3.

1 Vectors, discourse entities and reference frames1

Vectors, in their basic form, are a formal device for the analysis of physical
space, motion and forces. This is why they are of interest if one entertains the
possibility that much of language-related conceptualisation is built upon
spatial representation. But one should not expect linguistic conceptualisations
to match space exactly. Even more importantly, we need to think of vectors as
being incorporated in linguistic conceptualisation in a way that is humanly
relevant. Assuming that it is relevant to start from the three conventionally
recognised types of vector – position, translation and force vectors – we need
to speculate as to how each might be related to what has independently been
observed about language-based conceptualisation.

3.1.1 Perspectives on spatial relations: position vectors

Geometrically, position vectors in three-dimensional space anchor one entity
at another, the tail at an anchor point in a coordinate system (at the origin or
some other point) and the tip of the vector is given by coordinates for the
positioned object. In DST we are concerned with linguistic conceptualisations
and one important way in which we depart from a strict adherence to
geometrical formalism is to work with a relative metric only – i.e. no attempt
is made to give a real scaled measure of the length of a vector. In fact, as
already said in Chapter 2, we use an arbitrary unit vector for all vectors
standing for relations between discourse entities.2
Taking a closer look at the way in which DST abstracts away from
three-dimensional spatial models for spatial expressions gives a clearer
picture of the more general conceptual structures it is aiming to identify
and describe. DST does not aim, as has been said, to model three-
dimensional space, indeed it cannot do so. For spatial expressions it
models just two rather abstract cognitive directional relations. One of these
relations concerns what is cognitively foregrounded – and what is back-
grounded. The other concerns positioning – the conceptual process
whereby some entity is cognised as located at some position relative to
some reference point. These are purely conceptual relations, for, given two
objects neither one nor the other has an inherent objective priority as a
reference anchor for positioning the other; such prioritising comes from
human conceptualisation.

1
The following section derives from but supersedes Chilton (2005).
2
If there is a measurement expression, e.g. John is ten metres in front of the tree, this expression
is absorbed into the spatial relation expression as part of the vector ‘label’, thus: ten metres in
front of.
 3.1 Vectors, discourse entities and reference frames 53

tree
in front of

John

Figure 3.1a Example (1) John is in front of the tree

Consider first how the two sentences below appear in the abstract deictic
space:
(1) John is in front of the tree

(2) The tree is in front of John.

For both these sentences a purely spatial three-dimensional reference frame –
an ‘absolute’ reference frame, in Levinson’s terminology – would be identi-
cal. Whether we say (1) or (2) the physical situation – the grid reference on a
map – we are communicating about is the same. In conceptual terms, how-
ever, as we saw in Chapter 2, the two sentences involve alternate conceptual
reference frames, all concerned with the three physical dimensions. DSMs are
concerned with something slightly different. Between sentences (1) and (2)
above there is also a difference of attentional focus, communicated by the
different word order. In (1) John is conceptually ‘closer’ than the tree for S –
he is in the attentional foreground. In (2) he is in the conceptual background.
The word-order alternation enables a speaker to communicate the same
physical situation from different conceptual viewpoints. These viewpoints
may, in the natural flow of speech, be equivalent to what is referred to by
‘discourse topic’ – the current focus of communicative intention, what is in
the forefront, so to speak, of ongoing talk. Figures 3.1a and 3.1b show how
this kind of language-based conceptualisation can be modelled using the
geometrical ideas introduced so far. The d-axis gives us relative attentional
distance relative to S – which we can also think of cognitively related to
visual focus and depth, foreground–background, or figure–ground.
54 Distance, direction and verbs

John

in front of

tree

Figure 3.1b Example (2) The tree is in front of John

Another way of making the point is to note that in objective reality, and
truth conditionally, all physical objects referred to (here John and the church)
have the same absolute spatial positions, but in the conceived situation, which
is what the DSM represents, the relationships are represented differently. This
is what deictically anchored coordinate systems and position vectors enable
us to model explicitly. The DSM does not of course contain all the infor-
mation needed for a full spatial conceptualisation, since it does not represent
the three spatial dimensions. But as already noted, the conceptualisation that
arises in the course of processing discourse involves many parallel systems,
one of which is the three-dimensional spatial system of representation. What
the DSM does is model the fundamental deictic scaffolding.
Consider another spatial preposition, opposite. Once again, this preposition
requires its own spatial model, but such a model, while it will tell us about the
schematic semantics of this word in English, will not tell us about distancing
and directional effects that emerge in discourse. It is just the latter that DST
tells us about. Specifically, the d-axis is used for the mental distance and
direction that arises in discourse rather than in objective physical space. The
sentences (3) and (4) are denotationally equivalent, but have different con-
ceptual significance.
(3) The pub is opposite the post office

(4) The post office is opposite the pub.

Loosely, we can say that in (3) the pub is foregrounded (the sentence is
‘about’ the pub), while in (4) the post office is foregrounded (the sentence
 3.1 Vectors, discourse entities and reference frames 55

is ‘about’ the post office). Because the d-axis is a scale giving us relative
closeness to S, and because vectors give us directionality, we can represent
discourse foregrounding phenomena by positioning one referent closer to 0 on
the d-axis than another referent. In visual experience the ground is what
appears relatively more distant (backgrounded) in space. In the abstract
DSM these phenomena are of course quasi-spatial (or metaphorically spatial)
and constitute what might be called ‘conceived’ distance. The DSM diagrams
handle this very simply by changing the relative positions of the referents: in
(3), for example, the pub is ‘closer’ (more foregrounded) than the post office
and the reference object is the post office more ‘distant’ (more backgrounded).
The tail of the position vector is at the post office and its head at the pub. The
case is reversed for (4).
This section has outlined how the DSM uses the d-axis to model both
conceptualisations of (reduced) physical space and also indicates how the
model gives rise to the notion of attentional distance. The most obvious use of
such a notion is to integrate foreground–background construals into the
geometric modelling of discourse. It is assumed also that, for English at least,
the linear ordering of NPs in clauses will be reflected in the ordering of
referents on the d-axis, barring grammatical constructions for marked topica-
lisation. In the DSMs, the subject NP of a declarative clause will be treated as
‘closer’ to S than an object NP, for example. We have seen that vectors can be
used to represent the relation of objects to landmarks in three-dimensional
space. In DST they are also treated as representing the direction of activity
from a source to a goal. In terms of thematic roles, this means that the tail of
the vector might, for example, be located at the coordinates of an agent, the
head at the coordinates of a patient. Of course, since the vector is directional,
the orientation can be varied in combination with the relatively proximal or
relative distal location of the referents with respect to S. This in turn means
that it is possible to model the conceptualisations associated with passive–
active constructions, raising constructions and similar constructions in a
unified and natural way. We look at these constructions in these terms in
later sections and chapters.
Some linguists find problematic transitive verbs that express spatial rela-
tions. Langacker (1991: 311) examines sentences such as:
(5) a fence surrounds his property

(6) the parcel contained an explosive device.

Langacker notes that they are ‘static’ and have no ‘active’ element in their
semantics. This may be the case if one reinterprets such sentences in the light
of our metaknowledge of spatial experience. But the semantics of surround
and contain is open to alternate DSMs, i.e. alternate ways of using and
56 Distance, direction and verbs

interpreting vectors in the coordinate system, a fact that may reflect the
somewhat variable meanings associated with these and similar verbs. We
can consider using position vectors: for (5) tail at property and head at fence,
i.e. the position of the fence with respect to property. Similarly, for (6) the tail
of the vector is at explosive device and the head at parcel. But neither of these
solutions seems intuitively satisfactory or complete. The other modelling
possibility is to take literally the grammatical transitivity relation (despite
Langacker’s apparent unease about there being any implied ‘active’ element).
Why not follow through the principles of cognitive semantics and accept that
surround and contain are transitive because experience of these spatial
relationships is indeed associated with force in some sense? In this case
surround and contain can be modelled as force vectors. There is justification
for this in the semantics of the spatial preposition in, to which the verbs
surround and contain are conceptually related. Surrounding and containing
may indeed involve force in various types of sentence and context that easily
spring to mind. It has been argued by several linguists that in cannot be
modelled simply by a geometrical schema, by which they mean a purely
spatial configuration (cf. Herskovits 1986, Vandeloise 1991[1986], Tyler and
Evans 2003, Evans and Tyler 2004b). In fact Zwarts (2010: 194–9) surmounts
this problem by using force vectors.
Further, some such spatial verbs denote relations that are geometrically
symmetrical, although linguistic reversal of word order gives them the feel of
being not symmetrical conceptually, as in (3) and (4). These kinds of sym-
metrical relation verbs appear to have a simpler conceptual representation,
since they can be adequately modelled by means of position vectors and
relative positioning of the entities labelled on the d-axis.
Examples (1) to (6) show how position vectors can be used in the obvious
way – to model physical spatial location, abstracting away from the three
physical dimensions and using the d-axis in the base frame of reference to
model relative ‘distance’ of attentional focus. But in conceptual space, the
positioning of two entities in a reference frame need not be confined to
physical entities.

3.1.2 Position vectors, abstract locations and property predications

Position vectors can also be used to model certain kinds of non-spatial predi-
cates, including state-of-mind predicates. As work in conceptual metaphor
theory has shown, spatial concepts, in particular the container image schema,
is a source domain for changeable emotional and other mental states (Lakoff and
Johnson 1980, Kövecses 2000). In (7) the spatial positioning is metaphorical:
(7) The linguist is in a good humour.
 3.1 Vectors, discourse entities and reference frames 57

good humour

in

linguist

Figure 3.2 Example (7) The linguist is in a good humour

The discourse entity closer to S on the d-axis (i.e. linguist) is located at the
more distal entity good humour. The position vector, labelled in, has its tip at
the linguist and its tail at good humour – the vector locates the linguist in a
particular state conceived as a container. The DSM configuration, shown in
Figure 3.2, is the same as in Figures 3.1a and 3.1b, and rather than denoting a
physical location denotes a temporary mental state – a temporary property of
the discourse entity linguist.
Possession predicates also lend themselves to treatment as position
vectors. In some languages possession is expressed by spatial meanings:
French has le livre est à Philippe (literally ‘the book is at Philippe’), and
Russian u menya kniga (literally ‘the book is at me’). An English sentence
such as (8):
(8) John has/owns/possesses the book
can be represented by a DSM configured in such a way that the vector for
have, own, possess, etc. locates book at John – i.e. the vector points from
proximal John to distal book. That is, John is at the forefront of attention, the
book is the secondary focus of attention, and the positioning relation is given
by the direction of the vector (Figure 3.3).
Thus Figure 3.3 is the geometrical model for ‘the book is at John’, the
spatial origin of the quasi-spatial sentence. The verb have has the same
conceptual function as a spatial preposition, say at: it locates on entity at
another more focal entity. A position vector gives the position of point
relative to a reference point. Such a point is often the origin of a coordinate
system. Note, however that position vectors in DST generally relate one point
58 Distance, direction and verbs

book
has

John

Figure 3.3 Possession as position

to another point that is not the origin of the base reference frame. Potentially
all reference entities are origins of embedded reference frames, especially in
the modelling of constructions that represent other minds: individuals other
than oneself have their own reference frames, i.e. coordinate systems.
Taking account of the fact that languages use quasi-spatial locations to
communicate the conceptualisation of possession relations leads us to a
motivated way of modelling property predications in DST in terms of spatial
locations (cf. Anderson 1971, Lyons 1977: 718–24, Frawley 1992: 229–32).
There are a number of considerations and linguistic facts that further justify
modelling of property predications as quasi-spatial position vectors. Sen-
tences such as (5) can be regarded as predicating a property – the temporary
property of being good-humoured – and the means of expression is clearly
spatial.3 The sentences (9) and (10) illustrate two ways English has for
predicating a property of an entity:
(9) Bill has wisdom

(10) Bill is wise.

The proposal is to model properties, whether expressed by a nominal as in (9)

or as an adjective as in (10), in the configuration shown in Figure 3.4. The

3
There is a difference between being in a good humour and being good humoured in that the
latter can be construed as a permanent property. DST does not discriminate such semantic
differences between properties, nor does it discriminate classes of property concept as, for
example, Dixon (1982) does. This does not affect the central claim being made here: that vector
modelling of property predication in general is justifiable because property predication involves
spatial conceptualisation.
 3.1 Vectors, discourse entities and reference frames 59

wisdom/wise

Bill

Figure 3.4 Property and entity relation as position vector

vector is unlabelled; it simply positions the separately conceived property at

the entity Bill. (All entities potentially have their own axis systems, in which
the entity itself is the origin.)
Abstracting from the grammatical difference between noun and adjective
and between have and is, there is a common conceptual core that puts the
property wise/wisdom and entity (Bill) together. This is not to say that there is
no conceptual difference between these two constructions but there are
grounds for treating them as having a common cognitive basis. Francez and
Koontz-Garboden (2012) point to the occurrence of possessive strategies for
property predication across a range of languages including Hausa (a Chadic
language), Huitoto (Huitotoan, spoken in Columbia), Bisa (Mande) and Ulwa
(Misumalpan, Nicaragua), as well as Germanic and romance languages.
Possessive strategies may apply to only a small lexical subset. Spanish makes
use of the possessive relation in Juan tiene sueño analogous to Juan tiene un
carro. In French, the English John is afraid has to be expressed as Jean a
peur. The point is that possessive constructions surface across a range uncon-
nected languages; it is a natural means of expressing inherence of a property
in an entity.
Francez and Koontz-Garboden (2012) argue that grammatical possessive
strategies are semantically linked to property predication. Their argument is
that properties such as strength/strong are ‘abstract mass substances’ just as
water. In formal semantics, strength would then denote the set of all portions
of strength, just as water denotes the set of all portions of water. But to
predicate a portion of strength to an entity does not yield the required meaning
but something like ‘entity e is (a portion of ) strength’. They note that it is