Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

ISSN: 1057-610X (Print) 1521-0731 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uter20

Introducing the 1993 Terrorism and Political

Violence Dataset

Benjamin Acosta & Kristen Ramos

To cite this article: Benjamin Acosta & Kristen Ramos (2016): Introducing the 1993
Terrorism and Political Violence Dataset, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, DOI:
10.1080/1057610X.2016.1184061

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1184061

Accepted author version posted online: 28

Apr 2016.
Published online: 02 Jun 2016.

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 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1184061

RESEARCH NOTE

Introducing the 1993 Terrorism and Political Violence Dataset

Benjamin Acostaa and Kristen Ramosb
a
Department of Political Science, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA, USA; bDepartment of Government
and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park, College Park, MD, USA

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

The introduction of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) nearly a decade Received 14 February 2016
ago sparked a revolution in terrorism studies. However, one major flaw in Accepted 25 March 2016
the database continues to plague GTD users. Data lost prior to
digitalization, along with unsuccessful data recollection efforts, have left
GTD without data on events that took place during the year 1993. The
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missing data prevents researchers from using the entirety of GTD’s annual
range (1970–2014) to conduct reliable time-series analyses. Additionally, it
has likely contributed to the formation of theories and claims on faulty
empirical ground. To remedy the problem, we have collected data on
4,206 unique terror-attack incidents, with the aim of documenting the
universe of 1993 terrorism events. This article showcases our 1993 dataset
and illustrates the importance of terrorism events in 1993 for the
development of conflicts in Israel, Afghanistan, Colombia, and India.

Over the last 15 years, scholarship on terrorism and political violence has skyrocketed. Many
studies, and numerous large-n analyses in particular, now rely on data from the National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism’s (START) Global Ter-
rorism Database (GTD).1 Far more extensive than competing datasets that document indi-
vidual attacks, GTD has facilitated the analysis of terrorism globally,2 by country,3 by
organization,4 by campaign,5 and in various other important ways.6 One major flaw, how-
ever, prevents scholars from utilizing GTD to run reliable time-series analyses across the
entirety of the database’s annual range (1970–2014), and has likely contributed to the forma-
tion of theories and claims on faulty empirical ground.
This problem stems from the loss of data for the year 1993. The data loss apparently
occurred before the original data collection team at Pinkerton Global Intelligence Services
(PGIS) transferred its hard copies to the START headquarters at the University of Maryland
at College Park.7 According to START’s website: “PGIS lost data for 1993 in an office move
and these data have never been fully recovered.”8 START did attempt to “recollect” 1993
data but only identified 748 separate attack incidents9 and consequently has decided to leave
the limited event data off its popular searchable website.10 START notes that because of the
low number of observations in comparison to preceding and subsequent years, it has

CONTACT Kristen Ramos kramos1@umd.edu Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland,
College Park, 3140 Tydings Hall, 7343 Preinkert Drive, College Park, MD 20742, USA.
Color versions of one or more figures in the article can be found online at www.tandfonline.com/uter.
© 2016 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
 2 B. ACOSTA AND K. RAMOS

excluded the limited replacement data “from the GTD data to prevent users from misinter-
preting the low frequency in 1993 as an actual count.”11
Although START “reconstructed” country-level aggregate data,12 without comprehensive
disaggregated 1993 event data, it remains difficult to utilize GTD for dynamic time-series
analyses at the event or organizational level going back before 1994. Or, alternatively, it
leaves scholars with the option of running dynamic analyses between 1970 and 1992. Either
way, the missing 1993 data splits GTD roughly down the middle—nullifying its greater
potential.
Scholars have tried to sidestep the missing data problem in several ways. Some studies
simply begin their analyses after 1993,13 rely on competing datasets containing fewer overall
incidents,14 or insert incomplete alternative data.15 Some average 1992 and 1994 data in
efforts to estimate 1993 incidents.16 Others advance more sophisticated quarterly estimation
techniques.17 Countless studies that use GTD simply neglect to acknowledge the missing
1993 data and do not try to correct for its absence.18 Some draw specific theoretical infer-
ences from a yearly range including 1993 yet do not take into account the year’s missing
events,19 and others wrongly count zero attacks for 1993 in dynamic analyses of certain
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organizations.20 This article contends that only a new dataset that captures the universe or
near universe of 1993 events can fully satisfy methodological concerns in studies with a
time-series or time-milestone element.
The problem of missing data for an entire year poses a host of issues in addition to sty-
mieing dynamic analyses. Due to the importance of GTD and its general reliability, the
greatest problem perhaps rests in scholars ignoring distinct or clustered incidents of terror-
ism and political violence that transpired in 1993 that may have significant theoretical or
empirical implications. Indeed, the missing data has already led to the emergence of theories
based on faulty empirical ground.
For example, an oft-cited myth of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict maintains that Pal-
estinian organizations adopted suicide terrorism as a reaction to an attack on Muslim-
Palestinians in 1994 by a Jewish-Israeli gunman. Early on 25 February 1994, after word
had spread of Palestinian plans to attack Jews while celebrating Purim, Baruch Gold-
stein decided to act preemptively.21 Carrying an IMI Galil rifle, Goldstein open fired
on Muslim worshippers, killing 29 and injuring over a hundred. Researchers often attri-
bute this incident to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) deciding to start carry-
ing out suicide attacks against Israelis. In reality, nine Palestinian suicide bombers
struck Israeli targets in 1993.22 Nevertheless, several scholars who have published on
suicide terrorism have repeated the refrain that Goldstein’s attack led to the Palestinian
implementation of suicide attacks. Leading historians of the Israeli–Palestinian con-
flict,23 scholars of Palestinian politics,24 political Islam and jihad,25 as well as some
well-cited researchers of terrorism26 all make the same mistake of marking 1994 as the
year Palestinian organizations adopted suicide attacks.27 In contrast, scholars that rely
on their own datasets of Palestinian terrorist attacks tend to present the correct dates
for the adoption of suicide attacks by Hamas and PIJ,28 along with other Palestinian
organizations.29 As a result, such scholars regularly form very different theories than
those who inaccurately indicate 1994 as the initiation of Palestinian suicide terrorism.
The latter usually fixate on revenge for Goldstein’s attack as the core factor for Palesti-
nian organizations employing the tactic.30 Certainly, we do not blame GTD’s missing
1993 data for the common cross-disciplinary error. But, because GTD is so good in so
 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 3

many other areas, it establishes a dangerous level of scholarly comfort along the line of
well it’s not in GTD, so it probably didn’t happen.31
This research note offers an overview of our data project aimed at filling the 1993 gap in
GTD’s data. In order to facilitate the analysis of lengthier and uninterrupted time-series data
and in a broad effort to shed light on the events of the largely dark year of 1993, we have set
out to identify the universe of attacks that occurred in 1993. Keeping with GTD’s coding
schema, we code select attribute variables for each attack. To document individual attack
events, we refer to scholarly publications, news services and reports, and preexisting smaller
databases and datasets—all of which we note in our sourcing. As of this writing, we have
amassed 4,206 attack events, far surpassing START’s recollection attempt that ended with
748 attacks and approaching the original PGIS aggregate number of 4,954 attacks for the
year. Although our data collection enterprise remains ongoing, we view that our dataset as it
currently stands is essential to facilitating reliable time-series analyses at the event and orga-
nizational levels, as well as preventing the formation of further faulty theories supported by
incomplete empirical analyses.
This study proceeds with five sections. The first section describes our data collection
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methodology. The second section reviews our dataset.32 The third section illustrates four
applications of our data, demonstrating the importance of 1993 events for theorizing and
explaining the development of conflicts in Israel, Colombia, Afghanistan, and Manipur,
India. The fourth section assesses the utility of our data in contrast to the leading estimation
technique. The final section concludes.

Methodology
Data Collection
To document attacks in 1993, we employed an assortment of data collection techniques.
First, and marking the most fruitful of our endeavors, we mined event chronologies
found in scholarly publications. For example, we referred to daily chronologies pub-
lished in scholarly journal outlets like the Middle East Journal and Journal for Palestine
Studies, as well as chronologies recorded by the Center for International Development
and Conflict Management’s Minorities at Risk project.33 Second, we surveyed various
“mini-datasets,” such as RAND’s Database of World Terrorism Incidents (DWTI),
which documents 272 terrorist attacks for 1993,34 GTD’s limited recollection data,
which records 748 incidents,35 the United States (U.S.) State Department Significant
Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans: 1993 report, which documents 87
attacks,36 the United Kingdom Parliament report on Irish Republican violence on the
British mainland, which records 40 attacks for 1993,37 Terrorism in Western Europe:
Event Data (TWEED), which documents 87 attacks for 1993,38 and the Suicide-Attack
Network Database (SAND), which records 15 suicide attacks for 1993.39 We then
searched the archives of a variety of news services for each day in 1993, recording ter-
rorism events. A fourth central method involved searching scholarly books, journal
articles, and reports by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as Human Rights
Watch focusing on one militant organization or a single conflict that may include lists
of attacks. For each attack in our dataset, we list the particular sources used to con-
struct the related variables.
 4 B. ACOSTA AND K. RAMOS

Data Presentation
We code each attack as a separate event. For instance, the Bombay attacks in India on 12
March 1993 included 13 coordinated bombings that ensued on the same day. Our dataset
lists each attack distinctly, coding attributes for individual events.

The Attributes of Attack Events

The dataset tracks the following dimensions and attributes of attack events: ATTACK DATE, per-
petrating ORGANIZATION, ATTACK LOCATION (broken down by city, country region,
country, and global region), number of FATALITIES, number of WOUNDED, TARGET, TAR-
GET TYPE, ATTACK TYPE, WEAPON TYPE, whether the event consisted of a SUICIDE
ATTACK, and whether the attack was tactically SUCCESSFUL. We include notes for some
attacks, documenting novelties or other data that researchers might find useful. Generally, we
have sought to keep coding in line with GTD’s codebook.40
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Addressing Potential Biases

The greatest potential for bias rests in underrepresenting smaller attacks or attacks of less
political or social consequence. Highly politicized conflicts also run the risk of producing
inflated reports on event attributes, like fatality counts. Considering possible biases in source
material, we crosscheck event data from an array of sources and source types.
Additionally, we indicate degrees of certainty in the coding. Event lines or attribute varia-
bles in black reflect a high degree of confidence in the data presented. Lines or variables in
blue denote data with moderate certainty and lines in orange signify data with a lower bar of
assurance in the data. This color-coding schema provides researchers more flexibility in uti-
lizing the data.

Attack Date
We code the DATE in the common day/month/year format, which most closely resembles
the “approx. date” coding in GTD. In some cases, we include attacks with only a partial date
(e.g., the month of occurrence). However, we include “dateless” attacks only after determin-
ing with a high degree of confidence that (1) they took place in 1993 and (2) they do not rep-
resent a case of “double counting”—simply reflecting a previously recorded attack.

Perpetrating Organization
For ease in integrating our 1993 data with GTD, we try to use GTD’s spelling of the names of
ORGANIZATIONS that carry out attacks, which is typically the English translation or name
popularized in the international media. When two or more organizations carried out a joint
attack, we list the names of all involved organizations. For attacks that had no clear perpetra-
tor or when multiple organizations claimed an attack or authorities investigated numerous
suspects but established no sure perpetrator, we code the attacker as “unknown.” If a perpe-
trator acted on his or her own will (i.e., not on the orders of, or in connection with, an orga-
nization), we code the perpetrator/s as “individual/s.” We follow this practice rather than
noting the individual/s’ name/s in order to stay in line with GTD. Additionally, we avoid
using generic perpetrator descriptions, such as “hooded individuals” or “white men.”41
 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 5

In a few cases, although a source did not attribute an attack to an organization, we identi-
fied a discernable pattern in the attack profile—demonstrating a fair degree of certainty of a
particular organization’s responsibility for perpetrating a given attack. For example, sources
rarely credit the Somali National Alliance (SNA)—the formal name of the forces loyal to
General Mohammad Farrah Aidid—for its attacks against United Nations (UN) and U.S.
military targets in Somalia. Nonetheless, our research suggests a great degree of confidence
that the “Somali rebels” notorious for carrying out the attacks were by and large the SNA as
it marked the main functioning militant organization in Somalia in 1993 that attacked UN
and U.S. targets. Any attack that does not fit its modus operandi or in cases where we were
less definite about the attacking organization, we list the SNA’s name in either blue or orange
or list the attack as “unknown.”

Location
We break down attack location similarly to attack locations in GTD, with one notable differ-
ence. Rather than coding “state” location, we name the variable COUNTRY REGION. In
this way, we could list a province or general region of a country where the attack took place,
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especially since this information is more commonly available than the city location. CITY is
coded only when available; COUNTRY is almost always stated. GLOBAL REGION is based
on delineations in the GTD codebook. In cases of kidnappings or hijacking, the location is
from where a plane or vehicle departed or from where an organization abducted hostages—
not where they were taken or intercepted.

Number of Fatalities and Wounded

We aim to only include FATALITY and WOUNDED numbers of attack victims. Attack per-
petrators who were killed or injured during the assault are not included in the totals. This is
also the case for suicide bombers killed during the initiation of their attacks. We list the fatal-
ity of perpetrators in the notes when known.
In cases where different sources conveyed competing numbers of either the amount of
fatalities or wounded, we examine each source for a higher degree of reliability. For example,
later sources regularly have more complete data on killed and wounded, whereas sources
from the day of an attack (e.g., news wires or associated services) may only have initial or
estimated data.
As mentioned above, our dataset lists each attack separately, coding individual attack and
kills totals. One caveat arises when an organization attacks multiple locations on the same
day. In these cases, due to the nature of news reporting, it is not always clear how many fatal-
ities and wounded derived from one attack over another. Accordingly, our dataset lists the
aggregated number for fatalities and wounded of the linked events within the line of the first
attack; the spaces for the numbers of fatalities and wounded of connected incidents (listed
subsequently in the dataset) are marked as red-colored zeros, indicating not that a specific
attack did not kill or injure anyone but rather that a related entry records the totals.

Target, Attack, and Weapon Type

We code TARGET, ATTACK, and WEAPON TYPE using GTD’s coding schema. However,
we only code for the primary weapon and attack type (GTD often goes into much more
detail). In cases involving multiple attack types or weapon types, we frequently list a second-
ary weapon or attack type in the notes.
 6 B. ACOSTA AND K. RAMOS

Suicide Attacks, Tactical Success, and Notes

Both SUICIDE ATTACKS and tactical SUCCESS are binary variables. A 1 indicates the
event was a suicide attack or was tactically successful respectively; a 0 denotes that it
was not a suicide attack or was tactically unsuccessful. Determination of TACTICAL
SUCCESS is based on GTD’s definition. Usually, the only time an attack is not success-
ful is if it was an assassination attempt and the intended target was not killed or if a
bomb or other explosive device fails to detonate (or is found and defused). Even for
attacks where the weapon did not reach the intended target or caused little to no dam-
age, but was executed (i.e., guns were fired, bombs exploded, etc.) the attack is coded
as successful per GTD’s coding schema. As discussed above, the dataset’s NOTES sec-
tion contains extra information, such as the date kidnapping hostages were released or
reasons for a failed attack.

Data Overview
The tables that follow provide comparisons to competing data and GTD averages. Table 1
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contrasts the n of our dataset to that of other databases and datasets. Tables 2 through 5 com-
pare our 1993 statistics with the average yearly totals of GTD data (1970–1992/1994–2014).

Table 1. Number of attacks for 1993 across datasets.

Dataset/database Number of attacks

Our dataset 4,206

GTD’s recollection effort 748
ITERATE 553
Database of World Terrorism Incidents 272
TWEED 87

Table 2. General overview.

Attack Unknown Individual
Organizations Attacks Kills lethality perpetrators perpetrators

Our 1993 data 351 4,206 10,343 2.53 381 51

GTD averages
(1970–1992/1994–2014) 177 3,275 6,048 1.85 1,492 11

Table 3. Attack type.

Attack type 1993 GTD average

Assassination 439 377

Armed assault 1,001 771
Bombing/explosion 1,653 1,540
Hijacking 50 12
Barricade incident 27 17
Kidnapping 193 179
Facility/infrastructure 392 185
Unarmed assault 65 17
Unknown 349 107
 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 7

Table 4. Weapon type.

Weapon type 1993 GTD average

Biological 0 1
Chemical 1 5
Radiological 0 0
Nuclear 0 0
Firearms 1,017 1,080
Explosives/bombs/dynamite 1,713 1,594
Fake weapon 13 1
Incendiary 298 207
Melee 63 60
Vehicle 8 2
Sabotage equipment 63 3
Other 120 2
Unknown 871 250

Figure 1 shows the annual totals of terrorism and political violence from 1970 to 2012.
With the exception of our data for the year 1993, the data derives from the GTD. As of
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this writing, our data accumulation efforts have identified 4,206 individual attacks.
START estimates that the lost PGIS data for 1993 included 4,954 separate attacks for the
year. We are certain that once we complete the application of our data collection method
that our replacement dataset for 1993 will come in around, and likely slightly surpass,
the 4,954-estimate marker point.42
Figure 2 displays the number of organizations launching attacks between 1970 and 2014.
As of this writing, our 1993 data identify 351 unique militant organizations or groups that
perpetrated at least one attack during the year. While less than the 391 in the prior year of
1992 (the peak year for the contemporary era of political violence), the 351 for 1993 sit well
above the 45-year average of 177 organizations.

Table 5. Target type.

Target type 1993 GTD average

Business 223 401

Government 484 409
Police 179 432
Military 804 452
Abortion related 23 6
Airports and aircrafts 63 29
Government (diplomatic) 121 72
Educational institution 6 83
Food or water supply 0 6
Journalists and media 24 56
Maritime 1 7
NGO 19 18
Other 6 7
Private citizens and property 1302 716
Religious figures & institutions 43 78
Telecommunication 1 20
Terrorists/non-state militias 558 50
Tourists 49 9
Transportation 34 136
Unknown 176 65
Utilities 5 119
Violent political parties 11 31
 8 B. ACOSTA AND K. RAMOS
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Figure 1. Number of attacks per year (1970–2012).

Figure 2. Number of organizations conducting attacks (1970–2014).

 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 9
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Figure 3. Organizations with the most attacks in 1993.

Figure 3 illustrates the organizations with the most attacks during 1993. Gulbuddin Hekma-
tyar’s Hizb-e Islami takes the top slot with 785, with the majority of these attacks carried out
within the context of Afghanistan’s ongoing civil conflict. Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami, another mili-
tant organization involved in Afghanistan’s civil conflict, conducted the second most attacks in
1993 with 645. The organizations that carried out the most attacks in 1993 represent organizations
engaged in a wide range of conflict types. From the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey to
Hezbollah in Lebanon to Khun Sa forces in Myanmar, militant organizations executed acts of ter-
rorism in 1993 in pursuit of various outcome goals and political causes.
Figure 4 depicts the organizations with the highest attack lethality rates in 1993. The Lib-
eration Tigers of Tamil Eelam with an average of 66.8 inflicted-kills per attack marked the
most lethal militant organization. Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)-Torit faction
came in a close second with an average of 66.7 inflicted-kills per attack. Many of the most
lethal organizations employed terror tactics amid insurgent campaigns. However, some of
the deadlier organizations, such as D-Company in India or the Medellın Cartel in Colombia,
initially gained infamy through criminal activity before diving into the world of terrorism.

Applications
As noted previously, in addition to facilitating reliable time-series analyses, 1993 data illuminates
key points in the development of specific conflicts. We now review the impact of 1993 events for
four conflict zones: Israel, Afghanistan, Colombia, and Manipur, India. The examples demon-
strate the importance of scholarly treatments including 1993 data in assessments of particular
conflicts.
 10 B. ACOSTA AND K. RAMOS
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Figure 4. Organizations with the highest lethality (average deaths per attack).

Israel
During 1993 political violence in Israel reached exceptionally elevated levels. We document
79 attacks carried out by Hamas, 24 by PIJ, 19 by Fatah and affiliated organizations, 17 by
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), eight by Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Palestine, seven by PFLP-General Command, and 123 by intifada-inspired Pal-
estinians. These findings stand in glaring contrast to popular accounts of the First Intifada
that paint the uprising as basically “nonviolent” or “primarily unarmed protest.”43 They also
uncover problems for studies that mistakenly assume that GTD contains the universe of Pal-
estinian attacks for 1993 and then try to draw inferences from the data.44 Moreover, 1993
terrorism data is essential for an accurate process tracing of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict,
considering the State of Israel and the Fatah-led Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
signed the historic Declaration of Principles (DoP) on 13 September 1993, in which the two
entities formally recognized one another. As such, documenting degrees of terrorism and
political violence before and after the signing of the DoP can facilitate theorizing on how ter-
rorism may have affected the signing or how it might have heightened violence levels within
the conflict.

Afghanistan
In 1993, Afghanistan reached a new stage in the civil conflict that ravaged the country in the
aftermath of the Afghan–Soviet War. Hizb-e Islami and Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami waged an
 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 11

all out war on Burhanuddin Rabbani’s ruling government and Jamiat-e Islami militia, as well
as the forces loyal to Defense Minister Ahmad Shah Massoud. Frequently, both organiza-
tions launched attacks on Kabul targeting regime supporters, which led to hundreds of civil-
ian deaths and undermined the government’s legitimacy. Throughout 1993, Hizb-e Islami
and Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami would carry out terror attacks, extort concessions from the gov-
ernment, and then restart their terror campaigns in order to gain new concessions. The
chaos of Afghanistan in 1993—beset by the attacks of the two aligned organizations—helps
exhibit the context for the emergence of the Taliban in spring of 1994 and its seizing of
power in 1996.

Manipur, India
In 1993, conflict between the Naga and Kuki ethnic identity groups in the Northeast Indian
state of Manipur reached unprecedented levels.45 Militant organizations representing each
side regularly targeted civilian populations, using terrorism in campaigns to rid territory of
ethnic adversaries. Beginning in late 1992, the conflict reached new heights in 1993, which
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would pinpoint the bloodiest year in an active conflict that lasted until 1997—taking the lives
of 1,000 people and leaving more than 100,000 people internally displaced.46 In 1993 alone,
the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM) carried out more than
30 attacks on Kuki targets, killing nearly 400 people (primarily civilians). Other Naga mili-
tant organizations killed an additional 100 people. In 1993, Kuki militant organizations,
including the Kuki National Army, Kuki Defense Force, Kuki National Front, and others,
conducted at least 14 attacks that targeted Naga civilians, killing 66. More than 20 years later,
scholarly accounts still underestimate the conflict’s intensity during 199347 and consequently
struggle with understanding the initial factors of the conflict’s onset.48

Colombia
By 1993, after years of assassinations, bombings, and kidnappings, Carlos Escobar’s Medellın
Cartel had alienated vast swaths of the Colombian populace. Handicapped by corruption,
infiltration, and fear, Colombian security forces struggled with its U.S.-sponsored campaign
against Escobar’s narco-terrorist cartel. In an effort to “do what police could not,” the vigi-
lante organization Los Perseguidos por Pablo Escobar (or Los Pepes) emerged with the goal
of killing Escobar and dismantling his cartel. During 1993—its only year of violent activity—
Los Pepes waged an extensive terror campaign against Medellın Cartel members, associates,
and supporters, as well as members of Escobar’s family. Los Pepes killed hundreds and ulti-
mately succeeded in aiding in the effort to kill Escobar and destroy his cartel. Indeed, it
marks one of the few successful attempts of a terrorist organization to outright eliminate its
adversary. Yet, with the exception of a couple of journalistic49 and scholarly accounts,50 the
success of Los Pepes remains largely absent from either case studies or large-n analyses of
the effectiveness of terrorism.

Assessing Alternative Methods

Without disaggregated data for terrorism and political violence in 1993, researchers have
relied on alternative techniques to run time-series analysis. As noted in the Introduction,
 12 B. ACOSTA AND K. RAMOS

some average the data from 1992 and 1994 to manufacture data for 1993. However, this
method produces invalid and unreliable analyses as averages do not necessarily reflect actual
numbers. Whereas averaging offers an easy fix, it does not provide the accuracy, validity,
and reliability of the actual attack data for the year 1993.
Recognizing the pitfalls of using a simple annual averages, Enders, Sandler, and Gaibul-
loev develop a more sophisticated approach to fix the problem of GTD’s missing 1993
data.51 They put forth an alternative equation that enables interpolating quarterly numbers
for 1993.52 Table 6 shows how our quarterly breakdown, total, and mean of quarters for
1993 compare to Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev’s estimations. As the table reveals, a dis-
crepancy exists in the breakdown of numbers, but one could explain this by the difference in
the total number of our data contrasted to their total, which is based off of GTD’s purposed
aggregated number.
Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev aim to compare GTD data to ITERATE and contrast
domestic and transnational terrorism. The method of replicating quarter breakdowns for
terrorist incidents in 1993, and breaking it down further to generate aggregate numbers for
attacks resulting in a death or attacks resulting in casualties, works excellently for tackling
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their specific research. Nevertheless, the technique still falls short of the ideal of having actual
data for individual attacks for the year 1993. Though they can estimate the mean number of
quarterly attacks for 1993 to include in the range averages, their method does not provide
actual information about the numbers of attacks for deaths and casualties (see Table 7).
Both our data and the data estimations generated by Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev are
usable for annual analysis. However, for countless other types of research questions, nothing
matches having data on discrete events that transpired in 1993 along with a select number of
variables coded for each attack, similar to that which GTD documents. As noted in the
Introduction and demonstrated in the Application section, only detailed individual event
data might help scholars frame and develop accurate theories, in addition to conducting
sound empirical tests.

Conclusion
Our 1993 terrorism and political violence dataset makes two significant contributions.
First, it facilitates the reliable analysis of GTD’s time-series data. Second, the dataset

Table 6. 1993 quarterly number comparisons.53

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total Mean

Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev’s estimates54 1396 1291 1187 1083 4957 1239
Our data 1076 1153 790 775 4207 949

Table 7. 1993 quarterly average for deaths and casualties comparisons.

Our 1993 Their quarterly Their quarterly
quarterly average average of 1977:3–1997:4 average of 1991:2–1997:4

Death 221 193 320

Casualty 293 234 304

Note. We add their domestic and transnational averages together for comparison since our 1993 data is not dichotomized.
 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 13

can help advance analyses of conflicts in which 1993 marked an important year—
whether in terms of conflict onset, outcome, or milestone developmental processes. For
example, 1993 represents a key year for conflict development in places like Israel,
Afghanistan, Colombia, and Manipur, India. Accordingly, events that occurred in 1993
have notable empirical and theoretical implications. Ignoring or failing to account for
events, and sometimes specific incidents, in 1993 can have major consequences for
scholarly endeavors, as well as for making inferences for policy prescriptions.

Notes
1. TheNational Consortiumfor the StudyofTerrorismandResponsestoTerrorism(START), Global Ter-
rorismDatabase(GTD)(2015).Availableatwww.start.umd.edu/gtd (accessed 9 December 2015).
2. Charlinda Santifort, Todd Sandler, and Patrick T. Brandt, “Terrorist Attack and Target Diversity:
Changepoints and Their Drivers,” Journal of Peace Research 50 (2012), pp. 75–90.
3. Michael G. Findley and Joseph K. Young, “Terrorism, Democracy, and Credible Commitments,”
International Studies Quarterly 55 (2011), pp. 357–378; Dennis M. Foster, Alex Braithwaite, and
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David Sobek, “There Can Be No Compromise: Institutional Inclusiveness, Fractionalization and

Domestic Terrorism,” British Journal of Political Science 43 (2013), pp. 541–557; Matthew C. Wil-
son and James A. Piazza, “Autocracies and Terrorism: Conditioning Effects of Authoritarian
Regime Type on Terrorist Attacks,” American Journal of Political Science 57 (2013), pp. 941–955.
4. S. Brock Blomberg, Khusrav Gailbulloev, and Todd Sandler, “Terrorist Group Survival: Ideology,
Tactics, and Base of Operations,” Public Choice 149 (2011), pp. 441–463; Benjamin Acosta,
“From Bombs to Ballots: When Militant Organizations Transition to Political Parties,” Journal of
Politics 76 (2014), pp. 666–683; Benjamin Acosta, “Live to Win Another Day: Why Many Militant
Organizations Survive Yet Few Succeed,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 37 (2014), pp. 135–
161; Joseph L. Young and Laura Dugan, “Survival of the Fittest: Why Terrorist Groups Endure,”
Perspectives on Terrorism 8 (2014), pp. 2–23.
5. Max Abrahms, “The Political Effectiveness of Terrorism Revisited,” Comparative Political Studies
45 (2012), pp. 366–393.
6. Deniz Aksoy, David Carter, and Joseph Wright, “Terrorism in Dictatorships,” Journal of Politics
74 (2012), pp. 810–826; Erica Chenoweth, “Terrorism and Democracy,” Annual Review of Politi-
cal Science 16 (2013), pp. 355–378.
7. Gary LaFree and Laura Dugan, “Introducing the Global Terrorism Database,” Terrorism and
Political Violence 19 (2007), p. 186.
8. START, “History of the GTD” (2015). Available at www.start.umd.edu/gtd/about/History.aspx
(accessed 9 December 2015).
9. GTD’s principal investigators have addressed the problem in several articles. LaFree explains: “we
were able to reconstruct total numbers of events by country from original PGIS reports. In 2006,
we undertook an exhaustive search for the missing 1993 cases in an effort to restore them, but
were never able to come close to reproducing the number of cases in the original PGIS data.” See
Gary LaFree, “The Global Terrorism Database (GTD): Accomplishments and Challenges,” Per-
spectives on Terrorism 4 (2010), p. 45; LaFree and Dugan note the continuing problem but doubt
that the “data for 1993 will ever fully be restored.” See Gary LaFree and Laura Dugan, “Research
on Terrorism and Countering Terrorism,” Crime and Justice 38 (2009), p. 441.
10. Similarly, the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) dataset docu-
ments just 553 individual events of “transnational terrorism” for 1993.
11. START, “GTD: Distribution Letter” (2014). Available at www.start.umd.edu/gtd (accessed 9
December 2015).
12. LaFree and Dugan, “Introducing the Global Terrorism Database”; LaFree, “The Global Terrorism
Database (GTD).” Without individual event data, it also remains difficult to determine the reli-
ability of the country-level data.
 14 B. ACOSTA AND K. RAMOS

13. Charlinda Santifort-Jordan and Todd Sandler, “An Empirical Study of Suicide Terrorism: A
Global Analysis,” Southern Economic Journal 80 (2014), pp. 981–1001.
14. Benjamin Acosta and Steven J. Childs, “Illuminating the Global Suicide-Attack Network,” Studies
in Conflict and Terrorism 36 (2013), pp. 49–76; Justin Conrad and Kevin Greene, “Competition,
Differentiation, and the Severity of Terrorist Attacks,” Journal of Politics 77 (2015), pp. 546–561;
Christopher Gelpi and Nazli Avdan, “Democracies at Risk? A Forecasting Analysis of Regime
Type and the Risk of Terrorist Attack,” Conflict Management and Peace Science (Forthcoming).
15. Findley and Young, “Terrorism, Democracy, and Credible Commitments”; Robert Braun and
Michael Genkin, “Cultural Resonance and the Diffusion of Suicide Bombings: The Role of Collec-
tivism,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 58 (2013), pp. 1258–1284.
16. LaFree and Dugan, “Introducing the Global Terrorism Database”; LaFree, “The Global Terrorism
Database (GTD),” p. 45.
17. Walter Enders, Todd Sandler, and Khusrav Gaibulloev, “Domestic versus Transnational Terror-
ism: Data, Decomposition, and Dynamics,” Journal of Peace Research 48 (2011), pp. 319–337;
Santifort, Sandler, and Brandt, “Terrorist Attack and Target Diversity.”
18. Bryan C. Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counter-
terrorism,” International Security 36 (2012), pp. 9–46; Patrick B. Johnston, “Does Decapitation
Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns,”
International Security 36 (2012), pp. 47–79; Brian J. Phillips, “Terrorist Group Cooperation and
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Longevity,” International Studies Quarterly 58 (2014), pp. 336–347.

19. Jessica A. Stanton, “Terrorism in the Context of Civil War,” Journal of Politics 75 (2013), pp.
1009–1022.
20. Jenna Jordan, “When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation,” Secu-
rity Studies 18 (2009), 719–755.
21. Ian S. Lustick, For the Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel, Reissue (New York:
Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994).
22. GTD’s limited 1993 recollection data of 748 observations, which START leaves off its online database,
actually includes two of the Palestinian suicide attacks for the year, as well as a failed suicide attack.
23. Benny Morris, One State, Two States: Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2009), p. 151.
24. Jonathan Schanzer, Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle for Palestine (New York: Palgrave MacMillan,
2008), p. 67.
25. David Cook and Olivia Allison, Understanding and Addressing Suicide Attacks: The Faith and Politics of
Martyrdom Operations (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), pp. 28–29.
26. Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House,
2005), p. 349; Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Revised and Expanded ed. (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2006), p. 150; Jacob N. Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent
Covert Organizations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), p. 13.
27. Popular documentarians have also fallen victim. In discussing the documentary series on the ori-
gins and spread of suicide terrorism that features himself as host, former Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) operative Bob Baer states: “I almost look at The Cult of the Suicide Bomber films as
a CIA briefing. In the CIA, we were taught to go to policy makers and tell them what we believe is
the absolute truth. For me, the Cult films are the absolute truth.” However, Baer explains in the
first film that the Palestinian adoption of suicide attacks occurred as a reaction to the Goldstein
attack. See Robert Baer, “Product Description for The Cult of the Suicide Bomber 2” (2008). Avail-
able at www.amazon.com/Cult-Suicide-Bomber-2/dp/B001CA6W1S
28. Mohammed Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers
(Washington, DC: U.S. Institute for Peace Press, 2006); Benjamin Acosta, “The Suicide Bomber
as Sunni-Shi’i Hybrid,” Middle East Quarterly 17 (2010), pp. 13–20; Acosta and Childs, “Illumi-
nating the Global Suicide-Attack Network.”
29. Benjamin Acosta, “Dying for Survival: Why Militant Organizations Continue to Conduct Suicide
Attacks,” Journal of Peace Research 53 (2016), pp. 180–196.
30. See Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press,
2005), p. 20.
 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 15

31. As Sandler has pointed out, a result of GTD’s comparative advantages has been that “Researchers are
flocking to the data without questioning its strengths, shortfalls, or properties.” Todd Sandler, “New
Frontiers of Terrorism Research: An Introduction,” Journal of Peace Research 48 (2011), p. 282.
32. Our dataset is available at www.benjaminacosta.com
33. Available at www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/chronologies.asp?regionIdD99 (accessed 9 December 2015).
34. Available at smapp.rand.org/rwtid/search.php (accessed 9 December 2015).
35. Available at www.start.umd.edu/gtd/contact (accessed 9 December 2015).
36. Available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/19813.pdf (accessed 9 December 2015).
37. Available at hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1996/mar/04/terrorist-incidents
(accessed 9 December 2015).
38. Available at folk.uib.no/sspje/tweed.htm (accessed 9 December 2015).
39. Available at www.sandatabase.org (accessed 9 December 2015).
40. GTD’s codebook is available at www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf (accessed
9 December 2015).
41. As a result, our “individual/s” numbers are higher than GTD’s yearly average of “individual”
perpetrators.
42. Despite the incompleteness of our process, which we are continuing, we present the data where it
stands. Our view is that this data is essential to conducting sound empirical and theoretical
research on terrorism and political violence that involves the year 1993—whether time-series
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analyses or otherwise.
43. For example, see Samih K. Farsoun and Naseer H. Aruri, Palestine and the Palestinians: A Social
and Political History, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2006); Erica Chenoweth and Maria
J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2011); Wendy Pearlman, “Precluding Nonviolence, Propelling Vio-
lence: The Effect of Internal Fragmentation on Movement Protest,” Studies in Comparative Inter-
national Development 47 (2012), p. 24.
44. As a basis for their study on “spoiler opportunities” in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Braithwaite,
Foster, and Sobek state: “we use the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) [which] contains all
attacks against Israel for the period 1970 to 2007.” See Alex Braithwaite, Dennis M. Foster, and
David A. Sobek, “Ballots, Bargains, and Bombs: Terrorist Targeting of Spoiler Opportunities,”
International Interactions 36 (2010), p. 300.
45. The conflict also occasionally spilled over into the Indian states of Nagaland and Assam, as well as
neighboring Myanmar. See Nehginpao Kipgen, “Politics of Ethnic Conflict in Manipur,” South
Asia Research 33 (2013), p. 30.
46. Thongkholal Haokip, “The Kuki-Naga Conflict in Light of Recent Publications,” South Asia
Research 33 (2013), pp. 78–79.
47. Kipgen, “Politics of Ethnic Conflict in Manipur.”
48. A recent review article surveys the shortcoming of scholarship on the Naga-Kuki conflict. Haokip,
“The Kuki-Naga Conflict in Light of Recent Publications.”
49. Mark Bowden, Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World’s Greatest Outlaw (New York: Penguin, 2001).
50. Aldo Civico, “‘We Are Illegal, but Not Illegitimate.’ Modes of Policing in Medellin, Colombia,” PoLAR:
Political and Legal Anthropology Review 35 (2012), pp. 77–93; Acosta, “Live to Win Another Day.”
51. Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev, “Domestic versus Transnational Terrorism: Data, Decomposi-
tion, and Dynamics.”
52. “GTD1993:i D (4954/3612)[m1992 C (i/5)(m1994 – m1992)] where GTD1993:i is the interpolated
value of any incident type in GTD for quarter i of 1993; m1992 is the quarterly mean value of that
incident type for 1992; m1994 is the quarterly mean value of that incident type for 1994; and the
subscript i runs from 1 to 4.” See Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev, “Domestic versus Transna-
tional Terrorism,” p. 324 for more information and a further explanation. Although the numbers
derived from this equation seem to be a better representation of 1993 attacks than simply averag-
ing the years 1992 and 1994, Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev give no explanation or basis for the
structure of the equation. Because the values for m1994 and m1992 are means of the quarterly val-
ues for the respective year, the equation remains largely consistent except for value i, which
 16 B. ACOSTA AND K. RAMOS

changes based on the quarter number. This variation between each of the quarters for 1993 seems
arbitrary and not reflective of actual numbers for terrorist events in 1993.
53. Our dataset contains 413 incidents that we know took place in 1993, but are unsure of the month
within 1993 they occurred. Therefore, we leave these events out of the quarterly numbers in
Table 6, yet include them in our total number of events we have for 1993.
54. We round up all of their numbers to whole numbers.
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