Defense Analysis Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 215-219,1990 0743-0175/90 $3.00 + 00.

00
Printed in Great Britain. © 1990 Brasseys (UK) Ltd.

Landmarks in Defense Literature

Some books which have fallen within Defense Analysis's fields of interest have
paved the way for further studies, either because they have opened up a new
area for enquiry and research, or because they have introduced new
approaches and methodologies to existing areas. Other volumes have had
impact, but have, in their turn, owed an intellectual debt to an an earlier work.
Again, there are many books and studies on defense which have become
forgotten or which were unappreciated at the time of their publication, but
which have immediate relevance to today's problems. This section is designed
to review books that fall within these categories with a view to highlighting how
and why they deserve serious attention.

If Germany Attacks: the Battle in Depth in the West. By CAPTAIN G R A E M E C . WYNNE.

Faber & Faber, London (1940) [reprinted by Greenwood Press, Westport, C T (1976)]

One of the most penetrating books on the
German miUtary system ever to be written in
the English language was Captain G. C.
Wynne's / / Germany Attacks: the Battle in
Depth in the West. This book was a develop-
ment of some eight articles published between
1937 and 1939 on the German system of mobile
defense which, had they been applied by the
French and British Armies, would have
changed considerably the course of events in
May 1940. Their application to the defense of
Central Europe today is similarly pertinent.
Sadly his writings were ignored, although it is
heartening to note that his book has recently
been repubUshed in the United States.
Wynne's book is important for three main
reasons. Firstly, he shows that it is possible to
employ a highly mobile and aggressive defense
in even the most positional circumstances.
Secondly, he demonstrates the importance of a
215
conceptual basis to a tactical system, and
highUghts the key requirement of mobile oper-
ations: decentrahzation of command. Finally,
he illuminates the cyclical process through
which the tactics were perfected, and shows the
organizational characteristics this demands.
"The principal feature in the conduct of the
defence within the Flandern Position [at
Passchendaele] was its counter-attack organ-
isation. This was anchored to the teaching of
Clausewitz that the defensive battle should
take the form not of a pure defence but of
parry and thrust; the parry was to be the fire-
power of artillery and machine-guns and the
thrust was the infantry counter-attack."^
By the end of the British Passchendaele
offensive in 1917, the German defensive
system had developed to a depth of 10,000 m.
The majority of the defending forces were held
at the rear of this zone, outside the enemy field
216 Landmarks in Defense Literature
artillery range. Rather than simply reinforcing
the forward defenses, these troops were used
to hurl the attacker back by means of large-
scale immediate counterstrokes (Gegenstoss
am der Tiefe)} This was considered to be the
"decisive factor," revealing the aggressive
nature of the defensive doctrine.
An essential preliminary to these counter-
strokes was that the attacker's energy and
cohesion be dissipated, leaving him unable to
put up effective resistance. This task was
performed by that third of the defenders
deployed in the forward part of the defensive
system. These too operated in a highly mobile
fashion, with only a small proportion holding
static defensive positions. The great majority
of the forward defenders formed a swarm of
small units,^ which constantly probed and
stung the attacker by means of a mass of minor
counterstrokes {Gegenstoss in der Stellung).
This exhausted and disorganized the attacker,
leaving him prey to the main counterstrokes.
This dynamic and aggressive approach meant
that "the defensive battle developed into a
mobile action within the confines of a deep
zone."^
The German system, Wynne makes clear,
was not the result of haphazard developments.
On the contrary, it was based upon five key
concepts: Fldchenverteidigung^ (area defense),
subsequently extended into Flachen und
Lticken (areas and gaps); die Leere des
Gefechtfeldes^ (empty battlefield or invisi-
bility); and the Gegenstoss (immediate
counter-stroke), which subsequently became
Schlagfertigkeit (immediate responsiveness).
The concentration of artillery employed by
the British during the war allowed them to
obhterate any known German position. To
counter this, the Germans dispersed their
troops over a wide area (Fldchenverteidigung)
and rendered them invisible by deception,
camouflage and extensive use of dead ground
(die Leere des Gefechtfeldes). The British,
unable to locate the defenders, could not
identify the key points on which to focus their
efforts, and were compelled to bombard the
entire defensive zone. The effectiveness of the
German conception was seen at the battle of
Messines, June 1917, when during the pre-
paratory bombardment it took an average of
150 British shells to cause a single German
casualty.^
Subsequent British infantry attacks would
grind to a halt because, "the ground between
the German trench Unes would be honey-
combed with machine-gun nests and support-
ing detachments of infantry . . ."^ Their
unpredictable flanking fire and constant minor
counterstrokes (Gegenstdsse) destroyed the
cohesion of the attack. The overriding em-
phasis upon the need to seize every oppor-
tunity immediately, the basis of Schlagfertig-
keit, made it possible for the Germans to
impose their will upon the attacker, through
their ability to react more quickly and effec-
tively. In this way the Germans were able to
achieve tempo in the defense!^
"There is ample evidence to show that
without decentralisation of command the de-
velopment of the mobile defence in depth by
the Germans during 1917 would not have been
practicable."^^ The German defensive system
depended on its responsiveness to the fleeting
opportunities arising during an enemy attack.
In circumstances where orders could take up to
10 hr to travel from divisional headquarters to
the front line, a centralized system (restrictive
control), was completely ineffective. The
opportunity would have long since passed
before such a system could respond.
The Germans extensively decentralized
command during the First World War. Front
battalion commanders "were given as full a
control over their sector of the battle-area as
has a captain over his ship, and their decisions
were to be accepted, by superiors and sub-
ordinates aUke, as final and unquestioned
while the battle lasted. They not only com-
manded their own battalion, but also [the two
 Landmarks in Defense Literature
battalions of the regiment (brigade) in echelon
behind them in the regiment's defensive zone.
They also] automatically took charge of all
reinforcements which arrived in their sector,
irrespective of rank or seniority."^^ The critical
aspect of this was not the power front battalion
commanders had over their subordinates, as
these retained considerable independence, but
the freedom which the front battalion com-
manders gained by being released from the
constant control of their superiors. The situ-
ation was similar at divisional level.
The German regulations stated that "The
higher commanders must exercise self-restraint
. . . must leave subordinates latitude in making
dispositions . . . any interference in details
which is not absolutely necessary does more
harm than good."^^
Unlike the British Army, which dismissed
the trench era of the First World War, as it had
the open battlefield of the Boer War, as an
"aberration," the German Army retained and
developed its hard won experience. As a
result, Wynne could write that, "The authority
given to subordinate commanders in the Ger-
man Army by the end of the war has not only
been maintained, but, if anything, further
increased. They are now expected to change or
to modify orders given to them which events
have clearly made out of date, and are blamed
if they make dispositions, ordered perhaps by a
higher commander, which do not meet the
existing situation."^"^
Wynne identifies a final critical aspect in the
development of effective tactics: its cycHcal
nature. The Germans did not simply impose a
doctrine based on theory alone. On the con-
trary, "The development of this organisation in
depth was based almost entirely on the result
of personal observation."^^ Throughout the
war, senior German officers made a point of
visiting the front line, often at considerable
personal risk, in order to see the situation for
themselves. For example, within hours of
being appointed chief of staff of the embattled
217
Third Army in October 1915, Colonel von
Lossberg was "'running from shell-hole to
shell-hole' near the front line . . . in the most
threatened sector of the battle-field . . . There
he saw for himself the state of the position and
of the men holding it . . The contrast with
the British "chateau generals" is stark.
Throughout the war, German doctrine
evolved through a cycle of experience, gath-
ered by personal observation, modified by
theory and tested again by experience. The
experience from each battle was disseminated
through the General Staff organization, which
even held "schools" and "think tanks," that for
divisional commanders at Sedan having an
entire demonstration division. It is this cycle
which forms the central thread of Wynne's
book, with the Germans changing their system
in response to the lessons learned after each
AUied attack, and no such response from Haig.
Due weight is given to the sometimes passion-
ate disputes concerning theory among the staff
officers at OHL. In particular, he details the
disagreements as to how much freedom of
action to give to the soldiers on the ground,
based on human psychological realities, which
provides a marker for the evolution of the
doctrine.
Wynne notes the essential point that senior
German officers, including Ludendorff him-
self, were prepared to listen to officers with
ideas, regardless of their rank. Personal experi-
ence and ability were the only criteria. As
Wynne points out, "there can be little doubt
that the birth of the new defensive battle
doctrine was due to General Ludendorff's
faculty of being a ready listener to progress-
ively-minded members of his staff. "^^ Thus
the new defensive and offensive doctrines were
written by two junior staff officers. Colonel
Bauer and Captain Geyer, while Ludendorff
even went as far as issuing von Lossberg's
counterproposals as a supplement to the of-
ficial defense manual. This atmosphere in
which criticism and dissent were both per-
218 Landmarks in Defense Literature
mitted and responded to was essential for
the full development of tactical concepts. It
was this intellectual freedom which ensured
that doctrine remained fully anchored to the
realities of battle. By contrast, the British
appear to have regarded high rank as the prime
qualification for having ideas accepted.
Wynne's book was developed from his con-
flicts as a researcher for the British Official
Military Histories between 1918 and 1956 and
from a series of articles which appeared in the
British Army Quarterly between 1937 and
1939.^^ In these articles, Wynne sought to
demonstrate that serious dysfunction had
occurred when the British Army attempted to
adopt the German defensive system in the
winter of 1917-1918. He claimed that the
British had copied out-of-date captured Ger-
man manuals, without any understanding of
the philosophical tactical concepts upon which
the system was based. The result had been a
fatal dispersion of forces in static locations,
with none of the aggressive dynamism of the
German original. This error had resulted in the
disasters of March 1918, but had not been
identified. Indeed, the British misconception
was preserved in Field Service Regulations
(1935) and in French military theory. Wynne
believed that this meant that British and
French tactics were completely inadequate to
cope with a mobile opponent, such as the
German Wehrmacht; and this proved to be the
case in May 1940.
It may at first sight appear curious to
recommend this book to those concerned with
the defense of NATO's Central Front. After
all, one might ask, what relevance has an
analysis of the development of German de-
fensive doctrine during the First World War
for modern armored warfare? Much, in every
way. The British Army is once again in the
situation of attempting to adopt a maneuver-
orientated defense doctrine from the Germans.
Once again, it seems to be trying to copy a
system which it does not understand. Thus
Wynne's arguments appear to be as valid
today as they were 50 years ago. It is time
to take note.
MARTIN SAMUELS
Department of Military Studies
Victoria University of Manchester
Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, UK
NOTES
1. Captain G. C. Wynne, If Germany Attacks: the Battle
in Depth in the West, p. 293.
2. It is important to note that British terminology
regarding the counterattack is the reverse of the
German, which is used here. The German term
Gegenstoss ("immediate counterstroke") equates to
the British "local counterattack," while the German
Gegenangriff ("deliberate counterattack") equates to
the British "counterstroke." However, the German
Gegenstoss implies an immediate and spontaneous
action carried out without direct orders from above or
advanced planning. This concept appears to be foreign
to the British "local counterattack," which is therefore
more like the German Gegenangriff.
3. Wynne, // Germany Attacks, p. 295.
4. Wynne, // Germany Attacks, p. 129.
5. Wynne, // Germany Attacks, p. 149.
6. Wynne, // Germany Attacks, p. 61.
7. Calculated from 40 casualties per day in regimental
sector receiving 6000 shells daily. Wynne, If Germany
Attacks, p. 268.
8. Wynne, / / Germany Attacks, p. 249.
9. M. EUiott-Bateman, S. Fitzgibbon and M. Samuels,
Vocabulary: the second problem of military reform.
Part one: concepts. Unpublished article.
10. Captain G. C. Wynne, The legacy. Army Quarterly
39(1), 26 (1939).
11. Wynne, // Germany Attacks, p. 125.
12. Wynne, // Germany Attacks, p. 126.
13. Captain G. C. Wynne, The chain of command. Army
Quarterly 36(1), 31 (1938).
14. Wynne, The chain of command, p. 30.
15. Wynne, // Germany Attacks, p. 127.
16. Wynne, // Germany Attacks, p. 92.
17. Wynne, The legacy, p. 19.
18. Captain G. C. Wynne, The development of the
German defensive battle in 1917 and its influence on
British defensive tactics. Part I. Army Quarterly 34(1),
15-32 (1937); Captain G. C. Wynne, The development
of the German defensive battle in 1917 and its
influence on British defensive tactics. Part II: the
counter-attack divisions. Army Quarterly 34(2), 248-
292 (1937); Captain G. C. Wynne, The development
of the German defensive battle in 1917 and its
influence on British defensive tactics. Part III: field
service regulations (1935). Army Quarterly 35(1), 14-
27 (1937); Captain G. C. Wynne, The British attack
 Landmarks in Defense Literature 219
from Monchy-le-Preux on the 14th of April, 1917, and (1939); Captain G. C. Wynne, The Wotan Position.
commentary. Army Quarterly 36(1), 248-264 (1938); Army Quarterly 38(2), 227-250 (1939); Captain G. C.
Captain G. C. Wynne, The chain of command. Army Wynne, The legacy. Army Quarterly 39(1), 17-33
Quarterly 36(1), 23-37 (1938); Captain G. C. Wynne, (1939).
The Hindenburg Line. Army Quarterly 37(2), 205-228