XXIV.12 RAMON L. LABO, JR., v. COMELEC AND LUIS L.
LARDIZABAL,  enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these
G.R. No. 86564 | August 1, 1989
FACTS: Ramon Labo, Jr. was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City. The petition
for quo warranto  was filed by the private respondent Luis Lardizabal on January 26,
1988. The petitioner asks the Court to restrain the Commission on Elections from
looking into the question of his citizenship as a qualification for his office as Mayor
of Baguio City and instead rule on whether or not the public respondent has
jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry into this matter, considering that the petition
for quo warranto  against him was not filed on time.
There are two administrative decisions on the question of the petitioner's
citizenship. The first was rendered by the Commission on Elections on May 12,
1982, and found the petitioner to be a citizen of the Philippines.  The second was
rendered by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation on September 13,
1988, and held that the petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines. There was no
direct proof that the herein petitioner had been formally naturalized as a citizen of
Australia. But he had married an Australian citizen, obtained an Australian
passport, and registered as an alien with the CID upon his return to this country in
1980. On the other hand, the decision of the CID took into account the official
statement of the Australian Government dated August 12, 1984, through its Consul
in the Philippines, that the petitioner was still an Australian citizen as of that date
by reason of his naturalization in 1976.
The petitioner does not question the authenticity of statement of the Australian
Government. Neither does he deny that he obtained Australian Passport No.
754705, which he used in coming back to the Philippines in 1980, when he declared
before the immigration authorities that he was an alien and registered as such
under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-323985.  He later asked for the change
of his status from immigrant to a returning former Philippine citizen and was
granted Immigrant Certificate of Residence No. 223809.  He also categorically
declared that he was a citizen of Australia in a number of sworn statements
voluntarily made by him and. even sought to avoid the jurisdiction of the barangay
court on the ground that he was a foreigner.  under the Constitution itself because of his alienage.  He was therefore ineligible as
ISSUE: Whether or not Labo Jr., is a Filipino Citizen?
RULING: No. The Court denied the petition.
The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst
only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship. Such a
specious argument cannot stand against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which
are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship;
and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a
foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner. It is also worth
mentioning in this connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of the present
Constitution, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall
be dealt with by law."
Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia
was annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was
bigamous, that circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine
citizenship. The possibility that he may have been subsequently rejected by
Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has been automatically reinstated as
a citizen of the Philippines.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does
not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired
Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. He does not point to any judicial
decree of naturalization as to any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship
upon him. Neither has he shown that he has complied with PD No. 725, providing
that:
... (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire
Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee
on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications
are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon
cancel their certificate of registration. (Emphasis supplied.)
The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on January
18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter
a candidate for mayor of Baguio City, under Section 42 of the Local Government
Code providing in material part as follows:
Sec. 42. Qualifications. — An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-three years of age on election day, a qualified voter
registered as such in the barangay, municipality, city or province where he
proposes to be elected, a resident therein for at least one year at the time of the
filing of his certificate of candidacy, and able to read and write English, Filipino, or
any other local language or dialect.
The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a "futile technicality" that
should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio City, who elected him by a
"resonant and thunderous majority." To be accurate, it was not as loud as all that,
for his lead over the second-placer was only about 2,100 votes. In any event, the
people of that locality could not have, even unanimously, changed the
requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution. The electorate
had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of
Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the
Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.
The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may have done so
in the belief that he was qualified only strengthens the conclusion that the results
of the election cannot nullify the qualifications for the office now held by him.
These qualifications are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during
incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. In the case at bar, the
citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently lost but were not
possessed at all in the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner was
disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to
serve as such.
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed
the quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The
simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the
election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio city.
It remains to stress that the citizen of the Philippines must take pride in his status
as such and cherish this priceless gift that, out of more than a hundred other
nationalities, God has seen fit to grant him. Having been so endowed, he must not
lightly yield this precious advantage, rejecting it for another land that may offer him
material and other attractions that he may not find in his own country. To be sure,
he has the right to renounce the Philippines if he sees fit and transfer his allegiance
to a state with more allurements for him.  But having done so, he cannot expect to
be welcomed back with open arms once his taste for his adopted country turns
sour or he is himself disowned by it as an undesirable alien.
Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after
its renunciation. It may be restored only after the returning renegade makes a
formal act of re-dedication to the country he has abjured and he solemnly affirms
once again his total and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This
may not be accomplished by election to public office.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor of
Baguio City. He is ordered to VACATE his office and surrender the same to the Vice-
Mayor of Baguio City, once this decision becomes final and executory. The
temporary restraining order dated January 31, 1989, is LIFTED.
XXIV.13 ANTONIO BENGSON III, v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, 
G.R. No. 142840 | May 7, 2001
FACTS: Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He
was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The
fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. However, respondent
Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a
Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63,
section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.”
In 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation
under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of
the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a
convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was
then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with
respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that
respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of
Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI,
section 6 of the Constitution. HRET dismissed the petition for quo warranto and
declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan
in the May 1998 elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an
American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship?
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-
born Filipino since he lost his Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the
United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists
that Article citizens are those who are from birth with out having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as natural-
born citizen when he was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV,
Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-
born citizen.
RULING: NO. The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follow:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization.
These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the
natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his
birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof. 9
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship."
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens
through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization
Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant
has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications 12 and none of the
disqualification13 provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting
Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its
promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the
applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful
calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of
Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest
of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in
the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates
the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former
citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is
governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand,
naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to
reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the
disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who
lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; 19 services in the
armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;20 (3) service in the Armed Forces
of the United States at any other time,21 (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an
alien;22 and (5) political economic necessity. Repatriation simply consists of the
taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said
oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or
last resided. Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be
restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he
was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will
be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service
in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides: Section 1. Any person
who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the
Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where
he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain
a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan, respondent
Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a
status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing
that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status
before he lost his Philippine citizenship. Petitioner's contention that respondent
Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his
citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term
"natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973
Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person
must be a Filipino citizen birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to
obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino
citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized
and (2) those born before January 17, 1973,38 of Filipino mothers who, upon
reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized
citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because they were not
Filipino at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those
born of Filipino mothers before the effectively of the 1973 Constitution were
likewise not considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act to
perfect their Philippines citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of Filipino mothers
before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who re
natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are
considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who
are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of
citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in
accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to
undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is
natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate
category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently
reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be
natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their
citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition
thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceeding in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born
Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as
member of the House of Representatives.
XXIV.14 AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL
TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER - HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG, v.
THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, as the Secretary of Justice, 
G.R. No. 160869 |  May 11, 2007
FACTS: Hector Calilung filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary
of Justice Simeon Datumanong, the official tasked to implement laws governing
citizenship. Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent
from implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship
of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the
Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes."
Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5,
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical
to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Rep. Act No. 9225, signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on August 29,
2003, reads:
SECTION 1. Short Title.-This Act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003."
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking
the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I ___________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support
and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws
and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines;
and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose
this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the aforesaid oath.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional? (No)
(2) Whether or not the Court have jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual
allegiance? (None)
Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. He
avers that Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, together, allow dual allegiance
and not dual citizenship. Petitioner maintains that Section 2 allows all Filipinos,
either natural-born or naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their
Philippine citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual
allegiance because said law allows natural-born citizens of the Philippines to regain
their Philippine citizenship by simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting
their foreign allegiance.2 The Constitution, however, is categorical that dual
allegiance is inimical to the national interest.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely declares as a
state policy that "Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall
be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship." The OSG further claims
that the oath in Section 3 does not allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by the
former Filipino citizen is an effective renunciation and repudiation of his foreign
citizenship. The fact that the applicant taking the oath recognizes and accepts the
supreme authority of the Philippines is an unmistakable and categorical affirmation
of his undivided loyalty to the Republic.
RULING: NO. The Court dismissed the petition.
The deliberations of Congress is necessary to determine the intent of the legislative
branch in drafting the assailed law. During the deliberations, the issue of whether
Rep. Act No. 9225 would allow dual allegiance had in fact been the subject of
debate. The record of the legislative deliberations reveals the following:
Rep. Dilangalen asked whether in the particular case, the person did not denounce
his foreign citizenship and therefore still owes allegiance to the foreign
government, and at the same time, owes his allegiance to the Philippine
government, such that there is now a case of dual citizenship and dual allegiance.
Rep. Locsin clarified that by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the
person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Rep. Locsin replied that it is
imperative that those who have dual allegiance contrary to national interest should
be dealt with by law. However, he said that the dual allegiance problem is not
addressed in the bill. He then cited the Declaration of Policy in the bill which states
that "It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all citizens who become
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of this Act." He stressed that what the bill does is
recognize Philippine citizenship but says nothing about the other citizenship.
Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual allegiance is created
wherein a natural-born citizen of the Philippines takes an oath of allegiance to
another country and in that oath says that he abjures and absolutely renounces all
allegiance to his country of origin and swears allegiance to that foreign country.
The original Bill had left it at this stage, he explained. In the present measure, he
clarified, a person is required to take an oath and the last he utters is one of
allegiance to the country. He then said that the problem of dual allegiance is no
longer the problem of the Philippines but of the other foreign country.
It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do
away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine
citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other
countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born
Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual
allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person
implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No.
9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of
confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned
foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of
Rep. Act No. 9225.
Petitioner likewise advances the proposition that although Congress has not yet
passed any law on the matter of dual allegiance, such absence of a law should not
be justification why this Court could not rule on the issue. He further contends that
while it is true that there is no enabling law yet on dual allegiance, the Supreme
Court, through Mercado v. Manzano, already had drawn up the guidelines on how
to distinguish dual allegiance from dual citizenship.

For its part, the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5, Article IV of the 1987
Constitution, dual allegiance shall be dealt with by law. Thus, until a law on dual
allegiance is enacted by Congress, the Supreme Court is without any jurisdiction to
entertain issues regarding dual allegiance.

To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy

and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on
dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not
concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens
who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific
parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be
premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues
pertaining to dual allegiance. Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of
petitioner that a law is not needed since the case of Mercado had already set the
guidelines for determining dual allegiance. Petitioner misreads Mercado.  That case
did not set the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a
distinction between dual allegiance and dual citizenship.