ATTY.

ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, Petitioner,

ALFREDO S. LIM Petitioner-Intervenor,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, Respondents.

GR No. 206666, January 21, 2015

ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.– A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public office, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.

Facts:

September 2007, Sandiganbayan convicted Estrada for the crime of plunder with the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and
perpetual absolute disqualification.

October 2007, President Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon to Estrada with
"WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or
office,IN VIEW HEREOF and pursuant to the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution, I hereby
grant executive clemency to JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, convicted by the Sandiganbayan of
Plunder and imposed a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is hereby restored to his civil and political
rights." Which Estrada received and accepted by affixing his signature.

November 2009, Estrada filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of President and has earned 3
oppositions in the COMELEC. In 2012, Estrada filed a COC vying for the position of Manila City
Mayor. Then, Risos-Vidal filed a petition for disqualification against Estrada.

COMELEC: petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Risos-Vidal failed to present cogent proof sufficient
to reverse Estrada's right to seek public office as effectively restored by the pardon vested by Arroyo.

Risos-Vidal then invoked the Court's jurisdiction saying that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it failed to disqualify Estrada for having been convicted of plunder, an offense involving
moral turpitude. And for failing to consider the perpetual disqualification of Estrada.

The restoration of his right to run for any public office is the exception to the prohibition under Section
40 of the LGC, as provided under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. As to the seeming
requirement of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., the express restoration/remission of a
particular right to be stated in the pardon, the OSG asserts that "an airtight and rigid interpretation of
Article 36 and Article 41 of the [RPC] would be stretching too much the clear and plain meaning of the
aforesaid provisions." Lastly, taking into consideration the third Whereas Clause of the pardon granted
to former President Estrada, the OSG supports the position that it "is not an integral part of the decree of
the pardon and cannot therefore serve to restrict its effectivity
Issue: whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public
office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.

Ruling:

ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.– A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public office,
or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.

A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him
by the sentence.

ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory penalties.– The penalties of
reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or
during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification
which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall
have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which
naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The
wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified.

The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional.

Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph
Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither makes
the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to
suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored.

This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation,
considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as being restored. Jurisprudence
educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause
that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses
do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the
statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and
therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity
contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.