Running head: KOREAN WAR 1

The Korean War

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The Korean War

The Korean war took place narrowly between the second world war and the Vietnam

wars. The war started as a cold war between the years 1950-1953 and then into a full blown out

armed confrontation. The war can as well be viewed a test of force test between the United

States allies(South Korea) and the China-Russia allies(North Korea).

North Korea's declaration of war on South Korea on June 25th, 1950, caught the

international community especially America completely unaware, as a result, the American

leadership failed to come up with elaborate war objectives in the months that followed (Suh,

2008). However, on September 15th, 1950 under the guidance of General Douglas McArthur,

the U.S marine forces made a surprise landing on the strategic port of Inchon (Weathersby,

2015). While the location had been previously been seen as a hot spot, the general lead a valiant

landing with the help U.N forces. This lead to the cutting off of the North Korean Army supply

lines. This was vital to the recapturing of the Korean city of Seoul which had previously been

taken by the communist-led forces. The Inchon strategic attack had a profound impact on the

direction the war took. The war later boiled into a bloody stalemate which was finally terminated

by the 1953 armistice (Suh, 2008). During the Korean War nations adopted various military

strategies to facilitate the achievement of the war objective whilst minimizing the possible War

ramifications.

The operational art of Kim –II Sung was very straightforward and basic; Defeat the ill-

equipped Republic of South Korea before international interception especially from the

Americans and institute communist political control all over the Korean peninsula. Kim –II –

Jung speculated that military success will earn him military recognition from Russia and China
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hence the rest of the world will have no option but to oblige. The only crack in the NPKS plan

was that it had already dawned on general MacArthur that the stalling at the Pusan Perimeter

would lead to an exposure of a vulnerable rear at Inchon which General MacArthur had already

identified s a decisive point. Inchon gave the Americans a perfect chance for a counterblow,

cutting off the NPCs' supply chain.

The American military personnel to take on the North Koreans had significantly reduced

in numbers since the second war though still organized in the same manner, equipped with the

same military equipment and drafted on the same doctrine. Theoretically, the American military

army and other Marine divisions were made up of three divisions each, with supporting weapons,

armor, support staff, and special military personnel. In reality, the USA military was

significantly under strength, ill-equipped, and most of the military personnel were poorly

equipped and trained. The core advantage of the Americans laid in their tactical prowess. The

deployment of military personnel in the Pusan valley largely depended on brute use of artillery

and air power to keep the North Koreans at bay.

The NKPA had been specially designed and equipped by Russia with the sole mission of

mounting a quick surprise attack which as per the designers would easily run over the republic of

Korea, followed by a quick drive to the southern tip of Korea. The military convoy of NPKA

contained armored tanks massed military equipment manned by veteran Korean military

personnel who had participated in the World War 2 exploits of the red army. The inflexibility of

the NKPA plan gave a major boost to both the UN and American forces (Olesen, 2008). While

the NPKA was fighting with Lt. General Walton at Pusan they had an extensive amenable tail

stretching to Manchuria (Olesen, 2008). The venerable General MacArthur was able to come up

with an ambitious amphibian plan which would land at Inchon, despite the widespread
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opposition from both his seniors and subordinates in the initial days of the North Korean

invasion. General MacArthur imagined an all-out marine attack accompanied by a well-equipped

army platoon. The first Inchon plan, drafted in Tokyo was later canceled due to poor weather

conditions on the perimeters of Pusan. Not one to relent, General MacArthur directed the newly

arrived Gen. Ruffner to oversee JSPOG (Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group) formulate a

new attack plan to be undertaken in October owing to predicted calm weather.

Marshalling sufficient military force for the amphibian plan proved a challenge. Owing to

the ingenuity of General MacArthur-he managed to request more than a thousand landing craft

operators and subsequently an engineering team. The 1st brigade was also quickly marshaled

around the fifth battalion and immediately the 1st platoon embarked on sail for Japan. After

protracted negotiations with the American leadership, the General was also finally allowed to

call all Marine security guards from American embassies across the world. As the D day neared,

the Americans had marshaled sufficient military and personnel power.

The American battalion faced numerous challenges. While the Americans had an

extensive fleet of amphibian vessels situated across numerous locations that were previously

used in world war efforts, a significant number of them were in poor condition due to lack of

regular maintenance. To facilitate the general with proper artillery the navy quickly

recommissioned the vessels with new crew members going as calling on reservists, merchant

sailors and even utilizing the local Japanese platoon. Olesen (2008) records that out of the 47

landing ships that left Kobe to aid the operation, more than thirty ships were under Japanese

control. In spite of this effort, most of the ships lacked requisite hardware such as galleys and

radios. Coupled with these hurdles, the East command lacked well-equipped posts t command all

of the landing fleets. To overcome this challenge, the American leadership allowed General
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Macarthur upon his request to put into operation the X corps from among existing assets in the

arsenal. He selected his then serving chief of staff Maj. General Ruffner, to operate as the head

of staff. The X corps proved curved from the East command proved useful upon landing in

Korea.

Despite Macarthur's zeal in carrying out the Inchon operation from the onset, he faced

various hardships in convincing the American leadership of the viability of the program and even

from his staff. Their concerns were time constraints, insufficient military equipment, and

personnel. In a meeting with USA military chiefs sent to ascertain the state on the ground, the

general managed to prevail. While giving him the green light to go ahead with the mission, they

insisted on landing at Kunsan which was located farther south on the west coast.

The general's untold support for his subordinates in handling their needs proved useful

the next day after some dissidence from some of the subordinates who were concerned with the

weather conditions, mud banks along the approach, lack of sufficient vessels, personnel and the

lack of sufficient time to train and equip personnel and viability of carrying out such a mission in

an urban centre. That very evening, through a teleconference with Washington, General

MacArthur received JSC approval for a two-regiment marine division, and the 1st marine

Division set sail from the American West Coast.

The decisive success of the Inchon landing can be directly attributed to General

MacArthur's resolve to land in Inchon contrary to the insistence of the military chief on the

landing where it was best suited (Weathersby, 2015). The general's plan, despite the numerous

technical challenges experienced in the landing operations, was strategically and operationally
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sound. While key parts of the plan were based on numerous assumptions, these assumptions

were agreed upon after extensive discussions during the planning process.

The success of the strategy relays the fact that the General had a well laid out command

concept, of which he properly articulated to his subordinates and seniors. By pitting the military

personnel at the core of his Inchon plan, the general displayed in his task organization, a clear

understanding of the strategic significance of his concept, and properly relayed his intent that

evolved from being a mere landing into a diversionary attack. The general was not successful

because his strategy was in line with army chiefs but because he was finally able to explain and

convince the wisdom behind his assumptions.

In Mid 1951, after the the North Korean forces were repelled back to the 38th parallel the

battle line remained within the vicinity for the remaining parts of the war (Weathersby, 2015). A

military end state was attained in July, 1953 after protracted negotiations between key

participating nations e.g. the US and Russia signed a peace treaty that brought to an end to the

fighting and led to establishment of a new boundary near the 38th parallel that gave the RSK of

additional territory and created a 2.5 buffer zone (Weathersby, 2015). The zone was to act as a

buffer zone between the two countries because the two nations failed to sign a permanent

armistice treaty.

The Korean War had various implications for the nations involved. For starters, after the

Korean, the two nations remained as two separate sovereign entities and failed to unite. The

Korean War also had a telling impact on the social life structure of the Korean people. Families

were broken up, living on the opposite sides of the buffer zone, unable to visit or even exchange
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any form of communication with each other. Additionally, families lost loved ones, some

causalities of war and others generally reported as missing.

The economic effects of the war were also very pronounced. The industries were

destroyed in North Korea leading it to lag in economic growth and development. Additionally,

after the termination of the war, US military personnel remained in South Korea leading to

strained relations between South Korea and China impacting regional trade.

Throughout the war, the United States of America managed to achieve its core objective

of preventing the Republic of South Korea from falling into communist leadership but the ripple

effect impacted US foreign policy for more than two decades. The Korean War also leads to a

massive increase in national expenditure for rearming and drafting. The defense budget

skyrocketed from a$40 Billion in 1951 to $ 60 billion by the following year (Weathersby, 2015).

Consequently, the United States made various coalitions including one with the South American

states and in 1951 they made the ANZUS treaty (Okjoon Kim, 2013). The Korean War also had

negative ramifications on the United States as it lost a score of soldiers. Historically it was the

first war the US got engaged in and did not emerge victoriously.

The war also led to strained relations between China and the USSR as there arose issues

as to who was to pay for the war. The Chinese leadership was of the standing that the USSR was

a highly unreliable ally and China put in place requisite steps to insulate itself from USSR

influence. Eventually, in 1960, China severed its relations with the Soviet Union in an event

commonly referred to as the Sino-Soviet Split, leading to increased tensions between major

Soviet nations.
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The objectives of the USA joining the war are numerous. First, America wanted to curtail

the growing spread of communist ideals and the ripple effect that could after risen after the war.

The American leadership thought that if South Korea fell, the neighboring nations would also be

in line, such as Japan which was a key American trade partner. Additionally, as per the Truman

doctrine which called upon Americans to act in the interest of the nations threatened by

communism.

References

Okjoon Kim. (2013). Chinese War Participation Decision Process in the Korean War : From

North Korean Support Request to Participation Decision. The Journal Of Northeast Asia

Research, 28(2), 104-145. doi: 10.18013/jnar.2013.28.2.004

Olesen, T. (2008). Under the national paradigm: Cold War studies and Cold War politics in post-

Cold War Norden. Cold War History, 8(2), 189-211. doi: 10.1080/14682740802018686

Suh, D. (2008). Allan R. Millett, The War for Korea, 1945–1950: A House Burning. Journal Of

Cold War Studies, 10(2), 149-152. doi: 10.1162/jcws.2008.10.2.149

Weathersby, K. (2015). The Korean War at Sixty: New Approaches to the Study of the Korean

WarSteven Casey, ed., The Korean War at Sixty: New Approaches to the Study of the

Korean War. London: Routledge, 2012. 177 pp. Journal Of Cold War Studies, 17(3),

242-243. doi: 10.1162/jcws_r_00574