Geopolitics of Sino-Pakistani Relations in The Era of Terrorism - Cairn - Info

11/4/2019 Geopolitics of Sino-Pakistani relations in the era of terrorism | Cairn.
info
Geopolitics of Sino-Pakistani relations in the era of

terrorism
Mathieu Duchâtel
In Herodotus 2010/4 (No. 139) , pages 156 to 174
Article
" Friendship foolproof" ( all weather friendship) between China and Pakistan arose
from a common interest in containing the Indian power. For Peking, nurturing
the Indo-Pakistan rivalry was aimed at removing an important part of the Indian
1
army from Kashmir and preventing the emergence of a hegemon in South Asia. For
Islamabad, the focus was on access to Chinese technology and armaments, and
diplomatic support in times of crisis with India. If the two sides have never signed a
treaty of alliance, the Sino-Pakistan axis that emerges a ter the Sino-Indian war of
1962 is based on a rapprochement of reason. But the end of the 1980s saw the shake-
up of the geopolitical environment that had conditioned its emergence. The changes
in the international system and power relations in the post-cold-war period have
prompted China to re-evaluate its strategic environment and reconsider its interests
in Pakistan. Deng Xiaoping began as early as 1988 a warming of relations with India.
This process, which continues to be con¬ firmed for years, testifies to a recognition
of Indian power, and a desire to limit competition with India at a stage of rivalry,
maintaining the territorial disputes and possible border frictions at a level of
acceptable intensity. It leads to a decoupling of China's relations with India and
Pakistan, which raises serious concerns in Islamabad. Especially since the
redeployment of Chinese foreign policy exceeds the two rivals of South Asia. The
projection of Chinese interests in Southeast Asia, Africa or South America
encourages China to relativize the importance of Pakistan in its overall package and
to favor the major economic partners (Pakistan represents less than 1% of trade
China's direct investment and direct investment in 2009) or vital security issues.
https://www.cairn.info/revue-herodote-2010-4-page-156.htm 1/20
11/4/2019 Geopolitics of Sino-Pakistani relations in the era of terrorism | Cairn.info
The Sino-Pakistani partnership nevertheless survives the geostrategic upheavals of 2

the post-cold war era. During the 2000s, the rise of terrorism in Pakistan, the
exponential growth of economic exchanges between China and India, uncertainties
about the future of Afghanistan and US demands for Chinese cooperation in favor of
the stabilization of the AfPak puts it in the face of new challenges that reinforce the
strategic value of Pakistan in the eyes of Beijing. This reassessment is due in
particular to negative security considerations. In Beijing, the level of warning
against the terrorist risk on China and its citizens in Pakistan increases as Pakistan's
security deteriorates and neighboring Xinjiang again sinks into violence and
repression in the summer of 2009.
This article analyzes the e fects of the rise of terrorism on the geopolitics of Sino- 3
Pakistani relations. While the risk in the territory of China and its citizens in
Xinjiang should not be overestimated, the fact remains that cooperation against the
"three plagues" - terrorism, extremism, separatism according to Chinese
terminology - in the 2000s at the top of the bilateral relations agenda. However, if
the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighborly Relations signed on 5
April 2005 puts forward cooperation against terrorism in a "bilateral and
multilateral framework", the two countries only proceed at the bilateral level.
mutually exclusive way. Beijing certainly shares with the Western countries and the
powers of the region a declared interest in "stability" in South Asia.via Pakistan - lead
Beijing to perceive cooperation with other powers, particularly the United States, as
harmful and counterproductive to its interests in the region. In this context, Beijing
is stepping up guarantees with regard to Islamabad to maintain a relationship
whose clientelist character is strengthened as power asymmetry increases. In
seeking to prevent Pakistan from worsening even more alarmingly to protect its
security interests and retain its geostrategic maps, China is making a limited and
ambiguous contribution to maintaining security in Pakistan and the region.
Terrorist risk, a bilateral issue?
The safety of Chinese nationals in Pakistan

Since 2004, Chinese nationals have su fered targeted killings, kidnappings and 4
bomb attacks in Pakistan while at the same time doubling their numbers to 10,000
by the beginning of 2010. These abuses, it is true, are the result of more of the
deterioration of internal security in Pakistan than an anti-Chinese feeling that does
not exist, unlike other countries in the region such as Kyrgyzstan or Indonesia. But
if Pakistan remains in 2010 the country of Asia-Paci? That where the image of China
is the most favorable according to the investigations of the Pew Research Group, it
nonetheless became during the last most dangerous decade for its nationals. The
Chinese are first victims of the deterioration of security in Baluchistan, where the
year 2004 marks the aggravation of the tensions between the federal state and the
Baloch nationalists. Between the Islamist nebula and the Pakistani state, 2004 is also
the year of rupture, the first federal military operations in tribal areas responding to
the attacks against President Musharraf. Violence intensifies against the Chinese at
the turn of 2007, the year of the Pakistani forces' assault on the Red Mosque in
Islamabad, which the Pakistani press blames China for partly responsible, and which
provokes intensification attacks and suicide bombings all over Pakistan. A precise
examination of the incidents of 2004-2009 however reveals the exceptional nature of
the political attacks against the Chinese residents. Outside Balochistan, they are not
victims of structural violence. Yet two incidents, in 2007 and 2008, place the issue of
their security at the heart of Sino-Pakistani relations.
TABLE 1 : DEATH OR REMOVAL OF CHINESE CITIZENS IN PAKISTAN

BETWEEN 2001 AND 2009
Attacks on Chinese nationals fall under four modus operandi

Violence devoid of political vision. They are not terrorism but the spread of insecurity, as 5
in May 2004 or December 2008 in the tribal areas.
The use of Chinese nationals as a lever by the militants to put pressure on the Pakistani 6
government. There is only one attack of this type. In August 2008, the Taliban
kidnap two engineers in the Swat Valley and demand the release of 136 activists from
Islamabad, as well as a ransom, seeking to take advantage of Islamabad's supposed
propensity to accede to Beijing's demands. . The engineers would have been released
without giving in to blackmail, thanks to a successful mediation.
The case of the Red Mosque(Lal Masjid) in the summer of 2007, which begins with the 7
kidnapping of Chinese residents in Islamabad and ends with the assassination of
three workers in July near Peshawar, is a real turning point for the perception of
threats in China. For the first time, the extremist nebula is targeting the Chinese.
The tragedy begins on June 24, 2007, with the abduction of seven Chinese masseuses
practicing in beauty salons suspected of serving as a cover for prostitution. Their
release, a ter 24 hours of negotiations led by Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and the
Chinese Embassy, is not enough to stop the spiral of violence. According to a former
Chinese diplomat then stationed in Islamabad, Aziz promises militants that the
government will not use force against them. But less than a week a ter the release of
the hostages, In the presence of Pakistani Interior Minister A tab Khan Sherpao on a
visit to Beijing, Zhou Yongkang, Minister of Public Security, demands that the
perpetrators of these "terrorist" attacks be "severely punished". Zhou is the first
political leader to describe the militants of the Red Mosque as terrorists. At the same
time, Chinese o ficers advocate the use of force with their Pakistani counterparts.
These pressures from the Chinese security apparatus, carried out without
coordination with the Foreign Ministry, do not alone explain the decision of General
Musharraf, President of Pakistan, to storm the Red Mosque. But doubt is sown.
Shortly before the assault in which he will perish, one of the leaders of the Red
Mosque, the maulana Abdul Rashid Ghazi, underlines the Chinese responsibility to
the media. The Pakistani president himself maintains the ambiguity by mentioning
his embarrassment vis-à-vis China a ter the kidnapping of his nationals. Regardless
of Musharraf's intentions - to use Zhou Yongkang's statements to facilitate a
military solution he wanted to impose, or discard on China of part of the political
responsibility - it remains that a part of the Chinese security apparatus has taken
very hard positions and that the Pakistani militants are aware of it. It is in retaliation
that three Chinese workers are murdered in the tribal areas in July. The sequence of
events poses a crucial question for China's external security policy. To what extent
should it intervene in Pakistan's internal a fairs and circumvent its own principle of
non-interference, yet touchstone of the foreign policy of the People's Republic since
its founding? China is quickly learning the lessons of the crisis. It's a question of
in luencing Pakistan, but out of the media, to stop attracting the attention of
extremist fighters.
In Baluchistan, the province where the Chinese su fered the most deadly attacks and 8
where they are most economically present, violence is linked to a nationalist
movement and not to the rise of extremism. religious. The Baloch Liberation Army
(BNA), at the origin of the attacks, does not maintain links with global jihad, which
the Pakistani government has used to weaken it [Grare, 2006]. Baluchi nationalists
perceive the Chinese presence as a support for a federal policy of puncturing local
resources without fair redistribution, like all foreign nationals they have called to
leave the province. For China, which in addition to the port of Gwadar and
infrastructure projects in its hinterland, operates the gold mine, Saindak's silver and
copper and Duda's zinc mine, Baluchistan has untapped strategic potential, which
depends on Gwadar's success. The situation in this province, which obviously calls
for a separate approach to the problem of the Pakistani Taliban and al-Qaeda, places
China in a dilemma. Should it take advantage of its economic presence to push the
Pakistani government to a more political or military approach? Is inaction an
option? Should it take advantage of its economic presence to push the Pakistani
government to a more political or military approach? Is inaction an option? Should it
take advantage of its economic presence to push the Pakistani government to a more
political or military approach? Is inaction an option?
The risk of extension in Xinjiang of Pakistan insecurity

While no incidents have been reported since the end of 2008, the ethnic clashes 9
between Uighurs and Hans in Xinjiang in July 2009, which kill about 200 people, add
an extra dimension to the security problem. In October, in Pakistan, a senior al-
Qaeda leader, Abu Yahia Al-Libi, calls the Uyghurs jihad against China. The terrorist
organization never threatened or threatened China's interests, nor explicitly
included Xinjiang in its dra t caliphate. She has always turned a blind eye to the
strained relations between the Hans and Uyghurs in the autonomous region, even
though she is always quick to denounce discrimination against Muslims around the
world. Four months a ter the threats of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb against
Chinese interests, is not this the sign of a strategic break? Beyond al-Qaeda, of which
Al-Libi is a controversial leader since some terrorism experts believe it to be central
to the organization's organization in Pakistan while others consider it marginal and
unrepresentative, riots in Xinjiang pose the question of China's image to Muslim
communities. China owes only to the good o fices of Pakistan that the events of July
and the ensuing repression are not on the agenda of the organization of Islamic
States at its meeting in 2009. But even in the lack of internationalization of the
problem, the first urgency for Beijing is to avoid drawing the attention of the
extremist nebula to China and Xinjiang. Especially at the same time China is
discussing a possible cooperation with the United States to stabilize the "AfPak",
following requests for cooperation from the Obama administration. If it appears as
the ally of Westerners in addition to its internal problems in Xinjiang, does not it
risk immediate retaliation, a progressive radicalization of Xinjiang, even the
construction on the Pakistani territory of a rear base for operations? in Chinese

territory? These are the terms of the debate in China. Especially at the same time
China is discussing a possible cooperation with the United States to stabilize the
"AfPak", following requests for cooperation from the Obama administration. If it
appears as the ally of Westerners in addition to its internal problems in Xinjiang,
does not it risk immediate retaliation, a progressive radicalization of Xinjiang, even
the construction on the Pakistani territory of a rear base for operations? in Chinese
territory? These are the terms of the debate in China. Especially at the same time
China is discussing a possible cooperation with the United States to stabilize the
"AfPak", following requests for cooperation from the Obama administration. If it
appears as the ally of Westerners in addition to its internal problems in Xinjiang,
does not it risk immediate retaliation, a progressive radicalization of Xinjiang, even
the construction on the Pakistani territory of a rear base for operations? in Chinese
territory? These are the terms of the debate in China. even the construction on
Pakistani territory of a rear base for operations on the Chinese territory? These are
the terms of the debate in China. even the construction on Pakistani territory of a
rear base for operations on the Chinese territory? These are the terms of the debate
in China.
MAP 10
LE PROJET DE « CORRIDOR ÉNERGÉTIQUE ET COMMERCIAL ENTRE LA
CHINE ET LE PAKISTAN »
Yet, one year a ter the riots, the extension to Xinjiang of Pakistan's insecurity did
not take place. In reality, the Xinjiang independence movement and the extremist
Pakistan nebula are now rather distant. According to Chinese estimates, there are
only about 100 Uyghur fighters in the Pakistani tribal areas. Their numbers have
been steadily decreasing since the beginning of the Afghanistan war, when it had
reached the thousand. Uighur emigration to Pakistan has seen two peaks. In 1996,
Uyghurs lee Xinjiang where the "Strike Hard" campaign against crime is in full
swing and focuses on religious activities and separatism [Castets, 2003]. By the end
of 2001, resistance against the o fensive in Afghanistan was attracting young Uyghur
fighters. But US military operations in Afghanistan and the tribal areas and
Pakistani coups have decimated their ranks. Witness the assassination of two of
their most prominent leaders in the 2000s. In October 2003, Hasan Mahsum, who
according to Chinese analysts founded the East Turkestan Islamist Movement
(ETIM) in Pakistan in 1997, al-Qaida's financial support, is killed in South Waziristan

by the Pakistani army. In February 2010, Abdul Haq al-Turkestani, leader of the
Turkistani Islamic Party, a group that has repeatedly threatened China with
unconventional terrorist attacks on its territory, succumbs to an American drone
strike in North Waziristan. Witness the assassination of two of their most
prominent leaders in the 2000s. In October 2003, Hasan Mahsum, who according to
Chinese analysts founded the East Turkestan Islamist Movement (ETIM) in Pakistan
in 1997, al-Qaida's financial support, is killed in South Waziristan by the Pakistani
army. In February 2010, Abdul Haq al-Turkestani, leader of the Turkistani Islamic
Party, a group that has repeatedly threatened China with unconventional terrorist
attacks on its territory, succumbs to an American drone strike in North Waziristan.
Witness the assassination of two of their most prominent leaders in the 2000s. In
October 2003, Hasan Mahsum, who according to Chinese analysts founded the East
Turkestan Islamist Movement (ETIM) in Pakistan in 1997, al-Qaida's financial
support, is killed in South Waziristan by the Pakistani army. In February 2010, Abdul
Haq al-Turkestani, leader of the Turkistani Islamic Party, a group that has repeatedly
threatened China with unconventional terrorist attacks on its territory, succumbs to
an American drone strike in North Waziristan. is killed in South Waziristan by the
Pakistani army. In February 2010, Abdul Haq al-Turkestani, leader of the Turkistani
Islamic Party, a group that has repeatedly threatened China with unconventional
terrorist attacks on its territory, succumbs to an American drone strike in North
Waziristan. is killed in South Waziristan by the Pakistani army. In February 2010,
Abdul Haq al-Turkestani, leader of the Turkistani Islamic Party, a group that has
repeatedly threatened China with unconventional terrorist attacks on its territory,
succumbs to an American drone strike in North Waziristan.
In addition to this obvious weakness, Uighurs radicalized Pakistan have managed 11

neither to forge strong links with the separatist movement Xinjiang, nor to direct
the operations of Pakistani militants to Chinese targets. Thus, unlike Kyrgyzstan,
Pakistani soil has never been the scene of attacks led by Uighurs against Chinese.
There are certainly signs that they had the ambition, according to information
distilled in the Chinese press. In February 1998, she accused ETIM of trying to
infiltrate ten terrorists in Xinjiang from Pakistan, and then, in June 2006, to plan
kidnappings of Chinese diplomats in Islamabad and Karachi. On the other side of
the border, in Xinjiang, Chinese police seized small arms produced in clandestine
factories in tribal areas, and some Uyghurs arrested in the past decade for
proselytism were trained in Pakistani madrasas. However, the riots of summer 2009
are not linked to the deterioration of security in Pakistan, the presence of Uyghur
fighters on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border, nor to a progressive religious
radicalization of the Uyghur population related to any in luence of Pakistani
madrasas. None of the arrested Uighurs would have been trained in Pakistan, and
Chinese scholars now agree to highlight the socio-economic factors and their impact
on ethnic relations as the main factor of the 2009 violence - while considering that
Rebiya Kadeer, the president of the Uighur World Congress, represents a greater
danger than the Afghan-Pakistani extremist networks for the future of Xinjiang
because of its international visibility.
The rise of mutually exclusive cooperation against the "three

plagues"
To prevent the deterioration of the situation in Xinjiang and protect its nationals in 12
Pakistan, Beijing has developed with Islamabad a cooperation against the "three
scourges" which is profoundly di ferent from the American approach of pressure,
financial assistance and assistance. military operations, which to a certain extent is
taking place. It proceeds surgically and targets the symptoms without addressing
the root causes. It is a question of not becoming a target and not of settling in a
lasting way the question of the insecurity Pakistan, without intention to promote the
regional stability.
This objective requires dialogue and discretion. In Pakistan, China multiplies the 13
interlocutors in the pure communist tradition of the "united front": to isolate the
threat by allying with all those who can contribute to it, without ideological
distinction. It is about maintaining a broad consensus for a strong partnership with
China in Pakistan's political and civil society, to protect the bilateral relationship
from the vagaries of Pakistan's political life and the complexity of the rivalries and
antagonisms that divide the country. In other words, Beijing wants to make sure
that any Pakistani government sees China as a major ally and that Chinese interests
are taken into consideration at all levels of the state apparatus and society. Such an
ambition naturally runs up against areas of doubt. How to make sure that the
Pakistani services do not let some Uyghur militants loose their freedom in order to
maintain a leverage towards Beijing? Does China really have reliable relays in the
military and services to get the intelligence it needs and protect its interests? If these
questions are asked in China,
China maintains, viaits embassy, an extensive network in all strata of Pakistan's 14

political and military power. For this purpose, it benefits from optimal management
of its diplomatic resources. Young diplomats stationed in Pakistan are developing
their networks in the long term. So Zhang Chunxiang, ambassador to Islamabad
from 2002 to 2007, during the attacks against Chinese nationals, did he carry out his
whole career at the embassy of the People's Republic (from 1974 to 1984, then from
1995). to 1999), and to his consulate in Karachi (1987-1992), with the exception of two
passages in the Asian A fairs O fice of the Central Administration, all levels of the
diplomatic career. In this way,
The events of the Red Mosque convince Beijing of the relevance of the so t and 15
di fuse in luence and the need to maintain total opacity over any pressure exerted
on Islamabad. This is a discrete interventionism based on consent and persuasion,
as in other countries [Li, Zheng, 2009]. At the end of 2007, the Chinese Embassy sets
up a task forcewith several Pakistani government institutions (Ministries of the
Interior, Foreign A fairs, Defense, Economy, Government Secretariat), army and
intelligence services. This institutionalization e fort aims to better coordinate all
bilateral issues, but especially to allow even more follow-up of the issue of Chinese
nationals and the security of Xinjiang.
From the end of 2008, the departure of General Musharraf and the perceptible 16
weakness of the tandem formed by President Zardari and his Prime Minister Gilani
raise the question of his ability to protect Chinese interests, despite the guarantees
he multiplies with regard to Beijing. China manages this risk by developing
secondary channels of communication that bypass the federal state. It relies on its
congenial relationship with the army and weaves new links with actors deemed to
play an informative or relay role. This complementary diplomacy towards certain
Pakistani political parties is being implemented by the PRC Embassy in Islamabad
and the Communist Party Liaison Department. China relies for example on the
Pakistan Muslim League (Q) and its general secretary and former senator, Mushahid
Hussain Syed. Since its founding in September 2009, the latter has been running the
Pakistan China Institute, a think-tank"Non-partisan" dedicated to improving
contacts between the two countries and who counts as honorary president Li
Zhaoxing, former Minister of Foreign A fairs, now chairman of the Foreign A fairs
Committee of the National People's Assembly. A ter the violence in Xinjiang,
Mushahid Hussain Syed is one of the first Pakistani dignitaries to go there and
publicly express favorable judgments on socio-economic development and religious
freedom in the autonomous region. The Liaison Department of the CPC is also
diplomating Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), one of the parties that has served as an interface
between the Afghan Mujahideen and the Pakistani army. He invites in February
2009 its president, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, to spend a week in China, which ends with
the signing of a joint communiqué mentioning the JI's opposition to any separatist
movement in China. The e fect of this text, it is true, must not be overestimated. The
JI was itself the victim of attacks in July 2010. But the Chinese device is reinforced
again. Finally, in April 2010, the Liaison Department initiated a relationship with
maulana Fazl-ur-Rahman, leader of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), a party from the
Deobandie movement whose ties with the Taliban are proved, by receiving it in
China.
China's long-lasting con-sistency and alleged in luence, con - firmed - albeit in a very 17
ambiguous way - by the Red Mosque a fair, is one of the factors behind the US
attempts to convince the Chinese government to help stabilize AfPak. Can China not
mobilize its "friendship higher than the Karakorum and deeper than the ocean" with
Pakistan to in luence its policy against Islamist fighters, while its security services
have largely contributed to their growth, before losing control in part? Launched by
George W. Bush at the end of his second term and deepened by the Obama
administration, the US strategic shi t in Afghanistan wants to rely on a contribution
from China, she hopes to participate in the financing of reconstruction in

Afghanistan and the pooling of her in luence on Pakistan. But the US initiative
concludes with a "no-go" [Small, 2010; Swaine, 2010]. The main reason for this
failure is precisely the nature of China's counterterrorism approach. It is not a
question of fighting terrorism but of avoiding becoming its target. Since then, China
is benefiting from military operations It is not a question of fighting terrorism but
of avoiding becoming its target. Since then, China is benefiting from military
operations It is not a question of fighting terrorism but of avoiding becoming its
target. Since then, China is benefiting from military operations in Afghanistan and
the Pakistani tribal areas because they weaken the Uighurs but also because they
place the extremist nebula on American and Western targets.
The dialogue based on mutual respect and reciprocity is complemented by more 18

traditional methods, such as intelligence cooperation and joint exercises against
terrorism - codenamed Peace Mission - which take place every two years. While
cooperation focuses on the security of Xinjiang and Chinese nationals, Pakistan also
has a hand in it. Its strategic value is reassessed in a positive way, China supports it
actively or passively, taking into account the priorities of the country: the
continuation of the construction of its conventional deterrence tool vis-à-vis India,
the resolution of its energy crisis, its search for a status of nuclear power recognized
as India, and its economic development at the moment when international investors
abandon it. It also provides him with political backing on his major strategic options
with regard to terrorism, Afghanistan and Kashmir.
Power challenges and stability in South Asia
Building a strong Pakistan: "strategic reinsurance" and its

limits
In the late 1980s, the erosion of China's Pakistani stance on Kashmir and the gradual 19
expansion of Sino-Indian trade gave rise to incessant demands for strategic
guarantees from Islamabad. It was only in the second half of the 2000s that Beijing
adopted a policy designed to strengthen Pakistan. The risk to Chinese security is no
stranger to this change of approach. Without the term ever being spoken by those
who implement it, China has its own policy of preventing a "failed state" in Pakistan.
It is true that the insistent demands of President Musharraf for an intensification of
exchanges between the two countries, then the biannual visits to China of his
successor invite Islamabad to give the initiative of the jump in recent years in
bilateral relations. In reality, re-engagement with a "brother" country (xiongdi , a
term used sparingly by Chinese diplomacy) serves a whole series of power interests
that pre-existed the rise of the terrorist risk but that it had the e fect of revealing.
In the space of a few months at the turn of 2009 and 2010, China and Pakistan sealed 20
the enhancement of their strategic partnership. A ter several years of negotiations
started under Musharraf, an agreement is reached in November 2009 on the
purchase by Islamabad of thirty-six multi-role J-10 fighter jets, the lagship of the
Chinese aviation industry. Pakistan conquers its key position in the strategy of the
Chinese military-industrial complex. A true showcase for the exhibition of its
military technologies, particularly with regard to countries tempted by Chinese
aeronautics in the Middle East, Pakistan is not only an export market, however
important it is on this plan. There is also a politico-strategic dimension to this sale.
By responding positively to Pakistani military demands, China provides indirect
support for its strategic choices, in particular its controversial arbitration over the
priority given to Kashmir in allocating its defense resources. A few months later, in
April 2010, China announces the sale of two nuclear power plants (Chasma 3 and 4),
long delayed despite the impatience of Islamabad. It is concluded despite the
guidance of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which China has been a member of
since 2004, and which prohibits the transfer of civilian material to non-signatory
states of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is clearly Beijing's response to the US-
India nuclear deal and Washington's patient approval of an exemption from India's
hard-won GFN guidelines. in September 2008 to the impotent surprise of the
Chinese delegation. which China has been a member since 2004, and which prohibit
the transfer of civilian material to non-signatory states of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. This is clearly Beijing's response to the US-India nuclear deal and
Washington's patient approval of an exemption from India's hard-won GFN
guidelines. in September 2008 to the impotent surprise of the Chinese delegation.
which China has been a member since 2004, and which prohibit the transfer of
civilian material to non-signatory states of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is
clearly Beijing's response to the US-India nuclear deal and Washington's patient
approval of an exemption from India's hard-won GFN guidelines. in September
2008 to the impotent surprise of the Chinese delegation.
These two "big contracts" recall how much Sino-Pakistan trade depends on a strong 21
political interventionism, which explains their concentration in certain specific
sectors of the Pakistani economy: the defense industry, energy, telecommunications,
mining, transport infrastructure and the space program. Overall, weak economic
and trade exchanges have become a political issue for Islamabad and Beijing. With $
7 billion, bilateral trade is light in the face of Sino-Indian trade, which reached $ 60
billion in 2010. Economic issues have emerged on the agenda of bilateral relations in
a negative way, because of their weakness [Ye, 2009]. How to consolidate a
partnership without economic and social foundations? The question remains
unclear to this day. The e forts of China and Pakistan to expand their trade have
instead increased their reliance on politics.
The free trade agreement signed in November 2006, which entered into force on 22
October 10, 2009, does not provide a solution for building solid economic
foundations for Sino-Pakistani relations. Its goal - bringing bilateral trade to $ 15
billion in 2011 - is modest and seems out of reach. On the one hand, it will deepen the
Pakistani trade deficit, which is already a sensitive issue in Islamabad while it is only
5 billion dollars in 2008. On the other hand, it will accentuate the imbalance of trade,
the Pakistan exporting agricultural and mining products and buying manufactured
goods from China. The options for supporting Pakistan's economic development are
therefore not numerous. It remains the investment and buying groups that China
sends regularly, in a sign of political friendship that his diplomacy has systematized
in recent years. Overall, and despite the willingness of both parties to fill the
economic vacuum of their strategic partnership, "reinsurance" focuses on the most
pressing needs expressed by China's Pakistani interlocutors: transport, the energy
sector and defense. As the economic records show, there are limits to the support
that Beijing can provide to Islamabad. It is not for China to multiply initiatives to
strengthen Pakistan, but rather to react positively to its requests.
Ambiguities of China vis-à-vis Kashmir

China's traditional strategic approach to South Asia is to build a "strong" Pakistan to 23
maintain a balance with India. By inviting Pakistan as early as 1990 to carry out in
the Lop Nor desert its first secret nuclear tests, which will allow Islamabad to
become a nuclear power only a few weeks a ter the Indian trials of 1998 [Read,
Stillman, 2008, p. 131], China intentionally froze the Kashmir con lict. Balance and
power considerations remain today an important determinant of China's policy in
the region. It is clear that his ability to play a political role in Kashmir increases with
his economic and military power,
China is a party to the sovereignty dispute in Kashmir since it has occupied Aksai 24
Chin since the 1962 war. In addition, Pakistan has ceded land claimed by India
through a border agreement signed in 1963. Until the 1980s, the maintenance of a
con lict situation in Kashmir was in favor of Chinese national security. Support for
Pakistan's military modernization, use of its first veto in the UN Security Council a
year a ter joining the international organization - against Bangladesh's accession to
the UN in 1972 - and support for Security Council resolution 47, which calls for a self-
determination referendum in Kashmir, aimed precisely at weakening India, an ally
of the Soviet Union.
From the visit of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China in 1988, the Chinese 25
position becomes neutral. With the Cold War disappears the axis Moscow-Delhi;
India and China decide to no longer condition their trade to the prior resolution of
their territorial disputes. As a result, China no longer publicly supports Pakistani
positions from the 1990s [Singh Sidhu, Yuan, 2003]. Moreover, during his visit to
South Asia in December 1996, Jiang Zemin declared before a Pakistani parliament
that was taken aback by this mu led disavowal that "if certain issues can not be
resolved in the immediate future, they can be temporarily set aside, such that they
do not a fect normal state-to-state relations. "
Chinese South Asian expert Zhang Li interprets this development as China's 26

adoption of active diplomacy to limit tensions between its two neighbors [Zhang,
2009]. It does, however, pursue an ambiguous policy towards Kashmir. A recent sign
of this ambiguity is the Chinese insistence, during President Obama's visit to Beijing
in November 2009, to include in the joint communiqué a mention of the support of
the two countries for "the improvement of relations between India and Pakistan.
This is a stand in favor of Pakistan as it is clear that any mention by China (or
another power) of the Indo-Pakistani subject is seen in New Delhi as an
interference. clever
Yet, far from the spotlight, China has played a discreet role in times of crisis. It is no 27
longer only, as during the tensions linked to the Brasstracks Indian military exercises
in 1986, to refrain from taking a pro-Pakistani stance. A ter the nuclearization of the
Kashmir con lict in 1998, China played a mediating role in calling for moderation
viavarious diplomatic channels. In 1999, during the Kargil con lict, China did not
accede to the repeated demands of General Musharraf (then head of the army) and
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to provide diplomatic support to Pakistan. On the
other hand, she urges Pakistani o ficials to refrain from further provocations and
resume dialogue with India. Similarly, a ter the attacks on the Indian Parliament in
2001, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji visits Delhi and Islamabad in January 2002 and
calls again to the measure.
But even these invitations to the measure are not unambiguous. They seek to 28
prevent escalation, but never at the expense of Pakistani interests, in a manner
comparable to Chinese diplomacy toward the North Korean nuclear crisis. This
policy is based on silence and passivity. By emphasizing regional stability, it sti les
Pakistan by protecting it from external pressures. Beijing thus refuses to emphasize
Pakistan's responsibility in triggering the Kargil crisis, or that of the secret services
and the Pakistani army in the rise of Lashkar-e-Taiba or Jaish-e-Mohammad, who
commit the bombings of Delhi at the end of 2001. A ter the terrorist attacks that hit
Bombay in 2008, China condemns the attacks, expresses its condolences to India but
refrains from highlighting the links between certain elements of the Pakistani
security services and the Lashkar-e-Taiba. This is a principled stance on the part of
China, inseparable from its "strategic reinsurance" e fort against Pakistan. The
argument o ten made to justify this approach is that Pakistan is a victim of
terrorism,
Chinese ambiguity points to its tendency to use its Kashmir policy as an irritant 29
against India. This is the case since 2009 of the visa policy. The Chinese Embassy is
issuing visas to residents of Jammu and Kashmir on loose sheets and no longer on
their Indian passports, without giving any o ficial reason for this policy change. In
what appears to be a gradation in the use of the consular weapon, in August 2010,
China refused a visa to General Jaswal, Commander-in-Chief of Northern
Command's Indian troops, which included Kashmir. At the turn of 2009-2010, does
China reconsider its policy of de facto recognition of Indian sovereignty over Kashmir
and consolidate its relations with Pakistan?against India? This analysis, advanced in
some Indian think-tanks like Chennai's South Asia Analysis Group, also feeds on
China's growing economic and perhaps military presence in Gilgit-Baltistan (the
former Northern Territory of Kashmir). Pakistani control), provided since 2009 with
a new and more representative status.
However, there is every reason to believe that China will limit its actions to a low 30
level of con lictuality by favoring relative stability. Especially as its growing presence
in Gilgit-Baltistan o fers him a new map. With $ 7 billion invested in the only Buji
dam and the widening of the Karakorum road, China is gaining ground, despite
India's protests, in a disputed, volatile, and crucial region for the security of the
country. Xinjiang because it can bu fer Pakistan and China. In doing so, it multiplies
its strategic options. To protect its interests, in the event of the construction of an
"energy and trade corridor" that would open the doors of the South Seas to Xinjiang,
viaGwadar, should China not work for a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir issue?
Baluchistan and the Energy and Trade Corridor

For the time being, China's diplomatic palette in South Asia does not include the 31
"stabilizing" option beyond calls for moderation in times of crisis. The example of
Balochistan conquers it, in a di ferent register. In Baluchistan, short-term security
interests are the main determinant of Chinese diplomacy, which acts secondarily to
preserve China's power interests while waiting for better times. Beijing, however,
had a card to play to contribute to stability in this province while advancing its
economic interests. In February 2006, during a visit to China, General Musharraf re-
launched the idea of an energy and trade corridor that would allow China to
integrate the development of its Great West in Pakistan, while skirting the Strait of
Malacca for its energy supplies from the Middle East. The centerpiece of the corridor
is the port of Gwadar, whose construction is o ten analyzed in its supposed
geostrategic extensions for the expansion of the naval operations of the People's
Liberation Army on the high seas. The stability of Balochistan is an important
condition for success of this big building site.
But in the face of violence in Balochistan, Beijing is adopting a round back strategy. 32
On the one hand, the Chinese Embassy encourages Chinese companies to build
relationships with local actors. On the other hand, during 2009, it put all the
elements of the energy and trade corridor on the back burner, with the exception,
much further north, in Gilgit-Baltistan, of the widening of the Karakorum road,
under enhanced military protection. In 2010, the port of Gwadar, whose
construction is halted, had only seventy-two buildings since its opening, and there
was no indication that it would be able to exist in the shadow of Karachi, which still
captures Pakistani foreign trade. Nothing has been done to develop transport
infrastructure linking it to its hinterland. In addition, the hypothetical pipeline
Gwadar-Xinjiang,
China could have tried to convince the Pakistani government to adjust its approach 33
to Baluchistan, to pursue a more inclusive and less military-focused policy. Beijing
could also have conceived its economic presence in Baluchistan from a
transformative perspective, where growth builds security and stability. But, far from
seeking to improve security, China has preferred to wait for it to progress on its
own, in a manner favorable to its interests. Passivity and concentration on die
security objectives? Ned a minimum however not prevent Beijing contemplate the
future integration of western China into the Pakistani economy by projecting itself
on the long term. For the moment, the Chinese policy is mainly to keep all the
options on the table.
Afghanistan and the long-term power interests of Pakistan

and China
We find this approach in Afghanistan, where Pakistan, seen from Beijing, has a role 34
to play in advancing Chinese interests a ter the departure of the West as inevitable.
In 2001, China bene fi ted from good Pakistani o ficials to conclude an agreement
with the Afghan Taliban government to protect Chinese nationals in Afghanistan
and to cooperate in securing Xinjiang's security. Can not history repeat itself?
NATO's goal of reintegration and reconciliation for the Afghan Taliban is a rhetorical
victory for China and Pakistan, who have always defended this option while
portraying the Afghan Taliban as patriots without an international agenda, who
needed to be counted on to build peace in Afghanistan. NATO's new strategy places
Pakistan in a strong position to mediate because of the long-standing ties of its
intelligence services with the Taliban. A mission that Islamabad wishes to achieve
exclusively, to acquire a dominant position in a country that gives it a strategic depth
vis-à-vis India and which it fears above all that it falls into the orbit of New Delhi [
Saint-Mézard, 2010]. By refusing to cooperate with the United States to in luence
Islamabad's policy towards the Pakistani Taliban and Afghanistan, Beijing has
preserved the Pakistani map to play a role in the future of Afghanistan.
Conclusion
In recent years, terrorism has emerged at the top of the agenda of China-Pakistan 35
relations. The security risk has enhanced the strategic value of Pakistan in the eyes
of the Chinese government. Its management has been accompanied by arbitration
by Beijing in favor of its immediate security interests on most major issues that
structure the Sino-Pakistani relationship. They resulted in reassessments and
readjustments of China's objectives to preserve its interests in South Asia. Because

terrorism and violence impact them everywhere in Baluchistan and the rest of
Pakistan, Afghanistan and Kashmir. However, the Chinese approach, which favors
in luence, expectation, low proce- dur and discreet interventionism, exerts
comparable e fects on the geopolitics of each of these territories: it reinforces the
Pakistani approach while preserving the options there. from China. In South Asia,
China does not behave like a revisionist power in the classic sense of the term, which
deals with the active transformation of the regional status quo . But it can count on
Pakistan to expand its sphere of in luence without drastically altering the balances -
or imbalances - that structure the region.
Notes
[1] This article is based on an Asia Center study, conducted with Jean-Luc Racine for
the Ministry of Defense's strategic a fairs delegation, on Chinese perceptions of
Pakistan, and based on thirty interviews in Beijing and Chengdu in December.
2009 and March 2010 with Chinese specialists from South Asia. Many of the ideas
and information in this article are the result of a collective e fort, and the author of
this text would like to thank Jean-Luc Racine for proposing that he take it up again
from the angle of the terrorist question in Chinese relations. Pakistan.
Résumé
FrançaisLes relations sino-pakistanaises peuvent-elles être un facteur de stabilité en

Asie du Sud ? Marquées par le sceau de la prolifération nucléaire et balistique,
scellées dans une rivalité géopolitique avec l’Inde au cœur de la guerre froide, elles
ont plutôt servi des intérêts de puissance que la cause de la stabilité régionale depuis
les années 1960, avant de traverser une période de remise en cause dans les
années 1990. Mais la montée du terrorisme en Asie du Sud, l’essor des échanges sino-
indiens et les incertitudes sur l’avenir de l’Afghanistan les inscrivent dans une
géopolitique en mutation, où les dynamiques économiques, sécuritaires et
stratégiques invitent les deux pays à repenser les finalités stratégiques de leur
partenariat. Cet article montre que les initiatives chinoises récentes vis-à-vis du
Pakistan, qui procèdent exclusivement au niveau bilatéral et visent à éviter que le
Pakistan ne s’a faiblisse dans des proportions encore plus alarmantes, apportent une
contribution limitée et ambiguë à la sécurité régionale.
EnglishEnglish abstract on Cairn International Edition
Plan
Le risque terroriste, un enjeu bilatéral ?
La sécurité des ressortissants chinois au Pakistan
Les attaques subies par les ressortissants chinois relèvent de quatre modus operandi
Le risque d’extension au Xinjiang de l’insécurité pakistanaise
L’essor d’une coopération mutuellement exclusive contre les « trois léaux »
Enjeux de puissance et stabilité en Asie du Sud

Construire un Pakistan fort : la « réassurance stratégique » et ses limites
Les ambiguïtés de la Chine vis-à-vis du Cachemire
Le Baloutchistan et le corridor énergétique et commercial
L’Afghanistan et les intérêts de puissance de long terme du Pakistan et de la Chine
Conclusion
Bibliographie
Bibliographie
CASTETS R. (2003), « Le nationalisme ouïghour au Xinjiang, expressions

identitaires et politiques d’un mal-être », Perspectives chinoises, n° 78, juillet-août.
GRARE F. (2006), Pakistan, the Resurgence of Baluch Nationalism, Carnegie Endowment

for International Peace, Washington D. C.
LI H.-Y., ZHENG Y. (2009), « Re-interpreting China’s Non-Intervention Policy

towards Myanmar : leverage, interests and intervention », Journal of Contemporary
China, vol. 18, n° 61, septembre, p. 617-638.
READ T. et STILLMAN D. (2008), The Nuclear Express, a Political History of the Bomb and
its Proliferation, Zenith Press, Minneapolis, Mi.
SAINT-MÉZARD I. (2010), « Inde et Pakistan se mesurent en Afghanistan », Le Monde

diplomatique, janvier.
SINGH SIDHU W.P. et YUAN J.-D. (2003), China and India, Cooperation or Con lict ?,
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Co.
SMALL A. (2010), « China’s Caution on Afghanistan-Pakistan », The Washington

Quarterly, juillet, p. 81-97.
SWAINE M. (2010), « China and the AfPak Issue », China Leadership Monitor, n° 31,
hiver.
YE H. (2009), « China-Pakistan Relationship : all weather, but may be not all

dimensional », in K. ZETTERLUND (dir.), Pakistan. Consequences of Deteriorating
Security in Afghanistan, Swedish Defence Research Agency, Stockholm, p. 108-130.
ZHANG L. (2009), To Manage Con lict in South Asia, China’s Stakes, Perceptions and
Inputs, Institute for Security & Development Policy, Asia paper, Stockholm.
Auteur
Mathieu Duchâtel
Mathieu Duchâtel est chercheur à Asia Centre.
Posted on Cairn.info on 01/03/2011

https://doi.org/10.3917/her.139.0156
 Suivant

Pour citer cet article
Distribution électronique Cairn.info pour La Découverte © La Découverte. Tous droits

réservés pour tous pays. Il est interdit, sauf accord préalable et écrit de l’éditeur, de
reproduire (notamment par photocopie) partiellement ou totalement le présent article,
de le stocker dans une banque de données ou de le communiquer au public sous quelque
forme et de quelque manière que ce soit.
Cairn.info

Geopolitics of Sino-Pakistani Relations in The Era of Terrorism - Cairn - Info

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Geopolitics of Sino-Pakistani Relations in The Era of Terrorism - Cairn - Info

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

11/4/2019 Geopolitics of Sino-Pakistani relations in the era of terrorism | Cairn.

Geopolitics of Sino-Pakistani relations in the era of

The Sino-Pakistani partnership nevertheless survives the geostrategic upheavals of 2

Terrorist risk, a bilateral issue?

The safety of Chinese nationals in Pakistan

TABLE 1 : DEATH OR REMOVAL OF CHINESE CITIZENS IN PAKISTAN

Attacks on Chinese nationals fall under four modus operandi

The risk of extension in Xinjiang of Pakistan insecurity

construction on the Pakistani territory of a rear base for operations? in Chinese

(ETIM) in Pakistan in 1997, al-Qaida's ﬁnancial support, is killed in South Waziristan

In addition to this obvious weakness, Uighurs radicalized Pakistan have managed 11

The rise of mutually exclusive cooperation against the "three

China maintains, viaits embassy, an extensive network in all strata of Pakistan's 14

from China, she hopes to participate in the ﬁnancing of reconstruction in

The dialogue based on mutual respect and reciprocity is complemented by more 18

Power challenges and stability in South Asia

Building a strong Pakistan: "strategic reinsurance" and its

Ambiguities of China vis-à-vis Kashmir

Chinese South Asian expert Zhang Li interprets this development as China's 26

Baluchistan and the Energy and Trade Corridor

Afghanistan and the long-term power interests of Pakistan

readjustments of China's objectives to preserve its interests in South Asia. Because

FrançaisLes relations sino-pakistanaises peuvent-elles être un facteur de stabilité en

EnglishEnglish abstract on Cairn International Edition

Enjeux de puissance et stabilité en Asie du Sud

CASTETS R. (2003), « Le nationalisme ouïghour au Xinjiang, expressions

GRARE F. (2006), Pakistan, the Resurgence of Baluch Nationalism, Carnegie Endowment

LI H.-Y., ZHENG Y. (2009), « Re-interpreting China’s Non-Intervention Policy

SAINT-MÉZARD I. (2010), « Inde et Pakistan se mesurent en Afghanistan », Le Monde

SMALL A. (2010), « China’s Caution on Afghanistan-Pakistan », The Washington

YE H. (2009), « China-Pakistan Relationship : all weather, but may be not all

Mathieu Duchâtel est chercheur à Asia Centre.

Posted on Cairn.info on 01/03/2011

Distribution électronique Cairn.info pour La Découverte © La Découverte. Tous droits

You might also like