Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Sec 4 - Withdrawal
The court may allow the party, making an admission under the Rule, whether
express or implied, to withdraw or amend it upon such terms as may be just
Irene obtained a loan from DBP for the purposes of financing her piggery
business, as a security, she executed a real estate mortgage over 3 parcels of land. For
failure to comply with her obligations with DBP, DBP executed an extrajudicial
foreclosure for the properties in which DBP was the only winner. Irene was able to
redeem one of the properties and offered to buy the other but DBP refused and
countered with a higher price.
Irene then assigned her right to redeem her property to her daughter, Rosalinda
Go. Go offered to redeem the property for P526 882 but DBP stated that the purchase
price is P1,814,700. She was not able to redeem the property and thus DBP
consolidated the titles under its name
Go filed with the RTC of Makati a complaint for the nullification of the
consolidation of the titles. After DBP filed its answer, but before trial, Go requested for
admission by the adverse party; to which, DBP filed its comment. Go then objected to
the comment stating that such is not under oath as required by Sec 2 Rule 26; and that
it failed to state the reasons for the admission or denial of matter for which and
admission was requested.
DBP manifested that the statements, allegations, and documents contained in
the request for admission are substantially the same as those in the supplemental
complaint. They had already been either specifically denied or admitted by the DBP in
its answer or The reasons for the denial or admission had already been specifically
stated therein
RTC issued an order granting the motion of Go to consider as impliedly admitted
the matters sought to be admitted in the Request for Admission and all those denied by
the DBP in its comment. DBP filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied thus
DBP filed with the CA a petition for certiorari
The matters stated in Go’s Request for Admission are the same as those alleged
in her complaint, to require DBP to admit these matters under Rule 26 of ROC would be
pointless and superfluous. The ruling in Concrete Aggregates Co v Ca states that if the
factual allegations in the complaint are the very same allegations set forth in the request
for admission and have already been specifically denied or otherwise dealt with in the
answer, a response to the request is no longer required
Moreover, some of the matters sought to be admitted in the request for
admission were matters of law or opinions. Under Sec 1 Rule 26, the scope of matters
that a party may request the adversary to admit are (1) the genuineness of any material
and relevant document described in the exhibit with the request, and (2) The truth of
any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request.
The rule authorizing a party to call on the other party to make an admission
implies the making of demands for admission of relevant matters of fact and not for
admission of matters of law, conclusions, or opinions
Petitioner Adolfo filed with the RTC of Mandaue a Petition for Judicial separation
of property against his estranged wife, respondent Fe Adolfo. Respondent claimed that
one of the properties subject to the separation proceedings is her sole ownership since
the same is her paraphernal property which she alone acquired. She claims that the
subject lot is transferred to her by her mother and the same was sold to spouses
Garcia. She then redeemed the property from Garcias
The Gingoyons filed a case for partition with damages against respondent Go.
The complaint alleges that the property was sold to them by Go but the same was not
delivered even after the purchase price was paid. For her defense, Go claimed that
when the sale was made, her husband did not sign the deed of sale thus making the
sale null and void since the subject property is part of the conjugal property. Trial court
rendered a decision, declaring that the subject property is part of the conjugal property
of the marriage
During the pre-trial conference for the case of petitioner, petitioner submitted as
part of his evidence the decision, complaint, and answer in the case filed by the
Gingoyons. Petitioner then filed a request for admission for the submitted evidence.
Respondent failed to file her answer and petitioner filed a motion for judgment based on
the pleadings stating that the respondent failed to answer the request for admission
thus the matters contained in the request are deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 26;
and that on account of said admission, a hearing on the merits becomes unnecessary
and instead Rule 34 of ROC on judgments on the pleadings should apply
Respondent filed an opposition arguing that the request for admission was
premature considering that the decision in Gingoyons’ case was the subject of an
appeal, and this is not yet final. However, RTC granted the motion for judgment on the
pleadings which prompted respondent to institute an appeal with the CA
CA reversed the decision and remanded the case back to the RTC. although
respondent was bound by the resulting admission prompted by her failure to reply to
petitioner’s request for admission, her claims and documentary exhibits clearly
contradict what petitioner sought to be admitted in his request and that the trial court
disregarded the fact that the issues of whether the subject property is conjugal was still
unresolved as the case was still pending
Whether or not the request for admission of the decision in the Gingoyon’s case
was made premature
The trial court disregarded the fact that the issues of whether the subject property
is conjugal was still unresolved as the case was still pending. It should have known that
until the appeal is resolved by the appellate court, it would be premature to render
judgment on petitioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.
On the part of petitioner, by invoking the proceedings and decision in the
Gingoyon Case, he is precluded from obtaining judgement while the appeal in said case
is pending, because the result thereof determines whether the subject property is
indeed conjugal or not.
While it is true that a judgement cannot bind persons who are not parties to an
action, petitioner is now bound by the judgement in the appeal for Gingoyon Case. If the
judgement is deemed that the property is conjugal property, he is barred by estoppel
since such decision is already admitted
Spouses Hemedez filed an action for damages against persons for the death of
Dr. Vied Hemedez which happened in a dispersal operation during a strike staged by
the Union of Filipino Employees on account of alleged unfair labor practices committed
by Nestle Philippines
Spouses Hemedez filed in the RTC of laguna against nestle and several persons
for the death of Dr. Hemedez. In their answer to the complaint, Nestle and Santos
denied liability for the death.They interposed as special and affirmative defenses that
Nestle and Belltown Transport Services has contracted an agreement in which a
stipulation where Belltown would assume liability for any injuries or damages to
properties is stated.
Hemedez spouses served the defendants a request for admission of the truth of
the facts set forth in their complaint and the genuineness of each of the documents
appended thereto. The adverse parties, through their respective counsels, filed their
verified answer.
Hemedez sought to strike out said answers, contending that under Sec 2 of Rule
26 of ROC the parties themselves and not their counsel should personally answer the
request for admission and hence the answer filed by their counsel in their behalf was
“by nature based on hearsay.” RTC denied the motion of Hemedez claiming that the
grounds relief on were “more formal than substantial”
Whether or not the sworn answer in response to the request for admission
should be personally answered by the parties themselves and not through
counsel
As stated in PSCFC Financial Corporation v CA, when Rule 26 states that a party shall
respond to the request for admission, it should not be restrictively construed to mean
that a party may not engage the services of counsel to make the response in his behalf
Sec 21 of Rule 138 states that an attorney is presumed to be properly authorized
to represent any cause in which he appears, no written power of attorney is required to
authorize him to appear in court for his client
Cherry Valley is a foreign company based in england filed a complaint with the
RTC of Makati for the collection of a sum of money. Allied filed an answer denying the
material allegations of the complaint
Cherry Valley then served upon Allied a request for admission, Allied failed to
submit a sworn answer to the request for admission and Cherry Valley filed a motion for
summary judgment alleging that there was already an implied admission on the matters
requested for admission pursuant to Rule 26 of ROC. The trial court rendered
judgement against petitioner finding them to be liable to pay damages
Whether or not the failure of Allied to file a sworn answer would yield to an
implied admission of the facts to be used for summary judgement
Brinoneria v CA 101682
Whether or not matters set forth in the request for admission are deemed
admitted
Sec 1 Rule 26 states that the request for admission must be served directly upon
the party; otherwise, the party to whom the request is directed cannot be deemed to
have admitted the genuineness of any relevant document in and exhibited with the
request or relevant matters of fact set forth therein, on account of failure to answer the
request for admission
Sec 1 Rule 26 reads as “a party may serve upon any other party a written
request” should receive no other construction than that the request for admission must
be served directly on the party and not on his counsel.
Sime Darby v NLRC GR 148021
Sime Darby Association (union) and Sime Darby Pilipinas Inc (company) reached
a deadlock in their CBA negotiations. Sometime during the deadlock, the Company
declared and implemented a lockout against all the hourly employees of its tire factory
on the ground of sabotage and work slowdown. Soon after, the Company then sold the
tire manufacturing division and eventually served notices of termination to all the
employees, along with the petitioners
Petitioners filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal before the DOLE, and a
subsequent complaint for Unfair Labor Practice. The cases were then consolidated and
assigned to Labor Arbiter Portillo. Petitioners then filed a request for admission
reiterating the allegations set forth in their consolidated cases. Respondents failed to file
a sworn answer to request of admission. The Labor Arbiter then decided in favor of the
Company stating that the termination suffered by the employees falls within Art 283 thus
is valid.
Whether or not the Request for Admission should have been granted even if the
allegations set forth are materially the same with the allegations stated in the
complaint
1. That on the specific dates set forth in Annexes A, A-1 and A-2 hereof, plaintiff
delivered to and defendant received the various items particularly described in said
annexes duly covered by the invoices respectively set forth therein;
2. That of the total amount of P314,610.50 representing the value of the goods
described in Annexes A, A-1 and A-2, plaintiff has paid only P130,000.00.
Whether or not the material facts in the Request for Admission shall be
deemed admitted due to respondent’s failure to deny the same
Court ruled in the affirmative
Respondent having failed to discharge what is incumbent upon her under Rule
26, that is, to deny under oath the facts bearing on the main issue contained in the
"Request for Admission," she was deemed to have admitted that she received the
construction materials, the cost of which was indicated in the request and was indebted
to petitioner in the amount of P184,610.50 (P314,610.50 less the partial payment of
P130,000.00).
Spouses Odones are the owners of a 940-square meter parcel of land located at
Pao 1st, Camiling, Tarlac by virtue of an Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale
dated, January 29, 2004, executed by the surviving grandchildren and heirs of Donata
Lardizabal in whom the original title to the land was registered. These heirs were
Soledad Razalan Lagasca, Ceferina Razalan Cativo, Rogelio Lagasca Razalan and
Dominador Razalan.They found out that the land's Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
was cancelled on April 27, 2005 and replaced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
329427 in the name of herein petitioners.
Petitioners were able to secure TCT No. 329427 by virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Sale allegedly executed by Donata Lardizabal and her husband Francisco Razalan on
April 18, 1972. Petitioners then subdivided the lot among themselves and had TCT No.
329427 cancelled. In lieu thereof, three new TCTs were issued: TCT No. 392428 in the
names of Socorro Limos and spouses Rolando Delos Reyes and Eugene Delos Reyes,
TCT No. 392429 in the names of Spouses delos Reyes and TCT No. 392430 in the
name of Rosa Delos Reyes.
Respondents sought the cancellation of these new TCTs on the ground that the
signatures of Donata Lardizabal and Francisco Razalan in the 1972 Deed of Absolute
Sale were forgeries, because they died on June 30, 1926 and June 5, 1971,
respectively. In their answer, petitioners pleaded affirmative defenses, which also
constitute grounds for dismissal of the complaint. These grounds were: (1) failure to
state a cause of action; (2) non-joinder of the other heirs of Donata Lardizabal as
indispensable parties; and (3) respondents' claim is barred by laches.
In their Reply, respondents denied the foregoing affirmative defenses, and
insisted that the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale was valid. They maintained
their standing as owners of the subject parcel of land and the nullity of the 1972
Absolute Deed of Sale, upon which respondents anchor their purported title.Thereafter,
petitioners served upon respondents a Request for Admission. Respondents failed to
respond to the Request for Admission, prompting petitioners to file a Motion to Set for
Preliminary Hearing on the Special and Affirmative Defenses
The RTC denied the Motion and held that item nos. 1 to 4 in the Request for
Admission were earlier pleaded as affirmative defenses in petitioners' Answer, to which
respondents already replied on July 17, 2006. Hence, it would be redundant for
respondents to make another denial. The trial court further observed that item nos. 5, 6,
and 7 in the Request for Admission were already effectively denied by the Extrajudicial
Succession of Estate and Sale appended to the complaint and by the Sinumpaang
Salaysay of Amadeo Razalan attached to respondents' Reply. 16 Petitioners moved for
reconsideration 17 but the same was denied in an Order dated January 5, 2007.
Whether or not the Request for Admission should have been granted even
if the matters set forth in petitioners' Request for Admission were the same
affirmative defenses pleaded in their Answer which respondents already
traversed in their Reply
The said defenses were likewise sufficiently controverted in the complaint and its
annexes. In effect, petitioners sought to compel respondents to deny once again the
very matters they had already denied, a redundancy, which if abetted, will serve no
purpose but to delay the proceedings and thus defeat the purpose of the rule on
admission as a mode of discovery which is "to expedite trial and relieve parties of the
costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be
ascertained by reasonable inquiry."
Verily then, if the trial court finds that the matters in a Request for Admission
were already admitted or denied in previous pleadings by the requested party, the latter
cannot be compelled to admit or deny them anew. In turn, the requesting party cannot
reasonably expect a response to the request and thereafter, assume or even demand
the application of the implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26.