7/14/2021 The Misunderstood History of Pakistan-US Relations – The Diplomat

THE PULSE | DIPLOMACY | SECURITY | SOUTH ASIA

The Misunderstood
History of Pakistan-
US Relations
Pakistan has sometimes been
important to the U.S.,
sometimes not. Understanding
the shifts of the past can help
Islamabad plan for the future.

By Touqir Hussain
March 30, 2021

Credit: White House photo by David Bohrer

Writing about Pakistan-U.S. relations is like

composing a piece of literary criticism of
Shakespeare’s “Hamlet,” always looking for new
answers to old nagging questions, and falling short.
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7/14/2021 The Misunderstood History of Pakistan-US Relations – The Diplomat

Nevertheless, a serious inquiry into the history of the

bilateral relationship may help our quest for answers.
The fact is that the history of Pakistan-U.S. relations is
much misunderstood.

At present, Pakistan-U.S. relations are very much on

Islamabad’s mind as it increasingly fears being caught
in the crossfire between the United States and China,
while having to cope with the impact of deepening
India-U.S. relations, already reaffirmed by the Biden
administration, and the looming crisis of potential
civil conflict in Afghanistan following an American
withdrawal. 

Yet there is also Pakistan’s hope for a U.S. role in the

improvement of India-Pakistan relations and for the
revival of ties with Washington. Those hopes may
have partly inspired the Kashmir ceasefire deal and
the peace overtures pitched by the leadership at the
recent Islamabad Security Dialogue. And now comes
a deal between Iran and China, opening up the
possibility that the United States has lost Iran to China
and may not like Pakistan to be swept away into
Beijing’s strategic orbit, too. These may arguably be
the worst of times, and the best of times, for
Islamabad.

Probing the history of Pakistan-U.S. relations will not

resolve Pakistan’s policy dilemmas or realize its
hopes. But it may help to understand the reality of
shifting U.S. interests in the region and why Pakistan
has sometimes been important and sometimes not,
and what to expect from Washington, and what not to
expect, as the Biden administration concludes its
review of foreign policy, including the relationship
with Pakistan.

Neither Strategic Nor Transactional 

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As Richard Armitage, then-deputy secretary of state,

admitted in 2002, Pakistan was never important to
the United States in its own right. It was important, he
said, because of third parties. The implication was
that Pakistan had no permanent value for the U.S.,
and its importance for Washington derived from the
importance of South Asia more broadly.

South Asia’s importance for Washington until the end

of the Cold War was limited and variable. Now the
region is far more relevant to the United States for

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geopolitical, national security, and economic reasons.

This requires Washington to invest in wider and
longer term regional engagement in which both India
and Pakistan have a place. But that place it is not next
to each other. While India occupies a strategic space,
Pakistan has been on shifting sand. 

If the U.S. cannot have a strategic relationship with

Pakistan, has the relationship been transactional
then? Yes and no. It was transactional, but dealing
with strategic issues. And even the transactional
relationship has not been working well because of
contradictions within it and between each side’s
relationships with other countries.

Paradoxes in the Pakistan-U.S. relationship are not

new. They have existed since the very beginning and
lie at the heart of misperceptions about the
relationship. The two countries have had very high
profile relations from time to time, even bearing
characteristics of close allies. And yet Pakistan
suffered frequent sanctions reserved for adversaries.
Periodically the U.S. leadership has praised Pakistan
sky high as an ally. Yet Islamabad has also been
maligned by Washington. This is all the more
puzzling considering that the Pakistan-U.S.
relationship has historically served some of the
critical national interests of the two countries and
may do so again.

A Very “Special” Relationship

In their first engagement during the early years of the

Cold War Pakistan had important symbolic value as
an ally both as the then-largest Muslim country with a
salient geopolitical location, and as a link in the U.S.
chain of alliances from Europe to the Middle East to
Asia in the Cold War’s containment policy. 

During each phase of their relationship thereafter —

during the 1980s against the Soviets in Afghanistan
and their post-9/11 engagement — the specific task
given to Islamabad by Washington was critically
important not only in foreign policy terms, but also
politically in U.S. domestic politics.

As a result, the relationship came to have two

unusual attributes. Pakistan was handled by
successive administrations in the United States in
ways that were far out of proportion to the country’s
normal importance. Given the impact on domestic
politics and nature of the relationship — most of the
dealings with Pakistan related to military and
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intelligence cooperation — the White House was

driving ties.

Secondly, focusing as it did on intelligence and

military cooperation, much of the relationship with
Pakistan came to have an “underworld” aspect that
was beyond public view. Meanwhile, on the surface in
the U.S., Pakistan’s importance was not so evident.
That presented a recurring challenge for U.S.
administrations to orchestrate domestic political
support for Pakistan, particularly as the country also
embodied some negative features.

To this end successive U.S. administrations

exaggerated Pakistan’s geopolitical importance and
its role as an ally and discounted the negative sides.
Similarly, the Pakistani establishment — specially a
military government — sexed up the relationship to
broaden public support for it and blunt its own
unpopularity. 

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The United States made its own efforts to build public

support for the military governments, which were
providing help that a democratic and nationalist
government in Pakistan would not. President Richard
Nixon called Pakistan the United States’ “most allied
ally” and announced that relations with Pakistan
were a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. President
Ronald Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz
eulogized Pakistan as a front-line state, praising
President Zia ul Haq highly. President George W. Bush
cozied up to President Pervez Musharraf by saying he
could do business with him.

All of this created serious problems. When the special

need that had brought the two countries close was
fulfilled, and the relationship returned to normal the
U.S. side found Pakistan falling far short of its inflated
image as an ally. Pakistan’s conduct came under
heavy scrutiny across the board in media and
Congress. And there were cries of betrayal.

There were equally strong charges of betrayal by

Pakistanis. Most Pakistanis, like most foreigners, have
little understanding of the formation of public policy
in the United States and did not realize the American
leadership’s laudatory remarks were political
statements, not policy statements. They came to think
of the inflated relationship with the U.S. as the
natural default position, not an exaggerated position
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of convenience. They were then outraged when the

U.S. imposed various sanctions on Pakistan, in the lull
between moments of necessity in the alliance.
Pakistanis strongly believed their help to the U.S. had
an enormous importance, especially in the
Afghanistan war of the 1980s and the war on
terrorism. They feel that after 9/11 they not only gave
help but also suffered horrifically from the
consequences of the war in Afghanistan. 

A Changed South Asia

Where do we go from here? South Asia has changed

and so has the way big powers relate to it. After one
of the worst periods in the history of the relations
recently, owing largely to the troubled Afghanistan
war and the rising tide of India-U.S. relations,
Pakistan-U.S. ties might see some stability and new
meaning in the steadying hands of Biden. The United
States may now be looking at the relationship as part
of its broader interests in South Asia, which are
geopolitical, regional, and security related. Some
interests will be served by India, while others served
better by Pakistan. These two relationships now serve
different U.S. purposes, some of which conflict, and
some overlap. To maximize the benefits from both the
relationships, especially from the arguably more
important matters with India, Washington will steer
clear of India-Pakistan disputes, except for crisis
management.  

Pakistan needs to learn from its misunderstood

history of relations and adjust according to the vastly
changed times. Because of intensifying competition
between the U.S. and China, Pakistan’s geopolitical
location and close ties with China can work both as
an asset and a liability. It depends on what Pakistan
makes of it. Washington cannot leave Islamabad
entirely dependent on China and useful only to
Beijing’s strategic purposes. But in order to be useful
to both the U.S. and China, Pakistan has to build
internal strength, raise its contribution to peace
efforts in region, help stabilize Afghanistan, and
enhance its potential as an economic partner.
Ultimately what is good for Pakistan will be good for
Pakistan-U.S. relations.

Finally, Pakistan should scale down its expectations

of the U.S. and try to lower Washington’s
expectations for Islamabad. It should treat the
relationship with the U.S. as necessary, but not
critical.
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AUTHORS

GUEST AUTHOR

Touqir Hussain
Touqir Hussain is an adjunct professor at Georgetown
University and visiting senior research fellow at
National University of Singapore. He is a former
ambassador of Pakistan and diplomatic adviser to the
prime minister.

TAGS

The Pulse Diplomacy Security South Asia Pakistan United States

Biden administration Pakistan Pakistan foreign policy

U.S. South Asia Strategy U.S.-Pakistan history U.S.-Pakistan Relations

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