Francisco 1996

Coercion and Protest: An Empirical Test in Two Democratic States
Author(s): Ronald A. Francisco

Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Nov., 1996), pp. 1179-1204
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
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Coercion and Protest:An EmpiricalTest
in Two DemocraticStates*
Ronald A. Francisco,University
of Kansas
Theory:The theory ofprotestundervarying levelsofcoercionformsthecontext

foraninvestigation
ofthedataonprotestcoercioninGermany andNorthernIreland
for11 years(1982-92),aggregated weekly.
Hypotheses: Thestandardinverted-Uhypothesisis testedagainstcompetingunsta-
ble (protest
andcoerciondivergeandoscillate);backlash(coercionincreases pro-
test);andadaptation changetacticsaftercoercion)hypotheses.
(protesters
Methods:Threeformsof thebiologicalpredator-prey modelare estimated with
two-andthree-stageleastsquaresandsupplemented witha Bayesianupdating test.
Results:Thepredator-preymechanism fitstheGerman datawell,evenina context
oflow coercion.The resultscastdoubton theinverted-U hypothesis,supportthe
backlashhypothesis and strengthen
theevidencethatprotesters adapt.Northern
Ireland'sterror-based
protest
andcoerciondidnotconform as welltothepredator-
preymodel,butprotesters didadaptin a separatetestof Bayesianupdating.
The relationshipbetweencoercionand protestis a centralelementin

any theoryof protest.At present,it remainsunresolved.Research con-
ductedon largecross-nationalsamplescan provideonlyindirectevidence
of a director reciprocalrelationshipbetweencoercionand protest.Direct
testsrequiredata thatmove throughtimefora series of individualcases
(Tsebelis and Sprague 1989). Effortsto capturethedynamicnatureof the
relationship have typicallyignoredeach otherand rarelyconfronted
empiri-
cal data (Lichbach 1992). This paper uses timeseriesdata fromGermany
and Northern Irelandto testtherelationshipusingthreeinteractive
models.
These cases represent democraticstatesthathave generatedrelativelyhigh
ratesof coercionand protest.
The paper attemptsto extend recentfindingsfromhighlycoercive
states(Francisco1995; Khawaja 1993) to a politicalenvironmentcharacter-
*Thanks toPaulJohnson, PhilipSchrodt

andManusMidlarksy fortheir
adviceandassistance
in thispaper.Uwe Reisingled thedatacollection fortheproject.ChrisFranciscoassisted
inthemodelanddataanalysis. Thisresearchis fundedbya grantfromtheGeneralResearch
Fundof theUniversity of Kansas.Previousversionsof thispaperwerepresented at the
American PoliticalScienceAssociation
annualmeeting inNew Yorkin 1994andtheMid-
westPoliticalScienceAssociationannualmeeting inChicagoin 1995.Alldata,documenta-
tionandprograms necessarytoreplicate
thisanalysiscanbe obtained
from theICPSR under
thefilenameCOERPROT.96.The dataanalysesof thepredator-prey modelspresented in
thispaperwereconducted usingtheSAS Modelprocedure.
AmericanJournalof PoliticalScience,Vol. 40, No. 4, November
1996,Pp. 1179-1204
? 1996bytheBoardofRegentsoftheUniversity ofWisconsinSystem
1180 Ronald A. Francisco
ized by majority rule and whatJackman(1993) calls "powerwithout

force,"i.e., a democratic country.Germany represents
themoregeneral
case of democratic states,whileNorthern Irelandreflects
howregionsof
democratic statescandevolvetohighlevelsofterror andextensivecoercive
capacity(WhiteandWhite1995).Bothwerechosenbecauseoftheirpat-
ternofsustained politicalconflict.'
Theconcern ofthepaperis therelation-
shipbetweenprotest andcoercion, notthereasonpeopleprotest, norwhy
somedemocratic countries havelittleprotest.
CompetingHypotheses
Lichbach(1994) lamentsthelack of theoretical progress in thefield
of politicaldissent.Researchers havefocusedtoo muchon thefreerider
problem andnotenoughonthemajorquestions ofprotest,suchas theeffect
ofcoercion.Otherresearchers haveconducted cross-nationalresearch, but
thereforeprecluded insightintotherelationship
betweenprotest andcoer-
cion.2Finally,existing evidenceleavesunsettledtheeffect ofcoercionon
protest.Hibbs(1973) testedthetraditionalhypothesis ofan "inverted-U"
relationship,withlittleprotestatlowandhighlevelsofcoercion, butmuch
inmoderate coercion.Hibbs(1973) foundnoevidenceforanyrelationship
in hisindirecttests.LaterDeNardo(1985) formally restatedtheinverted-
U hypothesis. MullerandWeede(1990)confirmed itempirically ina large
cross-nationaltest.
Subsequent research has indicatedthattherelationshipis morecom-
plex thanpreviously realized.Mason and Krane(1989) and Khawaja
(1993)discovered surgesofprotest followingbrutalcoercion.Tsebelisand
Sprague(1989)predicted thatlong-term,heavyclashesofprotest andcoer-
cionwouldtakeonunstable, nonlinear thatis,protest
patterns; andcoercion
woulddivergeand oscillate.Francisco(1993) foundthattheinverted-U
formulation maymaska morefundamental imbalance inorganized strength
betweenregimeanddissidents. Evidencefromtheintifada,basedon esti-
matesofthepredator-prey model,stronglyconfirmed surgesofnewprotest
followingharshcoercion(Francisco1995).MullerandWeede(1994)argue
thatrelativedeprivation effectsfadeunderheavycoercion.Thesefindings
suggestthattheinverted-U hypothesisshouldbe subjectedto systematic
testson time-seriesdata.
'Thesecases completea sampleof fivecountries. The companion article(Francisco

1995)coversthreecoercivecases:Czechoslovakia, theGermanDemocratic Republic,and
thePalestinian intifada.
2Clearly, parameter estimatesgenerated
forNorthern Irelandshouldnotbe assumedto
applyto Germany, norto anyothercountry. Thisis a matterforempirical
investigation.
Cross-nationalanalysisis usefulforhypothesis butassumesthattheprotest
generation, and
coercionin all countries in thesampleareat equilibrium
(TsebelisandSprague1989).
COERCION AND PROTEST 1181
TheProblemofAdaptation
Protesters engagethestatein an intermittent contest.Lichbach(1987)
showsthatdissidents willchangetacticsovertime,especiallyafter defeats.
Lichbach' s modelformally solveda puzzlegenerated byconflictingempiri-
cal data:mostoftencoercionsuccessfully weakensprotest; occasionally,
though, coercionstrengthens dissidents (Rule 1988,267). The modeluses
a rational-actorperspectivetoexplainthatprotesters reacttobothcoercion
andaccommodation on thepartofthegovernment. HooverandKowaleski
(1992, 151) notethatprotesters are less experienced politically
thanthe
regime,less bureaucratic, and thusmorelikelyto experiment withnew
strategies.Bothsideshavethetimeandcapability to adaptto theother's
tacticsand resources overa protracted battle.Whatkindof adaptation is
availableto dissidents undercoercion?DeNardo(1985) focuseson pro-
grammatic flexibility.
Giventhatcoercion is lowormoderate inmostdemo-
craticstates,severalotheroptionsforadaptation exist.Supposea dissident
groupstagesa street demonstration, onlyto be teargassed,clubbed,and
ultimately arrested.The grouphas littleincentive to go backto thestreet
aftersuchan experience. Worse,itsmobilization capability erodesas word
oftherepression flowsthrough society. Cana groupoptonlyforideological
compromise or surrender? Dissidentshaveshownotherchoices:if street
demonstrations incurdanger, mobilizequietlyamongworkers anduse the
strikeweapon.If it is impossible to mobilizea strike, finda refugefrom
theregimethatoffersmobilization potential, e.g., a church-based group
(Opp and Roehl 1990). If coercionis too effective and mobilizationtoo
difficult,
dissidents sometimes chooseterror.
Adaptation complicates analysisoftheinteraction between and
protest
coercion.Thispaperdeals withtheproblemby usingtwodifferent mea-
suresofprotest andcoercion:first,demonstrations andtheir coercivecoun-
termeasures only;second,theprotest thatdoes notincludepublicdemon-
strations, e.g., strikes,petitions,and organizations' rallies and their
associatedcoercion.If protesters are betterat adaptation thanthepolice,
parameter estimates shouldbe smaller andlessrobust forthesamplesrepre-
senting adaptiveprotest anditsassociatedcoercion.The paperprobesan-
otherperspective on adaptation-Bayesian updating. Itarguesthatprotest-
ers(andgovernments) responddirectly topreceding events;thentheyadapt
to maximizetheirpotential gainandminimize theirrisks.
Hypotheses fashionedfrompreviousresearchand the perspectives
notedabovetakethefollowing forms:
1. Inverted-U:
coercion
depressesprotest.
Protest
accelerates
coercion.
2. Unstable:protest boundedonlybythelimits
andcoercionoscillate,
of mobilization.
1182 RonaldA. Francisco
3. Backlash:harshcoercionaccelerates
protest.
4. Adaptive:protesters
shifttheiractionsto eludecoercion.
The Predator-PreyModel
Thispaperusesthreeforms ofthepredatory-prey model,a widelyused
dynamicmodeldevelopedin biologyby Lotkaand Volterra. Whyuse a
biologicalmodelin a fieldthathas developedscoresof itsown?Simply
becauseit has significant advantages overexisting protest modelsforthe
analysisoftherelationship betweencoercionandprotest. First,itis a dy-
namicmodelthatmorecloselyreplicates thepursuitofdissidents bypolice
andtheirresulting interaction.Second,unlikethemostsophisticated mod-
emprotest models(e.g.,Lichbach1987),thepredator-prey modelprovides
information aboutboththedirection and themagnitude of changewhen
protestersandpoliceclash.Third,itis general, i.e.,ithasbeenadaptedin
severalforms thatfitprotest andcoercionin almostall conflicts, though it
is mosteffective whentherearemanyinteractions betweenthestateand
dissidents.Finally,themathematics of themodelhave been deeplyex-
ploredovera periodofdecadesina widerangeofapplications (Boyceand
DiPrima1992;Canale 1970;May 1973).3
Thepredator-prey modelis a dynamic modelwitha system ofdifferen-
tialequations.
As such,itopensa fieldofexplanations thatrangefarbeyond
thenormof multipleregression. Parameter estimates are thekeyto the
outcomes.Theyallow a researcher to applymainstream mathematics to
analyzea conflict:doescoercionincreaseordecreaseprotest? Whatis the
effectoftheinteraction between protestandcoercion, i.e.,doesitincrease
both,decreaseboth,increaseoneanddecreasetheother, ordoesitproduce
oscillation
overtime?Analyzing dynamic modelsrequires time-series data.
Usingreal-world dataincreases thedifficulty
ofestimating (i.e.,generating
parameter estimates) themodel.Becauseofthelargerangeofinteraction
oneshouldapplyseveralmethods
possibilities, inordertogaugetheconsis-
tencyoftheestimates. Ordinary leastsquaresdoesnotallowthesimultane-
ous analysisofa system oftwoormoreequations. Eachequationis treated
separately.Therefore, itis necessarytomovetotwo-stage andthree-stage
leastsquares,thelatteran analytical procedurethattreatssimultaneous
equationsas a singlesystem andchecksforcross-correlations oftheerror
terms inthesystem (Goldberger 1991;Theil1978).Thesemethods usethe
exogenousvariables in a system ofexactlyidentifieddifferential equations
as instrumentsin ordertoprovideconsistent estimates ofparameters fora
givendataseries(Goldberger 1991).
3Biologyandecologyofferwell-tested
modelsthatrepresent
politicalprocesses,
e.g.,
LowreyandGray(1995),andcompeting species,models
(May 1973;Murray1993).
Tsebelis-Sprague
TsebelisandSprague(1989,553-4) providea straightforward means
to assess theshapeof theprotest-coercion curve. They note thatprotest
activity a sequencedresponsebetweenthestateandrebels.
is essentially
Tsebelisand Spragueadaptedthepredator-prey modelto theproblem of
revolution andcoercion in orderto capturethedynamic of
characteristics
theseinteractions.Like thelynxand therabbitsof theoriginalmodel,the
number ofprotesters(prey)dependsin largeparton thelevelofcoercion
(predation) (May 1973;Vandemeer 1981).TsebelisandSpraguepresent a
canonicaladaptation of the standardLotka-Volterra ecologicalmodel.
Theirmostrelevant modelis:
dR= -fR + gc+ [1]

dt
dC= hR-kC + y [2]

dt
where,
R = extentof revolutionary
activity
C = extentof statecoercionand
f = rateat whichprotest
decreasesin theabsenceofcoercion
g = of protest
rateat whichcoercionincreasesas a function
increasesas a function
h = rateat whichprotest of coercion
k = rateat whichcoerciondecreasesin theabsenceof protest
t = time
to probetherelation
The canonicalmodelis a finebaselinestructure be-
tweencoercionandprotest. TheTsebelis-Spragueformulation hastwoad-
vantages,giventhechallengesof estimating dynamicmodelswithreal-
termsincreasestheprobability
worlddata.First,itsdeletionofinteractive
ofsuccessful Second,itprovides
estimation. a checkontheresults ofinter-
activeformsof thestandard model,sinceitsmechanism
predator-prey is
straightforwardand consistentwithmorecomplexmodels.In addition,
theselinearequationshavethecapacity
toencompass thedynamic behavior
thatTsebelisandSpragueexplore.Forthehypotheses to be validforthis
modeltheparameter (assumingstatistical
estimates mustbe
significance)
as follows:
1. Inverted-U:h is negative;g is negative.
2. Unstable:Parameter valuessatisfy (f - k)2 < 4 gh,
theinequality:
withgh>fk.Moregenerally, thematrix generated
bytheparameter
estimateshas complexeigenvalues(Goldberg1986; Saaty 1981;
SaatyandBram1981).4
3. Backlash:h is positive;g is positive.
4. Adaptive:Predator-preyparameter estimates
havelowert-scores for
adaptiveprotest and coercionthanfordirectconfrontations, e.g.,
publicdemonstrations.
Lotka-Volterra
The Lotka-Volterra modelis theoriginaland standard
predator-prey
biologicalmodel.ThismodelwasthebasisofTsebelisandSprague'swork.
It can estimate
thecoercion-protest moredirectly
relationship through its
inclusion oftwoterms theinteraction
representing ofprotest
andcoercion.
The fullmodelis generally
representedbytheequations:
dR= aR-gCR [3]

dt
dC = -bC + hCR [4]
dt
where,
a = rateat whichprotesters
increasein theabsenceof coercion
g = rateat whichtheinteraction
betweenprotestand coerciondecreasesprotest
4Parameters
forma Jacobian
matrixinaccordance ontheright
totheirpositions sideof
model,forexample,
IntheTsebelis-Sprague
theequations. theparametersformthefollowing
matrix:
f g
h k
Sinceall threemodelsareall exactlyidentified,

theJacobianmatricesaresquare.Thuswe
candetermine eigenvalues equation[seeanylinearalgebratext]).
(rootsofthecharacteristic
Realeigenvalues usuallysignifystability.
Complexconjugateeigenvalues
generallyindicate
or oscillation,
instability depending on thestructure
of themodel.See Goldberg(1986);
Saaty(1981).Foran introduction todynamicmodelingsee Huckfeldt,
Kohfeld, andLikens
(1982).
b = rateat whichcoerciondeclinesin theabsenceof protest

h = rateat whichtheinteraction
betweenprotestand coercionincreasescoercion
R = prey(protesters)
C = predators
(coercion)
TheresultsoftheLotka-Volterra
estimationshouldbeconsistent
withthose
fromtheTsebelis-Sprague canonicalformulation.
Yet thismodelfullyex-
plorestheinteraction
thatformsthesubjectofthispaperwithitstwointer-
actionterms.In theclashof dissidents
and theregime,g indicateswhat
happens toprotest,
whileh signifies
howcoercion changes.Againassuming
statistical forthehypotheses
significance, tobe validfortheLotka-Volterra
modeltheparameter estimates
mustassumethefollowing forms:
1. Inverted-U:a is positive;h is positive.
2. Unstable:thematrix generated bytheparameter
estimates
hascom-
plex conjugateeigenvalues, withthecoefficient
of theimaginary
partnonzero,providedthata > 0, b > 0.
3. Backlash:g is negative.
4. Adaptive:predator-preyparameter estimates
havelowert-scores
for
adaptiveprotest andcoercionthanfordirectconfrontations.
Parrish-Saila
TheNorthern Irishconflicts
presenta difficult
analyticproblem.Since
twogroupschallengethestate(one reformist, theotherstatusquo ante),
ideallyone shouldrepresent theconflict witha three-sidedmodel.Once
haveadaptedthepredator-prey
again,biologists modelfora similarlystruc-
turedproblem. The threespeciespredator-prey model(Parrishand Saila
1970)recognizes thefrequentinteractionofthreegroups-twocompetitors
anda predator.5
Thismodelallowsus torepresent theconfounding problem
inNorthern Ireland.Ifwe positthattheloyalists andtherepub-
(Protestant)
licans(Catholic)competedirectlywithoneanother, thatthestateattempts
tocontroltheviolenceofboth,andthatbothattackstateinterference with
theiractivities,
we havethefollowing model:
dR _ aR1 -
bRIR2 - cRIC [5]
dt
sParrish
and Saila's extension
of thepredator-prey
modelhas beenexploredforits
mathematical
and equilibrium properties.
See Parrishand Saila (1970); Cramerand May
(1972).
dR2 - f2- gRIR2- hR2C [6]

dt
dC - -jC + kRIC + lR2C [7]
dt
where,
RI = loyalistprotest
R2 = republican
protest
C = coercionby policeand BritishCrownforces
a = rateat whichloyalistprotestincreasesin theabsenceof interaction
b = rateat whichtheinteraction
of loyalistand republican
conflicts
decreasesloyalistprotest
c = rateat whichloyalistprotestdeclinesin theinteraction

of protestand coercion
f = rateat whichrepublicanprotestincreasesin theabsenceof interaction
g = rateat whichinteraction
of loyalistand republican
conflict
decreasesrepublicanprotest
h = rateat whichrepublicanprotestand coerciondecreasesrepublicanprotest
j = rateat whichcoerciondecreasesin theabsenceof protest
k = rateat whichinteraction
of loyalistprotestand coercionincreasescoercion
and
I = rateat whichtheinteraction
of republican
protestand coercionincreasescoercion
Thereis no consistentthree-sided in Germany's

conflict Thusthe
protest.
Parrish-Sailamodelappliesonlyto Northern Ireland.It shouldallowthe
detectionofa truemultisidedconflict
mechanism iftherewereonebetween
1982and 1993.Becauseall conflict amongtheloyalists, and
republicans
thestateis includedin theestimates of thismodel,thereis no meansto
testtheadaptivehypothesis. The Parrish-Saila
resultsconfirm theother
hypotheses underthefollowing conditions:
1. Inverted-U:c, h, k andI arepositive.
2. Unstable:at minimum, thematrix bytheparameter
generated esti-
mateshas complexeigenvalues.6
6Asa systemofthreedifferential
equations,theParrish-Saila
modelis quitecomplex
anddoes notreadilyyieldtheanalyticconditions
foroscillation.
The eigenvalues
forthe
generalmodelwerecalculatedby Mathematica andranto 63 pages.Murray (1993,705)
presents
therootsofthegeneralcubicpolynomial. See also CramerandMay(1972).
3. Backlash:c andh arenegative.

eachofthesemodels,converted
I estimate todifference with
equations,
two-stage and three-stageleast If
squares. the inverted-U fits
hypothesis
thesecases,then the parameter estimatesshould strong
reflect discourage-
mentofprotest followingcoercion, andstrong encouragement ofcoercion
following Finally,
protest. if the parameterestimates thatprotest
indicate
is stronglyboostedbycoercion, thentheyconfirm ofLich-
theexpectations
bach (1987), Mason and Krane (1989), Khawaja (1993) and Francisco
(1995) thatharshcoercivemeasures giverisetosignificant back-
dissident
lash.
Bayesian Updating
Rationalchoiceand gametheory offeran alternative explanationof
protesters'behaviorovertime.Theypositthatprotesters are inherently
awareofthestate'scoercivecapability andreacttoitsmostrecentactions:
hastheinjury rategonedown?Do thepolicestillarrest 30% oftheprotest-
ersineverydemonstration? Lichbach(1987)arguedthatdissidents monitor
andreactrationally to statecoercion.Givenweeklydata,thiskindoftem-
poralwarinesscan be captured in theprocessbasedon Bayes' theorem.
BrianSkyrms (1990) createda dynamic representationoftheprocess.He
assumesthatno one willactunlesstheutility ofactionexceedsthestatus
quo. His "boundedBayesiandeliberator" usesa simpleruleateachdeci-
sionpointtochoosean activeorpassivestrategy. Ifa protesteris deciding
whether toact(A), thenthedecisionis basedontheimmediate pastactions
oftheregime. Ifrecalculating expected on actingis e, thena protest-
utility
er's revisedprobability ofactionp2(A),in termsoftheformer probability
of actionp1(A), iS:7
P2(A) = p1(A) p(eJA) [8]

1ip(Ai)p(eJA)
where{A,} is a partition acts.

of alternative
Bayesianupdating doeslittlemorethanimputeto protesters themost
basic abilityto thinkand adapt.Equation[8] is usedin theGermanand
Northern IrelandCatholicdemonstrations toassesstheprobabilityofdem-
onstratinggiven1) arrestsor 2) injuriesin thepreviousweek.Onlythree
of thefourhypotheses can be testedwithBayesianupdating (thereis no
waytorepresent an unstable The resultsmustbe as followsto
condition).
confirm each hypothesis(assumingstatistical significance):
see FlorensandMouchart
surveyofBayesianmethods,
7Fora thorough (1993).
1. Inverted-
U: priorprobabilities
exceedposteriors.
2. Backlash:posterior
probabilities
exceedpriors.
3. Adaptive:posterior
probabilities
ofprotest
arelowerwithprevious
coercion.
The Cases
The twocaseschosenherearedemocratic countries.Each hasregular
a responsive
elections, legislature,
andcitizensenjoytherightto protest.
Yeteachhasa greatdealofprotest. Germany sustainsmoreregular protest
thanalmostanyothercountry, albeitwithlow ratesof coercion.It is in
mostrespects a representative
democraticcountry.NorthernIreland'ssitua-
tondiffersbecauseofthesectarian natureofpoliticalconflict.
Itis a much
studiedinstanceof violentprotestand coercionas wellas terrorism in a
democratic country.
Germany
Germany madethetransition fromNazismto developing democracy
quicklyafter1945.Duringitspostwar transition,Germany hashada rela-
tivelyhighlevelof protestanddissent, mostof whichwas metwithlow
levelsofcoercion.The 11-yearperiodofthesampledata(1982-92) repre-
sentsan eradominated almostwhollybytheconservative coalitionofthe
ChristianDemocratic UnionandtheFreeDemocratic Party. FromOctober
3, 1990,theformer GermanDemocratic Republicis includedin thedata,
a unitedGermany.
reflecting
A good deal of protestis presentin theGermandata.In an average
week,almost29,000demonstrators tookto thestreetsoverthe 11-year
period.Therewas an activeterror organization, theRote ArmeeFaktion
(Red ArmyFaction,RAF) thatoccupiedtheattention of thefederallaw
enforcement formanyyears.Still,thisis a democratic
authorities country.
Germany hadhighlevelsofprotest, butno sustained separatist orrevolu-
tionarymovement beyondtheRAF.Theprotests captured inthetimeseries
are a cascadeof varying groupsadvocating differentcauses:leftistsop-
posedthenewwestrunwayat Frankfurt airport,farmers soughtto keep
theirsubsidies,right-wingradicalsprotested politicalasylum,left-wing
radicalsandecologistsopposednuclearpowerand middleclass "candle
marchers" protestedviolenceagainstforeigners. In a largeproportion of
thecases, protestersweresuccessful; thatis, theyobtainedconcessions
fromthestate.Since Germany has a freepress,almosteveryone knows
aboutprotest demonstrations.The sequential (one cause at a time)nature
of theprotestssuggestsat minimum tacticallearningbydiversedissident
groups.Therewas little,ifany,intergroup conflict.Almostall confronta-
tionspitteddemonstratorsagainstthestate.Coercionlevelsremained
ex-
tremelylow forall kindsofprotestthroughouttheperiod.
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland's"Troubles"beganin 1968.The 11-year dataseries
forthispaperbeginsin 1982.In theintervening years,theBritishimposed
a rangeofstrategies, noneofwhichrestored order.Fromtheoutset, protest-
ersinNorthern IrelandadoptedAmerican demonstration strategies
(sit-ins,
streetmarches).But marchesand occupationsin Ulsterfundamentally
soughtterritorial control,not simplefreedomor civil rights(Feldman
1991).Theyweremetwithmoreseverecoercion thanUnitedStatesprotest-
ers experienced in the 1960s.The mostcontroversial policy(1971) was
"internment anddeepinterrogation." British troopsandRoyalUlsterCon-
stabulary policearrested and incarcerated suspectedrepublican terrorists
without trial.Thispolicywas perceivedby theCatholiccommunity as a
sharp,illegitimate increasein coercion.It backfired on theBritish. In the
fourmonthspreceding internment, foursoldiersand fourcivilianswere
killed.In thefourmonths following internment thedeathtollwas 30 sol-
diers,11policeand73 civilians.IrishRepublican Army(IRA) membership
grew(Finn1991,69-70). Peroff andHewitt(1980) analyzedtheeffect of
severalpoliciesandconcluded, nonetheless, thatinternment reduced rioting
in Northern Ireland.Tsebelisand Sprague(1989) questioned thisresult.
Theypredicted thatsucha policywouldproduceoscillating (unstable)vio-
lenceoverlongperiodsof time.
The timeperiodin theNorthern Irelandsampleis quitelong (573
weeks),butitreflects a timewhentheconflict changedtoless rioting and
farmoreterrorism, bothCatholicand Protestant-or"republican"and
"loyalist"in thelanguageof Northern Ireland.The principalsourceof
terrorforthefirst fewyearsofthedatawas theIRA anditsmoremilitant
offshoots. It wasjoinedin themid-1980s bya growing levelofProtestant
or "loyalist"terror. Demonstrations continued duringtheentireperiod,
butwereoutweighed in effectby thecontinuing terrorcampaign.Protest
politicsinNorthern Irelandinthese11 yearsis an admixture ofterror,riot,
demonstration, strike, andvoting.
TheIRA conceivesitselfas a military organization engagedina guer-
rillawarwithan occupying army.Itconsists ofa fewhundred activemem-
bersandperhaps 7,000activesupporters. Itis thushopelessly outnumbered
bythepolice(RoyalUlsterConstabulary, 7,000)andby theBritisharmy
(30,000).Itsstrategic choiceis dictated bythefactthatitacceptsno com-
promise rejecting Northern Irelandas partoftheIrishRepublicunderBrit-
ishoccupation. It was alwaystoo smalland tooradicalto stagea public
mobilization campaign. Norhasiteverattracted muchopensupport when
itspoliticalarm(SinnFein[ourselves alone])enters candidates inelections.

Its reputation has untilrecently beenviolent.It (and itsloyalistcounter-
parts)recruits violentindividuals whomakea breakwithterror difficult
to
achieve(Chai 1993).Thereis littlepublicsupport forviolenceor terror.
TheBritish government seteconomicdevelopment as a conflictresolution
policyin the 1980s.As soon as a newofficebuildingor retailcomplex
opened,theIRAbombedit.Onceagain,itssteadfast policywasnocompro-
miseandviolentretaliation. A polltakenin 1990(McCartney 1991)found
thatjust7.5% ofrespondents supported paramilitaryactionof anykind.
Withintheperiodcoveredbythedata,theIRA overcomes itsinherent
size limitwithstrategic plansanda steadystream offreepublicity arising
fromitsbombsandassassinations (Kaase 1991).TheIRA's smallsizedic-
tatesthatitmustinflict farmoreinjuries anddeathsthanitreceives.Itdoes
so bycareful planning-andadaptation. In a rareinterview a leaderofthe
Provisional IRA putitplainly:"The tacticsoftheIRA leadership areboth
surpriseandadaptability" (ReutersLibrary Report, December3, 1992).
Adaptit does. Overthe 11 yearsof thedata,theIRA first attacked
armyposts,individual soldiers,police,and policestationsuntilthesize
and activity of Britishforcesreduceditsrateof success.It thenattacked
publicand security targets in England.Whensecurity was redoubledat
BritishbasesinNorthern Ireland,theIRA blewupa military musicschool.
It thensetup a seriesofattackson Britishsoldiersin continental Europe,
especiallyGermany and theNetherlands. In recentyearsitstargets have
beenpart-time soldiersandpoliceas well as contractors whosupplythe
securityforces.TheIRA attacks throughout Northern Ireland,theUK, and
Western Europe.In gametheoretic terms, theIRA andthemilitary played
a ColonelBlotto8 game,exceptthattheIRA hadtheadvantages ofscouting
andpreplanned "runbacks'" (escaperoutes)(Dresher1981;Feldman, 1991,
42).
Data
Thebasisofthisresearch wasthecreation oftwodatasetsoncoercion
andprotest thathavethescope,density, andcompleteness to estimate
the
threemodelsofpredator-prey andBayesianupdating andtoaccommodate
future
tests.Thedatacomprise theconflict
events(protest
anditsattendant
coercion),theirtypes(e.g.,demonstrations, andtheirscale (e.g.,
strikes),
numbersdemonstrating, arrested,and/orinjuredorkilled).9
Data werecol-
8Twoforcescontending on a battlefield
mustplace theirtroopsbeforeknowing the
opposition's
deployment. The IRA,though, knowsthedeployment of British
forces(Luce
andRaiffa1957).
9Deathsand injuriescausedby internalsanctions
withintheCatholicand Protestant
paramilitary
communities werenotcoded.
lectedbyweekfrommultiple sources(Bew andGillespie1993;Factson

File; FBIS; Reuters;andtheTimes[London]).Severalothersourceswere
codedon NEXIS, including theGermanlanguageserviceof Reutersand
theBelfastTelegraph forthelateryearsin thedata.
Demonstrations werecodedbythenumber of protestors
whopartici-
patedin marchesor ralliesduringeach week.The coercionattendant to
thesedemonstrations was codeddiscretelyas thenumber of arrests,
inju-
ries,anddeaths.Alternateprotestprincipally
includedthenumber ofpoliti-
cal strikersand thenumber of peoplewhosigneda protest The
petition.
coercionassociatedwithalternate protest
wascodedthesamewayas dem-
onstrationcoercion.Terrorcomprised bombs,assassinations,
andkidnap-
pings.
Theselection ofweeklydataaggregationis basedonpreviousresearch.
Lichbach(1985,601) arguedthat"to capture thedynamics ofprotest
over
time,... studiesshoulduse as shorta temporalaggregation as possi-
ble ...." Withrapidretaliation apparentin bothdatasets(e.g.,fourtit-
for-tat inBelfastinoneday),anevenshorter
killings periodofaggregation
wouldyielda stillbettertestof how protest and coercioninteract.
The
principal reasonthatmonthlyandannualaggregations havedominatedpre-
viousresearch is thelackofdensityin thedata.Now thatNEXIS allows
Booleansearches ofwireservices,
regional
newsagencies, andmultilingual
agencies(AFP, Reuters)muchmorecompletedatacan be collectedand
codedefficiently.
Results
Parameter estimates,
significance
levels,andeigenvalues
arepresented
in Tables 1-4 and6-8. In all butone case,theparameterestimates
were
calculatedbythethree-stageleastsquaresmethod. Theseresults
werefully
consistentwithtwo-stageleastsquaresoutcomes. results
Bayesianupdating
appearin Tables5 and9.
Germany
German parameterestimatesareshowninTables1-4. Thetablesrepre-
sentboththeTsebelis-Sprague (equations1 and2) andtheLotka-Volterra
(equations3 and4) formsofthepredator-prey modelon different subsets
oftheGermandataseries,i.e.,demonstrations,non-demonstration protest,
andterrorism.Almostall of theparameter estimatesare significant.
Thus
bothforms ofthemodelmatched thecontext ofGermandissentandcoer-
cion.
Coercionis quitelow inGermany, evenbyWestEuropeanstandards.
Of nearly29,000demonstrators perweekin the 11-yearperiod,onlyan
averageof 10 wereinjured,just 18 arrested,
andno one was killedin the
Table 1. Tsebelis-Sprague
ResultsforGermanProtest
(Three-StageLeast Squares)
AR = -JR, + gC,
AC= hR, - kC,
Parameter Demonstrations OtherProtest
Coefficient Coefficient
f 0.978335* 0.33865*
(25.06) (10.6)
g 537.338* 6.258533
(10.5) (0.33)
h 0.0001111* 0.000095558
(3.58) (1.4)
k 0.742524* 0.721866*
(18.27) (17.69)
Eigenvalues X = 0.77654; X2= -1.01235 X1= 0.72266; X2 = -0.03466
Note: t-valuesare in parentheses
underparameter * indicatesstatistical
estimates; sig-
nificance.
R = extentof revolutionary
activity
C = extentof statecoercionand
decreasesin theabsenceof coercion
g = rateat whichcoercionincreasesas a function
of protest
h = rateat whichprotest as a function
increases of coercion
k = rateat whichcoerciondecreasesin theabsenceofprotest
t = time
entireperiod.A significant relationship betweenprotestandcoercionap-

pears,nonetheless, intheparameter forthepredator-prey
estimates models.
Table 1 showstheresults fortheTsebelis-Sprague modelon German dem-
onstrations,adaptiveprotest, andtheirassociatedcoercion.Theparameter
estimates indicatethatprotest spursrelativelylittlecoercion.The Lotka-
Volterra resultsin Table 2 yielda similarpicture. Thereis considerable
protest,butit meetslittlecoercionandstimulates littlemore.
Hypothesis 1 (inverted-U)impliesthattherewouldbe scantpolitical
protestinGermany-itis after all a democraticcountry withfewsanctions.
Yet protest is vigorous, principallyas a meansto influencepublicpolicy.
Theparameter estimates areconsistent indisconfirmingtheinverted-Uhy-
pothesisinGermany: intheTsebelis-Sprague model,g andh arepositive,
whilein theLotka-Volterra modelh is positive,buta is negative.The
inverted-U hypothesis is invalidin bothmodels.
Table 2. Lotka-Volterra
ResultsforGermanProtest
AR = -aR, - gCR,
AC = -bC, + hCR,
Parameter Demonstrations OtherProtest
a -1.207597* -0.343953*
(17.54) (8.88)
b 0.838394* 0.672261*
(11.38) (8.04)
g -0.0028328* 0.000008891
(7.07) (0.04)
h 0.0000006549* -0.0000004398
(2.0) (0.55)
Eigenvalues X= - 1.20956; XI = -0.343936;
?= 0.001964179 ?2 = -0.0000178184
underparameter * indicates
estimates; statistical
sig-
N = 573.
nificance.
betweenprotest
andcoerciondecreasesprotest
betweenprotest
andcoercionincreasescoercion
C = predators(coercion)
t = time
Hypothesis2 (unstable)faresno better,butone wouldnotexpectthat

protestandcoercionwouldgenerate divergent, results
oscillatory ina typi-
cal democratic
country. Theeigenvalues frombothformsofthepredator-
preymodelwererealnumbers. Therefore,theresultsfrombothof these
modelsindicatestability.The factthatbothsetsof theTsebelis-Sprague
parameterestimates generated eigenvalueswithdifferent signsprovides
evidenceofunstable equilibrium(a saddlepoint),butnotoscillation(Saaty
andBram1981).Theunstable hypothesis gainsbettersupportin thearena
of Germanterrorism (Tables 3 and 4). The matrixgenerated by Lotka-
Volterraparameter estimateshas complexeigenvalues, indicatingoscilla-
tion.Yetonlytwoofthefourparameter estimateswerestatistically
signifi-
cant.TheTsebelis-Sprague parameter estimatesgeneraterealeigenvalues,
Table 3. Tsebelis-Sprague
ResultsforGermanTerror
AR = -J?, + gC,
AC= hR,- kC,
Parameter Coefficient
f 0.787731*
(19.25)
g 0.000007
(0.0 1)
h 0.05269
(0.03)
k 0.999992*
(23.87)
Eigenvalues X= 0.9999922; 22 = -0.7877312

estimates; sig-
nificance.N = 573.
R = extent
of revolutionary
activity
C = extent
of statecoercionand
decreasesin theabsenceof coercion
g = rateat whichcoercionincreasesas a function
of protest
h = rateat whichprotest
increasesas a function
of coercion
k = rateat whichcoerciondecreasesin theabsenceof protest
t = time
although theirsignsdiffer.
Unstableequilibrium and oscillationprovide
weaksupport, then,fortheunstablehypothesis in onlyGermanterror.
Thereis stronger evidenceforbacklash(hypothesis 3) in Germany,
especiallyforweeklydemonstrations (Tables1 and2). Theresults arecon-
positivefora backlash.In theTsebelis-Sprague
sistently modelbothg and
h are positive,andtheLotka-Volterra resultsshowg is negative(Tables
1 and2). Bayesianupdating results(Table5) provideindependent support
forbacklashinGermandemonstrations. Thet-scores inthetablerepresent
thedifferencebetween theprobability ofdemonstrating everyweek(prior)
andtheBayesianprobability ofdemonstrating giveninjuriesor arrestsin
theprevious week(posterior).
Thefactthatthet-scores arenegative reflects
thefactthatposteriorprobabilitieswereactuallyhigherthanthepriorsin
Germany. Thismaybe a consequence ofthelow levelofcoercionduring
the11 yearsof thetimeseries,butthereare stronger indicationsthatthe
Table 4. Lotka-Volterra Results for German Terror

(Three-Stage Least Squares)
AR = aR, - gCR,
AC =-bC, + hCR,
a 1.004102
(1.13)
b 0.999985*
(23.87)
g 0.660415*
(2.13)
h -0.035343
(0.05)
Eigenvalues XI = 0.4843795 + .624735i;
2= 0.4843795 - .624735i
Note: t-valuesare in parentheses estimates;* indicatesstatistical
underparameter sig-
nificance.N = 573.
g = rateat whichtheinteraction
betweenprotest
andcoerciondecreasesprotest
b = rateat whichcoerciondeclinesin theabsenceofprotest
betweenprotest
C = predators(coercion)
t = time
Table 5. Bayesian Updating Results for German Demonstrations

(Two-sample t-tests)
Differencebetweenthe probabilityof demonstrating and the probabilityof dem-
given the level of injuriesor arrestsin the previousweek.
onstrating
Injuriesin thePreviousWeek Arrestsin thePreviousWeek
t statistic Significance
level t statistic level
Significance
-3.91 .0001 -5.15 <.0001
N = 573.
posteriorprobabilitiesarevalid.German dissidentsshowlowtolerance for

challenges totheirrighttodemonstrate. Theyare,after all,ina democratic
country. Demonstrators cameoutingreater numbers following arrests
and
injuriestoremind thegovernment ofthatfact.Backlashin a country with
low coercionmakessense-even risk-averse dissidentscan challengethe
state.
Hypothesis 4 (adaptation)
receivestentativesupportfrom bothmodels.
Theparameter estimatesgenerallyhavelowert-scores foradaptiveprotest
thanfordemonstrations only(see Tables1 and2). Adaptation thusreceives
support in Germany, butitis weak-not a surprising resultin a statewith
littleharassment ofprotesters.
Theprofile thatemerges fromtheresults forGermany is oneofregular
protestas an effectivemeanstogainan organization's goals.Thereis rela-
tivelylittleriskin takingtothestreets.Whenthestateattempts tocontrol
dissent,dissentincreases.The situation in Northern Irelanddiffers dis-
tinctly.We nexttakeup theresultsfromthiscase plaguedby sectarian
violence.
NorthernIreland
Northern Irelandpresents greaterdifficultyforempirical analysisthan
mostdomestic conflict cases.In mostinstances one can assumethatthere
aredissidents protesting againstthestateanda stateresponding withvary-
ingdegreesofcoercion.In Northern Irelandat leastthreesidesbattleone
another.Therearerepublican protesters,theirloyalist
counterparts,andthe
state,representing bothlocalUlsterauthority andtheBritish crown.Loyal-
istsandrepublicans fighteachotherandthestate.Within eachcommunity
thereare severalsplinter groupsthatengagein internecine As a
conflict.
practical
matter, theNorthern Irishtestswerefirstdividedintotwosections:
1) republican vs. thestate;and2) loyalistvs. thestate.BecauseProtestant
(loyalist)protest generated no morethanone significant parameter in any
configuration, theseresultsare notreported in theTsebelis-Sprague and
Lokta-Volterra tables.Theyare includedin thethree-sided Parrish-Saila
(equations5, 6, and7) table(Table 8). The othertables(Tables6 and7)
forNorthern Irelandrepresent republican forcesprotestingagainsttheBrit-
ishstateas wellas statecoercionagainstCatholics.
The greatbulkof protest duringthe1982-92 periodwas conducted
through terror.Protest evolvedin Northern Irelandfroma riot-based phe-
nomenon in the1970sto almostexclusiverelianceon terror in the1980s
and early1990s.Even mostCatholicdemonstrations after1984 formed
aroundfunerals of IRA guerrillas.The situation thuschangedfundamen-
tallyfromtheone investigated byPeroff andHewitt(1980),albeitnotin
thewaypredicted byTsebelisandSprague(1989).
Table 6. Tsebelis-Sprague Results for Northern Ireland Republican

Protest (Three-Stage Least Squares)
AR = -fR, + gC,
AC= hR, - kC,
Parameter Demonstrations Terror
f 0.887375* 0.820926*
(21.28) (19.89)
g -0.0000006696 -0.000001325
(0.00) (0.00)
h 0.00112256 0.47197
(0.02) (0.10)
k 0.500468* 0.500475*
(13.77) (13.77)
Eigenvalues X, =-0.887375; X2 = 0.500468 X, =-0.5005; X2= -0.821
underparameter sig-
estimates;* indicatesstatistical
nificance.N = 573.
Given these circumstances, the firsttests on the NorthernIreland data

compare republican demonstrations and terror(Tables 6 and 7). The Tse-
belis-Sprague results (Table 6) generated statisticallysignificantparameter
estimates only or lagged formsof protestand coercion respectively. Neither
g nor h is significant-that is, coercion does not affect the level of terror
and terrordoes not significantlychange the number of coercive acts. Table
7 displays the Lotka-Volterra results forrepublican demonstrationsand ter-
ror. The parameter estimates for terrorshould be viewed with caution, be-
cause they are calculated by ordinaryleast squares.'0 These coefficientsare
consistent, nonetheless, with the Tsebelis-Sprague results: the interaction
of terrorand coercion does not increase terror,but does appear to increase
coercion moderately in the OLS results.
Parameter estimates for republican demonstrationsare consistent with
the terrorresults in the Tsebelis-Sprague model. Once again, the models
do not generate the fitin Northern Ireland that they do in Germany and
even more coercive states (Francisco 1995). Neither the Tsebelis-Sprague
(Table 6) nor the Lotka-Volterra (Table 7) results indicate significantre-
sponses to coercion by demonstrators.Nor does interactionbetween dem-
onstrationsand coercion spur a significantlyhighercoercive response. Why
'OlnNorthern
Ireland'sterror, modelprovedimpossible
theLokta-Volterra toestimate
(i.e.,didnotconverge)
bytwo-andthree-stage inTable7 forthe
leastsquares.Theresults
terror columnarebasedon OLS only.
ResultsforNorthernIrelandRepublican
Table 7. Lotka-Volterra
Demonstrations (Three-StageLeast Squares) and Terror
(OrdinaryLeast Squares)
AR = -aR, - gCR,
AC = -bC, + hCR,
Parameter Demonstrations Terror
a -0.88504* -0.820923*
(20.69) (19.89)
b 0.500466* 0.999679*
(13.77) (22.82)
g 0.00108787 0.0000045
(0.25) (0.01)
h -0.000119 0.95716*
(0.02) (15.78)
Eigenvalues X, = -0.884419; X2= -0.00073475 X, = 0.95716; k2 = -0.821
estimates;* indicatesstatistical
underparameter
Note: t-valuesare in parentheses sig-
nificance.
g = rateat whichtheinteraction andcoerciondecreasesprotest
betweenprotest
betweenprotest
C = predators
(coercion)
t = time
not?Northern after
Ireland, oneofthehighest
all,represents levelsofpoliti-
cal conflict in theWestern worldin recenthistory.The answerappearsto
be a function ofthekindsofprotests thatformin thisphaseoftheUlster
conflict. numbers
Significant ofCatholicsturnouton anniversariesofpast
tragedies, butthemostfrequent demonstrationsfollowthedeathof IRA
fighters. Policeintervenedinthesegatheringsintheearlyyearsofthetime
series,butthenpurposely withdrew to thesidelinesaftertwoincidentsof
significant bloodshed. Formostofthe11-year period,thedatarevealfew
injuries andevenfewer arrests Thepoliceandthemilitary
ofdemonstrators.
inNorthern Irelanddecidedlongagotofocustheir ontherepublican
efforts
andloyalistparamilitary groups,noton streetdemonstrations.Theirenor-
mouscoercivecapacityis thususuallyinert.
It is possiblethattheconventional formsof thepredator-prey model
lacktheresolution toaccurately portray theNorthern Irelandconflicts. For

mostof the11 yearsof thedata,theUlsterwarwas a three-sided affair,
withloyalistterror increasing duringtheperiod.The Parrish-Saila three-
speciespredator-prey modelaffords an opportunity to testthisconjecture
bymeasuring theeffects oftheinteractions betweenloyalists andrepubli-
cans,as wellas theirconflict withcrownforces.
Emerging fromthelargerarrayofparameter estimates inParrish-Saila
results(Table8) is a portraitconsonant withthetwo-equation models.The
loyalistactivity did notshowenoughstrength to generate anysignificant
results.Nor did republican protest changesignificantly frominteraction
withloyalists orthecrown.The significant finding in theParrish-Saila re-
sultsis thesignificance of theparameter 1,theinteraction of republican
protestand crowncoercion.These interactions measurably increaseen-
forcement orcoercionactivities on thepartofpoliceandtheBritish army.
Theinverted-U hypothesis doesnotaccountfortheprotest inNorthern
Ireland.Thereis relativelylittleactivecoercion, butlargeamounts ofterror
andprotest. Coercion,whenit is applied,does notdepressterror. Neither
doestheunstable hypothesis applytoNorthern Ireland:theeigenvalues of
thematrices generated bytheparameters arerealnumbers-eventerror is
stable.Theparameter estimates indicate no significantbacklashagainstthe
Britishauthorities.Thereis no shortage oftit-for-tat
violencebetweenthe
twosectarian communities, butit does notextendregularly to statecoer-
cion.The statehas beenineffective in itsattempts to curtailterrorism by
theIRA,itsoffshoots, orevenitsloyalistcounterparts. Therefore thefirst
testoftheadaptation hypothesis is precluded in Northern Ireland,because
thereis insufficient protestbeyonddemonstrations and terror. Bayesian
analysisofNorthern IrishCatholicdemonstrations doesshowminimal ad-
aptation to physicalcoercion(Table 9). The probability of demonstrating
is significantlylowerfollowing injuriesinflictedin thepreviousweek's
demonstrations. Thereis nodifference following arrests,however, because
therewereveryfewarrests in theperiod(significant arrests in just 2 of
573 weeks).The policeinflicted fewerinjuriesin themid-andlateryears
ofthetimeseries,inpartbecausedemonstrations might recedebriefly, but
terrorusuallyincreasedfollowing physicalinjuriesamongCatholicpro-
testers.
Theseresults indicatethattheIRA was successful inpursuing itscam-
paignas a military operation. It determined thetargets andthetiming. The
typicalgovernment response toa seriousbombing incident wastheaddition
of 1,000troopsto theBritish armydetachment in Northern Ireland.Coer-
cive capacityincreases, butnotcoercionitself,becausethearmyhas no
greaterabilityto findtheIRA. In termsofinitiating action,theIRA is far
morepredator thanpreyin theperiodcoveredbythetimeseries.
Table 8. Parrish-Saila Results for NorthernIreland Protest

(Three-Stage Least Squares)
AR = -aR1 - bR,R2-cRIC
AR2 =R2 -
gRR2 -hR2C
AC = -jC + kR,C + IR2C

a -2.112962
(1.23)
b -291.421766
(0.07)
c -0.146732
(0.67)
f -0.986642*
(2.45)
g -205.68974
(1.67)
h 0.00152167
(0.02)
j 0.997292*
(7.51)
k 0.000049714
(0.14)
0.952653*
(3.63)
Eigenvalues X= -207.0925; X2 = -0.6162372; X3 = 0.85865
estimates; sig-
N = 573.
nificance.
RI = loyalistprotest
R2 = republican
protest
C = coercionbypoliceandBritish
Crownforces
a = rateat whichloyalistprotest
increasesin theabsenceof interaction
b = rateat whichtheinteraction
of loyalistandrepublican
conflicts
decreasesloyalistprotest
c = rateat whichloyalistprotest
declinesin theinteraction
of protest
andcoercion
f = rateat whichrepublican increasesin theabsenceof interaction
protest
of loyalistandrepublican
conflict
decreasesrepublican
protest
h = rateat whichrepublican andcoerciondecreasesrepublican
protest protest
j = rateat whichcoerciondecreasesin theabsenceof protest
k = rateat whichtheinteraction
of loyalistprotest
and
I = rateat whichtheinteraction
of republican andcoercionincreasescoercion
protest
Table 9. BayesianUpdatingResultsforCatholicDemonstrations
in NorthernIreland(Two-samplet-tests)
Injuriesin thePreviousWeek Arrestsin thePreviousWeek
t statistic Significance
level t statistic Significance
level
2.833 .0048 0.266 0.79
N = 573.
Discussion
Development ofa theory ofprotestrequires resolution oftherelation-
shipbetweenprotest and coercion.It is in thiscruciblethatmostof the
complexity ofprotestarises:theproblem ofcollectivemobilization, itsre-
latedfreeriderproblem, and theeffectof different levelsand typesof
coercionon theprobability ofprotest (Lichbach1995).Thispaperextends
existing recentresearchthatseekstolaybarethecomplexities oftheissue
andtotestalternative hypotheses drawnfromobservations ofinconsisten-
cies in thecurrent theories
ofprotest.
Thedecisiontoextendthepredator-prey modeltodemocratic countries
arosefromtheneedtoknowwhether thesamemechanism presentincoer-
civeenvironments existsin societiesthatguarantee theright to dissent.In
thisrespectGermany does showthatat leastone democratic country fits
thepredator-prey mechanism, despiteextremely lowcoercion.Protest and
coercionare interrelated.Yet theabsenceof coerciondoes notpreclude
protest.Germans protestfrequently.Thisis stillanother difficulty
withthe
inverted-U hypothesis-more likelybecauseit is too simplistic, notbe-
causeit is wrongin mostcases.
Therewasnoreasontoexpectbacklashoroscillatory protestandcoer-
cioninanenvironment ofstaterestraint.
Germans didshow,first,thatback-
lashagainstrecentcoercionworkstoreduceit;andsecond,thatchanging
tacticstoadaptto(evenlow)coercionatleastworkstolessentheprobabil-
ityof statesanction.The backlashindicatedby theBayesianupdating
method worked inGermany's lowcoercionenvironment andshowedadap-
tationto physicalcoercionin Northern Ireland.
Northern Ireland'sprotestandcoercion wasotherwise notwelladapted
tothepredator-prey mechanism. Thereasonforthisappearstobe theevolu-
tionofthesectarian conflict.
It cametoresemble violenceforthesakeof
violence.The activistsare all sectarianparamilitary groupsthatmurder
whilethestatestandshaplessly by,unableto mountan effective strategy
to curtailthefighting.The state'sanswerwas to increasethenumber of
soldiers,effectivelycreatingmoretargets fortheIRA. This is notquite
confirmation ofTsebelis's(1989) hypothesis thathiring morepolicedoes
notreducecrime.11 It is simplyevidencethattheBritishgovernment did

notknowhowto stopIRA andloyalistviolencewithsecurity police.
NorthernIrelandwas a prominent examplein TsebelisandSprague's
(1989)original
invocation ofthecanonicalpredator-prey
modelas anappli-
cablemechanism forprotest andcoercion.Thefactthatitsfitwas substan-
tiallylowerthanGermany's impliesthatprotest
andcoercionevolveand
adaptovertimeto suchan extentthatthebasic mechanism representing
theirrelationship
changes.Moretime-series data,especiallyofthelength
demonstratedhere,shouldbe collectedon different cases,nonetheless,to
testtheincreasingsetof refined hypotheses(e.g.,Lichbach1994) andto
makeavailablethebodyofevidencetoresearchers onprotestandcoercion.
Manuscriptsubmitted30 May 1995.

Final manuscriptreceived27 December 1995.
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Coercion and Protest: An Empirical Test in Two Democratic States

Author(s): Ronald A. Francisco

Theory:The theory ofprotestundervarying levelsofcoercionformsthecontext

The relationshipbetweencoercionand protestis a centralelementin

*Thanks toPaulJohnson, PhilipSchrodt

ized by majority rule and whatJackman(1993) calls "powerwithout

'Thesecases completea sampleof fivecountries. The companion article(Francisco

dR= -fR + gc+ [1]

dC= hR-kC + y [2]

dR= aR-gCR [3]

Sinceall threemodelsareall exactlyidentified,

b = rateat whichcoerciondeclinesin theabsenceof protest

dR2 - f2- gRIR2- hR2C [6]

C = coercionby policeand BritishCrownforces

a = rateat whichloyalistprotestincreasesin theabsenceof interaction

c = rateat whichloyalistprotestdeclinesin theinteraction

f = rateat whichrepublicanprotestincreasesin theabsenceof interaction

h = rateat whichrepublicanprotestand coerciondecreasesrepublicanprotest

j = rateat whichcoerciondecreasesin theabsenceof protest

Thereis no consistentthree-sided in Germany's

3. Backlash:c andh arenegative.

P2(A) = p1(A) p(eJA) [8]

where{A,} is a partition acts.

itspoliticalarm(SinnFein[ourselves alone])enters candidates inelections.

lectedbyweekfrommultiple sources(Bew andGillespie1993;Factson

entireperiod.A significant relationship betweenprotestandcoercionap-

Hypothesis2 (unstable)faresno better,butone wouldnotexpectthat

Note: t-valuesare in parentheses

Table 4. Lotka-Volterra Results for German Terror

Table 5. Bayesian Updating Results for German Demonstrations

posteriorprobabilitiesarevalid.German dissidentsshowlowtolerance for

Table 6. Tsebelis-Sprague Results for Northern Ireland Republican

Given these circumstances, the firsttests on the NorthernIreland data

lacktheresolution toaccurately portray theNorthern Irelandconflicts. For

Table 8. Parrish-Saila Results for NorthernIreland Protest

AC = -jC + kR,C + IR2C

notreducecrime.11 It is simplyevidencethattheBritishgovernment did

Manuscriptsubmitted30 May 1995.

"See also Cox (1994).

RonaldA. 1995."The Relationship

Rule, JamesB. 1988. Theoriesof Civil Violence.Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress.

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