
parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

More than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign
judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms.
More than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce
serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the
Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Fujiki vs. Marinay CARPIO, J. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43 (1922), Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are
successfully proven under the rules of evidence. Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the
validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that “[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.” In Republic v. Orbecido, 472 SCRA 114 (2005), this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is “to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse” under the laws of his or her country. The second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.
Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the
ground of bigamy; If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated — the foreign spouse can remarry while the
Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of
bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not
recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated — the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.

Bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the
foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but
this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal
prosecution for bigamy.
Kioke vs. Kioke PERLAS- Article 26 of the Family Code — which addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner — allows a Filipino spouse to contract a
BERNABE, J. subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code — which addresses
foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner — allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by
an alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The provision reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 10

 The law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of
the dissolution of the marriage.
The law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of
the marriage. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, 628 SCRA 266 (2010), the Court had the occasion to rule that: The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, “no sovereign is bound to give effect within its
dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.” This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the
purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.

Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must
be alleged and proven like any other fact.
In Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA 437 (2001), it was pointed out that in order for a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse to be recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be shown that
the divorce decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be
proven. Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be
alleged and proven like any other fact. Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the
matter are essentially factual that calls for a reevaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond
the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review.
Republic vs. PERALTA, J. Divorce in the Philippine jurisdiction
Manalo
1. Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute divorce or a vincula matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and
(2) limited divorce or amensa et tharo, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.

2. In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:

(a) Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.
(b) Consistent with Articles 15 and 17 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.
(c) An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.
(d) In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

Article 26, Family Code

3. As modified, Article 26 now states:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

4. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try
the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case. Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign
nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e. g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the Spouses, must still be determined by our courts.

5. In Republic v. Orbecido III (2005), this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were both
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree. The court stated therein that
“the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

Article 26 applies even if it is the Filipino spouse who filed for divorce from the alien spouse

6. Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under Article 26, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and
obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. We rule in the affirmative.

7. The fact that a validly obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our previous rulings.
In Van Dorn vs. Romillo was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, the court held that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad, and
dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino
spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction. In Fujiki vs. Marinay, the Filipino wife, with the help of her first husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to obtain a judgment from Japan's
family court, which declared the marriage between her and her second husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. The court held that a husband or wife of a
prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy. (see
also Dacasin vs. Dacasin and Medina vs. Koike)

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 11

 8. There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino
spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop short in likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary
consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and
ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.

Interpretation of Article 26 should give effect to the intent behind the provision

9. The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is subject to Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree
which she obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, but of the Philippines.

10. We beg to differ. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.” Based on a clear and plain
reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. Verba legis
non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

11. Assuming that the word “obtained” should be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of
the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to
achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes.

12. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws
of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien
spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place
and in ‘like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is
extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter's national
law.

Nationality rule cannot be invoked if it will lead to unequal application of the law

13. Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15 of the Civil Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. ln fact, the mere
existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it
would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as
written by the Legislature only if they are constitutional.

14. While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification, the deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons
accorded special protection by the Constitution. If a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of
a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve
a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.

15. “Fundamental rights” whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.
It includes the right to marry. On the other hand, what constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by
history. It essentially involves a public right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows the former to take precedence over the latter.

16. The differentiation in Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is arbitrary. There is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino
who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights
and obligations in a alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no
longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly
unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.

Divorce is not prohibited under the 1987 Constitution; Divorce Law history in the Philippines

17. The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. Nevertheless, it was not meant
to be a general prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response to a question by Father Joaquin G Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, was categorical about this point.

18. Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effective March 11, 1917, Philippine courts could grant an absolute divorce on the grounds of adultery on the part of
the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature. On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the
Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an EC.
No. 141 (“New Divorce Law "), which repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven grounds for absolute divorce, such as intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one
year prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an extent as to make further living together impracticable, and a spouse's
incurable insanity. When the Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth Government was restored, it ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again prevailed. From
August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 386 or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obtained by Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized.

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 12

 19. Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine society to re-institute absolute divorce. As a matter of fact, in the current 17th Congress,
H.B. No. 7303 entitled “An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines " or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House Committee
on Population and Family Relations on February 28, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading.

20. The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but
must be harmonized with other constitutional provisions. Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively promote its total
development. It is also obligated to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial
to their development. To Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these obligations if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 only to those foreign divorce initiated by
the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women and children are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of domestic abuse and violence.

Japanese law on divorce must be proved

21. If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered admissible as a written act of the foreign court.94 As it appears, the existence of the
divorce decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so.95

22. Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction thatour courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. The burden of proof lies
with the “party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.

23. Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her.
Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
Republic vs. Cote REYES, JR., J. As of present, our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino husbands and wives. Such fact, however, do not prevent our family courts from
recognizing divorce decrees procured abroad by an alien spouse who is married to a Filipino citizen.
It bears stressing that as of present, our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino husbands and wives. Such fact, however, do not prevent our family courts from
recognizing divorce decrees procured abroad by an alien spouse who is married to a Filipino citizen. Article 26 of the Family Code states: Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Although the Supreme Court (SC) has already laid down the rule regarding foreign divorce involving Filipino citizens, the Filipino spouse who likewise benefits from the
effects of the divorce cannot automatically remarry. Before the divorced Filipino spouse can remarry, he or she must file a petition for judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce.
In the landmark case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 472 SCRA 114 (2005), the Court ruled that the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. Although the Court has already laid down the rule
regarding foreign divorce involving Filipino citizens, the Filipino spouse who likewise benefits from the effects of the divorce cannot automatically remarry. Before the divorced Filipino
spouse can remarry, he or she must file a petition for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce. The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, “no sovereign is bound to give effect within its
dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.” This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the
purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.

A decree of absolute divorce procured abroad is different from annulment as defined by our family laws.
A decree of absolute divorce procured abroad is different from annulment as defined by our family laws. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only covers void and voidable marriages that are
specifically cited and enumerated in the Family Code of the Philippines. Void and voidable marriages contemplate a situation wherein the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. It treats the marriage as if it never existed. Divorce, on the other hand, ends a legally valid marriage and
is usually due to circumstances arising after the marriage.
De la Cruz- PERLAS- The rules on divorce prevailing in this jurisdiction can be summed up as follows: first, Philippine laws do not provide for absolute divorce, and hence, the courts cannot grant the
Morisono vs. BERNABE, J. same; second, consistent with Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code, the marital bond between two (2) Filipino citizens cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained
Morisono abroad; third, an absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws;
and fourth, in mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The fourth rule, which has been invoked by Luzviminda in this case, is encapsulated in Article 26 (2) of the Family Code which reads:

Article 26. x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise. have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

This provision confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 13

 dissolution of the marriage. It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try
the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case. Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign
nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts. The rationale for
this rule is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had
obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or her national law. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, the Court held:

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the
doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her
marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition
of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino
spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be
subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves
as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national
law.](Emphases and underscoring supplied)

According to Republic v. Orbecido III, the following elements must concur in order for Article 26 (2) to apply, namely: (a) that there is a valid marriage celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner; and (b) that a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. In the same case, the Court also initially clarified that
Article 26 (2) applies not only to cases where a foreigner was the one who procured a divorce of his/her marriage to a Filipino spouse, but also to instances where, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a
favorable decree.

However, in the recent case of Republic v. Manalo (Manalo), the Court En Banc extended the application of Article 26 (2) of the Family Code to further cover mixed marriages where it
was the Filipino citizen who divorced his/her foreign spouse. Pertinent portions of the ruling read:

Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding
abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. x x x.

We rule in the affirmative.

xxxx

When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody
and property relation, it should not stop short in likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to
remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic
relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.

xxxx

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the
provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce
proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words,
to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute
there should be no departure."

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will
not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.
Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes. x x x.

xxxx

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree
that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino
spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or
not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be
without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 14

 alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the
foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter's national law.

xxxx

A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences
between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic, cultural, and religious
dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while
a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his or her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in
accordance with the national law of the foreigner.

On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree
upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in
an alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer
their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is
utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.

xxxx

The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but
must be harmonized with other constitutional provisions. Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively promote its total
development. It is also obligated to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial
to their development. To our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these obligations if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 only to those foreign divorce initiated by
the alien spouse. x x x.

A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the
meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out of such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate.
Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The irony
is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and. against unions not formalized by marriage, but
without denying State protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs.

This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement of communication and information technology, as well as the improvement of the
transportation system that almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages
are made in heaven and that imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect unions. Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the
individual's full human potential and self-fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus, it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at
the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are of rotten quality.

Going back, We hold that marriage, being mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is
considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, pursuant to Manalo, foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify marriages between a Filipino and an alien citizen may already be recognized in this jurisdiction, regardless of who
between the spouses initiated the divorce; provided, of course, that the party petitioning for the recognition of such foreign divorce decree – presumably the Filipino citizen – must prove
the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.

In this case, a plain reading of the RTC ruling shows that the denial of Luzviminda's petition to have her foreign divorce decree recognized in this jurisdiction

In this case, a plain reading of the RTC ruling shows that the denial of Luzviminda's petition to have her foreign divorce decree recognized in this jurisdiction was anchored on the sole
ground that she admittedly initiated the divorce proceedings which she, as a Filipino citizen, was not allowed to do. In light of the doctrine laid down in Manalo, such ground relied upon
by the RTC had been rendered nugatory. However, the Court cannot just order the grant of Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree, as Luzviminda has yet to
prove the fact of her. "Divorce by Agreement" obtained, in Nagoya City, Japan and its conformity with prevailing Japanese laws on divorce. Notably, the RTC did not rule on such
issues. Since these are questions which require an examination of various factual matters, a remand to the court a quo is warranted.
Juego-Sakai vs. PERALTA, J. The fact that it was the Filipino spouse who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted should not affect the application nor remove him from the coverage of
Republic Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code which states that "where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." We observed that to interpret
the word "obtained" to mean that the divorce proceeding must actually be initiated by the alien spouse would depart from the true intent of the legislature and would otherwise yield
conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, which is, specifically, to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The subject
provision, therefore, should not make a distinction for a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who
is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 15

 Applying the foregoing pronouncement to the case at hand, the Court similarly rules that despite the fact that petitioner participated in the divorce proceedings in Japan, and even if it is
assumed that she initiated the same, she must still be allowed to benefit from the exception provided under Paragraph 2 of Article 26. Consequently, since her marriage to Toshiharu
Sakai had already been dissolved by virtue of the divorce decree they obtained in Japan, thereby capacitating Toshiharu to remarry, petitioner shall likewise have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.

Nevertheless, as similarly held in Manalo, We cannot yet grant petitioner's Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment for she has yet to comply with certain guidelines before
our courts may recognize the subject divorce decree and the effects thereof. Time and again, the Court has held that the starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment
is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under
our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. Since both the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court applies.
Thus, what is required is proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in
the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

In the instant case, the Office of the Solicitor General does not dispute the existence of the divorce decree, rendering the same admissible. What remains to be proven, therefore, is the
pertinent Japanese Law on divorce considering that Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason
of their judicial function.
Art. 34 – Marriages Exempt from Marriage License Requirement/Effect on Falsity of Affidavit of Cohabitation
Niñal vs. Badayog YNARES Governing Law on Marriage
SANTIAGO, J.
1. The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (August 1988). The applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code
which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.

Requirement of Marriage License, exemption, co-habitation for 5 years

2. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio.

3. One instance wherein a marriage license is dispensed with refers to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband
and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. (Art 76, Civil Code)

4. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their
status.

5. The five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the
union. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity- meaning no third
party was involved at any time within the 5 years andcontinuity - that is unbroken.

6. Otherwise, the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully
with their spouse.

7. The second marriage between Pepito and Norma Bayadog is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of
such element. At the time of their marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time
Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about twenty months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started
cohabiting with Norma. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful (first) spouse. The subsistence of the
marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as
"husband and wife".
Manzano vs. DAVIDE, JR., No License Required for Man and Woman Living together as Husband and Wife
Sanchez C.J.
1. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry
each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under
oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage. (Article 34, Family Code)

Requisites for Legal Ratification of Marital Cohabitation

2. The requisites for the legal ratification of marital co-habitation are:

(a) The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage;
(b) The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
(c) The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;
(d) The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 16

 (e) The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.

Not all of the Requirements are Present

3. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of
their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated."

4. Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.

Legal Separation Does Not Sever Marital Bond

5. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not
severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de
facto, as in the case at bar.

Marital Cohabitation Merely a Ground for Exemption of Marriage License

6. Free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.

7. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could
not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
De Castro vs. De Tinga, J. Lack of Marriage License
Castro
3. Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall
render the marriagevoidable.

4. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a
man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The
aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to
the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false
affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the
marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
Dayot vs. Dayot CHICO- A marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license
NAZARIO, J. is the essence of the marriage contract, in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law, whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage void; The rationale
for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper
government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.
Article 58 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually
resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75. Article 80(3) of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed
without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage
contract. This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law, whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a
marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to
contract marriage.

The reason for the law on ratification of marital cohabitation, whereby no marriage license is required, is that the publicity attending a marriage license may discourage
such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides: ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a
woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state
in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage. The reason for the law,
as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their
status.

The falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab
initio for lack of a marriage license.
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that “they have attained the
age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other.” One of the
central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement,
effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. We answer in the affirmative.

To settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from
the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage.

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 17

 To settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage,
characterized by exclusivity—meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years—and continuity that is unbroken.
Carlos vs. REYES, R.T., J. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of
Sandoval marriage.
But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on
judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage.

Section 2(a) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file
a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by
any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.—

(a) Who may file.—A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole
right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage.

Compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in
a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory
or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages
and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of
nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code.
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code.
This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective in its application. Thus, the Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli, viz.: As has been
emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application.

The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case; Plaintiff must be the real party-in-
interest.
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. But the
Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage? We
respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear
to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest.
For it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.
Santiago vs. SERENO Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity.
People Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity. If the accused
wants to raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case. In this case, petitioner
has consistently questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground that marriages celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio.

After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took place without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly
explained in their Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family Code. The provision reads as follows:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry
each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under
oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage.

Therefore, the marriage of petitioner and Santos would have been exempted from a marriage license had they cohabited exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years before
their marriage.

Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February 199632 and that after six months of courtship, she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any
objection from the prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage. However, he never cohabited with her, as
she was residing in the house of her in-laws, and her children from her previous marriage disliked him. On cross-examination, respondent did not question the claim of petitioner that
sometime in 1993, she first met Santos as an agent who sold her piglets.

All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for only less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited
for at least five years prior to their marriage.

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 18

 Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although the records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by
Article 34 of the Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at least five years before they
married each other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the Certificate of Marriage, in which the solemnizing officer stated under oath that no marriage license was
necessary, because the marriage was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.

It is a basic concept of justice that no court will “lend its aid to x x x one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of
action is founded.”
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus
face an anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing that they
had not satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her marriage contract.

We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy,
punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond between spouses.38 In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, we had the occasion to
emphasize that the State’s penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals “to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner,
and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.”

It is a basic concept of justice that no court will “lend its aid to x x x one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded.”
If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts. As a result, litigants shall be
denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue.

No less than the present Constitution provides that “marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.”
No less than the present Constitution provides that “marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.” It must be
safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. In keeping therefore with this fundamental policy, this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy.
35-38 Void Marriages
Santos vs. CA VITUG The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.

Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being
psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:

". . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not
care to inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated."

No Definition of ‘Psychological Incapacity’ in the Family Code

1. The Family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code revision Committee, which has drafted the Code,
provide an insight on the import of the provision.

2. The Family Code Revision Committee, in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in
its application.

3. The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. (Salita
vs. Magtolis)

Characteristics of Pyschological Incapacity

4. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by :

(a) Gravity - It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage
(b) Juridical Antecedence - It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage
(c) Incurability - It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

Phrase ‘Psychological Incapacity’ Not Encompassing all Forms of Psychoses

5. The use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses.

6. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support.

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 19

 7. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently
envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other.

Other Forms of Pyschoses Merely Renders Marriage Voidable (If Existing at Time of Marriage)

8. The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code.

Other Forms of Pyschoses Grounds for Legal Separation (If Manifested After Marriage)

9. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the
Family Code.

Conditions of Incapacity Should Be Carefully Examined and Evaluated

10. Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity
must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.

Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment.

The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.
Chi Ming Choi vs. TORRES, JR., J. Psychological Incapacity
CA
1. Since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other
becomes immaterial.

2. Since it is Chi Ming Tsoi’s claim that the reason for the failure to consummate the marriage is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of his wife, it became
incumbent upon him to prove such a claim. However, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he
presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection.

3. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.

4. One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the
basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted
refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation (to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse) is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

5. After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and
who has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological
incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code.

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, the sanction therefor is actually the
spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the
“spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order” (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with
another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say “I could not have cared less.” This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist
has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It
is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.
Republic vs. CA PANGANIBAN Psychological Incapacity Refers to Mental Incapacity
and Molina
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. (Santos vs. Court of Appeals)

The psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. (Ibid)

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 20

 Present Case Shows No Showing of Psychological Defect (Mere Difficulty or Neglect of Marital Obligations Insufficient)

In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations.

Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could not get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither
its juridical antecedence nor its incurability.

There was no showing that Reynaldo’s alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration.

Guidelines Formulated in the Interpretation and Application of Article 36

1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.

2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.

3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness
itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

4. The incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against every one of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage.

5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.

8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
Marcos vs. PANGANIBAN Guidelines Prescribed by Republic vs. Molina Did Not Require Physical Examination
Marcos
1. The guidelines incorporated the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: psycho-logical incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.

2. The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically
identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition.

3. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

Totality of Evidence Presented Insufficient to Warrant Psychological Incapacity

4. The Supreme Court ruled that evidence presented was not sufficient to warrant psychological incapacity. Although the Supreme Court was sufficiently convinced that respondent
failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts did not lead to a conclusion of psychological
incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.

5. The respondent’s alleged psychological illness was traced only to a certain period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there was no evidence showing that his
condition was incurable.

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 21

 Article 36 Should Not Be Confused With Divorce Law or Legal Separation

6. Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.

7. Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal
separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Dedel vs. CA YNARES- Psychological Incapacity Not Merely Physical Incapacity
SANTIAGO
1. "Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.

2. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

3. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other.

Sexual Infidelity Not Mental or Physical Illness

4. The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality disorder is a very complex and elusive phenomenon which defies easy analysis and definition.

5. In the case, respondent's sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof.

6. It appears that respondent's promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage.

Sexual Infidelity or Perversion Do Not Constitute Psychological Incapacity

7. Respondent's sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could
her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity.

8. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state,
not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.

Evidence Presented Refers to Only Grounds for Legal Separation

9. At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.

10. The evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Tenebro vs. CA YNARES- A declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.
SANTIAGO, J. Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner
fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are
concerned.

A marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of
criminal iability for bigamy; Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio
completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this
second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes “any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.” A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the
presence of the solemnizing officer) and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their
agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 22

 Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential
requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given
in the presence of the solemnizing officer) and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their
agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses). Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or
upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38 may contract marriage.
Jarillo vs. People PERALTA Subsequent declaration of nullity of (first or second) marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not a defense in the crime of bigamy

4. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner's two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted
a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the
second marriage, petitioner's marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting.

5. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner's marriage to Uy make any difference. As held in Tenebro vs CA, "[s]ince a marriage contracted during the subsistence
of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.”
Republic vs. CORONA Policy of the 1987 Constitution on the Family (Doubt to be Resolved in Favor of Validity)
Hamano
1. The policy of the 1987 Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

Molina Guidelines (Gravity, Juridical Antecedence and Incurability)

2. The Molina guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability."

Totality of Evidence Important to Sustain Finding of Psychological Incapacity

3. The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically
identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

Totality of Evidence Presented by Respondent Insufficient

4. We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio's act of abandonment
was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness.

5. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a
rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondent's case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness.

No Presumption of Pyschological Defect From Mere Abandonment

6. Pyschological defect cannot be presumed from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage.

7. As the SC ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable
of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.

8. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from
accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

No Distinction Between Alien and Filipino Spouse in Proving Psychological Incapacity

9. According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the present case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese
national.

10. The SC disagreed and ruled that in proving psychological incapacity, it found no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. The SC cannot be lenient in the
application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national.

11. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining
psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.
Antonio vs. Reyes TINGA Psychological Incapacity as Ground for Nullity of Marriage

1. Article 36 of the Family Code states that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 23

 2. The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the
dissolution of a marriage.

Psychological Incapacity Not a Vice of Consent

8. The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent.

9. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent,
and conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations.

10. Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not
affect the consent to the marriage."

Psychological Incapacity Refers to Mental Incapacity (Not Physical)

11. Santos vs. Court of Appeals acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."

12. The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed
in the Republic vs. Molina case.

13. Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume."

Judge to Interpret Article 36 on a Case-to-Case Basis

14. The intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis.

15. The preference of the revision committee was for the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon
Law.

Pattern of Fabrication Sufficiently Establishes Psychological Incapacity

16. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. He presented witnesses and certifications and expert witnesses to prove his
point.

17. The root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in
the trial court's decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior “of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous
stories, and inventing personalities and situations,” of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and
family background, among others.

A person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning,
and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the
part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling
lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and
the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.

18. Respondent's psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage.

19. The gravity of respondent's psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

20. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to
live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be
able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.

21. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. Interpretations given by the

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 24

 National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

22. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion.—The
requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in
this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondent’s psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal
necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue
prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would
not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not
pronounced as such at the trial court level.

From the totality of the evidence, the SC was sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent's psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner.
Najera vs. Najera PERALTA The guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code requiring that “psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability” do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated—what is important is the
presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition.
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995): “psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.” The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be “medically or clinically identified.” What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological
condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not
be resorted to. In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence submitted by petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. The root cause of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by
experts or shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

Where the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of
a psychological nature, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential
matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted, its decision is not based on the psychological incapacity of a spouse.
Santos v. Santos, 240 SCRA 20 (1995), cited the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the import
of Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that a part of the provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads: Canon 1095. The following
are incapable of contracting marriage: 1. those who lack sufficient use of reason; 2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential matrimonial
rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted; 3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It
must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which
mentions causes of a psychological nature, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential
matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted. x x x Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to the facts established by petitioner before the trial court, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the decree of nullity of
marriage by the court a quo is not based on the psychological incapacity of respondent. Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates
regarding the psychological incapacity of respondent is supported by the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.
Ferraris vs. YNARES- The root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained
Ferraris SANTIAGO, J.
1. The term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about
to assume.

2. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human
personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained, which Armida failed to convincingly demonstrate.

3. In this case, the couple’s relationship before the marriage and even during their brief union was not all bad since Armida was happy and contented with her life in the company of
Brix. Their problems began when Armida started doubting Brix’s fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the calls from women that Brix failed to perform his so-called
marital obligations. Brix could not understand Armida’s lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Brix could not relate to her anger, temper
and jealousy.

4. Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has a mixed personality disorder called “schizoid,” and why he is the “dependent and avoidant type.” Also,
his information that Brix had extramarital affairs was supplied by Armida herself. Notably, Dr. Dayan failed to demonstrate that there was really “a natal or supervening disabling factor”
on the part of Brix, or an “adverse integral element” in Brix’s character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting and complying with the essential marital obligations.

Mixed personality disorder, the “leaving-the-house” attitude, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support,
and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family are not manifestations of psychological incapacity

5. Where respondent preferred to spend more time with his friends than his family on whom he squandered his money, depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was
dishonest to his wife regarding his finances, the psychological defects spoken of were more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 25

 obligations and that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not enough to prove that the parties
failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not physical, illness.
(See Republic v. Court of Appeals)

6. Habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity.
(Hernandez v. Court of Appeals)

7. In this case, Brix’s alleged mixed personality disorder, the “leaving-the-house” attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity,
the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a
mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Paras vs. Paras PERLAS- One’s unfitness as a lawyer does not automatically mean one’s unfitness as a husband or vice versa—the disposition in a disbarment case cannot be conclusive on an action for
BERNABE, J. declaration of nullity of marriage.—One’s unfitness as a lawyer does not automatically mean one’s unfitness as a husband or vice versa. The yardsticks for such roles are simply
different. This is why the disposition in a disbarment case cannot be conclusive on an action for declaration of nullity of marriage. While Rosa’s charges sufficiently proved Justo’s
unfitness as a lawyer, however, they may not establish that he is psychologically incapacitated to perform his duties as a husband. In the disbarment case, “the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such.” Its purpose is “to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of
the court.” On the other hand, in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage based on the ground of psychological incapacity, the question for determination is whether the guilty
party suffers a grave, incurable, and pre-existing mental incapacity that renders him truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants. Its purpose is to free the innocent party from a
meaningless marriage. In this case, as will be seen in the following discussion, Justo’s acts are not sufficient to conclude that he is psychologically incapacitated, albeit such acts really
fall short of what is expected from a lawyer.

The law recognizes that not all marriages are made in heaven.—The law recognizes that not all marriages are made in heaven. Imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect
unions. Thus, when the imperfection is psychological in nature and renders a person incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, the State provides refuge to the
aggrieved spouse under Article 36 of the Family Code which reads: ART. 36. A marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Same; Same; Same; Characteristics of Psychological Incapacity.—The foregoing Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements mandated by the Court in Santos, to reiterate:
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.

Same; Same; Same; The fact that a husband has gone astray from the path of marriage because of a conflicting relationship with his wife and her family and repeated life’s setbacks is
not sufficient to establish that he is psychologically incapacitated.—What is clear in this case is a husband who has gone astray from the path of marriage because of a conflicting
relationship with his wife and her family and repeated life’s setbacks. While these do not justify his sins, they are not sufficient to establish that he is psychologically incapacitated.

Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes thereof manifest themselves—it refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage; Neither should Article 36 be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological
incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, sexual infidelity, and abandonment, and the like.—It is worthy to emphasize that
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and assume the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the
part of the errant spouse. As this Court repeatedly declares, Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
thereof manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220,
221 and 225 of the Family Code. Neither should Article 36 be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical
violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, sexual infidelity, and abandonment, and the like. At best the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to
grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Halili vs. Halili CORONA, J. By the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must consider as essential the expert opinion
(Recon) on the psychological and mental disposition of the parties.
In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the Philippines (579 SCRA 193 [2009]), this Court reiterated that courts should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity
(as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage) on a case-to-case basis—guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines and by
decisions of church tribunals. Accordingly, we emphasized that, by the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must consider
as essential the expert opinion on the psychological and mental disposition of the parties.

Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term—these disorders affect all areas of functioning
and, beginning in childhood or adolescence, create problems for those who display them and for others.
It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological condition that was grave and incurable and had a deeply rooted cause. This Court, in the same Te case,
recognized that individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term. Particularly, personality disorders are “long-
standing, inflexible ways of behaving that are not so much severe mental disorders as dysfunctional styles of living. These disorders affect all areas of functioning and, beginning in
childhood or adolescence, create problems for those who display them and for others.” From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological
incapacity that effectively renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner and respondent is declared null and void.
Ngo-Te vs. Te NACHURA, J. In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1997), in
resolving all cases of psychological incapacity; The unintended consequences of Molina has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity
and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions—far from what was
intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it.

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 In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the
Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG’s exaggeration of Article 36 as the “most liberal divorce procedure
in the world.” The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly,
which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket,
forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs,
narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the
said individuals.

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the
sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations,
from remaining in that sacred bond; To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by
the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence. The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of
cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape. In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is not
demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot
comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or
laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to
speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn
marriage.

Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in the instant case—it is simply declaring that there is need to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, 484
SCRA 353 (2006), there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being
redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts.
And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals.

By the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider
as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.
The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The
psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality
disorder, and respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder. By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-
making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.

The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 320 SCRA 76 (1999) emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a party’s psychological incapacity,
and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 (2000) asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence
must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless
for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, an option for the trial judge to refer the case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an independent assessment and
evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will assist the courts, who are no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious determination of the
case. The rule, however, does not dispense with the parties’ prerogative to present their own expert witnesses.
Ting vs. Velez- NACHURA, J. Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him
Ting as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's
and the appellate court's rulings declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.

In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioner's "defects" were present at the time of the celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already
knew that petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the part of her
husband. Neither did the evidence adduced prove such "defects" to be incurable.

The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive evidence in determining whether to declare the marriage between the parties null and void. Sadly, however, we
are not convinced that the opinions provided by these experts strengthened respondent's allegation of psychological incapacity. The two experts provided diametrically contradicting
psychological evaluations: Dr. Oñate testified that petitioner's behavior is a positive indication of a personality disorder,[63] while Dr. Obra maintained that there is nothing wrong with
petitioner's personality. Moreover, there appears to be greater weight in Dr. Obra's opinion because, aside from analyzing the transcript of Benjamin's deposition similar to what Dr.
Oñate did, Dr. Obra also took into consideration the psychological evaluation report furnished by another psychiatrist in South Africa who personally examined Benjamin, as well as his
(Dr. Obra's) personal interview with Benjamin's brothers.[64] Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obra's findings.

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Azcueta vs. LEONARDO-DE One who is unable to support himself, much less a wife; one who cannot independently make decisions regarding even the most basic and ordinary matters that spouses face
Republic CASTRO, J. everyday; one who cannot contribute to the material, physical and emotional well-being of his spouse is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations within the
meaning of Article 36.—Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations embodied in Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. As noted by the trial court, as a
result of Rodolfo’s dependent personality disorder, he cannot make his own decisions and cannot fulfill his responsibilities as a husband. Rodolfo plainly failed to fulfill the marital
obligations to live together, observe mutual love, respect, support under Article 68. Indeed, one who is unable to support himself, much less a wife; one who cannot independently make
decisions regarding even the most basic and ordinary matters that spouses face everyday; one who cannot contribute to the material, physical and emotional well-being of his spouse is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations within the meaning of Article 36.

Same; Same; With respect to the concept of psychological incapacity, courts must take into account not only developments in science and medicine but also changing social and
cultural mores, including the blurring of traditional gender roles.—The Court is not unmindful of the sometimes peculiar predicament it finds itself in those instances when it is tasked to
interpret static statutes formulated in a particular point in time and apply them to situations and people in a society in flux. With respect to the concept of psychological incapacity, courts
must take into account not only developments in science and medicine but also changing social and cultural mores, including the blurring of traditional gender roles. In this day and age,
women have taken on increasingly important roles in the financial and material support of their families. This, however, does not change the ideal that the family should be an
“autonomous” social institution, wherein the spouses cooperate and are equally responsible for the support and well-being of the family. In the case at bar, the spouses from the outset
failed to form themselves into a family, a cohesive unit based on mutual love, respect and support, due to the failure of one to perform the essential duties of marriage.
Kalaw vs. BERSAMIN, J. Courts Should Weigh the Probative Value of Findings of Expert Witnesses with Other Evidence
Fernandez
27. The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of her theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that she can render to the courts in showing
the facts that serve as a basis for her criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion is founded.

28. Court should weigh and consider the probative value of the findings of the expert witnesses vis-à-vis the other evidence available.

Judicial Understanding of Psychological Incapacity could be Informed of Evolving Standards and Current Trends in Psychological and Canonical Thought and Experience

29. Regarding Father Healy’s expert testimony, the Court declared that judicial understanding of psychological incapacity could be informed by evolving standards, taking into account
the particulars of each case, by current trends in psychological and even by canonical thought, and by experience.

30. The Court realized that it is prudent to do so because the concept of psychological incapacity adopted under Article 36 of the Family Code was derived from Canon Law.

31. Given his credentials and conceded expertise in Canon Law, Father Healy’s opinions and findings commanded respect. The contribution that his opinions and findings could add to
the judicial determination of the parties’ psychological incapacity was substantive and instructive.

Six Necessary Elements to Mature Marital Relationship

32. The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and
partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc.

Some Psychological Conditions that Might Lead to Failure of a Marriage

33. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to
persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently
fall short of reasonable expectations.

Malyn’s Addiction to Gambling and Mahjong Pointed to her Neglect of Parental Duties

39. The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose
them to a culture of gambling.

The 2011 Decision did not Take into Consideration the Findings that Both Parties Had Been Psychologically Incapacitated

40. The Court admitted that its 2011 decision did not properly take into consideration the findings of the RTC to the effect that both the petitioner and the respondent had been
psychologically incapacitated, and thus could not assume the essential obligations of marriage.

41. The RTC would not have found so without the allegation to that effect by the respondent in her answer, whereby she averred that it was not she but the petitioner who had suffered
from psychological incapacity.

The Respondent Could Establish Psychological Incapacity of Petitioner Because she Raised the Matter in Her Answer

42. Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the burden to prove the nullity of the marriage, the respondent, as the defendant spouse, could establish the psychological incapacity
of her husband because she raised the matter in her answer.

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 28

 43. The courts are justified in declaring a marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Coderegardless of whether it is the petitioner or the respondent who imputes the
psychological incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is fully substantiated with proof.

44. Psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone or in both of them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is established, the marriage has to be deemed null and
void.

The Motion for Reconsideration of Petitioner Tyrone was Granted

45. The Supreme Court ultimately reconsidered its 2011 decision and reinstated the decision of the Regional Trial Court. The marriage between Tyrone and Malyn was declared null
and void ab initio due to psychological incapacity.

Republic vs. PERLAS- That he married Olivia not out of love, but out of reverence for the latter’s parents, does not mean that Reghis is psychologically incapacitated in the context of Article 36
Romero II BERNABE, J. of the Family Code.
After a thorough review of the records of this case, the Court finds that the foregoing requirements do not concur. As aptly pointed out by the petitioners, Reghis’ testimony shows that
he was able to comply with his marital obligations which, therefore, negates the existence of a grave and serious psychological incapacity on his part. Reghis admitted that he and
Olivia lived together as husband and wife under one roof for fourteen (14) years and both of them contributed in purchasing their own house in Parañaque City. Reghis also fulfilled his
duty to support and take care of his family, as he categorically stated that he loves their children and that he was a good provider to them. That he married Olivia not out of love, but out
of reverence for the latter’s parents, does not mean that Reghis is psychologically incapacitated in the context of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Matudan vs. DEL CASTILLO, The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Republic J. Indeed, “[w]hat is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition.” “[T]he complete facts should allege the physical
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage.” Petitioner’s judicial affidavit and testimony during trial, however, fail to
show gravity and juridical antecedence. While he complained that Marilyn lacked a sense of guilt and was involved in “activities defying social and moral ethics,”30 and that she was,
among others, irrational, irresponsible, immature, and self-centered, he nonetheless failed to sufficiently and particularly elaborate on these allegations, particularly the degree of
Marilyn’s claimed irresponsibility, immaturity, or selfishness. This is compounded by the fact that petitioner contradicted his own claims by testifying that he and Marilyn were happily
married and never had a fight, which is why they begot four children; and the only reason for his filing Civil Case No. Q-08-62827 was Marilyn’s complete abandonment of the marriage
and family when she left to work abroad.

If any, petitioner’s accusations against Marilyn are untrue, at the very least. At most, they fail to sufficiently establish the degree of Marilyn’s claimed psychological incapacity.

On the other hand, Maricel cannot be of help either. She was only two years old when Marilyn left the family, Growing up, she may have seen the effects of Marilyn’s abandonment —
such as the lack of emotional and financial support; but she could not have any idea of her mother’s claimed psychological incapacity, as well as the nature, history, and gravity thereof.

Just as well, Dr. Tayag’s supposed expert findings regarding Marilyn’s psychological condition (Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder) were not
based on actual tests or interviews conducted upon Marilyn herself; they are based on the personal accounts of petitioner. This fact gave more significance and importance to
petitioner’s other pieces of evidence, which could have compensated for the deficiency in the expert opinion which resulted from its being based solely on petitioner’s one-sided
account. But since these other pieces of evidence could not be relied upon, Dr. Tayag’s testimony and report must fail as well.
Castillo vs. PERALTA, J. Guided by the foregoing principles and after a careful perusal of the records, this Court rules that the totality of the evidence presented failed to establish Felipe's psychological
Republic and incapacity.
Impas
Clinical psychologist Montefalcon opined that respondent is encumbered with a personality disorder classified as Narcissistic Personality Disorder deeply ingrained in his personality
structure that rendered him incapacitated to perform his marital duties and obligations.

The presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties by
the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. The probative force of the testimony of an expert does
not lie in a mere statement of her theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that she can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for her criterion and
the reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion is founded.

Although the evaluation report of Montefalcon expounds on the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of Felipe's personality disorder, it was, however, admitted that she
evaluated respondent's psychological condition indirectly from the information gathered from Mirasol and her witness. Felipe's dysfunctional family portrait which brought about his
personality disorder as painted in the evaluation was based solely on the assumed truthful knowledge of petitioner. There was no independent witness knowledgeable of respondent's
upbringing interviewed by the psychologist or presented before the trial court. Angelica Mabayad, the couple's common friend, agreed with petitioner's claims in the interview with the
psychologist, confirmed the information given by petitioner, and alleged that she knew Felipe as "chick boy" or "playboy". She did not testify before the court a quo.

Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as
psychological incapacity, the respondent's unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a disordered personality, completely preventing the respondent from
discharging the essential obligations of the marital state; there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated him from complying with the
obligation to be faithful to his spouse. It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 29

 As discussed, the findings on Felipe's personality profile did not emanate from a personal interview with the subject himself. Apart from the psychologist's opinion and petitioner's
allegations, no other reliable evidence was cited to prove that Felipe's sexual infidelity was a manifestation of his alleged personality disorder, which is grave, deeply rooted, and
incurable. We are not persuaded that the natal or supervening disabling factor which effectively incapacitated him from complying with his obligation to be faithful to his wife was
medically or clinically established.
Del Rosario vs. PERLAS- The Court maintains a similar view in this case and, thus, denies the petition. Based on the totality of the evidence presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude
Del Rosario BERNABE, J. that Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility, or infidelity amount to psychological incapacity.

Particularly, the Court notes that Rachel's evidence merely showed that Jose: (1) would often indulge in drinking sprees; (2) tends to become violent when he gets drunk; (2) avoids
discharging his duties as a father to Wesley and as a husband to Rachel, which includes sexual intimacy; (3) flirts openly and represented himself as single; and (4) engaged in an
extramarital affair with a bar girl who he brought to the conjugal dwelling on several occasions. Significantly, Rachel admitted that their married life ran smoothly in its early years. Dr.
Tayag's findings, on the other hand, simply summarized Rachel and Wesley's narrations as she diagnosed Jose with Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD) and proceeded to conclude
that Jose's "personality flaw is deemed to be severe, grave, and have become deeply embedded within his adaptive systems since early childhood years, thereby rendering such to be
a permanent component of his life [and] [t]herefore x x x incurable and beyond repair despite any form of intervention."

It should be pointed out that Dr. Tayag's Report does not explain in detail how Jose's APD could be characterized as grave, deeply rooted in his childhood, and incurable within the
jurisprudential parameters for establishing psychological incapacity. Particularly, the Report did not discuss the concept of APD which Jose allegedly suffers from, i.e., its classification,
cause, symptoms, and cure, or show how and to what extent Jose exhibited this disorder or how and to what extent his alleged actions and behavior correlate with his APD, sufficiently
clear to conclude that Jose's condition has no definite treatment, making it incurable within the law's conception. Neither did the Report specify the reasons why and to what extent
Jose's APD is serious and grave, and how it incapacitated him to understand and comply with his marital obligations. Lastly, the Report hastily concluded that Jose had a "deprived
childhood" and "poor home condition" that automatically resulted in his APD equivalent to psychological incapacity without, however, specifically identifying the history of Jose's
condition antedating the marriage, i.e., specific behavior or habits during his adolescent years that could explain his behavior during the marriage.

Moreover, Dr. Tayag did not personally assess or interview Jose to determine, at the very least, his background that could have given her a more accurate basis for concluding that his
APD is rooted in his childhood or was already existing at the inception of the marriage. To be sure, established parameters do not require that the expert witness personally examine
the party alleged to be suffering from psychological incapacity provided corroborating evidence are presented sufficiently establishing the required legal parameters. Considering that
her Report was based solely on Rachel's side whose bias cannot be doubted, the Report and her testimony deserved the application of a more rigid and stringent standards which the
RTC failed to apply.

In sum, Dr. Tayag's assessment, even when taken together with the various testimonies, failed to show that Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility, and infidelity rise to the level of
psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of the parties' marriage. To reiterate and emphasize, psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of the marital obligations; it is not enough that a party prove that the other failed to meet the responsibility and duty of a married person. There must be
proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person - an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage - which must be linked with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity.
De la Fuente vs. LEONEN, J. Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes states that the non-examination of one of the parties will not automatically render as hearsay or invalidate the findings of the examining psychiatrist or
De la Fuente psychologist, since "marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally
and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other."

Marcos v. Marcos emphasizes that Molina does not require a physician to examine a person and declare him/her to be psychologically incapacitated. What matters is that the totality
of evidence presented establishes the party's psychological condition.

Dr. Lopez's testimony, as corroborated by petitioner, sufficiently proved that respondent suffered from psychological incapacity. Respondent's paranoid personality disorder made him
distrustful and prone to extreme jealousy and acts of depravity, incapacitating him to fully comprehend and assume the essential obligations of marriage. As the trial court found:

Dr. Lopez testified that he arrived at his conclusion of respondent'[s] personality by taking into consideration the psychological impression and conclusion he gathered from the analysis
of the different behaviors he manifested during the time that he and petitioner were living together. According to him, under the Diagnostic Statistical Manual, he found the respondent
to be suffering from a paranoid personality disorder manifested by the respondent's damaging behavior like reckless driving and extreme jealousy; his being distrustful and suspicious;
his severe doubts and distrust of friends and relatives of the petitioner; his being irresponsible and lack of remorse; his resistance to treatment; and his emotional coldness and severe
immaturity. He also testified that this kind of disorder is actually one of the severe forms of personality disorder even more severe than the other personality disorders like the borderline
and narcissistic personality disorders.

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the ultimate task of decision-making, must give due regard to expert opinion on the psychological and mental disposition of the
parties.[90]

The root cause of respondent's paranoid personality disorder was hereditary in nature as his own father suffered from a similar disorder. Dr. Lopez stated that respondent's own
psychological disorder probably started during his late childhood years and developed in his early adolescent years. Dr. Lopez explained that respondent's psychological incapacity to
perform his marital obligations was likely caused by growing up with a pathogenic parental model.

The juridical antecedence of respondent's psychological incapacity was also sufficiently proven during trial. Petitioner attested that she noticed respondent's jealousy even before their
marriage, and that he would often follow her to make sure that she did not talk to anyone or cheat on him. She believed that he would change after they got married; however, this did
not happen. Respondent's jealousy and paranoia were so extreme and severe that these caused him to poke a gun at petitioner's head.

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 30

 The incurability and severity of respondent's psychological incapacity were likewise discussed by Dr. Lopez. He vouched that a person with paranoid personality disorder would refuse
to admit that there was something wrong and that there was a need for treatment. This was corroborated by petitioner when she stated that respondent repeatedly refused treatment.
Petitioner consulted a lawyer, a priest, and a doctor, and suggested couples counselling to respondent; however, respondent refused all of her attempts at seeking professional help.
Respondent also refused to be examined by Dr. Lopez.

Article 68 of the Family Code obligates the husband and wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." In this case, petitioner
and respondent may have lived together, but the facts narrated by petitioner show that respondent failed to, or could not, comply with the obligations expected of him as a husband. He
was even apathetic that petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage.

This Court also noticed respondent's repeated acts of harassment towards petitioner, which show his need to intimidate and dominate her, a classic case of coercive control. At first,
respondent only inflicted non-physical forms of mistreatment on petitioner by alienating her from her family and friends due to his jealousy, and stalking her due to his paranoia.
However, his jealousy soon escalated into physical violence when, on separate instances, he poked a gun at his teenage cousin, and at petitioner.

Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by intimidating, stalking, and isolating his wife from her family and friends, as well as his increasing acts of physical violence,
are proof of his depravity, and utter lack of comprehension of what marriage and partnership entail. It would be of utmost cruelty for this Court to decree that petitioner should remain
married to respondent. After she had exerted efforts to save their marriage and their family, respondent simply refused to believe that there was anything wrong in their marriage. This
shows that respondent truly could not comprehend and perform his marital obligations. This fact is persuasive enough for this Court to believe that respondent's mental illness is
incurable.
Bakunawa III vs. REYES, JR., J. Psychological incapacity not proven
Bakunawa
1. As the CA correctly ruled, the totality of evidence presented by Manuel comprising of his testimony and that of Dr. Villegas, as well as the latter's psychological evaluation report, is
insufficient to prove that he and Nora are psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage.

2. Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately related to them, such as relatives, close friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on
the allegedly incapacitated spouses' condition at or about the time of marriage, or to subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity already present at the time of
marriage. (Taring v. Taring)

3. In this case, the only person interviewed by Dr. Villegas aside from Manuel for the spouses' psychological evaluation was Moncho, who could not be considered as a reliable witness
to establish the psychological incapacity of his parents since he could not have been there at the time his parents were married.

4. Dr. Villegas did not administer any psychological tests on Manuel despite having had the opportunity to do so. While the Court has declared that there is no requirement that the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician, much less be subjected to psychological tests, this rule finds application only if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. In this case, the supposed personality disorder of Manuel could have been established by
means of psychometric and neurological tests which are objective means designed to measure specific aspects of people's intelligence, thinking, or personality.

Church grant of separation not controlling on the courts

5. With regard to the Confirmatory Decree of the National Tribunal of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manila in
favor of nullity of the Catholic marriage of Manuel and Nora, the Court accords the same with great respect but does not consider the same as controlling and decisive, in line with
prevailing jurisprudence
Singson vs. DEL CASTILLO, Psychological incapacity not established
Singson J.
(a) Gravity

4. The evidence on record does not establish that respondent's psychological incapacity was grave and serious as defined by jurisprudential parameters since "respondent had a job;
provided money for the family from the sale of his property; provided the land where the family home was built on; and lived in the family home with petitioner-appellee and their
children. "

5. Petitioner did not proffer any convincing proof that respondent's mere confinement at the rehabilitation center confirmed the gravity of the latter's psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the
difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of martial obligations or ill will.

6. Furthermore, habitual drunkenness, gambling and failure to find a job, while undoubtedly negative traits are nowhere nearly the equivalent of 'psychological incapacity', in the
absence of incontrovertible proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness.

(b) Juridical Antecedence

7. To support her Article 36 petition, petitioner ought to have adduced convincing, competent and trustworthy evidence to establish the cause of respondent's alleged psychological
incapacity and that the same antedated their marriage. Well-entrenched is the rule that "there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated the
respondent spouse from complying with the basic marital obligations" A cause has to be shown and linked with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity.

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 8. The medical basis or evidence adverted to by the RTC did not specifically identify the root cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity. In fact, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio did not
point to a definite or a definitive cause, viz. "with his history of typhoid fever when he was younger, it is difficult to attribute the behavioral changes that he manifested in 2003 and
2006." Besides, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio admitted that it was not she herself, but another psychologist who conducted the tests. And this psychologist was not presented by petitioner. Dr.
Sta. Ana-Ponio's testimony regarding respondent's alleged admission that he was allegedly betting on jai alai when he was still in high school is essentially hearsay as no witness
having personal knowledge of that fact was called to the witness stand.

9. Petitioner cannot lean upon her son Jose's testimony that his father's psychological incapacity existed before or at the time of marriage. It has been held that the parties' child is not
a very reliable witness in an Article 36 case as "he could not have been there when the spouses were married and could not have been expected to know what was happening between
his parents until long after his birth.

(c) Incurability

10. This Court cannot take judicial notice of petitioner's assertion that "personality disorders are generally incurable" as this is not a matter that courts are mandated to take judicial
notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
Republic vs. TIJAM, J. We find that Katrina failed to sufficiently prove that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated to discharge the duties expected of a husband.
Tionglico
Indeed, and We have oft-repeated that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but
on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings. Here, We find the totality of evidence clearly wanting.

First, Dr. Arellano's findings that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated were based solely on Katrina's statements. It bears to stress that Lawrence, despite notice, did not
participate in the proceedings below, nor was he interviewed by Dr. Arellano despite being invited to do so.

The same could be said in this case, where the various tests conducted by Dr. Arellano can most certainly be conclusive of the psychological disposition of Katrina, but cannot be said
to be indicative of the psychological condition of Lawrence. There was simply no other basis for Dr. Arellano to conclude that Lawrence was psychologically incapacitated to perform his
essential marital obligations apart from Katrina's self-serving statements. To make conclusions and generalizations on a spouse's psychological condition based on the information fed
by only one side, as in the case at bar, is, to the Court's mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.24

Second, the testimony of Katrina as regards the behavior of Lawrence hardly depicts the picture of a psychologically incapacitated husband. Their frequent fights, his insensitivity,
immaturity and frequent night-outs can hardly be said to be a psychological illness. These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of the "psychological incapacity" that the law
requires, and should be distinguished from the "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations that characterize some marriages.25 It is not
enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological illness. The psychological illness that must afflict a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive the party of his or her
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was then about to assume.

Although We commiserate with Katrina's predicament, We are hardpressed to affirm the RTC and CA when the totality of evidence is clearly lacking to support the factual and legal
conclusion that Lawrence and Katrina's marriage is void ab initio. No other evidence or witnesses were presented by Katrina to prove Lawrence's alleged psychological incapacity.
Basic is the rule that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof, i.e., mere allegations are not evidence. Here, we reiterate that apart from the
psychiatrist, Katrina did not present other witnesses to substantiate her allegations on Lawrence's psychological incapacity. Her testimony, therefore, is considered self-serving and had
no serious evidentiary value.
Dan vs. Dan DEL CASTILLO, Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of her judicial affidavit and testimony; the judicial affidavits and testimonies of her mother and Dr. Tayag; and Dr. Tayag's psychological, evaluation
J. report on the psychological condition of both petitioner and respondent. The determination of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity was based solely on petitioner's account
and that of her mother, since respondent was presumably in Italy and did not participate in the proceedings.

This is insufficient.

At some point in her accounts, petitioner admitted that before and during their marriage, respondent was working and giving money to her; that respondent was romantic, sweet,
thoughtful, responsible, and caring; and that she and respondent enjoyed a harmonious relationship. This belies her claim that petitioner was psychologically unfit for marriage. As
correctly observed by the trial and appellate courts, the couple simply drifted apart as a result of irreconcilable differences and basic incompatibility owing to differences in culture and
upbringing, and the very short period that they spent together prior to their tying the knot. As for respondent's claimed addiction to video games and cannabis, the trial and appellate
courts are correct in their ruling that these are not an incurable condition, and petitioner has not shown that she helped her husband overcome them - as part of her marital obligation to
render support and aid to respondent.

"What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition.""[T]he complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any,
as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage" such that "[i]f the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to."

With the declared insufficiency of the testimonies of petitioner and her witness, the weight of proving psychological incapacity shifts to Dr. Tayag's expert findings. However, her
determinations were not based on actual tests or interviews conducted on respondent himself - but on personal accounts of petitioner alone. This will not do as well.

We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent
from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 32

 inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was realty incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some
incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag's conclusion in her Report — i.e., that the respondent suffered "Narcissistic
Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave.and incurable' — is an unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous
characterization and portrayal of the respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological
condition, this same statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent's condition. To make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition based
on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
Republic vs. REYES, JR., J While it is true that Michelle was not personally examined or evaluated for purposes of the psychological report, the trial court was incorrect in ruling that Dr. Adamos' findings were
Javier based solely on the interview with Martin.[43] Even if that were the case, the findings of the psychologist are not immediately invalidated for this reason alone. Because a marriage
necessarily involves only two persons, the spouse who witnessed the other spouse's behavior may "validly relay" the pattern of behavior to the psychologist.[44]

This notwithstanding, the Court disagrees with the CA's findings that Michelle was psychologically incapacitated. We cannot absolutely rely on the Psychological Impression
Report on Michelle. There were no other independent evidence establishing the root cause or juridical antecedence of Michelle's alleged psychological incapacity. While this Court
cannot discount their first-hand observations, it is highly unlikely that they were able to paint Dr. Adamos a complete picture of Michelle's family and childhood history. The records do
not show that Michelle and Jose Vicente were childhood friends, while Martin, on the other hand, was introduced to Michelle during their adulthood. Either Martin or Jose Vicente, as
third persons outside the family of Michelle, could not have known about her childhood, how she was raised, and the dysfunctional nature of her family. [45] Without a credible source of
her supposed childhood trauma, Dr. Adamos was not equipped with enough information from which he may reasonably conclude that Michelle is suffering from a chronic and persistent
disorder that is grave and incurable.

It does not escape our attention, however, that Martin was also subjected to several psychological tests, as a result of which, Dr. Adamos diagnosed him with Narcissistic Personality
Disorder. Additionally, the diagnosis was based on Dr. Adamos' personal interviews of Martin, who underwent several—or to be accurate, more than 10—counselling sessions with Dr.
Adamos from 2008 to 2009. These facts were uncontroverted by the Republic.

In his testimony, Dr. Adamos explained that Martin had a "grandiose self[-]existence," which proceeded from his "ideas of preference towards ideal love and ideal marriage." [50] Dr.
Adamos also found that Martin lacked empathy, leading him to disregard and ignore the feelings of Michelle.

As a result, Martin was diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder, with tendencies toward sadism. Dr. Adamos concluded from the tests administered on Martin that this disorder
was rooted in the traumatic experiences he experienced during his childhood, having grown up around a violent father who was abusive of his mother. This adversely affected Martin in
such a manner that he formed unrealistic values and standards on his own marriage, and proposed unconventional sexual practices. When Michelle would disagree with his ideals,
Martin would not only quarrel with Michelle, but would also inflict harm on her. Other manifestations include excessive love for himself, self-entitlement, immaturity, and self-
centeredness.

These circumstances, taken together, prove the three essential characteristics of psychological incapacity on the part of Martin. As such, insofar as the psychological incapacity of
Martin is concerned, the CA did not commit a reversible error in declaring the marriage of the respondents null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Republic vs. Cruz GESMUNDO, J. The Court holds that both the CA and the RTC did not err in finding that the totality of evidence presented by respondent in support of his petition, sufficiently established the link
between Liezl's actions showing her psychological incapacity to understand and perform her marital obligations and her histrionic personality disorder. The Court respects the RTC's
appreciation of respondent's testimony during trial on what transpired before and during the marriage, considering that "[t]he totality of the behavior of one spouse during the
cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other." In addition, Dr. Tudla was able to collect and verify largely the same facts in the course of her
psychological evaluation of both spouses and her interview of Liezl's sister. Dr. Tudla's report gave a description of histrionic personality disorder, and correlated the characteristics of
this disorder with Liezl's behavior from her formative years through he course of her marriage to petitioner. Indubitably, Dr. Tudla's report and testimony enjoy such probative force
emanating from the assistance her opinion gave to the courts to show the facts upon which her psychological conclusion was based.

The fact that Liezl's disorder manifested itself through actions that occurred after the marriage was celebrated does not mean, as ,petitioner argues, that there is no psychological
incapacity to speak of. As held in Republic v. Pangasinan,] psychological incapacity may manifest itself after the celebration of the marriage even if it already exists at the time of the
marriage. More importantly, Art. 36 of the Family Code is explicit - a marriage contracted by a psychologically incapacitated party is also treated as void even if the incapacity becomes
manifest only after the marriage was celebrated.

The CA explained that Liezl's histrionic personality disorder was the cause of her inability to discharge her marital obligations to love, respect and give concern, support and fidelity to
her husband. The CA also narrated how the disorder was evidenced by Liezl's actions after the marriage was celebrated, starting from when she and petitioner lived together in Japan.
The gravity of her disorder is shown by appreciating the totality of her actions after she got married. Liezl was unable to accommodate the fact that she was already married into the
way she wanted to live her life, and essentially treated petitioner as a manipulable inconvenience that she could ignore or threaten to accede to her desires. It is clear that Liezl is truly
incognitive of her marital responsibilities.

The disorder was found by the CA to have begun when Liezl was an adolescent and continued well into adulthood. It fully appreciated Liezl's psychological evaluation that revealed her
unconsciousness of her disorder. Together with its rootedness in Liezl's personality since her teens, the CA came to agree with the expert findings that any medical or behavioral
treatment of her disorder would prove ineffective.

Petitioner also relies on the premise that Liezl's sexual infidelity and abandonment are only grounds for legal separation and cannot be used as basis to hold a marriage void ab initio.
According to petitioner, Liezl cheated on and abandoned her husband because of her illicit affair and not because she is psychologically incapacitated.

It is true that sexual infidelity and abandonment are grounds for legal separation. It may be noted, however, that the courts a quo duly connected such aberrant acts of Liezl as actual

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 33

 manifestations of her histrionic personality disorder. A person with such a disorder was characterized as selfish and egotistical, and demands immediate gratification.[30] These traits
were especially reflected in Liezl's highly unusual acts of allowing her Japanese boyfriend to stay in the marital abode, sharing the marital bed with his Japanese boyfriend and
introducing her husband as her elder brother, all done under the threat of desertion. Such blatant insensitivity and lack of regard for the sanctity of the marital bond and home cannot be
expected from a married person who reasonably understand the principle and responsibilities of marriage.

The Court has to affirm the declaration of respondent's marriage as void ab initio, even as it is clear from the records how much petitioner must love his wife to endure the pain and
humiliation she callously caused him in the hope that their relationship could still work out. Clearly, Liezl does not recognize the marital responsibilities that came when she married
petitioner. The severance of their marital vinculum will better protect the state's interest to preserve the sanctity of marriage and family, the importance of which seems utterly lost on
respondent.
Art. 40 – Need for Declaration of Nullity of a Previous Void Marriage for Purposes of Remarriage
Domingo vs. CA VITUG, J. A marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact under the. Family Code even for purposes other than remarriage.
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a
cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.

In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again.
With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.

That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of
remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in
case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their common
children and the delivery of the latters’ presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the
instance where a party who has previously contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to
prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

Declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a judgment for the liquidation of property, custody and support of children, etc. There is no need of filing a separate
civil action for such purposes.
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent’s ultimate prayer for separation of property will simply be one of the necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner’s suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless.
The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations
governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental
questions regarding the couple’s properties. Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible error in finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
Atienza vs. QUIASON Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage.
Brillantes Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of
the Family Code, said Article is given “retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.” This is
particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
Castillo vs. SERENO, C.J. The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration.
Castillo The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration. In this case, the law in force at the time Lea
contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. The children of the parties were also born while the Civil Code was in effect i.e., in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve
this case using the provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles 80, 81, 82 and 83 (first paragraph); and those on voidable marriages are Articles 83 (second
paragraph), 85 and 86.

“Void Marriage” and “Voidable Marriages,” Distinguished.

Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the following ways: (1) a void marriage is nonexistent — i.e., there was no marriage from the beginning —
while in a voidable marriage, the marriage is valid until annulled by a competent court; (2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified by cohabitation;
(3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot be collaterally attacked; (4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and
the offspring are natural children by legal fiction, while in voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children conceived before the decree of annulment are considered
legitimate; and (5) “in a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is necessary,” while in a voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree.

A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now expressly required where the nullity of a previous marriage is invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage.
It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the rulings in Odayat v. Amante, 77 SCRA 338 (1977), People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 (1954), and People v.
Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957), inapplicable to marriages celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now expressly required where the nullity
of a previous marriage is invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage. A second marriage contracted prior to the issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus considered
bigamous and void. In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572 (1993), we explained the policy behind the institution of this requirement: Marriage, a sacrosanct institution,
declared by the Constitution as an “inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family”; as such, it “shall be protected by the State.” In more explicit terms, the Family Code
characterizes it as “a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life.” So crucial
are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the nation that their “nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation.” As a matter of
policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 34

 union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect — and nothing more. Were this so, this
inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-
ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a socially significant institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the
exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same would be easily
verifiable through records accessible to everyone.

That there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under
the Civil Code.
As earlier explained, the rule in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon is applicable to this case. The Court thus concludes that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the
invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second
marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC of Parañaque City declaring the nullity of
Lea’s first marriage only serves to strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.
Art. 41 – Necessity Regarding Obtaining Decree of Presumptive Death
Republic vs. FELICIANO, J. Art. 41 of the Family Code has stricter requirements before absent spouse may be declared presumably dead.
Nolasco Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the
spouse present to remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there be no news
that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391 of the
Civil Code. The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes a "well founded belief' that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be
granted.

As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code: "1. That the absent spouse has been
missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry; 3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and 4. That the present spouse files a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee."

Where is there "well-founded belief' that spouse is dead.

In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the
basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of
local authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.

There is no analogy between Manila and its neighboring cities, on one hand, and London and Liverpool, on the other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around three
hundred fifty (350) kilometers apart. We do not consider that walking into a major city like Liverpool or London with a simple hope of somehow bumping into one particular person
there—which is in effect what Nolasco says he did—can be regarded as a reasonably diligent search.

The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her personal background even after, she had married respondent too convenient an
excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims were all returned to him.
Respondent said he had lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.

Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from their friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those
friends in his testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its nature,
be rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not synonymous with credibility. As noted before, there are serious doubts to respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if admitted as evidence,
said testimony merely tended to show that the missing spouse had chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.

Policy of doctrine of presumptive death must not be circumvented for spouse's convenience.
By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing that one of them leave the conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the
policy of the laws on marriage. The Court notes that respondent even tried to have his marriage annulled before the trial court in the same proceeding.
Calisterio vs. VITUG, J. Judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary in the new Civil Code as long as the prescribed period of absence is met.
Calisterio A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these
exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid “until declared null and void by a competent court.” It follows that the burden of proof would be, in these
cases, on the party assailing the second marriage.

Conditions in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid.
Under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of
the contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at
the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration.
Manuel vs. People CALLEJO, SR., J. One accused of bigamy has the burden of adducing in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of the first spouse as required by Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code; The phrase “or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered on the proceedings” in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an aggroupment of empty or useless words.
It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief that his first wife was already dead, as
he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 35

 required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and
would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however,
failed to discharge his burden. The phrase “or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered on the proceedings” in Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code was not an aggroupment of empty or useless words. The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the
spouse present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good
faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.

The requirement of judicial declaration of presumptive death is also for the benefit of the State—the laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest,
safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings.
The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the “State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution.” Marriage is a social institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of society require that the marital relation should be
surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the manner prescribed and the causes specified by law. The laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the
interest, safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an
ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the community.

Before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the
absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse; The Court rejects petitioner’s contention that the requirement of instituting a
petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely to enable the spouse present to contract a valid second marriage and
not for the acquittal of one charged with bigamy.
With the effectivity of the Family Code, the period of seven years under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the
spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without
prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse. As explained by this Court in Armas v. Calisterio: In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a
subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absent
for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse
present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which
purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial
intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code. The Court rejects petitioner’s contention that the requirement of instituting
a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely to enable the spouse present to contract a valid second marriage and not for the
acquittal of one charged with bigamy. Such provision was designed to harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion spawned by the
rulings of this Court and comments of eminent authorities on Criminal Law.

The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the amendments of Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code to conform to Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code.
The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the amendments of Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code to conform to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in that, in
a case where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the
absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the
absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime.
Republic vs. CA CALLEJO, SR., J. The spouse present is burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present
spouse may contract a subsequent marriage.
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present
spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that “es menester que su creencia sea firme se
funde en motivos racionales.”

Belief may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend even in a slight degree to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably
founded in truth.
Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to
elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of
life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions,
competence evidence on the ultimate question of his death.

Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances
occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent
spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a
great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.
Court warned against collusion between the parties when they find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means.
Although testimonial evidence may suffice to prove the well-founded belief of the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, in Republic v. Nolasco, the Court warned
against collusion between the parties when they find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means. It is also the maxim that “men readily believe what they
wish to be true.”

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 36

SSS vs. Vda de CARPIO- The applicable law to determine the validity of a marriage is the law in effect at the time of its celebration. Thus, if it was solemnized before the Family Code took effect on
Bailon MORALES, J. August 3, 1988, the Civil Law provisions on Marriage apply.
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code
which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. Article 83 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be
illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive,
or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three
cases until declared null and void by a competent court.

A subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved or contracted
under any of the three exceptional circumstances.
Under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first
annulled or dissolved or contracted under any of the three exceptional circumstances. It bears noting that the marriage under any of these exceptional cases is deemed valid “until
declared null and void by a competent court.” It follows that the onus probandi in these cases rests on the party assailing the second marriage.

Alice had been absent for 15 consecutive years when Bailon sought the declaration of her presumptive death, which judicial declaration was not even a requirement then for purposes
of remarriage.

Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable as it was contracted by the present spouse believing the absent spouse to be dead, it is terminated by final
judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage, while under the Family Code, no
judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary as it is automatically terminated by the recording of an affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse.
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, it is terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the
spouses in the subsequent marriage. Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. x x x The termination of the subsequent marriage by
affidavit provided by the above-quoted provision of the Family Code does not preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration
of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage.

If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action, such absentee’s mere reappearance, even if
made known to the spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage.
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action, such absentee’s mere reappearance, even if made known to
the spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage. Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead,
such presumption continues inspite of the spouse’s physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage
is terminated as provided by law. (Note: The second marriage to Jarque remains valid notwithstanding proof that the first wife is still alive at the time of the second marriage)

A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding.

It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding. Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the
parties and not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot
be impeached, and is made good ab initio.

Attack on Validity of Second Marriage is Barred by Death of One of the Parties (Second Marriage to Jarque can no longer be Questioned)

9. In the case at bar, the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an affidavit of reappearance or by judicial declaration but by death of the husband Bailon.

10. In instances when the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally believed
dead, the action for annulment becomes extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the
action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved.

11. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding. Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after
the death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and
is made good ab initio.

12. As no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, the marriage between Bailon and Jarque prior to the former's death in 1998, respondent Jarque is rightfully the dependent
spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.
Valdez vs. NACHURA, J. The Court explained that presumption of death cannot be the subject of court proceedings independent of the settlement of the absentee’s estate.
Republic The Court explained that presumption of death cannot be the subject of court proceedings independent of the settlement of the absentee’s estate.

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 37

 A judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary
proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final.
The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Szatraw, because it does not appear that he possessed property brought to the marriage and because he had acquired no
property during his married life with the petitioner. The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence which permits the court to presume that a person is dead after the fact that
such person had been unheard from in seven years had been established. This presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in a special
proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent court. Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot
be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or special proceeding. In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the
petitioner against her absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact (Hagans v. Wislizenus, 42
Phil. 880), for the petition does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner’s husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead because he had been
unheard from in seven years. If there is any pretense at securing a declaration that the petitioner’s husband is dead, such a pretension cannot be granted because it is unauthorized.
The petition is for a declaration that the petitioner’s husband is presumptively dead. But this declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve the petitioner’s
situation, because such a presumption is already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie
presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter
involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. The latter must decide finally the controversy between the parties, or determine finally the right or status of a
party or establish finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights and obligations arise or may arise; and once such controversy is decided by a final judgment, or such right or status
determined, or such particular fact established, by a final decree, then the judgment on the subject of the controversy, or the decree upon the right or status of a party or upon the
existence of a particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a few rare in stances especially provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that a judicial
declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the
stage of finality or become final. Proof of actual death of the person presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding
to have such particular fact finally determined. If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead, because he had not been heard from in seven years, cannot become final and
executory even after the lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a
petition for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner.

Under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise.
Under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to have taken place by
the seventh year of absence, Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982.

Considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of well-founded belief is not required.
At the time of petitioner’s marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to petitioner’s capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.
Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of “well-founded belief” is not required. Petitioner could not have been expected to comply with this requirement since the
Family Code was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The enactment of the Family Code in 1988 does not change this conclusion. The Family Code itself states: Art.
256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit “well-founded belief” will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second
marriage, which was valid at the time it was celebrated.
To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit “well-founded belief” will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second marriage, which was
valid at the time it was celebrated. Such a situation would be untenable and would go against the objectives that the Family Code wishes to achieve. In sum, we hold that the Petition
must be dismissed since no decree on the presumption of Sofio’s death can be granted under the Civil Code, the same presumption having arisen by operation of law. However, we
declare that petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio at the time their marriage was celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the said marriage is legal and valid.
Santos vs. Santos LEONEN, J. The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four (4) consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the
absent spouse is already dead, that constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the subsistence of another marriage.
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is
already dead, that constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the subsistence of another marriage. The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger of
being terminated by the presumptively dead spouse when he or she reappears.

When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive death, a presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead and that the
second marriage is legal.
When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive death, a presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead and that the second marriage is
legal. This presumption should prevail over the continuance of the marital relations with the first spouse. The second marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed valid. The burden of
proof to show that the first marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the person assailing the validity of the second marriage.

Mere reappearance will not terminate the subsequent marriage even if the parties to the subsequent marriage were notified if there was “no step taken to terminate the
subsequent marriage, either by filing an affidavit of reappearance or by court action.”
This court recognized the conditional nature of reappearance as a cause for terminating the subsequent marriage in Social Security System v. Vda. de Bailon, 485 SCRA 376 (2006).
This court noted that mere reappearance will not terminate the subsequent marriage even if the parties to the subsequent marriage were notified if there was “no step . . . taken to
terminate the subsequent marriage, either by [filing an] affidavit [of reappearance] or by court action[.]” “Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that
the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the spouse’s physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until
the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.”

Conditions for a Bigamous Subsequent Marriage to be Considered Valid.

A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous subsequent marriage may be considered valid when the following are present:

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 38

 1) The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years;
2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead;
3) There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse; and
4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse.

Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous and void.
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief that the spouse is
already dead. The first marriage will not be considered as validly terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered
bigamous and void. Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is protected by law.

If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad faith when he filed his petition to declare her presumptively dead and when he contracted the subsequent marriage, such marriage would
be considered void for being bigamous under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. This is because the circumstances lack the element of “well-founded belief” under Article 41 of the
Family Code, which is essential for the exception to the rule against bigamous marriages to apply.

A subsequent marriage may also be terminated by filing “an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or
termination of the subsequent marriage.”
The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the termination of the subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse who was declared presumptively
dead from availing other remedies existing in law. This court had, in fact, recognized that a subsequent marriage may also be terminated by filing “an action in court to prove the
reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage.”

Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family Code is valid until terminated, the “children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and
the property relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same as in valid marriages.”
Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not merely the termination of the subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its effects. She contends that
reappearance is not a sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of the declaration of her presumptive death and the subsequent
marriage.

Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family Code is valid until terminated, the “children of such marriage shall be considered
legitimate, and the property relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same as in valid marriages.” If it is terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the subsequent
marriage conceived before the termination shall still be considered legitimate. Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is a defense against prosecution for bigamy. It is true
that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent marriage may nullify the effects of the subsequent marriage, specifically, in relation to the status of children and the
prospect of prosecuting a respondent for bigamy.

However, “a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages may be filed solely by the husband or wife.” This means that even if Celerina is a real party-in-interest who
stands to be benefited or injured by the outcome of an action to nullify the second marriage, this remedy is not available to her.

Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere
filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina’s choice to file an action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie.
Republic vs. MENDOZA, J. The well-founded belief in the absentee’s death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the
Villanueva absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead.
Article 41 of the Family Code provides that before a judicial declaration of presumptive death may be granted, the present spouse must prove that he/she has a well-founded belief that
the absentee is dead. In this case, Edna failed. The RTC and the CA overlooked Edna’s patent noncompliance with the said requirement. The well-founded belief in the absentee’s
death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries,
he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one). Mere absence of the spouse (even
beyond the period required by law), lack of any news that the absentee spouse is still alive, mere failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would
not suffice. The premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of complying with the stringent requirement of “well-founded belief” which can
only be discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse’s whereabouts but, more importantly, whether the
absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.

Applying the standard set forth by the Supreme Court (SC) in the previously cited cases, particularly Republic v. Cantor, 712 SCRA 1 (2013), Edna’s efforts failed to satisfy
the required well-founded belief of her absent husband’s death.
Applying the standard set forth by the Court in the previously cited cases, particularly failed to satisfy the required well-founded belief of her absent husband’s death. Her claim of
making diligent search and inquiries remained unfounded as it merely consisted of bare assertions without any corroborative evidence on record. She also failed to present any person
from whom she inquired about the whereabouts of her husband. She did not even present her children from whom she learned the disappearance of her husband. In fact, she was the
lone witness. Following the basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof, the Court cannot give credence to her claims that she indeed exerted diligent
efforts to locate her husband. Moreover, no document was submitted to corroborate the allegation that her husband had been missing for at least fifteen (15) years already. As the OSG
observed, there was not even any attempt to seek the aid of the authorities at the time her husband disappeared. In Cantor, the present spouse claimed to have sought the aid of the
authorities or, at the very least, reported his absence to the police. Yet, the Court denied her pleas.
Republic vs. DEL CASTILLO, In the 2005 case of Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, 449 SCRA 57, the Supreme Court (SC) held that the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC’s) Decision on a Petition for declaration
Sareñogon J. of presumptive death pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code is immediately final and executory.

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 39

 In the 2005 case of Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, 449 SCRA 57, we held that the RTC’s Decision on a Petition for declaration of presumptive death pursuant to Article 41 of the Family
Code is immediately final and executory. Thus, the CA has no jurisdiction to entertain a notice of appeal pertaining to such judgment. Concurring in the result, Justice (later Chief
Justice) Artemio Panganiban further therein pointed out that the correct remedy to challenge the RTC Decision was to institute a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and not a petition
for review under Rule 45.

Under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals (CA) on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the
ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the Decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may
elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Given the Court’s imposition of “strict standard” in a petition for a declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code, it must follow that there was no
basis at all for the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC’s) finding that Jose’s Petition complied with the requisites of Article 41 of the Family Code, in reference to the “well-founded
belief” standard.
Given the Court’s imposition of “strict standard” in a petition for a declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code, it must follow that there was no basis at all for
the RTC’s finding that Jose’s Petition complied with the requisites of Article 41 of the Family Code, in reference to the “well-founded belief” standard. If anything, Jose’s pathetically
anemic efforts to locate the missing Netchie are notches below the required degree of stringent diligence prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside from his bare claims that he had
inquired from alleged friends and relatives as to Netchie’s whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand specific individuals or persons whom he allegedly saw or met in the
course of his search or quest for the allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that he sought the assistance of the pertinent government agencies as well as the media. Nor did
he show that he undertook a thorough, determined and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least two years (and what those years were), and naming the particular places,
provinces, cities, barangays or municipalities that he visited, or went to, and identifying the specific persons he interviewed or talked to in the course of his search.
Republic vs. PERLAS- Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four (4) consecutive years and the present
Tampus BERNABE, J. spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead.
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a
well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code), there are four (4) essential requisites for the
declaration of presumptive death:

(1) that the absent spouse has been missing for four (4) consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under
the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code;
(2) that the present spouse wishes to remarry;
(3) that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
(4) that the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.

The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the foregoing requisites under Article 41 of the Family Code exist. Since it is the present spouse who, for purposes of
declaration of presumptive death, substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue, it stands to reason that the burden of proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.

The “well-founded belief” in the absentee’s death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the
absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead.
The “well-founded belief” in the absentee’s death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse
and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive
one. As such, the mere absence of the spouse for such periods prescribed under the law, lack of any news that such absentee spouse is still alive, failure to communicate, or general
presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice. The premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of complying with the
stringent requirement of “well-founded belief” which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent
spouse’s whereabouts, but more importantly, whether the latter is still alive or is already dead.
Republic vs REYES, JR., J The well-founded belief in the absentee’s death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the
Catubag absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead.
Article 41 of the Family Code provides that before a judicial declaration of presumptive death may be granted, the present spouse must prove that he/she has a well-founded belief that
the absentee is dead. The well-founded belief in the absentee’s death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate
the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active
effort (not a mere passive one). Mere absence of the spouse (even beyond the period required by law), lack of any news that the absentee spouse is still alive, mere failure to
communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice. The premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden
of complying with the stringent requirement of “well-founded belief” which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain
not only the absent spouse’s whereabouts but, more importantly, whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.

Having laid out the foregoing jurisprudential guidelines in determining the existence of a "well-founded belief," the Court now shifts focus to the specific circumstances surrounding the
current case. In the case at bar, private respondent first took a leave of absence from his work in the United Arab Emirates and returned to the Philippines to search for Shanaviv. He
then proceeded to inquire about his wife's whereabouts from their friends and relatives in Cagayan and Bicol. Next, private respondent aired over Bombo Radyo Philippines, a known
radio station, regarding the fact of disappearance of his wife. Finally, he claims to have visited various hospitals and funeral parlors in Tuguegarao City and nearby municipalities.
Applying the foregoing standards discussed by the Court in Cantor, Granada, and Orcelino-Villanueva, the Court finds that private respondent's efforts falls short of the degree of
diligence required by jurisprudence for the following reasons:

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 First, private respondent claims to have inquired about his missing wife's whereabouts from both friends and relatives. Further, he claims to have carried out such inquiries
in the place where they lived and in the place where his wife was born and raised. However, private respondent failed to present any of these alleged friends or relatives to
corroborate these "inquiries." Moreover, no explanation for such omission was given. As held in the previous cases, failure to present any of the persons from whom
inquiries were allegedly made tends to belie a claim of a diligent search.

Second, private respondent did not seek the help of other concerned government agencies, namely, the local police authorities and the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI). In Cantor, the Court reasoned that while a finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature of the situation, it would still be prudent for the present spouse to seek
the aid of the authorities in searching for the missing spouse. Absent such efforts to employ the help of local authorities, the present spouse cannot be said to have actively
and diligently searched for the absentee spouse.[52]

Finally, aside from the certification of Bombo Radyo's manager, private respondent bases his "well-founded belief” on bare assertions that he exercised earnest efforts in
looking for his wife. Again, the present spouse's bare assertions, uncorroborated by any kind of evidence, falls short of the diligence required to engender a well-founded
belief that the absentee spouse is dead.

Taken together, the Court is of the view that private respondent's efforts in searching for his missing wife, Shanaviv, are merely passive. Private respondent could have easily
convinced the Court otherwise by providing evidence which corroborated his "earnest-efforts." Yet, no explanation or justification was given for these glaring omissions. Again, he who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it by some other means than mere allegations.

Stripped of private respondent's mere allegations, only the act of broadcasting his wife's alleged disappearance through a known radio station was corroborated. This act comes
nowhere close to establishing a well-founded belief that Shanaviv has already passed away. At most, it just reaffirms the unfortunate theory that she abandoned the family.

it is clear that private respondent failed to fulfill the requisite of establishing a well-founded belief that the absentee spouse is dead. Thus, the RTC should have denied private
respondent's petition for declaration of presumptive death.
Matias vs. VELASCO, JR., The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not an action that would have warranted the application of Article 41 of the FC because petitioner was not
Republic J. seeking to remarry. A reading of Article 41 of the FC shows that the presumption of death established therein is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent
marriage under the said law. Thus:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage,
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the presumptive death of Wilfredo as a prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the declaration of
presumptive death, petitioner categorically stated that the same was filed “not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as amended.”

Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the purpose of remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the presumption of death under either
Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code11 as the basis of her petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code express the general rule regarding presumptions of death for any
civil purpose, to wit:

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of
succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. lf he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years,
an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or
aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for four years.

Verily, the RTC’s use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the presumptive death of Wilfredo was misleading and grossly improper. The petition for the declaration of
presumptive death filed by petitioner was based on the Civil Code, and not on Article 41 of the FC.

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 Since the petition filed by the petitioner merely seeks the declaration of presumptive death of Wilfredo under the Civil Code, the RTC should have dismissed such petition outright. This
is because, in our jurisdiction, a petition whose sole objective is to have a person declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code is not regarded as a valid suit and no court has any
authority to take cognizance of the same.

In view of the foregoing circumstance, the Court deems it necessary to issue the following guidelines-culled from relevant law and jurisprudential pronouncements-to aid the public, PVAO
and the AFP in making or dealing with claims of death benefits which are similar to that of the petitioner:

1. The PVAO and the AFP can decide claims of death benefits of a missing soldier without requiring the claimant to first produce a court declaration of the
presumptive death of such soldier. In such claims, the PVAO and the AFP can make their own determination, on the basis of evidence presented by the claimant, whether
the presumption of death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code may be applied or not.

It must be stressed that the presumption of death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code arises by operation of law, without need of a court declaration, once the factual
conditions mentioned in the said articles are established.19 Hence, requiring the claimant to further secure a court declaration in order to establish the presumptive death of
a missing soldier is not proper and contravenes established jurisprudence on the matter.20

2. In order to avail of the presumption, therefore, the claimant need only present before the PVAO or the appropriate office of the AFP, as the case may be,
any “evidence”21which shows that the concerned soldier had been missing for such number of years and/or under the circumstances prescribed under Articles 390 and 391
of the Civil Code. Obviously, the “evidence” referred to here excludes a court declaration of presumptive death.

3. The PVAO or the AFP, as the case may be, may then weigh the evidence submitted by the claimant and determine their sufficiency to establish the requisite factual
conditions specified under Article 390 or 391 of the Civil Code in order for the presumption of death to arise. If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted
by the claimant is sufficient, they should not hesitate to apply the presumption of death and pay the latter’s claim.

4. If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is not sufficient to invoke the presumption of death under the Civil Code and denies the
latter’s claim by reason, thereof, the claimant may file an appeal with the Office of the President (OP) pursuant to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

lf the OP denies the appeal, the claimant may next seek recourse via a petition for review with the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of the Court. And finally, should such recourse still fail,
the claimant may file an appeal by certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Art. 42 – Requirement if Absentee Spouse Reappears
Santos vs. Santos LEONEN, J. The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to the present spouse was terminated when he or she was
declared absent or presumptively dead.
The Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with the remedy of terminating the subsequent marriage by mere reappearance. The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is
an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to the present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or presumptively dead. Moreover, a
close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject to several conditions:

(1) the nonexistence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio;
(2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of reappearance;
(3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and
(4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially determined.
Art. 45-47 – Voidable Marriage/Grounds/Prescriptive Period
Villanueva vs. CA YNARES- Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can terminate the
SANTIAGO, J. marital union by refusing to cohabitate.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant cannot claim that his marriage should be annulled due to the absence of cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation is,
per se, not a ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate.
The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud,
intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of those grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.
Almelor vs. RTC REYES, R.T., J. A marriage may be annulled when the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, such as concealment of homosexuality; It is the concealment of homosexuality, and
of Las Piñas City not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent party.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it as a ground to annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear—a marriage
may be annulled when the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, such as concealment of homosexuality. Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by preponderance of
evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife. It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality
per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other party in giving consent to the marriage.

Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of marriage.

This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. The State
and the public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against desecration by fabricated evidence. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the validity of marriage.

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 Art. 48 – Appearance of Prosecuting Attorney
Ancheta vs. CALLEJO, SR., J. Guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 48 of the Family Code.
Ancheta In the case of Republic v.Court of Appeals, this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State: (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within
fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.

The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance.
The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred
institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught
with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of
the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer
the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting
attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and
fabricated.

Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution.
Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social
institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral
fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members alone. Whether or not a marriage should continue to exist or a family should stay together must not depend on
the whims and caprices of only one party, who claims that the other suffers psychological imbalance, incapacitating such party to fulfill his or her marital duties and obligations.
Art. 50-51 – Effects if Marriage is Annulled Under Art. 45 or is Void under Art. 40
Noveras vs. PEREZ, J. Procedure Observed in the Liquidation of Absolute Community Regime.
Noveras Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the absolute community regime and the following procedure should apply:

Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
unpaid balance with their separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a
different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purposes
of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market
value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse
with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has
decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children.

Lex Situs; Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly
states that real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties. We
affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses in the absolute community properties in the Philippines, as well as the
payment of their children’s presumptive legitimes.

Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, “(t)he legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half or the hereditary estate of the father and of the
mother.” The children are therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the net assets of the absolute community, which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering
the same, as well as to their respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale ofthe Sampaloc property including the receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of P410,000.00.
Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay them the amount of P520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes therefrom.
Art. 55-67 – Legal Separation/Grounds/Denial/Effects
Siochi vs. Gozon CARPIO, J. Among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share
of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership; It is only the offending spouse’s share in the net profits which is forfeited.
Among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net
profits earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredo’s share in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of Winifred. Article 102(4) of the Family Code provides that “[f]or
purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value
of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.” Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredo’s
share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.

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Quiao vs. Quiao REYES, J. Net Profits of the Conjugal Property

21. The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the fruits of the separate properties of the spouses and the products of their labor and industry.

22. Article 102(4) applies to both the dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
regime under Article 129 of the Family Code.

23. Under Article 102(4) of the Family Code, net profits “shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the
marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.”

24. The difference lies in the processes used under the dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and in the processes used under the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code.

A. Absolute Community Regime

a. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife becomejoint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse
brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple's properties.
And when the couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have
established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.

b. Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of marriage, an inventory is prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive
properties of each; then the debts and obligations of the absolute community are paid out of the absolute community's assets and if the community's properties are insufficient, the
separate properties of each of the couple will be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance. Whatever is left of the separate properties will be delivered to each of them. The net remainder
of the absolute community is its net assets, which shall be divided between the husband and the wife; and for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture, said profits
shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.

c. Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the “net profits” requires that we first find the market value of the properties at the time of the community's dissolution. From the totality of
the market value of all the properties, we subtract the debts and obligations of the absolute community and this result to the net assets or net remainder of the properties of the absolute
community, from which we deduct the market value of the properties at the time of marriage, which then results to the net profits.

d. In the present case, since both husband and wife have no separate properties, and nothing would be returned to each of them, what will be divided equally between them is simply
the “net profits.” However, the trial court forfeited the half-share of the petitioner in favor of his children. Thus, if we use Article 102 in the instant case (which should not be the case),
nothing is left to the petitioner since both parties entered into their marriage without bringing with them any property

B. Conjugal Partnership of Gains

a. When a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article 142 of the Civil Code, “the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate
property and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by
either spouse during the marriage.” From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of
those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals

b. In the normal course of events, the following are the steps in the liquidation of the properties of the spouses:

c. An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made, separately listing the couple's conjugal properties and their separate properties. (In the instant case, the trial court found that
the couple has no separate properties when they married)

d. Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal partnership during the marriage is returned in equal amount to the assets of the conjugal partnership; and if the
community is enriched at the expense of the separate properties of either spouse, a restitution of the value of such properties to their respective owners shall be made.

e. Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the debts of the conjugal partnership; while the debts and obligation of each of the spouses shall be paid from their
respective separate properties.

f. But if the conjugal partnership is not sufficient to pay all its debts and obligations, the spouses with their separate properties shall be solidarily liable.

g. What remains of the separate or exclusive properties of the husband and of the wife shall be returned to each of them.

h. In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties
above are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their
respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children,
pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no
separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party's favor.

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 Art. 68-73 – Rights and Obligations Between Husband and Wife
Ilusorio vs. PARDO, J. In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.
Bildner When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also emphasized that the same shall be enforced under penalty of contempt in case of violation or refusal to comply. Such
assertion of raw, naked power is unnecessary. The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit
a husband. In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.

No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife; Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried
out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or
by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice.
Art. 87 – Donation Between Husband and Wife During Marriage/Prohibition/Inclusion of Common Law Relationship
Arcaba vs. MENDOZA, J. Donations Between Spouses During Marriage Void
Tabancura
1. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each
other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. (Article 87, Family Code)

Cohabitation Also Means Repeated Sexual Intercourse

2. In Bitangcor v. Tan, the Supreme Court held that the term "cohabitation" or "living together as husband and wife" means not only residing under one roof, but also having repeated
sexual intercourse.

3. Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex.

4. Cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as such.

5. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated, do not constitute such kind of cohabitation; they are merely meretricious. In this jurisdiction, this Court
has considered as sufficient proof of common-law relationship the stipulations between the parties, a conviction of concubinage, or the existence of illegitimate children.

Cirila Considered as Employee or Common-Law Wife?

6. Was Cirila Francisco's employee or his common-law wife? Cirila admitted that she and Francisco resided under one roof for a long time. It is very possible that the two consummated
their relationship, since Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept in the same bedroom. At the very least, their public conduct indicated that theirs was not
just a relationship of caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife.

7. Documents show that Cirila saw herself as Francisco's common-law wife, otherwise, she would not have used his last name in these documents. The fact that Cirila did not demand
from Francisco a regular cash wage was an indication that she was not simply a caregiver-employee, but Francisco's common law spouse.

Cirila, as Common-Law Wife, is Disqualified to Accept Donation

8. Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is
that the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.

9. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, voiding the donation to her by Frnacisco.

KAP | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (2ND EXAM) 45