CH A P T E R F I V E

Taqiyya: War and Deceit in Islam

R aymond Ibrahim

Today, at a time of wars and rumors of wars emanating from the Islamic
world—from the perpetual Arab-Israeli conf lict, to the saber-rattling of
nuclear-armed Pakistan and soon-to-be Iran, to the myriad and unnamed
jihadis who daily promise “infidels” death and destruction—the need for
non-Muslims to better understand Islam’s doctrines and objectives concern-
ing war and peace, and everything in between (e.g., treaties) has become
pressing. For instance, what does one make of the fact that, after openly and
vociferously making it clear time and time again that its ultimate aspiration
is to see Israel annihilated, an Islamist organization like Hamas also pursues
“peace treaties,” insisting on various forms of concessions from Israel—and
receives them? Moreover, even if the “true” nature of Islam were peaceful,
that would not change the fact that some Muslims will assume, and therefore
act upon the notion, that Islam does preach jihadi violence. In other words,
many apologists for Islam concede that the “radical” interpretation is still that,
an interpretation, albeit a f lawed one, that “hijacks” the true Islam. And since
that is the case, since “radical Islam,” whether the true face of Islam or not, is
still nonetheless a viable alternative for some, the West must conclude that it
will have violent jihadist enemies for the foreseeable future.
Before being in a position to assess the policy ramifications of such issues,
one must first appreciate the thoroughly legalistic nature of mainstream Islam.1
For all the talk that Islam is constantly being “misunderstood” or “misinter-
preted” by “radicals,” the fact is, relative to most other religions, Islam is a
clearly defined faith admitting of little ambiguity: indeed, according to sha-
riah (i.e., “Islam’s way of life,” more commonly translated as “Islamic law”),
every conceivable human act is categorized as either forbidden, discouraged,
permissible, recommended, or obligatory. “Common sense” and “univer-
sal opinion” are of little relevance to Islam’s notions of right and wrong. 2

E. D. Patterson et al. (eds.), Debating the War of Ideas

© Eric D. Patterson and John Gallagher 2009
68 Raymond Ibrahim
All that matters is what Allah (via the Quran) and his prophet Muhammad
(through the hadith) said about a subject, and how Islam’s greatest theologians
and jurists—collectively known as the ulema (the “ones who know”)—have
articulated it.
Consider the concept of deceit. According to shariah, deception is not only
permitted in certain situations but is deemed obligatory. Contrary to early
Christian tradition, for instance, Muslims who were forced to choose between
recanting Islam or suffering persecution were—and still are—permitted to lie
by feigning apostasy. Other jurists have decreed that, according to Quranic
verses forbidding Muslims from being instrumental in their own deaths, 3
Muslims are obligated to lie in order to preserve themselves.4

The Doctrine of Taqiyya

This is the classic definition of the doctrine of taqiyya. Based on an Arabic

word denoting “fear,” taqiyya has long been understood, especially by Western
academics, as “religious dissimulation” to be resorted to in times of religious
persecution, almost exclusively by minority Shi’i groups living among hos-
tile Sunni majorities, wherein the Shi’a constantly dissemble their religious
affiliation vis-à-vis the latter. However, a closer examination of the doctrinal
justifications of taqiyya reveals a much broader application.
Taqiyya’s ubiquity is well demonstrated by the opening words of one of the
few authoritative books devoted to the subject, Al-Taqiyya fi’l Islam, written
by Professor Sami Mukaram.

Taqiyya [“religious dissimulation”] is of fundamental importance in Islam.

Practically every Islamic sect agrees to it and practices it . . . We can go so
far as to say that the practice of taqiyya is mainstream in Islam, and that
those few sects not practicing it diverge from the mainstream . . . Taqiyya
is very prevalent in Islamic politics, especially in the modern era.5

Thus just as taqiyya is not limited to self-preservation (as will be delin-

eated later on), so too is it not an exclusively Shi’i phenomenon. Of course,
as a minority group often interspersed among a Sunni majority, Shi’a have
historically had more reason to dissemble. Due to centuries of this, taqiyya
has become “a pattern of behavior permitted by Iranian mores. In Iran it is
accordingly not merely a religious principle among the Shi’ites, but it is also a
social institution.”6 Revered Shi’i imam Ja’far as-Sadiq is on record as saying,
“He is most excellent in the performance of his religious duties in the eyes of
Allah who is best at observing taqiyya.” 7
Unlike the Shi’a, the Sunnis have historically had little reason to dissemble.
From the start, Sunni Islam, under the “righteous caliphs,” burst out of Arabia
subjugating much of southwest Asia, all of north Africa, and parts of Europe,