Road Safety: Risk Management Perspective
Alan Nicholson 1
Abstract: Risk is ubiquitous and is associated with a very wide range of human activities. This has resulted in the development of an
internationally agreed set of principles and guidelines for risk management in general. This paper describes the methods and processes
that have been developed for general risk management, along with some of the knowledge upon which those methods and processes are
based. It is argued that road safety could be improved by employing those methods and processes. DOI: 10.1061/AJRUA6.0001027. © 2019
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American Society of Civil Engineers.
Introduction
In the United States in 2015, accidents were the fourth most
common cause of death, after heart disease, cancer, and chronic
lower respiratory diseases (Murphy et al. 2017). A substantial pro-
portion of accidental deaths arises from motor vehicle accidents,
and they accounted for 28.6% of accidental deaths in the US in
2015 (Murphy et al. 2017). In the US, the rate of fatal crash involve-
ment of drivers varies with age, with the rate (per mile driven) for
drivers aged 16–29 inclusive being about 2.25 times the rate for
drivers aged 30–69 inclusive (Tefft 2017). The impact of road
accidents, unlike other causes of death (e.g., heart disease), is very
high for young people.
Elms (1998) noted that humans have long been conscious of
risk, with the first written evidence of systematic risk management,
the Code of Hammurabi, dating from about 1800 BC. This consid-
ered physical risk, specifying that if a building collapsed and the
owners’ son was killed, then the builder’s son would be executed.
It also considered commercial risk, with investors carrying the risk
of voyages in return for a share of the profits.
Risk management methods have improved considerably since
the development of the theory of probability in the 17th century,
and especially since around 1950. This has led to the development
of an international standard, ISO 31000 (ISO 2009a), which defines
risk very broadly as the “effect of uncertainty on objectives,” where
an effect is “a deviation from the expected” and can be positive or
negative and can “create or result in opportunities and threats.” Risk
management is also defined very broadly as “coordinated activi-
ties to direct and control an organization with regard to risk.”
ISO 31000 argues that risk should be expressed in terms of risk
sources, potential events, and the consequences and likelihood of
those potential events.
In ISO 31000, likelihood is the chance of an event occurring.
It can be defined objectively or subjectively, defined qualitatively
or quantitatively, and described in general terms or mathematically.
In this paper, the term probability is used and has the same broad
meaning as likelihood in ISO 31000.
1
Professor, Dept. of Civil and Natural Resources Engineering, Univ.
of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 8140, New Zealand.
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6256-9823. Email: Alan.Nicholson@
canterbury.ac.nz
Note. This manuscript was submitted on September 19, 2018; approved
on May 3, 2019; published online on October 24, 2019. Discussion period
open until March 24, 2020; separate discussions must be submitted for in-
dividual papers. This paper is part of the ASCE-ASME Journal of Risk
and Uncertainty in Engineering Systems, Part A: Civil Engineering,
© ASCE, ISSN 2376-7642.
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The risk management process involves the following activities
(ISO 2009a):
1. Establishing the context (i.e., defining the criteria for risk
evaluation);
2. Risk assessment:
• Risk identification (i.e., identifying the hazards and what can
go wrong);
• Risk analysis (i.e., identifying the probabilities, conse-
quences, expectations);
• Risk evaluation (i.e., using the risk evaluation criteria to
decide which risks should be treated);
3. Risk treatment (i.e., prepare an action plan for treating
selected risks);
4. Monitoring and review (i.e., evaluating actions and revising
action plan if appropriate); and
5. Communication and consultation with stakeholders.
The relationship between these activities is shown in Fig. 1.
While risk assessment is a major part of the risk management
process, and at least 30 risk assessment techniques have been
developed (ISO 2009b), the other risk management activities are
also important, and both “communication and consultation” and
“monitoring and review” are also discussed in what follows.
About 80 countries have implemented road assessment programs
that involve risk assessment. For instance, the New Zealand (NZ)
program has the following objectives (New Zealand Automobile
Association 2010, 2012):
1. Reduce deaths and injuries on NZ’s roads by systematically
assessing risk and identifying safety shortcomings that can
be addressed with practical road improvement measures;
2. Use risk assessment as a key factor in strategic decisions on
road improvements, crash protections, and standards of road
management; and
3. Provide meaningful information on where the greatest levels of
risk are faced and, in turn, to influence driver behavior.
The NZ program defines two types of risk for a section of road:
1. Collective risk is the annual number of fatal and serious injury
crashes per kilometer of road.
2. Personal risk is the annual number of fatal and serious crashes
per vehicle-kilometer of travel on a given section of road.
It has been suggested (New Zealand Automobile Association
2010, 2012) that road controlling authorities and NZ police be
interested primarily in collective risk because this kind of risk
indicates where the greatest reductions in crashes can be achieved
through infrastructure improvement and enforcement. It has also
been suggested (New Zealand Automobile Association 2010,
2012) that drivers will be more interested in the level of personal
risk, which is a measure of the danger to each individual, so they
ASCE-ASME J. Risk Uncertainty Eng. Syst., Part A: Civ. Eng.

Communication and Consultation
Establish the Context
Monitoring and Review
Risk Identification
Risk Analysis
Risk Evaluation
Risk Treatment
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Fig. 1. Risk management process.
can take greater care on those sections of highway for which the
personal risk is high.
This paper will discuss the relationship between accidents, risk,
and exposure, along with issues relating to the definition of risk and
exposure. The paper will then discuss the perception of risk,
followed by a discussion of risk acceptability and tolerability
(along with the factors affecting them). Issues related to risk com-
munication and consultation are then discussed, and some studies
involving the application of three risk assessment techniques are
described. The paper concludes with a discussion of innovative
technology and how efforts to improve road safety could be made
more effective by applying concepts and methods in use in risk
management.
Risk and Exposure
The concept of risk has been employed in road safety studies for
many years, frequently in association with the concept of exposure.
For instance, Chapman (1967) proposed that the actual number
of collisions is simply the product of the exposure (defined as
the possible number of collisions) and the probability that, given
the possibility of an accident occurring, the accident does actually
take place. He subsequently (Chapman 1971a) used the term risk
for the number of accidents per exposure.
Mahalel (1986) suggested there is an inherent methodological
problem with using the number of accidents per exposure as a risk
estimator, with the problem arising from the assumption that the
number of accidents is linearly related to the exposure, implying
a constant level of risk.
Haight (1986) noted that there was “no general agreement on
a technical definition of the term risk” and that risk was often de-
fined, as in Hauer (1982), as “the probability (chance) of accident
occurrence.” Haight suggested that this definition is somewhat
ambiguous, in that a person may well consider their risk of having
an accident as being low because their level of exposure is low.
Haight argued that considering risk as a probability is insuffi-
cient and that one should consider consequence as well. Haight
argued that risk should be treated as an expectation, i.e., risk equals
the sum (over all possible events) of the product of the probability
and consequence of those events. Defining risk in this manner is
consistent with the definition of risk used in risk management
(ISO 2009a).
There was subsequently a considerable amount of research
(e.g., Hauer and Persaud 1996; Maher and Summersgill 1996;
Turner and Nicholson 1998; Harwood et al. 2010; Elvik 2015)
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showing that accidents are not linearly related to traffic flows and
that the level of risk is not constant if traffic flow is used as the
measure of exposure.
There is difficulty in defining what constitutes an exposure,
and a range of exposure measures are used. The amount of travel
(i.e., the vehicle-kilometers of travel) is a commonly used measure
of exposure, but Chapman (1971b) argued that, while it is appro-
priate for single-vehicle crashes on a section of road, it is not ap-
propriate for rear-end or head-on crashes. For example, he showed
that the expected number of times a vehicle would encounter a
vehicle traveling in the opposite direction on a two-way road
(i.e., the expected number of exposures to a head-on crash) during
a period T is
Qa Qb ST½ð1=V a Þ þ ð1=V b Þ
where Qa and Qb = flow rates in two directions; V a and V b =
speeds in two directions; and S = length of road.
This exposure measure differs from the vehicle-kilometers of
travel, which is simply
½Qa þ Qb ST
and does not depend on the speed of travel, unlike the exposure
measure proposed by Chapman (1971b); that measure implies that
exposure decreases as vehicle speeds increase.
Chapman (1971b) showed that for a cross-road junction, the
number of exposures during a period T for a pair of conflicting
movements is
ðT=tÞ½1 − expð−Qa tÞ½1 − expð−Qb tÞ
where Qa and Qb = flow rates for conflicting movements; t = time
to cross collision area; and
t ¼ ðL þ WÞ=V
where L = vehicle length; W = vehicle width; and V = speed for
both conflicting movements.
This expression for exposure also implies that the exposure
decreases as speeds increase.
It appears that Chapman’s exposure measures have not received
much use in road safety studies, perhaps because the decrease in
exposure as speed increases has been interpreted as implying a de-
crease in the number of collisions with increasing speeds, which is
counter-intuitive. However, the probability of a collision given an
exposure might well increase with increasing speeds, at a faster
rate than the exposure decreases with increasing speeds, with the
net effect being an increase in the probability of a collision with
increasing speeds. That is, the exposure measures developed by
Chapman (1971b) do not necessarily mean a decrease in the prob-
ability of collisions with increasing speeds.
The safety of different modes of travel can be compared, but the
results can be sensitive to the exposure measure used. For example,
Ford (2000) compared the frequency of death for nine modes of
travel (air, rail, bus/coach, van, car, motorcycle, pedal cycle, foot,
and ship/ferry) in the UK using three measures:
• deaths per person-kilometer of travel,
• deaths per person-trip, and
• deaths per person-hour of travel.
Ford ranked each mode using each exposure measure and found
that the rankings of the modes depended upon which exposure
measure was used. For example, travel by aircraft is fairly sensitive
to the exposure measure used; it was the safest mode in terms
of deaths per person-kilometer, the seventh safest mode in terms
of deaths per person-trips, and the third safest mode in terms of
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 the deaths per person-hours. The rankings of some modes of travel
were not sensitive to the measure (e.g., motorcycle travel is the least
safe mode for all three measures). Travel by rail or bus/coach was
found to be relatively safe for all three exposure measures, while
travel by pedal cycle or foot was found to be relatively unsafe for all
three exposure measures. It is likely that different members of the
public have different measures in mind when they assess the safety
of the alternative modes.
In practice, the meaning of the term risk can vary quite widely.
For instance, it was used for the social cost of accidents per vehicle-
kilometer in the 2003 road safety strategic plan for New Zealand
(Ministry of Transport 2003), which recommended that roads with
a high “risk” (i.e., a high accident cost per vehicle-kilometer) be
targeted for equity reasons.
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Risk Perception, Acceptability, and Tolerability
Risk Perception
Fischhoff et al. (1982) described the results of a study involving
getting lay people to estimate the number of deaths/year due to
41 causes, where the actual number varied widely (from as low
as ≤5 to ≥1,000,000). The results showed that lay people tend
to overestimate the frequency of uncommon events and underesti-
mate the frequency of commonly occurring events. Motor vehicle
accidents were a notable exception, with the frequency of these
commonly occurring events being overestimated. Fischhoff et al.
(1982) suggested that those hazards for which the frequency is
overestimated tended to be disproportionately mentioned in the
news media.
Fischhoff et al. (1982) noted that the public is often criticized for
failing to wear seat belts. They commented that while safety experts
see the many lives that can be saved from a small reduction in each
trip’s probability of ending in death, drivers may see only the very
small probability of death during any given trip and believe that a
reduction in that very small probability does not justify the effort of
buckling up.
A number of studies, such as by Allman (1985) and Slovic
(1987), have examined the discrepancy between the public’s per-
ception and the experts’ assessment of risk. They compared the
public’s and experts’ rankings of 30 activities=technologies in
terms of their risk levels and found substantial differences between
the rankings. There was a high level of agreement on the risk as-
sociated with the use of motor vehicles, handguns, and smoking,
but there were some strong disagreements, as shown in Table 1.
Slovic (1987) found that the expert assessments of risk corre-
lated highly with the frequency of fatalities, but the assessments
of lay people were related more to other hazard characteristics
(e.g., the potential for a catastrophic consequence and, for some
hazards, the threat to future generations).
Table 1. Comparison of public perception and expert assessment of risk
Public perception Expert perception
Activity/technology (ranking out of 30) (ranking out of 30)
Nuclear power 1 20
Motor vehicles 2 1
Motorcycles 5 6
Smoking 4 2
Mountain climbing 15 29
Bicycles 16 15
X-rays 22 7 centage of the population participating in automobile travel, the
Note: The higher the ranking, the greater the perceived risk.
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Fischhoff et al. (1978) determined the mean perceived risk and
mean perceived benefit of each activity/technology and found
that the perceived risk tended to decline with increasing perceived
benefit. One activity/technology (using motor vehicles) stood out,
having a high perceived risk and a high perceived benefit, while
using motorcycles (along with several other activities/technologies,
including smoking and handguns) had a high perceived risk and a
low perceived benefit.
A survey of drivers in NZ (New Zealand Automobile
Association 2010) involved presenting them with photographs of
various roads and getting them to indicate how safe or dangerous
they thought the roads were. Drivers were asked to estimate the
potential for death or injury in various scenarios based on various
roadside hazards being present or safety devices either not being in
place or not being used.
For each scenario, the percentage of respondents who indicated
that, in the event of a crash, death or injury was probable or almost
certain was as follows:
• cliff or steep bank (down) 77%,
• no median barrier 73%,
• wall adjacent to road 56%,
• power poles adjacent to road 43%,
• trees 37%,
• deep ditch 32%, and
• not wearing a seat belt 80%.
Crash data for NZ show that about 50% of crashes in rural areas
involve a roadside hazard, with most of the crashes involving a
single vehicle that lost control, with the major roadside hazards
being cliffs, ditches, trees, and poles (New Zealand Automobile
Association 2010). The survey results showed that drivers seem
fairly well aware of the increased potential for death or injury as-
sociated with not wearing seat belts, the presence of cliffs or steep
banks, and the absence of median barriers. However, their aware-
ness of the risk associated with common hazards (power poles,
trees, and deep ditches adjacent to the road), which accident sta-
tistics show are strongly associated with serious crashes, was much
lower.
The survey results indicate that drivers underestimate the risk
associated with some real hazards and highlight the need “to pro-
vide meaningful information on where the greatest levels of risk are
faced,” which is one of the objectives of the NZ road assessment
program (New Zealand Automobile Association 2010, 2012), if
driver behavior is to be changed and road safety is to be improved.
Acceptability of Risk
Starr (1969) undertook one of the earliest studies of the willingness
of individuals to accept risks associated with various activities.
Starr studied, for a range of activities (including mining, hunting,
skiing, smoking, and traveling by various modes of transport), the
trade-off between the risk associated with the activity and the
benefit of undertaking those activities. He adopted a revealed pref-
erence approach, which assumed that people had full information
and that they used that information optimally.
Starr concluded that the risk (measured by the statistical expect-
ation of deaths per person-hour of exposure) was related approx-
imately to the third power (cube) of the financial benefit and that
the risk associated with voluntary activities (e.g., hunting, skiing,
and smoking) was about 1,000 times greater than the risk associ-
ated with involuntary activities (e.g., the generation and use of elec-
tric power). He also found that the risk for automobile travel was
similar to the risk of disease and suggested that, given the high per-
level of risk associated with automobile travel probably reflected
ASCE-ASME J. Risk Uncertainty Eng. Syst., Part A: Civ. Eng.
 a “true societal judgment” on the acceptability of risk in relation to
benefit.
Lowrance (1976) suggested 10 factors that affect an individual’s
acceptance of risk:
• whether the risk is assumed voluntarily or borne involuntarily,
• whether the effect is delayed or immediate,
• whether alternatives are available or unavailable,
• whether the risk is known or unknown to scientists and the
public,
• whether the exposure essential or nonessential,
• whether the risk is encountered occupationally or
nonoccupationally,
• whether the hazard is common or uncommon,
• whether the hazard affects average people or sensitive people,
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• whether the effect is reversible or irreversible, and
• whether the risk arises from an intended use or misuse of a
technology.
Fischhoff et al. (1978) undertook a study similar to that of Starr
(1969), except that they used a stated-preference method instead of
a revealed-preference method, with psychometric procedures being
used to obtain quantitative assessments of the perceived risk and
perceived benefit of various activities and technologies. For each
of the 30 activities or technologies, participants were also asked
to indicate the level of voluntariness, familiarity, controllability,
potential for major (multiple-fatality) consequences, immediacy of
consequences, and knowledge of the consequences of each activity
or technology.
The revealed-preference and stated-preference approaches each
have their strengths and weaknesses. Fischhoff et al. (1978) dis-
cussed the relative merits of both methods, concluding that a multi-
method and multidisciplinary approach would be required to answer
the question “how safe is safe enough?”
A number of studies, e.g., Davidshofer (1976) and Fischhoff
et al. (1982), have explored the consistency of people’s propensity
for taking risks in different situations and found little or no consis-
tency. Fischhoff et al. (1982) found that people who are daring in
one context may be timid in another.
Sandman (1993) suggested a list of 12 identified factors that
increased an individual’s willingness to accept a risk. Some of the
factors differed from those of Lowrance (1976), including the
risk being:
• natural rather than industrial or artificial,
• chronic rather than catastrophic,
• controlled by the person rather than someone else,
• distributed fairly rather than unfairly,
• assessed by a trusted source rather than an untrusted source,
• assessed transparently rather than nontransparently, and
• nonmemorable rather than memorable (subject to dramatic
media coverage).
Several of Sandman’s factors are relevant to road safety. For
instance, whether the risk is controlled by the person rather than
someone else is relevant when considering the risk for cyclists
and pedestrians exposed to collisions with motor vehicles. Pedes-
trians and cyclists, but not motor vehicle occupants, are more vul-
nerable to death or injury, and it is not surprising that pedestrians
and cyclists are consequently less likely to find the level of risk on
roads acceptable. While motor vehicle accidents involve artificial
objects, they are chronic rather than catastrophic. That is, though
road accidents are more frequent than aircraft crashes, the latter
generally involve a greater number of deaths).
If traffic control and enforcement authorities do adopt a strategy
of focusing on reducing the so-called collective risk (i.e., the fre-
quency of fatal and serious crashes per kilometer), as suggested by
the New Zealand Automobile Association (2010, 2012), it is likely
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to mean focusing on roads with substantial traffic flows. Users of
low-flow roads with a high personal risk (i.e., a high frequency of
fatal and serious crashes per vehicle-kilometer), who would be ex-
pected to be more careful, might well consider the distribution of
risk, and the strategy of traffic control and enforcement authorities,
unfair.
Tolerability of Risk
Many people treat acceptable risk and tolerable risk as identical, but
the UK Health and Safety Executive (2001) has argued that they are
not identical, saying that “tolerable does not mean acceptable : : :
(tolerable) refers to a willingness by society as a whole to live with
a risk so as to secure certain benefits in the confidence that the risk
is one that is worth taking and that it is properly controlled.” A risk
might not be acceptable to an individual, in which case that indi-
vidual will not take that risk, but it may be acceptable to a large
proportion of people and be tolerated by society. The tolerability
of risk to society is likely to be affected by the acceptability of risk
to individuals; the former is likely to decline as the latter declines.
This distinction between the acceptability of a risk to an individual
and the tolerability of a risk to society is important and has been
followed in this paper.
The UK Health and Safety Commission (1991) classified risks
according to their tolerability, based on the annual frequency (F) of
events involving N or more deaths, as follows:
• Risk is negligible if F < ð0.0001=NÞ;
• Risk is not negligible if ð0.0001=NÞ < F < ð0.01=NÞ and should
be reduced to “as low as reasonably practicable” (ALARP);
• Risk is possibly unjustifiable and should be scrutinized if
ð0.01=NÞ < F < ð0.1=NÞ; and
• Risk is intolerable if ð0.1=NÞ < F.
These limits are shown in Fig. 2 (note the logarithmic scales).
All activities can be assessed in terms of their FN curves (or
profiles), showing the annual frequency (F) of events involving
N or more deaths. Two FN profiles (Types A and B) are shown in
Fig. 3. The Type A profile represents an activity resulting in many
accidents involving a few deaths, and very occasionally accidents
involving more than a few deaths. The Type B profile represents an
activity resulting in a few accidents involving a few deaths, and
very occasionally accidents involving many deaths. Evans (1994)
developed FN profiles for road, rail, and air travel in the UK and
found that the profile for road travel was similar to the Type A
ANNUAL FREQUENCY (F) OF N OR MORE DEATHS
1E-1
1E-2
INTOLERABLE
POSSIBLY
1E-3
UNJUSTIFIED
1E-4
ALARP
1E-5
1E-6
NEGLIGIBLE
1E-7
1E+0 1E+1 1E+2 1E+3 1E+4
NUMBER OF DEATHS (N)
Fig. 2. Risk classification.
ASCE-ASME J. Risk Uncertainty Eng. Syst., Part A: Civ. Eng.
 ANNUAL FREQUENCY (F) OF N OR MORE DEATHS
1E+4
TYPE ‘A’
PROFILE
1E+3
1E+2
1E+1
1E+0
HSE TOLERABILITY
LIMIT
1E-1
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1E-2
1E+0
NUMBER OF DEATHS (N)
Fig. 3. FN profiles.
Table 2. Risk matrix
Minor
Probability (1)
Very unlikely (1) 1 10
Unlikely (2) 2 20
Moderate (3) 3 30
Likely (4) 4 40
Very likely (5) 5 50
profile shown in Fig. 3, with the profiles for rail and for air travel
being similar to the Type B profile shown in Fig. 3. He also found
that the profiles for all three modes of travel were well outside the
Health and Safety Commission’s tolerability threshold, as shown
in Fig. 3.
A risk matrix is a method of classifying risks to help to distin-
guish between tolerable and intolerable risks and to help to rank
risks for treatment. A risk matrix combines probability and conse-
quence, with both being allocated to discrete levels. Scores can be
allocated to each consequence and probability level, with risk
scores being the product of the consequence and probability scores
(Table 2). The higher the risk score, the higher is the priority that
should be given to improving safety.
A risk matrix approach can be used when risk analysts have
difficulty arriving at precise estimates of the probability and con-
sequence of events. However, the setting of consequence and prob-
ability scores is somewhat arbitrary, and the greater range of
consequence scores in Table 2 is consistent with placing greater
weight on the consequence of an event than the probability of that
event. This might well reflect the greater news media interest in
events with major or critical consequences.
Using Table 2, road accidents might well be assigned a risk
score of 5–10, corresponding to “very likely and minor” and “very
unlikely and moderate,” respectively, while rail and air accidents
might well be assigned much higher risk scores of 50–100, corre-
sponding to “very unlikely and major” (or “unlikely and major”)
and “very unlikely and critical,” respectively.
A risk matrix might be more easily understood by the public and
assist risk communication and make the risk assessment and evalu-
ation seem more transparent.
© ASCE
Risk Communication and Consultation
ISO 31000 (ISO 2009a) notes that communication and consultation
are “continual and iterative processes : : : to provide, share or
obtain information and to engage in dialogue with stakeholders
TYPE ‘B’ regarding the management of risk” and defines a stakeholder as
PROFILE “a person or organization that can affect, be affected by or perceive
themselves to be affected by a decision or activity.” That is, risk
communication should be a two-way process, with experts listen-
ing to the concerns of the public and providing the information
sought by the public.
The importance of risk communication has long been recog-
nized by those involved in environmental risk management, as evi-
denced by the formulation and adoption of seven so-called cardinal
rules of risk communication (EPA 1988). Recognition of the im-
1E+1 1E+2
portance of risk communication has spread to other areas involving
risk management, including emergency management, for example
(Janoske et al. 2012).
The first two cardinal rules of risk communication (EPA 1988)
are to accept and involve the public as a legitimate stakeholder (or
partner) in the management of the risk and to listen to them. It is
common practice for road safety strategies or plans to be developed
by government officials, sometimes with the aid of selected experts
Consequence or interest groups. This is not conducive to gaining the acceptance
Moderate Major Critical and support of a broad and representative section of the public,
(10) (50) (100) whose acceptance and support are important, given that the strat-
50 100 egies or plans invariably involve seeking a change in the behavior
100 200 of road users.
150 300 Keeney and von Winterfeldt (1986) argue that risk communica-
200 400 tion is a separate problem from the problem of deciding how to
250 500 analyze a risk and deciding what should be done about a risk. They
suggest that the objectives of risk communication are
• to educate the public about risks, risk analysis, and risk
management;
• to inform the public about specific risks and actions taken to
alleviate them;
• to encourage personal risk reduction measures;
• to improve the understanding of public values and concerns;
• to increase mutual trust and credibility; and
• to resolve conflicts and controversies.
According to Keeney and von Winterfeldt (1986), risk commu-
nication involves three distinct groups of people with fairly differ-
ent characteristics and viewpoints: risk analysts, regulators, and the
general public. Risk analysts are invariably very familiar with the
concepts of probability and consequence upon which risk analysis
is based, can be objective in their assessment of probabilities and
consequences, and are generally comfortable conceding uncer-
tainty in their conclusions regarding which risks should be ad-
dressed and how they should be addressed.
Regulators might well have some familiarity with the concepts
of probability and consequence upon which risk analysis is based
and might well be objective in their interpretation of the results of
risk analysis, but they can have strong preference for clear recom-
mendations regarding which risks should be addressed and how
they should be addressed.
The general public are generally not familiar with the concepts
upon which risk analysis is based, are generally not objective, and
often do not appreciate being regulated, while the media have a role
in transmitting information (often with some “translating”) from
experts or regulators to the general public.
Risk communication is complex, reflecting the complexities of
the problem being addressed. While the public frequently like to
express a risk problem in simple terms, such as “safe” or “unsafe,”
risk analysts and regulators must assess the range of possible
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 actions and balance multiple conflicting objectives. This makes risk Table 3. Relationship between qualitative and quantitative probabilities
communication difficult, particularly when the public are uncom- Qualitative probability Full probability Typical probability
fortable making difficult trade-offs and they expect the experts and term range (%) range (%)
regulators to be omniscient.
“Almost certainly” 50–99 85–99
This often leads regulators (policymakers and politicians) to “Highly likely” 50–99 85–99
become impatient with scientific uncertainty and, according to “Probable” 25–90 55–85
Keeney and von Winterfeldt (1986), asking for “one-armed’ scien- “Likely” 30–85 55–85
tists (i.e., analysts who will not say “on the one hand : : : but on the “Unlikely” 1–45 15–45
other hand : : : ”). Risk communication is also not helped by dis- “Improbable” 1–45 15–45
putes among experts or by experts using technical and bureaucratic “Highly unlikely” 1–30 1–15
language instead of language understandable to the general public. “Chances are slight” 1–45 1–15
Keeney and von Winterfeldt (1986) note that while experts
generally deal with statistical lives lost and average social costs
and benefits, most members of the public prefer to focus on the
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better to compare “4 out of 10,000” with “5 out of 10,000” than

effects on individuals, a tendency that is reinforced by the media
concentrating on individual drama and so-called human interest
stories. They also note that some members of the public have a
desire for both zero risk and certainty and that this is an unachiev-
able goal and presents an obstacle to presenting risk information
responsibly.
Regarding the achievability of zero risk, Allsop (2016) noted
that the ratio of the probability of death during travel on roads
(per hour of exposure) to the probability of death during all other
everyday activities (per hour of exposure) is much greater than one,
but the ratio (i.e., the relative risk of road travel) had decreased in
the UK from about seven in 2004 to about three in 2014 (i.e., trav-
eling on roads had become less dangerous compared with the rest
of everyday life). He suggested that as the ratio approaches one,
“people will look harder at the cost and intrusiveness of further
reducing death and injury on the roads” and “road safety will be
competing for resources and public attention : : : with other areas
of preventable death and injury.”
This is entirely consistent with the views of risk management
experts. For instance, Taig (1998) stated that while accidents are
avoidable and strenuous efforts are worthwhile to prevent them
and mitigate their effects, it is important to note that “as soon as
risks are compared and judgements made about them, it becomes
necessary to consider values, not only in respect of the risks them-
selves, but also in respect of the things people do that give rise
to risk : : : striving to eliminate risk, or introducing risk control
solutions that involve stopping the activities that give rise to risk,
are often wholly unacceptable : : : one of the most fundamental
purposes of risk control is, not to eliminate risk itself, but to enable
people to undertake activities they wish to pursue but know to be
hazardous, in the confidence that the risks are properly managed
and controlled : : : this applies across all walks of life, and to every
type of risk, whether financial, health and safety, environmental or
whatever.”
When presenting information to the public about the probability
of an event, it can be done as a percentage (e.g., 5%) or as a
frequency (e.g., 5 out of 100), and how a person responds to prob-
ability information depends upon the format that is chosen (Slovic
et al. 2007). This phenomenon is not confined to the general
public; a survey of experienced forensic psychologists/psychiatrists
(Slovic et al. 2007) found that 21% would refuse to discharge a
patient if told there was a 20% probability the patient would com-
mit a violent act, while 41% would refuse to discharge if told the
probability was 20 out of 100. Slovic et al. (2007) concluded that
“20%” led to a relatively benign image of the patient, but “20 out of
100” led to a frightening image of multiple patients committing
violent acts after release.
Slovic et al. (2007) also found that when presenting more than
one frequency for comparison, using the same denominators will
increase audience differentiation and comprehension (e.g., it is
“1 out of 2,500” with “10 out of 20,000” or “1 out of 2,000”).
When communicating with the public, it is important to note
that there are major variations in the probabilities assigned to terms
commonly used when discussing probability. Von Winterfeldt and
Edwards (1986) found that there were large variations between lay
people when converting qualitative probability terms (e.g., likely,
unlikely) to quantitative probabilities.
Table 3 shows, for each qualitative probability term, both the
full and typical ranges of probabilities; the full range includes
virtually all responses, and the typical range includes about 85%
of the responses (i.e., it excludes so-called outliers and is less wide).
It can be seen that the probability ranges (especially the full
ranges) are very wide and
• are the same for “almost certainly” and “highly likely,”
• are similar for “probable” and “likely,”
• are the same for “unlikely” and “improbable,” and
• are fairly similar for “highly unlikely” and “chances are slight.”
If lay people were asked to convert quantitative probabilities
to qualitative probability terms, it seems reasonable to expect a sim-
ilarly high level of variation between their responses. The consid-
erable scope for misinterpretation of quantitative probabilities and
qualitative probability terms is not conducive to effective risk
communication.
Risk Monitoring and Review
ISO 31000 defines monitoring as “continual checking, supervising,
critically observing or determining the status in order to identify
change from the performance level required or expected” and de-
fines review as an “activity undertaken to determine the suitability,
adequacy and effectiveness of the subject matter to achieve estab-
lished objectives.”
The effect of road safety risk management can differ from the
estimated or expected effect, and Evans (1985) suggested that this
could be due to not taking account of the risk perception issues
discussed earlier and how people react to changes in the perceived
level of risk. He proposed a “human behavior feedback model”:
ðActual effectÞ ¼ ð1 þ fÞ × ðEngineering effectÞ
where f is the feedback factor.
This model implies that
• the actual effect equals the engineering effect if f ¼ 0 (i.e., there
is no risk compensation or “feedback”);
• the actual effect is greater than the engineering effect if f > 0
(i.e., there is positive feedback); and
• the actual effect is less than the engineering effect if f < 0
(i.e., there is negative feedback).

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ASCE-ASME J. Risk Uncertainty Eng. Syst., Part A: Civ. Eng., 2020, 6(1): 04019017
 The risk homeostasis model (Wilde 1982) is a special case of
Evans’ human behavior feedback model with f equal to −1). It
assumes a target risk level for each person and implies that safety
treatments will be ineffective if drivers succeed in maintaining a
constant level of risk. As noted by Evans (1985), the risk homeo-
stasis model is not consistent with empirical data; Evans found
cases where f ≠ −1 (including cases where f > 0). Fuller (2000)
proposed a model with some similarity to Wilde’s risk homeostasis
model. With Fuller’s so-called task-capability interface model, each
driver is considered to have a target level of task difficulty rather
than a target level of risk. This model has led to the risk allostasis
theory (Fuller 2008), in which drivers seek to maintain a feeling of
risk within a preferred range.
The task-capability interface model implies that collisions can
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occur when the task demand experienced by a driver exceeds the
performance that drivers are willing and able to supply. Drivers can
adjust the task demand so it does not exceed their performance,
primarily by adjusting their speed. Hence, an increase in speed after
implementation of a treatment to improve road safety might be
taken as evidence of risk compensatory behavior. However, an
increase in speed does not necessarily mean that the treatment
has been ineffective in reducing the likelihood of accidents. For
example, a study of driver behavior on curves before and after
realignment (Wong and Nicholson 1992) found a reduction in
the likelihood of vehicles sliding off the outside of the curves,
despite an increase in vehicle speeds. This study considered the
basic physics/mechanics of vehicles traversing curves and revealed
a reduction in the required friction (i.e., the friction being called
upon by drivers), which meant an increase in the safety margin.
Risk Assessment Methods
Risk assessment is a major part of the risk management process,
and at least 30 risk assessment techniques have been developed
(ISO 2009b), some of which have been used in road safety risk
management for some time (Nicholson 2002). They include event
tree analysis, fault tree analysis, and Monte Carlo simulation.
Event tree analysis is a structured way of representing the vari-
ous possible outcomes of driver behaviors (violations, errors or
lapses, say) that might result in an accident and can help identifi-
cation of the failure process and the full range of outcomes. It in-
volves identifying initiating failure events, intermediate events, and
outcomes. Estimated probabilities can be assigned to each of the
possible alternatives at each stage, giving a weighted average con-
sequence. An event tree resembles the trunk and branches of a tree.
The trunk represents the initiating failure event (e.g., a driver enter-
ing a curve at too high a speed), where the major branches represent
the intermediate events (e.g., the vehicle leaves the road, the vehicle
collides with a pole close to the road, some vehicle occupants are
not wearing seat belts) and the minor branches represent the out-
comes (e.g., serious injury to some occupants).
Fault tree analysis is a structured way of clearly identifying the
logical structure of the system, so that one can understand how the
factors (or causes) and the preventive measures (or safeguards) are
logically linked. It enables the identification of weaknesses in pre-
ventive measures and the most appropriate means of reducing the
risk. A fault tree resembles the trunk and roots of a tree. The trunk
represents the event (e.g., some occupants of a vehicle are killed
after a vehicle collides with a pole alongside a road), the major
roots represent intermediate factors (e.g., seat belts worn by only
some occupants, pole located close to road on outside of curve),
and the minor roots represent the initiating factors (e.g., the driver
of the vehicle has been delayed by previously encountered and
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ASCE-ASME J. Risk Uncertainty Eng. Syst., Part A: Civ. Eng., 2020, 6(1): 04019017
unexpected traffic congestion). Estimated probabilities can be
assigned to each of the possible alternatives at each stage, giving
a probability of the vehicle occupants being killed.
Using fault and event trees emphasizes the complex interactions
that generally exist between the factors contributing to an accident
and helps identify how those factors operate in the particular cir-
cumstances surrounding each accident. One will be less likely to
form a simplistic view of why an accident has occurred than if
one thinks in terms of a single chain of events and will be less likely
to think that accidents can be avoided by focusing on one factor or
type of factor (e.g., human factors).
Fault trees, with their focus on understanding why an accident
has occurred, would seem well suited to so-called ex-post accident
investigations and accident reduction. Event trees would appear
well suited to ex-ante accident prevention (or safety auditing),
given their focus on identifying the possible consequences of an
event (e.g., a vehicle emerging from a minor road where the sight
distance along the main road is severely restricted).
Joshua and Garber (1992) used fault tree analysis for a study of
the causes of large truck accidents. They found that the fault tree
analysis increased the level of understanding of the system (particu-
larly how large truck accidents occur), the functional relationships
between failures, the degree of protection provided by the truck
design, and the design requirements from a system safety view-
point. They suggested the increased understanding allows the iden-
tification and quantification of potential failures, the identification
of cause-and-effect relationships, and informed judgement about
how, why, and with what frequency systems fail.
Washington (2015) investigated the use of event trees to assess
the probability of various types of accidents, including single-
vehicle loss-of-control accidents at curves, head-on collisions at
curves, and rear-end accidents. He found that, despite the difficulty
in estimating the probabilities of initiating failure events, intermedi-
ate events, and outcomes, the construction of an event tree provides
useful insights for those seeking to identify which accident counter-
measures would be effective in reducing accidents.
Monte Carlo simulation involves describing uncertain input var-
iables using probability distributions and deriving the distribution
of the dependent output variable. Menzies and Nicholson (2003)
studied the so-called amber dilemma problem using Monte Carlo
simulation, in conjunction with the basic deterministic theory of
Gazis et al. (1960). Menzies and Nicholson estimated the proba-
bility of a conflict between vehicles caught in the amber dilemma
zone and side road vehicles, where a conflict was defined as a sit-
uation where a collision would occur if no evasive action were
taken. They allowed for random variations in the uncertain input
variables (i.e., approach speed, acceleration rate, deceleration
rate, perception-reaction time, length and distance from stop line
for vehicles approaching the signal when amber commences, and
position of vehicle on side road). They found the probability of a
conflict at a traffic signal change was 5% when the amber time was
3.0 s and the all-red time was 0.0 s, 1% when the amber time was
3.8 s and the all-red time was 0.0 s, and 0.06% when the amber time
was 3.8 s and the all-red time was 1.0 s.
Innovative Technology
The interest in using innovative technology (e.g., autonomous
vehicles) to improve road safety is growing rapidly. However, it
is not new, as evidenced by proposals in the past to improve the
safety of vehicles negotiating horizontal curves, by having cars
automatically tilt (i.e., change the angle between the road and
the car’s chassis) as curves are traversed. This results in a higher
ASCE-ASME J. Risk Uncertainty Eng. Syst., Part A: Civ. Eng.
 proportion of the centrifugal force, which is experienced by drivers
as they traverse curves, acting along the so-called axis of the driver
(a compressive force) and a smaller proportion acting laterally
(i.e., parallel to the surface of the road) and causing body sway.
Because humans are more sensitive to a force causing body sway
than to a force along the axis of the body, having a tilting vehicle
would reduce driver discomfort and the need to reduce speed to
avoid discomfort. Hence, drivers will be less likely to reduce speed.
However, a tilting vehicle does not affect the forces on the ve-
hicle itself (i.e., the gravitational force and frictional force between
the tires and the road surface). Whether the vehicle slides toward
the outside of the curve depends upon the maximum available
frictional force. Hence, the tilting of the vehicle increases the prob-
ability of drivers not reducing speed sufficiently and consequently
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calling upon more friction than is available (i.e., it increases the
likelihood of an accident).
During the early 1990s, it was proposed to use in-vehicle speed
adaptation (ISA) to manage speeds and improve road safety by
reducing the probability and severity of crashes. Trials of ISA
were undertaken in some countries, including Sweden and the
Netherlands. The Lund trial (Hjälmdahl 2004) involved speed limit
reminders for drivers and fitting cars with an active accelerator
pedal, which applied a resistance to the accelerator pedal if the
speed limit was exceeded (acceleration was still possible by press-
ing very hard on the accelerator pedal), making it impossible to
exceed the speed limit inadvertently. The aim of the trial was to
assess the effectiveness and acceptability (to drivers) of the system.
Based on observed changes in speed, Hjälmdahl (2004) estimated
that ISA would give reductions of up to 25% and 32% in injury
and fatal crashes, respectively, and noted that driver acceptability
decreased as the intrusiveness increased (e.g., people who drive fast
and have a high accident involvement were less accepting).
Based on in-depth accident investigations (e.g., Sabey and
Staughton 1975; Treat 1980; Sabey 1983) having found that around
90% of road accidents involve human error, many advocates of
autonomous vehicles claim that accidents will be reduced by
around 90%. Such claims overlook the fact that accidents typically
involve more than one type of factor (road environment factors and
vehicle factors are typically involved in around 30% and around
10%, respectively), and eliminating human error might well not
prevent around 90% of accidents.
It is not clear how autonomous vehicles will recognize and
cope with deficiencies in the road environment, such as warning
signs being too close to the hazard, inappropriate warning signs,
nonstandard temporary traffic management arrangements at road-
works, localized reductions in superelevation at curves, road sur-
face deficiencies (e.g., potholes), and worn pavement markings.
Researchers who examine human factors are particularly con-
cerned about the transition of control (i.e., the switch from highly
automated driving to manual driving while in traffic), which will be
needed unless autonomous vehicles can master all possible traffic
situations and all weather conditions and will never fail. Vlakveld
(2015) notes that there are two types of control transition: planned
(e.g., driver takes control when leaving motorway) and acute
(i.e., driver takes control when ADS fails or cannot cope). Vlakveld
notes that in the first situation, driver actions are initially slow and
error-prone, and in the second situation, the driver is probably inca-
pable of avoiding an impending crash owing to a lack of situation
awareness.
Banks et al. (2018) note that the human factors literature indi-
cates that humans are notoriously inefficient at completing pro-
longed monitoring tasks. The researchers undertook observations
of on-road driver behavior with a partially automated vehicle re-
quiring drivers/supervisors to remain in an active monitoring state,
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ready to resume manual control if required. They concluded that
drivers are not being properly supported in adhering to their new
monitoring responsibilities and instead demonstrate behavior
indicative of complacency and overtrust. They suggested that these
attributes may encourage drivers to take more risks on the road.
Of particular concern is the risk to cyclists and pedestrians re-
sulting from collisions with autonomous vehicles, and Vissers et al.
(2016) argue that autonomous vehicle technology is currently not
able to reliably predict the intentions and behaviors of pedestrians
and cyclists, whose safety is likely to be reduced unless the tech-
nology is able to reliably predict their intentions and behavior.
Innovative technology, especially when developed in a competi-
tive environment, can and does malfunction, and there is real merit
in having wise humans with full situational awareness involved in
making decisions in situations where the adverse consequences of a
wrong decision are not minor. This is exemplified by the case of the
September 1983 malfunction of the USSR’s early warning system,
when the system indicated that missiles had been launched from the
US. As noted by Chan (2017), it was during one of the most tense
periods in the Cold War, with the USSR having recently shot down
a Korean Air Lines commercial flight after it had crossed into
USSR airspace (killing 269 people, including a US congressman),
the US president having recently declared the USSR an “evil em-
pire,” and the general secretary of the USSR strongly fearing an
attack from the US. Colonel Petrov, the duty officer at the USSR’s
early-warning system center, had to decide whether to initiate an
action that would probably have resulted in a retaliatory attack from
the USSR. Petrov decided to treat the alert as a system malfunction,
later explaining that it was a “gut decision” (Chan 2017) based on
his knowledge of the system.
Conclusion
Humans have been living with risk and practicing risk management
for a long time, with a wide range of risk management methods
having been developed. The management of transport risk would
benefit from evaluating those methods that have been developed for
general risk management and implementing those found to be
suited to the management of transport risk.
The management of transport risk would be improved if greater
attention were paid to so-called human factors, including the per-
ception of risk, the acceptability of risk (including the factors
affecting it and the relative importance of those factors), and the
nature of changes in driver behavior with a change in the perceived
risk. Knowledge of how people perceive transport risk and how
their perceptions influence their behavior (e.g., their speed and
mode choice) would assist effective safety education. It would also
assist identification of which exposure measure would be most
appropriately used in risk assessment. More sophisticated perfor-
mance measures than accidents per kilometer and per vehicle-
kilometer (currently widely used in transport strategies) might
become appropriate.
A greater emphasis on risk communication and consultation
during the development of road safety strategies, to obtain input
from a broad and representative section of the community, would
assist in achieving a better understanding, by both users and
providers of roads, of how they can contribute to improving road
safety.
Risk communication and consultation will need to take account
of variations between risk management specialists and the public,
as well as variations between members of the public, in the under-
standing and interpretation of qualitative and quantitative probabil-
ity terms. It will also be necessary to grapple with quite complex
ASCE-ASME J. Risk Uncertainty Eng. Syst., Part A: Civ. Eng.
 issues that appear to affect the acceptability of risk, such as whether
the distribution of risk is sufficiently fair.
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