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RAYRAY VS KYUNG LEE (GR NO. L-18176 OCTOBER 26, 1966)
Rayray vs Kyung Lee
GR No. L-18176 October 26, 1966
Facts: Plaintiff Lazaro Rayray seeks the annulment of his marriage to defendant Chae
Kyung Lee. Inasmuch as, the latter’s whereabouts is unknown, and she was formerly a
resident of Pusan, Korea, summons was served by publication, as provided in the Rules
of Court. Thereafter, plaintiff moved that defendant be declared in default, she not having
filed an answer, and that a date be set for the reception of his evidence. Before acting on
this motion, the lower court referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila pursuant to Articles
88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for the purpose of determining whether or
not a collusion between the parties exists. Said officer having found no such collusion, the
case was heard on the merits. In due course, thereafter, decision was rendered dismissing
plaintiff’s complaint, without costs, upon the ground: (1) that the court could not nullify a
marriage contracted abroad; and (2) that the facts proven do not warrant the relief prayed
for. A reconsideration of this decision having been denied, plaintiff appealed to the Court
of Appeals, which certified the case to the Supreme Court, the jurisdiction of the lower court
being in issue in the appeal.
Issues: Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to grant the annulment.
Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled for the relief prayed for.
Held: Yes. The subject-matter of the present case is the annulment of plaintiff’s marriage
to the defendant, which is within the jurisdiction of our courts of first instance, and, in
Manila, of its Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations.
The same acquired jurisdiction over plaintiff herein by his submission thereto in
consequence of the filing of the complaint herein. Defendant was placed under the
jurisdiction of said court, upon the service of summons by publication.
This is an action in rem, for it concerns the status of the parties herein, and status affects
or binds the whole word. The res in the present case is the relation between said parties,
or their marriage tie. Jurisdiction over the same depends upon the nationality or domicile
of the parties, not the place of celebration of marriage, or the locus celebrationis. Plaintiff
here is a citizen of the Philippines, domiciled therein. His status is, therefore, subject to our
jurisdiction, on both counts. True that defendant was and — under plaintiff’s — theory still
is a non-resident alien. But, this fact does not deprive the lower court of its jurisdiction to
pass upon the validity of her marriage to plaintiff herein.
Indeed, marriage is one of the cases of double status, in that the status therein involves
and affects two persons. One is married, never in abstract or a vacuum, but, always to
somebody else. Hence, a judicial decree on the marriage status of a person necessarily
reflects upon the status of another and the relation between them. The prevailing rule is,
accordingly, that a court has jurisdiction over the res, in an action for annulment of
marriage, provided, at least, one of the parties is domiciled in, or a national of, the forum.
Since plaintiff is a Filipino, domiciled in the Philippines, it follows that the lower court had
jurisdiction over the res, in addition to its jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the parties.
In other words, it could validly inquire into the legality of the marriage between the parties
herein.
No. Plaintiff cannot possibly secure the relief prayed for unless full faith and credence are
given to his testimony, but we cannot believe him for the records show that he would not
hesitate to lie when it suits his purpose. Thus, for instance, when plaintiff contracted
marriage with the defendant, he said that he was single, although, he admitted, this was a
lie, because, sometime in 1940, he married in Baguio, one Adelaida Melecio or Valdez.
But, then he would, also, have us believe that his marriage with the latter was illegal or
fictitious, because Adelaida and he did no more than sign, on a small window in the City
Hall of Baguio, certain documents the contents of which he did not read.
KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO., LTD.,
vs
MINORU KITAMURA
G.R. No. 149177
November 23, 2007
FACTS:
Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing
technical and management support in the infrastructure projects national permanently
residing in the Philippines. The agreement provides that Kitamaru was to
extend professionalservices to Nippon for a year. Nippon assigned Kitamaru to work as the
project manager of the Southern TagalogAccess Road (STAR) project. When the STAR
project was near completion, DPWH engaged the consultancy servicesof Nippon, this time

for the detailed engineering & construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road
Improvement (BBRI) Project. Kitamaru was named as the project manger in the contract.
Hasegawa, Nippon’s general manager for its International Division, informed Kitamaru that
the company had no more intention of automatically renewing his ICA. Hisservices would
be engaged by the company only up to the substantial completion of the STAR Project.
Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted that
Kitamaru’s contract was for a fixed term that had expired. Kitamaru then filed for specific
performance & damages w/ the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon filed a MTD.
Nippon’s contention: The ICA had been perfected in Japan & executed by & between
Japanese nationals. Thus, the RTC of Lipa City has no jurisdiction. The claim for improper
pre-termination of Kitamaru’s ICA could only be heard & ventilated in the proper courts of
Japan following the principles of lex loci celebrationis & lex contractus.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled hat the principle of lex loci
celebrationis was not applicable to the case, because nowhere in the pleadings was the
validity of the written agreement put in issue. It held that the RTC was correct in applying
the principle of lex loci solutionis.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific
performance & damages involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign
nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus,
“the state of the most significant relationship rule,” or forum non conveniens.
HELD:
NO. In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, 3consecutive phases are involved:
jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Jurisdiction &
choice of law are 2 distinct concepts.Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a
defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether
the application of a substantive law w/c will determine the merits of the case is fair to both
parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional
authority to applyforum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex foriwill often
coincide, the “minimum contacts” for one do not always provide the necessary “significant
contacts” for the other. The question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a
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transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction
to enter a judgment.
In this case, only the 1st phase is at issue—jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, however, has various
aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must have
jurisdiction over the plaintiff/petitioner, over the defendant/respondent, over the subject
matter, over the issues of the case and, in cases involving property, over the res or the
thing w/c is the subject of the litigation. In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein,
Nippon is actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign
authority w/c establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner
prescribed by law. It is further determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective
of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. To succeed
in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the claim, the movant must show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter
submitted to it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the claims.
In the instant case, Nippon, in its MTD, does not claim that the RTC is not properly vested
by law w/ jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for a civil case for specific performance
& damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation & is properly cognizable by the RTC
of Lipa City. What they rather raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are
the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and the “state of the most
significant relationship rule.” The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound.
Lex loci celebrationis relates to the “law of the place of the ceremony” or the law of the
place where a contract is made. The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci
contractus means the “law of the place where a contract is executed or to be performed.” It
controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract and it may pertain to the law
voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them either expressly or
implicitly.Under the “state of the most significant relationship rule,” to ascertain
what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine which state has the most
substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract,
the court should consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be
performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties. This
rule takes into account several contacts and evaluates them according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved.
Since these 3 principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute,
they are rules proper for the 2nd phase, the choice of law. They determine which state's law

is to be applied in resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as
the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable
but also not yet called for.
Further, Nippon’s premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact that
they have not yet pointed out any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before
determining which law should apply, 1st there should exist a conflict of laws situation
requiring theapplication of the conflict of laws rules. Also, when the law of a foreign country
is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence of such law
must be pleaded and proved.
It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought
before a court or administrative agency, there are 3 alternatives open to the latter in
disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to
assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the
internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account
orapply the law of some other State or States. The court’s power to hear cases and
controversies is derived from the Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to
recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign law short of
treaties or other formal agreements, even in matters regarding rights provided by foreign
sovereigns.
Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to deprive the RTC
of its jurisdiction. 1st, it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule
16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a ground. 2nd, whether a suit should be
entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts
of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the RTC. In this case,
the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. 3rd, the propriety of dismissing a case based on
this principle requires a factual determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more
properly considered a matter of defense.
Han over Tust vs Guerrero
FACTS:
1. Respondent Guerrero filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Bank
for allegedly: (a) illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his
checking account with the Bank; (b) a returned check worth USS18,000.99 due to
signature verification problems; and (c) unauthorized conversion of his
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account.
2. The Bank claimed that by stipulation Guerrero’s account is governed by New York and
this law does not permit any claim except actual damages. The Bank filed a Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment seeking to dismiss the
claims for consequential, nominal, temperate, moral and exemplary damages.
3. The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney, supported the Bank’s
claim that Guerrero’s bank account stipulated that the governing law is New
York law and that this law bars all of the claims except actual damages. The
Philippine Consular Office in NY authenticated the Walden affidavit.
4. CA: Even if the Walden affidavit is used for purpose of summary judgment,
the Bank must still comply with the procedure prescribed by the Rule 132, Sec.
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ISSUE: WoN there are genuine issues of fact that necessitate formal trial—YES.
RULING: Petition DENIED. There being substanstial triable issues, motion for
partial summary judgment is denied.
RATIO:
1.1.1.A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation
of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived so as
not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Walden affidavit shows that the
facts and material allegations as pleaded by the parties are disputed and
there are substantial triable issues necessitating a formal trial. Resolution
of whether a foreign law allows only the recovery of actual damages is a
question of fact as far as the trial court is concerned since foreign laws do not
prove themselves in our courts
CITIBANK vs. SABENIANO Case Digest
CITIBANK vs. SABENIANO
G.R.No. 156132, October 16, 2006
FACTS: Petitioner Citibank is a banking corporation duly authorized under the laws of the
USA to do commercial banking activities n the Philippines. Sabeniano was a client of both
Petitioners Citibank and FNCB Finance. Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners
claiming to have substantial deposits, the proceeds of which were supposedly deposited
automatically and directly to respondent’s account with the petitioner Citibank and that
allegedly petitioner refused to despite repeated demands. Petitioner alleged that

respondent obtained several loans from the former and in default, Citibank exercised its
right to set-off respondent’s outstanding loans with her deposits and money. RTC declared
the act illegal, null and void and ordered the petitioner to refund the amount plus interest,
ordering Sabeniano, on the other hand to pay Citibank her indebtedness. CA affirmed the
decision entirely in favor of the respondent.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner may exercise its right to set-off respondent’s loans with her
deposits and money in Citibank-Geneva
RULING: Petition is partly granted with modification.
1. Citibank is ordered to return to respondent the principal amount of P318,897.34 and
P203,150.00 plus 14.5% per annum
2. The remittance of US $149,632.99 from respondent’s Citibank-Geneva account is
declared illegal, null and void, thus Citibank is ordered to refund said amount in Philippine
currency or its equivalent using exchange rate at the time of payment.
3. Citibank to pay respondent moral damages of P300,000, exemplary damages for
P250,000, attorney’s fees of P200,000.
4. Respondent to pay petitioner the balance of her outstanding loans of P1,069,847.40
inclusive off interest.
ANCHETA vs GUERSEY-DALAYGON
FACTS:
Spouses Audrey O
’ nce with her will?
Neil and W. Richard Guersey were American Citizens with an adopteddaughter named
Kylie Guersey Hill, and have lived in the Philippines for 30 years. Audrey died leaving awill
bequeathing her entire estate to Richard, who was also designated as executor. The will
wasadmitted probate before the Orphan
’ While suchbreach of duty admittedly cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary
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s Court of Baltimore, Mary Land, U.S.A. which named James N.Philips as executor due to
Richard
’
s renunciation of his appointment. Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta, hereinpetitioner, of the Quasha
Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law offices was likewise designated by thecourt as
ancillary administrator.In 1981 Richard married herein respondent Candelaria Guersey-
Dalaygon with whom he has twochildren. Subsequently, Audrey’s will was admitted
probate by then Court of First Instance of Rizal. As administrator of Audrey’s estate in the
Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of Audrey s properties.On July 20,
1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate torespondent,
save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle.
The will was also admitted to probate by the Orphan’s Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and
James N.Phillips was likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William
Quasha or anymember of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as
ancillary administrator.On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No.9625
before the Makati RTC, amotion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Aubrey and
apportioned to them ¾ and ¼ of all theestate, respectively. This motion and project of
partition was granted and approved by the trial court inits Order dated February 12, 1988.
This was opposed by respondent on the ground that under the law of the State of Mary
land, “a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the propertysubject
of the legacy
.” Respondent argued
that since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then itshould be wholly adjudicated
to him and not merely ¾ thereof, and since Richard left his entire estate tothe respondent,
except for the A/G Interior Inc. shares, then the entire property should now pertain
torespondent. The Court of Appeals annul
led the trial court’s Orders in
Speacial Proceeding No. 9625 andlater denied the appeal of the petitioner, thus the petition
for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty when he disregarded the
lawsof the State of Maryland on the
distribution of Audrey’s estate in accorda
RULING:
Well-
intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s action appears to have
breached his duties and responsibilities as ancillary administrator of the subject estate.
circumstances, the

fiduciary nature of the said defendant’s position, as well as the resultant frustration of the
decedent’s
last will, combine to create a circumstance that is tantamount to extrinsic fraud.
Beam and Beam vs. Yatco
FACTS: On or before April 26, 1937, the Collector of Internal Revenue declared and
assessed items of property of A. W. Beam and Lydia McKee Beam at the time of the death
of the latter on October 18, 1934 at P8, 100,544.91. One-half thereof, appraised at P4,
050,272.46, was the estate to the deceased Lydia McKee Beam located in the Philippines
and transmitted to plaintiffs by virtue of inheritance, devise, or bequest, gifts mortis causa
or advance in anticipation of inheritance and the collector assessed and demanded
inheritance taxes aggregating P343, 698.72 which the plaintiffs paid under protest that was
overruled by the collector. Plaintiffs filed a complaint praying that the amount paid by them
be refunded, but the lower court dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in finding that appellant became a resident
and citizen of California in 1923.
RULING: NO. The finding of the lower court is fully supported by the testimonies of A. W.
Beam and John W. Haussermann, wherein the first stated that in 1923 he bought a house
in Oakland, California, and used it as a residence until December, 1930, when he built
another in Piedmont, California, which he has used and occupied as a residence since
then, and his children were in school in California and Mrs. Beam wanted to be with them
and made a home for them, and it was his intention to live in California and from 1923 on,
his family spent most of their time in California, where he himself used to take long
vacations, and that he never really intended to live permanently in the Philippines, while
Haussermann testified that A. W. Beam left the Philippines somewhere along 1923 and
1924 when he established a home for his wife and children on Kenmore Avenue, Oakland,
and he went there frequently. Also, because the burden of proof is on the plaintiffs to
establish their right to recover, in view of the fact that they had failed to establish that right
based on their alleged Utah citizenship to invoke the laws of the state which, it is alleged,
to the effect that properties acquired by the spouses during marriage belong to them
separately, the dismissal of the complaint is fully justified, and the defendant is entitled to
take advantage of the plaintiff's failure to present sufficient proof and of the evidence
adduced by themselves. Where plaintiffs themselves show a state of facts upon which they
should not recover, whether defendant pleaded such fact as a defense or not, their claim
should be dismissed. Evidence introduced without objection becomes property of the case
and all the parties are amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the
evidence .As correctly stated by Yatco, even granting appellant's contention that the
deceased became a resident of California only in 1934, she was a citizen of that state at
the time of her death and her national law applicable to the case, in accordance with article
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10 of the Civil Code, is the law of California which, in the absence of contrary evidence, is
to be presumed to be the same as the Philippine law.
REPUBLIC VS ORBECIDOG.R. No. 154380October 5, 2005
FACTS:
In 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III
m a r r i e d L a d y M y r o V i l l a n u e v a i n L a m - a n , Ozamis
City.I n 1 9 8 6 , O r b e c i d o d i s c o v e r e d t h a t h i s w i f e h a d h a d b e e n
n a t u r a l i z e d a s a n American citizen.Sometime in 2000, Orbecido learned
from his son that his wife had obtained adivorce decree and married an
American.O r b e c i d o f i l e d w i t h t h e T r i a l C o u r t a p e t i t i o n f o r “ A u
t h o r i t y t o R e m a r r y ” invoking Article 26 Paragraph 2 of the Family Code, the Court
granted
the petition.T h e R e p u b l i c , h e r e i n p e t i t i o n e r , t h r o u g h t h e O f f i c e o f t h e
S o l i c i t o r G e n e r a l , sought for reconsideration but it was denied by the Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the allegations of the respondent was proven as a fact accordingto the rules
of evidence.
HELD:
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreignlaw allowing
it. Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicialn o t i c e o f
foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and
p r o v e d . Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows
his former wife toremarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there
would be no evidencesufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another
marriage.However, in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and
onrecord, we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations
that his wife,w h o w a s n a t u r a l i z e d a s a n A m e r i c a n c i t i z e n , h a d
o b t a i n e d a d i v o r c e d e c r e e a n d h a d remarried an American, that respondent is
now capacitated to remarry. Such declarationcould only be made properly upon
respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence inhis favor.ACCORDINGLY, the
petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED.The assailed Decision dated
May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of theRegional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASID
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.

HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court
of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong
in 1972 and established their residence in the Philippines. They begot two children born on
April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively. But the parties were divorced in
Nevada, United States, in 1982 and the petitioner had remarried also in Nevada, this time
to Theodore Van Dorn.
On July 8, 1983, Richard Upton filed a suit against petitioner, asking that Alice Van Dorn
be ordered to render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila and be declared with
right to manage the conjugal property.
Issue:
Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in
Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
Held:
As to Richard Upton, the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen. Owing to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. The divorce is likewise valid as to the petitioner.
As such, pursuant to his national law, private respondent Richard Upton is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue Alice Van Dorn to exercise control
over conjugal assets. He was bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he did not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.
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San Luis v San Luis
2007
FACTS:
During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with
Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila,
Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had
a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a
Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United
States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and
Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married
respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr.
William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from
the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his
first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to
state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should
have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence
prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the
petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his
death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: denied the motion to dismiss, ruled that respondent, as widow of the
decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly
laid. Mila filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. Thus,
a new trial ensued.
(2) Trial Court (new): dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the
time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province
of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in
Makati City. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to
Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino
citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively
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applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children. notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
 Therefore, this case should be
(3) CA: reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained
by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
ISSUES: (3) Yes. Respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration
(1) Whether venue was properly laid, and may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under
(2) Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized
on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
(3) Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for
administration. letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards
the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
RULING:
(1) Yes, the venue was proper. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for
letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial
Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas Case Digest
For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may
not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency. While petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in
Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang,
FACTS:
Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. From the foregoing, we find that
Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate. Gerbert Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen but now a naturalized Canadian, married
(2) Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, a Filipina. He soon left to Canada after their wedding due to work
Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The commitments. He returned to Philippines on April 2005 only to find out Daisylyn has an
Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the affair with another man. Gerbert returned to Canada to file a divorce that took effect on
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under January 2006.
Philippine law. As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where
a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Two years later, he found another Filipina and wanted to marry her in the Philippines. He
Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already went to Pasig City Registrar's Office to register his Canadian divorce decree but was
established through judicial precedent. denied considering that his marriage with Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law, that
The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo the foregin divorce must be recognized judicially by the Philippine court.
to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition
as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient
Gerbert subsequently filed at the Regional Trial Court a judicial recognition of foreign
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage
divorce but was subsequently denied since he is not the proper party and according to
of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, Article 26 of the Civil Code, only a Filipino spouse can avail the remedy.
U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the
Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in
accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial
 8

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 26 can also be applied to Corpuz' petition of recognition of the
foreign divorce decree

HELD:

The Court held that alien spouses cannot claim the right as it is only in favor of Filipino
spouses. The legislative intent of Article 26 is for the benefit of the clarification of the
marital status of the Filipino spouse.

However, aliens are not strip to petition to the RTC for his foreign divorce decree as it is a
conclusive presumption of evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce decree with
confirmity to the alien's national law.

The Pasig City Registrar's Office acted out of line when it registered the foreign divorce
decree without judicial order recognition. Therefore, the registration is still deemed to be
void.