SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

Cases on R.A. No. 7610 – Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act

Submitted to:

Atty. Leonard Rey A. Aguinaldo

Submitted by:

Pilar del Pilar-Baysac

Case Digests:

a. People of the Philippines v. Leonardo Degay | G.R. No. 182526 | August 25, 2010 | J.
Perez

FACTS: At the time the crime of rape was complained by private respondent (AAA) she was
nine (9) years old and a grade III pupil. The accused is their neighbor with only five houses
separating them. During the second week of March, 2004, AAA was on her way to school when
she met the accused. The accused kissed AAA on the forehead several times, and he brought her
inside his house. He laid her on the sofa, mounted her, and inserted his hard penis into her
vagina. AAA felt pain in her vagina. After satisfying himself, the accused gave AAA P5.00 and
warned her not to tell her mother about what happened. The said act was again repeated on
March 25, 2004.

CCC, AAA’s mother learned about what happened to her daughter. CCC confronted AAA and
she confirmed to CCC that she was raped by the accused. AAA and BBB, a four-year old girl
who is another complainant were examined at the Bontoc General Hospital. BBB confessed that
she is also raped by the accused when one day the accused brought her to the bedroom on the
second floor of the house. He laid her down on the bed and the accused went on top of her. She
felt pain in her vagina.

The defense presented seven witnesses including the accused himself. The accused denied that
he knew the victims and that he came to know them when he was detained at Bauko Municipal
Jail. The RTC found the accused guilty of three counts of statutory rape and it was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether the accused is guilty of lascivious conduct and not statutory rape.

RULING: The accused argues that his acts of showing his penis to BBB and the touching of
AAA’s vagina, mashing of her breasts and letting his penis touch her vagina constitute lascivious
conduct and not statutory rape, citing Section 2(h) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting
and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases, Republic Act No. 7610, which defines lascivious
conduct as “the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or
mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate,
harass, degrade or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation,
lascivious exhibition of the genitals on pubic area of a person.” He cites that the lascivious
conduct is supported by the medico-legal findings on AAA and BBB, when it was found that
there was no hymenal laceration on their organs. The accused further faults the RTC for not
giving credence to his plausible alibi that he was in another place on 8 May 2004 and it was
impossible for him to have brought BBB to his house and raped her.

On the other hand, the prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General, in its brief argues
that it had proven beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed statutory rape and not
just acts of lasciviousness. It cited the categorical and straightforward testimonies of AAA and
BBB as corroborated by the medical findings showing both victims suffered erythema or redness
in the areas of their labias minora and majora. It pointed out that this Court had held in People
v. De la Cuesta, that absence of hymenal lacerations on the private organs of the victims does not
negate rape. It stressed that the RTC correctly convicted the accused of three counts of statutory
rape since the accused had sexual intercourse with the victims who are both under 12 years of
age. It finally argued that the accused cannot exculpate himself from liability by alleging that
from the last week of February, 2004 to the first week of April, 2004, he was in Caboan,
Capangdanan because Caboan is only three kilometers away from Sabangan and could be
traversed in an hour or less. It was therefore not physically impossible for the accused to be at
the crime scenes.

After review, we uphold the rulings of the appellate court and the RTC.
 b. People of the Philippines v. Ernesto Fragrante | G.R. No. 182521 | February 09, 2011
| J. Carpio

FACTS: Ernesto Fragrante was married to CCC; they had three children and the victim (AAA)
is their third child. Three or four months before her eleventh (11) birthday, she woke up early
because her father promised them that they will have driving lessons that day. Her father enterd
her room, lie beside her on her bed, he was talking about a lot of things to her and then he started
to fondle her breast and suck her nipples.

The said incident was repeated between June and August 1993 and on some other occasions. In
September 1995 when AAA is at the age of thirteen (13), she was raped by her father Ernesto.
She was told to get inside his room. He scolded her and told her to lie down on his bed. And then
he raped her. She bbegged and struggled for him to remove his penis inside her but despite all
her pleas he stayed on top of him.

In the evening of October 25, 1997 AAA was left home with his father because her mother and
siblings went to a wake. Her father started massaging her breast. Her father strangled her and
asked her whether she preferred to be strangled first and she answered no. He started touching
her private parts and then she told him that her mother has arrived, that was the only time that
she was allowed to leave but she was warned to not tell her mother what happened. After that,
they report the incident to the NBI. The appellant was charged with nine (9) counts of acts of
lasciviousness and (1) count of rape.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming appellant's conviction for nine (9)
counts of acts of lasciviousness and one (1) count of rape
.
RULING: The court sustained the appellant’s conviction for (7) counts of acts of lasciviousness
and (1) count of rape. He was acquitted for (2) counts of acts of lasciviousness on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
The prosecution sufficiently established appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
of rape.

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of
a woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, all the essential elements of rape are present in this
case. The evidence on record clearly proves that appellant had carnal knowledge of his own
minor daughter AAA.

It must be stressed that the gravamen of rape is sexual congress with a woman by force and
without consent. In People v. Orillosa, we held that actual force or intimidation need not be
employed in incestuous rape of a minor because the moral and physical dominion of the father is
sufficient to cow the victim into submission to his beastly desires. When a father commits the
odious crime of rape against his own daughter, his moral ascendancy or influence over the latter
substitutes for violence and intimidation. The absence of violence or offer of resistance would
not affect the outcome of the case because the overpowering and overbearing moral influence of
the father over his daughter takes the place of violence and offer of resistance required in rape
cases committed by an accused who did not have blood relationship with the victim.

In this case, AAA's testimony clearly showed how appellant took advantage of his relationship
with and his moral ascendancy over his minor daughter when he had carnal knowledge of her.
As found by the Court of Appeals, appellant instilled fear on AAA's mind every time he sexually
molested her, thus: [AAA] also admitted that after accused-appellant has started sexually
molesting her until she was raped, she was so frightened of him. In fact she could not tell her
mother of her ordeal, mindful of the serious threats on her life and of the chaos it would cause
their family.

We likewise find appellant's claim that the medical findings do not support the charge of rape
untenable. Aside from AAA's positive, straightforward, and credible testimony, the prosecution
presented the medical certificate issued by Dr. Bernadette Madrid and the latter's testimony
which corroborate AAA's claim that appellant raped her.

The Court is not impressed with appellant's claim that AAA's failure to immediately report the
incidents to the proper authorities affected her credibility. Delay could be attributed to the
victim's tender age and the appellant's threats. A rape victim's actions are oftentimes influenced
by fear, rather than reason. In incestuous rape, this fear is magnified because the victim usually
lives under the same roof as the perpetrator or is at any rate subject to his dominance because of
their blood relationship.

Appellant was charged with violation of Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in
relation to Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610. These provisions state:

Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. -- Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon
other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article,
shall be punished by prision correccional.

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who
for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon the following:

x x x x

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse of lascivious conduct with a child exploited
in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape
and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious
conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x

The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 are as
follows:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual
abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, all the elements of sexual abuse under Section 5,
Article III of RA 7610 are present here.

First, appellant's repeated touching, fondling, and sucking of AAA's breasts and inserting his
finger into AAA's vagina with lewd designs undoubtedly constitute lascivious conduct under
Section 2(h) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 7610, to wit:

(h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of
the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into
the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to
abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or public area of a person.

Second, appellant, as a father having moral ascendancy over his daughter, coerced AAA to
engage in lascivious conduct, which is within the purview of sexual abuse. In People v.
Larin, we held:

A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child
indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other
consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group.

Third, AAA is below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the offense, based on her
testimony which was corroborated by her Birth Certificate presented during the trial. Section
3(a), Article I of Republic Act No. 7610 provides:

SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. -

(a) "Children" refers [to] persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to
fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition;

Since all three elements of the crime were present, the conviction of appellant for acts of
lasciviousness was proper.

In Criminal Case Nos. 98-652 and 98-658, we agree with the Office of the Solicitor General,
representing the People, that the prosecution failed to prove appellant's guilt for acts of
lasciviousness beyond reasonable doubt. While AAA testified that appellant habitually molested
her, there was no specific evidence supporting the charge that appellant committed acts of
lasciviousness in May 1993 and September 1997, or on or about those dates. Hence, we find
appellant not guilty for two counts of acts of lasciviousness (Criminal Case Nos. 98-652 and 98-
658) on the ground of reasonable doubt.

As regards the other criminal cases for acts of lasciviousness, where appellant's guilt was proved
beyond reasonable doubt, we affirm appellant's conviction. In these cases, the alternative
circumstance of relationship under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code should be considered
against appellant. In People v. Fetalino, the Court held that, "in crimes against chastity, like acts
of lasciviousness, relationship is considered aggravating." In that case, the Court considered
relationship as an aggravating circumstance since the informations mentioned, and the accused
admitted, that the complainant is his daughter.

In the instant case, the information expressly state that AAA is appellant's daughter, and
appellant openly admitted this fact. Accordingly, we modify the penalty imposed in Criminal
Case Nos. 98-657 and 98-659. Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 prescribes the
penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. Since there is an
aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty shall be applied in its
maximum period - reclusion perpetua. Besides, Section 31 of Republic Act No. 7610 expressly
provides that "The penalty provided herein shall be imposed in its maximum period when the
perpetrator is [a] x x x parent, x x x. In People v. Montinola and People v. Sumingwa, where the
accused is the biological father of the minor victim, the Court appreciated the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of relationship and accordingly imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Thus, appellant herein is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in
Criminal Case Nos. 98-657 and 98-659.

In Criminal Case Nos. 98-651, 98-653, 98-654, 98-655, and 98-656, where AAA was still below
12 years old at the time of the commission of the acts of lasciviousness, the imposable penalty
is reclusion temporal in its medium period in accordance with Section 5(b), Article III of
Republic Act No. 7610. This provision specifically states "[t]hat the penalty for lascivious
conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its
medium period."Considering the presence of the aggravating circumstance of relationship, as
explained, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period. In People v. Velasquez, which
involved a two year old child sexually abused by her grandfather, the Court imposed the
indeterminate sentence of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum to 17 years
of reclusion temporal as maximum. Accordingly, appellant herein is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum to 17 years
of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Also, we modify the amount of moral damages and fine awarded by the Court of Appeals. We
reduce the amount of moral damages from P50,000 to P15,000 and the amount of fine from
P30,000 to P15,000 for each of the seven (7) counts of acts of lasciviousness. In addition, we
award civil indemnity in the amount of P20,000, and exemplary damages in the sum of P15,000,
in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of relationship, for each of the seven (7)
counts of acts of lasciviousness.
 c. People of the Philippines v. Bernabe Pangilinan | G.R. No.183090 | November 14,
2011 | J. Perez

FACTS: AAA, a thirteen year old girl lived with her aunt BBB and her husband since she was
two years old until July 27, 2001. At around 10 p.m. of July 27, 2001, while her aunt was
working in Angeles, Pampanga, and she was watching television in their house, appellant arrived
and ordered her to cook chicken adobo which she did. Appellant approached her and pointed a
samurai at her. Appellant then kissed her neck and mashed her breast. It was not the first time
that appellant did that to her. AAA testified that prior to the said incident; she was already
abused by the appellant several times. She said that the reason why she did not tell her aunt about
the molestation is because the appellant threatened to kill her and her aunt. She also said that her
aunt and appellant treated her like their own child.
BBB denied all the allegations against him and on his defense he said that it was CCC, AAA’s
cousin who molested her and that AAA is only forced by her wife’s relatives to file charges
against him because they were against him and their relationship. His testimony was
corroborated by two other witnesses. The Trial Court found the accused guilty for rape and
sexual abuse. The Court of Appeals affirmed the said decision but with modifications as to the
award for damages.

ISSUE: Whether the accused should be penalized for rape under RA 7610 or under Article 266-
A of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING: In this case, appellant was charged under two separate information for rape under
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610,
respectively. However, we find the Information in Criminal Case No. 11769 for sexual abuse to
be void for being violative of appellant’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.

The allegations in the above-quoted Information would show the insufficiency of the averments
of the acts alleged to have been committed by appellant. It does not contain the essential facts
constituting the offense, but a statement of a conclusion of law. Thus, appellant cannot be
convicted of sexual abuse under such Information. The right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against an accused cannot be waived for reasons of public policy. Hence,
it is imperative that the complaint or information filed against the accused be complete to meet
its objectives. As such, an indictment must fully state the elements of the specific offense alleged
to have been committed.

Art. 266-A Rape; When and How Committed – Rape is Committed –

 1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned
above be present.

We find that AAA remained steadfast in her assertion that appellant raped her through force and
intimidation with the use of a samurai. And even after the incident, appellant threatened AAA
that he would kill her and her aunt, i.e., appellant's wife, should AAA report the incident.

A finding that the accused is guilty of rape may be based solely on the victim's testimony if such
testimony meets the test of credibility. We held that no woman, much less a child of such tender
age, would willingly submit herself to the rigors, the humiliation and the stigma attendant upon
the prosecution of rape, if she were not motivated by an earnest desire to put the culprit behind
bars.

Appellant argues that he could not be convicted of rape since based on the medical examination
report, AAA's genitalia had no hymenal laceration which corroborated AAA's testimony that
appellant merely kissed her and touched her breast on July 27, 2001.

Proof of hymenal laceration is not an element of rape.[53] An intact hymen does not negate a
finding that the victim was raped. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina,
even without laceration of the hymen, is enough to constitute rape, and even the briefest of
contact is deemed rape.[54]

While it appears from AAA's testimony that she was not raped precisely on July 27, 2001 as
what appellant did was kiss her lips and mash her breast on that day, however, her entire
testimony in the witness stand positively shows that appellant with the use of force and
intimidation had carnal knowledge of her at some other time. She testified that appellant violated
her since she was seven years old. The first time was when they were still staying in Angeles
City where appellant touched her private parts; the second time was when they were already in
Gerona, Tarlac, where appellant pointed a samurai at her and raped her; and the third time
happened on July 27, 2001 when appellant kissed her lips and mashed her breast. Indeed,
appellant may be convicted for rape in the light of AAA's testimony. For in rape cases, the date
of the commission is not an essential element of the offense; what is material is its occurrence.

Notably, the information alleges that the crime of rape was committed “on or about July 27,
2001,” thus the prosecution may prove that rape was committed on or about July 27, 2001, i.e.,
few months or years before, and not exactly on July 27, 2001.

In his Supplemental Brief, appellant claims that he should have been prosecuted for rape under
RA No. 7610 since AAA was already more than 12 years old when the alleged rape was
committed which carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua.

We do not agree. In People v. Dahilig, wherein the question posed was whether the
crime committed was rape (Violation of Article 266-A, par. 1, in relation to Article 266-B,
1st paragraph of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA No. 8353), or is it Child Abuse,
defined and penalized by Section 5, (b), RA No. 7610, we said:

As elucidated by the RTC and the CA in their respective decisions, all the
elements of both crimes are present in this case. The case of People v.
Abay, however, is enlightening and instructional on this issue. It was stated in that
case that if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with
either sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 or rape under Article
266-A (except paragraph 1 [d] of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender
cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against double
jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal
liability for a single criminal act. Specifically, Abay reads:

Under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353,if

the victim of sexual abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender
should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape under
Article 266-A (1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code and penalized with
reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or
older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under
Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except
paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender
cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right
against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be
subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act. Likewise,
rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5 (b) of RA
7610. Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex
 crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot
be complexed with an offense penalized by a special law.

In this case, the victim was more than 12 years old when the crime
was committed against her. The Information against appellant stated
that AAA was 13 years old at the time of the incident. Therefore,
appellant may be prosecuted either for violation of Section 5 (b) of
RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1 [d]) of
the Revised Penal Code. While the Information may have alleged
the elements of both crimes, the prosecution's evidence only
established that appellant sexually violated the person of AAA
through force and intimidation by threatening her with a bladed
instrument and forcing her to submit to his bestial designs. Thus,
rape was established.

Accordingly, the accused can indeed be charged with either Rape or Child Abuse and be
convicted therefor. Considering, however, that the information correctly charged the
accused with rape in violation of Article 266-A par. 1 in relation to Article 266-B, 1st par.
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and that he was convicted
therefor, the CA should have merely affirmed the conviction.

As in the present case, appellant can indeed be charged with either Rape or Child Abuse and be
convicted therefor. The prosecution's evidence established that appellant had carnal knowledge
of AAA through force and intimidation by threatening her with a samurai. Thus, rape was
established. Considering that in the resolution of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor,
he resolved the filing of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code for which appellant
was convicted by both the RTC and the CA, therefore, we merely affirm the conviction.
 d. SPO1 Acuzar v. Jorolan and Hon. Apresa, People’s Law Enforcement Board
(PLEB) | G.R. No. 177878 | April 7, 2010 | J. Villarama Jr.

FACTS: Aproniano Jorolan filed an Administrative Case against petitioner before the PLEB
charging the latter of Grave Misconduct for allegedly having an illicit relationship with
respondent’s minor daughter. Jorolan also instituted a criminal case against the petitioner before
the Municipal Trial Court of New Corella for Violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic
Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act.

Petitioner filed a Counter – Affidavit before the PLEB and he denied all the accusations against
him. He also attached the complainant’s daughter’s affidavit wherein she denied having
relationship with the petitioner. Upon receipt of the decision of PLEB whish found him guilty of
grave misconduct (Child Abuse), he filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order with the RTC of Tagum City which annulled the
decision of PLEB. The respondent elevated the case to the CA which reversed and set aside the
ruling of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that petitioner’s resort to certiorari was not
warranted as the remedy of appeal from the decision of the PLEB was available to him.

RULING: petitioner opted to file a petition for certiorari before the trial court on the pretext that
the PLEB had no jurisdiction to hear the administrative case until petitioner is convicted before
the regular court. According to petitioner, although the case filed before the PLEB was
captioned as “Grave Misconduct,” the offense charged was actually for “Violation of Law,”
which requires prior conviction before a hearing on the administrative case can proceed. Thus,
petitioner insists that the PLEB should have awaited the resolution of the criminal case before
conducting a hearing on the administrative charge against him.

The contention however is untenable. A careful perusal of respondent’s affidavit-complaint

against petitioner would show that petitioner was charged with grave misconduct for engaging in
an illicit affair with respondent’s minor daughter, he being a married man, and not for violation
of law, as petitioner would like to convince this Court. Misconduct generally means wrongful,
improper or unlawful conduct, motivated by premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. It
usually refers to transgression of some established and definite rule of action, where no
discretion is left except what necessity may demand; it does not necessarily imply corruption or
criminal intention but implies wrongful intention and not to mere error of judgment. On the other
hand, “violation of law” presupposes final conviction in court of any crime or offense penalized
under the Revised Penal Code or any special law or ordinance. The settled rule is that criminal
and administrative cases are separate and distinct from each other. In criminal cases, proof
beyond reasonable doubt is needed whereas in administrative proceedings, only substantial
evidence is required. Verily, administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal
proceedings. The PLEB, being the administrative disciplinary body tasked to hear complaints
against erring members of the PNP, has jurisdiction over the case.

In the instant case, petitioner was notified of the complaint against him and in fact, he had
submitted his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses. He attended the hearings
together with his counsel and even asked for several postponements. Petitioner therefore cannot
claim that he had been denied of due process. Due process in an administrative context does not
require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard
either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due
process. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy. In other words, it is not legally objectionable
for being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on
position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of
witnesses may take the place of direct testimony. Here, we note that petitioner had more than
enough opportunity to present his side and adduce evidence in support of his defense; thus, he
cannot claim that his right to due process has been violated. Wherefore, the petition is denied.
 e. Jojit Garingarao v. People of the Philippines | G.R. No. 192760 | July 20, 2011 | J.
Carpio

FACTS: AAA, 16 years of age, was brought to the Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center by her
father BBB and mother CCC due to fever and abdominal pain. AAA was admitted at the hospital
for further observation. The next day, her father and mother left the hospital to process AAA’s
Medicare papers and to attend to their store, respectively, leaving AAA alone in her room. When
her father returned to the hospital, AAA told him that she wanted to go home. The doctor
allowed them due to AAA’s insistence but instructed her that she should continue her
medications. At home, AAA told her parents that Garingarao sexually abused her. They went
back to the hospital and reported the incident to Dr. Morante. They inquired from the nurses’
station and learned that Garingarao was the nurse on duty on that day.

An Information was filed against Garingarao for acts of lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610.
During the trial, AAA testified that, Garingarao, entered her room to check her medications and
if she was still experiencing pains. Garingarao lifted AAA’s bra and touched her left breast and
insisted that he was only examining her. Garingarao also slid his finger inside AAA’s private
part and only stopped when he saw that AAA really had her monthly period.

In his defense, the accused testified that he went inside AAA’s room to administer her medicines
and check her vital signs. Garingarao alleged that the filing of the case was motivated by the
argument he had with AAA’s father about the administering of medicines. He was supported by
the testimony of the nursing aide, Tamayo. Garingarao further alleged that, assuming the charges
were correct, there was only one incident when he allegedly touched AAA and as such, he
should have been convicted only of acts of lasciviousness and not of violation of RA 7610. The
RTC found Garingarao guilty as charged and gave credence to the testimony of AAA
over Garingarao’s denial, which was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the single incident of act of lasciviousness would suffice to hold the
accused liable under RA 7610

RULING: Yes. The Court has ruled that in case of acts of lasciviousness, the lone testimony of
the offended party, if credible, is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused. It is a settled rule
that denial is a weak defense as against the positive identification by the victim. Both denial and
alibi are inherently weak defenses and constitute self-serving negative evidence which cannot be
accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration by a credible witness.

Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
 influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 are the following:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse; and
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

Under Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7610,
lascivious conduct is defined as follows:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia,
anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with the intent to
abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.

In this case, the prosecution established that Garingarao touched AAA’s breasts and inserted his
finger into her private part for his sexual gratification. Garingarao used his influence as a nurse
by pretending that his actions were part of the physical examination he was
doing. Garingarao persisted on what he was doing despite AAA’s objections. AAA twice
asked Garingarao what he was doing and he answered that he was just examining her.

The Court has ruled that a child is deemed subject to other sexual abuse when the child is the
victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. In lascivious conduct
under the coercion or influence of any adult, there must be some form of compulsion equivalent
to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party’s free will. In this
case, Garingarao coerced AAA into submitting to his lascivious acts by pretending that he was
examining her.

Garingarao insists that, assuming that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were true, he
should not be convicted of violation of RA 7610 because the incident happened only
once. Garingarao alleges that the single incident would not suffice to hold him liable under RA
7610. This argument has no legal basis. The Court has already ruled that it is inconsequential that
sexual abuse under RA 7610 occurred only once. Section 3(b) of RA 7610 provides that the
abuse may be habitual or not. Hence, the fact that the offense occurred only once is enough to
hold Garingarao liable for acts of lasciviousness under RA 7610. The Court
finds Jojit Garingarao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of acts of lasciviousness in relation to
Republic Act No. 7610.