You are on page 1of 11

[ ADM. CASE NO.

2984, August 31, 2007 ]

RODOLFO M. BERNARDO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ISMAEL F. MEJIA,


RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review of Administrative Case No. 2984 with plea
for reinstatement in the practice of law filed by Ismael F. Mejia (Mejia) who is
already seventy-one years old and barred from the practice of law for fifteen years.

The antecedent facts that led to Mejia's disbarment are as follows.

On January 23, 1987, Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. accused his retained attorney,
Ismael F. Mejia, of the following administrative offenses:
1) misappropriating and converting to his personal use:
a) part of the sum of P27,710.00 entrusted to him for payment of real estate taxes
on property belonging to Bernardo, situated in a subdivision known as Valle Verde
I; and

b) part of another sum of P40,000.00 entrusted to him for payment of taxes and
expenses in connection with the registration of title of Bernardo to another property
in a subdivision known as Valle Verde V;
2) falsification of certain documents, to wit:
a) a special power of attorney dated March 16, 1985, purportedly executed in his
favor by Bernardo (Annex P, par. 51, complainant's affidavit dates October 4,
1989);

b) a deed of sale dated October 22, 1982 (Annex O, par. 48, id.); and

c) a deed of assignment purportedly executed by the spouses Tomas and Remedios


Pastor, in Bernardo's favor (Annex Q, par. 52, id.);
3) issuing a check, knowing that he was without funds in the bank, in payment of a
loan obtained from Bernardo in the amount of P50,000.00, and thereafter,
replacing said check with others known also to be insufficiently funded.[1]
On July 29, 1992, the Supreme Court En Banc rendered a Decision Per Curiam, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES the [sic] respondent, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia,
guilty of all the charges against him and hereby imposes on him the penalty of
DISBARMENT. Pending finality of this judgment, and effective immediately, Atty.
Ismael F. Mejia is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law. Let a copy of this
Decision be spread in his record in the Bar Confidant's Office, and notice thereof
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the Court Administrator
who is DIRECTED to inform all the Courts concerned of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
On June 1, 1999, Mejia filed a Petition praying that he be allowed to reengage in
the practice of law. On July 6, 1999, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a
Resolution denying the petition for reinstatement.

On January 23, 2007, Mejia filed the present petition for review of Administrative
Case No. 2984 with a plea for reinstatement in the practice of law. No comment or
opposition was filed against the petition.[2]

Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great
extent on the sound discretion of the Court. The action will depend on whether or
not the Court decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial
administration of justice will continue to be preserved even with the applicant's
reentry as a counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to
the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character, a fit and
proper person to practice law. The Court will take into consideration the applicant's
character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the
charge/s for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment,
and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement.[3]

In the petition, Mejia acknowledged his indiscretions in the law profession. Fifteen
years had already elapsed since Mejia's name was dropped from the Roll of
Attorneys. At the age of seventy-one, he is begging for forgiveness and pleading for
reinstatement. According to him, he has long repented and he has suffered enough.
Through his reinstatement, he wants to leave a legacy to his children and redeem
the indignity that they have suffered due to his disbarment.

After his disbarment, he put up the Mejia Law Journal, a publication containing his
religious and social writings. He also organized a religious organization and named
it "El Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle of Heart and Mind."

The Court is inclined to grant the present petition. Fifteen years has passed since
Mejia was punished with the severe penalty of disbarment. Although the Court does
not lightly take the bases for Mejia's disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the
fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. While the age of the petitioner and the
length of time during which he has endured the ignominy of disbarment are not the
sole measure in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of
the rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has
been attributed to him, and he has shown remorse. Obviously, he has learned his
lesson from this experience, and his punishment has lasted long enough. Thus,
while the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also
knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its
purpose. After all, penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to
correct offenders.

We reiterate, however, and remind petitioner that the practice of law is a privilege
burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness,
maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the
rules of the legal profession are the continuing requirements for enjoying the
privilege to practice law.[4]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for reinstatement in the Roll of
Attorneys by Ismael F. Mejia is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,


Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr., and Reyes, JJ.,
concur.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.

[ A.M. NO. P-07-2337 (FORMERLY A.M. OCA IPI NO. 04-2060-P), August
03, 2007 ]
ROLLY PENTECOSTES, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. HERMENEGILDO
MARASIGAN, CLERK OF COURT VI, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, KABACAN, NORTH COTABATO, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Atty. Hermenegildo Marasigan (respondent), Clerk of Court VI of the Office of the


Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabacan, North Cotabato, stands
administratively charged with grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming a public
officer for the loss of a motorcycle-subject matter of a criminal case which was
placed under his care and custody.

The administrative case against respondent stemmed from a sworn affidavit-


complaint[1] filed on November 11, 2004 by Rolly Pentecostes (Pentecostes), the
owner of a Kawasaki motorcycle, which was recovered by members of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) of M'lang, North Cotabato from suspected carnappers against
whom a criminal case for carnapping, Criminal Case No. 1010, was lodged at
Branch 22, RTC, Kabacan, North Cotabato.

On the order of the trial court, the chief of police of M'lang, North Cotabato turned
over the motorcycle to respondent who acknowledged receipt thereof on August 1,
1995.

After the conduct of hearings to determine the true owner of the motorcycle, the
trial court issued an Order[2] of November 15, 2000 for its release to Pentecostes.

Pentecostes immediately asked respondent to release the motorcycle to him.


Respondent, however, told him to wait and come back repeatedly from 2001 up to
the filing of the complaint.

In his Comment[3] filed on February 9, 2005, respondent gave the following


explanation:

After the motorcycle was delivered to him by the M'lang chief of police on August 1,
1995, he requested Alex Pedroso, a utility worker, to inspect the engine, chassis,
and make, after which he issued an acknowledgement receipt thereof.

He thereafter instructed Pedroso to bring the motorcycle to the Kabacan police


station for which he (respondent) prepared a receipt.

He and Pedroso visited and inspected the motorcycle every time a hearing on the
criminal case was conducted. When the court finally ordered the release of the
motorcycle to Pentecostes on November 15, 2000, the latter refused to receive it,
claiming that it was already "cannibalized" and unserviceable.

From that time on until 2003, Pentecostes harassed him, demanding that he be
responsible for reconditioning the vehicle. During the latter part of 2004, upon the
advice of the executive judge, he accompanied Pentecostes to the Kabacan police
station only to discover that the motorcycle was missing.
As no explanation could be offered by then Kabacan police chief Nestor Bastareche
for the loss, he prepared a letter-complaint requesting for assistance in the
recovery of the motorcycle and for the conduct of an investigation. Pentecostes
refused to sign the letter, however.

He later discovered that the turnover receipt attached to the record of the criminal
case and the page of the blotter where the turnover was recorded were missing.
Hence, he submitted the sworn statements of Pedroso[4] and SPO4 Alex Ocampo[5]
who confirmed the transfer of the vehicle from his custody to that of the Kabacan
chief of police.

Belying respondent's averments, Pentecostes, in his "Rejoinder,"[6] contended as


follows:

The vehicle was in good running condition when it was delivered to respondent by
police operatives[7] of M'lang.

Respondent's act of passing the blame to the PNP of Kabacan was a clear case of
hand washing as the records showed that respondent was responsible for the
safekeeping of the motorcycle. It was for this reason that he (Pentecostes) refused
to sign the letter to the chief of police of Kabacan protesting the loss. Moreover, the
police blotter of PNP Kabacan has no entry or record of the alleged turn over.

By Resolution of October 19, 2005,[8] this Court referred the case to the Executive
Judge of RTC, Kabacan, North Cotabato, for investigation, report and
recommendation.

Then Executive Judge Francisco G. Rabang, Jr. of the RTC, Kabacan, North
Cotabato submitted on January 16, 2006 his findings and recommendation for the
dismissal of the administrative complaint against respondent.[9]

In his report, Judge Rabang noted that Pentecostes denied any knowledge about
the turnover of the motorcycle to the PNP of Kabacan.

On the evidence for the defense, the investigating judge found that the motorcycle
was delivered by the PNP of M'lang, North Cotabato to respondent who in turn
transferred it to the PNP of Kabacan.

To Judge Rabang, what remained an issue was the actual physical condition of the
motorcycle when it was turned over to the PNP of Kabacan. The judge noted that
there was no proof of Pentecostes' claim that the vehicle was "cannibalized" from
the time it was under respondent's custody until its transfer to the PNP of Kabacan.

In light of the peace and order situation in Kabacan in the late 1990s and in the
early part of 2000 and the absence of a suitable courthouse then, Judge Rabang
believed that respondent had made a wise decision in turning over the custody of
the vehicle to the PNP of Kabacan.

To Judge Rabang's report and recommendation, Pentecostes filed a Motion for


Reconsideration[10] in which he assailed the conclusion that the motorcycle was no
longer roadworthy and was already "cannibalized" when it was delivered to the
office of the clerk of court from the M'lang police station.
Moreover, Pentecostes maintained that the alleged turnover of the motorcycle to
the police station of Kabacan was irrelevant because the proper custodian of the
vehicle was respondent who should be held responsible for its eventual loss.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the investigating judge's
recommendation to be sufficiently supported by the evidence.[11]

The OCA thus concurred with Judge Rabang's recommendation for the dismissal of
the complaint against respondent, subject to certain qualifications with respect to
the physical condition of the vehicle upon its delivery to respondent and the latter's
lack of authority for the turn over of the vehicle to the PNP of Kabacan.

While the investigating judge found no evidence to show the actual condition of the
motorcycle at the time it was turned over to respondent, the OCA observed that the
evidence presented during the investigation supported a finding that the vehicle
had missing parts when it was delivered to respondent.

From the testimony of Pentecostes' witness SPO2 Servando Guadalupe, the OCA
noted, the motorcycle was loaded into a service vehicle for delivery to respondent.
This fact, according to the OCA, could only mean that the vehicle could not run by
itself.

Although the OCA agreed with the investigating judge that the evidence sufficiently
proved that the vehicle was turned over to the PNP of Kabacan where it got lost, it
noted that respondent failed to ask prior authority from the trial court to transfer its
custody. Only when respondent was having problems with Pentecostes did he bring
the matter to the attention of the executive judge, the OCA added.

Accordingly, the OCA recommended that respondent be reminded to secure prior


authority from the court before evidence is turned over to any authorized
government office or agency and that he be warned to be more careful to prevent
any similar incident from arising in the future.

The finding of the OCA insofar as respondent's lack of authority to transfer the
motorcycle is well taken, on account of which respondent is administratively liable
for simple misconduct.

It is the duty of the clerk of court to keep safely all records, papers, files, exhibits
and public property committed to his charge.[12] Section D (4), Chapter VII of the
1991 Manual For Clerks of Court (now Section E[2], paragraph 2.2.3, Chapter VI of
the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court) provides:
All exhibits used as evidence and turned over to the court and before the case/s
involving such evidence shall have been terminated shall be under the custody and
safekeeping of the Clerk of Court.

Similarly, Section 7 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, provides:

SEC. 7. Safekeeping of property. - The clerk shall safely keep all record, papers,
files, exhibits and public property committed to his charge, including the library of
the court, and the seals and furniture belonging to his office.
From the above provisions, it is clear that as clerk of court of the RTC, Kabacan,
respondent was charged with the custody and safekeeping of Pentecostes'
motorcycle, and to keep it until the termination of the case, barring circumstances
that would justify its safekeeping elsewhere, and upon the prior authority of the
trial court.

No explanation was offered by respondent, however, for turning over the


motorcycle. But whatever the reason was, respondent was mandated to secure
prior consultations with and approval of the trial court.

Moreover disconcerting is the fact that the acknowledgment receipt evidencing the
turnover of the motorcycle from the trial court to the Kabacan police station was
lost from the records of Criminal Case No. 1010,[13] with nary a lead as to who was
responsible for it. This circumstance is viewed with disfavor as it reflects badly on
the safekeeping of court records, a duty entrusted to respondent as clerk of court.

With regard to the condition of the vehicle upon its delivery to respondent, the
evidence indicates that it was still serviceable when it was delivered by the M'lang
police to respondent and at the time it was turned over by respondent to the
Kabacan police station. The Joint Affidavit[14] of SPO2 Guadalupe and Police
Inspector Romeo Banaybanay categorically stated that the motorcycle was in "good
running condition" when they delivered it to respondent. Later during his testimony,
Guadalupe narrated that he was the "the driver of the service jeep while Chief
Banaybanay was on board the motorcycle" when the vehicle was turned over to
respondent on August 1, 1995.[15]

Even respondent's following testimony that:


"x x x when x x x [he] received the motorcycle for safekeeping, he immediately
delivered together with Alex Pedroso [sic] because it could be noted that
respondent do[es] not know how to drive a motorcycle, I requested x x x Alex
Pedroso to accompany me and deliver [it] to [the] chief of police of Kabacan"[16]
(Italics supplied)
suggests that the vehicle was in running condition when respondent took and
subsequently transferred its custody to the Kabacan police.

This Court has repeatedly emphasized that clerks of court are essential and ranking
officers of our judicial system who perform delicate functions vital to the prompt
and proper administration of justice.[17] Their duties include the efficient recording,
filing and management of court records and, as previously pointed out, the
safekeeping of exhibits and public property committed to their charge.

Clearly, they play a key role in the complement of the court and cannot be
permitted to slacken on their jobs under one pretext or another.[18] They cannot err
without affecting the integrity of the court or the efficient administration of
justice.[19]

The same responsibility bears upon all court personnel in view of their exalted
positions as keepers of public faith.[20] The exacting standards of ethics and
morality imposed upon court employees are reflective of the premium placed on the
image of the court of justice, and that image is necessarily mirrored in the conduct,
official or otherwise, of court personnel.[21] It becomes the imperative and sacred
duty of everyone charged with the dispensation of justice, from the judge to the
lowliest clerk, to maintain the courts' good name and standing as true temples of
justice.[22]

By transferring Pentecostes' motorcycle without authority, respondent failed to give


premium to his avowed duty of keeping it under his care and possession. He must,
therefore, suffer the consequences of his act or omission, which is akin to
misconduct.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite rule of action; more


particularly, it is an unlawful behavior by the public officer.[23] The misconduct is
grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to
violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be proved by
substantial evidence. Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple, as in this case.

The Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service


(Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1999) classifies simple misconduct as a
less grave offense, punishable by suspension of One Month and One Day to Six
Months. Considering that this is respondent's first offense and no taint of bad faith
has been shown by his actuations, a 15-day suspension without pay is deemed
appropriate.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Clerk of Court Hermenegildo Marasigan, is found guilty


of Simple Misconduct. He is SUSPENDED for 15 days without pay, with a stern
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5095 November 28, 2007

FATHER RANHILIO C. AQUINO, LINA M. GARAN, ESTRELLA C. LOZADA, POLICARPIO L.


MABBORANG, DEXTER R. MUNAR, MONICO U. TENEDRO, ANDY R. QUEBRAL, NESTOR
T. RIVERA, EDUARDO C. RICAMORA, ARTHUR G. IBAÑEZ, AURELIO C. CALDEZ and
DENU A. AGATEP, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. EDWIN PASCUA, respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the letter-complaint dated August 3, 1999 of Father Ranhilio C. Aquino,
then Academic Head of the Philippine Judicial Academy, joined by Lina M. Garan and the other
above-named complainants, against Atty. Edwin Pascua, a Notary Public in Cagayan.

In his letter-complaint, Father Aquino alleged that Atty. Pascua falsified two documents
committed as follows:

(1) He made it appear that he had notarized the "Affidavit-Complaint" of one Joseph B.
Acorda entering the same as "Doc. No. 1213, Page No. 243, Book III, Series of 1998,
dated December 10, 1998".

(2) He also made it appear that he had notarized the "Affidavit-Complaint" of one
Remigio B. Domingo entering the same as "Doc. No. 1214, Page 243, Book III, Series of
1998, dated December 10, 1998.

Father Aquino further alleged that on June 23 and July 26, 1999, Atty. Angel Beltran, Clerk of
Court, Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao, certified that none of the above entries appear in the
Notarial Register of Atty. Pascua; that the last entry therein was Document No. 1200 executed
on December 28, 1998; and that, therefore, he could not have notarized Documents Nos. 1213
and 1214 on December 10, 1998.

In his comment on the letter-complaint dated September 4, 1999, Atty. Pascua admitted having
notarized the two documents on December 10, 1998, but they were not entered in his Notarial
Register due to the oversight of his legal secretary, Lyn Elsie C. Patli, whose affidavit was
attached to his comment.

The affidavit-complaints referred to in the notarized documents were filed by Atty. Pascua with
the Civil Service Commission. Impleaded as respondents therein were Lina M. Garan and the
other above-named complainants. They filed with this Court a "Motion to Join the Complaint and
Reply to Respondent's Comment." They maintain that Atty. Pascua's omission was not due to
inadvertence but a clear case of falsification.1 On November 16, 1999, we granted their motion.2

Thereafter, we referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation, report and
recommendation.

On April 21, 2003, the Office of the Bar Confidant issued its Report and Recommendation partly
reproduced as follows:

A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this
reason, notaries public must observe the utmost care to comply with the formalities and
the basic requirement in the performance of their duties (Realino v. Villamor, 87 SCRA
318).

Under the notarial law, "the notary public shall enter in such register, in chronological
order, the nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him,
the person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument, xxx xxx. The notary
shall give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number
corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument the page
or pages of his register on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left
between entries" (Sec. 246, Article V, Title IV, Chapter II of the Revised Administrative
Code).
Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching
his notarial acts in the manner required by law is a ground for revocation of his
commission (Sec. 249, Article VI).

In the instant case, there is no question that the subject documents allegedly notarized
by Atty. Pascua were not recorded in his notarial register.

Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not intentional but due to oversight of his
staff. Whichever is the case, Atty. Pascua cannot escape liability. His failure to enter into
his notarial register the documents that he admittedly notarized is a dereliction of duty on
his part as a notary public and he is bound by the acts of his staff.

The claim of Atty. Pascua that it was simple inadvertence is far from true.

The photocopy of his notarial register shows that the last entry which he notarized on
December 28, 1998 is Document No. 1200 on Page 240. On the other hand, the two
affidavit-complaints allegedly notarized on December 10, 1998 are Document Nos. 1213
and 1214, respectively, under Page No. 243, Book III. Thus, Fr. Ranhilio and the other
complainants are, therefore, correct in maintaining that Atty. Pascua falsely assigned
fictitious numbers to the questioned affidavit-complaints, a clear dishonesty on his part
not only as a Notary Public, but also as a member of the Bar.

This is not to mention that the only supporting evidence of the claim of inadvertence by
Atty. Pascua is the affidavit of his own secretary which is hardly credible since the latter
cannot be considered a disinterested witness or party.

Noteworthy also is the fact that the questioned affidavit of Acorda (Doc. No. 1213) was
submitted only when Domingo's affidavit (Doc. No. 1214) was withdrawn in the
administrative case filed by Atty. Pascua against Lina Garan, et al. with the CSC. This
circumstance lends credence to the submission of herein complainants that Atty. Pascua
ante-dated another affidavit-complaint making it appear as notarized on December 10,
1998 and entered as Document No. 1213. It may not be sheer coincidence then that
both documents are dated December 10, 1998 and numbered as 1213 and 1214.

A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in
any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and
integrity of the legal profession (Maligsa v. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 409).

As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, Atty. Pascua is mandated to subscribe


to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy
and impressed with public interest.

A member of the Bar may be disciplined or disbarred for any misconduct in his
professional or private capacity. The Court has invariably imposed a penalty for
notaries public who were found guilty of dishonesty or misconduct in the performance
of their duties.

In Villarin v. Sabate, Jr. (325 SCRA 123), respondent lawyer was suspended from his
Commission as Notary Public for a period of one year for notarizing a document without
affiants appearing before him, and for notarizing the same instrument of which he was
one of the signatories. The Court held that respondent lawyer failed to exercise due
diligence in upholding his duties as a notary public.

In Arrieta v. Llosa (282 SCRA 248), respondent lawyer who certified under oath a Deed
of Absolute Sale knowing that some of the vendors were dead was suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that another infraction would
be dealt with more severely. In said case, the Court did not impose the supreme penalty
of disbarment, it being the respondent's first offense.

In Maligsa v. Cabanting (272 SCRA 409), respondent lawyer was disbarred from the
practice of law, after being found guilty of notarizing a fictitious or spurious document.
The Court considered the seriousness of the offense and his previous misconduct for
which he was suspended for six months from the practice of law.

It appearing that this is the first offense of Atty. Pascua, a suspension from the practice
of law for a period of six (6) months may be considered enough penalty for him as a
lawyer. Considering that his offense is also a ground for revocation of notarial
commission, the same should also be imposed upon him.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully recommended that the notarial


commission of Atty. EDWIN V. PASCUA, if still existing, be REVOKED and that he be
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months."3

After a close review of the records of this case, we resolve to adopt the findings of facts and
conclusion of law by the Office of the Bar Confidant. We find Atty. Pascua guilty of misconduct
in the performance of his duties for failing to register in his Notarial Register the affidavit-
complaints of Joseph B. Acorda and Remigio B. Domingo.

"Misconduct" generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a


premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.4 The term, however, does not necessarily imply
corruption or criminal intent.5

The penalty to be imposed for such act of misconduct committed by a lawyer is addressed to
the sound discretion of the Court. In Arrieta v. Llosa,6 wherein Atty. Joel A. Llosa notarized a
Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some of the vendors were already dead, this Court held
that such wrongful act "constitutes misconduct" and thus imposed upon him the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for six months, this being his first administrative offense.
Also, in Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,7 we revoked the notarial commission of Atty. Mario G.
Ramos and suspended him from the practice of law for six months for violating the Notarial Law
in not registering in his notarial book the Deed of Absolute Sale he notarized. In Mondejar v.
Rubia,8 however, a lesser penalty of one month suspension from the practice of law was
imposed on Atty. Vivian G. Rubia for making a false declaration in the document she notarized.

In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascua's first offense, we believe that the
imposition of a three-month suspension from the practice of law upon him is in order. Likewise,
since his offense is a ground for revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be
imposed upon him.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is declared GUILTY of misconduct and is SUSPENDED


from the practice of law for three (3) months with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. His notarial commission, if still existing,
is ordered REVOKED.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago*, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-


Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur.
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, on official leave.

You might also like