DACULA, MARK DAVID B.

1A
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGESTS (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, ET. AL. V. HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, ET.
AL.
(G.R. NO. 114783) DECEMBER 8, 1994

Facts:
Petitioners, being the taxpayers and residents of Manadaluyong, challenge the
constitutionality of Republic Act 7675 saying that it is contrary to Sections 5(1), 5(4),
26(2) of Article VI of the Constitution. R.A. 7675 was enacted to separate Mandaluyong
and San Juan into two separate districts and will turn the Municipality of Mandaluyong
into a highly urbanized city.
Issue:
Whether or not R.A. 7675 is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
No. It is not unconstitutional. The R.A. increases the composition of the House of
Representatives which the Constitution provides that the HoR may be increased
through the Congress mandating it through legislative enactment, thus is not contrary to
Art. VI, Sec. 5(1).
On the Repuplic Act being contrary to Art. VI, Sec. 5(4), it is not for as to the
contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to
reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since
petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated
upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot
possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
If the Republic Act is contrary to Art. VI, Sec. 26(1), then it is not contrary for
the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject
separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is
a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily,
the title of R.A. No. 7675, “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a
Highly Urbanized City of Manda-luyong” necessarily includes and contemplates the
subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional
district for Mandaluyong.
Lastly, R.A. 7675 is not contrary to Art. VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution for there
is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San
Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their
separation into two legislative districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the
validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through
the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of
Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative
districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must
contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws.
DACULA, MARK DAVID B.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGESTS (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ET. AL V. COMELEC, ET. AL.
(G.R. No. 136781) OCTOBER 6, 2000

Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which
obtained at least 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system as
members of the House of Representatives. Upon petition for respondents, who were
party-list organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list representatives although
they obtained less than 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system on
the ground that under the Constitution, it is mandatory that at least 20% of the members
of the House of Representatives come from the party-list representatives.
Issue:
Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party­list lawmakers is mandator
y.
Ruling:
NO. It is merely a ceiling for the party-list seats in Congress. The same declared
therein a policy to promote “proportional representation” in the election of party-list
representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them.
It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions
participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the
party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than
this percentage could have “additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes.”
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than
three seats in the House of Representatives (sec 11(b) RA 7941).
DACULA, MARK DAVID B.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGESTS (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
ANG BAGONG BAYANI VS. COMELEC
(G.R. NO. 147613) JUNE 26, 2001
Facts:

Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 which

approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein
impleaded, in the 2001 partylist elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of
private respondents, arguing mainly that the partylist system was intended to benefit the
marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the
nonmarginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted
on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

1. Whether or not petitioner’s recourse to the Court was proper.

2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.

3. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in

promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

Ruling:

1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of

other remedies "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is
involved, and in case of urgency." The facts attendant to the case rendered it justiciable.

2. Political parties – even the major ones may participate in the partylist elections
subject to the requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the
statutory law pertinent to the Party List System. Under the Constitution and RA 7941,
private respondents cannot be disqualified from the partylist elections, merely on the
ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides
that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a partylist
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations”. It is
however, incumbent upon the Comelec to determine proportional representation of the
“marginalized and underrepresented”, the criteria for participation, in relation to the
cause of the party list applicants so as to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the
party list system.

3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of

respondents in the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was
necessary which was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier of facts.
The Court ordered that the petition be remanded in the COMELEC to determine
compliance by the party lists.
DACULA, MARK DAVID B.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGESTS (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
BANAT V COMELEC
(GR 179271) APRIL 21, 2009
Facts:

In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which
was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the
following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the
remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987
Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which
garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to
one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%,
then it is entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban
Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than
6% of the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a
party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used.
BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its
provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of
the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the
2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed
by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is
mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be
impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also
proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of this
digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of
the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major
political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said
elections limited to sectoral parties.
Issues:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a
mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list
elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.

Ruling:
1. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for
legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative.
DACULA, MARK DAVID B.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGESTS (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250
members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from
legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the
Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the
lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may deem
appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district
representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be
55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.

2. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning,

the number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number
of the members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20%
shall be filled.

3. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to

allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast a requalified for a
seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2%
threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20
apportionment. The Supreme Court explained: It is therefore clear that the two
percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives.”

4. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast,
then it is guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists
garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.

5. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political
parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list
elections.
DACULA, MARK DAVID B.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGESTS (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and
its Commissioners
(G.R. No. 189793) April 7, 2010

Facts:
Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of
Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the
province. The said law originated from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009.
To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured
in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district
municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were
combined with the second district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new
second legislative district.
Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716
violates the constitutional standards that requires a minimum population of two hundred
fifty thousand ( 250, 000) for the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the proposed first
district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

Issue:
1. Whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional
requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.

Ruling:
No, The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states
that: “Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.”
There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district
on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For a
province is entitled to at least a representative, there is nothing mentioned about the
population. Meanwhile, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order
to be similarly entitled it does not constitute to become a province.
DACULA, MARK DAVID B.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGESTS (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
BAI SANDRA SEMA VS COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(558 SCRA 700 ) June 23, 2011
Facts:
The Maguindanao Province is part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao or ARMM. The City of Cotabato is part of the Maguindanao Province but is
not part of ARMM because the City of Cotabato voted against its inclusion to the ARMM
in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1st legislative
district comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.
R.A. 9054 was passed amending ARMM’s Organic Act which vested ARMM with
power to create provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the
ARMM Regional Assembly created the Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy
Act 201) which comprised of the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with
the exception of Cotabato City.
For the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district was now
only made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201) but it later amended this stating that
status quo should be retained; however, just for the purposes of the elections, the 1st
district should be called “Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City”. This is also while
awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as to Cotabato’s status as a legislative
district or part of any.
Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of
Sharriff Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was contending that
Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and that votes from Cotabato City
should be excluded in the tallying. This complaint might have been rooted from her
political rivalry with Dilangalen, who was from Cotabato City, who did in fact win the
elections. She contended that under the Constitution, upon creation of a province
(Sharriff Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative representation and
since Sharriff Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City, in effect, Cotabato is being deprived
of representation in the HOR. COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still
there and that regardless of Sharriff Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is
not affected and so is its representation.
Issue: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can validly
create LGU’s.
Held:
R.A. 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed
by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
“Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.” Thus, the creation of any
of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must comply
with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the
criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict
with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political
units affected. There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority
in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the
power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers,
Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government
units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision
of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and
municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to
compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the
DACULA, MARK DAVID B.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGESTS (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot
validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province. In order to create a city there must be at
least be a population of 250k, and that a province, once created, should have at least
one representative in the HOR. Furthermore, in order to have a legislative district, there
must at least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City did not meet the
population requirement so Sema’s contention is untenable. On the other hand, ARMM
cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative
district. But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts
is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities
and provinces.
DACULA, MARK DAVID B.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGESTS (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
AKO BICOL POLITICAL PARTY (AKB), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
(G.R. Nos. 203818-19) April 2, 2013

Facts:
Atong Paglaum, Inc. And other 51 parties were disqualified by the COMELEC in
the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified
as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors. They then filed a
petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the COMELEC.
Issue:
WoN the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the
said party list.
Ruling:
The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. As explained by the supreme court, party list representation should
not be understood to include only labor, peasant, and etc whose sectors are by their
nature are economically at the margins of society. It also includes groups of
professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as
marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies
as they are ideologically marginalized.
Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because
they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because
one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining
qualified nominee. As discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their
nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No.
7941.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully,
and desist from engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to
what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-
write the Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the
COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate
in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by
this Court.
WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED
DACULA, MARK DAVID B.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGESTS (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTION
(G.R. NO. 119976) SEPTEMBER 18, 1995

Facts:
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, petitioner, filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, stating that she is
7months resident in the said district.
Incumbent Representative of said district, Cirilo Roy Montejo, and a candidate for
the same position filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification against Marcos.
That petitioner did not meet the constitutional one year residency requirement.
Petitioner, thus, amended her COC, changing “seven” months to “since
childhood” citing that it was due to an honest misinterpretation or honest mistake. The
provincial election supervisor refused to admit the amended COC for the reason that it
was filed out of time. Petitioner, then, moved to file her amended COC with COMELEC's
head office in Manila. The Second Division of COMELEC, however, declared Imelda not
qualified to run and struck off the amended as well as original COCs.
It was found that Imelda was a registered voter of Manila and has expressly
declared herself a resident of said province, she is deemed to have abandoned
Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.
The COMELEC en banc affirmed this ruling.
During the pendency of the disqualification case, Imelda won in the election but
the COMELEC suspended her proclamation. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court
and invoked Section 78 of B.P. 881 which provides that a petition seeking to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy must be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than 15 days before the election. Since the COMELEC rendered the
resolution on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election, COMELEC already
lose jurisdiction over her case. She contended that it is the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of
members of the House of Representatives.
Issues:
I. WON COMELEC lost jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending
disqualification case after the elections
II. WON House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive
jurisdiction over the question of Imelda's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections
Held:
I. NO. The COMELEC did not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending
disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections due to the
enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881.
Section 6 states that any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for
any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Moreover, it is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment
within a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory, "so that
noncompliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the
statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it.
DACULA, MARK DAVID B.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGESTS (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
II. NO. HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a
candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Imelda, not being a
member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has
no jurisdiction over the question.
DACULA, MARK DAVID B.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGESTS (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
AGAPITO A. AQUINO, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MOVE
MAKATI, MATEO BEDON and JUANITO ICARO, respondents.
(G.R. No. 120265) September 18, 1995
Facts:
Aquino, filed a petition for certiorari because the COMELEC acted in favor of the
respondents and suspended the proclamation of Aquino permanently who got the
highest number of votes in the 1995 elections. Petitioner ran for Congress in
representing the 2nd District of Makati City where he stated in his Certificate of
Candidacy that he has resided in the said district for 10 months and has just transferred
to a leased condominium unit through this, the petitioner believes that he has satisfied
the constitutional residence requirement making him eligible to run for office in
representing the district. However the respondents filed a petition to disqualify him on
the grounds that he lacks the mentioned residence requirement as mandated by Art. VI,
Sec 6 of the Constitution. To which the petitioner changed the information on his
Certificate of Candidacy from 10 months to 1 year and 13 days.
Issue:
Whether or not Aquino satisfies the constitutional residence requirement in the
district he was running in.
Ruling:
No. The term “residence” is synonymous to “domicile” under the previous
constitutions and the 1987 Constitution, thus Aquino has not established the 2nd district
of Makati City, where he is running in, as his domicile of choice making him not satisfy
the constitutional residence requirement. To qualify as a candidate he must prove that
he has established not just residence but domicile of choice. What stands consistently
unassailable is that his domicile of origin record up to the time of filing his most recent
certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections which was Concepcion, Tarlac. The
intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a
condominium and not buying a unit instead. The intention to establish domicile must be
an intention to remain indefinitely or permanently in the new place. This element is
lacking in this instance. While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia
of the right to vote or to be voted upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has
other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short length of time he claims to be a
resident of the condominium unit in Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac)
“indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his physical residence”is not
to acquire a new residence or domicile “but only to qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City.”
DACULA, MARK DAVID B.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGESTS (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
ANTONIO Y. CO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
(199 SCRA 293, 1991)

FACTS:
Jose Ong, Jr., a candidate for congressional elections in his local district in
Laoang, Northern Samar is being assailed as to his qualifications that his being a
natural born citizen is questionable along with not having complied with the residency
requirement.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on
the following grounds: Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ong met the qualifications and the residency requirement.
RULING:
YES. As to the matter of citizenship the Court ruled in Ong’s favor citing the
following reasons. Firstly, Ong’s father was already naturalized while he was just 9
years old. Secondly, Ong’s mother was a Filipina plus the fact that a lot of instances
transpired after he reached the age of majority than reinforces the fact that he elected
Filipino citizenship. Lastly, because of the fact that his brother’s citizenship was in fact
already answered favorably by the Constitutional Commission itself.
As to the issue of residence, again the court ruled in Ong’s favor holding that he
never had any intention to abandon his domicile of origin despite having stayed in
Manila to study or pursue his personal career.
DACULA, MARK DAVID B.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGESTS (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
DIMAPORO V. MITRA
(202 SCRA 779)
Facts:
Dimaporo was elected as a representative for the second legislative district of
Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections.
Dimaporo filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of governor of ARMM.
Secretary and Speaker of the House excluded the name of Dimaporo from the Roll of
Members of HR Under Art IX of Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code. Dimaporo lost
the election wrote a letter intending to resume performing his duties and functions as an
elected member of the Congress. Unfortunately, he was not able to regain his seat in
the Congress.
Dimaporo contended that he did not lose his seat as a Congressman because
Art. IX Sec. 67 of BP 881 is not operative in the present constitution, and therefore not
applicable to the members of Congress.
Grounds may be termed to be shortened:
1. Holding any officer or employment in the government or ant subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality thereof.
2. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for a disorderly behavior
3. Disqualification as determined by a resolution of the electoral tribunal in an
election contest
4. Voluntary renunciation of office
Issue: Whether or not Dimaporo can still be considered as a member of Congress even
after he has filed for another government position
Held:
No. In the constitution there is a new chapter on the accountability of public officers. In
the 1935 Constitution, it was provided that public office is a public trust. Public officers
should serve with the highest degree of responsibility and integrity.

If you allow a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who has mandated to serve for 6
years to file for an office other than the one he was elected to, then that clearly shows
that he did not intend to serve the mandate of the people which was placed upon him
and therefore he should be considered ipso facto resigned.
The filling of a certificate shall be considered as an overt act or abandoning or
relinquishing his mandate to the people and he should therefore resign if he want to
seek another position which he feels he could be of better service.
DACULA, MARK DAVID B.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGESTS (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
NICANOR JIMENEZ V. BARTOLOME CABANGBANG
(17 SCRA 876) JANUARY 4, 2019

FACTS:
Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and
Chairman of its Committee on National Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang
caused the publication of an open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged
that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some
ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such
strategists have had collusions with communists and that the Secretary of Defense,
Jesus V argas, was planning a coup d’état to place him as the president.
The “planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise
and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to
meet such an end. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of general
circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages
against Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbang’ s statement is libelous. Cabangbang
petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said that as a member of the lower
house, he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the privileged communication
rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed
to members of Congress.
HELD:
No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony , and
breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of
the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or
debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.” The publication of the
said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered,
statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as
well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other
acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its
offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time
of the performance of the acts in question.
Congress was not in session when the letter was published and at the same time
he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter . It is obvious that, in thus causing
the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty , either as
a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the
finding made by the lower court the said communication is not absolutely privileged.
DACULA, MARK DAVID B.
1A
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGESTS (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS
(G.R. Nos. 132875-76) November 16, 2001

Facts:
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos, a Congressman, charged for the
acts of statutory rape on two counts and six counts on acts of lasciviousness on an
eleven year- old sex worker and was convicted by the Regional Trial Court and
sentenced to imprisonment. As a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined in
the national penitentiary while the charges filed against him was pending appeal, the
accused now the appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge his
duties of a Congressman, including attending of the legislative sessions and committee
hearings despite of his conviction of a non- bailable charge.
Issue:
Whether or not being a Congressman convicted of a crime charged, is exempted
from imprisonment
Ruling:
No. Constitution guarantees: “x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws.”, it simply means that all persons shall be treated alike both in rights
enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The Court cannot validate badges of inequality.
The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority
to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded. Here, election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions of a Congressman and duties
of its office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to
the same class. Hence, the performance of legitimate and even essential duties by
public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.
DACULA, MARK DAVID B.
1A
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGESTS (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
POBRE VS MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO
FACTS:
Through public invitation, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) published the soon
vacant position of Chief of Justice. Senator Miriam Santiago was one of the applicants,
but she was unfortunately informed by the JBC that only incumbent associate justices
would qualify for the position. During her privilege speech on the Congress the senator
said, “I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am
suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing
up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the
face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am
no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I
would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots.”
ANTERO J. POBRE in his sworn letter/complaint invited the attention of the court
and asked that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions may be taken
against senator Santiag.
ISSUE: Should a disbarment proceeding and/or other disciplinary actions be taken
against the senator?
RULING:
NO, the speech was conducted while the Congress was in session, therefore she
is covered with state immunity which is provided in our Constitution Art. VI Sec.11 of the
Constitution. Her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary
proceeding under the Rules of Court. The plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of
the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege
speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of
Court.
The disciplinary actions falls under the Congress provided in The Rules of the
Senate contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a
Senator from using, under any circumstance, offensive or improper language against
another Senator or against any public institution. Senate President had not apparently
called her to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for
appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such circumstance. The
senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. Therefore, the disbarment case
proceeding was dismissed.
DACULA, MARK DAVID B.
1A
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGESTS (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
CESAR BENGZON V. FRANKLIN DRILON
(G.R. No. 103524) April 15, 1992
Facts:
Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who
are currently receiving pensions under RA 910 as amended by RA 1797. President
Marcos issued a decree repealing section 3-A of RA 1797 which authorized the
adjustment of the pension of retired justices and officers and enlisted members of the
AFP. PD 1638 was eventually issued by Marcos which provided for the automatic
readjustment of the pension of officers and enlisted men was restored, while that of the
retired justices was not. RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297 in 1990. When her
advisers gave the wrong information that the questioned provisions in 1992 GAA were
an attempt to overcome her earlier veto in 1990, President Aquino issued the veto now
challenged in this petition.
It turns out that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 never became a valid law
absent its publication, thus there was no law. It follows that RA 1797 was still in effect
and HB 16297 was superfluous because it tried to restore benefits which were never
taken away validly. The veto of HB 16297 did not also produce any effect.
Issue:
WoN the veto of the president on the general proportion of the bill is
constitutional.
Ruling:
No. The justice sof the supreme court have vested rights to the accrued pension
that is due to them in accordance to R.A. 1797 which was never repealed. The
president has no power to set aside and override the decision of the SC neither he has
the the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less
to repeal of existing laws.
The SC explained that the veto is unconstitutional because the power of the
president to disapprove any item in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to
veto part and approve the same portion of an item. The rule is that the executive must
veto a bill in its entirety or not at all.
DACULA, MARK DAVID B.
1A
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGESTS (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
EUGENIO PUYAT VS SIXTO DE GUZMAN, JR.
(113 SCRA 31) January 4, 2012

Facts:
In May 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the
International Pipe Industries. Puyat’s rival, Eustaquio Acero questioned the election
claiming that the votes were not properly counted and filed a quo warranto case before
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Prior to Acero’s filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the
Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a member of
Acero’s group. And during a conference held by SEC Commissioner Sixto de Guzman,
Jr. to have the parties confer with each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his
appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected as he argued that it is unconstitutional
for an assemblyman to appear as counsel (to anyone) before any administrative body.
This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited himself from appearing as counsel for Acero.
He instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the said SEC case for him to
intervene, not as a counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a person who has
a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the motion
and in effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene.
Issue:
WON Fernandez violated the constitutional provision that an assemblyman must
not appear as counsel in such courts or bodies.
Held:
NO. Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is
not appearing as a counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation he is still barred from appearing. He bought the stocks
before the litigation took place. During the conference he presented himself as counsel
but because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so under the constitution he instead
presented himself as a party of interest – which is clearly a workaround and is clearly an
act after the fact. A mere workaround to get himself involved in the litigation. What could
not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly.
Under Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution appearance of the legislator
is now barred before all courts of justice, regardless of rank, composition, or jurisdiction.
The disqualification also applies to the revived Electoral Tribunal and to all
administrative bodies, like the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National
Labor Relations Commission. Courts martial and military tribunals, being administrative
agencies, are included.
DACULA, MARK DAVID B.
1A
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGESTS (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO AND SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD,
petitioners, vs. SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AND SEN. MARCELO B.
FERNAN, respondents.
(G.R. No. 134577) November 18, 1998
Facts:
Petitioners, Sen. Santiago and Sen. Tatad filed this case for quo warranto to oust
Guingona and declare Tatad as rightful minority leader. During the 1st regular session
the Senate held an election of officers to which Sen. Fernan and Sen. Tatad who were
both nominated for Senate President to which the former won by a vote of 20 to 2 he
was declared as the Senate President. Senate failed to arrive at a consensus on the
matter of minority leader for which Sen .Tatad and Sen. Guingona of the PRP and
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP were being considered, respectively. To which Tatad manifested
with Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming
the position of minority leader, that those who voted for Fernan compromised the
“majority” while those who voted for him compromised the “minority”. After 3 session
days Fernan as the senate President declared Gungona as minority leaders when he
received information that all Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators signed in agreement for Sen.
Guingona.
Issue: Whether or not did Guingona unlawfully usurp the position of minority leader in
violation of Art. VI, Sec 16(1) of the Constitution.
Ruling:
No. Petition fails. Majority may also refer to "the group, party, or faction with the
larger number of votes," not necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred
to as plurality. In contrast, minority is "a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of
votes or adherents than the majority." Between two unequal parts or numbers
comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority while
the lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal groupings,
it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all
the minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as
pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of
which has to be indentified by the Comelec as the "dominant minority party" for
purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate,
members either belong to different political parties or are independent. No constitutional
or statutory provision prescribe which of the many minority groups or the independents
or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a
House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers
in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall
choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." To our mind, the method of
choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such
method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
DACULA, MARK DAVID B.
1A
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGESTS (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
OSMEÑA VS. PENDATUN
(G.R. NO. L-17144) OCTOBER 28, 1960

FACTS:
Congressman Sergio Osmena, Jr., in a privilege speech delivered before the
House, made the serious imputations of bribery against the President which are quoted
in Resolution No. 59. Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun and fourteen other
congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House
Resolution No. 59 found said congressman guilty of serious disorderly behavior; and
acting on such report, the House approved on the same day-before closing its session-
House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended and suspending him
from office for fifteen months.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the resolution violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary
immunity for speeches delivered in the House?
RULING:
NO. The resolution does not violate the constitutional parliamentary immunity for
speeches delivered in the House. Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity
which is a fundamental privilege in every legislative assembly of the democratic world.
But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever
his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming of a
member thereof. For unparliamentarily conduct, members of the parliament or of
Congress have bee, or could be censured, committed to prison, suspended, even
expelled by the votes of their colleagues.
DACULA, MARK DAVID B.
1A
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGESTS (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
CEFERINO PAREDES, JR. V. SANDIGANBAYAN
(252 SCRA 641) JANUARY 4, 2012
Facts:
In January 1990, Teofilo Gelacio, the then vice mayor of San Francisco, Agusan
del Sur filed a case against Ceferino Paredes, Jr. (who was then the governor of the
same province), Atty. Generoso Sansaet (counsel of Paredes), and Mansueto Honrada
(a clerk of court). The three allegedly conspired to falsify a copy of a Notice of
Arraignment and of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes. Gelacio claimed that, in fact,
no arraignment notice had ever been issued against him in a criminal proceeding
against him. Gelacio was able to produce a certification from the judge handling the
case himself that the criminal case against him never reached the arraignment stage
because the prosecution was dismissed. Atty. Sansaet on his part maintained that there
was indeed a Notice of Arraignment but he later retracted his testimonies. Paredes
claimed that Sansaet only changed his side because of political realignment.
Subsequently, the Office of the Ombudsman recommended that Paredes et al be
charged with Falsification of Public Documents. Paredes appealed but was eventually
denied by the Sandiganbayan.
Issue:
Whether or not Paredes, now a member of Congress, may be suspended by
order of the Sandiganbayan.
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman
Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the
court on the prerogatives of congress. Petitioner’s invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI
of the Constitution – which deals with the power of each House of Congress inter alia to
‘punish its Members for disorderly behavior,’ and ‘suspend or expel a Member’ by a vote
of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of
suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days – is unavailing, as it appears
to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is
not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the
latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of
Representatives.
DACULA, MARK DAVID B.
1A
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGESTS (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
US V. PONS
34 Phil 729
Facts:
The defendant appellant Juan Pons et.al were charged with the crime of illegal
importation of opium, Pon's counsel alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the
special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February; that
Act No. 2381, under which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not passed or
approved on the 28th of February but on March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the
same is null and void. The validity of the Act is not otherwise questioned. As it is
admitted that the last day of the special session was, under the Governor-General's
proclamation, February 28 and that the appellant is charged with having violated the
provisions of Act No. 2381, the vital question is the date of adjournment of the
Legislature, and this reduces itself to two others, namely, (1) how that is to be proved,
whether by the legislative journals or extraneous evidence and (2) whether the court
can take judicial notice of the journals.
Issue:
Passing over the question whether the printed Act (No. 2381), published by
authority of law, is conclusive evidence as to the date when it was passed, we will
inquire whether the courts may go behind the legislative journals for the purpose of
determining the date of adjournment when such journals are clear and explicit.
Held:
From the foregoing it is clear that this investigation belongs entirely to that branch
of legal science which embraces and illustrates the laws of evidence.
In the case from which this last quotation is taken, the court cited numerous
decisions of the various states in the American Union in support of the rule therein laid
down, and we have been unable to find a single case of a later date where the rule has
been in the least changed or modified when the legislative journals cover the point. As
the Constitution of the Philippine Government is modeled after those of the Federal
Government and the various states, we do not hesitate to follow the courts in that
country in the matter now before us. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at
12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in
declining to go behind these journals.
DACULA, MARK DAVID B.
1A
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGESTS (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC., petitioner, vs.
HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, in his capacity as Auditor General of the Philippines, and
HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in his capacity as Auditor of the Central Bank,
respondents
(G.R. No. L-17931) February 28, 1963
FACTS:
Petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. — which is engaged in the
manufacture of synthetic resin glues, used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood
and hardwood producers — bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and
formaldehyde — which are the main raw materials in the production of said glues —
and paid therefor the aforementioned margin fee aggregating P33,765.42. In May, 1960,
petitioner made another purchase of foreign exchange and paid the sum of P6,345.72
as margin fee therefor.
Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42,
relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November
3, 1959, declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt
from said fee. Soon after the last importation of these products, petitioner made a
similar request for refund of the sum of P6,345.72 paid as margin fee therefor. Although
the Central Bank issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund of said
amounts, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approve said vouchers,
upon the ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's
separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of
section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No. 2609. On appeal taken by petitioner, the
Auditor General subsequently affirmed said action of the Auditor of the Bank. Hence,
this petition is for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Urea and formaldehyde are exempted from the payment of
margin fee as prescribed by law.
RULING:
No, Urea and Formaldehyde are not exempted from the payment of the marginal
fee. The substance, Urea Formaldehyde is a product of the combination of Urea and
Formaldehyde. The provision contained the conjunction “and” between the substances
of “Urea”, and “Formaldehyde”, as exception to the payment of marginal fee. But this is
not reflective of the view of the Senate and the intent of the House of Representatives in
passing the bill. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was
passed the only remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by a judicial
decree.
DACULA, MARK DAVID B.
1A
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGESTS (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
ARROYO V DE VENECIA
(GR. No. 127255) August 14, 1997
FACTS:
The petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this
suit against respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners
claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation
of the Constitution.
In the course of his interpellation, Representative Arroyo announced that he was
going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he
never did.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective
secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of
Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed
into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
ISSUE:
Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the
rules of the House; whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia, that the law was
properly passed is false and spurious; whether the Chair, in the process of submitting
and certifying the law violated House Rules; and whether a certiorari/prohibition will be
granted.
HELD:
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for
holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA No. 8240.
This case is therefore dismissed.
Ratio:
To disregard the “enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the
respect due the other two departments of our government. It would be an unwarranted
invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a
legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own
rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in
the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The
Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or
imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would
itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a
case may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a
new law or the repeal or amendment of RA. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the
contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good
faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than
disrespect is due the judgment of that body.
DACULA, MARK DAVID B.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGESTS (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
CARMELO F. LAZATIN,petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and
LORENZO G. TIMBOL,respondents.
(G.R. No. 84297) December 8, 1988

Facts:
Lazatin filed the instant petition assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to
annul his proclamation after he had taken his oath of office, assumed office, and
discharged the duties of Congressman of the 1st District of Pampanga. Lazatin claims
that the HRET and not the COMELEC is the sole judge of all election contests. Buan,
Jr., and Timbol (Lazatin’s opposition), alleged that the instant petition has become moot
and academic because the assailed COMELEC Resolution had already become final
and executory when the SC issued a TRO on October 6, 1987. In the COMMENT of the
Sol-Gen, he alleges that the instant petition should be given due course because the
proclamation was valid. The Telex Order issued by the COMELEC directing the
canvassing board to proclaim the winner if warranted under Section 245 of the Omnibus
Election Code," was in effect a grant of authority by the COMELEC to the canvassing
board, to proclaim the winner. A Separate Comment was filed by the COMELEC,
alleging that the proclamation of Lazatin was illegal and void because the board simply
corrected the returns contested by Lazatin without waiting for the final resolutions of the
petitions of candidates Timbol, Buan, Jr., and Lazatin himself, against certain election
returns.
Issue:
Whether or not the issue should be placed under the HRET’s jurisdiction.
Ruling:
Yes. The SC in a Resolution dated November 17, 1987 resolved to give due
course to the petition. The petition is impressed with merit because petitioner has been
proclaimed winner of the Congressional elections in the first district of Pampanga, has
taken his oath of office as such, and assumed his duties as Congressman. For this
Court to take cognizance of the electoral protest against him would be to usurp the
functions of the House Electoral Tribunal. The alleged invalidity of the proclamation
(which had been previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged
irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the
rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to the
sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.
DACULA, MARK DAVID B.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGESTS (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
EMIGDIO BONDOC VS MARCIANO PINEDA
(201 SCRA 792) January 22, 2012

Facts:
Emigdio Bondoc and Marciano Pineda both ran for a Congressional seat in the 4
District of Pampanga. Pineda was a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
(LDP). While Bondoc was a member of the Nacionalista Party (NP). The election was
won by Pineda, however, Bondoc contested the result in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Bondoc won in the protest and he was subsequently
declared as the winner by the HRET.
Congressman Juanito Camasura, Jr., a member of HRET, and also a member of
LDP confessed to Rep. Jose Cojuangco (LDP’s leader) that he voted for Bondoc
despite being a member of NP. This resulted to Camasura’s expulsion from the LDP.
Pineda then moved that they withdraw Camasura from the HRET. They further prayed
that a new election be held and that the new LDP representative be appointed in the
HRET. This new representative will be voting for Pineda in the reopening of the election
contest.
Camasura was then removed by HRET’s chairwoman Justice Ameurfina Herrera.
Naturally, Bondoc questioned such action before the Supreme Court (SC). Pineda
contends that the issue is already outside the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court because
Camasura’s removal is an official act of Congress and by virtue of the doctrine of
separation of powers, the judiciary may not interfere.
Issues:
WON the Supreme Court may inquire upon the validity of the said act of the
HRET without violating the doctrine of separation of powers.
Held:
YES. The Supreme Court can settle the controversy in the case at bar without
encroaching upon the function of the legislature. The issue here is a judicial question. It
the act of HRET not the act of Congress that is being questioned. When Camasura was
rescinded by the tribunal, a decision has already been made, members of the tribunal
have already voted regarding the electoral contest involving Pineda and Bondoc
wherein Bondoc won. The LDP cannot withdraw their representative from the HRET
after the tribunal has already reached a decision and the same election cannot be held
since the issue has already become moot and academic.
Camasura should be reinstated because his removal was not due to a lawful or
valid cause. Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the
HRET. Expulsion of Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.
DACULA, MARK DAVID B.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGESTS (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
(G.R. No. 105323) July 3, 1992

Facts:
Petitioner prays to enjoin COMELEC to re-open the ballot boxes to scan for
“Chavez” votes and credit the it in his favor. Francisco Chavez, the petitioner, ran for
Senator in the 1992 elections where a Melchor Chavez who also ran for the same
position got disqualified. With this said, the COMELEC issued a resolution to credit all
“Chavez” votes to Francisco and delete the name of Francisco Chavez in the qualified
candidates list. However there was a failure in implementation and that the disqualified
candidate was still included in the qualified list of candidates and that the “Chavez”
votes were declared to be either stray or invalid by the Board of Election Directors as
confusion arose nationwide
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC can act on Francisco’s prayer.
Ruling:
No. The case is not a pre-proclamation controversy and that pre-proclamation
cases are not allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and member of
the House of Representatives. COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction in such cases on
local elective officials thus it cannot act on Francisco’s prayers. What is allowed is the
correction of "manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns." To be
manifest, the errors must appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or election
returns sought to be corrected and/or objections thereto must have been made before
the board of canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their respective
proceedings. It is quite obvious that petitioner's prayer does not call for the correction of
"manifest errors in the certificates of canvass or election returns" before the Comelec
but for the re-opening of the ballot boxes and appreciation of the ballots contained
therein. Indeed, petitioner has not even pointed to any "manifest error" in the certificates
of canvass or election returns he desires to be rectified. There being none, petitioner's
proper recourse is to file a regular election protest which, under the Constitution and the
Omnibus Election Code, exclusively pertains to the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
DACULA, MARK DAVID B.
1A
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGESTS (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
PIMENTEL, ET AL. VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
(GR 141489) 29 NOVEMBER 2002

FACTS:
On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in
accordance with the Party-List System Act, national elections were held which included,
for the first time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations
whose nominees would become members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14
party-list representatives from 13 organizations.
There should be a nomination by the political parties of House members to
determine who are to occupy seats in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) and the Commission on Appointments (CA). From available records, it does not
appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections the party-list groups in the House
nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA.
On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters
addressed to then Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), as Chairman of
the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to cause the
restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives
to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this Court their Petitions for
Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and Members, and against the CA,
its Chairman and Members. They contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-List
System Act, party-list representatives should have 2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and
4 seats in the CA. They charge that the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates
the constitutional requirement of proportional representation because there are no
party-list representatives in the HRET.
RULING:
NO. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of Congress
exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their
members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral
tribunal. These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998
Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The discretion of the House to
choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the
mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.[26] However, under the
doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the
House of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution
or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
DACULA, MARK DAVID B.
1A
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGESTS (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR. V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
G.R. NO. 189506, FEBRUARY 11, 2010
FACTS:
In the 2007 elections, Bantay party-list group received the sufficient voting
percentage entitling it to a seat in the House of Representatives in which Petitioner
Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee.
Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr. , Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes.
Jr. ,Erlinda adapan, Antonia Flores, and Joselito Ustarez are members of the other
party-list groups filed with the HRET a petition for quo warranto against Bantay and its
nominee, Palaparan. They alleged that Palapran is not eligible to sit in the House of
Representative because he did not belong to a marginalized and under-represented
sector which then are the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Forces Geographical
Units (CAFGUs), security guards and former rebels.
Palaparan claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee and that HRET had no
jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list that was elected to
assume membership in the House of Representatives. Furthermore, he said that such
question should be raised before the party-list group, not before the HRET.
On July 23, 2009 HRET issued an order upholding its jurisdiction over the
question of petitioner Palparan’s qualifications. Palparan filed a motio for
reconsideration but the HRET denied it by a resolution dated September 10, 2009.
ISSUE:
Whether the HRET has the jurisdiction concerning the eligibilities of the
nominees of the party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress.
RULING:
YES. Under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, the members of the Housse
of Representatives are of two kinds: “members who shall be elected from legislative
districts” and “those who shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations”. Thus, it is the part-list
representatives who are “elected” into office, not their parties or organizations. Although
it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization
that sits as and becomes member of the House of Representatives.
As contemplated in Section 17 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives. Since the party-list representatives and
districts representatives are treated in like manner, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear
and pass upon their qualifications. Once the party or organization of the party-list
nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office
as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
DACULA, MARK DAVID B.
1A
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGESTS (LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
WALDEN F. BELLO V. COMELEC,
G.R. NO. 191998

Facts:
Ang Galing Pinoy Party-List (AGPP) on November 29, 2009, AGPP filed with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) its Manifestation of Intent to participate in the
May 10, 2010 elections. In order not to be disqualified, they must prove that the party-
list group and the nominees truly belong to the marginalized and underrepresented
sector/s, and to the sectoral party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to
represent.
Mikey Arroyo was one of the party’s nominees. Here arose several questions
regarding his qualification for, he is not only a member of the First Family, but is also (a)
an incumbent member of the House of Representatives.
Issue:
Whether or not Arroyo duly represents the marginalized sector he is
representing; and
Whether the HRET has jurisdiction over the question of Arroyo’s qualifications as
AGPP’s nominee after his proclamation and assumption to office as a member of the
House of Representatives?
Held:
1. It held, among others, that a Filipino citizen, in order to qualify as a party-list
nominee, only needs to be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent, for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and
must likewise be at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. The
COMELEC en banc also held that Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807 is ultra vires, since
the requirement that a nominee belong to the marginalized and underrepresented
sector he seeks to represent is not found in RA 7941.Thus, it concluded that Arroyo
possessed all the requirements mandated by Section 9 of RA 7941.

2. This issue is far from novel and is an issue previously ruled upon by this Court. The
consistent judicial holding is that the HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the
qualifications of party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of office;
they are, for all intents and purposes, "elected members" of the House of
Representatives although the entity directly voted upon was their party. What is
inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list
nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives no less than the
district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their
qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or
organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken
his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the
HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.