CUI V.
CUI Under this criterion, Jesus is not entitled as against Antonio, to
The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable institution
established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna
Cui for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent
invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons.” It acquired
corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239). Sec. 2 of the
Act gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in
case of their incapacity or death, to “such persons as they may
nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them.
(embodied in Sec. 2 of the spouses deed of donation)”
Jesus Ma. Cui and Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the
sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don
Pedro and Dona Benigna Cui.
In 1960, the then incumbent administrator of the Hospicio,
resigned in favor of Antonio Cui pursuant to a “convenio”
entered into between them that was embodied on a notarial
document.
Jesus Cui, however had no prior notice of either the “convenio”
or of his brother’s assumption of the position. Upon the death
of Dr. Teodoro Cui, Jesus Cui wrote a letter to his brother
Antonio, demanding that the office be turned over to him.
When the demand was not complied, Jesus filed this case.
Lower court ruled in favor of Jesus.
ISSUE
Whether or not titulo de abogado means mere possession of
academic degree of Bachelor of Laws rendering Jesus as the
rightful administrator of Hospicio de San Jose de Barili
RULING
Antonio should be the Hospicio’s administrator. Jesus is the
older of the two and under equal circumstances would be
preferred pursuant to sec.2 of the deed of donation. However,
before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives
preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of
the nephews named, who if not a lawyer (titulo de abogado),
should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that
order; or if failing all theses, should be the one who pays the
highest taxes among those otherwise qualified.
Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of laws but is not a
member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations.
Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar
and although disbarred in 1957, was reinstated by resolution,
about two weeks before he assumed the position of
administrator of the Hospicio.
The term “titulo de abogado” means not mere possession of
the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in
the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the
practice of law. A Bachelor’s degree alone, conferred by a law
school upon completion of certain academic requirements,
does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. By
itself, the degree merely serves as evidence of compliance
with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations
has “successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a
law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of
Education.
The founders of the Hospicio provided for a lwayer, first of all,
because in all of the works of an administrator, it is presumed,
a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the
profession would be a distinct asset.
the office of administrator. Reference is made to the fact that
the Antonio was disbarred (for immorality and unprofessional
conduct). However, it is also a fact, that he was reinstated
before he assumed the office of administrator. His
reinstatement is recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon
proof no less than that required for his admission to the Bar in
the first place. Also, when defendant was restored to the roll of
lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his
previous disbarment were wiped out.
IN RE: ALMACEN
Vicente Raul Almacen’s “Petition to Surrender Lawyer’s
Certificate of Title,” filed a protest against what he therein
asserts is “a great injustice committed against his client by
Supreme Court”. He indicts SC, in his own phrase, as a
tribual “peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for
justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable
decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution
with impunity.” His clients were deeply aggrieved by this
Court’s “unjust judgment,” has become one of the sacrificial
victims before the altar of hypocrisy.” He ridicules the members
of the Court, saying that “justice as administered by the
present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but
also deaf and dumb.” He then vows to argue the cause of his
client “in the people’s forum,” so that “people may know of the
silent injustices committed by this court’ and that “whatever
mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must
never be repeated.” He ends his petition with a prayer that:
“………a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive
the certificate of the undersigned attorney that at any time in
the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence,
we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest
profession.”
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case
entitled Yaptichay v. Calero, in which Atty. Almacen was
counsel for the defendant. The trial court rendered judgment
against his client. Atty. Almacen received a copy of the
decision. Twenty days later on he moved for its
reconsideration but did not notify the latter of the time and
place of hearing on said motion. For lack of proof of service,
the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve
on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for
reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed a second motion for
reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial
court upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who earlier,
had already perfected the appeal. Motion for reconsideration
was denied by Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Almacen as a lawyer can scrutinize the
official conduct of members of Supreme Court
RULING
Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of
the court and as citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms
and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.
As a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not
only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to
avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he
“professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official
conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen. Atty. Almacen is suspended from
the practice of law until further orders.
DIAO V. MARTINEZ
Martinez charged Diao with having falsely represented in his
application for Bar examination, that he had the requisite
academic qualifications. The matter was in due course referred
to the Solicitor-General who caused the charge to be
investigated; and later he submitted a report recommending
that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because
contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this
Court, Diao had not completed, before taking up law subjects,
the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department
of Private Education
ISSUE
Whether or not passing the bar examination the only
qualification in becoming attorney-at-law
RULING
Diao was not qualied to take the bar examinations; but due to
his false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily
passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such
admission having been obtained under false pretenses must
be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing such examination is n o t t
h e o nly qualication to become an attorney-at-law; taking the
prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is
KHAN V. SIMBILIO
A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was
published which reads: “Annulment of Marriage Specialist
[contact number]”. Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme Court,
called up the number but it was Mrs. Simbillo who answered.
She claims that her husband, Atty. Simbillo was an expert in
handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree
within 4-6mos provided thecase will not involve separation of
property and custody of children.
An administrative complaint was filed which was referred to the
IBP for investigation and recommendation. The IBP resolved to
suspend Atty. Simbillo for 1year. Note that although the name
of Atty. Simbillo did not appear in the advertisement, he
admitted the acts imputed against him but argued that he
should not be charged. He said that it was time to lift the
absolute prohibition against advertisement because the
interest of the public isn’t served in any way by the prohibition.
ISSUE
Whether or not advertising as annulment of marriage specialist
a violation as an attorney-at-law
RULING
Yes, the practice of law is not a business --- it is a profession in
which the primary duty is public service and money. Gaining
livelihood is a secondary consideration while duty to public
service and administration of justice should be primary.
Lawyers should subordinate their primary interest. Worse,
advertising himself as an “annulment of marriage specialist” he
erodes and undermines the sanctity of an institution still
considered as sacrosanct --- he in fact encourages people
otherwise disinclined to dissolve their marriage bond.
Solicitation of business is not altogether proscribed but for it to
be proper it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal
profession. Note that the law list where the lawyer’s name
appears must be a reputable law list only for that purpose --- a
lawyer may not properly publish in a daily paper,
magazine…etc., nor may a lawyer permit his name to be
published the contents of which are likely to deceive or injure
the public or the bar.
UI V. BONIFACIO
Lesli Ui found out that her husband Carlos Ui was carrying out
an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with
whom he begot two children. Hence, a complaint for
disbarment was filed by complainant against respondent
before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines on the ground of immorality, more
particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the
complainant’s husband. It is Atty. Iris’s contention that her
relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were
married abroad and that when she discovered Carlos Ui’s true
civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Atty. Iris averred
that Carlos Ui never lived with her.
ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Iris has conducted herself in an immoral
manner for which she deserves to be barred from the practice
of law.
RULING
The complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L.
Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, was dismissed. All the facts
taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that
respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs.
However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui,
clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid
marriage, cannot be considered immoral.
For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the
moral norms of society and the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community. Moreover, for such
conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be
“grossly immoral,” that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree.
IN RE: CUEVAS
Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr. was convicted for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide, for his participation in the September
1991 initiation rites of LEX TALIONIS FRATERNITY wherein a
neophyte died as a result of personal violence inflicted upon
him.
Petitioner applied for and was granted probation. On May 10,
1995, he was discharged from probation and his case was
closed and terminated.
Petitioner was allowed to take the bar examinations subject to
the condition that; should he pass he will not be allowed to take
the lawyer’s oath pending approval by the Court.
He passed the 1996 Bar Examinations and now prays that he
be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner Cuevas has the moral fitness
required to take the lawyer’s oath
RULING
Cuevas is allowed to take the LAWYER’S OATH and sign the
ROLL OF ATTORNEYS. The Court shares the sentiment of
Atty. Camaligan, father of hazing victim and condoles with the
untimely death of a son who is expected to become a lawyer
and succeed his father.
In his comment submitted to the Court, Atty. Camaligan
submits petitioner’s plea to be admitted to the membership to
the Philippine Bar, to the sound and judicious discretion of the
Court. The deliberate participation of Cuevas in the senseless
beating of a helpless neophyte which resulted to his death
indicates that petitioner does not possess the moral fitness
required for admission to the Bar.
However, petitioner was discharged from probation without any
infraction thereafter of the conditions of the probation and the
various certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and
civic-oriented character prove that he has taken decisive steps
to purge himself of his deficiency in moral character and atone
for the unfortunate death of Camaligan.
The Court then decides to give petitioner a chance in the same
manner that it allowed AL ARGOSINO, petitioner’s co-accused
to take the lawyer’s oath.
ULEP V. LEGAL CLINIC
Mauricio C. Ulep prays before the Supreme Court "to order the
The Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease and desist from issuing
advertisements. and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities
from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the
law profession other than those allowed by law.”
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above
reproduced are champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law
profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community
in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended
by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his
petition as herein before quoted.
In its answer to the petition, The Legal Clinic admits the fact of
publication of said advertisements at its instance, but claims
that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering
of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of
modern computers and electronic machines. The Legal Clinic
further argues that assuming that the services advertised are
legal services, the act of advertising these services should be
allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates
and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided
by the United States Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not the services offered by The Legal Clinic, Inc.,
as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either
case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the
The Legal Clinic constitute practice of law. The definition of
“practice of law” is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs.
Monsod, as defined: "practice of law as the rendition of
services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with
his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising
and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, in conveyance with the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice
to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken
for them in matters connected with the law."
The contention of The Legal Clinic that it merely offers legal
support services can neither be seriously considered nor
sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own
description of the services it has been offering.
While some of the services being offered by The Legal Clinic
merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as
the installation of computer systems and programs for the
efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of
research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an
exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out
legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that
such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more
apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about
foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the
credulity of this Court that respondent corporation will simply
 do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and
stop there as if it were merely a bookstore.
With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily
have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and
advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as
may be provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for which services it will
consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely
within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law."
Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that
respondent corporation does not represent clients in court
since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not
limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal
research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out
its services is not controlling.
What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by
virtueof the nature of the services it renders which thereby
brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against
the advertisements which it has caused to be published and
are now assailed in this proceeding.
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's
advertisement of his talents. (SEE CANON 2) A lawyer cannot,
without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his
talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant
advertising his goods. The proscription against advertising of
legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the
fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession.
The canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising
possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be
earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a
way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That
publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is
rightand proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no
artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He
easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.
ARCIGA V. MANIWANG
Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in Cebu
City when Magdalena was still a medical technology student
and Segundino was a law student. Magdalena and Segundino
had sexual congress. Thereafter, they had repeated acts of
cohabitation. Segundino started telling his acquaintances that
he and Magdalena were secretly married.
Segundino transferred and continued his studies in Davao
City. Magdalena discovered that she was pregnant. The two
went to her hometown, Ivisan, Capiz to apprise Magdalena’s
parents that they were married although they were not.
Segundino convinced Magdalena’s father to have the church
wedding deferred until after he had passed the bar
examinations where he secured his birth certificate preparatory
to applying for a marriage license.
· Segundino reassured Magdalena that he would marry once
he passed the bar examinations. The latter gave birth to their
child.
·
Segundino passed the bar examinations and after the
oathtaking, Segundino stopped corresponding with Magdalena.
Magdalena went to Davao to contact Segundino but she was
told that they could not get married for lack of money.
· Magdalena followed Segundino in Bukidnon only to find out
that their marriage could not take place because he had
married another woman.
· Segundino followed Magdalena in Davao and inflicted physical
injuries upon her because she had a confrontation with his
wife, Erlinda Ang.
· Magdalena Arciga then filed a disbarment case on the ground
of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his
promise of marriage to her.
ISSUE
· Whether or not breach of promise to marry by an attorney
constitutes gross immoral conduct that would render
disbarment
RULING
· No, Segundino Maniwang shouldn’t be disbarred. It is difficult
to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to
what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral
delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar.
The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional
behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct
that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined
as "that conduct which is willful, agrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good
and respectable members of the community."
There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be in
consonance with the canons of the moral code but he is not
subject to disciplinary action because his misbehavior or
deviation from the path of rectitude is not glaringly scandalous.
It is in connection with a lawyer's behavior to the opposite sex
where the question of immorality usually arises. Whether a
lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without
the benefit of marriage should be characterized as "grossly
immoral conduct" will depend on the surrounding
circumstances.
The Supreme Court found that Segundino’s refusal to marry
Magdalena was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant
disbarment. The complaint for disbarment against the
respondent is hereby dismissed.
CUETO V. JIMENEZ
Engr. Cueto was contracted to build a building for 5 Million for
Jimenez III. Cueto decided to have the contract notarized and
he chose Atty. Jose Jimenez, Jr., father of Jimenez III, to
notarize the said contract.
Before the notarization, the complainant did not how much will
Atty. Jimenez be charging. So he was surprise when after the
notarization, he was being asked to pay PhP 50,000.00. The
complainant paid in cash the amount of PhP 30,000.00 and he
issued a check worth PhP 20,000.00 to Atty. Jimenez Jr.
Later, the complainant advised Atty. Jimenez Jr. not to encash
the check yet because he has insufficient funds.
Notwithstanding, Atty. Jimenez still tried to encash the check
hence it was dishonored. Atty. Jimenez then filed a criminal
suit against Cueto.
ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Jimenez, Jr.’s action is appropriate
RULING
He violated Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) which states: “a lawyer shall avoid
controversies with clients concerning his compensation and
shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition,
injustice or fraud.”
There was no intention on the part of the Cueto to commit
fraud against the Atty. Jimenez Jr. as he paid 30,000.00 as
downpayment.
It just that, ironically, the reason why the Cueto does not have
sufficient fund in his account was that Jimenez II has failed to
pay the Cueto’s professional services in the building project.
Jimenez Jr. was severely reprimanded by the Supreme Court
for violating Rule 20.4, Canon 20 of the CPR.
IN RE: ARGOSINO
Al Caparros Argosino had passed the bar examinations but
was denied of taking the Lawyer’s Oath and to sign the Rolls of
Attorneys due to his conviction of “reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide” from a hazing incident.
Later in his sentence, he was granted probation by the court.
He filed a petition to the Supreme Court praying that he be
allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and sign the Rolls of
Attorneys.
As a proof of the required good moral character he now
possess, he presented no less than fifteen (15) certifications
among others from: two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges,
and six (6) members of religious order. In addition, he, together
with the others who were convicted, organized a scholarship
foundation in honor of their hazing victim.
ISSUE
Whether or not Mr. Argosino should be allowed to take the
Lawyer’s Oath, sign the Rolls of Attorneys, and practice law.
RULING
YES. Petition granted. Given the fact that Mr. Argosino had
exhibited competent proof that he possessed the required
good moral character as required before taking the Lawyer’s
Oath and to sign the Rolls of Attorneys, the Supreme Court
considered the premises that he is not inherently in bad moral
fiber. In giving the benefit of the doubt, Mr. Argosino was finally
reminded that the Lawyer’s Oath is not merely a ceremony or
formality before the practice of law, and that the community
assistance he had started is expected to continue in serving
the more unfortunate members of the society.
IN RE: MEDADO
Medado passed the Philippine bar exams and he took the
Attorney’s Oath at the PICC. He was scheduled to sign in the
Roll of Attorneys but failed to do so allegedly because he had
misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys.
Several years later, while rummaging through his things, he
found said Notice. He then realized that he had not signed in
the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of the
PICC was probably just an attendance record. He thought that
since he already took the oath, the signing of the Roll of
Attorneys was not as important.
The matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys was subsequently
forgotten.In 2005, when Medado attended MCLE seminars, he
was required to provide his roll number for his MCLE
compliances to be credited. Not having signed in the Roll of
Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number. About
seven years later, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying
that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys. Medado
justifies this lapse by characterizing his acts as “neither willful
nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest
error of judgment.
The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant
petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross
misconduct and utter lack of merit, saying that petitioner could
offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the
Roll of Attorneys.
However, the moment he realized that what he had signed was
just an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest
mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, he should
have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the
Philippine Bar, as it was the act of signing therein that would
have made him so. When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose
to continue practicing law, he willfully engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise
transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. At the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to
prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise
applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring
members of the Bar, they are bound to conduct themselves in
accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.
Medado cannot be suspended as he is not yet a full-fledged
lawyer. However, the Court imposed upon him a penalty akin
to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys
one (1) year after receipt of the Resolution. He was also made
to pay a fine of P32,000. Also, during the one-year period,
petitioner was not allowed to engage in the practice of law.

ISSUE

Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to sign the Roll of

Attorneys.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition subject to the

payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to
suspension from the practice of law

Not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be

akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment,
a penalty reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions.
In this case, said action is not warranted.

The Court considered Medado’s demonstration of good faith in

filing the petition himself, albeit after the passage of more than
30 years; that he has shown that he possesses the character
required to be a member of the Philippine Bar; and that he
appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner,
having held various positions at different firms and companies.

However, Medado is not free from all liability for his years of
inaction.

A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification,

because everyone is presumed to know the law and its
consequences. Medado may have at first operated under an
honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had
signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was
already the Roll of Attorneys.
BOLIVAR V. SIMBOL
Bolivar lived with and financially supported Simbol in his
studying for law school and other personal necessities since he
promised marriage to Bolivar.
But as soon as Simbol finished his studies he married another
woman while keeping it a secret from Bolivar and continuing to
get money from her. But when Bolivar found his secret, Simbol
still tried to ask money from her and persuade her to continue
their relationship.
The fact that complainant has withdrawn her complaint against
respondent does not wipe out the grievous offense he had
committed. Respondent "has failed to maintain the highest
degree of morality expected and required of a member of the
bar. Therefore, he is guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" within
the meaning of Secti
on 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court

This prompted Bolivar to file a Civil Case of the Juvenile &

Domestic Relations Court against Simbol but this did not
prosper since Atty. Simbol and Miss Concepcion had executed
a compromise agreement.

But the Sol Gen filed for disbarment proceedings on moral

grounds against Atty. Simbol. So, the Clerk of Court sent a
mail to respondent thru Atty. Valentino G. Castro, his counsel
of record, a letter with a copy of the foregoing complaint. Atty.
Castro replied that after the execution of the compromise
agreement between Bolivar and Atty. Simbol, he no longer
heard from Atty. Simbol.

He further stated that he tried to get in touch with the

respondent but was unable to do so and he requested that
copy of the complaint be sent directly to said respondents
address. So the Court did as what was requested but the letter
returned with the notation on the envelope that said
respondent was no longer in that city.

ISSUES
Whether or not Atty. Simbol is guilty of "grossly immoral
conduct" under Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court

RULING
Under Section 30, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states
that Attorneys has to be heard before removal or suspension.
But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer
the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter.

In view of this rule, respondent knew that the disbarment

proceedings were pending. His right to practice his profession
was at stake. He could ill-afford to just stand by and wait.

It was his duty to inquire as to his fate. He was hidebound by

his obligation to inform this Court of his whereabouts.
Furthermore, notice of hearing was sent to him at both his
Manila and Dumaguete addresses and he did not bother to get
it from the post-office.

Even his two attorneys of record, who received said notice, did
not appear before this Court. On the face these facts,
respondent gave the Court ample reason to believe that he
purposely stayed away and waived his right to be heard.
Therefore, the case can prosper.

Respondent's acts of making a dupe of complainant, living on

her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and
other personal necessities while dangling before her the
mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had
finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while
continuing to demand money from complainant, and trying to
sponge on her and persuade her to resume their broken
relationship after the latter's discovery of his immoral acts, are
indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the bar.