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introduction to pipeline
systems
1.1 Introduction
Pipelines affect the daily lives of people in most parts of the world. Modern-day life is
based on structures in which energy fulfills a prevailing role. Oil and gas are major par-
ticipants in this energy supply [1]. The ever shifting trends in forms of energy [2], such as
coal, nuclear, hydro-electric, gas, oil and renewables (Fig. 1-1) will continue to dominate
energy usage in the future, depending on acceptability, safety, technical, environmental,
and economic issues. The rise of renewable types of energy replacing other forms of energy
means that hydrocarbons will also be affected although this will be at least partially offset
by increasing demand.
However, pipelines are the means by which many hydrocarbon-based forms of energy
are transported. It is no coincidence that wherever there is the largest pipeline network, there
is also the highest standard of living and technological progress. Compared with other forms
of transport, pipelines allow a safer, more continuous, stable, and high-capacity supply of
hydrocarbons to reach end-users. Pipeline transportation has the advantages of being well
established, efficient, cost-effective, and readily expandable. In spite of claims that pipe-
lines are not safe and environmentally damaging, pipelines have consistently maintained a
very high safety record that is superior to other types of hydrocarbon transportation.
Pipeline technology is mature and well understood. The capital cost of a pipeline
project is largely a function of its diameter and length, although other factors, such as geog-
raphy and topography, are also significant. Operating expenditures and self-consumption of
product are relatively minor and predictable. Economic feasibility of a pipeline is limited
by variables, such as volumes to be transported, supply–demand distance relationships,
operating pressure, projected reserve life, and various risk factors. These limitations are
more restrictive offshore than onshore.
The relative transportation cost for various petroleum products is depicted in Fig. 1-2.
Although pipelines have been the most cost-effective mode of energy transportation, it can
be inferred from Fig. 1-2 that cost of energy transportation by pipeline is distance- and
location- (offshore versus onshore) dependent [3].
Pipelines are mostly buried. In virtual silence, pipelines supported by pump and com-
pressor stations that carry billions of cubic meters of our energy needs. Unattended pump
stations push oil and petroleum products in large volumes and under high pressure. Simi-
larly, natural gas transmission systems supported by compressor stations move large vol-
umes of gas to multiple destinations.
5
Gas Pipeline - Offshore
4
Gas Pipeline
US$/MBtu
- Onshore
3
LNG
2
1
Oil Pipeline
Oil Tanker
0
800 1600 3200 4800 6400 8000
Distance km
Figure 1-2. Representative costs of oil and gas transportation (US$/MBTU) (Mohitpour et al. [3]).
The liquid pipeline transportation system applies to a variety of liquid hydrocarbons, includ-
ing crude oil, refined petroleum products, liquid petroleum gas, gas to liquids, anhydrous
ammonia, alcohols, and carbon dioxide. Liquid pipelines, including generally consist of
laterals and mainlines which include tank farms, measurement facilities, pumping systems,
pressure reduction, control systems, and pipeline appurtenances (scraper traps, valves, etc.).
As can be seen from Fig. 1-3, pump stations are an integral component of this very exten-
sive network.
Liquid pipelines are used to transport liquids, such as crude and refined oil, from the
source of supply, such as a production area, to the market/demand locations, an export-
loading terminal, or to a processing unit (a refinery). Mainline pump stations are installed
Figure 1-3. Liquid petroleum systems from the wellhead to the consumer [4].
along the transmission pipelines at variable distances to compensate for the pipeline pres-
sure losses and elevation changes and to ensure a constant flow of liquid.
Scopes defining the limit of the pipeline system are well defined by applicable codes,
an example of which is shown in Fig. 1-4 [5]. Also included within the scope of the system
are:
§§ primary and associated auxiliary liquid petroleum and liquid anhydrous ammonia
piping at pipeline terminals (marine, rail, and truck), tank farms, pump stations,
pressure-reducing stations, and metering stations, including scraper traps, strainers,
and prover loops;
§§ storage and working tanks, including pipe-type storage fabricated from pipe and
fittings, and piping interconnecting these facilities;
§§ liquid petroleum and liquid anhydrous ammonia piping located on property which
has been set aside for such piping within petroleum refinery, natural gasoline, gas
processing, ammonia, and bulk plants; and
§§ those aspects of operation and maintenance of liquid pipeline systems relating to the
safety and protection of the general public, operating company personnel, environ-
ment, property, and the piping systems.
Pipeline pumps are used for boosting pressures and for transferring product in both gath-
ering and mainline transmission systems. Centrifugal, reciprocating, and rotary-positive
displacement pumps are generally used for such pipeline applications.
In a pump station located on larger transmission lines, usually one or more high-capacity,
single, or multi-stage centrifugal pumps are installed. They can be driven most commonly
by electric motors usually in the 2–6 MW range but also sometimes by a gas turbine or
diesel engine.
A unique aspect of a liquid pipeline system is that the product is pumped from the
wellhead into a storage tank. From there, the liquid is carried by a gathering system pipeline
(or flowline) to a larger set of storage tanks, also referred to as a terminal. The liquid is then
pumped to the next terminal. This process continues all along the pipeline system, a neces-
sary result of the fact that liquids are essentially incompressible.
Gas is usually considered to be any hydrocarbon-based gas or mixture of gases suitable for
domestic or industrial fuel that is transmitted or distributed to the user by a pipeline/piping
system. The most common types are various compositions of natural gas but other gases
such as hydrogen and carbon dioxide are becoming more prevalent. A gas transmission and
distribution system (Fig. 1-5) consists of the following components:
The components include production wells, gathering lines within the production wells,
processing plants, transmission pipelines, compressor stations (periodically along the trans-
mission pipelines), storage wells and associated gathering pipelines, metering stations and
city gate at distribution centers, distribution piping, and meters at distribution sites (resi-
dential or industrial).
Compression facilities are the heart of gas pipeline systems. Compressor stations trans-
mit natural gas through a pipeline by compressing the gas at intervals along the system.
Compressing gas increases the mass flow and increased pressure is necessary to overcome
friction and elevation. Gas flows by expanding in the pipe from the discharge side (high
pressure point) from one station to the suction side (low pressure point) of the next.
Figure 1-5. Natural gas pipeline systems from the wellhead to the consumer [4].
The use of compression equipment on or related to pipelines covers a wide field, rang-
ing from a small manually operated field compressor up to a large computer-controlled
installation involving many thousands of kilowatts. Compression equipment performs
one or more of the following major functions with respect to the gas pipeline industry in
general:
Transmission. Long-distance mainline transmission is designed with compressor sta-
tions spaced at intervals along the pipeline. The compression ratio across a station, resulting
from pipeline friction losses and typically ranging from 1.2–1.7, is established by the com-
pressor units as they are placed into operation or varied in load. These stations are usually
designed for fully automatic, remotely controlled operation to enable a complete pipeline
system to be operated from a central location.
Lateral Compression. Lateral pipeline transmission is designed to carry gas from one
or more sources to a main pipeline, or from a pipeline to a sales point or distribution system.
Operation varies from base load to “on–off” depending on the situation and can be subject
to large changes. Compression ratios are often higher than for a main line station, with
flows and power requirements being much less.
Field Compression. Field compression and gas gathering stations involve the boosting
of gas field well-head pressures up to a required plant inlet pressure or directly to a pipeline-
operating pressure. Compression ratios are often high, with a slowly declining suction pres-
sure (and therefore increasing pressure ratio) as the gas field becomes depleted.
Interchange Compression. Interchange compression is often required to transfer gas
between different pipeline systems. The operating conditions include variable suction and
discharge pressures, which may vary at random, unaffected by the compressor operation.
Gas Storage Compression. Gas storage compression is designed for injection and with-
drawal of gas from peak shaving or storage reservoirs. These compressor units operate
under a continually changing compression ratio, both on injection and withdrawal, and
would be considered as high-ratio, high-flow, and high-power units.
Booster Compression. Booster compression is designed to raise the pressure from a
low pressure transmission line, for example, to a high pressure line. The units would basi-
cally be considered as transmission units but operating under higher compression ratios.
Gas Recovery Compression. Gas recovery compression is used to raise associated gas
(gas in solution with crude oil) from very low pressures (down to almost atmospheric pres-
sure) up to pipeline transmission pressure. This is a very high-ratio service.
However, their consequences have the potential to be severe (large releases), up to and
including company or industry ending impacts. Worker Safety incidents are much more
frequent but minor in comparison. Both are important, and all safety incidents must be
prevented.
More emphasis on Process Safety Management (as opposed to personal or occupa-
tional safety) is being placed with respect to managing risk and hazards in regulations such
as OSHA 1910.119 Process safety management of highly hazardous chemicals in the US
and the National Energy Board Regulations SOR/99-294 in Canada. While these regula-
tions require programs to be set up for managing risks and hazards, they are not prescriptive
as to how this should be accomplished.
To meet this need, the pipeline industry has published more specific guidance in API
RP1173 [6] that applies to both pipelines and facilities. The major topics it covers are:
Further guidance is provided in national standards such as CAN/CSA Z662 [7] and
CAN/CSA Z767-17 [8]. There are also industry documents such as the recommended
practice on facility integrity [9] by the Canadian Energy Pipeline Association (CEPA).
The CEPA Recommended Practice provides a management systems approach in defining a
Facility Integrity Management Program (FIMP) with more detail on implementing a practi-
cal framework [10]. The main challenge in developing a framework for a FIMP lies in the
broad range of equipment and system types that the management system must encompass.
Equipment, in the context of Facilities Integrity Management, must encompass not only
station equipment (such as rotating equipment, valves, meters etc.,) but also categories such
as high pressure station piping and fuel lines.
The broad range of equipment types gives rise to three main parameters that needed to
be addressed [9]:
A very effective method is the use of bowtie diagrams. Bowtie diagrams are a widely
used method for demonstrating the relationship between the causes and consequences of
hazardous events. They are particularly useful for illustrating how safeguarding meas-
ures protect against particular threats or mitigate the various consequences of an incident.
Figure 1-6 presents an example of a bowtie for a leaking flange at a pump station by show-
ing its key features:
§§ Hazard – a potential source of danger. For a pump station, this would be oil in the
pipe and for a compressor station, the high pressure natural gas in the main piping.
Existence of a hazard does not necessarily imply that an incident will occur.
§§ Top Event – the hazardous event at the center of the diagram. The normal top event
for a pump station would be a Loss of Primary Containment (LOPC), in this case
a flange leak.
§§ Threats – potential causes of the top event, on the left-hand side. One threat for a
flange leak could be a defective flange connection.
§§ Causes – the means by which a threat could result in a tope event. For a defec-
tive connection, causes could be a manufacturing defect in the flange or gasket or
improper installation.
§§ Prevention barriers – measures in place to prevent threats leading to the top event.
Quality inspections at the vendor or during installation could be barriers that would
prevent a cause from leading to a flange leak. There is the likelihood of gasket dete-
rioration as a barrier decay mechanism that would suggest regular replacement or
monitoring would be appropriate, especially for corrosive liquids.
§§ Mitigation barriers – measures in place to prevent the top event from leading to a
more serious consequence. Quick emergency response would be a mitigation bar-
rier and a barrier decay mechanism that would need to be considered is a storage
issue with the emergency response equipment.
Figure 1-6. Example of a bowtie diagram for a flange leak at a pump station.
§§ Consequences – potential outcomes of the top event, on the right-hand side. For
a leaking flange, this would be an oil spill, usually contained with the facility
perimeter.
§§ Effects – actions that would have to be taken to deal with the consequences. In this
case, oil contamination would result and would have to be cleaned up.
Hazards for compressors are due mainly to high pressure and the potential for fire when in a con-
fined space such as the unit building. Piping components are also critical to safety as the weld
failure of a flange on a station gate valve at Princess Compressor Station in Alberta, Canada
on February 23, 1980 showed (Fig. 1-7). High voltage electrical components are a hazard for
electric units. Hermetic compressors are fundamentally very safe due to their sealed design but,
as an incident revealed, the weak point is where the cable supplying the motor is not properly
sealed and process gas can leak back into the control building where it can explode as Fig. 1-8
illustrates [16]. It must be remembered, however, that these types of incidents are very rare.
Mechanical hazards from improper pump or compressor operation could include:
§§ joint failure
§§ loss of piping and pump restraints
§§ corrosion
§§ erosion
§§ failure of connections—overload and fatigue issues
§§ entrapment from contact with rotating shaft or other similar components
Availability
Maintenance Logistic
support support
Need:
Compression of natural gas
Requirement: System/equipment:
Conditions of use:
Provide dependable Gas compressor including motor
Fluid: clean natural gas
compression capacity, safely driver, centrifugal compressor,
Environment: Tropical up
and with minimum controls and instrumentation,
to 40rC ambient
environmental impact sealing and pressurized oil system
Dependability Requirements:
Functional Requirements:
Operational Availability = 98%
Specified head, flow and Time-dependent aspects Reliability (yearly) = 99%
efficiency design point
Maintainability: High
Design according to specified
Maintenance Support: Routine
standards
maintenance done by local staff, major
Electrical and other safety
maintenance with vendor support
requirements as per
Note: this is only an Able to restore to service within a
specified standards
illustrative example to maximum of 3 days
Local and national safety and
clarify the interrelationships Durability: Life of at least 20 years
environmental regulations
between these concepts. Low life cycle cost
positive in enhancing availability and reliability but also negative in the sense of avoidance
of the consequences caused by cessation of required functions.
In general, dependability value can be expressed in the following ways:
System
life cycle Concept/
Concept/de Design/
Design/develo Realizaon/impl
Realizaon/ Operaon/
Operaon/m
Enhancement Rerement
process finion
definion pment
development ementaon
implementaon aintenance
maintenance
Value scenario
Value Operaon/maintenanc
Operaon/
creaon maintenance
e value value
•Risk assessment and
Design value
management plans
Opportunity for •System design for Enhancement value
Manufacturing/inst
Manufacturing/ •Operaon within
value availability •Increased
installaon
allaon value
value design limits
•Demand •Opmizaon of dependability
•Quality control of •Monitoring and
forecasng pipe vs. facilies •Enhanced
manufacturing inspecon of pipelines
•Inial contracts •Reliability-based performance,
•Quality control of •Prevenve and
•Esmated cost pipeline design efficiency
installaon predicve
vs. revenue •Design facilies •Increased cost
•Commissioning maintenance of
•Risk evaluaon for reliability and effecveness
facilies
maintainability •Reduced risk
•Measurement of
•Life cycle cosng
dependability
performance
Figure 1-11. Dependability framework over the life cycle for pipelines [19].
The value of pipelines can be represented by the sequence of life cycle stages, which
constitutes the primary process for value creation. Each life cycle stage from concept
initiation to in-service operation adds value to the process. Figure 1-11 illustrates the
general value creation framework for the system life cycle as applied to pipelines and
facilities.
During the design phase, considering reliability and maintainability are particularly
important and quite a few techniques exist to facilitate these as well as extensive standards,
including international ones by IEC/TC56 [20].
Detailed pipeline system operational capability, reliability, and availability assessment
of a system are described by Mohitpour et al. [21]. In this reference, applicable codes and
standards providing guidelines for assessment of pipeline systems reliability, and avail-
ability/dependability are provided. Fundamentals and techniques are described, and typical
pipeline component failure data are provided. Reliability/availability assessment applica-
tion is then detailed.
Creating value from dependability for compression or pumping facilities leads prima-
rily to these benefits: improved safety, high availability, and reduced costs. Improved safety
applies mainly to employees and contractors and not so much the public so it is less critical
than for pipelines.
Availability is linked to meeting delivery contract requirements and providing cus-
tomer satisfaction. The impact of compressor/pump downtime is very dependent on the
number of stand-by units installed and, especially for gas pipelines, the flexibility of the
pipeline itself in handling short term downtime which will guide the tradeoff between avail-
ability and capital and operating costs.
Reduced costs may range from short-term cost comparisons to long-term life cycle
costing (LCC is also known as TCO or total cost of ownership). LCC studies are best done
during equipment acquisition and used to compare alternatives.
The major steps in a LCC analysis are:
The concept of a RAM model stems from Reliability Block Diagram methods [23].
Interaction of large, complex and multi layered systems can then be analyzed using the
Monte Carlo simulation methods (or Stochastic Discrete Event Simulation) hence quanti-
fying the output of the entire system with greater accuracy than other estimating tools or
methods. Over 10 years, the company has developed its own failure database for equipment
and operational events, so consequently almost all model inputs are based on in-house
data rather than industry generic data, making the model output more robust, accurate and
appropriate for internal use [22].
Initially, RAM models were mainly built to assess and confirm the design capabilities of
future pipeline designs and assist in the optimal selection of specific design options. Because
of the effectiveness of the tool combined with the current cost constrained business environ-
ment, the company is moving towards building RAM models for assets already in operation in
order to optimize their performance. This is proving to be an extremely cost effective addition
to internal decision making processes. The approach has been used in risk-based budgeting,
asset maintenance, design modifications and throughput optimization initiatives.
RAM models are usually built for two types of systems depending on size and
complexity:
The RAM process model for a complex system with inputs and outputs usually required
is shown in Fig. 1-12. Not all inputs or outputs may be required. Also, if they are required,
they may be quite simple. For example, flow inputs for one booster pump model may only
have 3 states i.e. off, nominal or design flow. Whereas a 1,000 km pipeline may have 150-
200 states, one for each combination of pump or station outage on the pipeline.
Outputs from the model can be customized both in types of data and formats. As an
example, Fig. 1-13 shows overall throughput performance and the probability distribution
of achievement.
REFERENCES
[1] Mohitpour, M., 2008. Energy Supply and Pipeline Transportation—Challenges and Opportunities,
ASME Press, New York.
[2] BP Energy Outlook, 2018. BP p.l.c. 2018, https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics
/energy-outlook.html, p. 68.
[3] Mohitpour, M., Dawson, J., Babuk, T. and Jenkins, A., 2000. “Concepts for Increased Natural Gas
Supply—a Pipeline Perspective,” Presented at Forum 11, 16th World Petroleum Congress, June 11–15,
Calgary, AB, Canada.
[4] Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, “About
Pipelines,” https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov.
[5] ASME (American Society of Mechanical Engineers), 2016. “Pipeline Transportation Systems for
Liquid Hydrocarbons and Slurries,” ASME Code for Pressure Piping, B31.4, An American National
Standard.
[6] API Recommended Practice 1173, 2015. “Pipeline Safety Management Systems,” American Petro-
leum Institute, First Edition, 27 pages.
[7] CAN/CSA Z662-15, 2015. “Oil and Gas Pipeline Systems,” Canadian Standards Association, 868
pages.
[8] CAN/CSA-Z767-17, 2017. “Process safety management,” Canadian Standards Association, 48
pages.
[9] Canadian Energy Pipeline Association, 2013. “Facilities Integrity Management Program Recom-
mended Practice,” 1st Edition, May 2013 (www.cepa.com).
[10] Sahney, R., Reed, M. and Skibinsky, D., 2014. “The Development of a Facilities Integrity Management
Program Recommended Practice for Canadian Energy Pipelines,” Proceedings of the 10th International
Pipeline Conference, IPC2014-33746, Sept. 29–Oct. 3, 2014, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, 9 pages.
[11] IEC/ISO 31010:2009. “Risk management - Risk assessment techniques,” Edition 1.0, 2009-11-27, 188
pages.
[12] IEC 61882:2016. “Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP studies)—Application guide,” Edition 2.0,
International Electrotechnical Committee, 2016-03-10, 124 pages.
[13] IEC 60812:2006. “Analysis techniques for system reliability—Procedure for failure mode and effects
analysis (FMEA),” International Electrotechnical Committee, 2006-01-25, 93 pages.
[14] IEC 61025:2006. “Fault tree analysis (FTA),” Edition 2.0, International Electrotechnical Committee,
2006-12-13, 103 pages.
[15] Pettitt, G. and Pennicott, P., 2016. “Use of Bowties for Pipeline Safety Management,” Proceedings
of the 10th International Pipeline Conference, IPC2016-64243, Sept. 26–30, 2016, Calgary, Alberta,
Canada, 9 pages.
[16] Pipeline Investigation Report P00H0061, 2000. “Natural Gas Compressor Station Occurrence,” Trans-
portation Safety Board of Canada, 71 pages.
[17] Van Hardeveld, T. and Kiang, T.D., 2012. “Practical Application of Dependability Engineering,”
ASME Press, New York.
[18] ISO 20815:2008. “Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries—Production assurance and
reliability management,” First Edition, 2008-06-01.
[19] Van Hardeveld, T. and Kiang, T.D., 2012. “Achieving Dependability Value for Pipelines and Facili-
ties,” Proceedings of the 9th International Pipeline Conference, IPC 2012, September 24–28, 2012,
Calgary, Alberta, Canada.
[20] IEC/TC56 website, http://tc56.iec.ch/index-tc56.html, accessed March 9, 2018.
[21] Mohitpour, M., Szabo, J. and Van Hardeveld, T., 2004. Pipeline Operation and Maintenance—A Practi-
cal Approach, ASME Press, New York, pp. 565–606.
[22] Jones, B.M. and Ferrari, A.-M., 2016. “Reliability, Availability and Maintainability (RAM) Simulation
Models in Pipeline Systems,” Proceedings of the 10th International Pipeline Conference, IPC2016-
64205, Sept. 26–30, 2016, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, 10 pages.
[23] IEC 61078:2016. “Reliability block diagrams,” Edition 3.0, International Electrotechnical Committee,
2016-08-12, 250 pages.