28 BAR ARTICLES The British Army Review 163: Spring/Summer 2015 BAR The British Army Review 163:
BAR The British Army Review 163: Spring/Summer 2015 29
Training the
Army Reserve
Light Role
Infantry Company
Major Gerry Long analyses the focus on training required
for deploying a Light Role Army Reserve Rifle Company
while paired with its Regular Infantry Battalion on operations
in preparation for contingency and integration.
When this Regiment was formed our country
was doing pretty badly. Napoleon’s armies
were across the Channel getting ready to
invade us and a great many people thought
we were finished. We weren’t. But not
because we were lucky. When the first
battalion of this regiment marched against
Napoleon at Talavera in 1809 that was the
first battle they made their own.
They marched 42 miles in 24 hours of a
Spanish summer and every man jack of’em
carried a 60lb pack. Talavera. Look at your
cap badge; you’ll see … other battles too:
Barossa, Sabugal. At Sabugal they defeated
five times the number of Napoleons’
troops. Salamanca, Orthez, Waterloo,
Alma, Sebastopol, Tel-el-Kebir, Mons,
Ypres, Somme … those are battle honours.
More than 80 soldiers from Anzio Coy of the 4th Battalion The Duke of Lancaster’s Regt (4 LANCS) You’re allowed to wear the [cap-] badge…
trained with the Italian Army during Exercise ROMAN STAR. The aim of the exercise was to link the
training of reservists into that of the UK’s NATO partners and to share best practice across defence. to show that you belong to the regiment
Photo: Corporal Andy Reddy RLC, Crown Copyright. that won them and that when the time
comes, you’ll do as well as they did ...
It hasn’t been disgraced yet. And now you
are wearing it…
Lieutenant Jim Perry, the Way Ahead.
As Afghanistan moves into recent history there will
come detailed analysis on the lessons learned from that
conflict. Those lessons learned are still based around
the three classical levels of war, strategic, operational
and tactical. To some extent they have all been affected
by our experience of the Contemporary Operational
Environment (COE). One of the recent changes within
the tactical arena, reinforced by the COE, is that while
in the past, strategy was the preserve of generals;
the COE gives us the strategic corporal. The impact 1
The Dutch government
of the strategic corporal will continue far beyond the resigned in 2002 after
the publication of
battlefield. Indeed, with the prevalence of 24 hour Dossier Srebrenica, a
report investigating the
News, a single soldier’s action (or lack of action1) has role of the Dutch Army
during the massacre
strategic consequences.2 that occurred in the
In this article we are concerned with the tactical Bosnian town in 1995.
2
Krulak, C., (1999), The
level, and preparing the Light Role Infantry Company Strategic Corporal:
of the Reserve to take its place in its paired unit of the Leadership in the Three
Block War, Marines
Adaptable Force. The use of all-arms and air-power, Magazine.
30 BAR ARTICLES The British Army Review 163: Spring/Summer 2015 BAR The British Army Review 163: Spring/Summer 2015 31

although relevant, are outside the usual day-to-day Light infantry is the best counter to irregulars because Lessons Learned counterpart, along with the requirement to be ready
(weekend) training environment of the Army Reserve and it offers three critical capabilities. First, good light infantry Irregular War5 is more than just terrorism because to deploy at short notice. To be effective in combat
therefore the addition of other arms and services would (unless badly outnumbered) can usually defeat almost terrorism is a single tactical action designed to have and ready to integrate with our paired formation,
have to come at the later stages of mobilisation. What any force of irregulars it is likely to meet. It can do this direct operational or strategic effect. Because targets that training must be focused. The focus for future Infantry
we are concerned with here is the deployment of a Light in a man-to-man fight that avoids giving the opponent have such direct operational or strategic effect are few requirements can be boiled down to eight core training 5
There being nothing
‘irregular’ about these
Role Army Reserve Rifle Company3 into its paired Regular the propaganda potential of the David vs. Goliath image. and are usually well-protected, terrorism normally plays objectives that can be classified as EPIC-SCALE. None kinds of wars, they are
by definition they are
Infantry Battalion and the training focus required. In line If the light infantry does not load itself too heavily with a minor role in conflicts - though when it does occur the of this is new. The lessons and doctrine on how to as regular as any other
with Project PAYNE4 the aim will be to deliver true light arms and equipment, it can enjoy the same mobility as effects can be wide-ranging. Most of what we will face in train infantry well have been around since the Boer war, the only reason
the term ‘irregular’ is
infantry, skilled in stealth, scouting and field-craft more the irregulars (enhanced by necessary platforms). Light COE is guerrilla warfare. Here, lessons from past guerrilla War. These competences must be developed ahead of used is the est. army
does not want to fight
akin to Rodgers Rangers or Jaegers than the beast of infantrymen can show the local population a human face. wars, especially the likes of Malaya, Vietnam, Dhofar, etc. all other capabilities as they provide the Light Role them. Kilcullen, Lt Col
3
All Army Reserve
Infantry Battalions are burden that we have inherited from Op HERRICK. They can protect the local people from retaliation by the remain relevant today at the tactical level. Perhaps the Infantry its unique range of capabilities in terms of D. quoted in Kaplan,
Light Role Inf. F. (2013) Simon &
irregulars, assist with public works projects or help form most important lesson is that to defeat guerrillas, we have employability within the all-arms team: Schuster, New York, The
4
See Kilcullen, D Insurgents, p 88.
(2006) 28 Articles 5, Light Role Infantry and train a local defence force. to become better at their own game than they are. When 1. Every infantry soldier must retain the ability
ruthlessly lighten your
6
Hackworth, D.H.,
load, and enforce In any future operation there will be the challenge of As such true light infantry, is as much a state of Colonel David Hackworth commanded a battalion in the to integrate at the high end of warfighting Sherman, Julie, About
Face: The Odyssey of
a culture of speed training the Army Reserve Light Role Infantry but the mind as a tactical approach, without squaring the circle Vietnam War, he called this out-guerrilla’ing the guerrilla, capability. ‘To train infantry, which is an American Warrior,
and mobility http://
Touchstone, April 1990.
smallwarsjournal.com/ question here is how do we integrate this unit with of training light infantry efficiently we will seldom be or out-G’ing the G: essentially the tactical arm, is to exercise an
documents/28articles. 7
Infiltration need not be
pdf, & Manoeuvre its paired regular unit at the tactical level in a future able to come to grips with the elusive irregulars who We would no longer be the counterinsurgents art, whereas to train the technical arms is to exclusively the domain
Soldiers in Scales R.H., of the ‘irregular’ see
(2003) Yellow Smoke,
war? In such a future conflict our soldiers will need to will likely be our opponents or part of an opposing who, like actors on a well-lit stage, gave apply a science, [the infantryman] is a field- Wigram, L (1943) Attack
Future of Land Warfare, understand the importance of both the preparation for, force in future conflicts. all their secrets away to an unseen, silent craftsman, this is the title of honour to which
by Infiltration, http://mr-
Rowman & Littlefield, home.staff.shef.ac.uk/
New York, pp 81-93. and conduct of, operations. and ever-watchful (insurgent) audience in a he may aspire in the profession of arms.’8 9 hobbies/Wignam.txt
Reservist soldiers with 6th Battalion The Rifles (6 Rifles)
8
Liddell Hart (1933) The
are pictured on Exercise LEOPARD STAR 2012 in Germany.
darkened theatre. Instead we would approach 2. Physical fitness is a requirement for all Future of Infantry, Faber
& Faber, London p 64.
Photo: SSgt Mark Nesbit RLC, Crown Copyright. the battlefield and the war as our enemy infantrymen. All contact with whatever 9
Scales R.H., (2003),
approached it, and in so doing begin to out- shape our adversaries come in, ultimately Yellow Smoke, Future of
Land Warfare, Rowman
guerrilla the guerrilla - “out-G the G,”, as I requires dismounted manoeuvre with & Littlefield, New York,
hammered it again and again into the men of weapons and equipment in all types of
pp 85-87.
10
See Hackworth, D.H.,
the Hardcore (battalion) - and win. terrain and climate for extended periods of Sherman, Julie, About
The basic concepts behind my changes were time by day and night.
Face: The Odyssey of
an American Warrior,
that men, not helicopters or mechanical Touchstone, 1990, pp
gimmicks, won battles, and that the only way 3. Infantry soldiers must be masters of their 402-3 see also Scales
R.H., (2003) Yellow
to defeat the present enemy in the present profession. Like all professionals, the tools Smoke, Future of Land
Warfare, Rowman &
war at a low cost in friendly casualties was of the trade must be mastered to a level of Littlefield, New York,

through adopting the enemy’s own tactics, unconscious competence, whether it is the pp 69-70, 162-163, &
Macgregor, D.A.(2003)
i.e., “out G-ing the G” through surprise, rifle or the radio.10 Transformation under
Fire, Praeger, Westport,
deception, cunning, mobility ... imagination, 4. Close quarter combat skills are vital for closing pp 55-59.
11
Current Section level
and familiarity with the terrain ... 6 with and destroying the enemy. The infantry tactical doctrine can

In training a unit for guerrilla war, commanders should soldier must master the tactics, techniques, be revamped to train
Army Reserve Infantry
make use of the extensive literature on past operations; and procedures for combat at close range.11 (& Regular) and should
be based on the 5 basic
training should be wherever possible free-play exercises 5. Fieldcraft Skills have not been not been LRI tasks - to observe,
to move, to suppress,
against guerrilla opponents who are allowed to make full reduced in the early 21st century. The to attack and to bypass.
Simple Fire-team drills
use of such typical guerrilla tools as IEDs and infiltration. 7 ability to move and survive - to master the can be developed for
intricacies of one’s physical environment - is those tasks based on a
generic and simplified
Training Reserve Infantry for Integration crucial. ‘The infantryman's use of material - Battle Drill, based on 3
stages for employment
- the Core Training his weapons - is only complementary to the from Fire-Team through
to Coy: (1) Prepare
Field Marshall Montgomery observed that the object use he makes of tactics and ground before for battle. (2) Move to
of all training is success in battle. That training, for he gets to grips with his enemy. Because encountering the enemy
(making best use of
the Army Reserve Light Role Infantry has been given of the variety of elements with which he ground). (3) Reaction
to encountering the
additional emphasis by pairing with its Regular has to deal, the infantry commander is enemy.
32 BAR ARTICLES The British Army Review 163: Spring/Summer 2015
12
Liddell Hart (1933) The
Future of Infantry, Faber
& Faber, London p 64. 6. Communications and interpersonal skills have
13
Kilcullen, D (2006) 28
Articles 11, 13, Small
Wars Journal.
14
Krulak Gen Charles, K.,
(1999), The Strategic
Corporal: Leadership in
the Three Block War,
with the population.
Marines Magazine.
15
Liddell Hart (1933), The
7. All infantrymen to possess Situational
Future of Infantry, Faber
& Faber, London p 64.
16
Not unlike the German
Army between the wars
where the innovation
of Hans Von Seeckt led
to the creation of the
Fuhrerheer - an army
of leaders - (where
leadership was stressed
at every level) based
on physical and mental
robustness, competency
with small-arms and
fieldcraft, Addington,
Hans von Seeckt and the
Revolution in Military
Affairs.
17
Pratten, G (2009)
Australian Battalion
Commanders in the
Second World War,
Cambridge University
Press, p 156.
apt to confine himself to such parts of the
subject as he himself knows best. Hence the
tendency to over-emphasise such matters as
drill, bayonet fighting, which can be easily
mastered. Hence the neglect of tactical
training, which demands thought and is
difficult to learn and teach because it deals
with moral and variable factors and requires
a modicum of imagination.’ 12
never been so important. The infantryman
must not only have the technical and tactical
ability to communicate with other military
forces, he must also be able to communicate
13
Awareness is more essential now than
at any point in history. The intricacies of
population engagement demand that all
infantrymen strive to develop a full grasp of
the situation. Furthermore, the globalisation
of information has produced the ‘strategic
corporal’14 phenomenon, demanding
that every soldier possess an anticipatory
appreciation for the possible effects of his
actions. ‘In the future infantry must be
permeated by the best doctrine …and this
doctrine must be expressed in language so
simple and by metaphors and illustration so
clear, that it can be as readily grasped.’15
Army Reserve soldiers train alongside members of the Italian Army
on Exercise ROMAN STAR that marks a shift away from the tactical,
towards developing fully formed deployable hybrid units.
This better serves the commitment the MOD has made
to make more of the talents of Reservists.
Photo: Corporal Andy Reddy RLC, Crown Copyright.
8. Leadership. An infantryman must be prepared
to lead at whatever level. This requirement
has been eternal, but has now proliferated
to the lowest levels. Every infantry soldier
must be developed to be a thinking, decisive
leader.16 With dispersed operations in a
compartmentalised battlespace, infantrymen
will more often than not find themselves
isolated from their chain of command.
When in a leadership role the soldier must
strive to meet the expectations of the men
of his command in battle. By meeting this
expectation he will be trusted and respected
and therefore they in turn will respond readily
to his orders.17
The training of the Reserve Infantry Company, due
to its fragmented nature, must be based around the
small team, Platoon, Section, Fire-Team, centred
on developing their professional ability so they can
take their place in their paired unit. Training must be
relevant and current and reflect the need of the unit
the Reserves will be joining. It goes without saying
that this is a team-effort between the paired units,
with paired training directives, training cycle and
battle rhythm. This is more than cooperation; this is
BAR The British Army Review 163: Spring/Summer 2015 33
an adoption of a supporting mind-set that mirrors and stealth. To real light infantry, ambush is a mentality,21
binds the team at all levels. This mirror must continue not merely a technique. To make this a reality there
down to the lowest level with common Standard must be a complete overhaul of our troops’ training, via
Operating Procedures (SOPs) for not only the tactical Patrol Based Infantry Doctrine (PBID).22 The emphasis
situation, but also packing lists, vehicle equipment should shift away from specific techniques and 18
Marshall, S.L. A., (1980)
stowage and communication procedures so that even technical skills.23 Instead, it should be placed on tactical Ambush: Battle of Dau
Tieng, Jove, New York,
if the units cannot train together they have a common concepts, the inculcation of a hunter mind-set and p 3.
language and reference when training. the ability to make rapid but sound decisions, based 19
The Universal Infantry,
(2010), Australian Army
on the (necessarily limited) information at hand. In Journal, Summer 2010.
Developing Reserve Light Role Infantry for combat the Infantryman should be able to draw on his 20
20130614-Project_
Payne_brief_CO_IBS.ppt
Contingency Operations relevant tactical training to create a textbook assault 21
Hackworth, D.H. (1970)
As Samuel Marshall observed Most battles are more in the midst of disjointed individual actions, amongst Guerrilla Battalion,
U.S. Style, http://
like a schoolyard in a rough neighbourhood the noise, smoke, confusion where fear is the only www.hackworth.com/
guerrilla.html
[rather than a staged football game] they are commodity in large supply.24 22
Owen, William F., Patrol-
messy, inorganic and uncoordinated 18 Currently In the COE, most light infantry combat will occur at Based Infantry Doctrine,
Infantry Magazine,
our Light Role Infantry is ‘light’ only in the sense that the company level or below. Shifting the tactical focus Jan-Feb, 2006.
it does not have its own medium or heavy armoured to company-sized and smaller units will probably mean 23
The tactics used to train
the low level infantry
vehicles. However, it has a superabundance of almost in real terms a move to a flatter command structure. On commander need to
everything else. In the field, our nominal ‘light’ infantryman operations a Battalion might have eight or more sub-units be quickly absorbed,
this is best delivered
routinely carries more than 50 kilograms of body armour, under its command. Prior to 1914 the standard battalion by basing training on
five basic field-craft
weapons, ammunition, radios, field equipment, etc. had eight rifle companies. This gave the battalion great skills - to observe, to
We are dependent on Troop Carrying Vehicles (TCVs). flexibility in irregular warfare because it enabled it to move, to suppress, to
attack and to bypass.
These vehicles, in turn, tie our deployment to roads, thus create numerous detachments while still retaining a Simple Fire-team drills
exposing us to ambush and IEDs diminishing our ability to tactically viable force under its own control. The switch to
can be developed for
those tasks based on a
generic and simplified
operate in complex terrain. the four company organisation was in response to the 4 stage Battle Drill, for
Reducing our TCV dependence and making employment by the Fire
-Team through to Coy.
our infantry light will require some hard choices by An Army Reserve soldier from 6th Battalion The Rifles (6 RIFLES) 24
Marlantes, K (2010)
commanders at every level, including how we employ and
fires a General Purpose Machine Gun during
Matterhorn, Atlantic
Exercise WYVERN TEMPEST on Salisbury Plain.
man our Crew-Served Weapons (CSW). Not only are these Photo: Corporal Daniel Wiepen RLC, Crown Copyright.
Monthly Press, New
York, pp 475-80.
weapons themselves heavy, each one requires several
times its own weight in ammunition. Although modest
firepower levels are enough to defeat most potential
enemies, we still over-armour our ‘light’ infantry for
successful conventional combat that still requires excessive
amounts of firepower. We need to be able to adapt faster
against the changing nature of conflict - hence the need to
equip the man rather than man the equipment.19 However,
the job of training our infantry for true Light Role Infantry
(LRI) tasking is much more than just reducing the combat
load instead what our infantry carry should be in line with
Project PAYNE.20
Light Role Infantry must have a full tactical
repertoire. It cannot be accustomed merely to holding
positions, or calling for fire support whenever it
contacts the enemy. It must be expert at ambushes,
penetrations and encirclements in both rural and
urban settings. Light Role Infantry tactics are above all
hunting or stalking tactics; they must rely heavily on
34 BAR ARTICLES The British Army Review 163: Spring/Summer 2015 BAR The British Army Review 163: Spring/Summer 2015 35

impending battle against a very conventional enemy in

Western Europe.25 Conventional wisdom has it that a
given command element cannot tactically control more
than four manoeuvre elements. However, on a COE
battlefield, tactical control above the company level
is seldom needed. When it is needed it should usually
leave tactical matters to its platoons and companies.
In addition, Rifle Companies need greater logistical
independence. Although this requires additional
manpower, a company should have its own administrative
and logistic echelon. Centralising logistics at battalion level
or higher, ties the company much more closely to their
higher headquarters than is desirable in likely contingency
operations. Barring all-out conventional war in Europe, LRI
Companies should be able to subsist on a tighter logistical
support. LRI should have a Light Tactical Platform (LTP).
In line with Project - PAYNE26 an LTP is required to assist in
lightening the load of the Light Role Infantryman a LTP is
required, not unlike the Universal Carrier.
We cannot expect mobility on the battlefield
unless the man who fights on foot is given
the chance to be mobile. He must be
clothed and equipped as an athlete not as
a pack animal. Yet in fact, the infantryman
has been more heavily burdened than
25
Baynes, J (1955) Far any pack animal. For even the mule is not
From A Donkey, The
Life of General Sir Ivor loaded with more than one-third of his own
Maxse, KCB, CVO, DSO,
Brassey's, London, pp
body weight, whereas the infantryman’s
104-5. load [is] nearly two-thirds…a maximum load
20130614-Project_ compatible with mobility, i.e., a quarter of
26

Payne_brief_CO_IBS.ppt.
27
Liddell Hart (1933) The body weight…indicating that maximum load
Future of Infantry, Faber
& Faber, London p 41.
is about 30lbs.27
28
Fourth Generation The Reserve Infantryman must be ready to deploy on
War - Defense and the
National Interest, FMFM contingency operations and integrate with his paired unit
1-A, Draft 4.3 12 August
2008; FMFM-1A Fourth with little notice; therefore training must reflect this level
Generation War Imperial
and Royal Austro-
of professionalism and the urgency needed. This type of
Croatia
Hungarian, Marine true light infantry, or Jaegers, is very different from what through the primary group29 or Band of Brothers 30 in order to develop their basis infantry skills for contingency operations.
Corps 1.
29
Shils, E, Janowitz,
we now know as light infantry. Our Light Role Infantry approach, while not neglecting individual fieldcraft skill, Photo Corporal Andy Reddy, Crown Copyright
M, (Summer needs a programme to develop a true light infantry skill as Wavell observed: an Infantryman should possess
1948) Cohesion &
Disintegration in the set as quickly as possible, making full use of the available the qualities of a successful poacher, cat-burglar
Wehrmacht in World
War II, Public Opinion
training. To a degree our potential opponents can field and gunman.31 Today, that infantryman must also
Quarterly. better light infantry than we can; our ability to prevail over have certain attributes of an intelligence analyst, Psyops
30
Scales R.H., (2003)
Yellow Smoke, Future of
them is therefore greatly diminished.28 operator, and sometimes the copper on the beat while
Land Warfare, Rowman Armies that fail to adapt, are bound to always serve in not losing his ability to fight and win in a conventional fire-
& Littlefield, New York,
pp 162-3. darkness. To adapt and bask in the sunlight of innovation fight. A tall order, but a challenge the Reserve (integrated
31
Connell, J (1964) Wavell, means embracing inventive training, the parameters of with his Regular counterpart) Infantryman must meet.
Scholar and Soldier, More than 140 Army Reservists took park in Exercise SAVA STAR in
Collins, London, p 163. this training must include the need to build unit cohesion