WEE vs. TANKIANSEE G.R. No. 171124, February 13, 2008 NACHURA, J.

:
January 19, 2017Uncategorized
FACTS:

Petitioner Wee has money placements totaling to more than P210M with the Wincorp, to which,
respondent Tansiankee is a vice president and director.

Wincorp extended a loan equal to petitioner’s total money placement to a corporation, Power Merge,
with a subscribed capital of only P37.5M.

This credit facility originated from another loan of about P1.5B extended by Wincorp to another
corporation [Hottick Holdings]. When the latter defaulted in its obligation, Wincorp instituted a case
against it and its surety. Settlement was, however, reached in which Hottick’s president, Virata, assumed
the obligation of the surety.

Under the scheme agreed upon by Wincorp and Hottick’s president, petitioner’s money placements
were transferred without his knowledge and consent to the loan account of Power Merge through an
agreement that virtually freed the latter of any liability. Allegedly, through the false representations of
Wincorp and its officers and directors, petitioner was enticed to roll over his placements so that
Wincorp could loan the same to Virata/Power Merge.

Finding that Virata purportedly used Power Merge as a conduit and connived with Wincorp’s officers
and directors to fraudulently obtain for his benefit without any intention of paying the said placements,
petitioner instituted suit for damages with the RTC Manila. Respondent was impleaded in the complaint
as one of the defendants.

On the basis of the allegations in the complaint and the Affidavit of petitioner, RTC ordered the issuance
of a writ of preliminary attachment against the properties not exempt from execution of all the
defendants subject to petitioner’s filing of a P50M-bond. The writ was consequently issued.

Arguing that the writ was improperly issued and that the bond furnished was grossly insufficient,
respondent moved for the discharge of the attachment.

The other defendants likewise filed similar motions. RTC denied all the motions. The defendants,
including respondent filed their respective motions for reconsideration but the trial court likewise
denied the same.

Incidentally, while respondent opted not to question anymore the said orders, his co-defendants, Virata
and UEM-MARA Philippines Corporation (UEM-MARA), assailed the same via certiorari under Rule 65
before the CA. CA, however, denied it and the motion for reconsideration thereon.

In a petition for review on certiorari before SC, the latter denied the petition and affirmed the CA rulings
for Virata’s and UEM-MARA’s failure to sufficiently show that the appellate court committed any
reversible error.
Respondent filed before the trial court another Motion to Discharge Attachment, re-pleading the
grounds he raised in his first motion but raising the following additional grounds: (1) that he was not
present in Wincorp’s board meetings approving the questionable transactions; and (2) that he could not
have connived with Wincorp and the other defendants because he and Pearlbank Securities, Inc., in
which he is a major stockholder, filed cases against the company as they were also victimized by its
fraudulent schemes.

Ruling that the grounds raised were already passed upon by it in the previous orders affirmed by the CA
and SC, and that the additional grounds were respondent’s affirmative defenses that properly pertained
to the merits of the case, RTC denied the motion.

With the denial of his motion for reconsideration, respondent filed a certiorari petition before the CA
where the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision reversing and setting aside the
aforementioned orders of the RTC and lifting the Writ of Preliminary Attachment to the extent that it
concerned respondent’s properties. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the said ruling, but the
CA denied the same. Hence, petitioner filed a petiton for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the
SC.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA was correct in lifting the writ of preliminary attachment against respondent based on
additional ground that allegedly pertains already to the merits of the main action, i.e., lack of factual
circumstances of fraud.

HELD:

YES. Section 1(d) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court which pertinently reads:

Section 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue.-At the commencement of the action or at any time
before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have the property of the adverse party
attached as security for the aatisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in the following cases:

x x x x
(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the
obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the performance thereof.

For a writ to issue under this rule, the applicant must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the
alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the debtor’s mere non-payment of the
debt or failure to comply with his obligation. The applicant must then be able to demonstrate that the
debtor has intended to defraud the creditor.

In the instant case, petitioner’s Affidavit is bereft of any factual statement that respondent committed a
fraud. The affidavit narrated only the alleged fraudulent transaction between Wincorp and Virata and/or
Power Merge, by which SC affirmed the writ of attachment issued against the latter.
As to the participation of respondent in the said transaction, the affidavit merely states that respondent,
an officer and director of Wincorp, connived with the other defendants to defraud petitioner of his
money placements. No other factual averment or circumstance detailing how respondent committed a
fraud or how he connived with the other defendants to commit a fraud in the transaction sued upon. In
other words, petitioner has not shown any specific act or deed to support the allegation that respondent
is guilty of fraud.

The affidavit, being the foundation of the writ, must contain such particulars as to how the fraud
imputed to respondent was committed for the court to decide whether or not to issue the writ. Absent
any statement of other factual circumstances to show that respondent, at the time of contracting the
obligation, had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay, or without any showing of how respondent
committed the alleged fraud, the general averment in the affidavit that respondent is an officer and
director of Wincorp who allegedly connived with the other defendants to commit a fraud, is insufficient
to support the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.

In the application for the writ under the said ground, compelling is the need to give a hint about what
constituted the fraud and how it was perpetrated because established is the rule that fraud is never
presumed.

Verily, the mere fact that respondent is an officer and director of the company does not necessarily give
rise to the inference that he committed a fraud or that he connived with the other defendants to
commit a fraud. While under certain circumstances, courts may treat a corporation as a mere
aggroupment of persons, to whom liability will directly attach, this is only done when the wrongdoing
has been clearly and convincingly established.

Considering that petitioner has not fully satisfied the legal obligation to show the specific acts
constitutive of the alleged fraud committed by respondent, the trial court acted in excess of its
jurisdiction when it issued the writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of respondent.

The merits of the main action are not triable in a motion to discharge an attachment otherwise an
applicant for the dissolution could force a trial of the merits of the case on his motion.

However, the principle finds no application here because petitioner has not yet fulfilled the
requirements set by the Rules of Court for the issuance of the writ against the properties of respondent.
The evil sought to be prevented by the said ruling will not arise, because the propriety or impropriety of
the issuance of the writ in this case can be determined by simply reading the complaint and the affidavit
in support of the application.

ANITA MANGILA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LORETA GUINA, respondents.

G.R. No. 125027. August 12, 2002

CARPIO, J.:
Petitioner Anita Mangila, a resident of Pampanga, is a single proprietor exporting sea foods and doing
business under the name and style of Seafoods Products. Private respondent Loreta Guina is single
proprietor providing freight forwarding service doing business as Air Swift International, with office
address in Pasay.
Mangila contracted the freight forwarding services of Guina for shipment of sea food products to Guam
where Mangila maintains an outlet. Mangila agreed to pay Guina cash on delivery.
On the first shipment, Mangila requested for seven days within which to pay Guina. However, for the next
three shipments, Mangila failed to pay Guina the shipping charges.
Despite several demands, Mangila never paid Guina. Thus, Guina filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City a case for collection of sum of money.
Mangila filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue. Guina’s invoice for the freight
forwarding service stipulates that if court litigation becomes necessary to enforce collection, the agreed
venue for such action is Makati.
Guina filed an Opposition asserting that although Makati appears as the stipulated venue, the same was
merely an inadvertence by the printing press. Moreover, Guina claimed that Mangila knew that Guina was
holding office in Pasay City and not in Makati.
The trial court, finding credence in private respondents assertion, denied the Motion to Dismiss and
allowed the case to proceed.
The trial court thereafter ruled in favor of Guina, ordering Mangila to pay her outstanding balance.

ISSUE: W/N there was improper venue.

RULING: Yes.
The case should be dismissed for improper venue, but not for the reason stated by Mangila.
Mangila raised the issue of improper venue due to the stipulation in the invoice that any litigation’s agreed
venue is Makati. However, the stipulation does not limit the venue exclusively to Makati.
Nevertheless, Pasay is not the proper venue for this case.
Under the Rules of Court, venue in personal actions is where the defendant or any of the defendants
resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the
plaintiff. The exception to this rule is when the parties agree on an exclusive venue other than the places
mentioned in the rules. But, as discussed, this exception is not applicable in this case. Hence, following
the general rule, the case may be brought in the place of residence of the plaintiff or defendant, at the
election of the plaintiff.
In the instant case, the residence of Guina was not alleged in the complaint. Rather, what was alleged was
the postal address of her sole proprietorship, Air Swift International. It was only during trial that she
mentioned her residence to be in Paranaque City.
In the instant case, it was established in the lower court that petitioner resides in San Fernando,
Pampanga while private respondent resides in Paranaque City. However, this case was brought in Pasay
City, where the business of Guina is found. This would have been permissible had Guina’s business been
a corporation. However, as Guina admitted in her Complaint in the trial court, her business is a sole
proprietorship, and as such, does not have a separate juridical personality that could enable it to file a suit
in court. In fact, there is no law authorizing sole proprietorships to file a suit in court.
A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality separate and distinct from the personality
of the owner of the enterprise. The law merely recognizes the existence of a sole proprietorship as a form
of business organization conducted for profit by a single individual and requires its proprietor or owner to
secure licenses and permits, register its business name, and pay taxes to the national government. The
law does not vest a separate legal personality on the sole proprietorship or empower it to file or defend
an action in court.[42]

Thus, not being vested with legal personality to file this case, Air Swift International is not the plaintiff in
this case but rather Loreta Guina in her personal capacity.

Wack Wack vs. Won G.R. No. L-23851 March 26, 1976

Facts:

Won claims ownership of a membership fee certificate at Wack Wack Golf & Country Club. By virtue of a
civil case, he was issued such certificate. But a certain Tan also claims ownership over such certificate
pursuant to an assignment made by the alleged true owner of the same certificate. Thus, Wack Wack filed
a complaint to interplead Won and Tan to litigate their conflicting claims. Trial court dismissed the
complaint on the ground of res judicata by reason of the previous civil case that issued Won the right to
the certificate.

Issue: WON Wack Wack is barred to file an interpleader suit.

Held: Yes.

As to the subject matter (Membership fee certificate), there is no question that such is proper for an
interpleader suit. However, the instant interpleader suit cannot prosper because Wack Wack had already
been made independently liable in the previous civil case wherein Won had established his rights to the
certificate and, therefore, its present application for interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack
upon the final judgment in the civil case. Being so, this interpleader suit, if granted, would compel Won to
establish his rights anew, and thereby increase instead of diminish litigations, which is one of the purposes
of an interpleader suit. And because Wack Wack allowed itself to be sued to final judgment in the said
case, its action of interpleader was filed inexcusably late, for which reason it is barred by laches or
unreasonable delay.

HILARION M. HENARES, JR., et al. vs. LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY
BOARD (LTFRB devotions) et al.

G.R. No. 158290 October 23, 2006

FACTS

Citing statistics from National and International agencies, petitioners prayed for a writ of mandamus
commanding respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to
use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel. Petitioners allege that the particulate matters
(PM) – complex mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets, varying in sizes and compositions
emitted into the air from various engine combustions – have caused detrimental effects on health,
productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of life. In addition, they allege that with the
continuing high demand for motor vehicles, the energy and transport sectors are likely to remain the
major sources of harmful emissions. They cited studies showing that vehicular emissions in Metro
Manila have resulted to the prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases (COPD); that
pulmonary tuberculosis is highest among jeepney drivers; and that the children in Metro Manila showed
more compromised pulmonary function than their rural counterparts. Petitioners infer that these are
mostly due to the emissions of PUVs.

Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition for a writ of
mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section
16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution, in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. and Section 414 of Republic Act No.
8749 otherwise known as the “Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999.”

Petitioners insist that since it is the LTFRB and the DOTC that are the government agencies clothed with
power to regulate and control motor vehicles, particularly PUVs, and with the same agencies’ awareness
and knowledge that the PUVs emit dangerous levels of air pollutants, then, the responsibility to see that
these are curbed falls under respondents’ functions and a writ of mandamus should issue against them.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General said that the respondent government agencies, the DOTC and
the LTFRB, are not in a position to compel the PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel. He explained that the
function of the DOTC is limited to implementing the emission standards set forth in Rep. Act No. 8749
and the said law only goes as far as setting the maximum limit for the emission of vehicles, but it does
not recognize CNG as alternative engine fuel. He recommended that the petition should be addressed to
Congress for it to come up with a policy that would compel the use of CNG as alternative fuel.

ISSUES

1. Whether the respondent is the agency responsible to implement the suggested alternative of
requiring public utility vehicles to use compressed natural gas (cng)
2. Whether the respondent can be compelled to require public utility vehicles to use compressed
natural gas through a writ of mandamus

RULING

1. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty.
Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of
motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii),
Section 4 “to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or
franchises to operators of NGVs based on the results of the DOTC surveys.”
In addition, under the Clean Air Act, it is the DENR that is tasked to set the emission standards for fuel
use and the task of developing an action plan. As far as motor vehicles are concerned, it devolves upon
the DOTC and the line agency whose mandate is to oversee that motor vehicles prepare an action plan
and implement the emission standards for motor vehicles, namely the LTFRB.

2. No. Petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty on
respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for
public utility vehicles. The legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the
complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by
mandamus is taken.

In addition, the petition had been mooted by the issuance of Executive Order No. 290, which
implemented a program on the use of CNG by public vehicles. The court was assured that the
implementation for a cleaner environment is being addressed.

HILARION M. HENARES v. LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING, GR NO. 158290, 2006-10-23

Facts:
issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory
Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require public
utility vehicles (PUVs) to use... compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.
the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the National Capital Region,[2] a study of the Asian
Development Bank,[3]... the Manila Observatory[4] and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources[5] (DENR) on the high growth and low turnover in vehicle ownership in the Philippines,
including diesel-powered vehicles, two-stroke engine powered... motorcycles and their concomitant
emission of air pollutants, petitioners attempt to present a compelling case for judicial action against the
bane of air pollution and related environmental hazards.
petitioners propose the use of CNG.
CNG is a natural gas comprised mostly of methane which although containing small amounts of propane
and butane,... is... colorless and odorless and considered the cleanest fossil fuel because it produces
much less pollutants than coal and petroleum;
Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition for a writ of
mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16,[12]
Article II of the 1987 Constitution, our ruling in
Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,[13] and Section 4[14] of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the
"Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999."... motion to implead the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) as additional respondent.
writ of mandamus is not the correct remedy since the writ may be issued only to command a tribunal,
corporation, board or person to... do an act that is required to be done, when he or it unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to...
which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.[15] Further citing existing jurisprudence, the Solicitor General explains that in contrast to
a discretionary act, a ministerial act,... which a mandamus is, is one in which an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to a mandate of legal authority,
without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of an act done.
nothing in Rep. Act No. 8749 that petitioners invoke, prohibits the use of gasoline and diesel by owners
of motor vehicles... does not even mention the existence of CNG as... alternative fuel and avers that
unless this law is amended to provide CNG as alternative fuel for PUVs, the respondents cannot propose
that PUVs use CNG as alternative fuel.
DENR that is tasked to implement Rep. Act No. 8749 and not the LTFRB nor the DOTC.
respondents possess the administrative and regulatory powers to implement measures in accordance
with the policies and principles mandated by Rep. Act No. 8749, specifically Section 2[18] and Section
21.[
Issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS HAVE THE PERSONALITY TO BRING THE PRESENT ACTION
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESENT ACTION IS SUPPORTED BY LAW
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT IS THE AGENCY RESPONSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT THE SUGGESTED
ALTERNATIVE OF REQUIRING PUBLIC UTILITY VEHICLES TO USE COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS (CNG)
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CAN BE COMPELLED TO REQUIRE PUBLIC UTILITY VEHICLES TO USE
COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS THROUGH A WRIT OF MANDAMUS[20]
Ruling:
There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their case before this Court. Even
respondents do not question their standing. This petition focuses on one fundamental legal right of
petitioners, their right to clean air.
We brush aside this issue of technicality under the principle of the... transcendental importance to the
public, especially so if these cases demand that they be settled promptly.
We also said, it is clearly the duty of the responsible government agencies to advance the said... right.
there is an executive order implementing a program on the use of CNG by public vehicles. Executive
Order No. 290, entitled Implementing the Natural Gas Vehicle Program for Public Transport (NGVPPT),
took effect on
February 24, 2004.
A thorough reading of the executive order assures us that implementation for a cleaner environment...
is being addressed. To a certain extent, the instant petition had been mooted by the issuance of E.O.
No. 290.
he plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus
commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing.
Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by... law as a duty
Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor
vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 "to
grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public
Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs based on the results of the DOTC surveys."...
mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious
reason that neither is inferior to the other
The need for future changes in both legislation and its implementation cannot be preempted by...
orders from this Court, especially when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with
and courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that we give sufficient time and leeway for the coequal
branches to address by themselves the environmental problems raised in... this petition.
It appears to us that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to
the complex... environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by
mandamus is taken.
Principles:
people the right to breathe clean air in a healthy environment
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies under any of the following cases: (1) against any
tribunal which unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty;
(2) in case any corporation, board or person unlawfully... neglects the performance of an act which the
law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; and (3) in case any tribunal, corporation,
board or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
such other is legally... entitled; and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
Section 3 of E.O. No. 290, consistent with E.O. No. 66, series of 2002, designated the DOE as the lead
agency (a) in developing the natural gas industry of the country with the DENR, through... the EMB and
(b) in formulating emission standards for CNG. Most significantly, par. 4.5, Section 4 tasks the DOTC,
working with the DOE, to develop an implementation plan for "a gradual shift to CNG fuel utilization in
PUVs and promote NGVs [natural gas vehicles] in Metro Manila... and Luzon through the issuance of
directives/orders providing preferential franchises in present day major routes and exclusive franchises
to NGVs in newly opened routes..." A thorough reading of the executive order assures us that
implementation for a cleaner environment... is being addressed. To a certain extent, the instant petition
had been mooted by the issuance of E.O. No. 290.
Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by... law as a duty. Here,
there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles
to use CNG.
twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice" in Oposa,[28] where
we upheld the right of future
Filipinos to prevent the destruction of the rainforests, so do we recognize, in this petition, the right of
petitioners and the future generation to clean air. In Oposa we said that if the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is now explicitly found in the
Constitution even if the right is "assumed to exist from the inception of humankind,... it is because of the
well-founded fear of its framers [of the Constitution] that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too
far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also... for those to come. . .
Henares v LTFRB (Environmental Law)
Henares v LTFRB

GR No. 158290

October 23, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as
alternative fuel.

ISSUES:

(1) Do petitioners have legal personality to bring this petition before us?

(2) Should mandamus issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel?

APPLICABLE LAWS:

• Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution

The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
• Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999." SEC.
4. Recognition of Rights. – Pursuant to the above-declared principles, the following rights of citizens are
hereby sought to be recognized and the State shall seek to guarantee their enjoyment:

a) The right to breathe clean air;

b) The right to utilize and enjoy all natural resources according to the principle of sustainable
development;

c) The right to participate in the formulation, planning, implementation and monitoring of

environmental policies and programs and in the decision-making process;

d) The right to participate in the decision-making process concerning development policies, plans and
programs, projects or activities that may have adverse impact on the environment and public health;

e) The right to be informed of the nature and extent of the potential hazard of any activity, undertaking
or project and to be served timely notice of any significant rise in the level of pollution and the
accidental or deliberate release into the atmosphere of harmful or hazardous substances;

f) The right of access to public records which a citizen may need to exercise his or her rights effectively
under this Act;

g) The right to bring action in court or quasi-judicial bodies to enjoin all activities in violation of
environmental laws and regulations, to compel the rehabilitation and cleanup of affected area, and to
seek the imposition of penal sanctions against violators of environmental laws; and

h) The right to bring action in court for compensation of personal damages resulting from the adverse
environmental and public health impact of a project or activity.

RULING:

(1) YES. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their case before this Court.
Moreover, as held previously, a party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which
may, in the exercise of the Court's discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the issue raised.
We brush aside this issue of technicality under the principle of the transcendental importance to the
public, especially so if these cases demand that they be settled promptly.

(2) NO. plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus
commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to
compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates
the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. Mandamus will
not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that
neither is inferior to the other.
It appears that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the
complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus
is taken.

Calleja vs Panday GR No 168696 28 February 2006

11MondayJUL 2016

POSTED BY RACHEL CHAN IN CASE DIGESTS, REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 2

≈ LEAVE A COMMENT
Facts: Jose Pierre Panday, with the aid of 14 armed men usurped the powers which supposedly
belonged to respondents (Calleja, Tabora, et al) and took away the daily hospital collection from St. John
Hospital in Naga City. Calleja, et al filed a petition with the RTC of San Jose, Camarines Sur for quo
warranto with Damages and Prayer for Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction, Damages and Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order against Panday, et al.
“On May 24, 2005, RTC-Br. 58 issued an Order transferring the case to the Regional Trial Court in Naga
City. According to RTC-Br. 58, since the verified petition showed petitioners therein (herein respondents)
to be residents of Naga City, then pursuant to Section 7, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
action for quo warranto should be brought in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area where the respondents or any of the respondents resides. However, the Executive Judge
of RTC, Naga City refused to receive the case folder of the subject case for quo warranto, stating that
improper venue is not a ground for transferring a quo warranto case to another administrative
jurisdiction.”
The RTC-Br. 58 then proceeded to issue and serve summons.

On July 13, 2005, RTC-Br. 58 issued the assailed Order, the pertinent portions of which read as follows:

“It is undisputed that the plaintiffs cause of action involves controversies arising out of intra-corporate
relations, between and among stockholders, members or associates of the St. John Hospital Inc. which
originally under PD 902-A approved on March 11, 1976 is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the Securities and Exchange Commission to try and decide in addition to its regulatory and adjudicated
functions (Section 5, PD 902-A). Upon the advent of RA 8799 approved on July 19, 2000, otherwise
known as the Securities and Regulation Code, the Commissions jurisdiction over all cases enumerated in
Section 5, Presidential Decree 902-A were transferred []to the Court of general jurisdiction or the
appropriate Regional Trial Court with a proviso that the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority
may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases.
Pursuant to this mandate of RA 8799, the Supreme Court in the exercise of said mandated authority,
promulgated on November 21, 2000, A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC which took effect 15 December 2000
designated certain branches of the Regional Trial Court to try and decide Securities and Exchange
Commission Cases arising within their respective territorial jurisdiction with respect to the National
Capital Region and within the respective provinces in the First to Twelve Judicial Region. Accordingly, in
the Province of Camarines Sur, (Naga City) RTC Branch 23 presided by the Hon. Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr. was
designated as special court (Section 1, A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC).
Subsequently, on January 23, 2001, supplemental Administrative Circular No. 8-01 which took effect on
March 1, 2001 was issued by the Supreme Court which directed that all SEC cases originally assigned or
transmitted to the regular Regional Trial Court shall be transferred to branches of the Regional Trial
Court specially designated to hear such cases in accordance with A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC.
Xxx
In the light of the above-noted observations and discussion, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED pursuant to
the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies (A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC) which mandates
that motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading (Section 8) and in consonance with Administrative Order
8-01 of the Supreme Court dated March 1, 2001, this case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional
Trial Court Branch 23, Naga City which under A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC has been designated as special court
to try and decide intra-corporate controversies under R.A. 8799.”
Issue: “WHETHER A BRANCH OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WHICH HAS NO JURISDICTION TO TRY AND
DECIDE A CASE HAS AUTHORITY TO REMAND THE SAME TO ANOTHER CO-EQUAL COURT IN ORDER TO
CURE THE DEFECTS ON VENUE AND JURISDICTION.”
Decision: “Evidently, the RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur is bereft of jurisdiction over respondents
petition for quo warranto. Based on the allegations in the petition, the case was clearly one involving an
intra-corporate dispute. The trial court should have been aware that under R.A. No. 8799 and the
aforementioned administrative issuances of this Court, RTC-Br. 58 was never designated as a Special
Commercial Court; hence, it was never vested with jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the
SEC.
Such being the case, RTC-Br. 58 did not have the requisite authority or power to order the transfer of the
case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the
matter was to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.”

Quinagoran vs. CA Case Digest

0
● The doctrine that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with the RTC regardless
of the value of the property -- no longer holds true. As things now stand, a distinction must be made
between those properties the assessed value of which is below P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila;
and P50,000.00, if within. A complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the
complaint or the interest thereon to determine jurisdiction.

● Jurisdiction of the court does not depend upon the answer of the defendant or even upon agreement,
waiver or acquiescence of the parties.

************

Facts:

The heirs of Juan dela Cruz filed a complaint for recovery of a parcel of land with damages before RTC of
Cagayan against Quinagoran.

Quinagoran filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case under R.A.
No. 7691, which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC to include all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein which does not exceed
P20,000.00. He argued that since the 346 sq m lot which he owns adjacent to the contested property has
an assessed value of P1,730, the assessed value of the lot under controversy would not be more than the
said amount.

The RTC denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the basis that the action is accion publicciana and
therefore, its jurisdiction lies in the RTC, regardless of the value of the property. The CA affirmed decision
of the RTC.
Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court claiming that under RA 7691, the jurisdiction falls in the MTC.
He likewise avers that it is an indispensable requirement that the complaint should allege the assessed
value of the property involved. The complaint does not alleged that the assessed value of the land in
question is more than P20,000.00. There was also no tax declaration attached to the complaint to show
the assessed value of the property. Respondents, therefore, failed to alleged that the RTC has jurisdiction
over the case.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of possession regardless of the value
of the property involved?

2. Whether the complaint must allege the assessed value of the property

Held:

1. No. The doctrine that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with the RTC regardless
of the value of the property -- no longer holds true. As things now stand, a distinction must be made
between those properties the assessed value of which is below P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and
P50,000.00, if within.

Republic Act No. 7691 expressly provides:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where
the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except for forcible
entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

In Atuel v. Valdez (G.R. No. 139561, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 517), the Court likewise expressly stated
that: Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is vested in a court of general jurisdiction. Specifically, the
regional trial court exercises exclusive original jurisdiction “in all civil actions which involve x x x possession
of real property.” However, if the assessed value of the real property involved does not exceed P50,000.00
in Metro Manila, and P20,000.00 outside of Metro Manila, the municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction
over actions to recover possession of real property.

2. Yes. In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must allege the assessed value
of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has
jurisdiction over the action. This is because the nature of the action and which court has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type
of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether
the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein.

RUBEN SANTOS v. SPS. TONY AYON AND MERCY AYON, GR NO. 137013, 2005-05-06
Facts:
Ruben Santos, petitioner, filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Davao City a
complaint for illegal detainer against spouses Tony and Mercy Ayon, respondents,... petitioner averred
that he is the registered owner of three lots situated at Lanzona Subdivision, Matina, Davao City,
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 108174, 108175, and 108176. Respondent spouses
are the registered owners of an adjacent... parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-247792. The previous
occupant of this property built a building which straddled both the lots of the herein parties.
Respondents have been using the building as a warehouse.
Petitioner further alleged in his complaint that in 1985, when he bought the three lots, he informed
respondents that the building occupies a portion of his land. However, he allowed them to continue
using the building. But in 1996, he needed the entire portion of his lot,... hence, he demanded that
respondents demolish and remove the part of the building encroaching his property and turn over to
him their possession. But they refused. Instead, they continued occupying the contested portion and
even made improvements on the building. The dispute was... then referred to the barangay lupon, but
the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.
respondents sought a dismissal of this case on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over it since
there is no lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. Respondents denied they were occupying
petitioner's property by mere tolerance, claiming they... own the contested portion and have been
occupying the same long before petitioner acquired his lots in 1985.
The RTC upheld the finding of the MTCC that respondents' occupation... of the contested portion was by
mere tolerance. Hence, when petitioner needed the same, he has the right to eject them through court
action.
Petitioner contends that it is not necessary that he has prior physical possession of the questioned
property before he could file an action for unlawful detainer. He stresses that he tolerated respondents"
occupancy of the portion in controversy until he needed it. After his... demand that they vacate, their
continued possession became illegal. Hence, his action for unlawful detainer before the MTCC is proper.
Respondents, in their comment, insisted that they have been in possession of the disputed property
even before petitioner purchased the same on April 10, 1985. Hence, he cannot claim that they were
occupying the property by mere tolerance because they were ahead in time in... physical possession.
Issues:
The sole issue here is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law in holding that
petitioner's complaint is within the competence of the RTC, not the MTCC.
Ruling:
It is an elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations of the complaint and cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or
pleadings filed by the defendant.[6] This rule is no... different in an action for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer.[7] All actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed with the proper Metropolitan
Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, which actions... shall
include not only the plea for restoration of possession but also all claims for damages and costs arising
therefrom.[8] The said courts are not divested of jurisdiction over such cases even if the defendants
therein raises the question of ownership... over the litigated property in his pleadings and the question
of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership.[9]
Under the above provision, there are two entirely distinct and different causes of action, to wit: (1) a
case for forcible entry, which is an action to recover possession of a property from the defendant whose
occupation thereof is illegal from the beginning as he acquired... possession by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth; and (2) a case for unlawful detainer, which is an action for recovery of
possession from defendant whose possession of the property was inceptively lawful by virtue of a
contract (express or implied) with the... plaintiff, but became illegal when he continued his possession
despite the termination of his right thereunder.
Petitioner's complaint for unlawful detainer in Civil Case No. 3506-B-96 is properly within the
competence of the MTCC.
Verily, petitioner's allegations in his complaint clearly make a case for an unlawful detainer. We find no
error in the MTCC assuming jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint. A complaint for unlawful detainer is
sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of the possession or... the refusal to vacate is unlawful
without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.[12] Here, there is an allegation in petitioner's
complaint that respondents occupancy on the portion of his property is by virtue of his tolerance.
Petitioner's... cause of action for unlawful detainer springs from respondents' failure to vacate the
questioned premises upon his demand sometime in 1996. Within one (1) year therefrom, or on
November 6, 1996, petitioner filed the instant complaint.
It bears stressing that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful when the
possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by the owner. Our ruling in Roxas vs. Court
of Appeals[13] is applicable in this... case: "A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against... him."

AMELIA S. ROBERTS, petitioner vs. MARTIN B. PAPIO, respondent

G.R. No. 166714, February 9, 2007 | Callejo, Sr., J. kam

TOPIC: Sale distinguished from other contracts – Equitable mortgage

SUMMARY: Sps. Papio needed money to redeem subject property so they executed Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of Roberts. They then executed a 2-year lease subject to renewal. However Sps. Papio failed
to pay monthly rentals (after expiration of lease), and after 2 demand letters, Roberts instituted unlawful
detained against Sps. Papio. Sps. Papio claims they already repurchased the said land as their original
contract was a contract of equitable mortgage. SC ruled that it was not an equitable mortgage, it was only
a Contract of Sale, the right to repurchase was not reserved, and Papio admitted the existence of the sale
thus insisting he repurchased the land is incompatible with the defense of equitable mortgage.

DOCTRINES:
 An equitable mortgage is one that, although lacking in some formality, form or words, or other
requisites demanded by a statute, nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to change a
real property as security for a debt and contain nothing impossible or contrary to law.

A contract between the parties is an equitable mortgage if the following requisites are present:
(a) the parties entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale; and
(b) the intention was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage. The decisive factor is the
intention of the parties.

 One repurchases only what one has previously sold. The right to repurchase presupposes a valid
contract of sale between the same parties. By insisting that he had repurchased the property,
respondent thereby admitted that the deed of absolute sale executed by him and petitioner on
April 13, 1982 was, in fact and in law, a deed of absolute sale and not an equitable mortgage.

FACTS:
 Spouses Martin and Lucina Papio were owners of a residential lot located in Makati. In order to
secure a P59,000 loan from Amparo Investments, they executed a real estate mortgage on said
property. Upon Papio’s failure to pay the loan, the corporation filed a petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage.
 Since the couple needed money to prevent the foreclosure, they executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale over the property in favor of Amelia Roberts. Of the P85,000 purchase price, P59,000 was
 paid to Amparo Investments while the P26,000 difference was retained by the spouses. The title
to the property was delivered to Amelia Roberts.
 Thereafter, the parties executed a 2-year contract of lease over the property, with Roberts as
lessor and Papio as lessee. At first, Papio paid his monthly rentals, but stopped paying after 1985.
However, he and his family remained in possession of the property for almost 13 years.
 On 1998, Roberts made a demand on Papio to pay his back rentals, or vacate the property if he
failed to settle the amount. Despite repeated demand, Papio refused to pay and refused to leave
the premises. Hence, Roberts filed a complaint for unlawful detainer before the MeTC of Makati
City.
 Paprio raised the defense that in the original contract of sale, Roberts gave him the right to
redeem the property at any time for a reasonable amount. In fact, on 1985 he remitted to Roberts’
authorized representative, Perlita Ventura, the amount of P250,000 as repurchase price.
Allegedly, Roberts only refused to execute a deed of absolute sale because Ventura
misappropriated the amount of P39,000 from the supposed repurchase price.

Procedural: MeTC ruled in favor of petitioner. RTC affirmed in toto. CA reversed on ground that the Deed
of Absolute Sale entered into by Papio and Roberts is actually an equitable mortgage.

ISSUE (HELD):
1. Whether the contract of sale entered into by Papio and Roberts is actually an equitable mortgage?
(NO)
2. Whether petitioner is entitled to material or de facto possession of the property? (YES)

RATIO:
1. It is a contract of sale. Respondent’s insistent position that he repurchased the property pursuant
to his right to redeem granted by the petitioner is antithetical to an equitable mortgage.
a. An equitable mortgage is one that, although lacking in some formality or other requisite
demanded by a statute nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to change a real
property as security for debt and contain nothing impossible or contrary to law. A contract
between two parties is an equitable mortgage if the following requisites are present:
i. Parties entered into a contract denominated as contract of sale
ii. The intention was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage
b. In contrast, the right to repurchase presupposes a valid contract of sale. By insisting that
he had repurchased the property, Papio actually admits that the deed of absolute sale
executed by him and petitioner was really a contract of sale. Respondent is thus bound
by his admission of petitioner’s ownership of the property and is barred from claiming
otherwise.

2. YES. Respondent failed to prove his claim that he was given a right to repurchase in the original
contract of sale, and that he repurchased the same property for the amount of P250,000.
a. Interpretation of contract: If the terms of a contract is clear and leave no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations should control.
The contract is an absolute sale and not one with right to repurchase.

b. Right to repurchase is not a right granted to the seller by the buyer in a subsequent
document but rather, a right reserved in the same contract of sale. Once a deed of
absolute sale is executed, the seller can no longer reserve the right to repurchase; any
right thereafter granted in a separate document cannot be a right of repurchase but some
 other right. Hence, SC in Ramos v. Icasiano said: an agreement to repurchase becomes a
promise to sell when made after the sale. For when the sale is made without such
agreement, the purchaser acquires the thing sold absolutely, and if he afterwards grants
the vendor the right to repurchase, it is a new contract entered into by the purchaser as
absolute owner. An option to buy or a promise to sell is different and distinct from the
right of repurchase that must be reserved by means of stipulations to that effect in a
contract of sale.

c. Respondent also failed to prove the concurrence of the essential elements of contract.
He failed to prove that the negotiations between him and the petitioner culminated in his
offer to repurchase the property for P250,000, which offer was unconditionally accepted
by the petitioner. A contract of sale is consensual in nature and is perfected upon mere
meeting of the minds. When there is merely an offer by one party without acceptance of
the other, there is no contract. When the contract of sale is not perfected, it cannot, as
an independent source of obligation, serve as binding juridical relation between the
parties.

Disposition: CA decision reversed and set aside. Decision of MeTC, affirmed by RTC, is AFFIRMED.